Afghan war veteran Viktor Posmetny recalls.
“I will dwell on the 682nd motorized rifle regiment separately, since never in the entire history of the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan have troops suffered such one-time losses in battle as the losses suffered by this particular regiment.
Currently, they write a lot and even make films about other episodes of the war in Afghanistan, but for some reason this tragedy remains few people know.
By May 1984, rumors began to appear among officers that the regiment that had just entered Afghanistan from the Union had suffered huge losses in Panjshir. Nobody knew the whole truth then, but it was rumored that the full-blooded battalion of this regiment was allegedly destroyed by spooks led by mercenaries (no one explained why it was mercenaries).
It was as if the dead were taken out in the hundreds. Subsequently, it turned out that the size of the losses incurred was significantly less than word of mouth broadcast, however, it should be recognized that the Soviet army had never known such huge one-time losses in Afghanistan, based on the results of one battle.
As a result of one battle, during the day, the regiment lost 53 people, including 12 officers, and another 58 were wounded. The reasons and conditions under which such huge losses occurred require explanation.
Of course, a criminal case was opened regarding the losses, following the results of which in a military tribunal, the regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel Suman Pyotr Romanovich, was found guilty of this tragedy. That is, the reasons have been established, and those guilty of criminal negligence have received a well-deserved punishment. This would be the end of the story, but it doesn’t seem to be the end.
Taking into account my experience, having read many memoirs of surviving eyewitnesses, I will try to present my own version of the causes of the tragedy. The main thing that, in my opinion, was missed by the investigation is that not always, even a serious and significant, but a single mistake does not lead to a disaster.
Any catastrophe does not occur as a result of any one, single cause, but a combination of many causes leads to a catastrophe. This is an axiom and we should proceed from this. But when one reason is superimposed on another, under appropriate conditions, and all together catalyzes the destructive process, then a small push, a minor mistake is enough and the tragedy can no longer be stopped.
Covertly moving significant forces and assets in mountainous areas is difficult, if not impossible. After all, the enemy is also conducting surveillance and reconnaissance. At the same time, we know that Ahmad Shah Masud did not have a continuous line of defense in the Panjshir valley. He also did not have the ability to instantly transfer forces from one direction to another.
In the case under consideration, he managed to ensure a significant superiority of forces in a certain area precisely at the moment when the units of the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment were in an extremely unfavorable position for combat. But why did this become possible?
Ahmad Shah Masud.
Nobody gives an answer. They point out, and they point out correctly, that the commander of the 1st motorized rifle battalion, Captain Alexander Fedorovich Korolev, ordered the units to be removed from the heights and descended into the gorge. They correctly point out that this was his fatal mistake.
At the same time, the investigation has not reliably established who gave this order to the battalion commander. It is not possible to ask Alexander Korolev about this, since he was one of the first to die.
The only thing that surviving eyewitnesses agree on is that the battalion commander tried his best to prove to someone from the higher leadership that this could not be done. However, he carried out the combat order and this predetermined the development of subsequent events.
The enemy, who until the last moment did not show his presence in any way, waited until the most favorable situation for him was created, suddenly opened fire from several directions on the units of the 682nd regiment, organizing the battle in such a way that he even provided for cutting off the main forces of the regiment from the blocked ones.
November 7, 1983 after a military parade on a square in Termez, Uzbekistan. Leadership of the battalion "box" from left to right; Guards Captain Alexander Korolev - commander of the 1st Guards MSB; Guards Captain Nazarov Rustem, holder of the Order of the Red Banner for the capture of the Amin Palace in 1979 - commander of the 1st Guards MSR; Guards Captain Georgy Ryzhakov - Chief of Staff of the 1st Guards MSB; Guards Lieutenant Ruzhin Alexander - political officer of the 2nd Guards MSR.
Assessing the results of this battle, namely the significant losses suffered by the regiment's units, there is every reason to believe that the enemy not only knew well the general plan of the Soviet command for conducting combat operations, but also perfectly understood the logic of decision-making by the Soviet command in this situation.
In short, Ahmad Shah Masud knew that the command of the 682nd regiment, which opposed him, would do exactly this and nothing else. No other explanation can be given for such a significant number of losses suffered by Soviet troops during one battle.
At the same time, we must take into account that “taking” our soldier, and even more so an officer, is far from so simple. When our soldiers and officers find themselves in a difficult situation, they usually show exceptional courage and dedication. And the course of this battle fully confirmed this.
Those soldiers and officers who did not die in the first minutes of the battle fought to the end in the most unfavorable conditions for them. Finding themselves in a hopeless situation, they blew themselves up. Such dedication of our soldiers did not allow the enemy to achieve more significant results, and therefore it is certainly impossible to say that as a result of the battle a full battalion was lost.
But in order to understand the reasons that led to such a tragic result, it is necessary to trace and analyze the path of the regiment from the moment of its formation to the battle.
Sappers from the 108th Motorized Rifle Division assigned to the battalion on the eve of the Panjshir operation. All of them died in that battle on April 30, 1984.
It was a fresh, just formed part. Probably, the issue of its formation was resolved hastily, at the moment when the decision was made to conduct a major operation in the Panjshir River valley. This is indicated by the fact that the regiment was formed at the beginning of 1984 on the basis of the 285th tank regiment stationed in Termez, that is, only 3 months before the battle.
The commander of the formed regiment was Lieutenant Colonel Pyotr Ivanovich Sukman, who had previously commanded the 285th Tank Regiment. The fact that the formation was hasty is indicated by the fact that the regiment is equipped with a mixed type of equipment. Part of the regiment was equipped with armored personnel carriers, and part with infantry fighting vehicles. Not to mention the personnel, who were also a national team.
Nevertheless, we must give credit to the regiment commander and his officers; they managed to do the almost impossible. In the shortest possible time, the regiment became a full-fledged combat unit. In mid-February, the regiment crossed the border and successfully marched to the base in Bagram, where it stopped for a month.
The regiment's station in Bagram is significant in that the regiment's command and its officers communicated closely with representatives of the Afghan army and local authorities. There is a significant amount of evidence of this, in particular numerous photographs depicting the “brotherly, close ties” that connected the two “brotherly peoples.”
Such behavior of representatives of the Soviet troops with the people's army of Afghanistan was common in those days. This was part of Soviet ideology. Ours did not see the Afghans as enemies and omitted basic measures to ensure secrecy and security.
Fyodor Sapego took the first fire of this ambush upon himself. His platoon went ahead of everyone and was the first to come under heavy fire from the ambush set up by the dushmans.
I note that in 1982, Soviet military counterintelligence uncovered a huge network of informants of Ahmad Shah Massoud in the Afghan army, as well as in the KHAD, purges were carried out, but I doubt whether this yielded results. I am sure that even after a year the situation in this direction has hardly changed for the better.
There can be no doubt that everything that could interest the enemy, about the unit that was preparing to be sent to the Panjshir River valley, became known to Ahmad Shah and his headquarters, right down to the personal qualities of the officers and soldiers, which allowed the enemy to plan and carry out an attack with such dire consequences.
Direct betrayal on the part of the “allies” is not excluded, as evidenced by the fact that they abandoned their places in the battle formation in advance immediately before the start of this battle.
The decision of the army command to send a newly formed unit into battle with an experienced enemy, whose personnel and officers did not and could not have combat experience, is inexplicable. The lack of experience was aggravated by the fact that the regiment was destined to conduct combat operations in mountainous areas, the complexity of combat in which was not inferior to combat in the city. The truth is in the details.
Characteristic, in this regard, is the ratio of the total losses in killed to the losses of officers. It turns out that every fourth person killed in battle was an officer. What does this indicate? Yes, because the enemy “figured out” the officers in advance and immediately “cleaned them out”, depriving the battalion of control.
This can only be done if the officer in combat formations is dressed differently or shows by his behavior that he is an officer. Both of these indicate insufficient preparation of the regiment's units for combat in the mountains.
Lieutenant Andrei Shakhvorostov - Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously) from the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment.
The lack of sufficient experience was superimposed on the “friction” between the officer corps, which resulted in a misunderstanding of each other in a difficult situation. So, a professional tanker was appointed commander of a motorized rifle, and essentially an infantry regiment.
In no case do I question the professional and personal high qualities of the commanders of armored forces, but it is necessary to understand that a tank officer is trained and educated in military educational institutions differently than a combined arms officer.
The essence and character of a tanker is briefly and succinctly defined as follows: - “Fire!, Onslaught, Armor!” They are taught and have been taught to attack, quickly and no matter what to carry out combat missions. All this affects the formation of the tanker’s personal qualities and character. They are courageous and quick to make decisions.
In the infantry, everything is somewhat different; here, thoroughness and careful organization of interaction with other branches of the military are more important, in accordance with the terrain and other circumstances, since you have to stomp exclusively with your feet in conditions where the infantryman is not protected by armor.
May 1, 1984. Hazara Gorge. After the fight. In the foreground is the deceased commander of the 2nd Guards MSR, Guards Lieutenant Sergei Kurdyuk.
Especially the differences in the organization and conduct of combat operations between infantry and tanks differ in very rough terrain, in the mountains, city, forest, and wetlands. I believe that this is where “friction” arose between the regiment commander, who had not yet come out of the tank overalls (in the literal sense, since everywhere in the available photographs the regiment commander is pointedly dressed in a tank overalls) with the battalion commanders from the infantry.
Over time, mutual understanding would have improved, but fate did not provide them with time for this. At the decisive moment, one of them gave an ill-conceived order and rigidly insisted on its execution, and the other could not help but carry out this order, could not convince the regiment commander to change the ill-conceived decision.
As a result of the lack of mutual understanding between the commanders, one of them heroically died along with 52 subordinates, and the other commander was court-martialed. The enemy’s calculations on our omissions and shortcomings in the preparation and organization of the battle were fully justified, which he, that is, the enemy, wisely used to his advantage.
At the same time, it is impossible to place the blame for the tragedy that occurred - the death of more than fifty and the injury of the same number of servicemen - solely on the command of the regiment. The army command should have known that such or a similar tragedy would definitely happen to this insufficiently prepared regiment, forced to fight in the most difficult conditions of a mountain war.
In addition, the very possibility of contacts between Soviet military personnel and representatives of the Afghan army could not be allowed. Without a doubt, the enemy had the opportunity and time to carefully study the regiment and did it well.
Knowing the characteristics and weak points of the enemy, implementing the plan to strike becomes a matter of choosing the place and time. But the Soviet military counterintelligence missed these vitally important questions. The investigation did not raise these questions. The blame for the tragedy was placed on the regiment commander and indirectly on the deceased battalion commander.
Private Valery Rezmont from the 1st battalion.
I will give the following analogy to the case under consideration: Once upon a time, in the so-called “Wild West” of the early USA, “dashing people”, various kinds of cowboys, highway bandits and other rabble, of which there were many in the “Wild West”, took a break from their " works of the righteous" in taverns, so-called saloons. After drinking too much whiskey and rum, they began to practice shooting with Colt revolvers.
The target for their shooting exercises was musicians who played in saloons, entertaining the public, but as it seemed to the visitors, not quite as they would have liked. The owners of the drinking establishments resisted this bacchanalia as best they could, since no one wanted to play at the risk of their lives. To stop the hooliganism of drunken cowboys, the owners hung a notice over the musicians with the following content: “Don’t shoot the pianist, he plays as best he can.”
But in our case, the tragedy was blamed on those who did not know how and therefore could not do what was required of them in a difficult situation. And later they were punished for this, that is, for the fact that “they played as best they could,” but left without attention and punishment those who created the conditions for such sensitive losses to occur.
Subsequently, the position of the regiment changed little. It was located in an extremely turbulent place, actually on the front line, and in a gorge, without sufficient operational space to realize its capabilities. In this regard, losses in the regiment were high. And to supply the regiment with everything necessary, it was necessary to carry out a combat operation every time. In short, you won’t envy the guys of the 682nd regiment.
That same year, at the beginning of September, returning from vacation, I met a classmate from college, Andrei Kravtsov, at a transit point in Kabul. Having learned that he was sent to the 682nd regiment in Rukha, I sincerely sympathized with him. Saying that he was "very lucky." As I feared, Andryukha probably only managed to fight for about a month and a half, was seriously wounded and never returned to combat service."
We continue the stories about the war in Afghanistan. Today we present the memoirs of Afghan war veteran Viktor Posmetny.
“I will dwell on the 682nd motorized rifle regiment separately, since never in the entire history of the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan have troops suffered such one-time losses in battle as the losses suffered by this particular regiment.
Currently, they write a lot and even make films about other episodes of the war in Afghanistan, but for some reason this tragedy remains few people know.
By May 1984, rumors began to appear among officers that the regiment that had just entered Afghanistan from the Union had suffered huge losses in Panjshir. Nobody knew the whole truth then, but it was rumored that the full-blooded battalion of this regiment was allegedly destroyed by spooks led by mercenaries (no one explained why it was mercenaries).
It was as if the dead were taken out in the hundreds. Subsequently, it turned out that the size of the losses incurred was significantly less than word of mouth broadcast, however, it should be recognized that the Soviet army had never known such huge one-time losses in Afghanistan, based on the results of one battle.
As a result of one battle, during the day, the regiment lost 53 people, including 12 officers, and another 58 were wounded. The reasons and conditions under which such huge losses occurred require explanation.
Of course, a criminal case was opened regarding the losses, following the results of which in a military tribunal, the regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel Suman Pyotr Romanovich, was found guilty of this tragedy. That is, the reasons have been established, and those guilty of criminal negligence have received a well-deserved punishment. This would be the final point, but somehow it doesn’t end there.
Taking into account my experience, having read many memoirs of surviving eyewitnesses, I will try to present my own version of the causes of the tragedy. The main thing that, in my opinion, was missed by the investigation is that not always, even a serious and significant, but a single mistake does not lead to a disaster.
Any catastrophe does not occur as a result of any one, single cause, but a combination of many causes leads to a catastrophe. This is an axiom and we should proceed from this. But when one reason is superimposed on another, under appropriate conditions, and all together catalyzes the destructive process, then a small push, a minor mistake is enough and the tragedy can no longer be stopped.
Covertly moving significant forces and assets in mountainous areas is difficult, if not impossible. After all, the enemy is also conducting surveillance and reconnaissance. At the same time, we know that Ahmad Shah Masud did not have a continuous line of defense in the Panjshir valley. He also did not have the ability to instantly transfer forces from one direction to another.
In the case under consideration, he managed to ensure a significant superiority of forces in a certain area precisely at the moment when the units of the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment were in an extremely unfavorable position for combat. But why did this become possible?
Ahmad Shah Masud.
Nobody gives an answer. They point out, and they point out correctly, that the commander of the 1st motorized rifle battalion, Captain Alexander Fedorovich Korolev, ordered the units to be removed from the heights and descended into the gorge. They correctly point out that this was his fatal mistake.
At the same time, the investigation has not reliably established who gave this order to the battalion commander. It is not possible to ask Alexander Korolev about this, since he was one of the first to die.
The only thing that surviving eyewitnesses agree on is that the battalion commander tried his best to prove to someone from the higher leadership that this could not be done. However, he carried out the combat order and this predetermined the development of subsequent events.
The enemy, who until the last moment did not show his presence in any way, waited until the most favorable situation for him was created, suddenly opened fire from several directions on units of the 682nd regiment, organizing the battle in such a way that he even provided for cutting off the main forces of the regiment from the blocked ones.
November 7, 1983 after a military parade on a square in Termez, Uzbekistan. Leadership of the battalion "box" from left to right; Guards Captain Alexander Korolev - commander of the 1st Guards MSB; Guards Captain Nazarov Rustem, holder of the Order of the Red Banner for the capture of the Amin Palace in 1979 - commander of the 1st Guards MSR; Guards Captain Georgy Ryzhakov - Chief of Staff of the 1st Guards MSB; Guards Lieutenant Ruzhin Alexander - political officer of the 2nd Guards MSR.
Assessing the results of this battle, namely the significant losses suffered by the regiment's units, there is every reason to believe that the enemy not only knew well the general plan of the Soviet command for conducting combat operations, but also perfectly understood the logic of decision-making by the Soviet command in this situation.
In short, Ahmad Shah Masud knew that the command of the 682nd regiment, which opposed him, would do exactly this and nothing else. It is impossible to give any other explanation for such a significant number of losses suffered by Soviet troops during one battle.
At the same time, we must take into account that “taking” our soldier, and even more so an officer, is far from so simple. When our soldiers and officers find themselves in a difficult situation, they usually show exceptional courage and dedication. And the course of this battle fully confirmed this.
Those soldiers and officers who did not die in the first minutes of the battle fought to the end in the most unfavorable conditions for them. Finding themselves in a hopeless situation, they blew themselves up. Such dedication of our soldiers did not allow the enemy to achieve more significant results, and therefore it is certainly impossible to say that as a result of the battle a full battalion was lost.
But in order to understand the reasons that led to such a tragic result, it is necessary to trace and analyze the path of the regiment from the moment of its formation to the battle.
Sappers from the 108th Motorized Rifle Division assigned to the battalion on the eve of the Panjshir operation. All of them died in that battle on April 30, 1984.
It was a fresh, just formed part. Probably, the issue of its formation was resolved hastily, at the moment when the decision was made to conduct a major operation in the Panjshir River valley. This is indicated by the fact that the regiment was formed at the beginning of 1984 on the basis of the 285th tank regiment stationed in Termez, that is, only 3 months before the battle.
The commander of the formed regiment was Lieutenant Colonel Pyotr Ivanovich Sukman, who had previously commanded the 285th Tank Regiment. The fact that the formation was hasty is indicated by the fact that the regiment is equipped with a mixed type of equipment. Part of the regiment was equipped with armored personnel carriers, and part with infantry fighting vehicles. Not to mention the personnel, who were also a national team.
Nevertheless, we must give credit to the regiment commander and his officers; they managed to do the almost impossible. In the shortest possible time, the regiment became a full-fledged combat unit. In mid-February, the regiment crossed the border and successfully marched to the base in Bagram, where it stopped for a month.
The regiment's station in Bagram is significant in that the regiment's command and its officers closely communicated with representatives of the Afghan army and local authorities. There is a significant amount of evidence of this, in particular numerous photographs depicting the “brotherly, close ties” that connected the two “brotherly peoples.”
Such behavior of representatives of the Soviet troops with the people's army of Afghanistan was common in those days. This was part of Soviet ideology. Ours did not see the Afghans as enemies and omitted basic measures to ensure secrecy and security.
Fyodor Sapego took the first fire of this ambush upon himself. His platoon went ahead of everyone and was the first to come under heavy fire from the ambush set up by the dushmans.
I note that in 1982, Soviet military counterintelligence uncovered a huge network of informants of Ahmad Shah Massoud in the Afghan army, as well as in the KHAD, purges were carried out, but I doubt whether this yielded results. I am sure that even after a year the situation in this direction has hardly changed for the better.
There can be no doubt that everything that could interest the enemy, about the unit that was preparing to be sent to the Panjshir River valley, became known to Ahmad Shah and his headquarters, right down to the personal qualities of officers and soldiers, which allowed the enemy to plan and carry out an attack with such dire consequences.
Direct betrayal on the part of the “allies” is not excluded, as evidenced by the fact that they abandoned their places in the battle formation in advance immediately before the start of this battle.
The decision of the army command to send a newly formed unit into battle with an experienced enemy, whose personnel and officers did not and could not have combat experience, is inexplicable. The lack of experience was aggravated by the fact that the regiment was destined to conduct combat operations in mountainous areas, the complexity of combat in which was not inferior to combat in the city. The truth is in the details.
Characteristic, in this regard, is the ratio of the total losses in killed to the losses of officers. It turns out that every fourth person killed in battle was an officer. What does this indicate? Yes, because the enemy “figured out” the officers in advance and immediately “purged” them, depriving the battalion of control.
This can only be done if the officer in combat formations is dressed differently or shows by his behavior that he is an officer. Both of these indicate insufficient preparation of the regiment's units for combat in the mountains.
Lieutenant Andrei Shakhvorostov - Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously) from the 682nd Motorized Rifle Regiment.
The lack of sufficient experience was superimposed on the “friction” between the officer corps, which resulted in a misunderstanding of each other in a difficult situation. So, a professional tanker was appointed commander of a motorized rifle, and essentially an infantry regiment.
In no case do I question the professional and personal high qualities of the commanders of armored forces, but it is necessary to understand that a tank officer is trained and educated in military educational institutions differently than a combined arms officer.
The essence and character of a tanker is briefly and succinctly defined as follows: - “Fire!, Onslaught, Armor!” They are taught and have been taught to attack, quickly and no matter what to carry out combat missions. All this affects the formation of the tanker’s personal qualities and character. They are courageous and quick to make decisions.
In the infantry, everything is somewhat different; here, thoroughness and careful organization of interaction with other branches of the military are more important, in accordance with the terrain and other circumstances, since you have to stomp exclusively with your feet in conditions where the infantryman is not protected by armor.
May 1, 1984. Hazara Gorge. After the fight. In the foreground is the deceased commander of the 2nd Guards MSR Guards Lieutenant Sergei Kurdyuk.
Especially the differences in the organization and conduct of combat operations between infantry and tanks differ in very rough terrain, in the mountains, city, forest, and wetlands. I believe that this is where “friction” arose between the regiment commander, who had not yet come out of the tank overalls (in the literal sense, since everywhere in the available photographs the regiment commander is pointedly dressed in a tank overalls) with the battalion commanders from the infantry.
Over time, mutual understanding would have improved, but fate did not provide them with time, that is, for this. At the decisive moment, one of them gave an ill-conceived order and rigidly insisted on its execution, and the other could not help but carry out this order, could not convince the regiment commander to change the ill-conceived decision.
As a result of the lack of mutual understanding between the commanders, one of them heroically died along with 52 subordinates, and the other commander was court-martialed. The enemy’s calculations on our omissions and shortcomings in the preparation and organization of the battle were fully justified, which he, that is, the enemy, wisely used to his advantage.
At the same time, it is impossible to place the blame for the tragedy that occurred - the death of more than fifty and the injury of the same number of servicemen - solely on the command of the regiment. The army command should have known that such or a similar tragedy would definitely happen to this insufficiently prepared regiment, forced to fight in the most difficult conditions of a mountain war.
In addition, the very possibility of contacts between Soviet military personnel and representatives of the Afghan army could not be allowed. Without a doubt, the enemy had the opportunity and time to carefully study the regiment and did it well.
Knowing the characteristics and weak points of the enemy, implementing the plan to strike becomes a matter of choosing the place and time. But the Soviet military counterintelligence missed these vitally important questions. The investigation did not raise these questions. The blame for the tragedy was placed on the regiment commander and indirectly on the deceased battalion commander.
Private Valery Rezmont from the 1st battalion.
I will give the following analogy to the case under consideration: Once upon a time, in the so-called “Wild West” of the early USA, “dashing people”, various kinds of cowboys, highway bandits and other rabble, of which there were many in the “Wild West”, took a break from their " works of the righteous" in taverns, so-called saloons. After drinking too much whiskey and rum, they began to practice shooting with Colt revolvers.
The target for their shooting exercises was musicians who played in saloons, entertaining the public, but as it seemed to the visitors, not quite as they would have liked. The owners of the drinking establishments resisted this bacchanalia as best they could, since no one wanted to play at the risk of their lives. To stop the hooliganism of drunken cowboys, the owners hung a notice over the musicians with the following content: “Don’t shoot the pianist, he plays as best he can.”
But in our case, the tragedy was blamed on those who did not know how and therefore could not do what was required of them in a difficult situation. And later they were punished for this, that is, for the fact that “they played as best they could,” but left without attention and punishment those who created the conditions for such sensitive losses to occur.
Subsequently, the position of the regiment changed little. It was located in an extremely turbulent place, actually on the front line, and in a gorge, without sufficient operational space to realize its capabilities. In this regard, losses in the regiment were high. And to supply the regiment with everything necessary, it was necessary to carry out a combat operation every time. In short, you won’t envy the guys of the 682nd regiment.
That same year, at the beginning of September, returning from vacation, I met a classmate from college, Andrei Kravtsov, at a transit point in Kabul. Having learned that he was sent to the 682nd regiment in Rukha, I sincerely sympathized with him. Saying that he was "very lucky." As I feared, Andryukha probably only managed to fight for about a month and a half, was seriously wounded and never returned to combat service."
Captive "spirits".
On January 7, 1988, a battle took place at an altitude of 3234 m in the Afghan-Pakistan border zone. Based on these events, the film “The Ninth Company” was made. We decided to recall the most famous battles in which Soviet soldiers participated in Afghanistan.
BATTLE AT HEIGHT 3234
On January 7, 1988, in Afghanistan, at an altitude of 3234 m above the road to the city of Khost in the Afghan-Pakistan border zone, a fierce battle took place. This was one of the most famous military clashes between units of the Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the armed formations of the Afghan Mujahideen. Based on these events, the film “The Ninth Company” was shot in 2005. The height of 3234 m was defended by the 9th parachute company of the 345th Guards separate parachute regiment with a total number of 39 people, supported by regimental artillery. Soviet fighters were attacked by special mujahideen units numbering from 200 to 400 people, trained in Pakistan. The battle lasted 12 hours. The Mujahideen never managed to capture the heights. After suffering heavy losses, they retreated. In the ninth company, six paratroopers were killed, 28 were injured, nine of them seriously. All paratroopers for this battle were awarded the Order of the Red Banner and the Red Star. Junior Sergeant V.A. Alexandrov and Private A.A. Melnikov was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
View from height 3234. Photo from the personal archive of S.V. Rozhkova, 1988
Artillery played a big role in repelling the attacks, in particular, two howitzer batteries of six howitzers: three D-30 howitzers and three self-propelled Akatsiyas, which fired about 600 rounds. Presumably, the Mujahideen were supported by the Pakistani armed forces, delivering ammunition and reinforcements to the neighboring valley using transport helicopters and taking the dead and wounded towards Pakistan. Salvos from a Smerch launcher were fired at the helipad from a distance of about 40 km, as a result of which the helicopters were destroyed.
FIGHT NEAR COGNAK VILLAGE
On May 25, 1985, a battle took place between the guardsmen of the 4th motorized rifle company of the 149th guards motorized rifle regiment with the Afghan mujahideen of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan and the Pakistani mercenaries of the Black Stork detachment. The clash occurred during the “Kunar Operation” - a large-scale planned combined arms operation in the Pechdara gorge near the village of Konyak near the city of Asadabad in the Afghan-Pakistan border zone. The guardsmen carried out a combat mission to search and liquidate weapons and ammunition depots and members of the armed Afghan opposition.
As it turned out, the guides were local residents associated with the Mujahideen. In the highlands, these “guides” led the company into a cauldron, where, finding itself in a closed ring, for 12 hours it fought a fierce unequal battle with superior forces of the Mujahideen and Pakistani mercenaries. 43 military personnel fought with more than 200 Mujahideen. In this battle, Guard Junior Sergeant Vasily Kuznetsov behaved heroically. Heavily wounded, he, covering the company's retreat, having used up his ammunition, found himself surrounded by the enemy, let the enemies come close and destroyed them and himself with the last grenade. For this feat, Vasily Kuznetsov was posthumously awarded the Order of Lenin. 23 servicemen were killed in the clash, 18 servicemen were injured of varying degrees of severity.
BATTLE NEAR THE VILLAGE OF KHARA
On May 11, 1980, in the Pechdara gorge near the village of Khara near the city of Asadabad in the Afghan-Pakistan border zone, a battle between units of the 66th separate motorized rifle brigade took place against a large detachment of Afghan Mujahideen. While marching on foot from the village of Barkandai towards the village of Khara, Soviet units were ambushed by Mujahideen, approximately 150-200 people strong, and, being surrounded, took on a fierce battle. This battle is one of the largest in terms of the number of losses in the history of the Afghan war. 17 people emerged from the battle, in which 90 servicemen took part. According to the surviving participants in the battle, they came out of the encirclement with a fight, fighting hand-to-hand (one of the confirmed facts of hand-to-hand combat in the war in Afghanistan. Another fact of hand-to-hand combat was in 1984). The group went out in complete darkness, dragging the wounded and weapons in the water. The Mujahideen pursued for 1.5 km along the road along the river, but did not realize that the remnants of the encircled unit had leaked past them in the water. According to some reports, enemy losses amounted to 120 killed and seriously wounded.
BATTLE ON MOUNT JAFSADJ
On June 17, 1986, on Mount Yafsaj at an altitude of 2540 m in the Jarav gorge near the village of Mirheil in Takhar province, a battle took place between the 783rd separate reconnaissance battalion - the “Kunduz Reconnaissance Battalion” and a detachment of Mujahideen field commander Kazi Kabir. The clash took place during the large-scale combined arms operation “Maneuver”. The landing force was supposed to eliminate the transshipment base in the Mugulan, Cholbakhir, Tali-Gobang mountain range in the Ishkamysh region, which supplies weapons and ammunition to rebel units and stronghold settlements under their control in the north-eastern part of the Republic of Afghanistan. In addition, it was assumed that the field commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, who was in the combat area, would be captured.
The 783rd separate reconnaissance battalion was literally landed on the main strong point of the fortified area and found itself in a zone of continuous fire damage. There was a mistake by the commander of the helicopter squadron of the 335th separate helicopter regiment at the landing site, almost 8 km northwest of the planned landing point, which led to significant losses of personnel at the very beginning of the operation. The planned landing point was prepared for the landing by preliminary artillery and aviation fire. However, the landing began in an unprepared area directly under direct enemy fire from commanding heights; the first wave of reconnaissance troops landed on an absolutely unsuppressed enemy. Having taken advantageous positions at that time, the landing party immediately entered the battle. The absence of an element of surprise in the attack of the 783rd ORB, due to the leak of information about the time and details of the planned operation, the actual numerical advantage of the Mujahideen, as well as their competent use of the strategic position in the highlands led to a compression of the encirclement and blocked the scouts' escape routes. At CP 201 MSD they continued to erroneously believe that the landing force had been landed correctly, until the commander of the 783rd ORB, Major P.V. Korytny on the radio did not convince them that they were in a completely different place. Only on the morning of June 18, SU-25 attack aircraft and Mi-24 combat helicopters were sent to the actual battle area, which were aimed at the targets by landing forces. Also, thanks to the reinforcements sent, the landing force was able to capture the fortified area, weapons and ammunition depots and destroy the infrastructure of the transshipment base. In this battle, the 783rd ORB lost 18 killed, more than 15 servicemen were injured.
26 years ago, on February 15, 1989, the last Soviet soldiers left Afghanistan. Almost at the very end of the conflict, one of the bloodiest battles took place - the battle for height 3234, about which director Fyodor Bondarchuk made a feature film.
Chronology of events
The war was ending. By 1988, there was not a single province in Afghanistan that was under 100% control of the dushmans. The Soviet army was everywhere. But the most controversial point was the border town of Khost, in which the then Afghan oppositionists decided to create another government not controlled by the Soviet Union and again begin to destabilize the country. To be fair, it is worth noting that the Afghan opposition was called Afghan only in name - and although it consisted mostly of Afghans, the main control over the planning of the “activities” of the so-called opposition was carried out by Pakistani advisers, and, of course, by the American advisers and CIA officers behind them. The value of the settlement of Khost was determined by the fact that through it it was possible to penetrate into the territory of Afghanistan, virtually without any effort, and for Pakistani and American advisers, the capture of this settlement would have become a kind of vendetta to the leadership of the Soviet Union, for which they were never able to arrange a “Soviet Vietnam” "
Strategic point
As a result of a carefully planned operation, the dushmans, under the strict guidance of American advisers, managed to block the ground approaches to Khost, however, the air supply to the border territory was not disrupted, so the operation was not immediately successful. After a significant break in 1987, the command of the 40th Army of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union developed an operation to unblock and clear the village of Khost with the aim of taking the strategic point under absolute control. Operation "Magistral" by the forces of the Soviet army was carried out quite quickly: groups of dushmans were thrown back beyond the Jadran ridge and the highway, which served the border guards as the "road of life", was liberated. Situated at the commanding height of 3234, Senior Lieutenant Gagarin's platoon dug in and took a position, taking control of a significant area of strategically important territory.
"Black Storks"
At 15:00 local time, Afghan and Pakistani forces began a massive shelling of height 3234, on which 39 Soviet Army paratroopers held positions. Military historian, former teacher of the Margelov RVVDKU and veteran of the war in Afghanistan Viktor Dobroselsky in an interview with Zvezda spoke about this battle:
“In general, they fired not only at height 3234. They fired at everything around it. It just happened that the enemy concentrated massive fire at this height. During the shelling, the paratroopers suffered their first losses - a radio operator named Fedotov was killed, and along with his death, the platoon also lost the radio for which Fedotov was responsible. The shelling began at about three o'clock local time, and at half past four the first attack began. As far as I know, the people there were varied. In addition to the Mujahideen, there were also Pakistanis there, both ideological warriors and a whole bunch of mercenaries who had a “selfish interest,” but this orchestra was run, naturally from afar, by both Americans and Pakistani “specialists.” What was special about this attack was the fact that special forces, dressed in black uniforms, took part in the assault. They were called “black storks”. They included real thugs - mostly, of course, Pakistanis, because the “spirits” did not possess such combat skills. It is now absolutely clear that the “black storks” were prepared not only by the Pakistanis, but also by the Americans.”
Feat of Starley Gagarin
Viktor Gagarin, the immediate commander of the third platoon of the 9th company, organized the defense of the dominant height in such a way that in his first attack the enemy lost up to 40 people killed, while the defenders had only one wounded - junior sergeant Borisov. The calm that followed the first attack seemed to last only a few minutes. The paratroopers received a short respite until 17:35 local time: it was then that the second attack on the height began, which the enemy carried out from a different direction. However, the enemy’s cunning calculation failed this time too - on the other side, the attack was repelled by a platoon of senior lieutenant Rozhkov. After almost an hour of fierce battle, the dushmans retreated.
Lead rain at 7 pm
Military historian, veteran of the war in Afghanistan and teacher at the Institute of Asian and African Studies at Moscow State University Viktor Vorontsov told one interesting fact in an interview with Zvezda:
“All the attacks of the dushmans, especially the one that took place at 7 pm, were distinguished by some kind of animal, wild cruelty. If the first two attacks were first prepared - the shelling was carried out, then the third was combined, as they say, simultaneously fired from almost all sides. There was a whole hail, not a rain of bullets. During the third attack, the machine gunners at the Utes position (12.7mm machine gun), senior sergeants Borisov and Kuznetsov, were killed. The second machine gun, which at that moment was mowing down the attackers in bursts, was suppressed by the spirits from the RPG. The commander of the crew, Vyacheslav Aleksandrov, two or three minutes before he was attacked by an RPG, gave the command to his crew to retreat, and he himself shot to the last, until he was caught.”
Ninth Company
The day was already ending and the first reinforcements arrived at the third platoon: the same ninth company that is talked about so much. She was commanded by senior officer Sergei Rozhkov. And at night, scouts under the command of Senior Lieutenant Smirnov also arrived at the position. Immediately after the arrival of reinforcements, at approximately one o'clock in the morning local time, the most brutal and massive attack of the enemy began: the clash was so strong that the Mujahideen managed to come to a distance of 30-40 meters. Such a short distance turned out to be critical for the position of the landing forces and reconnaissance forces - the soldiers of the Soviet army simply began to throw grenades. However, despite the seemingly 100% defeat, the paratroopers and scouts managed to push the enemy back from their positions this time too. Says Viktor Vorontsov, a military historian, a veteran of the war in Afghanistan and a lecturer at the Institute of Asian and African Studies at Moscow State University:
“In the end, the Mujahideen realized where the positions of the patrolmen, the machine guns, and practically all the soldiers were, and began firing grenade launchers so hard that the ground shook. They started firing from recoilless rifles, and then they again started trying to take it, as they say, with their bare hands. In general, the night was not only furious, but monstrous. The bottom line was this: the battle began at about 16.30, and ended at 4 am the next day. It was a tough fight. Furious. They hammered the positions in a way that the Germans probably didn’t hammer during the assault on Stalingrad.”
Despite tenfold superiority in numbers, the factor of surprise, and 12 fierce attacks from various directions, the dushmans failed to take the height. In some areas of the attack, the Mujahideen managed to get close to the paratroopers' positions within throwing distance of a grenade, but even these furious jerks did not bring the desired result. The battle, which did not subside until four o’clock in the morning, was accompanied by so many mines and RPG shots fired by the Mujahideen that it seemed that the defeat of the paratroopers was inevitable. However, the reconnaissance platoon that came to the rescue almost immediately entered the battle and completely destroyed all the Mujahideen’s chances of capturing the strategic height. At the time of the approach of the support forces, 5 people remained in the ranks of the ninth company. Having lost 6 people killed and about 30 more wounded, the Soviet landing company still did not give up its positions. Beaten, wounded, barely alive and gray during the battle, the soldiers completed their task - the height near the village of Khost was held.
