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In July 1943, the German army launched Operation Citadel, a massive offensive on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge on the Eastern Front. But the Red Army was well prepared to at some point crush the advancing German tanks with thousands of Soviet T-34 tanks.

CHRONICLE OF THE BATTLE OF KURSK July 5-12

July 5 - 04:30 The Germans launch an artillery strike - this marked the beginning of the battle on the Kursk Bulge.

July 6 – over 2,000 tanks from both sides took part in the battle near the villages of Soborovka and Ponyri. German tanks were unable to break through the Soviet defenses.

July 10 - Model's 9th Army was unable to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops on the northern front of the arc and went on the defensive.

July 12 - Soviet tanks hold back the attack of German tanks in the grandiose battle of Prokhorovka.

Background. Decisive bet

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In the summer of 1943, Hitler directed the entire military power of Germany to the Eastern Front to achieve a decisive victory at the Kursk Bulge.

After the surrender of German troops at Stalingrad in February 1943, it seemed that the entire southern flank of the Wehrmacht was about to collapse. However, the Germans miraculously managed to hold out. They won the battle of Kharkov and stabilized the front line. With the onset of the spring thaw, the Eastern Front froze, stretching from the suburbs of Leningrad in the north to west of Rostov on the Black Sea.

In the spring, both sides summed up their results. The Soviet leadership wanted to resume the offensive. In the German command, in connection with the realization of the impossibility of making up for the horrific losses of the last two years, an opinion arose about the transition to strategic defense. In the spring, only 600 vehicles remained in the German tank forces. The German army as a whole was short-staffed by 700,000 men.

Hitler entrusted the revival of tank units to Heinz Guderian, appointing him chief inspector of armored forces. Guderian, one of the architects of the lightning victories at the start of the war in 1939-1941, tried his best to increase the number and quality of tanks, and also helped introduce new types of vehicles, such as the Pz.V Panther.

Supply problems

The German command was in a difficult situation. During 1943, Soviet power could only increase. The quality of Soviet troops and equipment also improved rapidly. Even for the German army to transition to defense, there were clearly not enough reserves. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein believed that, given the superiority of the Germans in the ability to wage maneuver warfare, the problem would be solved by “elastic defense” with “inflicting powerful local attacks of a limited nature on the enemy, gradually undermining his power to a decisive level.”

Hitler tried to solve two problems. At first he sought to achieve success in the East in order to induce Turkey to enter the war on the side of the Axis powers. Second, the defeat of the Axis forces in North Africa meant that the Allies would invade southern Europe in the summer. This would further weaken the Wehrmacht in the east due to the need to regroup troops to deal with the new threat. The result of all this was the decision of the German command to launch an offensive on the Kursk Bulge - that was the name of the protrusion in the front line, which was 100 km across at its base. In the operation, codenamed Citadel, German tank armadas were to advance from the north and south. A victory would thwart the plans for the Red Army's summer offensive and shorten the front line.

The plans of the German command are revealed

German plans for an offensive on the Kursk Bulge became known to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command from the Soviet resident “Luci” in Switzerland and from British codebreakers. At a meeting on April 12, 1943, Marshal Zhukov convincingly argued that instead of launching a preemptive offensive by Soviet troops, “it would be better if we exhaust the enemy on our defense, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, by going on a general offensive we will finally finish off the main enemy group " Stalin agreed. The Red Army began to create a powerful defense system on the ledge.

The Germans planned to strike at the end of spring or early summer, but they were unable to concentrate attack groups. It was not until July 1 that Hitler informed his commanders that Operation Citadel would have to begin on July 5. Within a day, Stalin learned from “Lutsi” that the strike would be carried out between July 3 and July 6.

The Germans planned to cut off the ledge under its base with powerful simultaneous attacks from the north and south. In the north, the 9th Army (Colonel General Walter Model) from Army Group Center was supposed to fight its way straight to Kursk and east to Maloarkhangelsk. This grouping included 15 infantry divisions and seven tank and motorized divisions. In the south, General Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army of Army Group South was to break through the Soviet defenses between Belgorod and Gertsovka, occupy the city of Oboyan, and then advance to Kursk to link up with the 9th Army. The Kempf army group was supposed to cover the flank of the 4th Panzer Army. The shock fist of Army Group South consisted of nine tank and motorized divisions and eight infantry divisions.

The northern front of the arc was defended by the Central Front of Army General Konstantin Rokossovsky. In the south, the German offensive was to be repelled by the Voronezh Front of Army General Nikolai Vatutin. Powerful reserves were concentrated in the depths of the ledge as part of the Steppe Front of Colonel General Ivan Konev. A reliable anti-tank defense was created. In the most tank-dangerous directions, up to 2,000 anti-tank mines were installed for every kilometer of the front.

Opposing parties. The Great Controversy

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In the Battle of Kursk, Wehrmacht tank divisions faced a reorganized and well-equipped Red Army. On July 5, Operation Citadel began - the experienced and battle-hardened German army went on the offensive. Its main striking force was tank divisions. Their staff at that time of the war was 15,600 people and 150-200 tanks each. In reality, these divisions included an average of 73 tanks. However, three SS tank divisions (as well as the Grossdeutschland division) each had 130 (or more) combat-ready tanks. In total, the Germans had 2,700 tanks and assault guns.

Mainly tanks of the Pz.III and Pz.IV types took part in the Battle of Kursk. The command of the German troops had high hopes for the striking power of the new Tiger I and Panther tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns. The Tigers performed well, but the Panthers showed some shortcomings, in particular those associated with unreliable transmission and chassis, as Heinz Guderian warned.

1,800 Luftwaffe aircraft took part in the battle, especially active at the beginning of the offensive. Ju 87 bomber squadrons carried out classic massive dive bombing attacks for the last time in this war.

During the Battle of Kursk, the Germans encountered reliable Soviet defensive lines of great depth. They were unable to break through or get around them. Therefore, German troops had to create a new tactical group for a breakthrough. The tank wedge - “Panzerkeil” - was supposed to become a “can opener” for opening Soviet anti-tank defense units. At the head of the strike force were heavy Tiger I tanks and Ferdinand tank destroyers with powerful anti-shell armor that could withstand hits from Soviet anti-tank defense shells. They were followed by lighter Panthers, Pz.IV and Pz.HI, dispersed along the front with intervals of up to 100 m between tanks. To ensure cooperation in the offensive, each tank wedge constantly maintained radio contact with strike aircraft and field artillery.

Red Army

In 1943, the Wehrmacht's combat power was declining. But the Red Army was rapidly turning into a new, more effective formation. A uniform with shoulder straps and unit insignia was reintroduced. Many famous units earned the title of “guards”, as in the tsarist army. The T-34 became the main tank of the Red Army. But already in 1942, modified German Pz.IV tanks were able to compare with this tank in terms of their data. With the advent of the Tiger I tanks in the German army, it became clear that the T-34's armor and armament needed to be strengthened. The most powerful combat vehicle in the Battle of Kursk was the SU-152 tank destroyer, which entered service in limited quantities. This self-propelled artillery unit was armed with a 152 mm howitzer, which was very effective against enemy armored vehicles.

The Soviet army had powerful artillery, which largely determined its successes. Anti-tank artillery batteries included 152 mm and 203 mm howitzers. Rocket artillery combat vehicles, the Katyushas, ​​were also actively used.

The Red Army Air Force was also strengthened. The Yak-9D and La-5FN fighters negated the technical superiority of the Germans. The Il-2 M-3 attack aircraft also turned out to be effective.

Victory tactics

Although at the beginning of the war the German army had superiority in the use of tanks, by 1943 this difference had become almost imperceptible. The bravery of the Soviet tank crews and the courage of the infantry in defense also negated the experience and tactical advantages of the Germans. The Red Army soldiers became masters of defense. Marshal Zhukov realized that in the Battle of Kursk it was worth using this skill in all its glory. His tactics were simple: form a deep and developed defensive system and force the Germans to get bogged down in a labyrinth of trenches in a futile attempt to break out. Soviet troops, with the help of the local population, dug thousands of kilometers of trenches, trenches, anti-tank ditches, densely laid minefields, erected wire fences, prepared firing positions for artillery and mortars, etc.

Villages were fortified and up to 300,000 civilians, mainly women and children, were recruited to build defense lines. During the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht was hopelessly stuck in the defense of the Red Army.

First stage. Strike from the North

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Tanks and infantry of Model's 9th Army launched an attack on Ponyri, but ran into powerful Soviet defensive lines. On the evening of July 4, on the northern face of the arc, Rokossovsky’s troops captured a team of German sappers. During interrogation, they testified that the offensive would begin in the morning at 03:30.

Taking this data into account, Rokossovsky ordered counter-artillery preparation to begin at 02:20 in the areas where German troops were concentrated. This delayed the start of the German offensive, but nevertheless, at 05:00, intense artillery shelling of the advanced units of the Red Army began.

The German infantry advanced with great difficulty through densely shot terrain, suffering serious losses from anti-personnel mines planted at a high density. By the end of the first day, for example, two divisions that were the main striking force of the group on the right flank of the German troops - the 258th Infantry, which had the task of breaking through along the Orel Kursk highway, and the 7th Infantry - were forced to lie down and dig in.

The advancing German tanks achieved more significant successes. During the first day of the offensive, the 20th Panzer Division, at the cost of heavy losses, in some places wedged 6-8 km deep into the defense line, occupying the village of Bobrik. On the night of July 5-6, Rokossovsky, having assessed the situation, calculated where the Germans would attack the next day and quickly regrouped the units. Soviet sappers laid mines. The main defense center was the town of Maloarkhangelsk.

On July 6, the Germans tried to capture the village of Ponyri, as well as Hill 274 near the village of Olkhovatka. But the Soviet command appreciated the significance of this position at the end of June. Therefore, Model's 9th Army stumbled upon the most fortified section of the defense.

On July 6, German troops went on the offensive with Tiger I tanks in the vanguard, but they had to not only break through the Red Army's defensive lines, but also repel counterattacks from Soviet tanks. On July 6, 1000 German tanks launched an attack on a 10 km front between the villages of Ponyri and Soborovka and suffered serious losses on the prepared defense lines. The infantry let the tanks pass and then set them on fire by throwing Molotov cocktails onto the engine shutters. The dug-in T-34 tanks fired from short distances. The German infantry advanced with significant losses - the entire area was intensively shelled by machine guns and artillery. Although Soviet tanks suffered damage from the fire of the powerful 88-mm guns of the Tiger tanks, German losses were very heavy.

German troops were stopped not only in the center, but also on the left flank, where reinforcements that arrived in Maloarkhangelsk in time strengthened the defense.

The Wehrmacht was never able to overcome the resistance of the Red Army and crush Rokossovsky's troops. The Germans only penetrated to an insignificant depth, but every time Model thought that he had managed to break through, the Soviet troops retreated and the enemy encountered a new line of defense. Already on July 9, Zhukov gave the northern group of troops a secret order to prepare for a counteroffensive.

Particularly strong battles were fought for the village of Ponyri. As in Stalingrad, although not on the same scale, desperate battles broke out for the most important positions - a school, a water tower and a machine and tractor station. During fierce battles they changed hands many times. On July 9, the Germans threw Ferdinand assault guns into battle, but they could not break the resistance of the Soviet troops.

Although the Germans did capture most of the village of Ponyri, they suffered serious losses: more than 400 tanks and up to 20,000 soldiers. The model managed to wedge 15 km deep into the defensive lines of the Red Army. On July 10, Model threw his last reserves into a decisive assault on the heights at Olkhovatka, but failed.

The next strike was scheduled for July 11, but by then the Germans had new reasons for concern. Soviet troops undertook reconnaissance in force in the northern sector, which marked the beginning of Zhukov's counteroffensive on Orel to the rear of the 9th Army. Model had to withdraw tank units to eliminate this new threat. By noon, Rokossovsky could report to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command that the 9th Army was confidently withdrawing its tanks from the battle. The battle on the northern face of the arc was won.

Map of the battle for the village of Ponyri

July 5-12, 1943. View from southeast

Events

1. On July 5, the German 292nd Infantry Division attacks the northern part of the village and the embankment.
2. This division is supported by the 86th and 78th Infantry Divisions, which attacked Soviet positions in and near the village.
3. On July 7, reinforced units of the 9th and 18th tank divisions attack Ponyri, but encounter Soviet minefields, artillery fire and dug-in tanks. Il-2 M-3 attack aircraft strike attacking tanks from the air.
4. In the village itself there are fierce hand-to-hand fights. Particularly heated battles took place near the water tower, school, machine and tractor and railway stations. German and Soviet troops struggled to capture these key defense points. Because of these battles, Ponyri began to be called “Kursk Stalingrad.”
5. On July 9, the 508th regiment of German grenadiers, supported by several Ferdinand self-propelled guns, finally occupied height 253.3.
6. Although by the evening of July 9, German troops advanced forward, but at the cost of very heavy losses.
7. To complete the breakthrough in this sector, Model, on the night of July 10-11, throws its last reserve, the 10th Tank Division, into the assault. By this time, the 292nd Infantry Division was drained of blood. Although the Germans occupied most of the village of Ponyri on July 12, they were never able to completely break through the Soviet defenses.

Second stage. Strike from the south

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Army Group South was the most powerful formation of German troops during the Battle of Kursk. Its offensive became a serious test for the Red Army. It was possible to stop the advance of Model’s 9th Army from the north relatively easily for a number of reasons. The Soviet command expected that the Germans would deliver the decisive blow in this direction. Therefore, a more powerful group was created on the Rokossovsky front. However, the Germans concentrated their best troops on the southern front of the arc. Vatutin's Voronezh Front had fewer tanks. Due to the greater length of the front, it was not possible to create a defense with a sufficiently high density of troops. Already at the initial stage, the German advanced units were able to quickly break through the Soviet defenses in the south.

Vatutin became aware of the exact date of the start of the German offensive, as in the north, on the evening of July 4, and he was able to organize counter-armor preparations for the German strike forces. The Germans began shelling at 03:30. In their reports, they indicated that more shells were expended in this artillery barrage than during the entire war with Poland and France in 1939 and 1940.

The main force on the left flank of the German strike force was the 48th Panzer Corps. His first task was to break through the Soviet defense line and reach the Pena River. This corps had 535 tanks and 66 assault guns. The 48th Corps was able to occupy the village of Cherkasskoye only after fierce fighting, which greatly undermined the power of this formation.

2nd SS Panzer Corps

In the center of the German group was advancing the 2nd SS Panzer Corps under the command of Paul Hausser (390 tanks and 104 assault guns, including 42 Tiger tanks out of 102 vehicles of this type as part of Army Group South). This corps was also able to advance into the first day thanks to good cooperation with aviation. But on the right flank of the German troops, the army task force "Kempf" was hopelessly stuck near the crossings of the Donets River.

These first offensive actions of the German army worried the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The Voronezh Front was reinforced with infantry and tanks.

Despite this, the next day the German SS panzer divisions continued their success. The powerful 100 mm frontal armor and 88 mm guns of the advancing Tiger 1 tanks made them almost invulnerable to fire from Soviet guns and tanks. By the evening of July 6, the Germans broke through another Soviet defense line.

Resilience of the Red Army

However, the failure of Task Force Kempf on the right flank meant that the II SS Panzer Corps would have to cover its right flank with its own regular units, which hampered the advance. On July 7, the actions of German tanks were greatly hampered by massive raids by the Soviet Air Force. Still, on July 8, it seemed that the 48th Tank Corps would be able to break through to Oboyan and attack the flanks of the Soviet defense. On that day, the Germans occupied Syrtsovo, despite persistent counterattacks by Soviet tank units. The T-34s were met by heavy fire from Tiger tanks of the elite Grossdeutschland tank division (104 tanks and 35 assault guns). Both sides suffered heavy losses.

During July 10, the 48th Tank Corps continued to attack Oboyan, but by this time the German command had decided only to simulate an attack in this direction. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was ordered to attack Soviet tank units in the Prokhorovka area. Having won this battle, the Germans would have been able to break through the defenses and enter the Soviet rear into operational space. Prokhorovka was to become the site of a tank battle that would decide the fate of the entire Battle of Kursk.

Map of the defense of Cherkasy

Attack of the 48th Tank Corps on July 5, 1943 - view from the south

Events:

1. On the night of July 4-5, German sappers clear passages in Soviet minefields.
2. At 04:00, the Germans begin artillery preparation along the entire front of the 4th Tank Army.
3. New Panther tanks of the 10th Tank Brigade begin the offensive with the support of the fusilier regiment of the Grossdeutschland division. But almost immediately they stumble upon Soviet minefields. The infantry suffered heavy losses, the battle formations were mixed up, and the tanks stopped under concentrated hurricane fire from Soviet anti-tank and field artillery. Sappers came forward to remove the mines. Thus, the entire left flank of the 48th Tank Corps' offensive stood up. The Panthers were then deployed to support the main forces of the Grossdeutschland division.
4. The offensive of the main forces of the Grossdeutschland division began at 05:00. At the head of the strike group, a company of Tiger tanks from this division, supported by Pz.IV, Panther tanks and assault guns, broke through the Soviet defense line in front of the village of Cherkasskoe. In fierce battles, this area was occupied by battalions of the Grenadier Regiment; by 09:15 the Germans reached the village.
5. To the right of the Grossdeutschland division, the 11th Panzer Division breaks through the Soviet defense line.
6. Soviet troops offer stubborn resistance - the area in front of the village is filled with destroyed German tanks and anti-tank guns; A group of armored vehicles was withdrawn from the 11th Panzer Division to attack the eastern flank of the Soviet defense.
7. Lieutenant General Chistyakov, commander of the 6th Guards Army, reinforces the 67th Guards Rifle Division with two regiments of anti-tank guns to repel the German offensive. It didn't help. By noon the Germans broke into the village. Soviet troops were forced to retreat.
8. Powerful defense and resistance of the Soviet troops stop the 11th Panzer Division in front of the bridge on the Psel River, which they planned to capture on the first day of the offensive.

Third stage. Battle of Prokhovka

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On July 12, German and Soviet tanks collided in a battle near Prokhorovka, which decided the fate of the entire Battle of Kursk. On July 11, the German offensive on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge reached its culmination. Three significant events happened that day. First, in the west, the 48th Panzer Corps reached the Pena River and prepared for a further attack to the west. In this direction there remained defensive lines through which the Germans still had to break through. Soviet troops constantly launched counterattacks, limiting the Germans' freedom of action. Since German troops now had to advance further east, to Prokhorovka, the advance of the 48th Tank Corps was suspended.

Also on July 11, the Army's Task Force Kempf, on the far right flank of the German advance, finally began to advance north. She broke through the Red Army's defenses between Melekhovo and Sazhnoye station. Three tank divisions of the Kempf group could advance to Prokhorovka. 300 units of German armored vehicles went to support an even larger group of 600 tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which was approaching this city from the west. The Soviet command was preparing to meet their rapid advance to the east with an organized counterattack. This German maneuver was dangerous for the entire defense system of the Soviet army, and forces were gathered in this area to prepare for the decisive battle with a powerful German armored group.

July 12th is the decisive day

Throughout the short summer night, Soviet and German tank crews prepared their vehicles for the battle that lay ahead the next day. Long before dawn, the roar of warming tank engines was heard in the night. Soon their bass roar filled the entire area.

The SS Tank Corps was opposed by the 5th Guards Tank Army (Steppe Front) of Lieutenant General Rotmistrov with attached and supporting units. From his command post southwest of Prokhorovka, Rotmistrov observed the positions of Soviet troops, which at that moment were bombed by German aircraft. Then three SS tank divisions went on the offensive: Totenkopf, Leibstandarte and Das Reich, with Tiger tanks in the vanguard. At 08:30, Soviet artillery opened fire on German troops. Following this, Soviet tanks entered the battle. Of the 900 tanks of the Red Army, only 500 vehicles were T-34s. They attacked German Tiger and Panther tanks at top speeds to prevent the enemy from exploiting the superior guns and armor of their tanks at long range. Having approached, Soviet tanks were able to hit German vehicles by firing at the weaker side armor.

A Soviet tankman recalled that first battle: “The sun helped us. It illuminated the contours of German tanks well and blinded the eyes of the enemy. The first echelon of attacking tanks of the 5th Guards Tank Army crashed into the battle formations of the Nazi troops at full speed. The through tank attack was so swift that the front ranks of our tanks penetrated the entire formation, the entire battle formation of the enemy. The battle formations were mixed up. The appearance of such a large number of our tanks on the battlefield came as a complete surprise to the enemy. Control in its advanced units and subunits soon broke down. The Nazi Tiger tanks, deprived of the advantages of their weapons in close combat, were successfully shot at by our T-34 tanks from short distances, and especially when hit on the side. Essentially it was tank hand-to-hand combat. Russian tank crews went to ram. The tanks flared up like candles when hit by direct shots, scattered into pieces from the explosion of ammunition, and turrets fell off.”

Thick black oily smoke billowed over the entire battlefield. Soviet troops failed to break through the German battle formations, but the Germans were also unable to achieve success in the offensive. This situation continued throughout the first half of the day. The attack by the Leibstandarte and Das Reich divisions began successfully, but Rotmistrov brought in his last reserves and stopped them, albeit at the cost of significant losses. The Leibstandarte division, for example, reported that it had destroyed 192 Soviet tanks and 19 anti-tank guns, losing only 30 of its tanks. By evening, the 5th Guards Tank Army had lost up to 50 percent of its fighting vehicles, but the Germans also suffered damage to the tune of about 300 of the 600 tanks and assault guns that attacked in the morning.

Defeat of the German army

The Germans could have won this colossal tank battle if the 3rd Panzer Corps (300 tanks and 25 assault guns) had come to the rescue from the south, but they failed. The units of the Red Army opposing him skillfully and staunchly defended themselves, so that the Kempf army group did not manage to break through to Rotmistrov’s positions until the evening.

From July 13 to July 15, German units continued to conduct offensive operations, but by that time they had already lost the battle. On July 13, the Fuhrer informed the commanders of Army Group South (Field Marshal von Manstein) and Army Group Center (Field Marshal von Kluge) that he had decided to abandon the continuation of Operation Citadel.

Map of the tank battle near Prokhorovka

Hausser tank attack on the morning of July 12, 1943, as seen from the southeast.

Events:

1. Even before 08:30, Luftwaffe planes begin intensive bombing of Soviet positions near Prokhorovka. The 1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" advance in a tight wedge with Tiger tanks at the head and the lighter Pz.III and IV on the flanks.
2. At the same time, the first groups of Soviet tanks emerge from camouflaged shelters and rush towards the advancing enemy. Soviet tanks crash into the center of the German armored armada at high speed, thereby reducing the advantage of the Tigers' long-range guns.
3. The clash of armored “fists” turns into a fierce and chaotic battle, breaking up into many local actions and individual tank battles at very close range (the fire was almost point-blank). Soviet tanks seek to envelop the flanks of the heavier German vehicles, while the Tigers fire from the spot. All day and even into the approaching dusk, a fierce battle continues.
4. Shortly before noon, the Totenkopf division is attacked by two Soviet corps. The Germans are forced to go on the defensive. In a fierce battle that lasted all day on July 12, this division suffered heavy losses in men and military equipment.
5. All day long, the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" has been engaged in very heavy fighting with the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. Soviet tanks steadfastly hold back the advance of the German division. By the end of the day, the battle continues even after dark. The Soviet command allegedly estimates the losses of both sides during the battle of Prokhorovka at 700 vehicles

Results of the Battle of Kursk

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The result of the victory in the battle of Kursk was the transfer of strategic initiative to the Red Army. The outcome of the Battle of Kursk was influenced, among other things, by the fact that a thousand kilometers to the west the Allies landed in Sicily (Operation Husky). For the German command, this meant the need to withdraw troops from the Eastern Front. The results of the German general offensive near Kursk were disastrous. The courage and tenacity of the Soviet troops, as well as the selfless work in the construction of the most powerful field fortifications ever created, stopped the selected Wehrmacht tank divisions.

As soon as the German offensive stalled, the Red Army prepared its offensive. It started in the north. Having stopped Model's 9th Army, Soviet troops immediately went on the offensive on the Oryol salient, which jutted deep into the Soviet front. It began on July 12 and became the main reason for Model’s refusal on the northern front to continue the advance, which could affect the course of the battle of Prokhorovka. The model himself had to fight desperate defensive battles. The Soviet offensive on the Oryol salient (Operation Kutuzov) failed to divert significant Wehrmacht forces, but German troops suffered heavy losses. By mid-August, they retreated to a prepared defense line (the Hagen line). In the battles since July 5, Army Group Center lost up to 14 divisions, which could not be replenished.

On the southern front, the Red Army suffered serious losses, especially in the battle of Prokhorovka, but was able to pin down the German units wedged into the Kursk ledge. On July 23, the Germans had to retreat to the positions they had occupied before the start of Operation Citadel. Now the Red Army was ready to liberate Kharkov and Belgorod. On August 3, Operation Rumyantsev began, and by August 22, the Germans were driven out of Kharkov. By September 15, von Manstein's Army Group South had retreated to the western bank of the Dnieper.

Losses in the Battle of Kursk are assessed differently. This is due to a number of reasons. For example, defensive battles near Kursk from July 5 to July 14 smoothly flowed into the phase of the Soviet counteroffensive. While Army Group South was still trying to continue its advance at Prokhorovka on 13 and 14 July, the Soviet offensive had already begun against Army Group Center in Operation Kutuzov, which is often seen as separate from the Battle of Kursk. German reports, hastily compiled during intense fighting and then rewritten after the fact, are extremely inaccurate and incomplete, while the advancing Red Army had no time to count its losses after the battle. The enormous importance that these data had from the point of view of propaganda of both sides was also reflected.

According to some studies, for example, Colonel David Glanz, from July 5 to July 20, the 9th Army of Army Group Center lost 20,720 people, and the formations of Army Group South - 29,102 people. Total – 49,822 people. The losses of the Red Army, according to rather controversial data used by Western analysts, for some reason turned out to be more than three times higher: 177,847 people. Of these, 33,897 people were lost by the Central Front and 73,892 people by the Voronezh Front. Another 70,058 people were lost to the Steppe Front, which acted as the main reserve.

The losses of armored vehicles are also difficult to estimate. Often damaged tanks were repaired or restored the same or the next day, even under enemy fire. Taking into account the empirical law that usually up to 20 percent of damaged tanks are completely written off, in the Battle of Kursk German tank formations lost 1b12 vehicles damaged, of which 323 units were irretrievable. The losses of Soviet tanks are estimated at 1,600 vehicles. This is explained by the fact that the Germans had more powerful tank guns.

During Operation Citadel, the Germans lost up to 150 aircraft, and up to 400 more were lost during the subsequent offensive. The Red Army Air Force lost over 1,100 aircraft.

The Battle of Kursk became the turning point of the war on the Eastern Front. The Wehrmacht was no longer able to conduct general offensives. Germany's defeat was only a matter of time. That is why, from July 1943, many strategically thinking German military leaders realized that the war was lost.

Battle of Kursk: its role and significance during the war

Fifty days, from July 5 to August 23, 1943, the Battle of Kursk continued, including the Kursk defensive (July 5 - 23), Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive strategic operations of the Soviet troops. In terms of its scope, the forces and means involved, tension, results and military-political consequences, it is one of the largest battles of the Second World War.

General course of the Battle of Kursk

Huge masses of troops and military equipment were involved on both sides in the fierce clash on the Kursk Bulge - more than 4 million people, almost 70 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, up to 12 thousand aircraft. The fascist German command threw more than 100 divisions into battle, which accounted for over 43% of the divisions located on the Soviet-German front.

The salient in the Kursk area was formed as a result of stubborn battles in the winter and early spring of 1943. Here the right wing of the German Army Group Center hung over the troops of the Central Front from the north, and the left flank of the Army Group South covered the troops of the Voronezh Front from the south. During the three-month strategic pause that began at the end of March, the warring parties consolidated their positions, replenished their troops with people, military equipment and weapons, accumulated reserves and developed plans for further action.

Considering the great importance of the Kursk salient, the German command decided in the summer to carry out an operation to eliminate it and defeat the Soviet troops occupying the defense there, hoping to regain the lost strategic initiative and change the course of the war in their favor. He developed a plan for an offensive operation, codenamed “Citadel”.

To implement these plans, the enemy concentrated 50 divisions (including 16 tank and motorized), attracted over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2.7 thousand tanks and assault guns and over 2 thousand aircraft. The German command had high hopes for the use of new heavy Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand assault guns, Focke-Wulf-190D fighters and Henschel-129 attack aircraft.

The Kursk ledge, which had a length of about 550 km, was defended by troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts, which had 1336 thousand people, more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, over 3.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 2.9 thousand aircraft. East of Kursk, the Steppe Front, which was in the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters, was concentrated, which had 573 thousand people, 8 thousand guns and mortars, about 1.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, and up to 400 combat aircraft.

The Supreme High Command headquarters, having timely and correctly determined the enemy's plan, made a decision: to move on to a deliberate defense on pre-prepared lines, during which they would bleed the strike groups of German troops, and then go on a counter-offensive and complete their defeat. A rare case in the history of war occurred when the strongest side, which had everything necessary for an offensive, chose the most optimal option for its actions from several possible ones. During April - June 1943, a deeply layered defense was created in the area of ​​the Kursk salient.

The troops and local population dug about 10 thousand km of trenches and communication passages, 700 km of wire barriers were installed in the most dangerous directions, 2 thousand km of additional and parallel roads were built, 686 bridges were restored and rebuilt. Hundreds of thousands of residents of the Kursk, Oryol, Voronezh and Kharkov regions participated in the construction of defensive lines. 313 thousand wagons with military equipment, reserves and supply cargo were delivered to the troops.

Having information about the time of the start of the German offensive, the Soviet command carried out a pre-planned artillery counter-training in areas where enemy strike forces were concentrated. The enemy suffered significant losses, and his plans for a surprise attack were thwarted. On the morning of July 5, German troops went on the offensive, but enemy tank attacks, supported by the fire of thousands of guns and aircraft, were defeated by the insurmountable resilience of Soviet soldiers. On the northern face of the Kursk salient he managed to advance 10 - 12 km, and on the southern face - 35 km.

It seemed that nothing living could resist such a powerful steel avalanche. The sky turned black with smoke and dust. The corrosive gases from the explosions of shells and mines blinded my eyes. From the roar of guns and mortars, the clanging of caterpillars, the soldiers lost their hearing, but they fought with unparalleled courage. Their motto became the words: “Not a step back, stand to the death!” German tanks were shot down by the fire of our guns, anti-tank rifles, tanks and self-propelled guns buried in the ground, hit by aircraft, and blown up by mines. The enemy infantry was cut off from the tanks and exterminated by artillery, mortar, rifle and machine gun fire, or in hand-to-hand combat in the trenches. Hitler's aviation was destroyed by our planes and anti-aircraft artillery.

When German tanks broke into the depths of the defense in one of the sectors of the 203rd Guards Rifle Regiment, the deputy battalion commander for political affairs, Senior Lieutenant Zhumbek Duisov, whose crew was wounded, knocked out three enemy tanks with an anti-tank rifle. The wounded armor-piercers, inspired by the officer’s feat, again took up arms and successfully repelled a new enemy attack.

In this battle, armor-piercing officer Private F.I. Yuplankov knocked out six tanks and shot down one Yu-88 plane, armor-piercing junior sergeant G.I. Kikinadze knocked out four, and Sergeant P.I. Houses - seven fascist tanks. The infantrymen boldly let enemy tanks through their trenches, cut off the infantry from the tanks and destroyed the Nazis with fire from machine guns and machine guns, and burned the tanks with combustible bottles and knocked them out with grenades.

A striking heroic feat was performed by the tank crew of Lieutenant B.C. Shalandina. The company in which he was operating began to be surrounded by a group of enemy tanks. Shalandin and his crew members, senior sergeants V.G. Kustov, V.F. Lekomtsev and Sergeant P.E. Zelenin boldly entered into battle with a numerically superior enemy. Acting from an ambush, they brought enemy tanks within direct shot range, and then, hitting the sides, burned two “tigers” and one medium tank. But Shalandin’s tank was also hit and caught fire. With the car on fire, Shalandin’s crew decided to ram it and immediately crashed into the side of the “tiger.” The enemy tank caught fire. But our entire crew also died. To Lieutenant B.C. Shalandin was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. By order of the Minister of Defense, he was forever included in the lists of the Tashkent Tank School.

Simultaneously with the fighting on the ground, there were fierce battles in the air. An immortal feat was accomplished here by guard pilot Lieutenant A.K. Gorovets. On July 6, as part of a squadron on a La-5 aircraft, he covered his troops. Returning from a mission, Horowitz saw a large group of enemy bombers, but due to damage to the radio transmitter, he was unable to inform the presenter about this and decided to attack them. During the battle, the brave pilot shot down nine enemy bombers, but he himself died.

On July 12, in the Prokhorovka area, the largest oncoming tank battle in World War II took place, in which up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part on both sides. During the day of the battle, the opposing sides lost from 30 to 60% of tanks and self-propelled guns each.

On July 12, the turning point in the Battle of Kursk came, the enemy stopped the offensive, and on July 18, he began to withdraw all his forces to their original position. The troops of the Voronezh Front, and from July 19, the Steppe Front, switched to pursuit and by July 23 drove the enemy back to the line that he occupied on the eve of his offensive. Operation Citadel failed; the enemy failed to turn the tide of the war in their favor.

On July 12, troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts began an offensive in the Oryol direction. On July 15, the Central Front launched a counteroffensive. On August 3, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began a counteroffensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction. The scale of hostilities expanded even further.

Our troops showed massive heroism during the battles on the Oryol salient. Here are just a few examples.

In the battle for a strong point southwest of the village of Vyatki on July 13, the commander of a rifle platoon of the 457th Infantry Regiment of the 129th Infantry Division, Lieutenant N.D., distinguished himself. Marinchenko. Carefully camouflaging himself, unnoticed by the enemy, he led the platoon to the northern slope of the height and, from close range, brought down a shower of machine-gun fire on the enemy. The Germans began to panic. They threw down their weapons and ran. Having captured two 75-mm cannons at a height, Marinchenko’s fighters opened fire on the enemy from them. For this feat, Lieutenant Nikolai Danilovich Marinchenko was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On July 19, 1943, in the battle for the village of Troena, Kursk Region, a heroic feat was accomplished by the gunner of a platoon of 45-mm cannons of the 896th Infantry Regiment of the 211th Infantry Division, Sergeant N.N. Shilenkov. The enemy here repeatedly launched counterattacks. During one of them, Shilenkov allowed German tanks to reach 100 - 150 m and set one on fire with cannon fire and knocked out three of them.

When the cannon was destroyed by an enemy shell, he took the machine gun and, together with the riflemen, continued to fire at the enemy. Nikolai Nikolaevich Shilenkov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On August 5, two ancient Russian cities, Orel and Belgorod, were liberated. That same day, in the evening, an artillery salute was fired for the first time in Moscow in honor of the troops who liberated them.

By August 18, Soviet troops, having inflicted a heavy defeat on Army Group Center, completely liberated the Oryol bridgehead. At that time, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts were fighting in the Kharkov direction. Having repelled strong counterattacks from enemy tank divisions, our units and formations liberated Kharkov on August 23. Thus, the Battle of Kursk ended in a brilliant victory for the Red Army.

The date August 23 is now celebrated in our country as the Day of Military Glory of Russia - the defeat of Nazi troops in the Battle of Kursk (1943).

At the same time, it should be noted that victory in the Battle of Kursk came at a very high cost to Soviet troops. They lost over 860 thousand people killed and wounded, more than 6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 5.2 thousand guns and mortars, over 1.6 thousand aircraft. Nevertheless, this victory was joyful and inspiring.

Thus, the victory at Kursk was new convincing evidence of the loyalty of Soviet soldiers to the oath, military duty and combat traditions of our Armed Forces. It is the duty of every soldier of the Russian Army to strengthen and multiply these traditions.

Historical significance of the victory at Kursk

The Battle of Kursk is one of the most important stages on the path to victory in the Great Patriotic War. The crushing defeat of Nazi Germany at the Kursk Bulge testified to the increased economic, political and military power of the Soviet Union. The military feat of the soldiers merged with the selfless work of the home front workers, who armed the army with excellent military equipment and provided it with everything necessary for victory. What is the world-historical significance of the defeat of the Nazi troops at Kursk?

Firstly, Hitler’s army suffered a severe defeat, huge losses, which the fascist leadership could no longer compensate for with any total mobilizations. The grandiose battle of the summer of 1943 on the Kursk Bulge demonstrated to the whole world the ability of the Soviet state to defeat the aggressor on its own. The prestige of German weapons was irreparably damaged. 30 German divisions were destroyed. The total losses of the Wehrmacht amounted to more than 500 thousand soldiers and officers, over 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, 3 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft. By the way, pilots of the French Normandy squadron, who shot down 33 German aircraft in air battles, selflessly fought alongside Soviet pilots in the battles on the Kursk Bulge.

The enemy tank forces suffered the heaviest losses. Of the 20 tank and motorized divisions that took part in the Battle of Kursk, 7 were defeated, and the rest suffered significant losses. The chief inspector of the Wehrmacht tank forces, General Guderian, was forced to admit: “As a result of the failure of the Citadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were put out of action for a long time due to large losses in men and equipment... The initiative finally passed to the Russians.”

Secondly, in the Battle of Kursk, the enemy’s attempt to regain the lost strategic initiative and take revenge for Stalingrad failed.

The offensive strategy of the German troops was a complete failure. The Battle of Kursk led to a further change in the balance of forces at the front, made it possible to finally concentrate the strategic initiative in the hands of the Soviet command, and created favorable conditions for the deployment of a general strategic offensive of the Red Army. The victory at Kursk and the advance of Soviet troops to the Dnieper marked a radical turning point in the course of the war. After the Battle of Kursk, the Nazi command was forced to finally abandon the offensive strategy and go on the defensive along the entire Soviet-German front.

However, at present, some Western historians, shamelessly falsifying the history of the Second World War, are trying in every possible way to belittle the significance of the victory of the Red Army at Kursk. Some of them claim that the Battle of Kursk is an ordinary, unremarkable episode of the Second World War, others in their voluminous works either simply remain silent about the Battle of Kursk, or speak about it sparingly and incomprehensibly, other falsifiers seek to prove that the German- The fascist army was defeated in the Battle of Kursk not under the blows of the Red Army, but as a result of Hitler’s “miscalculations” and “fatal decisions”, due to his reluctance to listen to the opinions of his generals and field marshals. However, all this has no basis and is in conflict with the facts. The German generals and field marshals themselves recognized the inconsistency of such statements. “Operation Citadel was the last attempt to maintain our initiative in the east,” admits the former Nazi Field Marshal, who commanded the artillery group
mission "South" E. Manstein. - With its termination, tantamount to failure, the initiative finally passed to the Soviet side. In this respect, "Citadel" is a decisive, turning point of the war on the Eastern Front."

Thirdly, the victory in the Battle of Kursk is a triumph of Soviet military art. During the battle, Soviet military strategy, operational art and tactics once again proved their superiority over the military art of Hitler's army.

The Battle of Kursk enriched the domestic military art with the EXPERIENCE of organizing a deeply layered, active, sustainable defense, conducting flexible and decisive maneuver of forces and means during defensive and offensive actions.

In the field of strategy, the Soviet Supreme High Command took a creative approach to planning the summer-autumn campaign of 1943. The originality of the decision was expressed in the fact that the side with strategic initiative and overall superiority in forces went on the defensive, deliberately giving an active role to the enemy in the initial phase of the campaign. Subsequently, within the framework of a single process of conducting a campaign, following the defense, a transition to a decisive counter-offensive and the deployment of a general offensive was planned. The problem of creating an insurmountable defense on an operational-strategic scale was successfully solved. Its activity was ensured by the saturation of the fronts with a large number of mobile troops. It was achieved by conducting artillery counter-preparation on the scale of two fronts, wide maneuver of strategic reserves to strengthen them, and launching massive air strikes against enemy groups and reserves. The Supreme High Command headquarters skillfully determined the plan for conducting a counteroffensive in each direction, creatively approaching
choosing the directions of the main attacks and methods of defeating the enemy. Thus, in the Oryol operation, Soviet troops used concentric attacks in converging directions, followed by fragmentation and destruction of the enemy group in parts. In the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, the main blow was delivered by adjacent flanks of the fronts, which ensured the rapid breaking of the enemy’s strong and deep defenses, the dissection of his group into two parts and the exit of Soviet troops to the rear of the enemy’s Kharkov defensive region.

In the Battle of Kursk, the problem of creating large strategic reserves and their effective use was successfully resolved, and strategic air supremacy was finally won, which was held by Soviet aviation until the end of the Great Patriotic War. The Supreme High Command headquarters skillfully carried out strategic interaction not only between the fronts participating in the battle, but also with those operating in other directions.

Soviet operational art in the Battle of Kursk for the first time solved the problem of creating a deliberate positional insurmountable and active operational defense up to 70 km deep.

During the counteroffensive, the problem of breaking through the enemy's deeply layered defense was successfully resolved through the decisive massing of forces and means in the breakthrough areas (from 50 to 90% of their total number), the skillful use of tank armies and corps as mobile groups of fronts and armies, and close cooperation with aviation , which carried out a full front-scale air offensive, which largely ensured the high rate of advance of the ground forces. Valuable experience was gained in conducting oncoming tank battles both in a defensive operation (near Prokhorovka) and during the offensive when repelling counterattacks of large enemy armored groupings.

The successful conduct of the Battle of Kursk was facilitated by the active actions of the partisans. Striking the enemy's rear, they pinned down up to 100 thousand enemy soldiers and officers. The partisans carried out about 1.5 thousand raids on railway lines, disabled more than 1 thousand locomotives and destroyed over 400 military trains.

Fourthly, the defeat of the Nazi troops during the Battle of Kursk was of enormous military-political and international significance. He significantly increased the role and international authority of the Soviet Union. It became obvious that the power of Soviet weapons faced Nazi Germany with inevitable defeat. The sympathy of ordinary people for our country increased even more, the hopes of the peoples of the countries occupied by the Nazis for early liberation strengthened, the front of the national liberation struggle of groups of Resistance fighters in France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway expanded, the anti-fascist struggle intensified both in Germany itself and and other countries of the fascist bloc.

Fifthly, the defeat at Kursk and the results of the battle had a profound impact on the German people, undermined the morale of the German troops and faith in the victorious outcome of the war. Germany was losing influence on its allies, disagreements within the fascist bloc intensified, which later led to a political and military crisis. The beginning of the collapse of the fascist bloc was laid - Mussolini's regime collapsed, and Italy came out of the war on the side of Germany.

The victory of the Red Army at Kursk forced Germany and its allies to go on the defensive in all theaters of World War II, which had a huge impact on its further course. The transfer of significant enemy forces from the west to the Soviet-German front and their further defeat by the Red Army facilitated the landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy and predetermined their success.

Sixth, under the influence of the victory of the Red Army, cooperation between the leading countries of the anti-Hitler coalition strengthened. She had a great influence on the ruling circles of the USA and Great Britain. At the end of 1943, the Tehran Conference took place, at which the leaders of the USSR, USA, and Great Britain I.V. met for the first time. Stalin; F.D. Roosevelt, W. Churchill. At the conference, it was decided to open a second front in Europe in May 1944. Assessing the results of the victory at Kursk, the head of the British government, W. Churchill, noted: “Three huge battles - for Kursk, Orel and Kharkov, all carried out within two months, marked the collapse of the German army on the Eastern Front.”

Victory in the Battle of Kursk was achieved thanks to the further strengthening of the military-economic power of the country and its Armed Forces.

One of the decisive factors that ensured victory at Kursk was the high moral, political and psychological state of the personnel of our troops. In the fierce battle, such powerful sources of victory for the Soviet people and their army as patriotism, friendship of peoples, self-confidence and success emerged with all their might. Soviet soldiers and commanders showed miracles of mass heroism, exceptional courage, perseverance and military skill, for which 132 formations and units received the Guards rank, 26 were awarded the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, and Kharkov. More than 100 thousand soldiers were awarded orders and medals, and 231 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The victory at Kursk was also achieved thanks to a powerful economic base. The increased capabilities of Soviet industry, the heroic feat of home front workers, made it possible to provide the Red Army with huge quantities of advanced models of military equipment and weapons, superior in a number of decisive indicators to the military equipment of Nazi Germany.

Highly appreciating the role and significance of the Battle of Kursk, the courage, resilience and mass heroism shown by the defenders of the cities of Belgorod, Kursk and Orel in the struggle for the freedom and independence of the Fatherland, by Decrees of the President of the Russian Federation dated April 27, 2007, these cities were awarded the honorary title “City of Military Glory” "

Before and during a lesson on this topic, it is advisable to visit the museum of the formation or unit, organize viewing of documentaries and feature films about the Battle of Kursk, and invite veterans of the Great Patriotic War to perform.

In the introductory speech, it is advisable to emphasize the importance of such a historical event as the Battle of Kursk, emphasizing the fact that here a radical turning point in the course of the war ended and the mass expulsion of enemy troops from our territory began.

When covering the first question, it is necessary, using a map, to show the location and balance of forces of the opposing sides at different stages of the Battle of Kursk, while emphasizing that it is an unsurpassed example of Soviet military art. In addition, it is necessary to talk in detail about the exploits, give examples of the courage and heroism of soldiers of their branch of troops committed in the Battle of Kursk.

In the course of considering the second question, it is necessary to objectively show the significance, role and place of the Battle of Kursk in Russian military history, and to consider in more detail the factors that contributed to this great victory.

At the end of the lesson, it is necessary to draw brief conclusions, answer questions from the audience, and thank the invited veterans.

1. Military encyclopedia in 8 volumes. T.4. - M.: Military Publishing House. 1999.

2. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941 - 1945: A Brief History. - M., 1984.

3. Dembitsky N., Strelnikov V. The most important operations of the Red Army and Navy in 1943 // Landmark. - 2003. - No. 1.

4. History of the Second World War 1939 -1945 in 12 volumes. T.7. - M., 1976.

Lieutenant colonel
Dmitry Samosvat,
Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences, Lieutenant Colonel
Alexey Kurshev

Battle of Kursk(July 5, 1943 - August 23, 1943, also known as the Battle of Kursk) is one of the key battles of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War in terms of its scale, forces and means involved, tension, results and military-political consequences. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into 3 parts: Kursk defensive operation (July 5-12); Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive. The German side called the offensive part of the battle “Operation Citadel.”

After the end of the battle, the strategic initiative in the war passed to the side of the Red Army, which until the end of the war carried out mainly offensive operations, while the Wehrmacht was on the defensive.

Story

After the defeat at Stalingrad, the German command decided to take revenge, having in mind the implementation of a major offensive on the Soviet-German front, the location of which was the so-called Kursk ledge (or arc), formed by Soviet troops in the winter and spring of 1943. The Battle of Kursk, like the battles of Moscow and Stalingrad, was distinguished by its great scope and focus. More than 4 million people, over 69 thousand guns and mortars, 13.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, and up to 12 thousand combat aircraft took part in it on both sides.

In the Kursk area, the Germans concentrated up to 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized divisions, which were part of the 9th and 2nd armies of the Center group of General Field Marshal von Kluge, the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force group Army "South" of Field Marshal E. Manstein. Operation Citadel, developed by the Germans, envisaged the encirclement of Soviet troops with converging attacks on Kursk and a further offensive into the depths of the defense.

The situation in the Kursk direction by the beginning of July 1943

By the beginning of July, the Soviet command completed preparations for the Battle of Kursk. The troops operating in the Kursk salient area were reinforced. From April to July, the Central and Voronezh Fronts received 10 rifle divisions, 10 anti-tank artillery brigades, 13 separate anti-tank artillery regiments, 14 artillery regiments, 8 guards mortar regiments, 7 separate tank and self-propelled artillery regiments and other units . From March to July, 5,635 guns and 3,522 mortars, as well as 1,294 aircraft, were placed at the disposal of these fronts. The Steppe Military District, units and formations of the Bryansk and left wing of the Western Front received significant reinforcements. The troops concentrated in the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov directions were prepared to repel powerful attacks from selected Wehrmacht divisions and launch a decisive counteroffensive.

The defense of the northern flank was carried out by the troops of the Central Front under General Rokossovsky, and the southern flank by the Voronezh Front of General Vatutin. The depth of defense was 150 kilometers and was built in several echelons. Soviet troops had some advantage in manpower and equipment; In addition, warned of the German offensive, the Soviet command carried out counter-artillery preparation on July 5, inflicting significant losses on the enemy.

Having revealed the offensive plan of the fascist German command, the Supreme High Command Headquarters decided to exhaust and bleed the enemy’s strike forces through deliberate defense, and then complete their complete defeat with a decisive counteroffensive. The defense of the Kursk ledge was entrusted to the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts. Both fronts numbered more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3,300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,650 aircraft. Troops of the Central Front (48, 13, 70, 65, 60th Combined Arms Army, 2nd Tank Army, 16th Air Army, 9th and 19th Separate Tank Corps) under the command of General K.K. Rokossovsky was supposed to repel the enemy's attack from Orel. In front of the Voronezh Front (38th, 40th, 6th and 7th Guards, 69th Armies, 1st Tank Army, 2nd Air Army, 35th Guards Rifle Corps, 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps) , commanded by General N.F. Vatutin was tasked with repelling the enemy’s attack from Belgorod. In the rear of the Kursk ledge, the Steppe Military District was deployed (from July 9 - Steppe Front: 4th and 5th Guards, 27th, 47th, 53rd armies, 5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Air Army, 1 rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized, 3 cavalry corps), which was the strategic reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters.

On August 3, after powerful artillery preparation and air strikes, front troops, supported by a barrage of fire, went on the offensive and successfully broke through the first enemy position. With the introduction of second echelons of regiments into battle, the second position was broken through. To increase the efforts of the 5th Guards Army, advanced tank brigades of the corps of the first echelon of tank armies were brought into battle. They, together with rifle divisions, completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s main defense line. Following the advanced brigades, the main forces of the tank armies were brought into battle. By the end of the day, they overcame the second line of enemy defense and advanced 12–26 km in depth, thereby separating the Tomarov and Belgorod centers of enemy resistance. Simultaneously with the tank armies, the following were introduced into the battle: in the zone of the 6th Guards Army - the 5th Guards Tank Corps, and in the zone of the 53rd Army - the 1st Mechanized Corps. They, together with rifle formations, broke the enemy’s resistance, completed the breakthrough of the main defensive line, and by the end of the day approached the second defensive line. Having broken through the tactical defense zone and destroyed the nearest operational reserves, the main strike group of the Voronezh Front began pursuing the enemy in the morning of the second day of the operation.

One of the largest tank battles in world history took place in the Prokhorovka area. About 1,200 tanks and self-propelled artillery units took part in this battle on both sides. On July 12, the Germans were forced to go on the defensive, and on July 16 they began to retreat. Pursuing the enemy, Soviet troops drove the Germans back to their starting line. At the same time, at the height of the battle, on July 12, Soviet troops on the Western and Bryansk fronts launched an offensive in the Oryol bridgehead area and liberated the cities of Orel and Belgorod. Partisan units provided active assistance to the regular troops. They disrupted enemy communications and the work of rear agencies. In the Oryol region alone, from July 21 to August 9, more than 100 thousand rails were blown up. The German command was forced to keep a significant number of divisions only on security duty.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

The troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts defeated 15 enemy divisions, advanced 140 km in the southern and southwestern direction, and came close to the Donbass enemy group. Soviet troops liberated Kharkov. During the occupation and battles, the Nazis destroyed about 300 thousand civilians and prisoners of war in the city and region (according to incomplete data), about 160 thousand people were driven to Germany, they destroyed 1,600 thousand m2 of housing, over 500 industrial enterprises, all cultural and educational , medical and communal institutions. Thus, Soviet troops completed the defeat of the entire Belgorod-Kharkov enemy group and took an advantageous position to launch a general offensive with the aim of liberating Left Bank Ukraine and Donbass. Our relatives also took part in the Battle of Kursk.

The strategic talent of Soviet commanders was revealed in the Battle of Kursk. The operational art and tactics of military leaders showed superiority over the German classical school: second echelons in the offensive, powerful mobile groups, and strong reserves began to emerge. During the 50-day battles, Soviet troops defeated 30 German divisions, including 7 tank divisions. The total losses of the enemy amounted to more than 500 thousand people, up to 1.5 thousand tanks, 3 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3.5 thousand aircraft.

Near Kursk, the Wehrmacht military machine suffered such a blow, after which the outcome of the war was actually predetermined. This was a radical change in the course of the war, forcing many politicians on all warring sides to reconsider their positions. The successes of the Soviet troops in the summer of 1943 had a profound influence on the work of the Tehran Conference, in which the leaders of the countries participating in the anti-Hitler coalition took part, and on its decision to open a second front in Europe in May 1944.

The victory of the Red Army was highly appreciated by our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. In particular, US President F. Roosevelt wrote in his message to J.V. Stalin: “During a month of gigantic battles, your armed forces, with their skill, their courage, their dedication and their tenacity, not only stopped the long-planned German offensive, but also began a successful a counter-offensive with far-reaching consequences... The Soviet Union can rightly be proud of its heroic victories.”

The victory at the Kursk Bulge was of invaluable importance for further strengthening the moral and political unity of the Soviet people and raising the morale of the Red Army. The struggle of Soviet people located in the territories of our country temporarily occupied by the enemy received a powerful impetus. The partisan movement gained even greater scope.

The decisive factor in achieving the victory of the Red Army in the Battle of Kursk was the fact that the Soviet command managed to correctly determine the direction of the main attack of the enemy’s summer (1943) offensive. And not only to determine, but also to be able to reveal in detail the plan of Hitler’s command, to obtain data about the plan for Operation Citadel and the composition of the grouping of enemy troops, and even the start time of the operation. The decisive role in this belonged to Soviet intelligence.

In the Battle of Kursk, Soviet military art received further development, and all 3 of its components: strategy, operational art and tactics. Thus, in particular, experience was gained in creating large groupings of troops in defense capable of withstanding massive attacks by enemy tanks and aircraft, creating powerful in-depth positional defense, the art of decisively massing forces and means in the most important directions, as well as the art of maneuvering as during a defensive battle as well as an offensive one.

The Soviet command skillfully chose the moment to launch a counteroffensive, when the enemy’s strike forces were already thoroughly exhausted during the defensive battle. With the transition of Soviet troops to a counteroffensive, the correct choice of attack directions and the most appropriate methods of defeating the enemy, as well as the organization of interaction between fronts and armies in solving operational-strategic tasks, were of great importance.

The presence of strong strategic reserves, their advance preparation and timely entry into battle played a decisive role in achieving success.

One of the most important factors that ensured the Red Army's victory on the Kursk Bulge was the courage and heroism of Soviet soldiers, their dedication in the fight against a strong and experienced enemy, their unshakable resilience in defense and unstoppable pressure in the offensive, readiness for any test to defeat the enemy. The source of these high moral and fighting qualities was not at all the fear of repression, as some publicists and “historians” are now trying to present, but a feeling of patriotism, hatred of the enemy and love of the Fatherland. It was they who were the sources of the mass heroism of Soviet soldiers, their loyalty to military duty when carrying out combat missions of the command, countless feats in battle and selfless dedication in defending their Fatherland - in a word, everything without which victory in the war is impossible. The Motherland highly appreciated the exploits of Soviet soldiers in the Battle of the Arc of Fire. More than 100 thousand participants in the battle were awarded orders and medals, and over 180 of the bravest warriors were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The turning point in the work of the rear and the entire economy of the country, achieved by the unprecedented labor feat of the Soviet people, made it possible by mid-1943 to supply the Red Army in ever-increasing volumes with all the necessary material resources, and above all with weapons and military equipment, including new models, not only not inferior in terms of tactical and technical characteristics, they were the best examples of German weapons and equipment, but often surpassed them. Among them, it is necessary, first of all, to highlight the appearance of 85-, 122- and 152-mm self-propelled guns, new anti-tank guns using sub-caliber and cumulative projectiles, which played a big role in the fight against enemy tanks, including heavy ones, new types of aircraft, etc. d. All this was one of the most important conditions for the growth of the combat power of the Red Army and its increasingly steadily increasing superiority over the Wehrmacht. It was the Battle of Kursk that was the decisive event that marked the completion of a radical turning point in the war in favor of the Soviet Union. In a figurative expression, the backbone of Nazi Germany was broken in this battle. The Wehrmacht was never destined to recover from the defeats it suffered on the battlefields of Kursk, Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov. The Battle of Kursk became one of the most important stages on the path of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces to victory over Nazi Germany. In terms of its military-political significance, it was the largest event of both the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War. The Battle of Kursk is one of the most glorious dates in the military history of our Fatherland, the memory of which will live for centuries.

Despite the artistic exaggerations associated with Prokhorovka, the Battle of Kursk was indeed the last attempt by the Germans to win back the situation. Taking advantage of the negligence of the Soviet command and inflicting a major defeat on the Red Army near Kharkov in the early spring of 1943, the Germans received another “chance” to play the summer offensive card according to the models of 1941 and 1942.

But by 1943, the Red Army was already different, just like the Wehrmacht, it was worse than itself two years ago. Two years of bloody meat grinder were not in vain for him, plus the delay in starting the offensive on Kursk made the very fact of the offensive obvious to the Soviet command, which quite reasonably decided not to repeat the mistakes of the spring-summer of 1942 and voluntarily conceded to the Germans the right to launch offensive actions in order to wear down them on the defensive, and then destroy the weakened strike forces.

In general, the implementation of this plan once again showed how much the level of strategic planning of the Soviet leadership had increased since the start of the war. And at the same time, the inglorious end of the “Citadel” once again showed the subsidence of this level among the Germans, who tried to reverse the difficult strategic situation with obviously insufficient means.

Actually, even Manstein, the most intelligent German strategist, had no special illusions about this decisive battle for Germany, reasoning in his memoirs that if everything had turned out differently, then it would have been possible to somehow jump from the USSR to a draw, that is, in fact admitted that after Stalingrad there was no talk of victory for Germany at all.

In theory, the Germans, of course, could push through our defenses and reach Kursk, encircling a couple of dozen divisions, but even in this wonderful scenario for the Germans, their success did not lead them to solving the problem of the Eastern Front, but only led to a delay before the inevitable end, because By 1943, Germany's military production was already clearly inferior to that of the Soviet Union, and the need to plug the “Italian hole” did not make it possible to assemble any large forces to conduct further offensive operations on the Eastern Front.

But our army did not allow the Germans to amuse themselves with the illusion of even such a victory. The strike groups were bled dry during a week of heavy defensive battles, and then the roller coaster of our offensive began, which, starting in the summer of 1943, was practically unstoppable, no matter how much the Germans resisted in the future.

In this regard, the Battle of Kursk is truly one of the iconic battles of the Second World War, and not only due to the scale of the battle and the millions of soldiers and tens of thousands of military equipment involved. It finally demonstrated to the whole world and, above all, to the Soviet people, that Germany was doomed.

Remember today all those who died in this epoch-making battle and those who survived it, reaching from Kursk to Berlin.

Below is a selection of photographs of the Battle of Kursk.

Commander of the Central Front, Army General K.K. Rokossovsky and member of the Front Military Council, Major General K.F. Telegin at the forefront before the start of the Battle of Kursk. 1943

Soviet sappers install TM-42 anti-tank mines in front of the front line of defense. Central Front, Kursk Bulge, July 1943

Transfer of "Tigers" for Operation Citadel.

Manstein and his generals are at work.

German traffic controller. Behind is an RSO crawler tractor.

Construction of defensive structures on the Kursk Bulge. June 1943.

At a rest stop.

On the eve of the Battle of Kursk. Testing infantry with tanks. Red Army soldiers in a trench and a T-34 tank that overcomes the trench, passing over them. 1943

German machine gunner with MG-42.

Panthers are preparing for Operation Citadel.

Self-propelled howitzers "Wespe" of the 2nd battalion of the artillery regiment "Grossdeutschland" on the march. Operation Citadel, July 1943.

German Pz.Kpfw.III tanks before the start of Operation Citadel in a Soviet village.

The crew of the Soviet tank T-34-76 "Marshal Choibalsan" (from the "Revolutionary Mongolia" tank column) and the attached troops on vacation. Kursk Bulge, 1943.

Smoke break in German trenches.

A peasant woman tells Soviet intelligence officers about the location of enemy units. North of the city of Orel, 1943.

Sergeant Major V. Sokolova, medical instructor of anti-tank artillery units of the Red Army. Oryol direction. Kursk Bulge, summer 1943.

The German 105-mm self-propelled gun "Wespe" (Sd.Kfz.124 Wespe) from the 74th self-propelled artillery regiment of the 2nd tank division of the Wehrmacht, passes next to an abandoned Soviet 76-mm ZIS-3 gun in the area of ​​​​the city of Orel. German offensive Operation Citadel. Oryol region, July 1943.

The Tigers are on the attack.

Photojournalist of the newspaper "Red Star" O. Knorring and cameraman I. Malov are filming the interrogation of the captured chief corporal A. Bauschof, who voluntarily went over to the side of the Red Army. The interrogation is conducted by Captain S.A. Mironov (right) and translator Iones (center). Oryol-Kursk direction, July 7, 1943.

German soldiers on the Kursk Bulge. Part of the body of the radio-controlled B-IV tank is visible from above.

German B-IV robot tanks and Pz.Kpfw control tanks destroyed by Soviet artillery. III (one of the tanks has the number F 23). Northern face of the Kursk Bulge (near the village of Glazunovka). July 5, 1943

Tank landing of sapper demolitions (sturmpionieren) from the SS division "Das Reich" on the armor of the StuG III Ausf F assault gun. Kursk Bulge, 1943.

Destroyed Soviet T-60 tank.

The Ferdinand self-propelled gun is on fire. July 1943, village of Ponyri.

Two damaged Ferdinands from the headquarters company of the 654th battalion. Ponyri station area, July 15-16, 1943. On the left is the headquarters "Ferdinand" No. II-03. The car was burned with bottles of kerosene mixture after its undercarriage was damaged by a shell.

The Ferdinand heavy assault gun, destroyed by a direct hit from an aerial bomb from a Soviet Pe-2 dive bomber. Tactical number unknown. Area of ​​Ponyri station and state farm "May 1".

Heavy assault gun "Ferdinand", tail number "723" from the 654th division (battalion), knocked out in the area of ​​the "1 May" state farm. The track was destroyed by projectile hits and the gun was jammed. The vehicle was part of the "Major Kahl's strike group" as part of the 505th heavy tank battalion of the 654th division.

A tank column is moving towards the front.

Tigers" from the 503rd heavy tank battalion.

Katyushas are firing.

Tiger tanks of the SS Panzer Division "Das Reich".

A company of American M3s General Lee tanks, supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease, is moving to the front line of defense of the Soviet 6th Guards Army. Kursk Bulge, July 1943.

Soviet soldiers near a damaged Panther. July 1943.

Heavy assault gun "Ferdinand", tail number "731", chassis number 150090 from the 653rd division, blown up by a mine in the defense zone of the 70th army. Later, this car was sent to an exhibition of captured equipment in Moscow.

Self-propelled gun Su-152 Major Sankovsky. His crew destroyed 10 enemy tanks in the first battle during the Battle of Kursk.

T-34-76 tanks support the infantry attack in the Kursk direction.

Soviet infantry in front of a destroyed Tiger tank.

Attack of T-34-76 near Belgorod. July 1943.

Abandoned near Prokhorovka, faulty "Panthers" of the 10th "Panther Brigade" of the von Lauchert tank regiment.

German observers are monitoring the progress of the battle.

Soviet infantrymen hide behind the hull of a destroyed Panther.

The Soviet mortar crew changes its firing position. Bryansk Front, Oryol direction. July 1943.

An SS grenadier looks at a T-34 that has just been shot down. It was probably destroyed by one of the first modifications of the Panzerfaust, which were first widely used at the Kursk Bulge.

Destroyed German Pz.Kpfw tank. V modification D2, shot down during Operation Citadel (Kursk Bulge). This photograph is interesting because it contains the signature “Ilyin” and the date “26/7”. This is probably the name of the gun commander who knocked out the tank.

Leading units of the 285th Infantry Regiment of the 183rd Infantry Division engage the enemy in captured German trenches. In the foreground is the body of a killed German soldier. Battle of Kursk, July 10, 1943.

Sappers of the SS division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" near a damaged T-34-76 tank. July 7, area of ​​the village of Pselets.

Soviet tanks on the attack line.

Destroyed Pz IV and Pz VI tanks near Kursk.

Pilots of the Normandie-Niemen squadron.

Reflecting a tank attack. Ponyri village area. July 1943.

Shot down "Ferdinand". The corpses of his crew lie nearby.

The artillerymen are fighting.

Damaged German equipment during the battles in the Kursk direction.

A German tankman examines the mark left by a hit in the Tiger's frontal projection. July, 1943.

Red Army soldiers next to a downed Ju-87 dive bomber.

Damaged "Panther". I made it to Kursk as a trophy.

Machine gunners on the Kursk Bulge. July 1943.

Self-propelled gun Marder III and panzergrenadiers at the starting line before the attack. July 1943.

Broken Panther. The tower was torn down by an explosion of ammunition.

Burning German self-propelled gun "Ferdinand" from the 656th regiment on the Oryol front of the Kursk Bulge, July 1943. The photo was taken through the driver's hatch of the Pz.Kpfw control tank. III robotic tanks B-4.

Soviet soldiers near a damaged Panther. A huge hole from a 152-mm St. John's wort is visible in the turret.

Burnt tanks of the column "For Soviet Ukraine". On the tower torn down by the explosion one can see the inscription “For Radianska Ukraine” (For Soviet Ukraine).

Killed German tankman. In the background is a Soviet T-70 tank.

Soviet soldiers inspect a German heavy self-propelled artillery installation of the Ferdinand tank destroyer class, which was knocked out during the Battle of Kursk. The photo is also interesting because of the SSH-36 steel helmet, rare for 1943, on the soldier on the left.

Soviet soldiers near a disabled Stug III assault gun.

A German B-IV robot tank and a German BMW R-75 motorcycle with a sidecar destroyed on the Kursk Bulge. 1943

Self-propelled gun "Ferdinand" after the detonation of ammunition.

The crew of an anti-tank gun fires at enemy tanks. July 1943.

The picture shows a damaged German medium tank PzKpfw IV (modifications H or G). July 1943.

The commander of the Pz.kpfw VI "Tiger" tank No. 323 of the 3rd company of the 503rd battalion of heavy tanks, non-commissioned officer Futermeister, shows the mark of a Soviet shell on the armor of his tank to Sergeant Major Heiden. Kursk Bulge, July 1943.

Statement of combat mission. July 1943.

Pe-2 front-line dive bombers on a combat course. Oryol-Belgorod direction. July 1943.

Towing a faulty Tiger. On the Kursk Bulge, the Germans suffered significant losses due to non-combat breakdowns of their equipment.

T-34 goes on the attack.

The British Churchill tank, captured by the "Der Fuhrer" regiment of the "Das Reich" division, was supplied under Lend-Lease.

Tank destroyer Marder III on the march. Operation Citadel, July 1943.

and in the foreground on the right is a damaged Soviet T-34 tank, further on the left edge of the photo is a German Pz.Kpfw. VI "Tiger", another T-34 in the distance.

Soviet soldiers inspect an exploded German tank Pz IV ausf G.

Soldiers from the unit of Senior Lieutenant A. Burak, with the support of artillery, are conducting an offensive. July 1943.

A German prisoner of war on the Kursk Bulge near a broken 150-mm infantry gun sIG.33. On the right lies a dead German soldier. July 1943.

Oryol direction. Soldiers under the cover of tanks go on the attack. July 1943.

German units, which include captured Soviet T-34-76 tanks, are preparing for an attack during the Battle of Kursk. July 28, 1943.

RONA (Russian People's Liberation Army) soldiers among captured Red Army soldiers. Kursk Bulge, July-August 1943.

Soviet tank T-34-76 destroyed in a village on the Kursk Bulge. August, 1943.

Under enemy fire, tankers pull a damaged T-34 from the battlefield.

Soviet soldiers rise to attack.

An officer of the Grossdeutschland division in a trench. Late July-early August.

Participant in the battles on the Kursk Bulge, reconnaissance officer, guard senior sergeant A.G. Frolchenko (1905 - 1967), awarded the Order of the Red Star (according to another version, the photo shows Lieutenant Nikolai Alekseevich Simonov). Belgorod direction, August 1943.

A column of German prisoners captured in the Oryol direction. August 1943.

German SS soldiers in a trench with an MG-42 machine gun during Operation Citadel. Kursk Bulge, July-August 1943.

On the left is an Sd.Kfz anti-aircraft self-propelled gun. 10/4 based on a half-track tractor with a 20-mm FlaK 30 anti-aircraft gun. Kursk Bulge, August 3, 1943.

The priest blesses Soviet soldiers. Oryol direction, 1943.

A Soviet T-34-76 tank knocked out in the Belgorod area and a tanker killed.

A column of captured Germans in the Kursk area.

German PaK 35/36 anti-tank guns captured on the Kursk Bulge. In the background is a Soviet ZiS-5 truck towing a 37 mm 61-k anti-aircraft gun. July 1943.

Soldiers of the 3rd SS Division "Totenkopf" ("Death's Head") discuss a defensive plan with the Tiger commander from the 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion. Kursk Bulge, July-August 1943.

German prisoners in the Kursk region.

Tank commander, Lieutenant B.V. Smelov shows a hole in the turret of a German Tiger tank, knocked out by Smelov’s crew, to Lieutenant Likhnyakevich (who knocked out 2 fascist tanks in the last battle). This hole was made by an ordinary armor-piercing shell from a 76-mm tank gun.

Senior Lieutenant Ivan Shevtsov next to the German Tiger tank he destroyed.

Trophies of the Battle of Kursk.

German heavy assault gun "Ferdinand" of the 653rd battalion (division), captured in good condition along with its crew by soldiers of the Soviet 129th Oryol Rifle Division. August 1943.

The eagle is taken.

The 89th Rifle Division enters liberated Belgorod.

Preparation of the Kursk strategic defensive operation (April - June 1943)

6.4. Directive of the Supreme High Command Headquarters on the creation of a Reserve Front (from 15.4 - Stepnoy Military District) consisting of 5 combined arms, 1 tank and 1 air armies and several rifle, cavalry, tank (mechanized) corps.

8.4. Report of Marshal G.K. Zhukov to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the possible actions of the Germans and Soviet troops in the spring and summer of 1943 and on the advisability of switching to a deliberate defense in the Kursk region.

10.4. Request from the General Staff to the commanders of the front forces about their thoughts on assessing the situation and possible actions of the enemy.

12–13.4. The Supreme Command Headquarters, based on the report of Marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky, General A.I. Antonov, as well as taking into account the considerations of the front commanders, made a preliminary decision to switch to deliberate defense in the Kursk region.

15.4. Order No. 6 of the Wehrmacht headquarters on preparations for the offensive operation near Kursk (code name “Citadel”)

6–8.5. Operations of the Soviet Air Force to destroy enemy aircraft at airfields and in the air on the central sector of the Soviet-German front.

8.5. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command advises the commanders of the Bryansk, Central, Voronezh and South-Western fronts on the timing of a possible enemy offensive.

10.5. Directive of the Supreme High Command Headquarters to the commander of the troops of the Western, Bryansk, Central, Voronezh and Southwestern fronts on improving defense.

May - June. Organization of defense in the zones of the Bryansk, Central, Voronezh and Southwestern fronts, creation of deeply echeloned defensive lines, replenishment of troops, accumulation of reserves and materiel. Continuation of Soviet Air Force operations to destroy enemy aircraft at airfields and in the air.

2.7. Directive from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to the commanders of the front forces, indicating the timing of the possible start of the enemy’s offensive (3–6.7).

4.7. The Germans conducted reconnaissance in force in the defense zones of the 6th and 7th Guards. armies of the Voronezh Front. The offensive of several reinforced enemy battalions was repulsed.

5.7. At 02:20 Based on reconnaissance data about the time of the start of the German offensive (scheduled for 03:00 on 5.7), artillery counter-preparation was carried out and air strikes were carried out on enemy troops concentrated in the initial areas.

5.7. The Germans, with the main forces of Army Groups "Center" and "South", went on the offensive on the northern (05:30) and southern (06:00) fronts of the Kursk bulge, delivering massive attacks in the general direction of Kursk.

The operation involved troops of the Central Front (commanded by General K.K. Rokossovsky) - 48, 13, 70, 65, 60th, 2nd Tank, 16th Air Armies, 9th and 19th Tank Corps - in the Oryol direction; Voronezh Front (commander General N.F. Vatutin) - 38th, 40th, 6th Guards, 7th Guards, 69th, 1st Guards. Tank, 2nd Air Army, 35th Guards. sk, 5th guards tk - in the Belgorod direction. In their rear, strategic reserves were deployed, united in the Steppe Military District (from July 9, Steppe Front, commander General I.S. Konev) - 4th Guards, 5th Guards, 27th, 47th, 53rd, 5th Guards. tank, 5th air army, one sk, three tk, three mk and three kk - with the task of preventing a deep breakthrough of the enemy, and when going on a counteroffensive, increase the force of the strike.

5.7. At 05:30 the strike force of the 9th German Army (9 divisions, including 2 tank divisions; 500 tanks, 280 assault guns), with aviation support, attacked positions at the junction of the 13th (General N.P. Pukhov) and 70th (General I. V. Galanin) armies in a sector of 45 km, concentrating the main efforts in the Olkhovat direction. By the end of the day, the enemy managed to wedge 6–8 km into the army’s defenses and reach the second defensive line.

6.7. By the decision of the front commander, a counterattack was launched against the wedged enemy in the Olkhovatka area by part of the forces of the 13th and 2nd tank armies and the 19th tank army. The enemy's advance here was stopped.

7.7. The Germans transferred the main efforts to the 13th Army zone in the direction of Ponyri. Counterattacks of the 15th and 18th Guards. sk and 3 tk.

7-11.7. Repeated attempts by the German 9th Army to break through the defenses of the Central Front were unsuccessful. During the seven days of the offensive, the enemy advanced only 10–12 km.

12.7. The transition of the 9th German Army to defense in the Central Front. Completion of the defensive operation.

13.7. At a meeting at Hitler's headquarters, a decision was made to switch to the defense of the troops of the 9th Army in the north and to continue the offensive by the troops of the 4th Panzer Army in the south of the Kursk ledge.

5.7. At 06:00 After artillery preparation and massive air raids, the strike force of Army Group South, consisting of the 4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf (1,500 tanks), went on the offensive.

The enemy sent the main forces (2 SS tanks, 48 ​​tanks, 52 ak) against the 6th Guards. the army of General I.M. Chistyakov in the Oboyan direction.

Against the 7th Guards. In the army of General M.S. Shumilov, three tank and three infantry divisions of 3 Tank Corps, 42 AK and AK "Raus" were advancing in the Korochan direction.

The intense battles that unfolded continued throughout the day and were fierce.

The counterattack launched by part of the forces of the 1st Guards. the tank army of General M.E. Katukov did not give a positive result.

By the end of the first day of the battle, the enemy managed to break into the defenses of the 6th Guards. army at 8-10 km.

On the night of July 6, by decision of the front commander of the 1st Guards. Tank Army, 5th and 2nd Guards. TK were deployed on the second defensive line of the 6th Guards. army on a 52-kilometer front.

6.7. The enemy in the Oboyan direction broke through the main defense line of the 6th Guards. army, and by the end of the day, having advanced 10–18 km, he broke through the second line of defense of this army in a narrow area.

In the Korochan direction, the enemy's 3rd Tank Tank reached the second line of defense of the 7th Guards. army.

7.7. At night, J.V. Stalin gave personal instructions to General N.F. Vatutin to wear down the enemy on prepared lines and not allow him to break through before the start of our active operations on the Western, Bryansk and other fronts.

7-10.7. There were fierce tank battles in the Oboyan and Korochan directions. The German tank group managed to break through to the army defensive zone of the 6th Guards. army, and in the Korochan direction the enemy broke into the second line of defense of the 7th Guards. army. However, the further advance of the Germans was delayed, but not stopped. The Germans, having advanced to a depth of 35 km and unable to overcome the resistance of the front tank forces on the Oboyan highway, decided to break through to Kursk from the south through Prokhorovka.

9.7. In the created alarming situation on the Voronezh Front, the Supreme High Command Headquarters ordered the commander of the Steppe Front to advance the 4th Guards, 27th, 53rd Armies to the Kursk-Belgorod direction and transfer the 5th Guards to the subordination of N.F. Vatutin. army of General A.S. Zhadov, 5th Guards. the tank army of General P. A. Rotmistrov and a number of separate tank corps. The commander of the Voronezh Front and Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, who was on this front, decided to launch a powerful counterattack against the German group advancing on Kursk from the south.

11.7. The enemy unexpectedly launched a strong tank and air strike and pushed back formations and units of the 1st Guards. tank, 5th, 6th, 7th Guards. armies and captured the line planned for the deployment of the 5th Guards. tank army. After this, the 1st Guards. tank and 6th Guards. the armies were unable to participate in the counterattack.

12.7. One of the largest oncoming tank battles took place, which received the name “Prokhorovskoe” in history. About 1,500 tanks took part in it on both sides. The battle took place simultaneously in two areas: the main forces of the parties fought on the Prokhorovsky field - 18th, 29th, 2nd and 2nd Guards. TK 5th Guards tank army and division of the 5th Guards. army, they were opposed by the SS divisions “Adolf Hitler” and “Reich” of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps; In the Korochan direction, brigades of the 5th Guards acted against the 3rd German Tank Corps. MK 5th Guards tank army.

23.7. The defensive operation of the Voronezh Front was completed.

12.7. A turning point in the Battle of Kursk in favor of the Red Army. On this day, simultaneously with the Battle of Prokhorov, the offensive of the troops of the Western and Bryansk Fronts began in the Oryol direction. The plans outlined by the German command suffered a complete collapse.

It should be noted that as a result of intense air battles during the Kursk defensive operation, Soviet aviation firmly gained air supremacy.

Includes the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operations.

The left wing of the Western Front (commander General V.D. Sokolovsky) took part - 11th Guards, 50th, 11th and 4th Tank Armies; Bryansk Front (commander General M.M. Popov) - 61st, 3rd, 63rd, 3rd Guards. tank and 15th air armies; the right wing of the Central Front - the 48th, 13th, 70th and 2nd Tank Armies.

12–19.7. Breakthrough of enemy defenses by troops of the Western Front. Advance of the 11th Guards. the army of General I. Kh. Bagramyan, 1, 5, 25 Tank Tank to a depth of 70 km and expanding the breakthrough to 150 km.

15.7. The Central Front is included in the operation.

12–16.7. Breakthrough of enemy defenses by troops of the Bryansk Front - 61st (General P. A. Belov), 63rd (General V. Ya. Kolpakchi), 3rd (General A. V. Gorbatov) armies, 1st Guards, 20th Tank Army to a depth of 17–22 km.

19.7. The commander of the Bryansk Front, at the direction of the Supreme Command Headquarters, introduces the 3rd Guards into the battle. tank army of General P. S. Rybalko (800 tanks). The army, together with combined arms formations, breaking through numerous defensive lines, suffered heavy losses. In addition, it was repeatedly regrouped from one direction to another and was eventually transferred to the Central Front.

19.7. Fierce fighting in all directions. Slowdown in the rate of advance of Soviet troops.

20.7. The entry into battle by the commander of the troops of the Western Front of the 11th Army of General I. I. Fedyuninsky, who arrived from the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, which advanced 15 km in 5 days.

26.7. The entry into battle of the 4th Tank Army of General V.M. Badanov, transferred from the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters to the Western Front (650 tanks). She broke through along with the 11th Guards. the army defended the enemy’s defensive lines and advanced 25–30 km in 10 days. In just 30 days, the army fought 150 km and at the end of August was withdrawn for replenishment.

29.7. The troops of the 61st Army of the Bryansk Front captured a large enemy defense center in the city of Bolkhov.

3–5.8. Departure of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to the active army. He visited the headquarters of the Western and Kalinin fronts.

5.8. Liberation of Orel by troops of the 3rd and 69th armies of the Bryansk Front. By order of I.V. Stalin, who was in the active army, the first artillery salute was given in Moscow in honor of the liberation of the city by Soviet troops. Belgorod and Orel.

7.8. The armies of the Western Front went on the offensive north of the Oryol bridgehead, which forced the Germans to weaken resistance in the Bryansk direction, and Soviet troops began to pursue the enemy.

12.8. Troops of the 65th and 70th armies of the Central Front liberated the city of Dmitrovsk-Orlovsky.

13.8. The commander of the Central Front received a directive from the General Staff, which noted serious shortcomings in the use of tanks.

15.8. Troops of the Bryansk Front liberated the city of Karachev.

18.8. Soviet troops reached the approaches to Bryansk and created the conditions for a new operation. During the 37 days of the Oryol operation, Soviet troops advanced 150 km to the west and eliminated the enemy bridgehead from which the Germans had been threatening Moscow for two years.

Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation “Commander Rumyantsev” (August 3-23)

Troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts were involved in the operation (38, 47, 40, 27, 6th Guards, 5th Guards, 52nd, 69th, 7th Guards Armies, 5th Guards and 1st Guards Tank Armies , 5th separate TK and 1st MK).

3–4.8. Breakthrough of enemy defenses by troops of the Voronezh Front, introduction of tank armies and corps into the breakthrough and their entry into operational depth.

5.8. Liberation of Belgorod by units of the 69th and 7th Guards. armies.

6.8. Advancement of tank formations to a depth of 55 km.

7.8. Advancement of tank formations to a depth of 100 km. Capturing important enemy strongholds. Bogodukhov and Grayvoron.

11.8. The exit of tank troops to the Akhtyrka - Trostyanets area.

11–16.8. Enemy counterattack on the troops of the 1st Guards. tank army.

17.8. The troops of the Steppe Front began fighting on the outskirts of Kharkov.

18.8. Enemy counterattack from the Akhtyrka area against the 27th Army. Directive from the Supreme Command Headquarters to the commander of the Voronezh Front on shortcomings in the conduct of the operation.

23.8. By introducing new forces, the Voronezh Front managed to complete the task and liberate Akhtyrka again by August 25.

23.8. The troops of the Steppe Front, with the assistance of the Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts (53rd, 69th, 7th Guards, 57th Army and 5th Guards Tank Army) liberated Kharkov after stubborn battles. During the operation, the troops advanced 140 km in 20 days.