The specifics of scientific knowledge in philosophy briefly. What is the classical picture of the world? What is metaphysics

Cognition is a specific type of human activity aimed at understanding the world around us and oneself in this world. “Knowledge is, determined primarily by socio-historical practice, the process of acquiring and developing knowledge, its constant deepening, expansion, and improvement 4.”

A person comprehends the world around him, masters it in various ways, among which two main ones can be distinguished. First (genetically original) - logistical - production of means of living, labor, practice. Second - spiritual (ideal), within which the cognitive relationship of subject and object is only one of many others. In turn, the process of cognition and the knowledge obtained in it in the course of the historical development of practice and cognition itself is increasingly differentiated and embodied in its various forms.

Each form of social consciousness: science, philosophy, mythology, politics, religion, etc. correspond to specific forms of cognition. Usually the following are distinguished: ordinary, playful, mythological, artistic and figurative, philosophical, religious, personal, scientific. The latter, although related, are not identical to one another; each of them has its own specifics.

We will not dwell on the consideration of each of the forms of knowledge. The subject of our research is scientific knowledge. In this regard, it is advisable to consider the features of only the latter.

1. Features of scientific knowledge

1. The main task of scientific knowledge is the discovery of objective laws of reality - natural, social (public), laws of cognition itself, thinking, etc. Hence the orientation of research mainly on the general, essential properties of an object, its necessary characteristics and their expression in a system of abstractions. “The essence of scientific knowledge lies in the reliable generalization of facts, in the fact that behind the random it finds the necessary, natural, behind the individual - the general, and on this basis makes predictions of various phenomena and events” 5 . Scientific knowledge strives to reveal the necessary, objective connections that are recorded as objective laws. If this is not the case, then there is no science, because the very concept of scientificity presupposes the discovery of laws, a deepening into the essence of the phenomena being studied.

2. The immediate goal and highest value of scientific knowledge is objective truth, comprehended primarily by rational means and methods, but, of course, not without the participation of living contemplation. Hence, a characteristic feature of scientific knowledge is objectivity, the elimination, if possible, of subjectivist aspects in many cases in order to realize the “purity” of consideration of one’s subject. Einstein also wrote: “What we call science has its exclusive task of firmly establishing what exists” 6 . Its task is to give a true reflection of processes, an objective picture of what exists. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that the activity of the subject is the most important condition and prerequisite for scientific knowledge. The latter is impossible without a constructive-critical attitude to reality, excluding inertia, dogmatism, and apologetics.

3. Science, to a greater extent than other forms of knowledge, is focused on being embodied in practice, being a “guide to action” for changing the surrounding reality and managing real processes. The vital meaning of scientific research can be expressed by the formula: “To know in order to foresee, to foresee in order to practically act” - not only in the present, but also in the future. All progress in scientific knowledge is associated with an increase in the power and range of scientific foresight. It is foresight that makes it possible to control and manage processes. Scientific knowledge opens up the possibility of not only predicting the future, but also consciously shaping it. “The orientation of science towards the study of objects that can be included in activity (either actually or potentially, as possible objects of its future development), and their study as subject to objective laws of functioning and development is one of the most important features of scientific knowledge. This feature distinguishes it from other forms of human cognitive activity” 1.

An essential feature of modern science is that it has become such a force that predetermines practice. From the daughter of production, science turns into its mother. Many modern manufacturing processes were born in scientific laboratories. Thus, modern science not only serves the needs of production, but also increasingly acts as a prerequisite for the technical revolution. Great discoveries over the past decades in leading fields of knowledge have led to a scientific and technological revolution that has embraced all elements of the production process: comprehensive automation and mechanization, the development of new types of energy, raw materials and materials, penetration into the microworld and into space. As a result, the prerequisites were created for the gigantic development of the productive forces of society.

4. Scientific knowledge in epistemological terms is a complex contradictory process of reproduction of knowledge that forms an integral developing system of concepts, theories, hypotheses, laws and other ideal forms, enshrined in language - natural or - more characteristically - artificial (mathematical symbols, chemical formulas, etc.) .p.). Scientific knowledge does not simply record its elements, but continuously reproduces them on its own basis, forms them in accordance with its norms and principles. In the development of scientific knowledge, revolutionary periods alternate, the so-called scientific revolutions, which lead to a change in theories and principles, and evolutionary, quiet periods, during which knowledge deepens and becomes more detailed. The process of continuous self-renewal by science of its conceptual arsenal is an important indicator of scientific character.

5. In the process of scientific knowledge, such specific material means as instruments, instruments, and other so-called “scientific equipment” are used, often very complex and expensive (synchrophasotrons, radio telescopes, rocket and space technology, etc.). In addition, science, to a greater extent than other forms of knowledge, is characterized by the use of ideal (spiritual) means and methods such as modern logic, mathematical methods, dialectics, systemic, hypothetico-deductive and other general scientific techniques to study its objects and itself. and methods (see below for details).

6. Scientific knowledge is characterized by strict evidence, validity of the results obtained, and reliability of the conclusions. At the same time, there are many hypotheses, conjectures, assumptions, probabilistic judgments, etc. That is why the logical and methodological training of researchers, their philosophical culture, constant improvement of their thinking, and the ability to correctly apply its laws and principles are of utmost importance.

In modern methodology, various levels of scientific criteria are distinguished, including, in addition to those mentioned, such as the internal systematicity of knowledge, its formal consistency, experimental verifiability, reproducibility, openness to criticism, freedom from bias, rigor, etc. In other forms of knowledge considered criteria may exist (to varying degrees), but there they are not decisive.

Understanding the specifics of scientific knowledge follows from how science itself is defined and what it is. All philosophical movements reflect on the problems of science and science itself and its place in culture in modern philosophy (not only the “philosophy of science” as a specific neo-positivist direction that took shape at the beginning of the 20th century). From the understanding of what science is, the actual philosophical question follows: whether philosophy itself is a science, or is it some other, specific spiritual activity. On the one hand, philosophers of the New Age sought to bring philosophy closer to science, considered philosophy itself a scientific activity (Kant, Hegel), on the other hand, in the 19th century many philosophical trends emerged that made a sharp distinction between philosophy and science (irrationalist movements - philosophy of life, existentialism , philosophical hermeneutics). Already in the 20th century, these trends continued their development, and by the end of this century, the separation and rapprochement of philosophy and science also continues to exist: philosophers of science see the goal of philosophy in the analysis of the principles of scientific knowledge, its development and evolution, in the consideration of the methodology of knowledge (analysis of ways and means obtaining knowledge in the theory of knowledge), in the analysis of paradigms and scientific revolutions, while the tendencies of the non-rationalistic approach to philosophy lead to new interpretations of philosophy as a literary activity (a genre of literature similar and parallel to other literary genres), as free creativity and comprehension, independent of rigid principles natural sciences.

In general, the relationship between science and philosophy is complex: in addition to the worldview interpretation of the results of science, philosophy is also united with science by the desire to construct knowledge in theoretical form, to logical proof of its conclusions. The specificity of scientificity in philosophy is conceptualized as follows:

Science is a sphere of human activity, the function of which is the development and theoretical systematization of objective knowledge about reality. In the course of historical development, science turns into a productive force of society and the most important social institution. The concept of “science” includes both the activity of obtaining new knowledge and the result of this activity - the sum of the scientific knowledge acquired to date, which together forms a scientific picture of the world. The immediate goal of science is to describe, explain and predict the processes and phenomena of reality that constitute the subject of its study, based on the laws it discovers, i.e. in a broad sense - a theoretical reflection of reality.

Being inseparable from the practical way of exploring the world, science as the production of knowledge also represents a specific form of activity. If in material production knowledge is used as a means of increasing labor productivity, then in science it is obtained in the form of a theoretical description, a technological process diagram, a summary of experimental data, a formula for a drug, etc. - forms the main and immediate goal. Unlike types of activities, the result of which is, in principle, known in advance, scientific activity provides an increase in new knowledge. That is why science acts as a force that constantly revolutionizes other activities.

What distinguishes science from the aesthetic (artistic) way of mastering reality is the desire for logical (consistent, demonstrative), maximally generalized objective knowledge.

Science, focused on the criteria of reason, in its essence also was and remains the opposite of religion, which is based on faith (in supernatural, otherworldly, other-worldly principles).

The emergence of science dates back to the 6th century. BC, when in Dr. Greece has the appropriate conditions. The formation of science required criticism and destruction of mythological systems; for its emergence, a sufficiently high level of development of production and social relations was also necessary, leading to the division of mental and physical labor and thereby opening up the opportunity for systematic studies of science (theory, theory - literally with Greek contemplation, speculation, as opposed to practical activity) .

The development of science is characterized by a cumulative (collective) character: at each historical stage it summarizes its past achievements in a concentrated form, and each result of science is an integral part of its general fund; it is not crossed out by subsequent advances in knowledge, but is only rethought and clarified. The continuity of science ensures its functioning as a special type of “social memory” of humanity, theoretically crystallizing the past experience of knowing reality and mastering its laws.

The process of scientific development affects the entire structure of science. At each historical stage, scientific knowledge uses a certain set of cognitive forms - fundamental categories and concepts, methods, principles and schemes of explanation, i.e. everything that is united by the concept of thinking style. For example, ancient thinking is characterized by observation as the main way of obtaining knowledge; the science of modern times is based on experiment and on the dominance of the analytical approach, which directs thinking to the search for the simplest, indecomposable primary elements of the reality under study; modern science is characterized by the desire for a holistic and multilateral coverage of the objects being studied.

The entire history of science is permeated by a complex, dialectical combination of processes of differentiation (separation) and integration (connection): the development of ever new areas of reality and the deepening of knowledge lead to the differentiation of science, to its fragmentation into increasingly specialized areas of knowledge; at the same time, the need for a synthesis of knowledge is constantly expressed in the tendency towards the integration of science. Initially, new branches of science were formed on a subject basis - in accordance with the involvement in the process of cognition of new areas and aspects of reality. For modern science, the transition from subject to problem orientation is becoming more and more characteristic, when new areas of knowledge arise in connection with the promotion of a certain major theoretical or practical problem. Important integrating functions in relation to individual branches of science are often performed by philosophy, as well as such scientific disciplines as mathematics, logic, and computer science, which equip science with a system of unified methods.

According to their focus, according to their direct relationship to practice, individual sciences are usually divided into fundamental and applied. The task of the fundamental sciences (physics, chemistry, biology) is to understand the laws governing the behavior and interaction of the basic structures of nature, society and thinking. The immediate goal of applied sciences is to apply the results of fundamental sciences to solve not only cognitive, but also social and practical problems. Fundamental scientific research determines the prospects for the development of science.

In the structure (structure) of science, there are empirical (experimental) and theoretical levels of research and organization of knowledge. Elements of empirical knowledge are facts obtained through observations and experiments and stating the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of objects and phenomena. Stable repeatability and connections between empirical characteristics are expressed using empirical laws, often of a probabilistic nature. The theoretical level of scientific knowledge presupposes the discovery of laws that enable an idealized description and explanation of empirical situations, i.e. knowledge of the essence of phenomena.

All theoretical disciplines, in one way or another, have their historical roots in practical experience. However, in the course of development, individual sciences break away from their empirical base and develop purely theoretically (for example, mathematics), returning to experience only in the sphere of their practical applications (that is, within the framework of other sciences).

The development of the scientific method has long been the privilege of philosophy, which even now continues to play a leading role in the development of methodological problems (i.e., methods, ways of obtaining knowledge), being the general methodology of science (in the “philosophy of science”). In the 20th century Methodological means are becoming much more differentiated and, in their specific form, are increasingly being developed by science itself.

The formation of science as a social institution occurred in the 17th - early 18th centuries, when the first scientific societies and academies were formed in Europe and the publication of scientific journals began. At the turn of the 19th-20th centuries. A new way of organizing science is emerging - large scientific institutes and laboratories with a powerful technical base, which brings scientific activity closer to the forms of modern industrial labor. Up to the end. 19th century science played a supporting role in relation to production. Then the development of science begins to outstrip the development of technology and production, and a unified system “Science - Technology - Production” takes shape, in which science plays a leading role.

The complexities and contradictions associated with the growing role of science give rise in modern society to diverse and often contradictory forms of its ideological assessment. The poles of such assessments are scientism (from the Latin scientia - science) and anti-scientism. Scientism is characterized by the absolutization of the style and general methods of the “exact” sciences, the declaration of science as the highest cultural value, often accompanied by the denial of social, humanitarian and ideological issues as having no cognitive significance. Antiscientism, on the contrary, proceeds from the position that science is fundamentally limited in solving fundamental (existential, essential) human problems, and in its extreme manifestations it evaluates science as a force hostile to man, denying it a positive influence on culture.

The main distinguishing features of science

It seems intuitively clear how science differs from other forms of human cognitive activity. However, a clear explication of the specific features of science in the form of signs and definitions turns out to be a rather difficult task. This is evidenced by the variety of definitions of science and ongoing discussions on the problem of demarcation between it and other forms of knowledge.

Scientific knowledge, like all forms of spiritual production, is ultimately necessary in order to regulate human activity. Different types of cognition perform this role in different ways, and the analysis of this difference is the first and necessary condition for identifying the characteristics of scientific cognition.

Activity can be considered as a complexly organized network of various acts of transformation of objects, when the products of one activity pass into another and become its components. For example, iron ore, as a product of mining production, becomes an object that is transformed in the activity of a steelmaker; machine tools produced at a plant from the steel mined by a steelmaker become means of activity in another production. Even subjects of activity - people who carry out transformations of objects in accordance with set goals, can to a certain extent be presented as the results of training and education activities, which ensures that the subject masters the necessary patterns of action, knowledge and skills in using certain means in the activity.

The structural characteristics of an elementary act of activity can be presented in the form of the following diagram (Fig. 1).

Rice. 1 Scheme of structural characteristics of an elementary act of activity.

The right side of this diagram depicts the subject structure of activity - the interaction of means with the subject of activity and its transformation into a product through the implementation of certain operations. The left part represents the subject structure, which includes the subject of the activity (with his goals, values, knowledge of operations and skills), carrying out appropriate actions and using certain means of activity for this purpose. Means and actions can be attributed to both object and subject structures, since they can be considered in two ways. On the one hand, means can be presented as artificial organs of human activity. On the other hand, they can be considered as natural objects that interact with other objects. Similarly, operations can be viewed in different ways both as human actions and as natural interactions of objects.

Activities are always governed by certain values ​​and goals. Value answers the question: “why is this or that activity needed?” The goal is the answer to the question: “what should be obtained in the activity.” The goal is the ideal image of the product. It is embodied and objectified in a product, which is the result of the transformation of the subject of activity.

Since activity is universal, the function of its objects can be not only fragments of nature, transformed in practice, but also people, whose “properties” change when they are included in various social subsystems, as well as these subsystems themselves, interacting within society as an integral organism. Then, in the first case, we are dealing with the “subject side” of man’s change in nature, and in the second case, with the “subject side” of practice aimed at changing social objects. From this point of view, a person can act both as a subject and as an object of practical action.

At the early stages of the development of society, the subjective and objective aspects of practical activity are not divided into cognition, but are taken as a single whole. Cognition reflects methods of practical change of objects, including in the characteristics of the latter the goals, abilities and actions of a person. This idea of ​​the objects of activity is transferred to the whole of nature, which is viewed through the prism of the practice being carried out.

It is known, for example, that in the myths of ancient peoples the forces of nature are always likened to human forces, and its processes are always likened to human actions. Primitive thinking, when explaining the phenomena of the external world, invariably resorts to comparing them with human actions and motives. Only in the process of the long evolution of society does knowledge begin to exclude anthropomorphic factors from the characteristics of objective relations. An important role in this process was played by the historical development of practice, and above all by the improvement of means and tools.

As tools became more complex, those operations that had previously been directly performed by man began to “reify,” acting as the sequential influence of one tool on another and only then on the object being transformed. Thus, the properties and states of objects arising due to these operations ceased to seem caused by direct human efforts, but increasingly acted as a result of the interaction of natural objects themselves. Thus, if in the early stages of civilization the movement of goods required muscular effort, then with the invention of the lever and pulley, and then the simplest machines, it was possible to replace these efforts with mechanical ones. For example, using a system of blocks it was possible to balance a large load with a small one, and by adding a small weight to a small load, raise the large load to the desired height. Here, lifting a heavy body does not require human effort: one load independently moves another.

This transfer of human functions to mechanisms leads to a new understanding of the forces of nature. Previously, forces were understood only by analogy with human physical efforts, but now they are beginning to be considered as mechanical forces. The given example can serve as an analogue of the process of “objectification” of the objective relations of practice, which, apparently, began already in the era of the first urban civilizations of antiquity. During this period, cognition begins to gradually separate the objective side of practice from subjective factors and consider this side as a special, independent reality. Such consideration of practice is one of the necessary conditions for the emergence of scientific research.

Science sets as its ultimate goal to foresee the process of transforming objects of practical activity (object in the initial state) into corresponding products (object in the final state). This transformation is always determined by essential connections, the laws of change and development of objects, and the activity itself can be successful only when it is consistent with these laws. Therefore, the main task of science is to identify the laws in accordance with which objects change and develop.

In relation to the processes of transformation of nature, this function is performed by the natural and technical sciences. The processes of change in social objects are studied by social sciences. Since a variety of objects can be transformed in activity - objects of nature, man (and his states of consciousness), subsystems of society, iconic objects functioning as cultural phenomena, etc. - all of them can become subjects of scientific research.

The orientation of science towards the study of objects that can be included in activity (either actually or potentially as possible objects of its future transformation), and their study as subject to objective laws of functioning and development constitutes the first main feature of scientific knowledge.

This feature distinguishes it from other forms of human cognitive activity. So, for example, in the process of artistic exploration of reality, objects included in human activity are not separated from subjective factors, but are taken in a kind of “glue” with them. Any reflection of objects of the objective world in art simultaneously expresses a person’s value attitude towards the object. An artistic image is a reflection of an object that contains the imprint of a human personality, its value orientations, which are fused into the characteristics of the reflected reality. To exclude this interpenetration means to destroy the artistic image. In science, the peculiarities of the life activity of the individual creating knowledge, her value judgments are not directly included in the composition of the generated knowledge (Newton’s laws do not allow us to judge what Newton loved and hated, whereas, for example, in portraits by Rembrandt the personality of Rembrandt himself is captured, his worldview and his personal attitude to the social phenomena depicted; a portrait painted by a great artist always acts as a self-portrait).

Science is focused on the substantive and objective study of reality. The above, of course, does not mean that the personal aspects and value orientations of a scientist do not play a role in scientific creativity and do not influence its results.

The process of scientific knowledge is determined not only by the characteristics of the object being studied, but also by numerous factors of a sociocultural nature.

Considering science in its historical development, one can find that as the type of culture changes, the standards for presenting scientific knowledge, ways of seeing reality in science, and styles of thinking that are formed in the context of culture and are influenced by its most diverse phenomena change. This impact can be represented as the inclusion of various sociocultural factors in the process of generating scientific knowledge itself. However, the statement of the connections between the objective and the subjective in any cognitive process and the need for a comprehensive study of science in its interaction with other forms of human spiritual activity do not remove the question of the difference between science and these forms (ordinary knowledge, artistic thinking, etc.). The first and necessary characteristic of such a difference is the sign of objectivity and subjectivity of scientific knowledge.

Science in human activity singles out only its subject structure and examines everything through the prism of this structure. Just like King Midas from the famous ancient legend - whatever he touched, everything turned to gold - so science, whatever it touched, is for it an object that lives, functions and develops according to objective laws.

Here the question immediately arises: well, what then to do with the subject of activity, with his goals, values, states of his consciousness? All this belongs to the components of the subjective structure of activity, but science is capable of studying these components, because there are no prohibitions for it to study any really existing phenomena. The answer to these questions is quite simple: yes, science can study any phenomena of human life and his consciousness, it can study activity, the human psyche, and culture, but only from one angle - as special objects that obey objective laws. Science also studies the subjective structure of activity, but as a special object. And where science cannot construct an object and imagine its “natural life”, determined by its essential connections, there its claims end. Thus, science can study everything in the human world, but from a special perspective, and from a special point of view. This special perspective of objectivity expresses both the boundlessness and limitations of science, since man, as an amateur, conscious being, has free will, and he is not only an object, he is also a subject of activity. And in this subjective existence, not all states can be exhausted by scientific knowledge, even if we assume that such comprehensive scientific knowledge about man and his life activity can be obtained.

There is no anti-scientism in this statement about the limits of science. This is simply a statement of the indisputable fact that science cannot replace all forms of knowledge of the world, of all culture. And everything that escapes her field of vision is compensated by other forms of spiritual comprehension of the world - art, religion, morality, philosophy.

By studying objects that are transformed in activity, science is not limited to the knowledge of only those subject connections that can be mastered within the framework of the existing types of activity that have historically developed at a given stage of social development. The goal of science is to foresee possible future changes in objects, including those that would correspond to future types and forms of practical change in the world.

As an expression of these goals in science, not only research is formed that serves today's practice, but also layers of research, the results of which can only find application in the practice of the future. The movement of knowledge in these layers is determined not so much by the immediate demands of today's practice, but by cognitive interests, through which the needs of society in predicting future methods and forms of practical development of the world are manifested. For example, the formulation of intrascientific problems and their solution within the framework of fundamental theoretical research in physics led to the discovery of the laws of the electromagnetic field and the prediction of electromagnetic waves, to the discovery of the laws of fission of atomic nuclei, quantum laws of radiation of atoms during the transition of electrons from one energy level to another, etc. All these theoretical discoveries laid the foundation for future methods of mass practical development of nature in production. After several decades, they became the basis for applied engineering research and development, the introduction of which into production, in turn, revolutionized engineering and technology - electronic equipment, nuclear power plants, laser systems, etc. appeared.

The focus of science on studying not only objects that are transformed in today's practice, but also those that may become the subject of mass practical development in the future, is the second distinctive feature of scientific knowledge. This feature allows us to distinguish between scientific and everyday, spontaneous-empirical knowledge and derive a number of specific definitions that characterize the nature of science.

Scientific and everyday knowledge

The desire to study objects of the real world and, on this basis, to foresee the results of its practical transformation is characteristic not only of science, but also of everyday knowledge, which is woven into practice and develops on its basis. As the development of practice objectifies human functions in tools and creates conditions for the elimination of subjective and anthropomorphic layers in the study of external objects, certain types of knowledge about reality appear in everyday knowledge, generally similar to those that characterize science.

The embryonic forms of scientific knowledge arose in the depths and on the basis of these types of everyday knowledge, and then spun off from it (the science of the era of the first urban civilizations of antiquity). With the development of science and its transformation into one of the most important values ​​of civilization, its way of thinking begins to have an increasingly active impact on everyday consciousness. This influence develops the elements of objective and objective reflection of the world contained in everyday, spontaneous-empirical knowledge.

The ability of spontaneous empirical knowledge to generate substantive and objective knowledge about the world raises the question of the difference between it and scientific research. It is convenient to classify the characteristics that distinguish science from ordinary knowledge according to the categorical scheme in which the structure of activity is characterized (tracing the difference between science and ordinary knowledge by subject, means, product, methods and subject of activity).

The fact that science provides ultra-long-range forecasting of practice, going beyond existing stereotypes of production and everyday experience, means that it deals with a special set of objects of reality that cannot be reduced to objects of everyday experience. If everyday knowledge reflects only those objects that, in principle, can be transformed in existing historically established methods and types of practical action, then science is capable of studying such fragments of reality that can become the subject of mastery only in the practice of the distant future. It constantly goes beyond the framework of the existing types of objective structures and methods of practical exploration of the world and opens up new objective worlds for humanity of its possible future activities.

These features of scientific objects make the means that are used in everyday cognition insufficient for their mastery. Although science uses natural language, it cannot describe and study its objects only on its basis. Firstly, ordinary language is adapted to describe and foresee objects woven into the existing practice of man (science goes beyond its scope); secondly, the concepts of ordinary language are vague and ambiguous, their exact meaning is most often discovered only in the context of linguistic communication, controlled by everyday experience. Science cannot rely on such control, since it primarily deals with objects that have not been mastered in everyday practical activity. To describe the phenomena being studied, she strives to record her concepts and definitions as clearly as possible.

The development by science of a special language suitable for its description of objects that are unusual from the point of view of common sense is a necessary condition for scientific research. The language of science is constantly evolving as it penetrates into ever new areas of the objective world. Moreover, it has the opposite effect on everyday, natural language. For example, the terms “electricity” and “refrigerator” were once specific scientific concepts, and then entered everyday language.

Along with an artificial, specialized language, scientific research requires a special system of special tools, which, by directly influencing the object being studied, make it possible to identify its possible states under conditions controlled by the subject. Tools used in production and everyday life are, as a rule, unsuitable for this purpose, since objects studied by science and objects transformed in production and everyday practice most often differ in nature. Hence the need for special scientific equipment (measuring instruments, instrument installations), which allow science to experimentally study new types of objects.

Scientific equipment and the language of science act as an expression of already acquired knowledge. But just as in practice its products are transformed into means of new types of practical activity, so in scientific research its products - scientific knowledge expressed in language or embodied in instruments - become a means of further research.

Thus, from the peculiarities of the subject of science, we received, as a kind of consequence, differences in the means of scientific and everyday knowledge.

The specificity of the objects of scientific research can further explain the main differences between scientific knowledge as a product of scientific activity and knowledge obtained in the sphere of everyday, spontaneous-empirical knowledge. The latter are most often not systematized; it is, rather, a conglomerate of information, instructions, recipes for activity and behavior accumulated during the historical development of everyday experience. Their reliability is established through direct application in actual situations of production and everyday practice. As for scientific knowledge, its reliability can no longer be justified only in this way, since science primarily studies objects that have not yet been mastered in production. Therefore, specific ways to substantiate the truth of knowledge are needed. They are experimental control over the acquired knowledge and the deducibility of some knowledge from others, the truth of which has already been proven. In turn, deducibility procedures ensure the transfer of truth from one fragment of knowledge to another, due to which they become interconnected and organized into a system.

Thus, we obtain characteristics of systematicity and validity of scientific knowledge, distinguishing it from the products of ordinary cognitive activity of people.

From the main characteristic of scientific research one can also derive such a distinctive feature of science when comparing it with ordinary knowledge as a feature of the method of cognitive activity. The objects to which ordinary cognition is directed are formed in everyday practice. The techniques by which each such object is isolated and recorded as an object of knowledge are woven into everyday experience. The set of such techniques, as a rule, is not recognized by the subject as a method of cognition. The situation is different in scientific research. Here, the very detection of an object, the properties of which are subject to further study, is a very labor-intensive task. For example, to detect short-lived particles - resonances, modern physics conducts experiments on the scattering of particle beams and then applies complex calculations. Ordinary particles leave traces in photographic emulsions or in a cloud chamber, but resonances do not leave such tracks. They live for a very short time (10-22 s) and during this period of time they travel a distance less than the size of an atom. Because of this, resonance cannot cause ionization of photoemulsion molecules (or gas in a cloud chamber) and leave an observable trace. However, when the resonance decays, the resulting particles are capable of leaving traces of the indicated type. In the photograph they look like a set of dash rays emanating from one center. Based on the nature of these rays, using mathematical calculations, the physicist determines the presence of resonance. Thus, in order to deal with the same type of resonances, the researcher needs to know the conditions under which the corresponding object appears. He must clearly define the method by which a particle can be detected in an experiment. Outside of the method, he will not at all distinguish the object being studied from the numerous connections and relationships of natural objects. To fix an object, a scientist must know the methods of such fixation. Therefore, in science, the study of objects, the identification of their properties and connections is always accompanied by an awareness of the method by which the object is studied. Objects are always given to a person in a system of certain techniques and methods of his activity. But these techniques in science are no longer obvious, they are not techniques repeated many times in everyday practice. And the further science moves away from the usual things of everyday experience, delving into the study of “unusual” objects, the clearer and more distinctly the need for the creation and development of special methods in the system of which science can study objects is manifested. Along with knowledge about objects, science generates knowledge about methods. The need to develop and systematize knowledge of the second type leads, at the highest stages of the development of science, to the formation of methodology as a special branch of scientific research, designed to target scientific research.

Finally, the desire of science to study objects relatively independently of their development in existing forms of production and everyday experience presupposes specific characteristics of the subject of scientific activity. Doing science requires special training of the cognitive subject, during which he masters the historically established means of scientific research and learns the techniques and methods of operating with these means. For everyday cognition, such preparation is not necessary, or rather, it is carried out automatically, in the process of socialization of the individual, when his thinking is formed and developed in the process of communication with culture and the inclusion of the individual in various spheres of activity. Studying science involves, along with mastering the means and methods, also the assimilation of a certain system of value orientations and goals specific to scientific knowledge. These orientations should stimulate scientific research aimed at studying more and more new objects, regardless of the current practical effect of the acquired knowledge. Otherwise, science will not fulfill its main function - to go beyond the subject structures of the practice of its era, expanding the horizons of possibilities for man to master the objective world.

Two main principles of science provide the desire for such a search: the intrinsic value of truth and the value of novelty.

Any scientist accepts the search for truth as one of the main principles of scientific activity, perceiving truth as the highest value of science. This attitude is embodied in a number of ideals and standards of scientific knowledge, expressing its specificity: in certain ideals of the organization of knowledge (for example, the requirement of logical consistency of a theory and its experimental confirmation), in the search for an explanation of phenomena based on laws and principles reflecting the essential connections of the objects under study, etc.

An equally important role in scientific research is played by the focus on the constant growth of knowledge and the special value of novelty in science. This attitude is expressed in a system of ideals and normative principles of scientific creativity (for example, the prohibition of plagiarism, the admissibility of a critical revision of the foundations of scientific research as a condition for the development of ever new types of objects, etc.).

The value orientations of science form the foundation of its ethos, which a scientist must master in order to successfully engage in research. Great scientists left a significant mark on culture not only due to the discoveries they made, but also due to the fact that their work was an example of innovation and service to the truth for many generations of people. Any deviation from the truth for the sake of personal, selfish goals, any manifestation of unprincipledness in science was met with unquestioning rebuff from them.

In science, the principle is proclaimed as an ideal that in the face of truth all researchers are equal, that no past merits are taken into account when it comes to scientific evidence.

At the beginning of the century, a little-known employee of the patent office, A. Einstein, discussed with the famous scientist G. Lorentz, proving the validity of his interpretation of the transformations introduced by Lorentz. Ultimately, it was Einstein who won this argument. But Lorenz and his colleagues never resorted in this discussion to techniques that are widely used in disputes in everyday life - they did not argue, for example, that criticism of Lorenz’s theory was unacceptable on the grounds that his status at that time was incommensurate with the status of someone not yet known to the scientific community young physicist Einstein.

An equally important principle of scientific ethos is the requirement of scientific honesty when presenting research results. A scientist may make mistakes, but does not have the right to falsify the results; he can repeat an already made discovery, but does not have the right to plagiarize. The Institute of References, as a prerequisite for the preparation of a scientific monograph and article, is intended not only to record the authorship of certain ideas and scientific texts. It provides a clear selection of what is already known in science and new results. Without this selection, there would be no incentive for an intense search for something new; endless repetitions of the past would arise in science and, ultimately, its main quality would be undermined - to constantly generate the growth of new knowledge, going beyond the framework of familiar and already known ideas about the world.

Of course, the requirement of inadmissibility of falsification and plagiarism acts as a kind of presumption of science, which in real life can be violated. Different scientific communities may impose different severity of sanctions for violating the ethical principles of science.

Let us consider one example from the life of modern science, which can serve as an example of the community’s intransigence towards violations of these principles.

In the mid-70s, the so-called case of Gallis, a young and promising biochemist who in the early 70s worked on the problem of intracerebral morphines, became famous among biochemists and neurophysiologists. He put forward an original hypothesis that morphines of plant origin and intracerebral morphines have the same effect on nervous tissue. Gallis conducted a series of labor-intensive experiments, but could not convincingly confirm this hypothesis, although indirect evidence indicated its promise. Fearing that other researchers would overtake him and make this discovery, Gallis decided to falsify it. He published fictitious experimental data supposedly confirming the hypothesis.

Gallis's "discovery" aroused great interest in the community of neurophysiologists and biochemists. However, no one was able to confirm his results by reproducing experiments using the method he published. Then the young and already famous scientist was invited to publicly conduct experiments at a special symposium in 1977 in Munich, under the supervision of his colleagues. Gallis was eventually forced to admit to falsification. The scientific community reacted to this recognition with a strict boycott. Gallis's colleagues stopped maintaining scientific contacts with him, all of his co-authors publicly refused to publish joint papers with him, and as a result, Gallis published a letter in which he apologized to his colleagues and stated that he was quitting his studies in science.

Ideally, the scientific community should always reject researchers caught in deliberate plagiarism or deliberate falsification of scientific results for the sake of some worldly benefits. The communities of mathematicians and natural scientists are closest to this ideal, but in the humanities, for example, since they experience much greater pressure from ideological and political structures, sanctions against researchers who deviate from the ideals of scientific integrity are significantly relaxed.

It is significant that for everyday consciousness, adherence to the basic principles of the scientific ethos is not at all necessary, and sometimes even undesirable. A person telling a political joke in an unfamiliar company does not need to cite the source of the information, especially if he lives in a totalitarian society.

In everyday life, people exchange a wide variety of knowledge, share everyday experiences, but references to the author of this experience are simply impossible in most situations, because this experience is anonymous and is often broadcast in culture for centuries.

The presence of norms and goals of cognitive activity specific to science, as well as specific means and methods that ensure the comprehension of ever new objects, requires the targeted formation of scientific specialists. This need leads to the emergence of an “academic component of science” - special organizations and institutions that provide training for scientific personnel.

In the process of such training, future researchers must acquire not only specialized knowledge, techniques and methods of scientific work, but also the basic value guidelines of science, its ethical norms and principles.

So, when clarifying the nature of scientific knowledge, we can identify a system of distinctive features of science, among which the main ones are: a) an orientation toward the study of the laws of transformation of objects and the objectivity and objectivity of scientific knowledge that realizes this orientation; b) science going beyond the framework of the subject structures of production and everyday experience and its study of objects relatively independently of today’s possibilities for their production development (scientific knowledge always refers to a wide class of practical situations of the present and future, which is never predetermined). All other necessary features that distinguish science from other forms of cognitive activity can be presented as depending on the indicated main characteristics and conditioned by them.

The problems considered apply to any cognitive activity. Scientific knowledge is of particular importance for science, the specifics of which deserve special analysis.

Scientific and non-scientific knowledge

Cognition (and, accordingly, knowledge) can be divided into scientific and non-scientific, and the latter - into pre-scientific, everyday and extra-scientific, or parascientific.

Pre-scientific knowledge is a historical stage in the development of knowledge, preceding scientific knowledge. At this stage, some cognitive techniques, forms of sensory and rational knowledge are formed, on the basis of which more developed types of cognitive activity are formed.

Everyday and parascientific knowledge exist along with scientific knowledge.

Ordinary, or everyday, knowledge is called knowledge based on observation and practical exploration of nature, on the life experience accumulated by many generations. Without denying science, it does not use its means - methods, language, categorical apparatus, but provides certain knowledge about observable natural phenomena, moral relations, principles of education, etc. A special group of everyday knowledge consists of the so-called folk sciences: traditional medicine, meteorology, pedagogy, etc. Mastering this knowledge requires lengthy training and considerable experience; they contain practically useful, time-tested knowledge, but these are not sciences in the full sense of the word.

Extra-scientific (parascientific) includes knowledge that claims to be scientific, uses scientific terminology, and in reality is incompatible with science. These are the so-called occult sciences: alchemy, astrology, magic, etc. Having emerged in the era of late antiquity and developed in the Middle Ages, they have not disappeared at the present time, despite the development and dissemination of scientific knowledge. Moreover, at critical stages of social development, when a general crisis is accompanied by a spiritual crisis, there is a revival of occultism, a departure from the rational to the irrational. Belief in sorcerers, palmists, astrological forecasts, in the possibility of communicating with the souls of the dead (spiritism) and similar “miracles” is being revived. Religious and mystical teachings are widespread.

This was the case during the years of crisis generated by the First World War, when the “theory of psychotransmutation” by G.Yu. Godzhiev, anthroposophy of R. Steiner, theosophy of E.P. Blavatsky and teachings. In the 60s During the crisis in Western countries, esoteric teachings turned out to be fashionable (from the Greek - “directed inward.” Knowledge intended only for the “chosen ones”, understandable only to them).

The crisis in our country, generated by the perestroika processes, has created a spiritual vacuum, which is sought to be filled by various kinds of ideas and “teachings” that are far from science. The existence of extra-scientific ideas along with scientific ones is due, not least of all, to the fact that scientific knowledge cannot yet answer all the questions in which people are interested. Biology, medicine, agricultural and other sciences have not yet discovered ways to prolong a person’s life, rid him of diseases, protect him from the destructive forces of nature, crop failure, etc. People's hopes arise to find simple and reliable means of treating diseases and solving other vital problems. These hopes are supported by some sensationalist media. Suffice it to recall radio and television speeches by psychics and psychotherapists or “charged” issues of newspapers that “heal” all diseases. And many people turned out to be susceptible to these and similar “miracles.”

It cannot be denied that some parascientific theories contain elements of useful knowledge that deserve attention. The futile attempts of alchemists to find a “philosopher’s stone” for transforming base metals into gold and silver were associated with the study of the properties of metals, which played a certain role in the formation of chemistry as a science. Parapsychology, exploring forms of sensitivity that provide ways of receiving information that cannot be explained by the activity of known sense organs, forms of influence of one living creature on another, accumulates material that can receive further scientific justification.

However, the search for super-intelligent means of knowledge, supernatural forces, irrationalism and mysticism are not compatible with scientific knowledge, with science, which is the highest form of knowledge and knowledge.

Science arose as a result of dissociation from mythology and religion, from the explanation of phenomena by supernatural causes. It relies on a rational explanation of reality, rejecting faith in super-rational means of knowledge - mystical intuition, revelation, etc.

Science is a field of research activity aimed at producing knowledge about nature, society, and man. Along with scientists with their knowledge and abilities, qualifications and experience, it includes scientific institutions with their experimental equipment and instruments, with the entire amount of achieved knowledge, methods of scientific knowledge, conceptual and categorical apparatus.

Modern science has powerful material and intellectual means of knowledge; it not only opposes various non-scientific teachings, but also differs from everyday knowledge.

These differences are as follows.

The object of everyday knowledge is predominantly observable phenomena, and the knowledge obtained is a set of information that is not included in the system; it is not always justified and often coexists with outdated ideas and prejudices. Scientific knowledge deals not only with observable, but also with unobservable objects (elementary particle, gene, etc.). It is characterized by consistency, systematicity, the desire to substantiate its provisions with laws, special methods of verification (scientific experiment, rules of inferential knowledge).

The purpose of everyday knowledge is limited mainly to immediate practical tasks; it is not capable of penetrating the essence of phenomena, discovering laws, or forming theories. Scientific knowledge poses and solves fundamental problems, puts forward well-founded hypotheses, and develops long-term forecasts. Its goal is the discovery of the laws of nature, society, thinking, knowledge of the essence of phenomena, and the creation of scientific theories.

The means of everyday cognition are limited by the natural cognitive abilities that a person has: sense organs, thinking, forms of natural language, based on common sense, elementary generalizations, simple cognitive techniques. Scientific knowledge also uses scientific equipment, special research methods, creates and uses artificial languages, and special scientific terminology.

Most agree that scientific knowledge is the highest form of knowledge. Science has a huge impact on the life of modern man. But what is science? What is its difference from such types of knowledge as ordinary, artistic, religious, and so on? They tried to answer this question for a long time. Even ancient philosophers sought the difference between genuine knowledge and changeable opinion. We see that this problem is one of the main ones in positivism. It was not possible to find a method that would guarantee the receipt of reliable knowledge or at least distinguish such knowledge from non-scientific knowledge. But it is possible to identify some common features that would express the specificity of scientific knowledge.

The specificity of science is not its accuracy, since accuracy is used in technology and public administration. The use of abstract concepts is not specific either, since science itself also uses visual images.

The specificity of scientific knowledge is that science exists in the form of a system of theoretical knowledge. Theory is generalized knowledge that is obtained using the following techniques:

1. Universalization- extension of the general points observed in the experiment to all possible cases, including those not observed. ( « All bodies expand when heated."

2. Idealization- the wording of laws indicates ideal conditions that do not exist in reality.

3. Conceptualization- concepts borrowed from from other theories having precise meaning and meaning.

Using these techniques, scientists formulate the laws of science, which are generalizations of experience that reveal repeating, necessary, essential connections between phenomena.

Initially based on the classification of empirical data ( empirical level of knowledge) generalizations are formulated in the form of hypotheses (beginning theoretical level knowledge). A hypothesis is a more or less well-founded but unproven assumption. Theory- this is a proven hypothesis, this is a law.

Laws make it possible to explain already known phenomena and predict new ones, without resorting for the time being to observations and experiments. Laws limit their scope. Thus, the laws of quantum mechanics apply only to the microworld.

Scientific knowledge is built on three methodological guidelines (or principles):

· reductionism- the desire to explain the qualitative uniqueness of complex formations by the laws of lower levels;

· evolutionism- affirmation of the natural origin of all phenomena;

· rationalism- as the opposite of irrationalism, knowledge based not on evidence, but on faith, intuition, etc.

These principles make science different from religion:

a) supranational, cosmopolitan;
b) she strives to become the only one;
c) scientific knowledge is transpersonal;
d) science is open in nature, its knowledge is constantly changing, supplemented, etc.

In scientific knowledge, empirical and theoretical levels are distinguished. They record differences in the method and methods of cognitive activity of scientists and the nature of the material being extracted.

The empirical level is the subject-instrumental activity of scientists, observations, experiments, collection, description and systematization of scientific data and facts. Here there are both sensory cognition and thinking as characteristics of cognition in general. The theoretical level is not all thinking, but something that reproduces internal, necessary aspects, connections, and the essence of the phenomenon being studied that are hidden from direct perception.

Empirical methods include:

· observation - associated with testing a hypothesis systematically, systematically;

· measurement is a special type of observation in which a quantitative characteristic of an object is given;

· modeling is a type of experiment when direct experimental research is difficult or impossible.

Theoretical methods of scientific knowledge include:

· induction - a method of transition from knowledge of individual facts to general knowledge (Types of induction: analogy, model extrapolation, statistical method, etc.);

· deduction is a method when other statements are logically deduced from general provisions (axioms) (from general to specific).

Along with other methods, science uses historical and logical methods of cognition.

The historical method is the study of the real history of an object, the reproduction of the historical process to reveal its logic.

The logical method is the disclosure of the logic of the development of an object by studying it at the highest stages of the historical process, since at the highest stages the object reproduces its historical development in a compressed form (ontogenesis reproduces phylogeny).

What kind of knowledge does a person have that is not part of science?

Is this a lie, delusion, ignorance, fantasy? But isn't science wrong? Isn't there some truth in fantasy, in deception?

Science has an area of ​​intersection with these phenomena.

a) Science and fantasy. In Jules Verne, out of 108 ideas, 64 have come true or will soon come true, 32 are feasible in principle, 10 are considered erroneous. (H.G. Wells - out of 86 - 57, 20, 9; Alexander Belyaev - out of 50 - 21, 26, 3, respectively.)

b) Science and culture. Criticism of science is currently underway. The historian Gilanski says this about scientists: “If it were their will, they would turn magnificent blossoms into botany, and the beauty of sunsets into meteorology.”

Ilya Prigogine also argues that science reduces the richness of the world to monotonous repetition, removes reverence for nature and leads to domination over it. Feyerabend: “Science is the theology of scientists, with an emphasis on the general, science coarsens things, opposes itself to common sense and morality. Life itself with impersonal relationships through writing, politics, money is to blame for this. Science must be subordinated to morality.”

Criticism of science should be considered fair only from the position of a person who has refused to use its results. Humanism presupposes the right of every person to choose the meaning and way of life. But the one who enjoys its fruits has no moral right to criticism. The development of culture is no longer conceivable without the development of science. To eliminate the consequences of the development of science, society uses science itself. Refusal of science is a degradation of modern man, a return to an animal state, which a person is unlikely to agree to.

So, cognition is a complex process. The highest form of knowledge is scientific knowledge, which has a complex structure, its own specificity, which elevates science, makes its knowledge generally accepted, but at the same time separates science from the individual, from morality, and common sense. But science does not have impassable boundaries with non-science and should not have them in order not to cease to be human.

Review questions:

1. How did ancient materialists show the difference between the phenomena of consciousness and material things?

2. What is the qualitative difference between the phenomena of consciousness and material things?

3. How to define the ideal, how does it differ from the material?

4. How is consciousness related to matter? What possible answers are there?

5. What is a psychophysiological problem?

6. What is a psychophysical problem?

7. Dialectical materialism believes that all matter has a property, which at different levels of matter has different development, and at the highest level becomes human consciousness. What is this property?

8. What problem in dialectical materialism should the theory of reflection in dialectical materialism solve?

9. What problem in explaining consciousness arises in dialectical materialism with the adoption of the theory of reflection?

10. Why did consciousness arise only in humans? Could it not have happened?

11. Can we say that thinking and speech are the same thing, that there is no thought without words? Do animals have thinking?

12. What is the subconscious?

13. What is the unconscious in the human psyche?

14. What is “superconsciousness” in the human psyche?

15. What is parapsychology?

16. What is telepathy?

17. What is telekinesis?

18. What is clairvoyance?

19. What is psychic medicine?

20. What is cognition?

21. What problem in knowledge did the Eleatics (Parmenides and Zeno) discover and what solution did they propose?

22. To what question do agnostics give a negative answer?

23. We have two sources of obtaining knowledge. One source is the mind, the other is feelings, sensations. What source provides reliable knowledge?

24. From what idea of ​​R. Descartes did the materialistic sensationalism of D. Locke and the subjective-idealistic sensualism of D. Berkeley follow?

26. G. Helmholtz believed that our sensations are symbols of things (not at all similar), G.V. Plekhanov compared sensations with hieroglyphs (slightly similar), V.I. Lenin called them copies, photographs of things (very similar). Who was closer to the truth?

27. “One hand is cold, the other is hot, put them in normal water. One hand feels warm, the other feels cold. What is water really like?” - asks D. Berkeley.
What philosophical problem does he pose?

28. What are generally possible options for understanding truth if we are talking about the correspondence of knowledge and what this knowledge is about?

29. How did the ancient materialists understand the truth?

30. How should the understanding of truth differ between metaphysicians and dialecticians?

31. What did objective idealists understand by truth? What aspect of the truth were they emphasizing?

32. What does dialectical materialism consider to be true? Which side of the truth does he celebrate?

33. What is the criterion of truth for pragmatists? Which aspect of the truth is he exaggerating?

34. Which side of our knowledge does irrationalism point to?

35. What is the criterion of truth in subjective idealism? Which side of the truth is being exaggerated?

36. What is considered truth in conventionalism? Which side of the truth is emphasized?

37. What definition of truth can be considered correct?

39. Is the use of abstract concepts specific to science?

40. In what form does scientific knowledge exist?

41. What is a scientific theory?

42. Soviet psychologist P.P. Blonsky explained the origin of a person’s smile from the grin of animals when they see food. What scientific principle guided him?

43. How does scientific knowledge differ from religious and artistic knowledge?

44. In scientific knowledge, empirical and theoretical levels are distinguished. They record differences in the method and methods of cognitive activity of scientists and the nature of the material being extracted.
Which level does it belong to:

- classification of facts (for example, classification of plants, animals, mineral samples, etc.);
- creation of a mathematical model of the phenomenon under study?

45. Theoretical methods of scientific knowledge include induction and deduction. What is their difference?

46. ​​Is there anything scientific about lies, delusion, or fantasy?



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