Strange “winter war” on the Karelian Isthmus. Stalin's fourth blow: the defeat of the Finnish army

Chapter VII THE STRUGGLE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOVIET POWER LOCAL. THE DEFEAT OF THE CENTRAL RADA AND KALEDINSHCHYNA The triumphal march of Soviet power across the country, the work of the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the proclamation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic

After the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, Germany went to war with Poland, and relations between the USSR and Finland began to strain. One of the reasons is a secret document between the USSR and Germany on delimiting spheres of influence. According to it, the influence of the USSR extended to Finland, the Baltic states, western Ukraine and Belarus, and Bessarabia.

Realizing that a major war was inevitable, Stalin sought to protect Leningrad, which could be shelled by artillery from Finland. Therefore, the task was to move the border further north. To resolve the issue peacefully, the Soviet side offered Finland the lands of Karelia in exchange for moving the border on the Karelian Isthmus, but any attempts at dialogue were suppressed by the Finns. They didn't want to come to an agreement.

Reason for war

The reason for the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 was an incident near the village of Mainila on November 25, 1939 at 15:45. This village is located on the Karelian Isthmus, 800 meters from the Finnish border. Maynila was subjected to artillery shelling, as a result of which 4 representatives of the Red Army were killed and 8 were wounded.

On November 26, Molotov summoned the Finnish ambassador in Moscow (Irie Koskinen) and handed over a note of protest, stating that the shelling was carried out from the territory of Finland, and that the only thing that saved from the outbreak of war was that the Soviet army had an order not to succumb to provocations.

On November 27, the Finnish government responded to the Soviet note of protest. Briefly, the main provisions of the answer were as follows:

• The shelling actually took place and lasted approximately 20 minutes.
• The shelling came from the Soviet side, approximately 1.5-2 km southeast of the village of Maynila.
• It was proposed to create a commission that would jointly study this episode and give it an adequate assessment.

What really happened near the village of Maynila? This is an important question, since it was as a result of these events that the Winter (Soviet-Finnish) War was unleashed. The only thing that can be stated unequivocally is that there really was shelling of the village of Maynila, but who carried it out is impossible to establish through documentation. Ultimately, there are 2 versions (Soviet and Finnish), and each needs to be evaluated. The first version is that Finland shelled the territory of the USSR. The second version is that it was a provocation prepared by the NKVD.

Why did Finland need this provocation? Historians talk about two reasons:

1. The Finns were a political tool in the hands of the British, who needed war. This assumption would be reasonable if we consider the winter war in isolation. But if we remember the realities of those times, then at the time of the incident a world war was already underway, and England had already declared war on Germany. England's attack on the USSR automatically created an alliance between Stalin and Hitler, and this alliance would sooner or later hit England itself with all its might. Therefore, to assume this is tantamount to assuming that England decided to commit suicide, which, of course, was not the case.
2. They wanted to expand their territories and influence. This is an absolutely stupid hypothesis. This is from the category - Liechtenstein wants to attack Germany. It's nonsense. Finland had neither the strength nor the means for war, and everyone in the Finnish command understood that their only chance of success in the war with the USSR was a long defense that would exhaust the enemy. With such situations, no one will disturb the den with the bear.

The most adequate answer to the question posed is that the shelling of the village of Mainila is a provocation of the Soviet government itself, which was looking for any excuse to justify the war with Finland. And it was this incident that was subsequently presented to Soviet society as an example of the treachery of the Finnish people, who needed help to carry out the socialist revolution.

Balance of forces and means

It is indicative how the forces were correlated during the Soviet-Finnish war. Below is a brief table that describes how the opposing countries approached the Winter War.

In all aspects except infantry, the USSR had a clear advantage. But conducting an offensive, superior to the enemy by only 1.3 times, is an extremely risky undertaking. In this case, discipline, training and organization come to the fore. The Soviet army had problems with all three aspects. These figures once again emphasize that the Soviet leadership did not perceive Finland as an enemy, expecting to destroy it in the shortest possible time.

Progress of the war

The Soviet-Finnish or Winter War can be divided into 2 stages: the first (December 39th - January 7th 40th) and the second (January 7th 40th - March 12th 40th). What happened on January 7, 1940? Timoshenko was appointed commander of the army, who immediately set about reorganizing the army and establishing order in it.

First stage

The Soviet-Finnish war began on November 30, 1939, and the Soviet army failed to carry it out briefly. The USSR army actually crossed the state border of Finland without declaring war. For its citizens, the rationale was as follows - to help the people of Finland in overthrowing the bourgeois government of the warmonger.

The Soviet leadership did not take Finland seriously, believing that the war would be over in a few weeks. They even mentioned a figure of 3 weeks as a deadline. More specifically, there should be no war. The Soviet command's plan was approximately as follows:

• Send in troops. We did this on November 30th.
• Creation of a working government controlled by the USSR. On December 1, the Kuusinen government was created (more on this later).
• Lightning-fast attack on all fronts. It was planned to reach Helsinki in 1.5-2 weeks.
• Declining the real government of Finland towards peace and complete surrender in favor of the Kuusinen government.

The first two points were implemented in the first days of the war, but then problems began. The blitzkrieg did not work out, and the army was stuck in the Finnish defense. Although in the initial days of the war, until approximately December 4, it seemed that everything was going according to plan - Soviet troops were moving forward. However, very soon they stumbled upon the Mannerheim line. On December 4, the armies of the eastern front (near Lake Suvantojärvi), on December 6 - the central front (Summa direction), and on December 10 - the western front (Gulf of Finland) entered it. And it was a shock. A huge number of documents indicate that the troops did not expect to encounter a well-fortified defense line. And this is a huge question for the Red Army intelligence.

In any case, December was a disastrous month that thwarted almost all the plans of the Soviet Headquarters. The troops advanced inland slowly. Every day the pace of movement only decreased. Reasons for the slow advance of Soviet troops:

1. Terrain. Almost the entire territory of Finland is forests and swamps. It is difficult to use equipment in such conditions.
2. Application of aviation. Aviation was practically not used in terms of bombing. There was no point in bombing villages adjacent to the front line, since the Finns were retreating, leaving behind scorched earth. It was difficult to bomb the retreating troops, since they were retreating with civilians.
3. Roads. As the Finns retreated, they destroyed roads, caused landslides, and mined everything they could.

Formation of the Kuusinen government

On December 1, 1939, the People's Government of Finland was formed in the city of Terijoki. It was formed on territory already captured by the USSR, and with the direct participation of the Soviet leadership. The Finnish people's government included:

• Chairman and Minister of Foreign Affairs – Otto Kuusinen
• Minister of Finance – Mauri Rosenberg
• Minister of Defense - Axel Antila
• Minister of the Interior – Tuure Lehen
• Minister of Agriculture – Armas Eikia
• Minister of Education – Inkeri Lehtinen
• Minister for Karelia Affairs – Paavo Prokkonen

Outwardly it looks like a full-fledged government. The only problem is that the Finnish population did not recognize him. But already on December 1 (that is, on the day of its formation), this government concluded an agreement with the USSR on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the FDR (Finnish Democratic Republic). On December 2, a new agreement is signed - on mutual assistance. From this moment on, Molotov says that the war continues because a revolution took place in Finland, and now it is necessary to support it and help the workers. In fact, it was a clever trick to justify the war in the eyes of the Soviet population.

Mannerheim Line

The Mannerheim Line is one of the few things that almost everyone knows about the Soviet-Finnish war. Soviet propaganda said about this fortification system that all the world generals recognized its impregnability. This was an exaggeration. The line of defense was, of course, strong, but not impregnable.

The Mannerheim Line (as it received this name already during the war) consisted of 101 concrete fortifications. For comparison, the Maginot Line, which Germany crossed in France, was approximately the same length. The Maginot Line consisted of 5,800 concrete structures. In fairness, it should be noted the difficult terrain conditions of the Mannerheim Line. There were swamps and numerous lakes, which made movement extremely difficult and therefore the defense line did not require a large number of fortifications.

The largest attempt to break through the Mannerheim Line at the first stage was made on December 17-21 in the central section. It was here that it was possible to occupy the roads leading to Vyborg, gaining a significant advantage. But the offensive, in which 3 divisions took part, failed. This was the first major success in the Soviet-Finnish war for the Finnish army. This success came to be called the “Miracle of Summa.” Subsequently, the line was broken on February 11, which actually predetermined the outcome of the war.

Expulsion of the USSR from the League of Nations

On December 14, 1939, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations. This decision was promoted by England and France, who spoke of Soviet aggression against Finland. Representatives of the League of Nations condemned the actions of the USSR in terms of aggressive actions and the outbreak of war.

Today, the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations is cited as an example of the limitation of Soviet power and as a loss in image. In fact, everything is a little different. In 1939, the League of Nations no longer played the role it had been assigned following the First World War. The fact is that back in 1933, Germany left it, refusing to comply with the demands of the League of Nations for disarmament and simply left the organization. It turns out that at the time of December 14, the League of Nations de facto ceased to exist. After all, what kind of European security system can we talk about when Germany and the USSR left the organization?

Second stage of the war

On January 7, 1940, the Headquarters of the Northwestern Front was headed by Marshal Timoshenko. He had to solve all the problems and organize a successful offensive of the Red Army. At this point, the Soviet-Finnish war took a break, and no active operations were carried out until February. From February 1 to 9, powerful attacks began on the Mannerheim line. It was assumed that the 7th and 13th armies were to break through the defense line with decisive flank attacks and occupy the Vuoksy-Karkhul sector. After this, it was planned to move to Vyborg, occupy the city and block the railways and highways leading to the West.

On February 11, 1940, a general offensive of Soviet troops began on the Karelian Isthmus. This was a turning point in the Winter War, as units of the Red Army managed to break through the Mannerheim Line and begin advancing deeper into the country. We advanced slowly due to the specifics of the terrain, the resistance of the Finnish army and severe frosts, but the main thing was that we advanced. At the beginning of March, the Soviet army was already on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay.

This effectively ended the war, since it was obvious that Finland did not have large forces and means to contain the Red Army. From that time on, peace negotiations began, in which the USSR dictated its terms, and Molotov constantly emphasized that the conditions would be harsh, because the Finns forced them to start a war, during which the blood of Soviet soldiers was shed.

Why did the war last so long

According to the Bolsheviks, the Soviet-Finnish war was supposed to end in 2-3 weeks, and the decisive advantage was to be given by the troops of the Leningrad district alone. In practice, the war dragged on for almost 4 months, and divisions were assembled throughout the country to suppress the Finns. There are several reasons for this:

• Poor organization of troops. This concerns the poor performance of the command staff, but the bigger problem is coherence between the branches of the military. She was practically absent. If you study archival documents, there are a lot of reports according to which some troops fired at others.
• Poor security. The army was in need of almost everything. The war was fought in winter and in the north, where the air temperature dropped below -30 by the end of December. And at the same time, the army was not provided with winter clothing.
• Underestimating the enemy. The USSR did not prepare for war. The plan was to quickly suppress the Finns and solve the problem without war, attributing everything to the border incident of November 24, 1939.
• Support for Finland by other countries. England, Italy, Hungary, Sweden (primarily) - provided assistance to Finland in everything: weapons, supplies, food, airplanes, and so on. The greatest efforts were made by Sweden, which itself actively helped and facilitated the transfer of assistance from other countries. In general, during the Winter War of 1939-1940, only Germany supported the Soviet side.

Stalin was very nervous because the war was dragging on. He repeated - The whole world is watching us. And he was right. Therefore, Stalin demanded a solution to all problems, restoration of order in the army and a speedy resolution of the conflict. To some extent this was achieved. And quite quickly. The Soviet offensive in February-March 1940 forced Finland to peace.

The Red Army fought extremely undisciplinedly, and its management does not stand up to criticism. Almost all reports and memos about the situation at the front were accompanied by a postscript - “an explanation of the reasons for the failures.” I will give some quotes from Beria’s memo to Stalin No. 5518/B dated December 14, 1939:

• During the landing on the island of Sayskari, a Soviet plane dropped 5 bombs, which landed on the destroyer "Lenin".
• On December 1, the Ladoga flotilla was fired upon twice by its own aircraft.
• When occupying the island of Gogland, during the advance of the landing forces, 6 Soviet aircraft appeared, one of which fired several shots in bursts. As a result, 10 people were injured.

And there are hundreds of such examples. But if the situations above are examples of the exposure of soldiers and troops, then next I want to give examples of how the equipment of the Soviet army took place. To do this, let us turn to Beria’s memo to Stalin No. 5516/B dated December 14, 1939:

• In the Tulivara area, the 529th Rifle Corps needed 200 pairs of skis to bypass enemy fortifications. This was not possible, since the Headquarters received 3,000 pairs of skis with broken points.
• The new arrivals from the 363rd Signal Battalion include 30 vehicles in need of repair, and 500 people are wearing summer uniforms.
• The 51st Corps Artillery Regiment arrived to replenish the 9th Army. Missing: 72 tractors, 65 trailers. Of the 37 tractors that arrived, only 9 were in good condition, out of 150 machines - 90. 80% of the personnel were not provided with winter uniforms.

It is not surprising that against the backdrop of such events there was desertion in the Red Army. For example, on December 14, 430 people deserted from the 64th Infantry Division.

Help for Finland from other countries

In the Soviet-Finnish war, many countries provided assistance to Finland. To demonstrate, I will cite Beria’s report to Stalin and Molotov No. 5455/B.

Finland is helped by:

• Sweden – 8 thousand people. Mainly reserve personnel. They are commanded by career officers who are on “vacation.”
• Italy - number unknown.
• Hungary – 150 people. Italy demands an increase in numbers.
• England - 20 fighter aircraft are known, although the actual number is higher.

The best proof that the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 took place with the support of the Western countries of Finland was the speech of Finnish Minister Greensberg on December 27, 1939 at 07:15 to the English agency Havas. Below I quote the literal translation from English.

The Finnish people thank the English, French and other nations for the assistance they provide.

Greensberg, Minister of Finland

It is obvious that Western countries opposed the USSR aggression against Finland. This was expressed, among other things, by the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations.

I would also like to show a photo of Beria’s report on the intervention of France and England in the Soviet-Finnish war.

Conclusion of peace

On February 28, the USSR handed over to Finland its terms for concluding peace. The negotiations themselves took place in Moscow on March 8-12. After these negotiations, the Soviet-Finnish war ended on March 12, 1940. The peace terms were as follows:

1. The USSR received the Karelian Isthmus along with Vyborg (Viipuri), the bay and islands.
2. The western and northern coasts of Lake Ladoga, together with the cities of Kexgolm, Suoyarvi and Sortavala.
3. Islands in the Gulf of Finland.
4. Hanko Island with its maritime territory and base was leased to the USSR for 50 years. The USSR paid 8 million German marks for rent annually.
5. The agreement between Finland and the USSR from 1920 has lost its force.
6. On March 13, 1940, hostilities ceased.

Below is a map showing the territories ceded to the USSR as a result of the signing of the peace treaty.

USSR losses

The question of the number of USSR soldiers killed during the Soviet-Finnish War is still open. The official history does not answer the question, speaking in veiled terms about “minimal” losses and focusing on the fact that the objectives were achieved. There was no talk about the scale of the Red Army's losses in those days. The figure was deliberately underestimated, demonstrating the success of the army. In fact, the losses were huge. To do this, just look at report No. 174 of December 21, which provides figures on the losses of the 139th Infantry Division over 2 weeks of fighting (November 30 - December 13). The losses are as follows:

• Commanders - 240.
• Privates - 3536.
• Rifles - 3575.
• Light machine guns – 160.
• Heavy machine guns – 150.
• Tanks – 5.
• Armored vehicles – 2.
• Tractors – 10.
• Trucks – 14.
• Horse train - 357.

Belyanov's memo No. 2170 dated December 27 talks about the losses of the 75th Infantry Division. Total losses: senior commanders - 141, junior commanders - 293, rank and file - 3668, tanks - 20, machine guns - 150, rifles - 1326, armored vehicles - 3.

This is data for 2 divisions (much more fought) for 2 weeks of fighting, when the first week was a “warm-up” - the Soviet army advanced relatively without losses until it reached the Mannerheim Line. And during these 2 weeks, of which only the last was actually combative, the OFFICIAL figures are losses of more than 8 thousand people! A huge number of people suffered frostbite.

On March 26, 1940, at the 6th session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, data on USSR losses in the war with Finland were announced - 48,745 people killed and 158,863 people wounded and frostbitten. These are official figures and therefore greatly underestimated. Today, historians give different figures for the losses of the Soviet army. It is said that between 150 and 500 thousand people died. For example, the Book of Combat Losses of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army states that in the war with the White Finns, 131,476 people died, went missing, or died from wounds. At the same time, the data of that time did not take into account the losses of the Navy, and for a long time people who died in hospitals after wounds and frostbite were not taken into account as losses. Today, most historians agree that about 150 thousand Red Army soldiers died during the war, excluding the losses of the Navy and border troops.

Finnish losses are listed as follows: 23 thousand dead and missing, 45 thousand wounded, 62 aircraft, 50 tanks, 500 guns.

Results and consequences of the war

The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, even with a brief study, points to both absolutely negative and absolutely positive aspects. The negative is the nightmare of the first months of the war and the huge number of victims. By and large, it was December 1939 and early January 1940 that demonstrated to the whole world that the Soviet army was weak. That's how it really was. But there was also a positive aspect: the Soviet leadership saw the real strength of its army. We have been told since childhood that the Red Army has been the strongest in the world almost since 1917, but this is extremely far from reality. The only major test of this army was the Civil War. We will not now analyze the reasons for the victory of the Reds over the Whites (after all, we are now talking about the Winter War), but the reasons for the victory of the Bolsheviks do not lie in the army. To demonstrate this, it is enough to just quote one quote from Frunze, which he voiced at the end of the Civil War.

All this army rabble needs to be disbanded as soon as possible.

Frunze

Before the war with Finland, the leadership of the USSR had its head in the clouds, believing that it had a strong army. But December 1939 showed that this was not the case. The army was extremely weak. But starting in January 1940, changes were made (personnel and organizational) that changed the course of the war, and which largely prepared a combat-ready army for the Patriotic War. This is very easy to prove. Almost the entire December of the 39th Red Army stormed the Mannerheim line - there was no result. On February 11, 1940, the Mannerheim line was broken through in 1 day. This breakthrough was possible because it was carried out by another army, more disciplined, organized, and trained. And the Finns did not have a single chance against such an army, so Mannerheim, who served as Minister of Defense, even then began to talk about the need for peace.

Prisoners of war and their fate

The number of prisoners of war during the Soviet-Finnish war was impressive. At the time of the war, there were 5,393 captured Red Army soldiers and 806 captured White Finns. Captured Red Army soldiers were divided into the following groups:

• Political leadership. It was political affiliation that was important, without singling out rank.
• Officers. This group included persons equated to officers.
• Junior officers.
• Privates.
• National minorities
• Defectors.

Particular attention was paid to national minorities. The attitude towards them in Finnish captivity was more loyal than towards representatives of the Russian people. The privileges were minor, but they were there. At the end of the war, a mutual exchange of all prisoners was carried out, regardless of their belonging to one group or another.

On April 19, 1940, Stalin orders everyone who was in Finnish captivity to be sent to the Southern Camp of the NKVD. Below is a quote from the Politburo resolution.

All those returned by the Finnish authorities should be sent to the Southern camp. Within three months, ensure all the necessary measures are taken to identify persons processed by foreign intelligence services. Pay attention to dubious and alien elements, as well as those who voluntarily surrendered. In all cases, refer cases to court.

Stalin

The southern camp, located in the Ivanovo region, began work on April 25. Already on May 3, Beria sent a letter to Stalin, Molotov and Timoschenko, informing that 5277 people had arrived at the Camp. On June 28, Beria sends a new report. According to it, the Southern camp “receives” 5,157 Red Army soldiers and 293 officers. Of these, 414 people were convicted of treason and treason.

The myth of war - Finnish “cuckoos”

“Cuckoos” is what Soviet soldiers called snipers who continuously fired at the Red Army. It was said that these are professional Finnish snipers who sit in trees and shoot almost without missing. The reason for such attention to snipers is their high efficiency and the inability to determine the point of the shot. But the problem in determining the point of the shot was not that the shooter was in a tree, but that the terrain created an echo. It disoriented the soldiers.

Stories about “cuckoos” are one of the myths that the Soviet-Finnish war gave rise to in large numbers. It’s hard to imagine in 1939 a sniper who, at air temperatures below -30 degrees, was able to sit on a tree for days, while firing accurate shots.

Before the Germans had time to recover from the attacks in the south, in June 1944, Stalin's fourth blow - defeat of the Finnish army in the Karelia region . As a result, the Red Army defeated the Finnish troops, liberated Vyborg and Petrozavodsk, and liberated part of the Karelo-Finnish Republic.

Under the influence of the successes of the Red Army, our allies were no longer able to further delay the opening of a second front. On June 6, 1944, the American-British command, two years late, began a large landing in Northern France.

On June 10, 1944, the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation began. The offensive of Soviet troops in Karelia in 1944 was already the fourth “Stalinist blow”. The strike was carried out by troops of the Leningrad Front on the Karelian Isthmus and troops of the Karelian Front in the Svir-Petrozavodsk direction with the support of the Baltic Fleet, Ladoga and Onega military flotillas.

The strategic operation itself was divided into the Vyborg (June 10-20) and Svir-Petrozavodsk (June 21 - August 9) operations. The Vyborg operation solved the problem of defeating Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus. The Svir-Petrozavodsk operation was supposed to solve the problem of liberating the Karelo-Finnish SSR. In addition, local operations were carried out: the Tuloksa and Bjork landing operations. The operations involved troops of the Leningrad and Karelian fronts, which had 31 rifle divisions, 6 brigades and 4 fortified areas. The Soviet fronts numbered more than 450 thousand soldiers and officers, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, more than 800 tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 1.5 thousand aircraft.

The fourth “Stalinist blow” solved several important problems:

The Red Army supported the allies. On June 6, 1944, the Normandy operation began and the long-awaited second front was opened. The summer offensive on the Karelian Isthmus was supposed to prevent the German command from transferring troops to the west from the Baltic states;

It was necessary to eliminate the threat to Leningrad from Finland, as well as the important communications that led from Murmansk to the central regions of the USSR; liberate the cities of Vyborg, Petrozavodsk and most of the Karelo-Finnish SSR from enemy troops, restoring the state border with Finland;

The headquarters planned to inflict a decisive defeat on the Finnish army and bring Finland out of the war, forcing it to conclude a separate peace with the USSR.

Background.

After the successful winter-spring campaign of 1944, the Headquarters determined the tasks of the summer campaign of 1944. Stalin believed that in the summer of 1944 it was necessary to clear the entire Soviet territory of the Nazis and restore the state borders of the Soviet Union along the entire line from the Black to the Barents Sea. At the same time, it was obvious that the war would not end on the Soviet borders. It was necessary to finish off the German “wounded beast” in his own lair and free the peoples of Europe from German captivity.

On May 1, 1944, Stalin signed a directive to begin preparing the troops of the Leningrad and Karelian fronts for an offensive. Particular attention was paid to the need to conduct an offensive in the specific conditions of the terrain, in which the Red Army had already had to wage a difficult and bloody struggle during the Winter War of 1939-1940. On May 30, the commander of the Karelian Front, K. A. Meretskov, reported on the progress of preparations for the operation.

On June 5, Stalin congratulated Roosevelt and Churchill on their victory - the capture of Rome. The next day, Churchill announced the start of the Normandy operation. The British Prime Minister noted that the start was good, obstacles had been overcome, and large landings had successfully landed. Stalin congratulated Roosevelt and Churchill on the successful landing of troops in Northern France. The Soviet leader also briefly informed them about the further actions of the Red Army. He noted that, according to the agreement at the Tehran Conference, an offensive would be launched in mid-June on one of the important sectors of the front. The general offensive of the Soviet troops was planned for the end of June and July. On June 9, Joseph Stalin additionally informed the British Prime Minister that preparations for the summer offensive of the Soviet troops were being completed, and on June 10 an offensive would be launched on the Leningrad Front.

It should be noted that the transfer of the military efforts of the Red Army from the south to the north came as a surprise to the German military-political leadership. In Berlin it was believed that the Soviet Union was capable of carrying out large-scale offensive operations in only one strategic direction. The liberation of Right Bank Ukraine and Crimea (the second and third Stalinist attacks) showed that the main direction in 1944 would be the south. In the north, the Germans were not expecting a new big offensive.

Strengths of the parties. USSR. To carry out the Vyborg operation, troops of the right wing of the Leningrad Front under the command of Army General (Marshal from June 18, 1944) Leonid Aleksandrovich Govorov were involved. The 23rd Army was already on the Karelian Isthmus under the command of Lieutenant General A.I. Cherepanov (in early July the army was led by Lieutenant General V.I. Shvetsov). It was strengthened by the 21st Army of Colonel General D.N. Gusev. Gusev's army was to play a major role in the offensive. Considering the power of the Finnish defense, over three years the Finns built powerful defensive fortifications here, strengthening the “Mannerheim Line”; the Leningrad Front was significantly strengthened. It received two breakthrough artillery divisions, an artillery-cannon brigade, 5 special artillery divisions, two tank brigades and seven self-propelled gun regiments.

The 21st Army, under the command of Dmitry Nikolaevich Gusev, included the 30th Guards, 97th and 109th Rifle Corps (a total of nine rifle divisions), as well as the 22nd fortified area. Gusev's army also included: the 3rd Guards Artillery Breakthrough Corps, five tank and three self-propelled artillery regiments (157 tanks and self-propelled artillery units) and a significant number of individual artillery, sapper and other units. The 23rd Army under the command of Alexander Ivanovich Cherepanov included the 98th and 115th Rifle Corps (six rifle divisions), the 17th fortified area, one tank and one self-propelled artillery regiment (42 tanks and self-propelled guns), 38 artillery divisions. In total, both armies had 15 rifle divisions and two fortified areas.

In addition, the front reserve included the 108th and 110th rifle corps from the 21st Army (six rifle divisions), four tank brigades, three tank and two self-propelled artillery regiments (in total the front tank group consisted of more than 300 armored vehicles) , as well as a significant number of artillery. In total, more than 260 thousand soldiers and officers (according to other sources - about 190 thousand people), about 7.5 thousand guns and mortars, 630 tanks and self-propelled guns and about 1 thousand aircraft were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus.

From the sea, the offensive was supported and provided by the coastal flanks: the Red Banner Baltic Fleet under the command of Admiral V.F. Tributs - from the Gulf of Finland, the Ladoga Military Flotilla of Rear Admiral V.S. Cherokov - Lake Ladoga. From the air, the ground forces were supported by the 13th Air Army under the leadership of Lieutenant General of Aviation S. D. Rybalchenko. The 13th Air Army was strengthened by the reserves of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and consisted of about 770 aircraft. The air army included three bomber air divisions, two attack air divisions, the 2nd Guards Leningrad Air Defense Fighter Air Corps, a fighter air division and other units. The Baltic Fleet aviation consisted of about 220 aircraft.

Plans of the Soviet command. The terrain was difficult to navigate - forests and swamps, which made it difficult to use heavy weapons. Therefore, the command of the Leningrad Front decided to deliver the main blow with the forces of Gusev’s 21st Army in the coastal direction in the area of ​​Sestroretsk and Beloostrov. Soviet troops were to advance along the northeastern coast of the Gulf of Finland. This made it possible to support the offensive of ground forces with naval and coastal artillery, and amphibious landings.

Cherepanov's 23rd Army was supposed to actively defend its positions in the first days of the offensive. After the 21st Army reached the Sestra River, Cherepanov’s army also had to go on the offensive. The remaining three armies of the Leningrad Front, concentrated in the Narva sector of the Soviet-German front, had to intensify their actions at this time in order to prevent the transfer of German divisions from the Baltic states to the Karelian Isthmus. In order to misinform the German command, a few days before the Vyborg operation, the Soviet command began to spread rumors about the imminence of a major offensive by the Red Army in the Narva region. To achieve this, a number of reconnaissance and other activities were carried out.

Finland. Soviet troops on the Karelian Isthmus were opposed by the main forces of the Finnish army: parts of the 3rd Corps under the command of Lieutenant General J. Siilasvuo and the 4th Corps of General T. Laatikainen. The reserve of Commander-in-Chief K. G. Mannerheim was also located in this direction. On June 15, they were united into the Karelian Isthmus task force. The group included: five infantry divisions, one infantry and one cavalry brigade, a single Finnish armored division (located in the operational reserve in the Vyborg area), as well as a significant number of individual units. Three infantry divisions and an infantry brigade occupied the first line of defense, two divisions and a cavalry brigade occupied the second line. In total, the Finns had about 100 thousand soldiers (according to other sources - about 70 thousand people), 960 guns and mortars, more than 200 (250) aircraft and 110 tanks.

The Finnish army relied on a powerful defensive system that was created on the Karelian Isthmus over three years of war, as well as on the improved “Mannerheim Line”. The deeply-echeloned and well-prepared defense system on the Karelian Isthmus was called the “Karelian Wall”. The depth of the Finnish defense reached 100 km. The first line of defense ran along the front line, which had been established in the fall of 1941. The second defense line was located approximately 25-30 km from the first. The third line of defense ran along the old “Mannerheim Line,” which was improved and further strengthened in the Vyborg direction. Vyborg had a circular defensive belt. In addition, outside the city there was a rear, fourth line of defense.

In general, the Finnish army was well equipped and had extensive experience in fighting in wooded, swampy and lake areas. Finnish soldiers had high morale and fought hard. The officers supported the idea of ​​“Great Finland” (due to the annexation of Russian Karelia, the Kola Peninsula and a number of other territories) and advocated an alliance with Germany, which was supposed to help Finnish expansion. However, the Finnish army was significantly inferior to the Red Army in terms of guns and mortars, tanks and especially aircraft.

The offensive of the Red Army.

On the morning of June 9, the artillery of the Leningrad Front, coastal and naval artillery began to destroy previously discovered enemy fortifications. On a 20-kilometer section of the front in front of the positions of Gusev’s 21st Army, the density of ground artillery fire reached 200-220 guns and mortars. The artillery fired non-stop for 10-12 hours. On the first day, they tried to destroy the enemy’s long-term defensive structures to the entire depth of the first line of defense. In addition, they conducted an active counter-battery fight.

At the same time, Soviet aviation launched a massive attack on enemy positions. About 300 attack aircraft, 265 bombers, 158 fighters and 20 reconnaissance aircraft of the 13th Air Force and Naval Aviation took part in the operation. The intensity of airstrikes is indicated by the number of sorties per day - 1100.

The air and artillery strike was very effective. The Finns later admitted that as a result of Soviet fire, many defensive structures and barriers were destroyed or severely damaged, and minefields were blown up. And Mannerheim wrote in his memoirs that the thunder of Soviet heavy guns was heard in Helsinki.

Late in the evening, the reinforced forward battalions of the 23rd Army began reconnaissance in force, trying to break into the Finnish defense system. There was some minor success in some areas, but in most areas there was no progress. The Finnish command, realizing that this was the beginning of a major offensive, began to tighten the battle formations.

In the early morning of June 10, Soviet artillery and aviation resumed attacks on Finnish positions. Baltic Fleet ships and coastal artillery played a major role in the attacks in the coastal direction. 3 destroyers, 4 gunboats, batteries of the Kronstadt and Izhora coastal defense sectors, and the 1st Guards Naval Railway Brigade took part in the artillery preparation. Naval artillery attacked Finnish positions in the Beloostrov area.

The effectiveness of the artillery barrage and airstrikes on June 9-10 is evidenced by the fact that in a small area in the Beloostrov area alone, 130 pillboxes, armored caps, bunkers and other enemy fortifications were destroyed. Almost all the wire barriers were demolished by artillery fire, anti-tank obstacles were destroyed, and minefields were blown up. The trenches were badly damaged and the Finnish infantry suffered heavy losses. According to the testimony of prisoners, Finnish troops lost up to 70% of the units that occupied the forward trenches.

After three hours of artillery preparation, units of the 21st Army went on the offensive. The artillery, after the completion of the artillery preparation, provided support to the advancing troops. The main blow was delivered on the front section of Rajajoki - Old Beloostrov - height 107. The offensive began successfully. The 109th Rifle Corps, under the command of Lieutenant General I.P. Alferov, advanced on the left flank - along the coast, along the railway to Vyborg and along the Primorskoye Highway. In the center, along the Vyborg Highway, the 30th Guards Corps of Lieutenant General N.P. Simonyak was advancing. On the right flank, in the general direction towards Kallelovo, the 97th Rifle Corps of Major General M. M. Busarov was advancing.

On the very first day, Gusev’s army broke through the enemy’s defenses (in Moscow this success was celebrated with fireworks). The 30th Guards Corps advanced 14-15 km during the day. Soviet soldiers liberated Stary Beloostrov, Maynila, and crossed the Sestra River. In other areas, progress was not as successful. The 97th Corps reached Sestra.

To develop success, the command of the Leningrad Front created two mobile groups from tank brigades and regiments; they were assigned to the 30th Guards and 109th Rifle Corps. On June 11, Soviet troops advanced another 15-20 km and reached the second line of enemy defense. Near the village of Kivennape, which was a key hub of the Finnish defense, a Finnish tank division launched a counterattack on the Soviet troops. Initially, her attack had some success, but the Finns were soon driven back to their original positions.

On the same day, Cherepanov's 23rd Army began its offensive. The army struck with the forces of the 98th Rifle Corps under Lieutenant General G.I. Anisimov. In the afternoon, the right-flank 97th Corps of the 21st Army was transferred to the 23rd Army. In exchange, Gusev's 21st Army was transferred from the front reserve to the 108th Rifle Corps.

The Finnish 10th Infantry Division, which held the defense in the direction of the main attack, was defeated and suffered heavy losses. She ran to the second line of defense. On June 11, it was taken to the rear for reorganization and replenishment. The Finnish command was forced to urgently transfer troops from the second line of defense and from the reserve (3rd Infantry Division, Cavalry Brigade - they stood in the second line of defense, a tank division and other units) to the defense line of the 4th Army Corps. But this could no longer radically change the situation. Realizing that it would not be possible to hold the first line of defense, by the end of the day on June 10, the Finnish command began to withdraw troops to the second line of defense.

In addition, Mannerheim began to transfer troops to the Karelian Isthmus from other directions. On June 10, the Finnish commander ordered the transfer of the 4th Infantry Division and the 3rd Infantry Brigade from eastern Karelia. On June 12, the 17th division and 20th brigade were sent to the Karelian Isthmus. Mannerheim hoped to stabilize the front in the second line of defense.

Liberation of Vyborg.Breakthrough of the second line of defense of the Karelian Wall (June 12-18).

June 12, 1944 The Red Army's offensive stalled somewhat. The Finnish command transferred reserves, and the Finns, relying on the second line of defense, strengthened their resistance. The 23rd Army advanced only 4-6 km. In the offensive zone of the 21st Army, units of the 109th Corps captured the settlement of Raivola, and units of the 30th Guards Corps stormed Kivennapa. Units of the 108th Corps tried to immediately break through the second line of defense, but failed.

The Soviet command decided to pull up forces and transfer the main blow from the Srednevyborgskoye Highway, where the Finns had concentrated significant forces in the Kivennapa area, to the Primorskoye Highway strip. The forces of the 108th and 110th Rifle Corps were concentrated in the Terijoki area (the 110th Corps was sent from the front reserve). The main artillery forces were also brought up, including the 3rd Guards Artillery Breakthrough Corps. On June 13, there was a regrouping of forces and preparations for a new powerful blow. At the same time, units of Cherepanov’s 23rd Army continued attacks on Finnish positions and captured a number of enemy strongholds.

On the morning of June 14, Soviet artillery and aviation struck the Finnish fortifications with a powerful blow. In the offensive zone of the 23rd Army, the artillery preparation lasted 55 minutes, in the zone of the 21st Army - 90 minutes. Units of the 109th Rifle Corps, which advanced along the Vyborg Railway, as a result of many hours of stubborn battle, with the support of one of the mobile groups of the front (1st Red Banner Tank Brigade), captured the important enemy stronghold of Kuterselka, and then Mustamäki.

The Finns resisted fiercely all day and repeatedly launched counterattacks. At night, the Finnish command launched a tank division under the command of General R. Lagus into the attack. Initially, her offensive had some success, but by morning she suffered significant losses and retreated 5 km to the north. The Finns, having lost hope of holding the second line of defense, began to retreat to the third line of defense.

On June 15, units of the 108th Rifle Corps advanced along the Primorskoye Highway and the railway; with the support of tanks and self-propelled guns, by the end of the day they were able to capture another well-fortified enemy defense center - the village of Myatkyulya. The settlement was protected by a powerful system of engineering structures, including armored caps, pillboxes and bunkers. To destroy enemy fortifications, the Soviet command used heavy guns from Kronstadt and railway artillery. As a result, the second line of defense of the Karelian Wall was broken through in an area of ​​12 km. The Soviet command introduced the fresh 110th Rifle Corps into the resulting gap. This threatened the encirclement of the Finnish troops, who still held their defense areas. On July 14-15, the troops of Cherepanov’s 23rd Army successfully advanced. Soviet troops finally passed the first line of enemy defense, reached the second line and penetrated it in a number of areas.

On June 15-18, units of the 21st Army advanced 40-45 km and reached the third line of enemy defense. Units of the 108th Corps, with the support of tankers, took Fort Ino. On June 18, units of the corps broke through the defenses of the Finnish army and captured the city of Koivisto with a swift blow. As a result, the third line of defense of the Karelian Wall was partially broken through.

The Finnish army in the Vyborg direction found itself in a critical situation. The Finnish command urgently sent all available reserves and troops from southeastern Karelia to the Karelian Isthmus. The 17th Infantry Division was already on its way, the 11th and 6th divisions were loading into wagons. In addition, the 4th Division, an infantry brigade and several other units were expected to arrive. All main forces were concentrated for the defense of Vyborg. The reserves - an armored division and the 10th Infantry Division, allocated for restoration and replenishment, were located west of Vyborg, where, as the Finnish command believed, the main blow of the Red Army would be delivered.

On June 18-19, 20 bombers and 10 fighters were transferred from Estonian airfields to Finland. On June 19, the Finnish government turned to Adolf Hitler with a request to urgently transfer six German divisions, equipment and aircraft to Finland. However, the Germans sent by sea only the 122nd Infantry Division and the 303rd Assault Gun Brigade, and aircraft from the 5th Air Fleet. In addition, the 200th German regiment, formed from Estonian volunteers, arrived in Finland. The German command could not give more; the Wehrmacht itself had a hard time.

At dawn on June 19, the batteries of the railway brigade opened fire on the city and Vyborg station. Soviet troops launched an assault on Finnish positions. To strengthen the blow of the 21st Army, the 97th Rifle Corps was again transferred to it. With the support of artillery, aviation and tanks, rifle units captured the most important lines of enemy resistance and broke through the “Mannerheim Line”, reaching directly to Vyborg. By the end of the day, the third line of enemy defense was broken through at a front 50 km from the Gulf of Finland to Lake Muolan-järvi.

At the same time, the offensive of the 23rd Army continued. Soviet troops finally broke through the second line of enemy defense and captured Valkjärvi. The army reached the Vuoksa water system. Units of the Finnish 3rd Corps retreated to the Vuoksa defensive line.

The Vyborg region was defended by significant forces. However, the Finnish command, confused by the fact that Soviet troops penetrated all their main defensive lines in the shortest possible time, did not have time to properly organize the defense of the city. At night, Soviet sappers made passages in the minefields and in the morning, Soviet tanks with troops on board burst into Vyborg. Units of the 20th Infantry Brigade, which formed the garrison of the city, stubbornly defended themselves, but in the afternoon they were forced to leave Vyborg. By the end of the day, Soviet soldiers completely liberated the city from enemy forces. However, Soviet troops were only able to advance slightly north of the city due to the approach of the 10th and 17th Finnish infantry divisions, as well as German units.

The Finnish army lost its most important stronghold, which, according to the plans of the Finnish command, was supposed to bind significant forces of the Red Army with stubborn defense for a long time. This defeat was a strong blow to the morale of the Finnish army.

MK IV Churchill tanks on the street of liberated Vyborg

Continuation of the offensive. Naval landings.

In view of the successful development of the Vyborg operation, the Supreme High Command Headquarters decided to continue the offensive. On June 21, 1944, Directive No. 220119 “on the continuation of the offensive on the Karelian Isthmus” was issued. The Leningrad Front received the task of reaching the Imatra-Lappenranta-Virojoki line by June 26-28.

On June 25, the Leningrad Front went on the offensive in a 30-kilometer section - from the Vuoksa River to the Vyborg Bay. Four rifle corps of the 21st Army (109th, 110th, 97th and 108th), for a total of 12 rifle divisions, took part in the operation. In addition, the 30th Guards Rifle Corps was in reserve. However, the Soviet rifle divisions were bled dry and weakened by previous fierce battles. The divisions averaged 4-5 thousand bayonets. There were not enough tanks and other equipment. The Military Council of the Leningrad Front asked the Supreme High Command Headquarters for significant reinforcements: two rifle corps, one engineer brigade, tanks and self-propelled guns to replenish retired armored vehicles, as well as a significant amount of other weapons and ammunition. The Supreme High Command headquarters refused to reinforce Govorov's strike force, believing that the Leningrad Front had enough strength to break through the enemy's defenses.

The Finnish army at this time was significantly strengthened. Reinforcements arrived from Karelia and German troops from the Baltic states. On June 24-25, the 17th, 11th and 6th infantry divisions appeared at the front. In addition, in the area from Vyborg to Lake Vuoksi, the defense was already held by three divisions - the 3rd, 4th and 18th, and two brigades - the 3rd and 20th. The 10th Infantry Division and a tank division were in reserve. German troops arrived - the 122nd German Infantry Division and the 303rd Assault Gun Brigade. As a result, the Finnish command concentrated almost all available forces in well-prepared positions. In addition, before the Soviet offensive, Germany supplied Finland with 14 thousand Faust cartridges. Their massive use has led to some deterrent effect. Germany also strengthened the aviation component of the Finnish army: at the end of June 39 Messerschmitt Bf-109G fighters arrived, and in July another 19 aircraft.

On June 25, 1944, after an hour of artillery bombardment, the divisions of the 21st Army went on the offensive in the sector north of Tali. For several days there were stubborn battles, the Finns constantly counterattacked. As a result, at the end of June, Soviet troops were able to advance only 6-10 km, and at the beginning of July only 2 km. As Mannerheim wrote:

“We didn’t even dare to hope for such an ending. It was a real miracle."

Advance of the 23rd Army.

The 23rd Army received the task of crossing Vuoksa in the Vuosalmi area and, advancing along the eastern bank of the river, reaching the flank of the main Finnish group from the northeast. Part of the army's forces was to advance on Kexholm. However, units of the 23rd Army also did not achieve decisive success.

On June 20, the army reached the Vuokse River. At the same time, units of the Finnish 3rd Army Corps retained a bridgehead on the southern bank of the river. On the morning of July 4, a powerful artillery strike was carried out on the enemy bridgehead. However, despite significant superiority in infantry, artillery and aviation, units of the 98th Rifle Corps were only able to liquidate the enemy bridgehead on the seventh day. The battle was distinguished by great ferocity - the commander of the Finnish 2nd Infantry Division I. Martola, which defended the bridgehead, at a critical moment asked for permission to withdraw the remnants of the garrison, but the commander of the 3rd Army Corps, General J. Siilasvuo, ordered to fight to the last. As a result, almost all the defenders of the Finnish bridgehead were killed.

On July 9, after artillery preparation and under the direct cover of artillery fire, units of the 23rd Army began their offensive. The 142nd Rifle Division successfully crossed the river and occupied a bridgehead up to 5-6 km along the front and up to 2-4 km in depth. In other areas it was not possible to cross the river, so units of the 10th and 92nd Infantry Divisions began to be transferred to the bridgehead already captured by the 142nd Infantry Division.

The Finnish command urgently increased its grouping in this direction. Units of the 15th Infantry Division and the 19th Infantry Brigade from the 3rd Corps, a tank division and a Jaeger brigade were transferred here. Later, units of the 3rd Infantry Division arrived. On July 10, the Finnish army launched a counteroffensive, trying to destroy the Soviet bridgehead. Fierce fighting continued until July 15. Soviet troops withstood the blow and were even able to somewhat expand the bridgehead, but failed to develop the offensive. After this, there were no more active hostilities. Thus, although the 23rd Army did not break through the German defenses, it was able to create the opportunity for a further offensive in the Kexholm direction.

The Soviet offensive at the end of June - beginning of July did not bring the expected success. On July 11, 1944, the troops of the Leningrad Front, advancing on the Karelian Isthmus, by order of Headquarters, stopped active hostilities and went on the defensive. Part of the forces of the 21st and 23rd armies were withdrawn from the Karelian Isthmus to the Baltic states.

Simultaneously with the frontal offensive, the Soviet command tried to carry out a deep envelopment of the Finnish army with the help of amphibious landings. At the end of June, the forces of the Baltic Fleet carried out the Bjork landing operation, and at the beginning of July, troops were landed on the islands of the Vyborg Bay.

After the liberation of Vyborg, the islands of the Björk archipelago (Beryozovye Islands) found themselves in the rear of the advancing Soviet troops, which gave the Finnish army the opportunity to land troops and reconnaissance groups in the rear of the Leningrad Front. In addition, these islands blocked the Baltic Fleet ships from entering the Vyborg Bay. The islands were defended by a garrison of 3 thousand soldiers with 40 guns. The Finnish command realized the threat to the garrison of the islands, so they strengthened the minefields in their area, set up enhanced patrols and strengthened the German-Finnish naval group (up to 100 ships and vessels).

On June 19, Govorov ordered the Baltic Fleet to occupy the islands. The operation was planned to be carried out by the fleet, since the ground forces were busy fighting in other directions. The operation was directly supervised by the commander of the Kronstadt naval defense region, Vice Admiral Yu. F. Rall. The brigade of skerry ships and the 260th separate marine brigade (about 1,600 soldiers) were subordinate to him.

On the night of June 20, a reinforced company of marines was landed on Nerva Island. There was no enemy on the island, and it became a springboard for a further offensive. A coastal battery, several machine-gun bunkers and engineering barriers were built on the island. On the same night, Soviet torpedo boats sank the German destroyer T-31 off the island. Half of the crew died or were captured, the other half was rescued by Finnish boats.

On June 21, a reconnaissance detachment - a company of marines - was landed on Piysari Island (now Northern Birch Island), and it took a bridgehead. Contrary to intelligence data, there was a strong enemy garrison on the island - the Soviet detachment was attacked by three infantry companies. The landing force was reinforced with another company. The Finnish command sent a detachment of ships to the island, which began shelling the Soviet bridgehead. However, with the help of the fleet and aviation, which sank a landing artillery ship, a torpedo boat and damaged another ship, the attack of the enemy naval detachment was repelled. In addition, the Soviet Air Force played a big role in the defeat of the island's garrison - 221 sorties were made during the day. However, the battle dragged on, then Rall transferred the entire 260th Marine Brigade along with 14 guns to the island. By dawn on June 23, the island was cleared of the enemy. On June 23, Soviet troops captured the islands of Björkö and Torsari, their garrisons offered little resistance and retreated.

The Finnish command, deciding that holding the islands was pointless and would lead to heavy losses, decided to evacuate the garrison. On June 25, the island of Tuppuransaari was captured. The Finnish garrison, after a small skirmish, fled, abandoning two guns and 5 machine guns. On June 27, they occupied the island of Ruonti without a fight.

Thus, the goal of the landing operation was realized. The Baltic Fleet received a base for further offensive. This was the first successful landing operation of the Baltic Fleet during the entire war. The victory was achieved due to the good cooperation of the Marine Corps, Navy and Air Force.

35 guns and other property were captured on the islands. The Finns lost about 300 people, 17 ships and vessels were sunk, 18 were damaged. 17 enemy aircraft were shot down. Soviet troops on the island of Piisaari lost 67 people killed, 1 small hunter boat and 1 armored boat were sunk, 5 ships were damaged, 16 aircraft were killed or went missing.

Landing on the islands of the Vyborg Bay.

On July 1 - 10, 1944, a landing was carried out on the islands of the Vyborg Bay. Comfront Marshal of the Soviet Union L.A. Govorov set the Baltic Fleet the task of clearing the enemy from the islands in the Vyborg Bay: Teikarsaari (Playful), Suonionsaari (Krepysh) and Ravansaari (Maly Vysotsky) and others. The islands were to become a springboard for the landing of part of the forces of 59- th Army of the LF to the northern coast of the gulf - to strike in the rear of the Finnish group. The port of Koivisto became the starting base for the landing. The commander of the Kronstadt naval defensive region, Vice Admiral Yu. F. Rall, was responsible for the operation. He was promptly subordinated to the command of the 59th Army.

The islands were defended by the 1st Finnish Cavalry Brigade. The adjacent coast of the Vyborg Bay was defended by the Finnish 2nd Coastal Defense Brigade. These formations were part of the 5th Army Corps, whose commander had at his disposal three Finnish and one German infantry divisions. After the loss of the Björk Islands, the Finnish command hastily strengthened the defense of the islands and minefields were installed. Finnish and German ships and boats that had left the Björk archipelago and were transferred from remote areas of the Gulf of Finland were drawn to the coast. 131 coastal artillery guns were stationed on the islands.

On July 1, the landing force (one battalion and a reconnaissance group) was landed on the island of Teikarsaari (Playful). Several tenders were damaged by enemy coastal artillery, 1 armored “small hunter” and 1 tender were blown up by mines and died. The enemy immediately put up stubborn resistance. Two companies were deployed to support the garrison (350 people with several guns). A detachment of German and Finnish ships was brought up (18 pennants, including two destroyers). During the naval battle, three Soviet torpedo boats and two enemy patrol boats were killed. In addition, the Finnish garrison was supported by fire from coastal batteries. As a result, the Soviet troops were thrown into the sea. Soviet ships were able to pick up 50 people.

The main reason for the death of the landing force was the poor organization of interaction between the landing force and coastal artillery (it turned out to be ineffective) and aviation (Air Force support was insufficient). The riflemen were not prepared for landing operations; the detachment did not have its own artillery and few means of communication.

On July 4, three regiments of the 224th Infantry Division launched an assault on Teikarsaari, Suonionsaari, and Ravansaari. The Soviet command took into account the mistakes of July 1: the fleet constantly provided fire support, transported ammunition and reinforcements; Soviet aviation carried out constant attacks on enemy positions (up to 500 sorties per day); Coastal artillery fired continuously. The 1st Guards Red Banner Krasnoselskaya naval railway artillery brigade alone fired about 1.5 thousand large-caliber shells. They even landed 4 light tanks on the island of Suonionsaari. By 17 o'clock the islands of Suonionsaari and Ravansaari were cleared of the enemy. On the same day and at night from June 4 to 5, several more small islands were captured.

Things took a bad turn in Teikarsaari. During the landing, a sea hunter was blown up by a mine and died; where the regimental headquarters was located with the commander of the landing detachment, contact was lost. For this reason, the assistance of aviation and coastal artillery turned out to be ineffective. In addition, the island was not completely blocked, which allowed the enemy to transfer reinforcements to it. During a fierce battle, the enemy first managed to stop the advance of the landing force, then cut it off with a series of counterattacks. By the morning of July 5, the landing force was defeated, only isolated pockets of resistance resisted.

At the same time, fierce battles took place at sea. A Finnish-German detachment attacked Soviet ships. In the naval battle, 4 minesweepers and 1 landing barge were destroyed, and several enemy ships were damaged. The Soviet Air Force also attacked enemy ships and reported the destruction of a gunboat, a patrol boat and two barges. The Baltic Fleet lost, mainly to mines, 4 armored boats, 1 small hunter, 1 patrol boat. Several more ships were damaged.

The Soviet command first tried to take the remnants of the landing force to Teikarsaari. However, enemy artillery fire did not allow this task to be solved. It was possible to take out only one small group (20 soldiers) with the commander of the 160th regiment, Major S.N. Ilyin. Then they decided to throw all their strength into storming the island. By 11 o'clock in the afternoon, under continuous heavy enemy fire, two rifle battalions were landed on the island, by 16:30 - two more battalions and four light tanks. Aviation constantly attacked enemy positions (more than 300 sorties were carried out). In order to prevent the transfer of Finnish troops from the mainland to the island, a detachment of ships was transferred to the northern tip of the island. This deprived the Finnish garrison of external support. The Finnish command decided to withdraw the garrison from the island. Soviet aviation and navy concentrated their efforts on combating enemy watercraft. 3 patrol ships, a gunboat, a patrol boat, 3 medium and small transports were destroyed, and a significant number of ships were damaged. By evening the island was cleared of Finns. The last Finnish soldiers swam across the strait.

On July 7-8, the island of Hapenensaari (Podberyozovy) was captured. The Finns stubbornly resisted, but after intensifying the landing, they left the island. On July 7, an attempt was also made to land troops on the coast of the Gulf of Finland in the area of ​​the Karpila Peninsula. But the enemy’s coastal batteries sank two patrol boats and abandoned the landing. On July 9-10, the landing force captured the island of Koivusaari (Bereznik). In total, by July 10, Soviet troops occupied 16 islands. On July 10, the front command stopped the landing operation in connection with the start of peace negotiations between the USSR and Finland.

The operation was never resumed. The 21st Army was unable to break through the Finnish defenses and the landing in the rear of the Finnish group lost its meaning. The landing operation on the islands of the Vyborg Bay led to partial success; some of the islands remained in enemy hands. The capture of the islands led to significant losses in people and ships. 1,400 paratroopers were killed, 200 ship crew members were killed, and 31 ships were lost. According to Finnish data, Soviet troops lost 3 thousand people in killed alone. According to Soviet data, the Finns lost 2.4 thousand people, more than 110 guns and machine guns, and 30 ships.

Results of the Vyborg operation.

In 1941-1944, the Finnish army, together with the Wehrmacht, besieged Leningrad. Even after the complete liberation of Leningrad (the first “Stalinist strike”: the complete elimination of the blockade of Leningrad) from the blockade, Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus stood only 30 km from the second capital of the USSR. As a result of the Vyborg operation, Finnish troops were finally driven back from Leningrad.

During the operation, the armies of the Leningrad Front in just 10 days broke through several lines of Finnish defense, which had been strengthened for several years, advanced 110-120 km and occupied Vyborg.

The Finnish army suffered a heavy defeat, losing more than 32 thousand people in the battles of June 10-20 (according to other sources - 44 thousand). To stabilize the front and prevent a military catastrophe, the Finnish command had to urgently transfer troops from southern and eastern Karelia, which greatly facilitated the second stage of the strategic Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation - the Svir-Petrozavodsk operation.

The Finnish government, realizing that military defeat was close, began to look for the possibility of concluding peace with the USSR. Already on June 22, Finland, through the Swedish embassy, ​​turned to the USSR with a request for peace.

This operation showed the greatly increased skill and power of the Red Army; in a few days it broke through several strong enemy defense lines, including the infamous “Mannerheim Line”. Even the most powerful defense was lost to the skillful interaction of infantry, artillery, tanks and aircraft.

Svirsk-Petrozavodsk operation.

On June 21, 1944, the second stage of the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation began - the Svir-Petrozavodsk operation. The troops of the Karelian Front, as well as the forces of the Ladoga and Onega military flotillas, went on the offensive. The operation ended in complete victory for the Soviet troops; they advanced 110-250 kilometers in the western and southwestern directions and liberated most of the Karelo-Finnish SSR from the enemy. The preconditions were created for Finland to emerge from World War II.

Offensive plan.

On February 28, 1944, the commander of the Karelian Front, Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov, presented the general plan for the upcoming offensive to the Supreme Command Headquarters. The main blow was planned to be delivered in the Kandalash direction towards the Finnish border and further across the territory of Finland to the Gulf of Bothnia in order to cut off the main forces of the Finnish army from the German group in Lapland. In the future, they planned, if necessary (Finland continues to persist), to develop an offensive in a southern direction, into central Finland. At the same time, they wanted to launch an auxiliary strike in the Murmansk direction. The Supreme High Command headquarters approved the plan of the Karelian Front and until the end of spring Meretskov’s troops were preparing for its implementation.

However, then, at the suggestion of the 1st Deputy Chief of the General Staff A.I. Antonov, it was decided to change the general plan of the offensive of the Karelian Front. First, they decided to defeat the Finnish army in order to bring Finland out of the war, and only then launch an offensive against the German group in Lapland. The Supreme Commander approved this plan. At the same time, in the area of ​​​​Petsamo and Kandalaksha, the troops had to continue preparing for the offensive in order to give the enemy the appearance of an impending attack. The new offensive plan involved delivering two powerful successive attacks: first, the troops of the right flank of the Leningrad Front on the Karelian Isthmus were to go on the offensive, then the forces of the left wing of the Karelian Front were to go on the offensive in southern Karelia.

On May 30, Meretsky was summoned to the GVK Headquarters, where he was given a new task - to defeat Finnish troops in southeastern Karelia. The front was supposed to go on the offensive on June 25. Meretskov tried to defend the original plan, since it was necessary to regroup forces from the Kandalaksha and Murmansk directions to the Petrozavodsk direction as soon as possible. However, Headquarters insisted on its own. The main attack by the troops of the left flank of the Karelian Front was to be delivered from the Lodeynoye Pole area. The troops of the Karelian Front, with the support of the Onega and Ladoga military flotillas, were given the task of breaking through the Finnish defenses, crossing the Svir River and developing an offensive in the directions of Olonets, Vidlitsa, Pitkyaranta, Sortavala and part of the forces to Petrozavodsk (7th Army), and Medvezhyegorsk, Porosozero, Kuolisma (32nd Army). The troops of the Karelian Front were supposed to defeat the Finnish Svir-Petrozavodsk group, liberate Petrozavodsk, the Karelo-Finnish SSR, and reach the state border in the Kuolisma area. At the same time, the forces of the right flank of the Karelian Front were supposed to demonstratively continue preparations for an attack on the Petsamo and Kirkenes area.

The main role was assigned to the 7th Army under the command of Major General Alexei Nikolaevich Krutikov. It was supposed to deliver its main blow to the enemy from the Lodeynoye Pole area, cross the Svir and advance along the coast of Lake Ladoga, northwest to the state border. The 7th Army was supposed to occupy Olonets, Vidlitsa, Salmi, Pitkyaranta and Sortavala. Part of the forces of the 7th Army launched an auxiliary attack on Petrozavodsk.

The offensive of Krutikov’s army was to be facilitated by the Ladoga flotilla under the command of Rear Admiral Viktor Sergeevich Cherokov. In addition, in the area between the Vidlitsa and Tuloksa rivers, it was planned to land troops consisting of two marine brigades in order to cut the strategically important railway and highway. On Lake Onega, the offensive of the 7th Army in the Petrozavodsk direction was facilitated by the Onega military flotilla under the command of Captain 1st Rank Neon Vasilyevich Antonov.

The 32nd Army, under the command of Lieutenant General Philip Danilovich Gorelenko, was supposed to strike north of Lake Onega. The army received the task of breaking through the enemy’s defenses in the Medvezhyegorsk direction, advancing in the direction of Porosozero, Kuolisma, defeating the Massel task force of the Finnish army, and part of the forces supporting the liberation of Petrozavodsk. The remaining three armies of the Karelian Front (14th, 19th and 26th) received the task, in the event of the transfer of German troops from Lapland to southern Karelia, to strike the enemy on the right wing of the front.

Strengths of the parties.

USSR. Before the start of the operation, the 7th Army was significantly strengthened by the reserves of the front and the reserves of the Supreme High Command Headquarters. In the direction of the main attack near Lodeynoye Field there were two rifle corps: the 4th rifle corps of Major General P. V. Gnidin (two divisions, one division - the 368th rifle division, operated in the eastern sector, in the Voznesenye area), 37- 1st Guards Rifle Corps under Lieutenant General P.V. Mironov (three divisions). In the Petrozavodsk direction, the 99th Rifle Corps of Major General S.P. Mikulsky (three divisions) and the 368th Rifle Division of the 4th Corps were supposed to attack. Two marine brigades were to take part in the landing operation. In the second echelon of Krutikov’s army there were two corps - the 94th Rifle Corps of I. I. Popov (three divisions), the 127th Light Rifle Corps of Major General Z. N. Alekseev (three brigades), one marine brigade. In addition, the army included the 150th and 162nd fortified areas, the 7th Guards and 29th tank brigades (131 tanks), the 92nd amphibious tank regiment (40 tanks), 6 separate guards self-propelled artillery regiments ( more than 120 self-propelled guns), two battalions of amphibious vehicles (200 vehicles), the 7th Guards Artillery Breakthrough Division, as well as a significant number of other formations.

Gorelenko's 32nd Army was supposed to strike with three rifle divisions (289th, 313th and 176th) and one tank regiment (30 vehicles). From the air, the offensive of the Karelian Front was supported by the 7th Air Army under the command of Major General of Aviation Ivan Mikhailovich Sokolov. It consisted of 875 aircraft. But, since the army provided air cover for the entire Karelian Front, the offensive could be supported by 588 vehicles. Therefore, the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense line on the Svir River had to be supported by the 13th Air Army of the Leningrad Front with part of its forces. The coordination of the actions of the two air fronts was carried out by the representative of the Headquarters, Air Marshal A. A. Novikov.

In total, the front troops that were allocated for the offensive numbered more than 180 thousand soldiers (according to other sources, more than 200 thousand people), about 4 thousand guns and mortars, 588 aircraft, more than 320 tanks and self-propelled guns.

Finland. By order of Mannerheim, the Finnish army in December 1941 began the construction of a deeply echeloned defensive system on the isthmus between Lakes Ladoga and Onega. Its construction and improvement continued until the summer of 1944. The first Finnish defensive line ran along the northern bank of the Svir and around the bridgehead on the southern bank of the river in the area from Oshta to Svirstroy. It consisted of two or three trenches. The trenches were covered with wire fences in several rows. In many areas near the banks of the Svir River, the Finns sank rafts or special slingshots with barbed wire to make it difficult to force the water barrier. Minefields were laid out in areas that were most convenient for landing troops. There were especially powerful defensive formations in the Lodeynoye Pole area.

The second line of defense ran along the line Obzha - Megrera - Megrozero. It consisted of several strong strongholds located on possible directions of advance of the Red Army. A powerful defense center was located in the Megrozero area, where one flank abutted a forest where there were no roads, and the other flag was covered by a swamp. In front of the front line there were anti-tank ditches, granite ridges and minefields. Machine gun nests were placed at the heights. To protect infantry from air strikes and artillery fire, reinforced concrete shelters were erected with supplies of water, food, ammunition, telephone communications and electricity. An even more powerful defense unit was Sambatux. Here, in addition to bunkers, there were many long-term reinforced concrete firing points (five per kilometer of front).

In addition, there were strong rear positions. They were located along the banks of the Tuloksa (to the Petrozavodsk area), Vidlitsa (to Syamozero) and Tulemajoki rivers. Already near Finland itself there was a defensive line between Pitkäranta and Loimola. The Finnish army's defense was facilitated by a fairly developed network of highways and railways. The Medvezhyegorsk - Petrozavodsk - Svirstroy railway worked normally. The Lodeynoye Pole - Olonets - Vidlitsa highway was in good condition.

On the isthmus between Lake Onega and Segozero, the Finnish army prepared two main defensive lines and several auxiliary lines in the rear. The first line of defense ran along the line Povenets - White Sea-Baltic Canal - Khizhozero - Maselskaya - Velikaya Guba. The second Finnish defense line ran along the line Pindushi - Medvezhyegorsk - Chebino - Kumsa. One of the auxiliary lines ran along the Kudamguba - Porosozero line.

On the isthmus between Lakes Ladoga and Onega, the defense was held by the Finnish operational group “Olonets” under the command of Lieutenant General P. Talvela. It included the 5th and 6th Army Corps, the Ladoga Coastal Defense Brigade and some individual units. On the bridgehead, on the southern bank of the Svir River, positions were occupied by units of the 11th and 7th Infantry Divisions, from Podporozhye to Lake Ladoga - by the 5th and 8th Infantry Divisions, and the 15th Infantry Brigade. The 20th Infantry Brigade was in reserve. Units of the 4th and 6th Infantry Divisions were stationed on the rear lines, closer to Finland (they would soon be transferred to the Vyborg direction).

On the isthmus between Lake Onega and Segozero, the defense was held by the Maselsky operational group. It included the 2nd Army Corps of General E. Mäkinen (one infantry division and three brigades), 3 separate infantry battalions and the Onega coastal defense brigade. In total, the Svirsk-Petrozavodsk enemy group, according to Soviet data, consisted of about 130 thousand people (about 76 thousand soldiers against the 7th Army and 54 thousand against the 32nd Army), about 1 thousand guns and mortars, 30 tanks and armored cars. From the air, Finnish troops were supported by 203 aircraft from the German 5th Air Fleet and the Finnish Air Force.

Before the attack.Weakening of the Finnish defense.

Finnish troops had a powerful defense, but before the offensive of the Karelian Front it was significantly weakened by the transfer of forces to the Karelian Isthmus. On June 9-10, the Leningrad Front struck. Already on June 10, the first line of defense was broken through. On June 14-15, the second line of defense was broken through. The Finnish command urgently began to transfer reserves and troops from other sectors of the front to the Karelian Isthmus. The situation was so difficult that the Finnish commander-in-chief Mannerheim was ready to abandon the defense of Karelia in order to free up troops to defend the Vyborg direction.

Already on June 12, the first units of the 4th Infantry Division will arrive on the Karelian Isthmus. Then units of the 17th Infantry Division and the 20th Infantry Brigade were transferred to the Karelian Isthmus, followed by the 6th and 11th divisions and the command of the 5th Army Corps. Considering the weakening of the Svirsk-Petrozavodsk group, the impossibility of strengthening it with reserves in the event of an offensive by the Red Army (all the main available forces were thrown against the advancing armies of the Leningrad Front), and intelligence data about the imminent enemy offensive in Karelia, Mannerheim decided to begin a secret withdrawal of troops to the second lane defense On the isthmus between Lakes Ladoga and Onega, the Finns had to retreat from the bridgehead on the Lake Onega - Svirstroy section across the Svir River.

The headquarters, having received the reconnaissance transfer of part of the enemy forces to the Karelian Isthmus and the regrouping of Finnish troops, ordered the CF to begin the offensive earlier than planned, on June 21. On June 20, front-line reconnaissance detected the retreat of Finnish troops from the southern bridgehead of the Svir River and the defense line of the 32nd Army. Meretskov gave the order to immediately go on the offensive. By the end of June 20, the forces of the 7th Army reached Svir, and units of the 32nd Army on the night of the 21st crossed the White Sea-Baltic Canal and moved to Medvezhyegorsk.

Air strike.

One of the important prerequisites for the success of the Svir-Petrozavodsk operation was the destruction of the Svir-3 hydroelectric dam. The aviation of the Baltic Fleet was supposed to solve this problem. The hydroelectric power station was necessary to destroy in order to reduce the water level in the Svir above the dam and thereby facilitate the task of crossing the river of the 368th Infantry Division and to remove the threat of flooding the area by the Finns when crossing the Svir by troops of the 7th Army in the lower reaches.

The strike was to be carried out by 55 bombers. Their crews were trained at a specially prepared training ground. Then the planes were concentrated in the Novaya Ladoga area. On June 20, at 10:50 a.m., the bomber group launched its first powerful strike on the dam. 250-, 500- and 1000-kg bombs were dropped, and sea mines were dropped along with them. In total, naval aviation made 123 sorties. 64 large-caliber bombs and 11 mines were dropped. The problem was successfully solved. The dam was destroyed, and the water shaft literally swept away the Finnish fortifications, which were located near the shore below the dam.

On June 21, at 8 a.m., powerful artillery preparation began. Finnish positions were hit by guards mortars. At the same time, several hundred bombers and attack aircraft appeared over the Finnish positions. As Meretskov recalled, massive fire hit the Finns in the second and third trenches, and tanks and self-propelled guns hit the opposite bank with direct fire. There was a short break and rafts with soldiers sailed from the Russian coast. Hidden Finnish firing points, those that survived, opened fire on the troops crossing the river. However, it turned out that this was a military ruse - scarecrows were launched on rafts and boats, they were led by 16 volunteer heroes. Subsequently, they were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The Finns gave up their firing positions. Soviet observers spotted the locations of enemy firing points. They opened targeted fire at them. Another 75 minutes of artillery preparation (in total the artillery preparation lasted three and a half hours) and a second powerful air strike. Enemy positions were attacked by 360 bombers and attack aircraft from the 7th and 13th Air Armies.

At about 12 o'clock the crossing of the Svir began. The reconnaissance echelon crossed the river in five minutes and began making passages in the Finnish barriers. Two hundred amphibians (they made several trips) and other watercraft entered the river in front of the stunned enemy, who had suffered heavy losses. The Finnish rearguards fired rifles and machine guns, mortar batteries fired several shots each, while the main forces hastily retreated to the second line of defense.

The first to cross the river were the soldiers of the 98th and 99th Guards Divisions of Mironov's Corps and the 114th and 272nd Divisions of Gnidin's Corps. They were supported by amphibians and amphibious tanks of the 92nd Regiment. By 4 p.m., Soviet troops occupied a bridgehead 2.5-3 km deep. By evening, sappers had built two bridges and twenty ferry crossings. They began to move heavy weapons over them. By the end of the day, a bridgehead was occupied in an area 12 km wide and 6 km deep.

On June 22, the river steamships Titan, Khasan, Vesyegorsk, Shiman and Gorlovka entered Svir from Lake Ladoga. Under enemy fire, they passed through minefields up the river to the breakthrough site and began transporting troops and equipment. On June 22, the 7th Army continued its offensive. The Finnish command withdrew its forces to the second line of defense, resisting with strong rearguards who created rubble, mined roads, and blew up crossings. The 368th Rifle Division, with the support of the Onega flotilla, crossed the Svir in the Voznesenye area. The 99th Rifle Corps liberated Podporozhye and also crossed the river. By the end of the day, the Svir was crossed along its entire length.

The headquarters expressed dissatisfaction with the slow development of the offensive of the Karelian Front, although it had a fourfold superiority over the enemy. The 7th Army was tasked with liberating Olonets no later than June 23-24 and occupying Pitkäranta around July 2-4. The right wing of the army had to liberate Petrozavodsk as soon as possible. The 32nd Army was supposed to liberate Medvezhyegorsk on June 23. At the same time, the Supreme High Command Headquarters decided that the main task had been solved - the enemy’s front had been breached, the Finnish group had been weakened by the transfer of forces to the Vyborg area and was retreating, so the 94th Rifle Corps from the second echelon of the army, which never took part in the operation, was put into reserve.

Tuloksa landing operation and liberation of Petrozavodsk.

On June 23, in the direction of the main attack of the 7th Army, the divisions of the 4th and 37th corps continued their systematic offensive. Soviet soldiers reached the area of ​​the enemy's second line of defense: Sambatux - Megrer - Sarmagi - Obzha. Units of the 99th Rifle Corps, after crossing the Svir in the Podporozhye region, did not meet organized resistance from Finnish troops and quickly moved along the forest road to Kotkozero and to the Petrozavodsk-Olone highway, this created a threat of enveloping the Finnish group.

Landing operation.

At this moment, the front command decided to launch an amphibious operation - with the help of the Ladoga flotilla, to land troops behind the Finnish group in the area between the Vidlitsa and Tuloksa rivers. The paratroopers were supposed to intercept the highway and railway that ran along the coast of Lake Ladoga, depriving the enemy of the opportunity to transfer reserves, supply ammunition, and also quickly withdraw. With the successful development of the operation, it became possible to cover the Olonets operational group.

In the first echelon of the landing force was the 70th Naval Rifle Brigade under the command of Lieutenant Colonel A.V. Blak (more than 3.1 thousand people). In the second echelon there was the 3rd separate marine brigade under the command of engineer-captain 1st rank S.A. Gudimov (more than 2 thousand soldiers). Almost the entire Ladoga flotilla was involved in the operation - 78 ships and boats. The flotilla was divided into four detachments: a troop transport detachment, a landing craft detachment, a security detachment, and an artillery support detachment (5 gunboats, 2 armored boats). The operation was personally led by the commander of the flotilla, Rear Admiral V.S. Cherokov. The landing was supported from the air by aircraft of the 7th Air Army and aircraft of the Baltic Fleet. In total, three assault regiments, two bomber regiments, one fighter regiment, and reconnaissance aircraft were involved (230 aircraft in total). The initial landing base was Novaya Ladoga.

Taking into account the nature of the enemy’s defenses - the coast was defended by the Finnish Ladoga coastal defense brigade, whose units were scattered at a great distance from each other (the Finnish command hoped for the possibility of quickly transferring troops from other directions), the operation was well prepared and sufficient forces were prepared for the landing. Before the landing, reconnaissance was carried out, the organization of landing and support of the landing battalions with naval fire was well worked out. Each formation had fire spotters with radio stations, and duplicate communication channels were prepared. Each formation was assigned certain ships, which supported them with fire. In addition, the commander of the landing detachment had his own artillery headquarters and could concentrate the fire of the artillery support detachment on any threatened area.

On June 23, 1944, at 5 o’clock in the morning, the Ladoga flotilla began artillery preparation. At 5:30 a.m. the aircraft struck. At about 6 o'clock, ships and ships, under the cover of a smoke screen, approached the shore and began landing paratroopers. At the same time, the gunboats continued to iron enemy positions. In four hours, two echelons of the 70th Marine Brigade were landed. During the day, the entire brigade with reinforcement units was landed - 3,667 people with 30 guns, 62 mortars, 72 anti-tank rifles, 108 heavy and light machine guns.

For the Finns, this operation came as a complete surprise. Initially there was virtually no resistance. During the landing, the landing party lost only 6 people wounded. A bridgehead 4.5 km along the front and 2 km in depth was captured. The paratroopers cut the Olonets-Pitkyaranta road. At the landing site, an enemy artillery unit was destroyed, 3 guns, 10 tractors and vehicles with ammunition were captured.

However, the Finnish command quickly got its bearings and began hastily transferring reinforcements to the threatened area. In the afternoon, Finnish counterattacks began. The Finns tried to drop troops into the lake. Initially, the Finnish attacks were chaotic and scattered, but soon the onslaught intensified and became well organized. Units of the Finnish 15th Infantry Brigade and a separate Jaeger battalion, and then an armored train, were transferred to the site of the Soviet landing. There was a stubborn battle all night. The Soviet Air Force made 347 sorties per day. Finnish aviation tried to strike the Ladoga flotilla. A group of enemy aircraft (14-18 aircraft) attacked the landing ships in the morning, but were repelled by air cover fighters. The Finns managed to slightly damage only one landing craft.

On June 24, the situation worsened significantly, and in the middle of the day a crisis situation arose. The Finns continuously received reinforcements, their firepower increased significantly. Finnish troops tried to destroy the landing force with a decisive blow. The landing force began to experience a shortage of ammunition. Due to deteriorating weather, the delivery of ammunition from Novaya Ladoga was difficult, as was air support. But, despite the bad weather conditions, the pilots were still able to make several flights and dropped containers with ammunition onto the bridgehead. Rear Admiral Cherokov, in order to support the landing, ordered the ships to come close to the shore and maximize fire on the enemy, as well as transfer some of the available ammunition to the shore. As a result, the landing force withstood the enemy's attack.

Realizing that without reinforcements the landing party would be defeated, the Soviet command decided to transfer a second echelon. Despite the stormy weather, units of the 3rd Separate Marine Brigade were landed on the shore. As a result, the total number of the landing force increased to 5 thousand soldiers. The situation changed in favor of the Soviet troops. They not only repelled all enemy attacks, but also expanded the bridgehead. At night and in the morning of June 26, the remaining units of the 3rd brigade, artillery and anti-aircraft regiments (59 guns, 46 mortars) were landed on the bridgehead. Given that the 7th Army continued to advance successfully, the Finnish command abandoned further attacks on the bridgehead and focused on evacuating troops.

By cutting the railway and highway to Pitkäranta, Soviet troops significantly worsened the ability of the Finnish troops to retreat. The Finns had to abandon heavy equipment, property, supplies and retreat along country roads, bypassing the bridgehead. On the night of June 27-28, the landing unit linked up with the advancing units of the 7th Army and took part in the liberation of Vidlitsa. The Ladoga flotilla continued to support units of the 7th Army.

As a result, the Tuloksa landing operation became one of the most successful landing operations of the Soviet Navy in the Great Patriotic War. The operation ended in victory and achieved all its goals. The Ladoga military flotilla was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for this success. Five marines became Heroes of the Soviet Union, many soldiers were awarded orders and medals.

The landing of a large assault force in the rear of the Finnish group and the bypass of the main defense line by units of the 99th Rifle Corps created a real threat of encirclement of the 5th and 8th Finnish infantry divisions. Therefore, the Finnish command decided to withdraw troops to the western bank of Vidlitsa.

On June 25, the 4th Rifle Corps captured powerful centers of enemy resistance - the settlements of Sarmyagi and Obzha. On June 26-27, parts of the corps crossed Tuloksa and linked up with the landing force. Troops of the 37th Guards Rifle Corps liberated Olonets on June 25. The next day, the guards occupied Nurmolitsy. On June 28-29, units of the Guards Corps, overcoming the resistance of the enemy's 8th Finnish Infantry Division, made their way to the Torosozero area, and on June 30 they reached the Vidlitsa River. At this time, units of the 99th Rifle Corps were fighting in the Vedlozero area. On the right flank of the 7th Army, units of the 368th Infantry Division, the 69th Infantry Brigade and the 150th fortified area successfully advanced from Ascension to Sheltozero and Petrozavodsk.

With the arrival of the troops of the 7th Army at the line of the Vidlitsa River, the first stage of the offensive in the Svir-Olonets direction was completed. The Olonets enemy group suffered heavy losses, lost three defensive lines, retreated across the Vidlitsa River and took up defense on its western bank. Finnish troops were forced to retreat by a roundabout route and country roads, abandoning some of their heavy weapons and various property, but at the same time they avoided defeat and retained their combat effectiveness.

In the offensive sector of Gorelenko's 32nd Army, Soviet troops were confronted by the 1st and 6th Infantry Divisions and the 21st Infantry Brigade. The Finns built a powerful defense, which, like on Svir, had many bunkers, reinforced concrete firing points with armored caps, several lines and trenches, barbed wire barriers, and minefields. Forest roads were blocked by log debris. Tank-dangerous directions are covered with granite gouges. At the same time, the Soviet strike group - the 289th, 313th and 176th rifle divisions - was approximately equal in strength to the Finnish group. True, the Finns did not have tank formations, but the 32nd Army had a tank regiment.

On June 20, Gorelenko ordered reconnaissance in force in the sector of the 313th and 289th divisions. As a result, the army command received information that Finnish troops were regrouping and preparing to withdraw. The troops of the 32nd Army received orders to pursue the enemy along the entire front. On the night of June 20-21, the leading battalions of the 313th Infantry Division crossed the White Sea-Baltic Canal and with a sudden attack knocked the Finns out of the first line of defense. Then the main forces of the division crossed the canal.

On June 21, Soviet soldiers liberated Povenets and, developing the offensive, reached Medvezhyegorsk. At the same time, units of the 176th and 289th rifle divisions, after a short artillery barrage, penetrated the enemy’s defenses and by evening reached Lake Vozhema and Malyga station, 14 km south of Maselskaya station.

The fierce battle for Medvezhyegorsk lasted almost a day. Only when the 289th division arrived here from the north on the morning of June 23 did a joint attack from the east and north manage to liberate the city from the enemy. By the end of June 24, the entire Finnish Medvezhyegorsk fortified area was cleared of the enemy. Retreating, Finnish troops, as usual, destroyed bridges, crossings, destroyed roads, mined not only highways, but also forest paths, and created rubble. In the first five days of fighting alone, units of the 32nd Army had to build 26 bridges, restore 153 km of roads and clear more than 7 thousand mines.

After the liberation of Medvezhyegorsk, the 313th Division continued its offensive in two main directions. Two regiments moved in the direction of Justozero - Koikory - Spasskaya Guba and further to Suoyoki, Suoyarvi. Then Soviet troops had to reach the state border. One rifle regiment was supposed to clear the railway and highway in the Medvezhyegorsk - Kondopoga section. From there the regiment was supposed to turn to Spasskaya Guba to link up with the main forces of the division. However, part of the forces of the 313th Division continued the offensive in the Petrozavodsk direction.

Units of the 176th and 289th divisions advanced in the direction of Porosozero - Luisvara - Kuolisma. This direction was replete with small lakes and swamps; there were no good communications there. Finnish troops skillfully used all the advantages of the terrain and quickly erected field fortifications, especially on the narrow inter-lake defiles. To get around them, it was necessary to walk tens of kilometers through off-road, virgin forest. This took a lot of time. Therefore, the offensive proceeded more slowly than planned. Thus, Soviet troops only reached the Justozero area by June 30.

Liberation of Petrozavodsk. Continuation of the offensive of the 7th Army (June 28 – August 9).

By the end of June 26, the troops of the right wing reached the Ladva station. The Onega military flotilla was active. On the morning of June 28, she landed troops in the Uyskaya Bay area (about 20 km south of Petrozavodsk). Soldiers of the 31st separate marine battalion under the command of I.S. Molchanov immediately liberated the village of Derevyannoye and intercepted the highway, cutting off the Finnish troops’ escape route.

At this time, intelligence reported that the Finns were not going to defend Petrozavodsk and were actively mining and destroying the city. Therefore, the command decided to divide the forces of the landing force. Part of the battalion remained as a barrier on the highway in Derevyanny, the other part moved along the road to the city, and the third part was again loaded onto ships and went at full speed to Petrozavodsk. At approximately one o'clock in the afternoon, the Marines were dropped into the city. Petrozavodsk was liberated, the Finns surrendered it without a fight. In the evening, another part of the Marine battalion arrived in the city. In the city, Soviet marines saw a terrible picture; they liberated more than 20 thousand people from five concentration camps.

On June 29, units of the 368th Division also reached the city, and formations of the 313th Division of the 32nd Army approached from the north. As a result, Soviet troops established control over the strategically important Kirov Railway along its entire length. It should be noted that the fascist Finnish troops severely destroyed the city. Industrial enterprises, power plants, and bridges were destroyed. During the week alone, sappers removed more than 5 thousand mines.

On July 2, the 7th Army continued its offensive on the Vidlitsa River. The attack was carried out by three corps: on the coast of Lake Ladoga, the 4th Rifle Corps, in the center - the 37th Guards Rifle Corps, on the right flank, near Vedlozero - the 99th Rifle Corps. By July 3, the Finnish defenses were broken and the strike units of the 4th and 37th Guards Rifle Corps reached the next enemy defensive line, which ran along the rather wide Tulemajoki River. Soviet troops immediately captured a powerful enemy defense center - the village of Salmi. However, it was possible to break through the Finnish defenses only after three days of fierce fighting. The guards were able to cross Tulemajoki and advance another 15-20 km.

On July 6, the Soviet command sent reserves into battle - the 27th Light Rifle Corps, reinforced by the 7th Tank Brigade. The corps struck in the area between the 4th and 37th corps and was supposed to reach Pitkäranta. On July 10, Soviet troops took Pitkäranta. Units of four Soviet rifle corps on a wide front reached the rear Finnish defense line in the Pitkäranta-Loimola sector. Here four Finnish divisions and one infantry brigade put up stubborn resistance. Soviet divisions attacked Finnish fortifications for several days, but were unable to break through them. The 7th Army's offensive ran out of steam and there were no more reserves.

As a result, the offensive stopped at the Pitkäranta-Loymola line, and the Winter War also ended there. Until the beginning of August, the corps of the 7th Army tried to break through the Finnish defenses, but were not successful. On August 4, the 7th Army went on the defensive. The headquarters transferred the 37th Guards Corps, the 29th Tank Brigade, the Guards Mortar Brigade, the 7th Breakthrough Artillery Division, and other formations to reserve and to other sectors of the front.

Continuation of the offensive of the 32nd Army.

On the right wing of the Karelian Front, the 32nd Army continued to pursue the enemy. Units of the 176th and 289th rifle divisions advanced in the direction of Porosozero - Luisvara - Kuolisma. Units of the 313th Infantry Division, together with the 368th Division (after the liberation of Petrozavodsk, it was transferred to the 32nd Army) advanced on Suoyarvi and Jagliarvi.

By July 20, advancing in difficult conditions of wooded, swampy terrain and off-road conditions, Soviet troops liberated Porosozero, Kudamagaba, Luisvara, Jagliarvi, Suoyarvi and many other settlements. On July 21, units of the 176th Infantry Division took Lengonvary and reached the state border. Soviet troops penetrated 10-12 km into Finnish territory, advancing in the direction of Vikiniemi. On July 25, the 289th Division also crossed the Finnish state border.

However, the Soviet divisions were weakened by the previous offensive (two divisions totaled only about 11 thousand people), their rears lagged behind, and communications were stretched. There were no reserves. Therefore, the counterattack of the Finnish troops led to a serious crisis. The Finnish command strengthened the troops available in this area with reserves. Task Force “R” was formed under the command of Major General E. Raappan (21st Infantry Brigade, Cavalry Brigade and several separate battalions, about 14 thousand people in total). At the end of July, the Finnish group attacked the unprotected flanks of two Soviet divisions (Battle of Ilomantsi). Finnish troops operated in small, mobile groups, taking advantage of the dispersed nature of enemy forces, attacking and encircling individual formations. Soviet divisions fell into a “cauldron”. By August 2, the Soviet divisions were isolated from each other and divided into several centers of resistance. Subsequently, the Finns tried to destroy the encircled Soviet units, but they repelled all enemy attacks. However, the situation was difficult. There was not enough ammunition; three or four shots from enemy artillery were answered with one. The Finns did not have the strength to quickly destroy the Soviet divisions, but a siege could lead to their rather quick death.

The command of the Karelian Front immediately took measures to relieve the blockade of the encircled divisions. First, the 70th Naval Rifle Brigade was transferred to the combat area, but it was unable to release the 176th Division. On August 4-5, units of the 3rd, 69th Marine Brigades and part of the forces of the 29th Tank Brigade arrived in the Kuolisma area. The offensive was led personally by Army Commander Gorelenko. After several days of stubborn fighting, contact with the 176th and 289th Rifle Divisions was restored. Taking into account the fact that both divisions suffered heavy losses, and their supply was associated with great difficulties, they were withdrawn to more advantageous positions several kilometers from the border. The Finns also suffered heavy losses and were unable to build on this local success.

After this battle, the front stabilized and by August 10, active hostilities in Karelia ended. Isolated skirmishes continued until the end of August. The battle of Ilomantsi did not affect the general situation, although the Finns tried to inflate the success. The Svir-Petrozavodsk operation ended in victory for the Soviet troops and the local success of the Finnish army could not prevent Finland’s defeat in the war.

Results.

The Svirsk-Petrozavodsk operation ended in complete victory. The Finnish troops were defeated, their defensive lines fell one after another, and most of the Karelo-Finnish SSR was liberated. The Karelian front advanced 180-200 km, cleared an area of ​​over 47 thousand square meters from the enemy. km, liberated Petrozavodsk, Medvezhyegorsk, Kondopoga, Olonets, in total more than 1250 settlements and 42 railway stations. Control was restored over the strategically important Kirov Railway along its entire length, the Svir River and the White Sea-Baltic Canal.

Researchers note that the Karelian Front could have achieved greater success, but several factors prevented this.

Firstly, this is the complexity of the terrain and the lack of developed communications, especially in the northern part of the Karelian SSR.

Secondly, serious miscalculations of the Headquarters, which at the last moment changed the original offensive plan and deprived the front of reserves after the first stage of the offensive. As a result, the front offensive of the Karelian Front began 11 days later than the operation of the Leningrad Front, which allowed the Finnish command to transfer troops from one direction to another. And the front did not have time to implement all the measures to prepare the operation.

Thirdly, the Headquarters noted the poor organization of troop control by the front command and the presence of “inactive and incapable people” in the front leadership. As a result, the chief of staff of the front, Lieutenant General B.A., lost his position. Pigarevich and other high-ranking officers of the Karelian Front.

The Supreme High Command headquarters, counting on a quick conclusion of peace, on September 5 ordered the troops of the Karelian Front not to carry out any active actions. In addition, the front was deprived of reserves and lost striking power. There was no point in wasting forces and resources in protracted battles in a secondary direction; the Red Army was preparing for the liberation of Belarus and battles in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.

Headquarters abandoned further offensive against Finland. The Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation solved all the main problems. The Finnish army suffered a heavy defeat; its main defensive lines on the Karelian Isthmus and in southeastern Karelia were broken through. Soviet troops pushed the enemy back from Leningrad, eliminating the threat to the second Soviet capital from the north and northeast, liberated Vyborg and Petrozavodsk, and reached the Finnish border.

The defeat of the Finnish army seriously changed the strategic situation in the entire northern sector of the Soviet-German front, creating conditions for the successful liberation of the Baltic states and an offensive in the North. The Baltic Fleet received freedom of action in the entire eastern part of the Gulf of Finland; now it could be based on the islands of the Vyborg Bay and the Bjork Islands.

The offensive operations of the Leningrad and Karelian fronts brought fascist Finland to the brink of defeat. Already in August, the Finnish leadership abandoned the alliance with the Third Reich, and on September 19, a truce between the Soviet Union and Finland was signed in Moscow. The defeat on the Karelian Isthmus and in Karelia did not allow the Finnish military-political leadership to hope that Finland would withstand a new major offensive by Soviet troops. It could lead to the complete defeat and occupation of Finland by Soviet troops.

Therefore, the Finns preferred to start negotiations in order to negotiate easy peace terms without significant losses. Moscow, focused on more important tasks, stopped the offensive and began peace negotiations.

(Visited 4,034 times, 1 visits today)