1956 events in the USSR Hungary. Re-entry of Soviet troops and the Suez crisis

Having assessed the difficult situation in the country, Khrushchev did not dare to use armed force and even made concessions: the Polish leadership was updated, workers' councils were created at enterprises, agricultural cooperatives were dissolved, the former Minister of Defense of Poland, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. K. Rokossovsky and numerous Soviet advisers. Bloodshed was avoided this time. Blood would be shed later, on December 17, 1970, when the same Gomulka gave the order to shoot demonstrators in Gdansk. True, on December 20 he himself will resign and Edward Gierek will become the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP.

Events unfolded in Hungary according to a different scenario.

In Hungary, the influence of the opposition grew rapidly, making itself known more and more loudly. Events in Poland spurred on the Hungarians: if the Poles managed to return Gomulka to power, despite Russian resistance, then why couldn’t they do the same with Imre Nagy?

Soviet armored personnel carrier BTR-40

All this caused a sharp negative assessment by Soviet Ambassador Yu. V. Andropov. The Hungarian leadership’s consent to the return of “old party cadres” to the Politburo was regarded by them as “a serious concession to right-wing and demagogic elements.” M. Suslov and A. Mikoyan were sent to Budapest to analyze the events and evaluate them. Ultimately, Mikoyan persuaded “the best student of Comrade Stalin” M. Rakosi to resign. The Hungarian Workers' Party (HWP) was led by Erne Gere, who was almost no different from his predecessor in ideological and political views.

In September, opposition protests noticeably intensified under the slogans of “more humane socialism” and the restoration of former Prime Minister I. Nagy to the party. Under strong pressure from below, the Hungarian party leadership was forced to announce on October 14 the restoration of Nagy to the VPT. But protest demonstrations continued.

On October 23, tens of thousands of residents of the capital took to the streets, demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops, freedom of the press, a multi-party system, etc. By the evening, the number of demonstrators reached 200 thousand people. The crowd chanted: “Death to Hera!”, “Imre Nagy to the government, Rakosi to the Danube!”

At approximately 8 pm E. Gere spoke on the radio. His speech was replete with attacks against the demonstrators - they say that this demonstration is “nationalist” and “counter-revolutionary”. He demanded that the riots stop and everyone go home. But with this speech, Gere only added fuel to the fire: at night, groups of radical youth looted a number of weapons warehouses. A small army unit with two tanks went over to the side of the already armed demonstrators. With their support, demonstrators seized the building of the national radio center, where the secret police were forced to open fire with their service pistols. The rebels already had machine guns and machine guns (two tanks have already been mentioned). The rebels smashed the giant statue of Stalin into small pieces. The first dead and wounded appeared, the demonstration quickly grew into an uprising!

The distinctive features of the Hungarian events were the radicalism and intransigence of their participants. A real armed uprising took place in Hungary against the Soviet Union and its supporters. The streets were filled with blood, sometimes of completely innocent victims, as, for example, during the mass lynching of Hungarian party activists and secret police recruits on Republic Square by an angry crowd - 28 people became victims of “people's” lynching, of which 26 were Hungarian state security officers. The Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy, who returned to power, managed in the few days allotted to him by fate, history and the Kremlin to hand over to the Soviet Ambassador Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov a statement on Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and its neutrality and to radio the whole world about the war between the Hungarians and the Russians.

The uprising did not come as a surprise to the military - given the difficult political situation in the country, already in July 1956, by order of Moscow, the corps command developed the “Action Plan for Soviet Troops to Maintain and Restore Public Order in Hungary.” After the plan was approved by the commander of the Special Corps, it received the name “Compass”.

Armored car BA-64, created during the Great Patriotic War. It remained in service with the Soviet Army for a long time.

The restoration of order in Budapest according to this plan was entrusted to the 2nd Guards Mechanized Division, Lieutenant General S. Lebedev. The 17th Guards Mechanized Division, Major General A. Krivosheev, was supposed to cover the border with Austria with its main forces. Particularly discussed were the cases when it was allowed to use lethal weapons. No other activities or special training were carried out for Soviet units.

Western countries actively helped the Hungarians in preparing the rebellion: on July 18, the United States allocated more than $100 million for the preparation of the putsch, Radio Free Europe intensively inspired: NATO countries would come to the rescue, in Upper Bavaria, near Traunstein, Hungarian saboteurs (who fled in 1945) were preparing . to the west are Hortis and Salashists). In October 1956, a group of Hungarian Germans arrived there, many of whom had previously served in the SS. From them, cohesive core groups of rebel detachments were formed, which were then transported by plane to Austria, and from there, by ambulance planes and vehicles, to Hungary.

In Munich, on Lockerstrasse, there was a recruiting center headed by an American army captain. From here, former Nazi supporters headed to the scene of events. On October 27, one of the groups (about 30 people) was transferred to Hungary with the help of border guards from neutral Austria. More than 500 “freedom fighters” were transferred from England. Several dozen groups were sent from Fontainebleau, France, where NATO headquarters was then located.

T-34 on the street of Budapest

So, as already mentioned, on October 23, tens of thousands of people took to the streets of Budapest, demanding free elections and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country. In the evening, a telephone rang in the office of Lieutenant General P. N. Lashchenko. The Soviet Ambassador Yu. V. Andropov called:

Can you send troops to eliminate unrest in the capital?

In my opinion, the Hungarian police, state security agencies and the Hungarian army should restore order in Budapest. It is not within my competence, and it is undesirable to involve Soviet troops in carrying out such tasks. In addition, such actions require a corresponding order from the Minister of Defense.

Despite the obvious reluctance of the army authorities to interfere in the internal Hungarian conflict, Andropov and Gere that same evening, by telephone through the Moscow party leaders who had gathered for an emergency meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, achieved a decision to put units of the Special Corps on combat readiness.

After the start of shooting and fighting on the streets of Budapest, the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky, at 11 pm on October 23, gave the order to move Soviet troops to Budapest. Imre Nagy himself did not object to this decision. A similar action was supported by Mao Zedong, Joseph Broz Tito and Palmiro Togliatti. The corps commander, General Lashchenko, went to the capital to lead the troops, accompanied by security. On one of the streets of Buda, the rebels burned down a radio station in a car and killed the radio operator. Approaching Soviet tanks saved the other crew members.

On the city streets, Soviet soldiers were met by barricades hastily erected by the rebels. The troops were fired from the windows of houses and from the roofs. The rebels skillfully used close combat anti-tank weapons and the peculiarities of urban planning. Strong pockets of resistance were created in the city center, which were defended by rebel detachments numbering up to 300 people. every.

The first to enter the battle on the streets of Budapest in the early morning of October 24 was the 2nd Guards Mechanized Nikolaev-Budapest Division of Major General S.V. Lebedev, having lost four tanks and four armored personnel carriers during the day of fierce fighting.

The BTR-152 armored personnel carriers, which did not have an armored roof, burned like candles: any grenade or Molotov cocktail thrown from the upper floors of the buildings turned them into a flaming steel grave for the entire crew and troops.

The current situation required clarification of the Compass plan, since there was no need to count on the help of the Hungarian army and police. As it became known later, out of 26 thousand people. 12 thousand personnel of the Hungarian People's Army (HPA) supported the rebels. In Budapest itself alone there were about 7 thousand Hungarian military personnel and up to 50 tanks. In addition, there were several dozen self-propelled artillery units (SAU), anti-tank guns, mounted and hand grenade launchers. The passages between the houses were mined and blocked with barricades.

The rebellion turned out to be well prepared; a lot of weapons fell into the hands of its participants. It was the saboteurs mentioned above who seized radio stations and the Danuvia and Lampadyar weapons factories on the night of October 24. The International Red Cross Hospital in Budapest was headed by former SS man Otto Frank.

The Hungarian Revolution began with a carnival, but too quickly turned into a bloodbath. The intervention of Soviet tanks politically turned its course: the civil war turned into a war with the Soviet Army, its main slogan now became “Soviets, go home!”

There were already up to three thousand armed rebels operating on the streets of the Hungarian capital. About 8 thousand people were released from prison, most of whom were ordinary criminals.

The approaching units - the 37th Guards Tank Nikopol Red Banner Order of Suvorov Regiment of Colonel Bichan, the 5th Guards Mechanized Regiment of Colonel Pilipenko, the 6th Guards Mechanized Regiment of Colonel Mayakov and the 87th Guards Heavy Tank-Self-Propelled Brest Regiment of Nikovsky - immediately entered fight.

The number of Soviet troops that entered Budapest did not exceed one division: about 6 thousand people, 290 tanks,

Some units of the Hungarian People's Army went over to the side of the rebels

120 armored personnel carriers and 156 guns. These forces were clearly not enough to restore order in a huge city of two million.

Units of the Hungarian People's Army that remained loyal to the previous government also entered the battle - until October 28, in 40 cities of the country, Hungarian units used weapons against their compatriots. According to Hungarian data, about a thousand people died, Hungary was on the verge of civil war.

Four divisions of the 3rd VNA Rifle Corps arrived in the capital and began fighting against the rebels. The grouping of Soviet troops in the Hungarian capital was also constantly increasing. On the same day, October 24, armored vehicles of the 83rd Tank and 57th Guards Mechanized Regiments of the 17th Guards Yenakievo-Danube Mechanized Division entered the city.

At noon on October 24, Hungarian radio announced the introduction of a state of emergency in Budapest and the establishment of a curfew. The cases of participants in the uprising were to be considered by specially created military courts. Imre Nagy declared martial law in the country, trying to bring the anarchy of the revolution into the mainstream of law and order. Alas, it was already too late - events that had been held back for too long, as if catching up for lost time, developed spontaneously and uncontrollably.

During the day of fierce fighting, about 300 rebels were captured. Soviet tanks took control of strategic targets in Budapest and bridges across the Danube.

On October 25, M. Suslov and A. Mikoyan met with I. Nady. By October 28, an agreement was reached to overcome the crisis by peaceful means, but the entire course of subsequent events in the capital and the country changed the agreements reached.

In the following days the fighting continued. The tankers had a hard time on narrow streets among a hostile population. Schoolchildren, who at first did not pay attention to them, approached the tanks parked at intersections, took bottles of gasoline from their briefcases and set fire to the combat vehicles. There was constant shooting from the windows at soldiers who had abandoned their tanks and shelters. There was danger everywhere. Every day, transport planes took the wounded and the bodies of the dead to the Union.

PTRS-41 is another fairly effective anti-tank weapon. Simonov's anti-tank rifle had a 5-round magazine and automatic reloading

By October 28, virtually all power in Hungary was in the hands of the Revolutionary Military Council, led by generals Kanna, Kovacs and Colonel Maletera. They proclaimed Imre Nagy the official leader of the uprising. On the same day, Hungarian troops receive an order from their government not to participate in hostilities. The assault on the center of the capital planned for that day by the joint efforts of Soviet and Hungarian units never took place.

At the request of Imre Nagy's government, Soviet troops were withdrawn from Budapest at the end of October. On October 30, Suslov and Mikoyan brought from Moscow the Declaration of the Soviet government on equality and non-interference in relations between socialist countries. The next day, Soviet units began to leave Budapest, and Imre Nagy announced on the radio the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

On November 1, the Hungarian government, in connection with the transfer of additional eight divisions to the territory of Hungary by the Soviet command, announced its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, the neutrality of the country and the need to withdraw Soviet units and units outside the country. Such a development of events was not expected either in Moscow or in the capitals of other socialist states.

At the same time, 87-year-old Admiral Horthy, who was in Portugal, offered himself as the ruler of Hungary, and in Montreal, Canada, there was a demonstration of Hungarian emigrants shouting: “Hitler is coming back!” We are freedom fighters!”

In October 1956, the “fighters for democracy and freedom,” brutalized by blood and impunity, hanged them, trampled their victims underfoot, gouged out their eyes and cut off their ears with scissors. On Moscow Square in Budapest, they hung 30 people by their feet, doused them with gasoline and burned them alive.

Nevertheless, the withdrawal of Soviet troops began, but it was only a smoke screen. The grouping of troops in Hungary and in neighboring territories continued to increase - the danger of the Hungarian example for other socialist countries of Eastern Europe was too great. The Soviet leadership decided to put out the flaring fire as quickly as possible.

Soviet units withdrawn 15–20 km from the capital were putting equipment and weapons in order, replenishing fuel and food supplies. The Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, received instructions from the Party Central Committee to develop “an appropriate action plan related to the events in Hungary.” This was the last combat operation that Zhukov had to carry out.

The Degtyarev light machine gun (RPD), created back in 1944, was actively used by both sides

N. S. Khrushchev and G. K. Zhukov: one of the last “peaceful” conversations

To N. S. Khrushchev’s question about how long it would take the Soviet troops to restore order in the People’s Republic of China, Zhukov replied: “Three days.” It took, of course, more, but the operation had already received the code name “Whirlwind.” The leadership of Soviet troops in Hungary was entrusted to the Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states, Marshal I. S. Konev.

Troops were raised on alarm in the border military districts. Units of the 38th Army of General X. Mamsurov and the 8th Mechanized Army of General A. Babajanyan from the Carpathian Military District were urgently sent to help the Special Corps, including the 31st Tank, 11, 13 (39), 32nd Guards , 27th mechanized division.

Li-2 - began its service in the United States before World War II. For a long time it was the best Soviet military transport aircraft

Units sent to Hungary received new T-54 tanks and other military equipment. A white vertical stripe was applied to the tank turrets to identify “friend or foe.” The 33rd Guards Mechanized Division, Major General E.I. Obaturov, arrived from the Separate Mechanized Army stationed in Romania. The 35th Guards Mechanized Division was transferred from the Odessa Military District.

Thousands of tanks, self-propelled guns, and armored personnel carriers walked along the roads of Hungary. Not since World War II have Hungarians seen so much military equipment and soldiers. The ring of Soviet troops tightened around the center of the armed uprising - Budapest. USSR Defense Minister Marshal Zhukov reported daily to the party leadership on the progress of the fighting on Hungarian soil.

T-34–85 with identification stripe, slightly damaged

By this time, the new government of Hungary, headed by Imre Nagy, announced the neutral status of the country, and even appealed to the UN with a request to protect its sovereignty. These actions of the Hungarian authorities finally decided their fate. The Soviet leadership gave the order for the armed suppression of the “rebellion.” To hide preparations for a military action, Soviet representatives entered into negotiations on the withdrawal of troops. Naturally, no one was going to do this, they just needed to gain time.

On November 2, Janos Kadar was brought to Moscow, who agreed to head the new government after the suppression of the rebellion, although recently, in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador Yu. V. Andropov, he stated: “I am a Hungarian, and if necessary, I will fight our tanks with my bare hands "

T-54 - the newest tank of that time

But the rebels did not waste time. A defensive belt was created around the capital, reinforced with hundreds of anti-aircraft guns. Outposts with tanks and artillery appeared in settlements adjacent to the city. The most important objects of the cities were occupied by armed detachments, the total number of which reached 50 thousand people. There were already about 100 tanks in the hands of the rebels.

Particularly brutal battles broke out in Hungary in November 1956. After strengthening the group and careful preparation, on November 4 at 6 a.m., at the signal “Thunder,” Operation Whirlwind began. The Soviet command, completing preparations for the operation, sought to misinform and, if possible, behead the Hungarian leadership. When the troops were already completing the final preparations for the assault on Budapest, Army General M. S. Malinin negotiated with the Hungarian delegation on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country. The delegation was led by Pal Maleter, who had already received the rank of lieutenant general. And on November 3, the chairman of the KGB of the USSR and his group, during negotiations, arrested a delegation of the Hungarian government, which included the “new” Minister of Defense Pal Maleter, Chief of the General Staff Such and other officers. A military tribunal awaited them ahead, which did not promise anything good.

The main task of “neutralizing” the enemy was still carried out by units of the Special Corps. The 2nd Guards Mechanized Division was to take control of the northeastern and central parts of Budapest, the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division was to enter the city from the southeast, and the 128th Guards Rifle Division was to establish control over the western part of the city.

Soviet tank and mechanized units had to go into battle on the move, without thorough reconnaissance and organization of interaction with the infantry. To capture the most important objects, commanders created one or two special forward detachments in the division as part of an infantry battalion with attached paratroopers and 10–12 tanks. In a number of cases, assault groups were created. To suppress pockets of resistance, troops were forced to use artillery and use tanks as mobile fire weapons. The assault groups used flamethrowers, smoke grenades and sabers. In cases where the massive use of artillery did not produce positive results, surprise night attacks were carried out.

It can be said that the tactics of the combined arms units of the Soviet Army were based on the virtually universal experience of the Great Patriotic War.

The German MP-40 submachine gun again proved to be an excellent weapon in urban battles

By 7 o'clock in the morning on November 4, the main forces of the 2nd, 33rd Guards Mechanized and 128th Guards Rifle Divisions (about 30,000 people) rushed into Budapest, capturing the bridges over the Danube, the Budaers airfield, and capturing about 100 tanks, 15 guns, 22 aircraft. Paratroopers from the 7th and 31st Guards Airborne Divisions also fought in the city.

Tanks, using cannon fire and ramming, made passages in the barricades built on city streets, opening the way for infantry and paratroopers. The scale of the fighting is indicated by the following fact: on November 5, units of the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division, after an artillery raid, began an assault on the resistance center in the Corvin cinema, in which about 170 guns and mortars from 11 artillery divisions took part. From three sides, several dozen tanks shot at the surviving firing points, suppressing the last pockets of rebel resistance. By evening, the 71st Guards Tank Regiment of Colonel Litovtsev and the 104th Guards Mechanized Regiment of Colonel Yanbakhtin captured the city quarter.

At the same time, our units attacked rebel positions near Moscow Square. It was not possible to immediately capture the positions near the square, the Royal Fortress and the quarters adjacent to Mount Gellert from the south, but here one of the rebel leaders, General Istvan Kovacs, was captured. Fighting continued in this area in the following days. The assault groups used flamethrowers, smoke and incendiary charges.

Stubborn battles took place for the Royal Fortress and for the former palace of the dictator Horthy. More than a thousand rebels skillfully used engineering communications and underground walls of the fortress. We had to use heavy tanks and concrete-piercing shells. On November 7, Soviet units took another node of resistance - Mount Gellert.

The suppression of the rebellion also took place outside Budapest. From November 4 to 6, units of the 8th Mechanized Army disarmed 32 Hungarian garrisons, suppressing armed resistance in Derbrecen, Miskolc, Szolnok, Kecskemét, etc. The troops of generals Babajanyan and Mamsurov took control of airfields and main roads, and the Austro-Hungarian border was blocked.

"Faustpatron" (Panzerfaust) - the most formidable anti-tank melee weapon of the period of the end of World War II was again used by the rebels

On November 8, over the island of Csepel, where several military factories were located and the production of anti-tank “faustpatrons” was established, the Hungarians manage to shoot down an Il-28R from the 880th Guards Regiment of the 177th Guards Bomber Air Division. The entire crew of the reconnaissance aircraft was killed: squadron commander Captain A. Bobrovsky, squadron navigator Captain D. Karmishin, squadron communications chief Lieutenant V. Yartsev. Each crew member was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The fact that during the assault on the island, Soviet troops lost only three tanks is the undoubted merit of the heroic crew - the losses could have been much greater.

Small armed groups that remained after the defeat of the main detachments no longer sought to hold individual buildings and positions, but, acting from ambushes, retreated first to the outskirts of populated areas and then into forests.

By November 11, the armed resistance of the rebels was broken throughout Hungary. Having stopped the open struggle, the remnants of the rebel groups went into the forests with the aim of creating partisan detachments, but a few days later, after a continuous combing of the area, in which Hungarian officer regiments took part, they were finally liquidated.

Coaxial MG-42 anti-aircraft machine gun on an anti-aircraft mount. With the help of such a “spark”, an Il-28R was shot down

The Il-28R reconnaissance plane descended too low and was shot down. The crew died

During the fighting, Soviet troops lost 669 people killed. (according to other sources - 720 people), 1540 were wounded, 51 people went missing. Units of the 7th and 31st Guards Airborne Divisions lost 85 people killed. and 12 people - missing.

A large amount of equipment was shot down and damaged, so the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division alone lost 14 tanks and self-propelled guns, 9 armored personnel carriers, 13 guns, 4 BM-13 installations, 31 cars and 5 motorcycles.

The 9-mm Makarov pistol (PM) has been in service with the Soviet Army and a number of Warsaw Pact allies since 1951.

During the period of fighting and after its end, a large number of weapons were confiscated from the Hungarian armed groups and the population: about 30 thousand rifles and carbines, 11.5 thousand machine guns, about 2 thousand machine guns, 1350 pistols, 62 guns (of which 47 anti-aircraft). According to official Budapest, from October 23 to January 1957, that is, until the clashes between the rebels and Hungarian and Soviet troops stopped, 2,502 people died. and 19,226 were injured. About 2 thousand people died in Budapest alone. and over 12 thousand were wounded. About 200 thousand people. left Hungary.

When the fighting ended, investigative actions began to be taken against those individuals who were suspected of participating in the uprising. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Hungary, Imre Nagy, asked for political asylum from Yugoslavia. Tito refused to hand over the rebellious prime minister for almost a month, but eventually relented, and on November 22, 1956, I. Nagy, accompanied by two employees of the Yugoslav embassy, boarded a bus and headed to his home.

When the car drove past the headquarters of the Soviet command, a tank blocked its way, the Yugoslavs were thrown out of the bus, and Imre Nagy was arrested. Two years later he was convicted and executed “for treason.” Although it should be noted that N. Khrushchev advised J. Kadar to handle the case of the former Hungarian leader with “soft mittens” - put him in prison for 5-6 years, and then get him a job as a teacher at some institute in the provinces. But Janos Kadar did not listen to the “patron”: Imre Nagy and his six main associates were executed by hanging. There were 22 thousand trials, another 400 people. were sentenced to death and 20 thousand were expelled from the country.

The attempt to “democratize” Hungarian society from below ended in failure. After the suppression of the rebellion on the territory of Hungary, the Southern Group of Forces was formed, which included the 21st Poltava and 19th Nikolaev-Budapest Guards Tank Divisions.

J. Kadar ruled Hungary for more than 30 years. But he did not build the socialism that developed on the territory of the Soviet Union. Kadar constantly emphasized that socialism is a distant prospect and there is no need to rush. In Hungary, he introduced alternative elections (several candidates for one seat), partial liberalization of prices, and economic levers for managing enterprises. A program for the development of commercial banks, joint stock companies and stock exchanges was implemented, the Hungarian economy remained multi-structured - state, cooperative and private enterprises competed with each other in the market. As a remark, it can be noted that the “father” of Hungarian economic reforms, R. Njersz, at one time passed on the experience of Hungarian reforms to China, which to this day gives the PRC stability of development and a positive effect.

After the liquidation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (read socialist camp) and, accordingly, its military component (Warsaw Pact Organization), Hungary quickly chose a pro-Western orientation, and by 1999 it became a full member of the military organization of the West during the implementation of the NATO Eastward Expansion program "

However, at present there is a certain revival of contacts between Hungary and Russia in the military-technical sphere. It is proposed to replace outdated Hungarian armored vehicles with Russian armored personnel carriers, and supplies of Russian tanks are expected. There has been a noticeable increase in the supply of spare parts for various types of Russian-made military equipment and weapons, which are mainly equipped with the Hungarian army.

Notes:

15 developing countries have ballistic missiles in service, and another 10 are developing their own. Research in the field of chemical and bacteriological weapons continues in 20 countries.

Quote from: Russia (USSR) in local wars and military conflicts of the second half of the 20th century. - M., 2000. P.58.

The engineering structure itself, which bore this name and included a high wall of reinforced concrete slabs, was installed in August 1961 and existed until 1990.

50 Jahre das Beste vom Stern. 1998, no. 9. S. 12.

The secrecy has been removed... - M.: VI, 1989. P. 397.

OPERATION VORTEX

In 1956, Khrushchev’s famous report was made at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. As usual, for Soviet citizens, except for verified party members, he remained unknown and secret. Western intelligence services quickly obtained the text of the report and published it in the press. For the first time, the crimes of the Stalinist regime were spoken openly (in the West!), and the Khrushchev “thaw” began in the country. The chairs swayed under the Eastern European “Stalins”. Tens of millions of people, from the Elbe to the Bug, were waiting for change.

In Poland, workers, without waiting for changes from above, took to the streets demanding reforms. The authorities responded with bullets - on June 28, 1956 in Poznan, during the dispersal of a workers' demonstration, 73 people were killed and more than 300 were injured. But rallies and marches under anti-Stalin and anti-Soviet slogans continued. On October 19, Khrushchev went to Warsaw for a plenum of the Polish Central Committee, at the same time ordering the Soviet tank units stationed in Poland to begin advancing towards the capital.

The Polish plenum at this time elected Władysław Gomulka, recently released from prison and just rehabilitated, as the first secretary of the Central Committee of the PUWP. Early in the morning of October 19, a Soviet plane landed without warning at a military airfield near the Polish capital, from which Khrushchev, Molotov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich and Marshal Konev got out. They met with Polish leaders in the Warsaw Belvedere.

Traitors! - Khrushchev yelled at them straight away. - We shed blood for the liberation of your country, and you, in agreement with the Zionists, want to give it to the Americans. But you won't succeed! This won't happen! We won't allow...

At this time, he noticed a man unfamiliar to him among the Poles:

Who are you?

I am the same Gomulka whom you kept in prison for three years. And now you are preventing a return to political life.

This is how the first acquaintance of the leaders of Poland and. Meanwhile, the Soviet tank division was already approaching the Polish capital, and when the arguments against the Poles were exhausted, Khrushchev hinted that the issue, in this case, could be resolved by the army. Gomulka took this option into account and informed Khrushchev that students and workers of Warsaw factories were already armed. Khrushchev had no choice but to give the order to the troops to suspend the attack on Warsaw.

Having assessed the difficult situation in the country with its pronounced anti-Soviet orientation, Khrushchev did not dare to use armed force and even made concessions: the Polish leadership was updated, workers' councils were created at enterprises, collective farms were dissolved, the former Minister of Defense of Poland, Marshal Rokossovsky, and numerous councils went to their homeland -nicknames. Bloodshed was avoided.

Events unfolded in Hungary according to a different scenario. Here the Hungarian leader Rakosi, who received power from the hands of Stalin, and his comrade-in-arms Gepe, who diligently carried out orders from Moscow and destroyed all those suspected of sedition, under the influence of new winds from the east, flew out of their posts. But the cosmetic repairs undertaken by Moscow superintendents did not help. In Hungary, the influence of the opposition grew rapidly, making itself known more and more loudly.

Events in Poland spurred on the Hungarians: if the Poles managed to return Gomulka to power, despite Russian resistance, then why couldn’t they do the same with Imre Nagy? The distinctive features of the Hungarian events were radicalism, intransigence and an armed, brutal character.

In Hungary, a real armed uprising took place against the Soviet Union and its native puppets: the streets were filled with blood, sometimes completely innocent, as, for example, during the mass lynching of party activists and secret police recruits on Republic Square by an angry mob, and the Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy managed to pressure, in the few days allotted to him by fate, history and the Kremlin, to hand over to the Soviet Ambassador Andropov a statement about Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and its neutrality and to report by radio to the whole world about the war between the Hungarians and the Russians.

On the territory of the country during this period there were units of the Special Corps of Soviet Forces (the corps headquarters was located in Szekesfehérvár, it was commanded by Lieutenant General P.N. Lashchenko) - the 2nd and 17th Guards Mechanized Divisions, which were delayed on the way home from Austria after liquidation of the Central Group of Forces in 1955. The uprising did not come as a surprise - given the difficult political situation in the country, the corps command already in July 1956, by order of Moscow, developed an “Action Plan for Soviet Troops to Maintain and Restore Public Order in Hungary.”

On October 23, tens of thousands of people took to the streets of Budapest, trying Stalinist socialism and demanding free elections and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country. In the evening, a telephone rang in General Lashchenko’s office. The Soviet Ambassador Yu.V. called. Andropov:

Can you send troops to eliminate unrest in the capital?

In my opinion, the Hungarian police, state security agencies and the Hungarian army should restore order in Budapest. It is not within my competence and it is undesirable to involve Soviet troops in carrying out such tasks. In addition, such actions require a corresponding order from the Minister of Defense.

Despite the obvious reluctance of the army authorities to intervene in the internal Hungarian conflict, Andropov, through the Moscow party leaders, achieved an order from the General Staff to be sent to Budapest to put units of the Special Corps on combat readiness.

On the evening of October 23, the first shots were fired in the city. An armed uprising began, its scale significantly surpassing the unrest in the GDR.

After the shooting and fighting began on the streets of Budapest, the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal V.D. At eleven o'clock in the evening on October 23, Sokolovsky gave the order to move Soviet troops to Budapest. The corps commander, General Lashchenko, went to the capital to lead the troops, accompanied by security. On one of the streets of Buda, the rebels burned down a radio station in a car and killed the radio operator. Approaching Soviet tanks saved the other crew members.

On the city streets, Soviet soldiers were met by barricades hastily erected by the rebels. The troops were fired from the windows of houses and from the roofs. The first to enter the battle on the streets of Budapest in the early morning of October 24 was the 2nd Guards Mechanized Nikolaev-Budapest Division of Major General S.V. Lebedev, having lost four tanks and four armored personnel carriers in a day of fierce fighting. The BTR-152 armored personnel carriers, which did not have an armored roof, burned like candles - any grenade or Molotov cocktail turned them into a flaming steel grave for the entire crew and troops.

The Hungarian Revolution began with a carnival, but too quickly turned into a bloodbath. The intervention of Soviet tanks politically redirected its course: the civil war turned into a war of liberation against the occupiers, its main slogan now became “The Soviets go home!”, The Hungarian army began to go over to the side of the rebels.

The grouping of Soviet troops in the Hungarian capital was constantly increasing. On the same day, October 24, armored vehicles of the 83rd Tank and 57th Guards Mechanized Regiments of the 17th Guards Yenakievo-Danube Mechanized Division entered the city.

During the day of fierce fighting, about 300 rebels were captured. Soviet tanks took control of strategic targets in Budapest and bridges over the Danube. A state of emergency was declared and a curfew was established. By the evening of the first day of fighting, about 6,000 soldiers and officers, 290 tanks, 120 armored personnel carriers and 156 guns of the Special Corps were operating on the streets of Budapest. They were confronted by about 3,000 rebels.

At the request of the government of Imre Nagy, which took power into its own hands, at the end of October, Soviet troops were withdrawn from Budapest. On October 30, Suslov and Mikoyan brought from Moscow the Declaration of the Soviet government on equality and non-interference in relations between socialist countries. The next day, Imre Nagy announced on the radio the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

But this was just a smokescreen - the group of troops in Hungary continued to build up - the danger of the Hungarian example for other socialist countries in Europe was too great. It was necessary to put out the fire that was flaring up in the center of Europe as quickly as possible. Therefore, troops in the border military districts were on alert. Units of the 38th Army of General X. Mamsurov and the 8th Mechanized Army of General A. Babajanyan from the Carpathian Military District were urgently sent to help the Special Corps, including the 31st Tank, 11th, 13th (39th ), 32nd Guards, 27th Mechanized Divisions.

Units sent to Hungary received new T-54 tanks and other military equipment. The 33rd Guards Mechanized Division, Major General G.I., arrived from the Separate Mechanized Army stationed in Romania. Obaturova. The 35th Guards Mechanized Division was transferred from the Odessa Military District.

Thousands of tanks, self-propelled guns, and armored personnel carriers walked along the roads of Hungary. Since the Second World War, Hungarians have not seen such a quantity of military equipment and foreign soldiers. The ring of Soviet troops tightened around the center of the armed uprising - Budapest. USSR Defense Minister Marshal Zhukov reported daily to the party leadership on the progress of the fighting on Hungarian soil.

By this time, the new government of Hungary, led by Imre Nagy, announced its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact Organization, the country's neutral status and demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country, while simultaneously appealing to the UN for the protection of sovereignty. These actions of the Hungarian authorities finally decided their fate. The Soviet leadership gave the order for the armed suppression of the “rebellion.” To hide preparations for a military action, Soviet representatives entered into negotiations on the withdrawal of troops. Naturally, no one was going to do this; they just needed to gain time.

Particularly brutal fighting took place in Hungary in November 1956. After strengthening the group and careful preparation, on November 4 at 6 a.m., Operation Whirlwind began to restore order in Hungary. It was personally led by the Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact states, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S., who urgently arrived in Hungary on November 1. Konev.

The Soviet command, completing preparations for Operation Whirlwind, sought to misinform and, if possible, behead the Hungarian leadership. When the troops were already completing the final preparations for the assault on Budapest, Army General M.S. Malinin negotiated with the Hungarian delegation on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country. In violation of all agreements, on November 3, the chairman of the USSR KGB and his group during negotiations arrested a delegation of the Hungarian government, which included Minister of Defense Pal Maleter, Chief of the General Staff Such and other officers. The Hungarians were deeply shocked by Soviet treachery. A military tribunal awaited them ahead, which did not promise anything good.

The main role in the street battles in Budapest was played by the 33rd Kherson Red Banner, twice Order of Suvorov, Guards Mechanized Division, reinforced by the 100th Tank Regiment of the 31st Tank Division and the 128th Self-Propelled Tank Regiment of the 66th Guards Rifle Division. It was commanded by General Obaturov. By 7 o'clock in the morning on November 4, the main forces of the 2nd, 33rd Guards Mechanized and 128th Guards Rifle Divisions (about 30,000 people) rushed into Budapest, capturing the bridges over the Danube and the Budaers airfield in a day, capturing about 100 tanks, 15 guns, 22 aircraft. Paratroopers from the 7th and 31st Guards Airborne Divisions also fought in the city.

Tanks, using cannon fire and ramming, made passages in the barricades built on city streets, opening the way for infantry and paratroopers.

The scale of the fighting is indicated by the following fact: on November 5, units of the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division began an assault on the resistance center in Korvin Lane after an artillery raid, in which about 170 guns and mortars from 11 artillery divisions took part. From three sides, several dozen tanks shot at the surviving firing points, suppressing the last pockets of rebel resistance. By evening, the 71st Guards Tank Regiment of Colonel Litovtsev and the 104th Guards Mechanized Regiment of Colonel Yanbakhtin took possession of the ruins of the former city quarter. Fighting continued in the following days. The assault groups used flamethrowers and incendiary charges, literally burning out the counter-revolution in the capital of Hungary.

By November 11, the armed resistance of the rebels was broken throughout Hungary. During the fighting, Soviet troops lost 669 people killed, 51 people went missing. In these battles, the 33rd Guards Mechanized Division lost 14 tanks and self-propelled guns, 9 armored personnel carriers, 13 guns, 4 BM-13 installations, 31 cars and 5 motorcycles. In Budapest alone, about 2,000 people died and over 12,000 were injured. About 200 thousand people left Hungary.

When the fighting ended, proceedings began with everyone who was suspected of participating in the uprising. At the same time, Soviet representatives behaved as if they were on the territory of a defeated and occupied country. By order of Serov, more than a thousand arrested Hungarians were loaded into railway cars and sent to the Soviet Union. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Hungary, Imre Nagy, who asked for political asylum at the Yugoslav embassy, was arrested there by the Soviet military authorities, and two years later he was shot “for treason.”

The attempt to democratize Hungarian society ended in complete failure. After the suppression of the rebellion on the territory of Hungary, the Southern Group of Forces was formed, which included the 21st Poltava and 19th Nikolaev-Budapest Guards Tank Divisions. Many years after these events, the former chief of staff of the Special Corps, a direct participant in the events described, General Malashenko admitted: “Support for the Gepe political regime, the initial reliance on a forceful solution to the crisis that arose led to the erroneous decision to send our troops to Budapest, which caused increased resistance , subsequently required the introduction of significant forces of Soviet troops into Hungary. All this was direct interference of the USSR in the internal affairs of a sovereign state and contradicted the norms of international law.”

(Based on materials from E.I. Malashenko “Special Corps on Fire in Budapest.” Military History Magazine, 1993)

Events in Hungary in 1956 led to a large-scale revolt, which the Soviet army was brought in to suppress. The Hungarian Autumn became one of the largest regional conflicts of the Cold War, in which the intelligence services of both the USSR and the USA took part. Today we will try to understand the events of those days, and also try to understand the reasons.

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Role of Yugoslavia

The beginning of events should be dated back to 1948, when relations between Stalin and Tito (leader of Yugoslavia) finally deteriorated. The reason is that Tito demanded complete political independence. As a result, countries began to prepare for a possible war, and the Soviet command was developing a plan to enter the war from the territory of Hungary.

In May 1956, Yuri Andropov received information (he immediately forwarded it to Moscow) that Yugoslav agents and intelligence were actively working against the USSR in Hungary.

The Yugoslav Embassy played a significant role against the Soviet Union and the current Hungarian government.
Dmitry Kapranov, cryptographer of the Special Corps of the USSR Army in Hungary

If back in 1948 there was a confrontation between Tito and Stalin, then in 1953 Stalin passed away and Tito began to aim for the role of leader of the Soviet bloc. Behind him was a very strong army of Yugoslavia, military assistance agreements with NATO and economic assistance agreements with the United States. Realizing this, in the summer of 1956, Khrushchev traveled to Belgrade, where Marshal Tito set the following conditions for normalizing relations between the countries:

Yugoslavia pursues an independent policy.
Yugoslavia continues its partnership with the US and NATO.
The USSR stops criticizing the Tito regime.

Formally, this is where the disagreement ended.

The role of the Hungarian communists

The peculiarity of the development of post-war Hungary is the complete copying of the USSR, starting in 1948. This copying was so stupid and widespread that it applied to literally everything: from the economic model to the uniform of soldiers in the army. Moreover, the Hungarian communists began to carry out absolutely extreme measures (this is generally a characteristic feature of communists at the beginning of their rule) - mass Russification: flag, coat of arms, language, and so on. This is what, for example, the coat of arms of the Hungarian People's Republic (Hungarian People's Republic) looked like in 1956.

Of course, the coat of arms, flag, language, and clothing in themselves did not cause discontent, but all together they significantly damaged the pride of the Hungarians. Moreover, the problem was worsened by economic reasons. Rakosi's party simply copied the USSR model of economic development, completely ignoring the peculiarities of Hungary. As a result, the post-war economic crisis is becoming stronger every year. Only constant financial assistance from the USSR saves us from economic chaos and collapse.

In fact, in the period 1950-1956 in Hungary there was a struggle between the communists: Rakosi against Nagy. Moreover, Imre Nagy was much more popular.

Nuclear horse-drawn horse and its role

In June 1950, the United States knew for certain that the USSR had an atomic bomb, but very little uranium. Based on this information, US President Truman issues directive NSC-68, demanding to cause and support unrest in the satellite countries of the USSR. Countries identified:

German Democratic Republic.
Hungarian People's Republic.
Czechoslovakia.

What do these countries have in common? There are two such features: firstly, they were geographically located on the border of the western zone of influence; secondly, all three countries had fairly large uranium mines. Therefore, destabilization and separation of these countries from Soviet patronage is the US plan to curb the nuclear development of the USSR.

US role

The active stage of work on creating a rebellion began after March 5, 1953 (the date of Stalin’s death). Already in June, the CIA approved the “Day X” plan, according to which uprisings began in a number of large cities of the GDR and in the city of Ger (uranium mines). The plan failed, and the uprising was very quickly suppressed, but this was only a preparation for more “grand” events.

The National Security Council (NSC) of the United States adopts Directive No. 158 on June 29, 1953. This document was declassified quite recently and its main meaning is the following - to support resistance to communism by all means so that no one doubts the spontaneity of these actions. The second important order under this directive is to organize, supply with everything necessary and train underground organizations capable of conducting long-term military operations. These are 2 directions that were reflected in the events in Hungary in 1956, and which are still in effect today. Suffice it to recall the recent events in Kyiv.

An important detail: in the summer of 1956, Eisenhower made a statement that the post-war division of the world was no longer relevant, and it needed to be divided in a new way.

Operations Focus and Prospero

"Focus" and "Prospero" are secret operations of the American intelligence agencies during the Cold War. In many ways, it was these operations that gave birth to Hungary 1956. These operations were aimed at Poland and Hungary with the goal of turning the local population against the USSR and providing the local population with everything they needed to fight for “independence.”

In May 1956, a new radio station (Radio Free Europe) began operating near Munich, aimed exclusively at Hungary. The radio station was financed by the CIA and continuously broadcast to Hungary, conveying the following things:

America is the most powerful country in the world in all components.
Communism is the worst form of government, which is the source of all troubles. Therefore, it is the source of the USSR’s problems.
America always supports peoples fighting for independence.

This was the preparation of the population. With the beginning of the revolution in Hungary (October - November 1956), the radio station began broadcasting the program “Special Armed Forces,” which told the Hungarians exactly how to fight against the Soviet army.

Along with the beginning of radio broadcasting, propaganda leaflets and radios were transported from the territory of Germany and Austria by balloons to Hungary. The flow of balloons was great, which confirms the following fact. On February 8 and July 28, Endre Sak sent notes of protest to the US Embassy. The last note states that since February 1956, 293 balloons have been seized, and because of their flights, 1 plane crashed and its crew died. In this regard, the Hungarians even warned international companies about the dangers of flying over the country. The response from the US Embassy is indicative - “private companies” are to blame for everything, and the US authorities have nothing to do with it. The logic is wild and today, by the way, it is also often used (private organizations do dirty work, including military work), but why is no one investigating the financing of these organizations? Mystery. After all, not a single private company will buy balloons with its own money, print leaflets, purchase radios, open a radio station and send all this to Hungary. For a private company, profit is important, that is, someone must finance all this. This funding leads to Operation Prospero.

The goal of Operation Focus was to overthrow socialism in Eastern Europe. The final stage of the operation begins on October 1, 1956, at the Radio Free Europe base. Propaganda in broadcasts is intensifying and the main motive of all speeches is to start a movement against the USSR. Several times a day the phrase is heard: “The regime is not as dangerous as you think. The people have hope!

Internal political struggle in the USSR

After Stalin's death, a struggle for power began, which Khrushchev won. This man’s further steps, not directly, but provoked anti-Soviet sentiments. This was due to the following:

Criticism of Stalin's personality cult. This immediately weakened the international position of the USSR, which was recognized, including in the United States, which, on the one hand, announced a respite in the Cold War, and on the other hand, further intensified secret operations.
Execution of Beria. This is not the most obvious reason for the Hungarian events of 1956, but it is a very important one. Along with the execution of Beria, thousands of state security agents were fired (arrested, shot). These were people who had been stabilizing the situation for years and had their own agents. After they were removed, the state security positions became noticeably weaker, including in terms of counter-revolutionary and counter-terrorism activities. Returning to the personality of Beria - it was he who was the patron of “Volodya” Imre Nagy. After the execution of Beria, Nagy was expelled from the party and removed from all posts. This is important to remember to understand future events. In fact, because of this, starting in 1955, Nagy ceased to be controlled by the USSR and began to look towards the West.

Chronology of events

Above we examined in some detail what preceded the events in Hungary in 1956. Now let's focus on the events of October-November 1956, since this is the most important thing, and it was during this time that the armed uprising happened.

In October, numerous rallies began, the main driving force of which were students. This is generally a characteristic feature of many riots and revolutions of recent decades, when everything begins with peaceful demonstrations of students and ends with bloodshed. There are 3 main demands at the rallies:

Appoint Imre Nagy as head of government.
Introduce political freedoms in the country.
Withdraw Soviet troops from Hungary.
Stop the supply of uranium to the USSR.

Even before the start of active rallies, numerous journalists from different countries come to Hungary. This is a big problem, since it is often impossible to draw the line between who is a real journalist and who is a professional revolutionary. There are many indirect facts indicating that at the end of the summer of 1956, a large number of revolutionaries entered Hungary along with journalists and took an active part in subsequent events. Hungarian state security allowed everyone into the country.

On October 23, 1956, at 15:00, a demonstration began in Budapest, the main driving force of which were students. Almost immediately the idea of going to the radio station arises so that the demands of the protesters are announced on the radio. As soon as the crowd approached the radio station building, the situation moved from the stage of a rally to the stage of revolution - armed people appeared in the crowd. A key role in this was played by Sandor Kopacz, the chief of police of Budapest, who goes over to the side of the rebels and opens military warehouses for them. Then the Hungarians begin to attack and seize radio stations, printing houses, and telephone exchanges in an organized manner. That is, they began to take control of all means of communication and media.

Late in the evening of October 23, an emergency meeting of the Party Central Committee takes place in Moscow. Zhukov continues that a 100,000-strong demonstration is taking place in Budapest, the radio station building is on fire, and shots are heard. Khrushchev proposes sending troops to Hungary. The plan was as follows:

Imre Nagy will be returned to the government. This was important because the protesters demanded it, and this way it was possible to calm them down (as Khrushchev mistakenly thought).
1 tank division needs to be brought into Hungary. This division will not even need to enter the events, since the Hungarians will get scared and run away.
Control was entrusted to Mikoyan.

Colonel Grigory Dobrunov's reconnaissance unit is given the order to send tanks to Budapest. It was already said above that Moscow expected rapid advance of the army and the absence of resistance. Therefore, the order to the tank company was given “Don’t shoot.” But events in Hungary in October 1956 developed rapidly. Already at the entrance to the city, the Soviet army encountered active resistance. The rebellion, which they say arose spontaneously and from students, lasted less than a day, but fortifications were already organized in the area, and well-organized groups of armed people were created. This is a clear sign indicating that events in Hungary were being prepared. Actually, this is why the article contains analytical reports and CIA programs.

This is what Colonel Dobrunov himself says about the entrance to the city.

When we entered the city, our first tank was soon shot down. The wounded driver jumped out of the tank, but they caught him and wanted to burn him alive. Then he took out the F-1, pulled the pin and blew himself and them up.
Colonel Dobrunov

It became clear that the “don’t shoot” order was impossible to carry out. Tank troops are moving forward with difficulty. By the way, the use of tanks in the city is a huge mistake of the Soviet military command. This mistake occurred in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and much later in Grozny. Tanks in the city are an ideal target. As a result, the Soviet army loses approximately 50 people killed every day.

Aggravation of the situation

October 24 Imre Nagy speaks on the radio and calls on fascist provocateurs to lay down their arms. This is in particular reported in declassified documents.

On October 24, 1956, Nagy was already head of the Hungarian government. And this man calls the armed people in Budapest and other regions of the country fascist provocateurs. In the same speech, Nagy stated that Soviet troops were sent into Hungary at the request of the government. That is, by the end of the day the position of the Hungarian leadership was clear: the army was brought in at the request - civilians with weapons are fascists.

At the same time, another strong figure appeared in Hungary - Colonel Pal Maleter. During World War 2, he fought against the USSR, was captured and collaborated with Soviet intelligence, for which he was later awarded the Order of the Red Star. On October 25, this man with 5 tanks arrived at the “Kilian Barracks” to suppress the uprising near the Corwin cinema (one of the main strongholds of the rebels), but instead joined the rebels. At the same time, agents of Western intelligence agencies are intensifying their work in Hungary. Here is one example, based on declassified documents.

On October 26, Colonel Dobrunov’s group approaches the Hungarian Korvin cinema, where they capture the “tongue”. According to testimony, it is in the cinema that the headquarters of the rebels is located. Dobrunov requests permission from the command to storm the building in order to destroy the main center of resistance and suppress the rebellion. The command is silent. The real chance to end the Hungarian events of the autumn of 1956 was missed.

By the end of October it becomes clear that the current troops are unable to cope with the rebellion. Moreover, Imre Nagy's position is becoming more and more revolutionary. He no longer speaks of the rebels as fascists. He prohibits Hungarian security forces from shooting at the rebels. It facilitates the transfer of weapons to civilians. Against this background, the Soviet leadership decides to withdraw troops from Budapest. On October 30, the Hungarian special corps of the Soviet army returned to its positions. During this time, only 350 people were killed.

On the same day, Nagy speaks to the Hungarians, declaring that the withdrawal of USSR troops from Budapest is his merit and the victory of the Hungarian revolution. The tone has already completely changed - Imre Nagy is on the side of the rebels. Pal Maleter is appointed Minister of Defense of Hungary, but there is no order in the country. It would seem that the revolution, albeit temporarily, was victorious, Soviet troops were withdrawn, Nagy is leading the country. All the demands of the “people” have been met. But even after the withdrawal of troops from Budapest, the revolution continues, and people continue to kill each other. Moreover, Hungary is splitting apart. Almost all army units refuse to carry out the orders of Nagy and Maleter. A confrontation arises between the leaders of the revolution in the struggle for power. Worker movements are being formed throughout the country against fascism in the country. Hungary is falling into chaos.

An important nuance - on October 29, Nagy dissolves the Hungarian State Security Service by his order.

Religious question

The issue of religion in the events of the Hungarian autumn of 1956 is little discussed, but it is very indicative. In particular, the position of the Vatican, voiced by Pope Pius 12, is indicative. He stated that the events in Hungary were a religious issue and called on the revolutionaries to fight for religion to the last drop of blood.

The United States takes a similar position. Eisenhower expresses full support for the rebels as they fight for “freedom” and calls for the appointment of Cardinal Mincenty as Prime Minister of the country.

Events of November 1956

On November 1, 1956, there was actually a civil war in Hungary. Bela Kiraly and his troops destroy all those who disagree with the regime, people kill each other. Imre Nagy understands that maintaining power in such conditions is unrealistic and the bloodshed must be stopped. Then he makes a statement, guaranteeing:

Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungarian territory.
Reorientation of the economy towards Western countries.
Withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact agreements.

Nagy's statement changed everything. The first point did not cause Khrushchev any concern, but Hungary’s exit from the Department of Internal Affairs changed everything. During the Cold War, the loss of a zone of influence, also through rebellion, undermined the prestige of the USSR and the international position of the country. It became clear that the introduction of Soviet troops into Hungary was now a matter of a few days.

Operation Whirlwind

Operation "Whirlwind" to introduce the Soviet army into Hungary begins on November 4, 1956 at 6:00 on the signal "Thunder". The troops are commanded by the hero of the Second World War, Marshal Konev. The USSR army is advancing from three directions: from Romania in the south, from the USSR in the east and Czechoslovakia in the north. At dawn on November 4, units began to enter Budapest. Then something happened that actually revealed the cards of the rebellion and the interests of its leaders. Here, for example, is how the Hungarian leaders behaved after the entry of Soviet troops:

Imre Nagy - took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. Let us remember the role of Yugoslavia. It should also be added that Khrushchev consulted with Tito about the November 4 attack on Budapest.
Cardinal Mincenty - took refuge in the US Embassy.
Belai Kiraly gives the order to the rebels to hold out until the bitter end, and he himself goes to Austria.

On November 5, the USSR and the USA find common ground on the issue of the conflict on the Suez Canal, and Eisenhower assures Khrushchev that he does not consider the Hungarians as an ally and NATO troops will not be brought into the region. In fact, this was the end of the Hungarian rebellion in the fall of 1956 and Soviet troops cleared the country of armed fascists.

Why was the second troop entry more successful than the first?

The basis of the Hungarian resistance was the belief that NATO troops were about to come in and protect them. On November 4, when it became known that England and France were sending troops to Egypt, Hungary realized that they could not expect any help. Therefore, as soon as the Soviet troops entered, the leaders began to scatter. The rebels began to run out of ammunition, which the army depots no longer supplied them with, and the counter-revolution in Hungary began to fade away.

Mh2>Results

On November 22, 1956, Soviet troops carried out special operations and captured Nagy at the Yugoslav embassy. Imre Nagy and Pal Maleter were later convicted and sentenced to death by hanging. The leader of Hungary was Janas Kadar, one of Tito's closest associates. Kadar led Hungary for 30 years, making it one of the most developed countries of the socialist camp. In 1968, Hungarians took part in suppressing the rebellion in Czechoslovakia.

On November 6, the fighting in Budapest ended. There were only a few pockets of resistance left in the city, which were destroyed on November 8th. By November 11, the capital and most of the country were liberated. Events in Hungary developed until January 1957, when the last rebel groups were destroyed.

Losses of the parties

Official data on losses among soldiers of the Soviet army and the civilian population of Hungary for 1956 are presented in the table below.

It is very important to make reservations here. When we talk about losses in the USSR army, these are people who suffered specifically from the Hungarian population. When we talk about the losses of the civilian population of Hungary, only a minority of them suffered from USSR soldiers. Why? The fact is that in fact there was a civil war in the country, where fascists and communists destroyed each other. Proving this is quite simple. During the period between the withdrawal and re-entry of Soviet troops (this is 5 days, and the rebellion itself lasted 15 days), casualties continued. Another example is the seizure of a radio tower by rebels. Then it’s not that there were no Soviet troops in Budapest, even the Hungarian corps were not alerted. Nevertheless, there are human casualties. Therefore, there is no need to blame Soviet soldiers for all sins. This, by the way, is a big greeting to Mr. Mironov, who in 2006 apologized to the Hungarians for the events of 1956. The person apparently has no idea what really happened in those days.

Once again I want to remind you of the numbers:

At the time of the rebellion, 500 thousand Hungarians had almost 4 years of experience in the war against the USSR on the side of Germany.
5 thousand Hungarians returned from a USSR prison. These are the people who were convicted of real atrocities against Soviet citizens.
13 thousand people were freed by the rebels from Hungarian prisons.

The victims of the Hungarian events of 1956 also include those who were killed and wounded by the rebels themselves! And the last argument is that the police and Hungarian communists took part in the storming of Bucharest on November 4, 1956, along with the Soviet army.

Who were the Hungarian “students”?

We increasingly hear that the events in Hungary in 1956 were an expression of the will of the people against communism, and that the main driving force were students. The problem is that in our country history is generally quite poorly known, and the Hungarian events remain a complete mystery for the vast majority of citizens. Therefore, let's understand the details and the position of Hungary in relation to the USSR. To do this we will need to go back to 1941.

On June 27, 1941, Hungary declares war on the USSR and enters World War II as an ally of Germany. The Hungarian army was little remembered on the battlefields, but it forever went down in history in connection with its atrocities against the Soviet people. Basically, the Hungarians “worked” in three regions: Chernigov, Voronezh and Bryansk. There are hundreds of historical documents testifying to the cruelty of the Hungarians against the local, Russian population. Therefore, we must clearly understand - Hungary from 1941 to 1945 was a fascist country even more than Germany! During the war, 1.5 million Hungarians took part in it. Approximately 700 thousand returned home after the end of the war. This was the foundation of the rebellion - well-trained fascists who were waiting for any opportunity to act against their enemy - the USSR.

In the summer of 1956, Khrushchev made a huge mistake - he released Hungarian prisoners from secular prisons. The problem was that he released people who had been convicted of real crimes against Soviet citizens. Thus, about 5 thousand people returned to Hungary, convinced Nazis who went through the war, are ideologically opposed to communism and know how to fight well.

Much can be said about the atrocities of the Hungarian Nazis. They killed a lot of people, but their favorite “fun” was hanging people by their legs from lampposts and trees. I don’t want to go into these details, I’ll just give you a couple of historical photographs.

Main characters

Imre Nagy has been the head of the Hungarian government since October 23, 1956. Soviet agent under the pseudonym "Volodya". On June 15, 1958 he was sentenced to death.

Mathias Rakosi is the head of the Hungarian Communist Party.

Endre Sik is the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary.

Bela Kiraly is a Hungarian major general who fought against the USSR. One of the leaders of the rebels in 1956. Sentenced to death in absentia. Since 1991 he has lived in Budapest.

Pal Maleter - Minister of Defense of Hungary, Colonel. He went over to the side of the rebels. On June 15, 1958 he was sentenced to death.

Vladimir Kryuchkov - press attache of the Soviet embassy in Hungary in 1956. Formerly Chairman of the KGB.

Yuri Andropov is the USSR Ambassador to Hungary.

Annotation. The article attempts to rethink and evaluate the Hungarian events of 1956 from the standpoint of analyzing the historiography of the issue and the need to reconstruct collective historical memory.

Summary . The article attempts to rethink and evaluate the events in Hungary in 1956 from the standpoint of analyzing the historiography of the issue and the need for reconstruction of the collective historical memory.

THERE WAS A COLD WAR

CHEREDNIKOVAAnna Yurievna- senior lieutenant, candidate of historical sciences, associate professor

(Moscow. E-mail: [email protected]).

Operation Whirlwind. Hungary, 1956year

“Budapest autumn”, “Hungarian revolution”, “democratic revolution against the Stalinist regime in Hungary”, “Hungarian uprising”, “counter-revolutionary rebellion”1, “Hungarian revolt”, “bloody autumn of Budapest”, “anti-Soviet uprising”, “establishment operation peace in Hungary”2... All these formulations and epithets refer to the tragic events of the autumn of 1956 in Hungary.

In the historiography of the USSR and the countries of the socialist camp, the events of 1956 in Hungary were assessed as a counter-revolution, a counter-revolutionary rebellion, an attempt at capitalist restoration3. Scientists did not have the opportunity to cover this topic in full, focusing on details4 that fit into the ideological interpretations of this controversial bloody event.

In modern historical science and journalism, there are polar interpretations: a popular uprising against the communist pro-Soviet regime, an anti-Soviet demonstration that resulted in an armed uprising5, some authors consider the events in Hungary as a revolution6. A number of works and memoirs defend the idea that the instigators in the Hungarian events were precisely those who in the 40s were Hitler’s accomplices in Hungary, an ally of the Reich, and the conductor of nationalist ideologies in their country. A participant in Operation Whirlwind, retired colonel B. Bratenkov believes that the lion’s share of the blame lies with the United States and NATO, which organized support for the rebel fascists and whose “hidden aggressiveness... through armed Hungarian rebels forced the USSR to use military force”7. According to the American political scientist, specialist in international relations and military strategy, political consultant to the US State Department and the US Department of Defense, former adviser to President Reagan E. Luttwak, citing American sources: “In the US itself and in Germany, with the support of the Americans, emigrant Hungarian organizations were created whose goal was the restoration of capitalism. Based in Germany, the “Union of Hungarian Brothers in Arms,” which united former Horthy officers, in the spring of 1955 began organizing and training “volunteers” in military camps to be sent to Hungary. The Americans financed and trained Hungarian emigrants in Germany within the framework of the Volunteer Freedom Corps, established back in 1953, established by directive of the US National Security Service dated May 20, 1953. The purpose of creating the corps was defined by the National Security Service as “the creation of cadre units of anti-Soviet volunteers that could be quickly increased in case of emergency or large-scale war.”8. The participation of the United States in the bloody events in Hungary is stated and documented by historian N.N. Platoshkin9.

Military contemporaries, primarily direct participants in the events, interpreted the Hungarian events unambiguously. Thus, in the articles of B. Bratenkov it is proved that “the Soviet Army extinguished the source of the civil war in Hungary and preserved peace in Europe”10. Assessing what happened in Hungary in 1956, reserve colonel S. Smolyannikov, a member of the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine and Secretary of the All-Ukrainian Union of Marine Painters, emphasizes that it was indeed a war, short-term, but bloody11. V. Gavrilov, also a participant in Operation Whirlwind, a colonel and professional historian, characterizing what happened, speaks of a rebellion during which real combat operations took place12.

Indeed, assessing what happened after the fact, on the one hand, is simple, because the factual and ideological components are obvious. On the other hand, this is extremely difficult to do due to 60 years ago and changed political and socio-economic realities. However, as long as the participants and witnesses of those years are alive, as long as their memory is used as a tool for reconstructing the picture of what happened, the accumulation of collective historical memory13 and an adequate assessment of the Hungarian events of 1956 are seen as extremely important. Moreover, until the time of perestroika, it was not customary to talk about this openly. All this time, veterans of the Hungarian events remained in the shadows, and their number is becoming smaller every year. Their combat experience even now remains little studied, unclaimed, unrecognized, and unappreciated.

It is known that the confrontation between the USSR and the USA, which arose almost immediately after the end of World War II, and the formation of a bipolar world plunged the peoples of Europe and the world as a whole into a series of conflicts, including military ones. The European space became a springboard for the geopolitical tug-of-war already in the mid-50s of the twentieth century. The situation was complicated by the socio-economic and political processes that took place in the countries of Eastern Europe that found themselves in the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. We are talking, first of all, about the rooting of a model of socialist development based on the model of the USSR, without taking into account the national and historical characteristics of the development of these states. The combination of the above nuances became the basis for the emergence of protest movements of various kinds in the countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).

Their prerequisite and catalyst is considered to be the 20th Congress of the CPSU (February 14-25, 1956), the report of the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N.S. Khrushchev “On the cult of personality and its consequences” and, to a greater extent, the Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee of June 30, 1956 “On overcoming the cult of personality and its consequences.” China and the Eastern European states, the Warsaw Bloc countries, as well as the Communist Parties of leading Western countries (USA, France, Great Britain) found themselves in a state of misunderstanding, and their reactions to what was happening were different. However, it was in Poland and Hungary, where anti-Stalinist and anti-Soviet sentiments were especially acute, that the crisis of the model of Stalinist socialism manifested itself most clearly and earlier than in other states. Thus, in Poland in June 1956, security forces suppressed labor unrest in Poznan. In October of the same year, during a period of acute confrontation between intra-party groups in the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) and mass public protests, the possibility of using military force of the USSR to put pressure on the Polish government and the leadership of the PUWP was prevented by diplomatic means. In this case, the Polish leadership, being anti-Russian/anti-Soviet throughout interstate history, nevertheless acted as a guarantor of stabilizing the situation in the country and preventing crisis and bloodshed.

The Hungarian events were of a completely different nature. The process of rehabilitation of victims of internal party repression, “former Horthy officers and officials, wealthy peasants and some of the intelligentsia”14 quite quickly grew into a desire to remove Hungary from the sphere of influence of the USSR.

The anti-Soviet protest began with student unrest in Budapest on October 22 with demands for democratization and the provision of freedoms, the removal of Stalin’s henchmen from the leadership and management of the country, the abolition of the state security police and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. It was decided to hold a demonstration on October 23 in support of the events that unfolded the day before in Poland. Then the situation developed rapidly: having initially been refused permission to demonstrate, an already armed crowd of rebels rushed to the radio station building, simultaneously committing acts of vandalism (destroying the monument to I.V. Stalin, knocking down state symbols from institutions and houses, etc.). The rebels occupied an arms factory, an international call center and tried to seize the state radio building. Neither the police nor the radio center security, despite repeated requests, received permission to use weapons.

Historian and journalist D.K. Alkar states: “Meanwhile, Soviet forces in Hungary did not succumb to provocations; there was an order not to use weapons. But, despite this, the preparation of the Special Corps15 in case of a critical situation continued non-stop [since the summer of 1956]. Yu.V. played a decisive role in this. Andropov, who in the period from October 6 to October 19 repeatedly held meetings with the command of Soviet troops in the Hungarian People's Republic. Soviet ambassador to Hungary and corps commander, Lieutenant General P.N. Lashchenko carried out active preparatory work, developing an action plan taking into account local specifics... the actions of the troops were careful, thoughtful and even too cautious in their respect for local political and social processes”16.

Meanwhile, on October 23, attacks on government institutions occurred not only in Budapest, but also in a number of other cities. In the Hungarian capital there were about 6,000 military personnel and 1,300 employees of the State Security Administration, who only on the night of October 24 received permission to use weapons exclusively for self-defense. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic (HPR), Imre Nagy, declared martial law. In his address to the people, he promised not only an amnesty for the rebels, but also the democratization of the country “in all areas.” However, by this time almost all of Hungary was engulfed in unrest. Unable to cope with the situation, I. Nagy turned to the leadership of the USSR with a request to provide military assistance to fight the rebels and prevent unrest. “At 23.00 on October 23, by order of the USSR Minister of Defense, five divisions of the Soviet army in Hungary, Romania and the Carpathian Military District were raised on combat alert. This measure was explained by the fact that only two mechanized divisions were stationed in Hungary itself (one of them covered the border with Austria), consolidated into a Special Corps and located far from the capital”17. On the night of October 24, Soviet troops (about 6,000 military personnel) were brought into the capital of the Hungarian People's Republic and entered into battle with the rebels on the streets of Budapest. Groups of rebels fired from ambushes at Soviet tanks and provoked military personnel to use heavy tank weapons.<…>

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NOTES

1 Morozov N. Rise from the past. Part 1. See Internet resource: http://rusk.ru (date of access: May 10, 2016).

2 Bratenkov B. Hungarian events of 1956. “Whirlwind” is an operation to establish peace in Hungary and preserve peace in Europe. See Internet resource: http://samlib.ru (date of access: May 10, 2016).

3 Berets Ya. In a fraternal union: from the history of Soviet-Hungarian relations. M., 1979; aka. The collapse of Operation Focus: counter-revolution with pen and weapon. M., 1986; aka. To the 30th anniversary of the defeat of the counter-revolution in Hungary // New and recent history. 1986. No. 6; Hollosh E. What were they trying to achieve? Documentary essay. M., 1969, etc.

4 Israelyan V.L. Recent history of Hungary (1918-1962). M., 1965; It's him. From the history of the ideological preparation of the counter-revolutionary rebellion in Hungary in the fall of 1956 // Questions of history. 1957. No. 12; Sabo B. Fifties (1948-1957). Budapest, 1986; Nezhinsky L.N. At the origins of the socialist community: the USSR and the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. M., 1987; It's him. Essay on the history of People's Hungary (1948-1962). M., 1969; Nemes D. Hungary 1946-1961. M., 1962; Pushkash A.I. The struggle for agrarian reform in Hungary. M., 1959, etc.

5 Gibiansky L.Ya. N.S. Khrushchev, I. Broz Tito and the Hungarian crisis of 1956 // New and recent history. 1999. No. 1; Gusev Yu. Homocominternicus. The story of Matyas Rakosi - Stalin's governor in Budapest // New Times. 1993. No. 7; Zhelitski B.I. Hungary 1956. Evolution of assessments of Hungarian historians // New and recent history. 1992. No. 3; Karpichenko N. From the “Wave” plan to the “Whirlwind” operation // 1956. Autumn in Budapest. M., 1996; Musatov V.L. In search of truth // New time. 1989. No. 24; Operation “Whirlwind” // Ibid. 1991. No. 49; About Hungarian events: 35 years later // Centaur. 1992. No. 1-2, etc.

6 For example: Alekseev V. Hungary 56. Chain break. M., 1996; Stykalin A.S. About one of the testimonies about the Hungarian revolution of 1956 (V.A. Kryuchkov and his memories) // Slavic Studies. 1998. No. 4; aka. Interrupted revolution. M., 2003.

7 Bratenkov B.G. Hungarian events 1956 // Military history. magazine. 2008. No. 3. P. 24.

8 Luttwak E. Coup d'etat: a practical guide. Events of 1956 in Hungary: truth and myths. See online resource: http://allconspirology.org (accessed May 6, 2016).

9 Platoshkin N.N. Budapest: gloomy autumn of 1956 // Military History. magazine. 2010. No. 2.

10 Bratenkov B.G. Hungarian events of 1956 “Whirlwind” - an operation to establish peace in Hungary...

11 Smolyannikov S. Hungary 1956. Bloody autumn of Budapest. To the 55th anniversary of the events that received the official name “Liquidation of the Hungarian Rebellion” // Network literary magazine “Kamerton”. 2011. No. 24. October. See Internet resource: http://webkamerton.ru (date of access: May 10, 2016).

12 Gavrilov V. Chronicle of an armed rebellion in Hungary. "Black October" 1956. See Internet resource: http://vpk-news.ru (access date: May 6, 2016).

13 Astafieva O.N. Historical memory as a resource of cultural policy and the formation of collective identity // Cultural memory in the context of the formation of the national idea of Russia in the 21st century. pp. 80-93. See Internet resource: http://mkrf.ru (date of access: May 10, 2016); Akhmetshina A.B. The concept of “historical memory” and its meaning in modern Russian society. See Internet resource: http://sibac.info (access date: May 10, 2016); Bogdanov V.V., Bailov A.V., Makarova E.A. Social memory as an object of research. // Bulletin of the Taganrog Institute of Management and Economics. 2015. No. 1. P. 85-94; Bogdanov V.V., Fomenko O.A., Bailov A.V. Social memory. Maykop, 2015; Turbine E. Learning to remember: vectors of memory research / The power of time: social boundaries of memory. M., 2011. P. 25-44; Chistyakova V.O.“Memory of the War” as an element of the national idea (the experience of domestic cinema 1911-2011) // Cultural memory... pp. 94-109, etc.

14 Luttwak E. Coup d'etat...

15 Let us recall that in May 1955 a peace treaty was signed between the USSR and Austria. Soviet troops located in Austria as part of the Central Group of Forces were withdrawn to the territory of the USSR during the summer. A Special Corps was formed from a group of Soviet troops in Hungary. Thus, the troops of the Soviet army, mainly tank units, were in the country with the consent of the legitimate government of Hungary.

16 Alkar D.K. Hungarian uprising of 1956. Eternal memory to our soldiers and patriots of Hungary who died at the hands of the Horthyists and NATO agents of influence. See Internet resource: http://samlib.ru (date of access: May 5, 2016).

17 The Soviet Union and the Hungarian crisis of 1956. M, 1998. P. 357.

On November 4, 1956, sixty years ago, the Soviet Army launched Operation Whirlwind, which resulted in the suppression of anti-Soviet protests in the Hungarian People's Republic. The order of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, which was brought to the attention of the personnel immediately before entering the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic, stated: “The forces of reaction and counter-revolution have rebelled in order to destroy the people's democratic system, eliminate the revolutionary gains of the working people and restore the old ones in it.” landowner-capitalist order."

Matthias Rakosi

The ground for an aggravation of the situation in Hungary took a long time to mature. Back in June 1953, the Soviet leadership criticized the policies of Matthias Rakosi, the General Secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party, who in Eastern Europe was nicknamed "Stalin's best student." Rakosi was relieved of his post as head of the Hungarian government, but retained leadership of the party. Imre Nagy, an old Marxist with pre-war experience, who had lived in the USSR for a long time and was known as a supporter of a more democratic model of the political and economic structure of Hungary, was appointed to the post of head of government. Imre Nagy, having become head of the government, began to implement a whole range of measures that raised many questions both from Rakosi, who continued to head the party, and from the Soviet leadership. In particular, Imre Nagy stopped the ongoing construction of large industrial facilities, prohibited evictions from large cities on the basis of social class, and carried out an amnesty for prisoners. The rejection of the policy of industrialization and cooperation in agriculture could not be received positively in the USSR.

In the end, on August 18, 1955, Nagy (pictured) was removed from the post of prime minister and expelled from the party, and the government was headed by thirty-three-year-old András Hegedüs, a young politician who did not have serious influence in party circles. In fact, control over the country's leadership still remained in the hands of the Stalinist Matthias Rakosi and his comrade-in-arms Erno Geryo. This caused quite noticeable discontent in Hungarian society. In the end, the Soviet leadership, not only out of a desire to minimize protest sentiments in Hungary, but also because of its own questions to Rakosi, achieved his removal in July 1956 from the post of first secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Working People's Party. However, instead of Rakosi, the party was headed by his closest comrade Erno Geryo, one of the oldest Hungarian communists, a participant in the Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919 and the Spanish Civil War. For obvious reasons, there was no hope that such a “bison” as Geryo would pursue a policy of democratization of the country. Fermentation began in the party environment and in society as a whole, initiated by opponents of the “Stalinist” Rakosi-Gero line. The example of neighboring Poland, where the famous Poznan uprising took place in 1956, also had a certain influence on the mood in Hungary.

Mass street protests in Budapest began on October 23, 1956. Until now, these events are most often viewed in a “black and white” spectrum - some accuse the initiators of the uprising of pro-Western sentiments and the desire to return capitalist orders to Hungary, others see the popular uprising of October - November 1956 as an exclusively anti-Soviet and anti-communist uprising. In any case, the victims of the uprising were, first of all, communists and workers of the party and state apparatus. Although the Hungarian rebels positioned themselves as supporters of "workers' councils", they were no exception to pro-Western and anti-communist slogans.

On the night of October 23, 1956, the Hungarian Communist Party decided to appoint Imre Nagy as head of the government of the republic. This decision was made with the consent of the Soviet leadership, since Anastas Mikoyan and Mikhail Suslov, who arrived in Budapest, simply had no choice but to come to terms with the appointment of Imre Nagy. Thus, Imre Nagy, expelled from the party and removed from all posts, returned to Hungarian “big politics”.

One of Imre Nagy’s interesting personnel decisions was the appointment of the famous philosopher György Lukács (pictured) to the post of Minister of Culture of Hungary. Special mention should be made about this man. Gyorgy Bernat Lukács is considered one of the classics of the Western Marxist tradition. Coming from a wealthy Jewish family, Lukács, whose real name was Levinger, was introduced to Marxist and anarcho-syndicalist ideas in his youth at the beginning of the 20th century. At the same time, Lukács remained a person from an academic environment, although during the short-term existence of the Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919 he held the post of acting. Commissioner of Education In 1929-1945, Lukács lived in Moscow and, surprisingly, despite his dubious views from the point of view of official Soviet Marxism, he was not repressed, but had the opportunity to continue his scientific work. In 1945, Lukács returned to Hungary, where he was also not persecuted, and in 1949 he was even included in the Academy of Sciences. At the same time, although Lukács was criticized by adherents of official Soviet Marxism, even Mikoyan and Suslov agreed that in the difficult conditions of the autumn of 1956, Lukács, despite his seventy years of age, was the most acceptable candidate for the post of Minister of Culture than others reviewed scientists and public figures.

Imre Nagy appointed Colonel Pal Maleter (pictured), formerly the commander of the engineering forces of the Hungarian People's Army, to the most important post of Minister of Defense in any government. Pal Maleter was not known to the general public before the events of 1956 - he simply turned out to be the only senior officer of the Hungarian People's Army who openly went over to the side of the uprising.

On October 27, Ernő Gerő was removed from his post as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Working People's Party. He was replaced by Janos Kadar, another pro-Soviet politician. However, this could no longer turn the tide of events back. Imre Nagy, who by this time headed the country's government, found himself in a difficult situation. He could either suppress the uprising by turning to the Soviet Union for help, or try to lead it and further build “Hungarian socialism” without regard to Moscow. Nagy chose the second option. It is difficult to say what he was guided by - whether it was personal ambitions, the desire to prevent bloodshed, or ideological views that diverged from the line of the Soviet leadership. In any case, Imre Nagy entered the picture as the man who led the Budapest uprising.

At the end of the 20th of October, Soviet troops were already on the streets of the Hungarian capital, brought into the city on the night of October 24 - immediately after the start of the uprising. Initially, the Soviet command hoped that units of the Hungarian People's Army would help them suppress the uprisings. However, on October 28, the VNA command received an order from the head of government, Imre Nagy, not to interfere in the situation and not to take action against the rebels. Imre Nagy later spoke on the radio, announcing that the government considered the rebels' actions revolutionary and saying that the Hungarian People's Army was disbanding and new armed forces were being formed in its place. At the same time, Imre Nagy ordered all members of the Communist Party who were defending party and state institutions to lay down. In fact, this order was a real betrayal of the Hungarian communists, since many of them paid with their lives precisely because they laid down their arms - the rebels were not going to spare them. On October 30, the Soviet leadership decided to withdraw all Soviet troops from Budapest, since in the current situation Moscow could not yet develop a clear position on how to deal with Imre Nagy and the “Hungarian revolution.”

However, just these days, an armed conflict began between Egypt on the one hand, England, France and Israel on the other, which became the culmination of the Suez crisis. In the current situation, Nikita Khrushchev decided not to withdraw troops from Hungary, so as not to give the Americans and their allies a reason to doubt the military-political power of the Soviet Union. The Soviet leadership decided to create a new revolutionary workers' and peasants' government in Hungary, led by the pro-Soviet Janos Kadar, and overthrow the government of Imre Nagy. To this end, the development of a plan for Operation Whirlwind began, led by the Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov. The plan to carry out an armed operation to suppress the Hungarian uprising aroused understanding and support among the leadership of other countries of the socialist camp, including even China and Yugoslavia, which at first reacted very friendly to the Hungarian events. Socialist countries feared that the Hungarian revolution could become a dangerous precedent for the overthrow of the socialist system “from below,” and Western countries would take advantage of its fruits.

To participate in Operation Whirlwind, 15 tank, mechanized, rifle and aviation divisions, 2 airborne divisions (7th and 31st), and a railway brigade were allocated. The total number of troops involved in the operation reached more than 60 thousand people. On November 3, the commander of the Special Corps, Lieutenant General Pyotr Lashchenko, ordered the commanders of the 2nd and 33rd Guards Mechanized Divisions and the 128th Guards Rifle Division to begin the assault on Budapest on November 4 at 05:50. Similar orders were given to subordinate units by the commander of the 8th Mechanized Army, Lieutenant General Amazasp Babajanyan, and the commander of the 38th Combined Arms Army, Lieutenant General Khadzhi-Umar Mamsurov. The Special Corps of General Lashchenko was tasked with capturing the most important objects on the territory of Budapest, including the bridges over the Danube, the Buda Fortress, the parliament buildings, the Central Committee of the All-Russian Trade Union, the Ministry of Defense, the police department, the Nyugati and Keleti stations, and the Kossuth radio station. Within each of the three divisions that were part of the Special Corps, special detachments were formed consisting of infantry battalions, reinforced by companies of paratroopers and 10-12 tanks. Each detachment also included employees of state security agencies. Meanwhile, at 05:15 on November 4, an official appeal by János Kadar was heard on Szolnok Radio about the creation of a Hungarian revolutionary workers' and peasants' government to protect the republic from “fascism and reaction.” Thus, Soviet troops entered Hungarian territory at the official invitation of the workers' and peasants' government of Janos Kadar.

Imre Nagy, who heads the government that supported the rebels, hid in the territory of the Yugoslav embassy. Soviet troops occupied Budapest within one day on November 4, demonstrating a high level of combat training. Meanwhile, in other areas of Hungary, units of the 8th Mechanized Army and the 38th Combined Arms Army were able to neutralize almost the entire Hungarian army, disarming 5 Hungarian divisions and 5 separate regiments with a total number of more than 25 thousand troops.

Over the next three days, November 5, 6 and 7, street fighting continued on the streets of the Hungarian capital between Soviet troops and individual rebel groups. On November 7, Janos Kadar himself arrived in Budapest and announced the transfer of power to the revolutionary workers' and peasants' government. The resistance of the last rebel groups was crushed on November 8. Another day later, on November 10, representatives of the workers' councils of Budapest turned to the Soviet command with a request for a ceasefire.

However, despite the fact that in fact control of the Hungarian capital passed to Soviet troops, and the power of the Hungarian Workers' Party under the leadership of Janos Kadar was restored in the country, the workers' councils created during the uprising continued to exist for some time. They continued their activities for a whole month until they were dispersed by the Hungarian security authorities in early December 1956. As a result of the repressive measures that followed the suppression of the uprising, several thousand people were arrested. It was possible to lure Imre Nagy out of hiding in the Yugoslav embassy. A trial was held over Imre Nagy, who sentenced the former head of government to death. On June 16, 1958, almost two years after the uprising, its leaders were executed. Imre Nagy, Colonel Pal Maleter, who served as Minister of Defense in Nagy's government, and journalist Miklos Gimes, who edited the newspaper Hungarian Freedom, were hanged.

The key leaders of the Hungarian communist movement before 1956 - Miklós Rákosi, Ernő Gerő, László Piroš, André Hegedyus - moved to the Soviet Union. Rakosi remained forever in the USSR, where he died in 1971, 14 years after the uprising. Ernő Gerő returned to Hungary in 1960, where he lived without being involved in politics. He died in 1980 at an old age. Laszlo Piros, who served as Minister of the Interior until 1956, returned to Hungary in 1958, worked as the director of a salami factory and was not involved in politics. In 1958, Andre Hegedyush returned to Hungary - but he was no longer involved in politics, but worked as a teacher, living for over forty years - until 1999. Army General Mihaly Farkas, considered the third person in the party hierarchy after Rákosi and Görö, was nevertheless arrested already under Kádár and spent several years in prison until 1961, and then worked in a publishing house and died in 1965, at the age of 61.

The suppression of the 1956 protests contributed to the strengthening of the USSR's position in Eastern Europe, demonstrating Moscow's decisive attitude. Hungary itself remained socialist for another thirty-four years, although even then an alarm signal was given, which became, in a way, a rehearsal for subsequent “velvet revolutions” against pro-Soviet political regimes.