The lightning war was disrupted in progress. Lightning war as a method of conducting offensive actions

A catastrophic start. On June 22, 1941, without a declaration of war, Nazi Germany troops invaded Soviet territory. The most difficult and bloody war in the history of our Fatherland has begun. At 4 o'clock in the morning, German aircraft began to bomb Soviet cities - Smolensk, Kyiv, Zhitomir, Murmansk, Riga, Kaunas, Liepaja, military bases (Kronstadt, Sevastopol, Izmail), railway tracks and bridges. On the first day of the war, 66 airfields and 1,200 aircraft were destroyed, of which 800 were on the ground. By the end of June 22, enemy groups had advanced to a depth of 50–60 km.

Stalin's mistakes and miscalculations regarding the timing and location of the German invasion allowed the aggressor to gain significant advantages. In accordance with the plan for the defense of the state border of the USSR, developed and approved by the government in February 1941, mobilization activities began during May-June. About 2,500 reinforced concrete structures were built in the border areas, and the network of military airfields expanded. In the second half of May - early June, the movement of troops from the internal military districts began with the aim of bringing them closer to the western border. However, by the time the Germans attacked, the strategic deployment of troops had not been completed. To G.K. Zhukov’s repeated proposals to bring the border troops to a state of combat readiness, Stalin stubbornly refused. Only on the evening of June 21, having received a message from a defector that at dawn German troops would launch an attack on the USSR, the High Command sent Directive No. l to the border districts to bring troops to a state of combat readiness. As evidenced by the analysis of this directive, it was drawn up unprofessionally, did not give specific instructions to the troops and allowed for ambiguous interpretation of individual points, which was unacceptable in combat conditions. In addition, the directive was delivered to the troops very late: some border districts, which took the first blows from the enemy, never received it.

On the eve of the attack, Hitler's Germany and its allies concentrated 190 divisions (5.5 million people), almost 4 thousand tanks, 5 thousand combat aircraft, and over 47 thousand guns and mortars along the borders of the Soviet Union.

The military potential of the Red Army, in principle, was not much lower than the German one. 170 divisions (2.9 million people) were concentrated in the western border military districts. In terms of the number of military equipment, armored vehicles and aviation, the Soviet troops were not inferior to the German ones, but a significant part of the tanks, and especially aircraft, were of outdated types, new weapons were only being mastered by personnel, many tank and aviation formations were in the formation stage. The lack of understanding of the scale of the German invasion by the Soviet command, and primarily by Stalin, is evidenced by the second directive sent to the troops at 7 a.m. on June 22: “The troops are to attack enemy forces with all their might and means and destroy them in areas where they violated the Soviet border " Stalin’s note “From now on, until further notice, ground troops will not cross the border” indicated that Stalin still thought that war could be avoided. This directive, like Directive No. 1, was drawn up unprofessionally and hastily, which once again indicates that the Soviet command did not have clear plans in case of forced defense.

On June 22, Molotov made a radio call to repel the aggressor. Stalin's speech took place only on July 3.

Resistance to the aggressor. The fascist command organized an offensive in three strategic directions: Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev. The Soviet command was expecting the main blow in the southwest, but Hitler delivered it in the center, in the western direction. The Germans' advance in all directions, contrary to their expectations, was accompanied by fierce fighting. From the very beginning of the war, Soviet troops put up serious resistance to the enemy. For the first time since 1939, the Germans began to suffer significant losses.

A striking manifestation of the heroism and courage of our soldiers and officers at the initial stage of the war was the defense of the Brest Fortress. Its garrison under the command of Major P. M. Gavrilov held back attacks from superior enemy forces for more than a month.

On June 23, soldiers of the 99th Infantry Division knocked out the Germans from Przemysl with a counterattack and held the city for 5 days. In the very first battles, the 1st Artillery Anti-Tank Brigade, which consisted mainly of young Muscovites, destroyed 42 tanks of General Kleist’s group. On June 23, the division of Colonel I. D. Chernyakhovsky completely destroyed the motorized regiment of the 4th Panzer Group of General Hepner. There were many such examples.

But despite the massive heroism and self-sacrifice of Soviet soldiers, the results of the initial stage of the war were catastrophic for the Red Army. By mid-July 1941, fascist troops captured Latvia, Lithuania, a significant part of Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, the cities of Pskov, Lvov, and a huge number of military personnel were captured.

A terrible tragedy took place near Minsk. Here, by July 9, the Germans managed to encircle almost 30 Soviet divisions. Minsk was abandoned in battle, 323 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers were captured, the losses of the Western Front amounted to 418 thousand people. Stalin blamed the commander of the Western Front, D. G. Pavlov, and a number of other military leaders for this defeat. All of them were shot by the Supreme Court on July 22, 1941 on charges of cowardice (rehabilitated in 1956). The flywheel of repression did not stop even with the start of the war. On August 16, 1941, during the retreat of the Soviet troops, Stalin issued order No. 270, according to which deserters from command personnel should be “shot on the spot,” and those who were surrounded should not surrender and fight to the last bullet. Stalin's accusations of desertion of military leaders were largely unfounded, nevertheless, only from July 1941 to March 1942, 30 generals were shot (all also rehabilitated).

The repressive policy also affected the civilian population. In August 1941, Soviet Germans (about 1.5 million people) were deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan and most of them were sent to the labor army. In September 1941, 170 political prisoners were shot in the Oryol prison, among whom were famous revolutionaries Kh. Rakovsky and M. Spiridonova. A special meeting of the NKVD continued to pass sentences in large numbers without trial or investigation. Spreading false rumors was punishable by 2 to 5 years in prison.

In these difficult conditions, the Soviet people managed to unite against a common enemy - fascism - and showed their heroic character.

The occupation of a significant part of Soviet territory was assessed by the Nazi command as a decisive success in the war, but the Red Army turned out to be much stronger than the fascist strategists expected. Soviet troops not only defended themselves, but also struck back at the enemy.

Advancing towards Moscow, the enemy encountered fierce resistance during the capture of Smolensk. The Battle of Smolensk lasted two months (from July 10 to September 10, 1941). During the battle, the Soviet command used the famous Katyushas for the first time. Rocket launchers under the command of Captain I.A. Flerov struck the enemy in the Orsha area, and then Rudnya and Yelnya. In bloody battles, Soviet soldiers and commanders showed true heroism. On July 30, the Germans were forced to go on the defensive for the first time. On September 5, 1941, troops of the Reserve Front formed on July 30 under the command of G.K. Zhukov broke through the enemy’s defenses during a counteroffensive and liberated Yelnya. The enemy lost several divisions (more than 50 thousand soldiers). For their distinction in the Elninsky operation, the four best rifle divisions were the first in the Red Army to receive the rank of guards.

During the battles near Smolensk from August 9 to 10, 1941, the air division under the command of M.V. Vodopyanov on heavy Pe-8 aircraft, having made a heroic and most dangerous flight, bombed Berlin for the first time.

The battle near Smolensk allowed the Soviet command to gain time to prepare the defense of Moscow. On September 10, the enemy was stopped 300 km from Moscow. Hitler's “blitzkrieg” was dealt a serious blow.

Organizational events. The beginning of the war is the most tragic page in the history of the Great Patriotic War. By mid-July 1941, out of 170 Soviet divisions, 28 were completely defeated, 70 divisions lost over 50% of their personnel and equipment. The troops of the Western Front suffered especially heavy losses.

German troops, having advanced 300–500 km into the interior of the country over several weeks of fighting in different directions, captured the territory where almost 2/3 of industrial and agricultural products were produced before the war. About 23 million Soviet people fell into occupation. By the end of 1941, the total number of prisoners of war reached 3.9 million people.

In the very first days of the war, the country's leadership took a number of measures to organize resistance to the enemy: general mobilization was announced, and the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR was created. In a secret directive dated June 29, 1941, the country's leadership spoke for the first time about the scale of military defeats to party and Soviet organizations in the front-line regions. The directive contained a strict requirement to defend every inch of Soviet land, to leave nothing to the enemy during a forced retreat, to destroy valuable property that cannot be taken out, to organize partisan detachments and sabotage groups in the occupied territory, and to create unbearable conditions for the enemy.

The Soviet totalitarian system, ineffective in peaceful conditions, turned out to be more effective in wartime conditions. Its mobilization capabilities, multiplied during the Great Patriotic War by the patriotism and sacrifice of the Soviet people, played an important role in organizing resistance to the enemy, especially at the initial stage of the war.

The call “Everything for the front, everything for victory!” was accepted by all the people. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens voluntarily joined the active army. In the week since the start of the war, over 5 million people were mobilized.

On June 30, 1941, the State Defense Committee (GKO) was created - the extraordinary highest state body of the USSR, headed by I.V. Stalin. The State Defense Committee concentrated all power in the country during the war. Much attention was paid to military-economic work. A week after the start of the war, the “Mobilization Plan” for the third quarter of 1941 was adopted. By the Decree of the State Defense Committee of July 4, 1941, the development of a military-economic plan for the use of resources and the development of enterprises relocated to the eastern regions of the country began. Throughout the war, quarterly and monthly plans for military economic work were drawn up.

From the very first days of the war, all industrial and scientific institutions of the country began to reorganize their work in accordance with the needs of defense. During the wartime period, the entire working population of cities was mobilized to work in production and construction. The decree “On the working hours of workers and employees in wartime” of June 26, 1941 established a working day of 11 hours, introduced mandatory overtime, and abolished vacations. In the fall of 1941, a card system for distributing food among the population was reintroduced.

An important part of creating a military economy was the movement of industrial enterprises, equipment, material and cultural assets to the rear. In just the first six months, over 1,500 large industrial enterprises were moved from areas threatened by occupation, and many educational institutions, research institutes, libraries, museums, and theaters were evacuated. More than 10 million people were sent to the east of the country (according to some sources, 17 million people). The deployment of the military-industrial base in the eastern regions of the country took place under extremely difficult conditions. In the rear, people worked around the clock, often in the open air, in severe frosts.

By mid-1942, the restructuring of the economy on a war footing was largely completed. The eastern regions of the country became the main arsenal of the front and the main production base of the country.

Defensive battles of the summer-autumn 1941 The outcome of the entire Great Patriotic War was seriously influenced by the defensive battles waged by the Red Army in the summer and autumn of 1941. Hitler’s strategic failures near Smolensk forced him to change the direction of the main attack and direct it from the center to the south - to Kyiv, Donbass, Rostov. Significant forces were concentrated near Kiev from both the German and Soviet sides. Together with personnel units, militias and residents of Kyiv heroically fought against the fascists. However, the Germans managed to enter the rear of the 6th and 12th armies and encircle them. For almost a whole week, Soviet soldiers and officers offered heroic resistance. Trying to save the army, the commander of the Southwestern Front, Marshal S. M. Budyonny, asked Headquarters for permission to leave Kyiv, but Stalin was against it. Only on September 18 such permission was given, but the situation worsened so much that few managed to escape the encirclement. In fact, both armies were lost. With the enemy's capture of Kyiv, the road to Moscow through Bryansk and Orel was opened.

At the same time, the Germans were attacking Odessa, an important base of the Black Sea Fleet. The legendary defense of Odessa lasted more than two months. The Red Army soldiers, sailors and city residents became a single combat garrison and successfully repelled the onslaught of several Romanian divisions. Only on October 16, in connection with the threat of the seizure of Crimea by order of the Supreme High Command, the defenders of Odessa left the city. A significant part of the participants in the defense of Odessa was transferred to Sevastopol.

On its defensive lines, the warriors of the Primorsky Army (commander General I.E. Petrov) and the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet, led by Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky, destroyed almost as much enemy manpower as the Nazi army lost in all theaters of combat before the attack to the USSR. The enemy tried more than once to take the city by storm, but Sevastopol stood unshakable.

Army Group North, having captured Pskov on July 9, advanced close to Leningrad. His fall, according to the plans of the German command, should have preceded the capture of Moscow. However, despite repeated attempts, the Germans and the Finns working together with them failed to take the city. On September 8, 1941, the 900-day siege of Leningrad began. For 611 days the city was subjected to intense artillery shelling and bombing. The blockade put its defenders in an extremely difficult position. The daily bread quota in November-December 1941 was 250 g for workers, 125 g for employees and dependents. About a million Leningrad residents died from hunger, cold, bombing and shelling. To connect the city with the mainland, an ice route was built across Lake Ladoga, called by Leningraders the “Road of Life”.

Despite the occupation of a significant part of the western regions of the country, the German army did not achieve decisive successes in any of the three main strategic directions of the offensive.

Operation Typhoon failed. After the capture of Kyiv, Hitler’s General Staff began to develop a new operation to capture Moscow, called “Typhoon”. On September 30, 1941, after a lull on the Central Front after the Battle of Smolensk, a new offensive by enemy troops began. The tank army of the German General Guderian directed an attack along the Orel-Tula-Moscow line and captured Orel and Bryansk.

In accordance with the Typhoon plan, the enemy concentrated 1.8 million soldiers and officers and a significant amount of military equipment in the Moscow direction, creating a numerical superiority over Soviet troops. Despite the heroic resistance of the Red Army, during the offensive the fascists managed to capture the cities of Vyazma, Mozhaisk, Kalinin and Maloyaroslavets and came within 80–100 km of Moscow. Hitler’s directive stated: “The city must be surrounded so that not a single Russian soldier, not a single inhabitant - be it a man, woman or child - can leave it. Suppress any attempt to leave by force. Make the necessary preparations so that Moscow and its surroundings are flooded with water using huge structures. Where Moscow stands today, a sea must appear that will forever hide the capital of the Russian people from the civilized world.”

At the beginning of October, the situation became critical: as a result of the encirclement of five Soviet armies, the path to Moscow was practically open. The Soviet command took a number of urgent measures. On October 12, the Western Front was created under the command of General G.K. Zhukov, and the armies of the Reserve Front were also transferred to it. Particularly fierce fighting in the Moscow direction flared up in mid-October. On October 15, 1941, the State Defense Committee decided to evacuate part of the government and party institutions, the diplomatic corps to the city of Kuibyshev and prepare for the destruction of 1,119 industrial enterprises and facilities in Moscow and the region. Stalin was supposed to be evacuated. Under the influence of rumors about the surrender of Moscow on October 16, panic arose in the capital. Subsequently, according to contemporaries, the words “man of October 16” became synonymous with shameful behavior and cowardice. Three days later, the panic was stopped by the order of Stalin, who remained in the Kremlin. Tough measures were taken against cowards, alarmists, and looters, including execution. A state of siege was declared in Moscow.

The whole country rose to defend the capital. Trains with reinforcements, weapons, and ammunition from Siberia, the Urals, the Far East, and Central Asia were rushing to Moscow. 50 thousand militia fighters came to the aid of the front.

The defenders of Tula made an invaluable contribution to the defense of Moscow. Guderian's army was unable to take the city and was stopped by the heroic actions of the defenders of Tula. Moscow was also reliably protected from air attack. Defending the skies of Moscow, pilot V.V. Talalikhin was one of the first to use a night air ram.

As a result of the measures taken, the Nazi offensive was stopped at the end of October and beginning of November. Operation Typhoon failed. On November 6, in Moscow, in the hall of the Mayakovskaya metro station, a ceremonial meeting was held dedicated to the 24th anniversary of the October Revolution, at which I.V. Stalin made a speech. On November 7, 1941, a traditional military parade took place on Red Square, after which the troops immediately went to the front. All these events were of great importance for maintaining the morale of Soviet soldiers.

By mid-November, German troops launched a new offensive against Moscow. 51 divisions took part in it, including 13 tank and 7 motorized divisions, armed with 1.5 thousand tanks and 3 thousand guns. They were supported by 700 aircraft. The Western Front, holding back the offensive, at that time already had more divisions than the enemy, and was 1.5 times larger than German aviation in the number of aircraft.

As a result of the offensive, the Germans managed to capture Klin, Solnechnogorsk, Kryukovo, Yakhroma, Istra and approach Moscow within 25–30 km. The fighting was especially stubborn in the defense zone of the 16th Army (commander - General K.K. Rokossovsky) in the Istra region. A group of tank destroyers from the 316th Infantry Division of General I.V. Panfilov stood to their death. He himself died in battle on November 18. Through heroic efforts, the Nazi troops were stopped almost at the walls of the capital.

Counter-offensive of Soviet troops near Moscow. At the beginning of December 1941, the Soviet command, in secrecy, was preparing a counteroffensive near Moscow. Such an operation became possible after the formation of ten reserve armies in the rear and a change in the balance of forces. The enemy retained superiority in the number of troops, artillery and tanks, but it was no longer overwhelming.

In early December, the Germans launched another attack on Moscow, but during the attack on December 5–6, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive along the entire front, from Kalinin to Yelets. It was attended by troops of three fronts - Western (under the command of G.K. Zhukov), Kalinin (under the command of I.S. Konev) and South-Western (under the command of S.K. Timoshenko). This offensive was a complete surprise for the German command. It was unable to repel the powerful attacks of the Red Army. By the beginning of January 1942, Soviet troops pushed the Nazis back from Moscow 100–250 km. The winter offensive of the Red Army continued until April 1942. As a result, the Moscow and Tula regions, many areas of the Smolensk, Kalinin, Ryazan and Oryol regions were completely liberated.

The “blitzkrieg” strategy finally collapsed near Moscow. The failure of the attack on Moscow prevented Japan and Turkey from entering the war on the German side. The victory of the Red Army pushed the USA and England to create an anti-Hitler coalition.

p. 166 Questions in the margins

1. What is the meaning of the term “guard” in the modern army?

The Guard is a selected privileged part of the troops, which is the personal security of the head of state and military commander.

p. 173 Questions in the margins

The military parade in Moscow was perceived by the world as a bolt from the blue, and the effect of its holding was compared to a successfully carried out front-line operation. It was of great importance in raising the morale of the army and the entire country, showing the whole world that Moscow is not giving up and the morale of the army is not broken. This parade became one of the brightest pages in the heroic history of our Motherland and the history of the Great Patriotic War.

p. 176 Questions and assignments

1. What was the surprise of Nazi Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union? What was the balance of forces and means of the warring parties at the initial stage of the war?

For the top leadership of the Soviet state and the Red Army, not only the suddenness of the attack by Nazi Germany was a surprise. G.K. Zhukov subsequently noted: “The main danger was not that the Germans crossed the border, but that their six- and eight-fold superiority in forces in decisive directions turned out to be a surprise to us; the scale of concentration of their troops also turned out to be a surprise to us , and the force of their impact."

2. How did the restructuring of our country’s economy take place on a war footing?

The government and people were required to unite the front and rear into a single, monolithic organism. To achieve this, a number of measures were outlined and implemented to ensure the preservation of significant production resources and the construction of new plants and factories for military needs.

In the conditions of the rapid advance of the Nazis, one of the most important tasks was the evacuation of industrial enterprises, agricultural equipment, and livestock. In 1941 – 1942 More than 3 thousand plants and factories, as well as many other material and cultural assets, were sent to the East. Together with enterprises, about 40% of the country's labor collectives were transferred to the East. In 1941 alone, 1.5 million railway cars, or 30 thousand trains, were occupied for evacuation.

After the mobilization of men into the army, the rural labor force consisted of women, old people and teenagers. The production rate established for adolescents was equal to the minimum pre-war standard for adults. The share of female labor in the national economy increased to 57%. All women from 16 to 45 years old were declared mobilized for production.

3. Describe the “new order” that the Nazis imposed on the occupied territory.

A system of city councils was established in cities, and volost elders and elders were appointed in villages. Punitive security forces similar to the gendarmerie were formed. In most settlements, policemen were appointed. All residents were ordered to unconditionally obey the new authorities.

In the occupied territories of the Soviet Union, the Germans solved three tasks set by Hitler: mass executions of “superfluous” people; economic robbery of the country; deportation (expulsion) of the working population to Germany.

4. What were the tasks of the partisan movement?

The main goal of the guerrilla war was to destroy the front's support system - disruption of communications and communications, the operation of its road and railway communications. The tasks of reconnaissance and sabotage groups were to collect information about enemy troops, commit sabotage at military installations and communications, etc.

5. How did the battle for Leningrad develop? Why were the Nazis, having enormous military superiority, unable to take the city?

On August 30, 1941, the enemy managed to cut the railways connecting the city with the country. Having captured Shlisselburg, the Germans reliably closed the blockade ring. The city defended itself bravely. On its territory, 4,100 pillboxes and bunkers were built, 22,000 firing points were equipped, and 35 km of barricades and anti-tank obstacles were installed. Hundreds of artillery shells, incendiary and high-explosive bombs fell on the city every day. Air raids and artillery shelling often continued for 18 hours a day. There was a food shortage in the city. The situation of the blockade survivors was extremely difficult. The only way to deliver food, medicine, and ammunition to besieged Leningrad was the “Road of Life” - the transport route across Lake Ladoga.

Why the Nazis were never able to take the city: there are many reasons for this. At first, in 1941, they failed to do this on the move (and the Germans had a chance then!), because you cannot be strong in all strategic directions at once (the Germans simultaneously launched 3 major offensives - on Leningrad, Moscow, in Ukraine, they simply did not have enough strength.) . In the future, because it is impossible to capture a city whose population is ready to die rather than surrender. The heavy and anti-aircraft artillery of the ships of the Baltic Fleet played a very important role in the defense of Leningrad. Well, then, in 1942-1943, the Leningrad direction became secondary for the Germans, their “interests” moved to the south.

6. Why were our troops unable to defend Brest and Minsk, Kyiv and Smolensk, dozens of other large cities, and did not surrender Moscow and Leningrad to the enemy?

The defeat of the German troops was an unexpected “miracle” for foreigners. Until now, many foreigners cannot understand that the Russian miracle was hidden in the souls of our people, in their ineradicable desire to be unconquered, to defend the freedom and independence of their Motherland. Our victory was due to the high morale of the people, their unshakable fortitude, great patriotism and heroism. An enormous strain of mind and will, moral, spiritual and physical strength was demonstrated during the tragic struggle, which, it would seem, did not give any reason to expect success. But the Soviet people were approaching victory step by step.

7. Why did the Red Army's counteroffensives fail in 1942?

At the beginning of 1942, the forces of both sides were approximately equal. After many failures and the first major victory near Moscow, competent and thoughtful decisions were needed. But Stalin ordered an offensive to be launched on all fronts, which, however, did not produce positive results.

The fighting took place in difficult terrain. The troops lacked weapons, ammunition, food, and vehicles. The offensive, although it initially put the Germans in a difficult position, floundered. The enemy launched a counter-offensive.

06.12.2009

The battle that thwarted the plans of the Nazis. Defense of Moscow, 1941

Adolf Hitler considered the capture of Moscow, the capital of the USSR and the largest Soviet city, as one of the main military and political goals of Operation Barbarossa. In German and Western military history it is known as "Operation Typhoon".

The city of Klin in the Moscow region after liberation from the German invaders

By the beginning of December, the balance of forces near Moscow began to change. Although the enemy retained superiority in the number of troops, artillery and tanks, this superiority was no longer overwhelming. In early December, German troops made another attempt to capture Moscow, but were immediately stopped.

November 12, 1941. Reconnaissance sappers V. Drachev, P. Kaigorodov and I. Aksyonov are preparing passages through German barriers.

At a moment when the enemy’s offensive capabilities had already dried up, but he had not yet managed to go on the defensive, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive along the entire front from Kalinin to Yelets on December 5-6.

As a result of a successful counteroffensive, by the beginning of January 1942, the Red Army liberated Kalinin, Kaluga, and hundreds of cities and villages.

The enemy was driven back 100-250 km from Moscow. The immediate threat to the capital of the Soviet state was eliminated.

The victory near Moscow was of enormous military and political significance.

Hitler's army, marching triumphantly across Europe, suffered its first major defeat.

December 3, 1941. Artillery soldiers fire at the enemy from a heavy howitzer during the Great Patriotic War.

Near Moscow, the fascist plan for a “lightning war” was finally thwarted.

At the beginning of January, the Supreme Command Headquarters decided to launch a general offensive by Soviet troops in the zone from Lake Ladoga to Crimea.

Mortar paratroopers at firing positions near Moscow

At the CP of the 16th Army: Rokossovsky K.K., Beloborodov A.P., Lobachev A.A. and writer Stavsky V.P. on one of the front sectors in the Istra region

When a modern Russian hears the words “blitzkrieg”, “blitzkrieg”, the first thing that comes to mind is the Great Patriotic War and Hitler’s failed plans for the instant conquest of the Soviet Union. However, this was not the first time that this tactic had been used by Germany. At the beginning of the war, German General A. Schlieffen, who was later called the theorist of blitzkrieg, developed a plan for the “lightning-fast” destruction of enemy forces. History has shown that the plan was unsuccessful, but it is worth talking in more detail about the reasons for the failure of the lightning war plan.

First World War: causes, participants, goals

Before examining the reasons for the failure of the lightning war plan, we should first analyze the prerequisites for the outbreak of hostilities. The cause of the conflict was the contradiction in the geopolitical interests of two political blocs: the Entente, which included Great Britain, France and the Russian Empire, and the Triple Alliance, whose participants were Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Italy, and later (since 1915) Turkey. There was a growing need to redistribute colonies, markets and spheres of influence.

The Balkans, where many Slavic peoples lived, became a special zone of political tension in Europe, and the European great powers often took advantage of the numerous contradictions between them. The reason for the war was the assassination of the heir to the Emperor of Austria-Hungary, Franz Ferdinand, in Sarajevo, in response to which Serbia received an ultimatum from Austria-Hungary, the terms of which practically deprived it of sovereignty. Despite Serbia's readiness to cooperate, on July 15 (July 28, new style), 1914, Austria-Hungary began a war against Serbia. Russia agreed to side with Serbia, which led to Germany declaring war on Russia and France. The last member of the Entente, England, entered the conflict on August 4.

General Schlieffen's plan

The idea of ​​the plan, in essence, was to devote all forces to victory in the only decisive battle to which the war would come down. It was planned to encircle the enemy (French) army from the right flank and destroy it, which would undoubtedly lead to the surrender of France. The main blow was planned to be delivered in the only tactically convenient way - through the territory of Belgium. It was planned to leave a small barrier on the Eastern (Russian) front, counting on the slow mobilization of Russian troops.

This strategy seemed well thought out, if risky. But what are the reasons for the failure of the lightning war plan?

Moltke's changes

The High Command, fearing the failure of plans for a lightning war, considered the Schlieffen plan too risky. Under pressure from disgruntled military leaders, some changes were made to it. The author of the modifications, Chief of the German General Staff H.I.L. von Moltke, proposed strengthening the left wing of the army to the detriment of the attacking group on the right flank. In addition, additional forces were sent to the Eastern Front.

Reasons for making changes to the original plan

1. The German command was afraid to radically strengthen the right wing of the army, which was responsible for encircling the French. With a significant weakening of the forces of the left wing, combined with an active enemy offensive, the entire German rear was exposed to threat.

2. Resistance from influential industrialists regarding the possible surrender of the Alsace-Lorraine region into the hands of the enemy.

3. The economic interests of the Prussian nobility (Junkers) forced the diversion of a fairly large group of troops to the defense of East Prussia.

4. Germany's transport capabilities did not allow supplying the right wing of the army to the extent that Schlieffen expected.

1914 Campaign

In Europe there was a war on the Western (France and Belgium) and Eastern (against Russia) fronts. The actions on the Eastern Front were called the East Prussian Operation. During its course, two Russian armies, coming to the aid of allied France, invaded East Prussia and defeated the Germans in the Battle of Gumbinnen-Goldap. In order to prevent the Russians from striking Berlin, German troops had to transfer some troops from the right wing of the Western Front to East Prussia, which ultimately became one of the reasons for the failure of the Blitz. Let us note, however, that on the Eastern Front this transfer brought success to the German troops - two Russian armies were surrounded, and about 100 thousand soldiers were captured.

On the Western Front, timely assistance from Russia, which drew German troops to itself, allowed the French to provide serious resistance and prevent the Germans from blockading Paris. The bloody battles on the banks of the Marne (September 3-10), which involved approximately 2 million people on both sides, showed that the First World War went from lightning to protracted.

Campaign of 1914: summing up

By the end of the year, the advantage was on the side of the Entente. The troops of the Triple Alliance suffered defeats in most areas of the fighting.

In November 1914, Japan occupied the German port of Jiaozhou in the Far East, as well as the Mariana, Caroline and Marshall Islands. The rest of the Pacific passed into the hands of the British. At that time, fighting was still going on in Africa, but it was clear that these colonies were also lost for Germany.

The fighting of 1914 showed that Schlieffen's plan for a quick victory did not live up to the expectations of the German command. The reasons for the failure of the lightning war plan had become obvious by this point will be discussed below. A war of attrition of the enemy began.

As a result of military operations, by the end of 1914, the German military command transferred the main military operations to the east - in order to withdraw Russia from the war. Thus, by the beginning of 1915, Eastern Europe became the main theater of military operations.

Reasons for the failure of the German plan for lightning war

So, as mentioned above, by the beginning of 1915 the war had entered a protracted stage. Let us finally consider the reasons for the failure of the lightning war plan.

Let us first note that the German command simply underestimated the strength of the Russian army (and the Entente as a whole) and its readiness to mobilize. In addition, following the lead of the industrial bourgeoisie and the nobility, the German army often made tactically incorrect decisions. Some researchers on this matter argue that it was Schlieffen’s original plan, despite its riskiness, that had a chance of success. However, as mentioned above, the reasons for the failure of the plan for a lightning war, which were mainly the unpreparedness of the German army for a long war, as well as the dispersal of forces in connection with the demands of the Prussian Junkers and industrialists, were largely due to the changes made to the plan by Moltke, or, as they were called often called "Moltke's errors".

HORSE PARTIZAN UNIT ON A MISSION...

PATRIOTIC WAR 1941-1945.

In the Battle of Moscow, for the first time in World War II, Soviet troops inflicted a major defeat on the army of Nazi Germany and dispelled the myth of its invincibility. The enemy suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment; 38 enemy divisions were defeated near Moscow. Although it was not possible to completely defeat Army Group Center due to limited forces and means, the Battle of Moscow played a huge role in the war. Hitler's plan for a "blitzkrieg" was finally thwarted. Soviet troops wrested the strategic initiative from the enemy. The victory of the Red Army near Moscow had enormous political and military significance. It marked a decisive turn of military events in favor of the USSR and had a great influence on the entire further course of the Great Patriotic War. and World War 2. The defeat of the Germans near Moscow inspired the Soviet people and the peoples of the whole world to fight for liberation against fascism.
Summer-autumn campaign of 1942. In the spring of 1942, the Red Army went on the defensive to consolidate the successes of the winter offensive. The heroic work of the Soviet people made it possible to achieve a rapid increase in military production. In the first half of 1942, 1,200 enterprises were restored and put into operation and relocated to the east; Compared to the 2nd half of 1941, the production of ground artillery increased by 2 times, tanks by 2.3 times, submachine guns and anti-tank rifles by 6 times, and mortars by 3.2 times. Aircraft production increased slightly.
The USSR achieved great success in the international arena. By the summer of 1942, the anti-fascist coalition already included 28 countries. On May 26, 1942, the USSR and Great Britain signed an agreement on alliance in the war against Nazi Germany and its accomplices in Europe and on cooperation and mutual assistance after the war. On June 11, the Soviet-American agreement “On the principles applicable to mutual assistance in waging war against aggression” was signed. The communiqué on the negotiations indicated that “... complete agreement was reached regarding the urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942” (Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union during the Patriotic War, vol. 1, 1944, p. 248).
By May 1942, the Soviet active fronts and fleets included 5.5 million people, 43,642 guns and mortars, 1,223 rocket artillery installations, 4,065 tanks and 3,164 combat aircraft. Nazi Germany and its allies had 6.2 million people, about 3,230 tanks and assault guns, almost 3,400 combat aircraft and up to 43 thousand guns and mortars on the Soviet-German front.
When planning the summer campaign of 1942, the Soviet Supreme High Command planned generally defensive actions, but, counting on the Allies opening a second front in Europe, they planned a series of offensive operations near Leningrad, in the Demyansk area, in the Smolensk, Oryol, Kharkov directions and in the Crimea. A well-known overestimation of the capabilities of the Soviet Armed Forces, an error in determining the direction of the enemy's main attack in the summer of 1942 (it was believed that this would be in the Moscow area) and the associated distribution of forces and means in strategic directions, as well as the absence of a second front, largely determined the unsuccessful outcome for the Soviet troop progress and outcome of this campaign.
The fascist German command set the main task of defeating the Soviet troops and ending the war in 1942. It was planned to achieve this strategic goal through successive operations: first, to capture the Kerch Peninsula, Sevastopol and carry out private attacks on other sectors of the front; in the north to achieve the fall of Leningrad; in the future it was planned to deliver the main blow to the south and destroy Soviet troops west of the river. Don, to capture the oil regions of the Caucasus and the passes through the Caucasus ridge, and by capturing Stalingrad to cut off Soviet communications on the Volga. The successful conduct of these operations was supposed to create the conditions for a subsequent attack on Moscow. The fascist German leadership hoped that the victorious completion of the campaign would allow Turkey and Japan to be drawn into the war against the USSR.