The political situation in the Far East and in the Pacific Ocean, the state of which is largely connected with the unresolved problem of a peaceful settlement of territorial issues between a number of states and Japan, has aroused and is arousing increased interest in political circles around the world. Relations between Russia and Japan for a long time can be described as contradictory. Russia remained the only country that fought in World War II with Japan, with which Tokyo refuses to sign a peace treaty. They need these four islands of the Kuril chain like air. Only Russian nuclear weapons stop the Japanese from an armed adventure. But the appetite of this quarrelsome and greedy country will only increase with time. They are no longer asking, they are already demanding.
The surrender of the islands by Russia would mean a global catastrophe with far-reaching consequences. The Japanese will experience a colossal shift in consciousness. The drums will beat again and behind the sparkling windows of expensive stores and billboards of this almost toy country, a forgotten Japanese dragon will appear, but recovered from severe wounds and risen again. He has not changed at all and is again hungry and thirsty for prey and will not be touched at all by the weak bleating of the proliferating insignificant liberals.
We must not forget that war and colonial conquests were the main milestones of Japanese history. Brief respites between wars served mainly to eliminate the consequences of the last war. The scale of wars became wider and wider each time. The rapid development of Japan's economy in the post-war period made the country one of the leading powers in the world. Already, stagnant Japan wants to play a more important role in solving problems of peace and international security. In addition to research and negotiations with the United States on the possibility of creating a missile defense, it can hardly be ruled out that under certain military-political conditions Japan may become the owner of nuclear weapons. This, in particular, was confirmed during a meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers by Japanese representative Kabun Muto: “If North Korea creates nuclear weapons, it will pose a threat to Japan. But, firstly, we have the “nuclear umbrella” of the United States , which covers Japan. And if it starts to collapse, then it is very important to have confidence that we can produce nuclear weapons." Japan, with its first-class army, developed economy, nuclear industry and science, as well as a large number of nuclear plants, the presence of heavy rockets for space exploration, the opportunity to become a nuclear missile power can be realized within six months, with the most unfavorable forecast.
After the intervention in the Far East failed in 1922, the Japanese government was forced to evacuate its occupation troops from the territory of Soviet Russia. In the ruling circles of Japan, there was an understanding that it was impossible to defeat the Russians with a limited contingent of troops and carry out an occupation with the aim of further seizing the fabulously rich Far Eastern lands in their favor.
By the beginning of the 1920s, the bloody Civil War had generally ended on the former territory of the Russian Empire. Soviet power, led by the Bolshevik Party, was established almost everywhere in the country.
Soviet Russia, opposing itself to the rest of the capitalist world, found itself in political and economic isolation from almost all Western countries. This situation hampered the economic and social development of the country. The 20s were the time of restoration of the economy destroyed by wars, the transition to a new economic policy. Changes in the domestic policy of Soviet Russia entailed a change in the situation in foreign policy. It was this line that prevailed in the international relations of the Country of Soviets in the 20-30s of the 20th century. At the same time, contradictions between the largest capitalist states themselves, as well as between them and the “awakening” countries of the East, intensified. In the 1930s, the balance of international political forces was largely determined by the increasing aggression of the militaristic states, Germany, Italy and Japan.
Moscow was well aware that in the eyes of Western and geopoliticians, the threat from Russia was due to the fact that it is the holder of a Eurasian monolith, the mass of which is many times greater than the disparate mass of oceanic states. In this regard, the foreign policy of the Soviet state, while maintaining continuity with the policy of the Russian Empire in the implementation of geopolitical tasks, differed from it in its new nature and methods of implementation. Only now it was characterized by ideologization of the foreign policy course. Carrying out such a foreign policy led the Soviet state to a serious and large-scale crisis in the Far East at the end of the 20s. Soviet Russia found itself involved in a military conflict with Kuomintang China, represented by the Manchu ruler Zhang Xue Liang. The Chinese rulers, who united China into a single state in 1928, decided to begin a policy of abandoning the unequal treaties imposed on them by Western militaristic powers in the past. Inspired by incredible successes and victories, believing in their infallibility and genius, Chiang Kai-shek and Zhang Xue Liang decided to start a war against what they thought was a weakened state and, in addition to the railway, also seize lands along the Amur and Ussuri, lost in their opinion as a result of expansion Russian Empire in the 19th century. But they made one fatal mistake, which subsequently cost the Chinese people tens of millions of victims at the hands of foreign invaders. Carried away by military-political games in the fight against the communist infection, they did not notice, or did not want to notice, that nearby, almost at their side, a greedy and bloodthirsty Japanese dragon was preparing to jump.
Pushed by the British and Americans, the Kuomintang in the summer of 1929 seized the Chinese Eastern Railway and began mass arrests of Soviet citizens; then detachments of White Guards and Chinese units invaded the territory of the USSR. But soon, for objective reasons, anti-Soviet provocations in the Far East failed. In November 1929, units of the Far Eastern Army under the command of V.K. Blucher completely defeated the army of Chinese militarists.
Thanks to the courage of the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, the almost 300 thousand army of Chinese would-be warriors was completely defeated in record time. Thus, over the course of 20 years, the Soviet Union managed not only to overcome the state of diplomatic isolation, but also to strengthen its foreign policy positions. This magnificent victory made an indelible impression on not very friendly neighbors and sworn enemies. In this world, the strong are respected and always taken into account.
Western countries and Japan, after a period of stabilization from 1924 to 1929, met the beginning of the 1930s in an environment of economic crisis. At the end of 1929, a world economic crisis broke out in capitalist countries, the most destructive and deepest of all the crises in the previous development of capitalism. It was a crisis of overproduction; gigantic stocks of goods could not find a market. Industrial production in capitalist countries fell by more than one third. The crisis also affected agriculture. The presence of huge reserves of agricultural raw materials and food led to a fall in prices and massive ruin of the peasantry.
In Japan, by the beginning of 1933, industrial production had fallen on average by more than a quarter, world trade turnover by one and a half times, and industrial wages by almost half. the number of unemployed by 1931 reached 3 million, the price of rice rose by more than half. The Japanese state, with an underdeveloped economy and a militaristic budget, found itself in a difficult situation. The weak point of Japanese capitalism was its insufficient raw material base. The country did not have its own iron ore, cotton, non-ferrous metals, and little coal. Own production satisfied the needs of the island state with only half of the requirement.
In the pre-war years, Japan prioritized the implementation not so much of ideological as of geopolitical, geoeconomic and geostrategic interests in its zones of influence. Tanaka's memorandum amounted to the proclamation of an aggressive course of Japanese policy on the world stage. This document, which was the Japanese analogue of the German Mein Kampf, was nothing more than a program for Japan to gain world domination. Although in modern times there has been a whole horde of various scientists who are foaming at the mouth trying to refute the existence of this memorandum. They, like the Germans, are trying to emasculate the history of the Second World War, whitewash their politicians and rehabilitate their people for bloody crimes against humanity.
After victories in the Russo-Japanese and Sino-Japanese wars, the foreign policy of the Land of the Rising Sun began to be characterized by extreme aggressiveness. In 1905, Korea was turned into a protectorate of Japan, and 5 years later it was annexed into the Empire. At the beginning of the 30s of the 20th century, the two main competitors in the region, China and the USSR, were in a weakened state. China was torn by internal strife, and the Soviet Union was recovering from revolutions, a bloody civil war and a series of interventions. According to Tanaka’s memorandum, Japan’s struggle for world domination outlined a series of aggressive actions; it contained an open call for war with the Soviet Union and the United States. The key to establishing Japanese dominance in East Asia must be the conquest of China, and for this it is first necessary to seize Manchuria and Mongolia. War between Japan and the USSR was declared inevitable because of Northern Manchuria and Mongolia, and war between Japan and the USA because of China.
The growing contradictions between the largest countries of the world and the acute social consequences of the global economic crisis contributed to the aggravation of the international situation, gave impetus to the militarization of the economy and the emergence of the first outbreaks of the Second World War. They were especially noticeable in China, where the numerous interests of many leading imperialist powers intersected. And America, England and Japan, in the context of the raging economic crisis in the world, saw in China a huge and almost bottomless sales market and raw material base. Washington's aggressive expansionist aspirations in China met fierce resistance from England and Japan. The struggle for dominance in China became intense and was one of the main reasons that the American military and politicians began to consider Japan their main enemy in Asia.
Japanese imperialism intensified in the Far East, striving to turn all of East Asia into a territory subject to Japan. General Tanaka sharply criticized Foreign Minister Shidehara's position as frankly weak and called for a great renewal of Japan's China policy.
The occupation of Manchuria had long been planned by Japan. Back in July 1927, the Prime Minister of Japan, General G. Tanaka, presented a secret memorandum to Emperor Hirohito, which stated: “In Japan, the centuries-old concept of Japanese dominance in the Pacific Ocean and Asia, known under the slogan “hakko ichiu” “eight angles under one roof."
In the 1920s, there was a massive Japanese settlement of the Kwantung region and Manchuria. By September 1931, about 800 thousand Japanese lived in the Kwantung region, and another 200 thousand in Manchuria.
Already in June 1927, the chief of staff of the Kwantung Army presented a developed plan for the capture of the northeastern provinces of China, which included expansion into the Mongolian People's Republic. Japanese aggression was prepared with frantic energy in all directions, economic, political and ideological.
Trying for a number of years to tear away Northern China through an inspired movement for its autonomy and using corrupt Chinese generals and politicians to do this, the Japanese militarists were never successful. Then the Japanese government, casting aside all shame, began to solve this problem from a position of strength.
It didn’t take long for Japanese politicians and generals to look for a pretext to start aggression. Without being particularly zealous, on September 18, 1931, near Mukden on the South Manchurian Railway, they blew up several meters of the railway track. And, interestingly, on one of two paths. Minor damage caused by the explosion served as a compelling reason for the outbreak of hostilities. In September 1931, Japan began an armed takeover of Northeast China. After a 6-hour battle, Japanese troops captured Mukden. Chinese units of General Ma Zhenshan attacked Japanese troops on the Nunjiang River, stopping their further advance to the north of Manchuria. Having not encountered serious resistance from the demoralized Chinese troops, the Japanese Kwantung Army occupied Qiqihar on November 18. After a Japanese bombardment and massive artillery bombardment, the Japanese overthrew the Chinese troops and captured Jinzhou and soon occupied all of Manchuria.
On the night of November 2, 1931, Pu Yi, who lived under Japanese guard in Tanjing, accompanied by the Japanese Colonel Doihara, left for Shenyang. In 1932, the Japanese urgently proclaimed the Independent Manchurian State - Manchukuo, led by the Chinese Emperor Pu Yi, overthrown by the revolution of 1911-1913.
In fact, power in Manchukuo belonged to the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to Manchukuo. He was also the commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army. All Japanese advisory officers in the Manchukuo army and all Japanese who held any positions in the government apparatus and local provincial authorities were subordinate to him. In March 1932, under the control of Japanese officers, the formation of the “national armed forces” of Manchukuo began, which by the end of the year numbered more than 75 thousand people. Their commander-in-chief was Pu Yi.
Japan constantly increased its armed forces in Manchuria. So, in March 1932, units of the 10th Infantry Division arrived from Japan, and in early May, units of the 14th Infantry Division and reinforcement units, these divisions took an active part in the battles in the Far East during the Russian Civil War. By the beginning of 1933, the size of the army in Manchuria was increased to 100 thousand people.
On March 13, 1932, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Manchukuo sent the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M.M. Litvinov sent a telegram in which he announced the creation of the state of Manchukuo, declared recognition of the international obligations of the Republic of China by this state and proposed to establish formal diplomatic relations.
Moscow remained silent in response. But, on the other hand, the Soviet Consulate General in Harbin continued to function normally. Moreover, the USSR government allowed the Manchu authorities to open five consulates, including in Moscow. There were also five Soviet consulates in Manchukuo.
On December 12, 1932, Moscow and Beijing exchanged notes on the restoration of diplomatic relations, severed in 1929. The Japanese government viewed this as a major defeat, as an unfriendly act on the part of Moscow, which meant its departure from its previous neutral position in the Japan-China conflict and an expression of obvious sympathy for Tokyo's enemy.
In 1931, the situation in Manchuria changed radically, and the Soviet leadership realized that it would not be possible to hold on by standing by the road over the abyss. Since the summer of 1931, Moscow quite palpably felt the mortal danger on its Far Eastern borders, which arose with the entry of Japanese troops to the Soviet-Chinese border along its entire line.
In January 1932, Japanese officials proposed that the Soviet Union conclude a Japan-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and, in the form of secret articles, the Soviet Union's obligations not to attack Manchukuo and sell oil to Japan in the event of a Japanese-American War. The Soviet government expressed its readiness to conclude a long-term agreement for the supply of oil to Japan, and in the event of signing a non-aggression pact with Tokyo, to publicly record in it guarantees of non-aggression against Manchuria. The Japanese refused to conclude a non-aggression pact, citing the fact that Japanese society was not ready to sign the pact.
On August 29, 1932, the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow Hirota proposed to Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Karakhan to sell the Chinese Eastern Railway and recognize Manchukuo. Karakhan responded by calling not to limit himself to resolving individual issues, but to regulate all relations between the USSR and Japan by concluding a general agreement for several years and including in this agreement obligations of mutual non-aggression.
Although the Soviet side, by delaying approval and shaking down various documents, managed to hold out for several more months, in June 1933 it was necessary to begin negotiations with the Japanese on the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway. To begin with, our side requested 250 million gold rubles. That, taking into account the funds Russia invested in this road and its strategic importance, this price was more than dumping. But the insolent Japanese did not want to pay even this, and began seizing and arresting hostages from among Soviet citizens, railway employees.
On March 23, 1935, the "Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Manchukuo on the cession of Manchukuo's rights to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway" was signed in Tokyo. The USSR ceded “all rights” to the road for 140 million yen, that is, for a symbolic cost. And the next day, a year after Moscow’s proposal to conclude a Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact, the Japanese Foreign Ministry rejected this proposal with an official note.
By the beginning of 1931, the Soviet Union had no naval forces in the Far East, apart from a few lightly armed patrol ships and border guard boats that were part of the NKVD. In October 1922, the Japanese imposed on us an agreement on the demilitarization of the Vladivostok area. In 1923, according to this agreement, the Vladivostok fortress was abolished, and the weapons remaining after the First World War and the Civil War were dismantled. Soon, active construction of coastal batteries in the Vladivostok area began. In January 1932, the first three railway batteries transferred from the Baltic took up firing positions in the commercial port at Cape Egersheld.
Since the spring of 1932, military trains have been continuously traveling to the Far East, in which freight and passenger cars alternated with ordinary and special multi-axle platforms, on which tanks, torpedo boats, field and coastal guns and even Malyutki VI series submarines stood, carefully covered with tarpaulins. . In the spring of 1932, the reconstruction of our Pacific Fleet began. On January 11, 1935, the Naval Forces of the Far East were renamed the Pacific Fleet.
In an effort to ensure stability in the newly created puppet state, in early 1933 Japan sent troops to the northern provinces of Inner China. After a protest from the League of Nations, Japan withdrew from its membership in 1933.
Finding itself in a difficult situation, the Chinese government entered into secret armistice negotiations with the Japanese. Their secrecy was due to the requirement of Japanese diplomacy not to notify or involve a third party in negotiations. On the morning of May 31, 1933, the Chinese delegation, in accordance with the humiliating ritual developed by the Japanese, left their luxurious carriages and walked along a dusty road to the residence of the Japanese command, where they signed an armistice agreement under which the Japanese kept everything they had captured. The Tanggu truce meant the capitulation of Chiang Kai-shek's government to the aggressor. Chiang Kai-shek again turned to his patrons and allies in Western Europe and the United States with requests for help and loans. Tokyo closely monitored the diplomatic moves of its victim and waited for the moment when an isolated and weakened nationalist China would make a new deal with Japan.
One of the significant events in the difficult Soviet-Japanese relations was the entry of Japanese troops onto the Soviet border. This event radically changed the entire foreign policy of the Soviet state in the Far East for a long period of time. For the USSR, an extremely dangerous and, one might even say, deadly situation has developed on the Far Eastern borders, which required the state to attract huge resources here to create parity and neutralize the threat.
This is how a hotbed of military danger arose in the Far East.
It was Japan, in full accordance with Tanaka’s memorandum, that ignited the first fires of a gigantic universal fire, which from the turn of September 1, 1939 began to be called the Second World War, and they burned not far from the borders of the USSR.
Richard Sorge reported to Moscow on July 30, 1941: “Starting from the second half of August, Japan can start a war, but only if the Red Army is actually defeated by the Germans, as a result of which the defensive capacity in the Far East will be weakened.”
My Japanese opponents often put forward what they consider to be a “strong argument” in discussions, declaring that the Japanese government during the Second World War allegedly strictly complied with the provisions of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, did not attack the USSR in a difficult time for it, but “ the insidious Stalin" allegedly struck Japan in the back in 1945. At the same time, it is argued that Japan had no intention of fighting with the USSR, did not take advantage of Hitler’s attack on it in 1941, and strengthened the Kwantung Army (army group) standing along the Manchurian-Soviet border... in case of an attack by the Red Army. And this is about a situation where preventing war in the Far East was of critical importance for the Soviet leadership and was one of the most important, if not the most important, strategic task.
Statements that “Japan honestly fulfilled its obligations under the neutrality pact, and Stalin violated them” are sometimes found in reader comments on historical essays on this topic published in the REGNUM news agency, including personally addressed to me. Such ideas are strongly supported by the right-wing Japanese media, which seek to prove, through accusations of Stalin, hated in our country, that “the USSR entered the war and seized the primordially Japanese territories” - the Kuril Islands. Some “Russian specialists” endowed with professorial titles even go so far as to say that our people should thank Japan for not attacking the USSR at the same time as its closest ally, Hitler’s Germany, and thereby saving the Russians from defeat and enslavement.
This forces us to return again to the events of the war period, to convey to our people not a story made up by propagandists and falsifiers, but a story based on facts and documents.
Richard Sorge. 1940
The issue of an attack on the Soviet Union in the context of Hitler's aggression was discussed at the Imperial Conference on July 2, 1941 (a meeting of the highest political and military leadership of Japan in the presence of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Emperor's Army and Navy Hirohito). It was decided:
“Our attitude towards the German-Soviet war will be determined in accordance with the spirit of the Tripartite Pact (military alliance of Germany, Japan and Italy - A.K.). However, for now we will not interfere in this conflict. We will secretly strengthen our military preparations against the Soviet Union, maintaining an independent position. During this time, we will conduct diplomatic negotiations with great caution. If the German-Soviet war develops in a direction favorable to our Empire, we, by resorting to armed force, will resolve the northern problem and ensure the security of the northern borders.”
The very next day, a resident of Soviet military intelligence in Japan Richard Sorge learned about the top secret decisions of the Imperial Conference. On July 3, he informed Moscow:
“...The German military attache told me that the Japanese general staff is filled with activity, taking into account the German offensive against a large enemy and the inevitability of defeat of the Red Army.
He thinks Japan will enter the war within six weeks. The Japanese offensive will begin on Vladivostok, Khabarovsk and Sakhalin with a landing from Sakhalin on the Soviet coast of Primorye...
Source Invest (Ozaki Hotsumi - A.K.) thinks Japan will enter the war in six weeks. He also said that the Japanese government had decided to remain faithful to the three-power pact, but would also adhere to the neutrality pact with the USSR.”
“The Invest source said that at a meeting with the emperor it was decided not to change the plan of action against Saigon (Indochina), but at the same time it was decided to prepare for actions against the USSR in the event of the defeat of the Red Army. German Ambassador Ott said the same thing - that Japan would start fighting if the Germans reached Sverdlovsk. The German military attaché cabled Berlin that he was convinced that Japan would enter the war. But not earlier than the end of July or the beginning of August, and she will enter the war as soon as she completes her preparations.”
At the same time, Sorge reported to Moscow that “German Ambassador Ott received orders to push Japan into war as soon as possible.”
In accordance with the decision of the Imperial Conference, the General Staff of the Army and the Japanese War Ministry developed a set of broad measures aimed at speeding up preparations for offensive operations against the Soviet armed forces in the Far East and Siberia. In Japanese secret documents, it received the encrypted name “Kantogun tokushu enshu” (“Special maneuvers of the Kwantung Army”) - abbreviated as “Kantokuen”. On July 11, 1941, the imperial headquarters sent special directive No. 506 to the Kwantung Army and the Japanese armies in Northern China, which confirmed that the purpose of the “maneuvers” was to strengthen readiness to move against the Soviet Union. "Kantokuen" was based on the operational-strategic plan for the war against the USSR, developed by the General Staff for 1940.
Captured Japanese soldiers. Khalkhin Gol. 1939
The experience of defeat at Khalkhin Gol forced the Japanese command to use a large group of troops against the USSR. For operations in the eastern (coastal) direction, the 1st Front was formed consisting of 19 divisions, in the northern (Amur) direction the 4th Army was to operate, consisting of 3 divisions, and in the western (Greater Khingan region) - the 6th Army ( 4 divisions).
The reserve of the commander of the Kwantung Army, who was entrusted with direct control of the actions of the troops, consisted of 4 divisions.
According to the strategic plan, it was planned that a series of successive strikes in selected directions would defeat groupings of Soviet troops in Primorye, the Amur region and Transbaikalia, seize the main communications, military-industrial and food bases and, breaking the resistance of the Soviet troops, force them to surrender.
Military operations were divided into two stages. The first plan was to attack Soviet troops in Primorye by advancing in the Ussuri direction. On the second - to capture the support base of the Soviet Pacific Fleet Vladivostok, occupy Khabarovsk, then defeat Soviet troops in the northern and western directions. In parallel, with the forces of the 7th division stationed on the island of Hokkaido and a mixed brigade in Southern Sakhalin, capture Northern Sakhalin and Petropavlovsk-on-Kamchatka. It was also envisaged, depending on the situation, to carry out operations on the coast of the USSR opposite Sakhalin.
Particular attention in the plan was paid to the widespread use of the Japanese Air Force in military operations, which were supposed to “destroy enemy aircraft before the start of the operation.” The task was set to reach Lake Baikal in approximately six months and end the war.
During the operations it was planned to capture Voroshilov (Ussuriysk), Vladivostok, Blagoveshchensk, Iman, Kuibyshevka, Khabarovsk, Birobidzhan, Birokan, the Rukhlovo region, Northern Sakhalin, Nikolaevsk-on-Amur, Komsomolsk, Sovetskaya Gavan and Petropavlovsk-on-Kamchatka.
Important evidence that the activities of the Kantokuen plan were nothing more than preparations for an attack on the USSR is the schedule for completing preparations and waging war developed by June 25 by the Japanese General Staff and approved by headquarters:
- decision on mobilization - June 28;
- publication of the mobilization directive - July 5;
- the beginning of the transfer and concentration of troops - July 20;
- making the decision to start the war - August 10;
- the beginning of hostilities - August 29;
- transfer of four divisions from Japan - September 5;
- completion of operations - mid-October.
In accordance with this schedule, on July 5, a directive from the high command was issued on the first stage of mobilization, according to which the Kwantung Army was increased by two divisions (51st and 57th). On July 7, the emperor authorized the secret mobilization of 500 thousand people, as well as ships with a total displacement of 800 thousand tons to transport military supplies to Manchuria.
Japanese pilots. Khalkhin Gol. 1939
Since the decision of the Imperial Conference especially emphasized the requirement to “secretly” complete military preparations for an attack on the USSR, measures were taken to ensure the secrecy of the ongoing mobilization. It was carried out under the guise of training camps for enlisted personnel and was called an “extraordinary conscription.” The term “mobilization” in all documents and instructions was replaced by “extraordinary formations.” All kinds of farewells were prohibited.
On July 22, with a violation of the schedule for only two days, the concentration of troops began at the Soviet border. However, it was impossible to hide the scale of the secret mobilization. Indeed, during the transfer and concentration of troops according to the Kantokuen plan, up to 10 thousand soldiers and officers and 3.5 thousand horses were passed through points on Korean territory alone per day. On July 25, 1941, German Ambassador Ott and military attache Kretschmer, who closely followed the progress of mobilization, reported to Berlin that 900 thousand reservists aged 24 to 45 had already been called up. It was noted that persons who speak Russian are being drafted into the Japanese army.
“Invest and Intern sources (Miyagi Yotoku - A.K.) said that more than 200,000 people will be drafted in Japan as part of the new mobilization. Thus, by mid-August there will be about 2 million people under arms in Japan. Starting from the second half of August, Japan can go to war, but only if the Red Army is actually defeated by the Germans, as a result of which the defensive capacity in the Far East will be weakened. This is the point of view of the Konoe group (Prime Minister of Japan - A.K.), but how long the Japanese General Staff intends to wait is difficult to say now. Source Invest is convinced that if the Red Army stops the Germans in front of Moscow, in this case the Japanese will not come out.”
Numerous attached units and units arrived in Manchuria. According to the plan of the first and second stages, 629 attached units and subunits were sent to the formed three fronts (eastern, northern and western), the total number of which corresponded to the strength of 20 divisions. In addition, the War Ministry planned to further strengthen the troops in Manchuria with five more divisions. A significant portion of the troops were transferred from the Sino-Japanese front. As a result, the Kwantung Army was doubled and numbered 700 thousand people. After the second stage of mobilization, according to order No. 102 of July 16, 1941, 850 thousand soldiers and officers of the Japanese army were concentrated in the territory of Manchuria and Korea.
To participate in the war against the USSR, by headquarters directive No. 519 of July 24, 1941, the so-called Kwantung Defense Army was formed, which served as a reserve. Units of the 7th Division in Hokkaido, a mixed brigade in Southern Sakhalin, as well as military formations in the Kuril Islands were put on combat readiness. As was established at the Tokyo Trial, in the summer of 1941, to attack the USSR, the high command created a group of troops, the total number of which was about 1 million military personnel.
The Kwantung Army and Korea created reserves of ammunition, fuel and food necessary to conduct military operations for 2-3 months.
Units of the Manchukuo Army Ground Forces
According to the Kantokuen plan, puppet troops from Manchukuo and Inner Mongolia were to participate in the war against the USSR. The Manchukuo Army was created after the occupation of Manchuria. All leadership of this army was carried out by the headquarters of the Kwantung Army. Direct control was entrusted to numerous Japanese military advisers. In order to use the human resources of Manchuria in preparation for the war against the USSR, the Japanese accumulated military-trained reserves here. In 1940, a conscription law was introduced in Manchukuo.
The Army of Japanese-occupied Inner Mongolia was intended to join Japanese forces in invading the Mongolian People's Republic. The Kantokuen plan envisaged “the creation of a situation in which the voluntary unification of Outer Mongolia with Inner Mongolia would occur.”
The White emigrants who fled from Soviet Russia were not forgotten either. Since 1938, in Manchuria there were units of White Guards formed by order of the command of the Kwantung Army, intended to participate as part of the Japanese troops in the war against the USSR. Their task included the destruction of railways and other communications, striking supply bases in the rear of Soviet troops, conducting reconnaissance, carrying out sabotage, and conducting anti-Soviet propaganda. After the adoption of the Kantokuen plan, by order of the commander of the Kwantung Army, special units were formed from white emigrants to carry out acts of sabotage on Soviet territory.
The actions of the ground forces were planned to be supported by the navy. Its task was to ensure the landing of troops on Kamchatka and Northern Sakhalin, the capture of Vladivostok, and the destruction of warships of the Pacific Fleet. On July 25, having received the emperor's sanction, the naval command ordered the formation of the 5th Fleet specifically for the war against the USSR.
The main forces of Japanese aviation were supposed to be used in the eastern direction in order to suppress Soviet troops in Primorye and contribute to the development of the offensive of ground forces.
Japanese fighter Ki 27
To conduct military operations against the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the Far East and Siberia, it was initially planned to create a group of 34 divisions. Since at the beginning of the German-Soviet war there were only 14 personnel divisions in Manchuria and Korea, it was planned to transfer 6 divisions from the metropolis and 14 from the Chinese front to the Kwantung Army. However, this was opposed by the command of the Japanese Expeditionary Army in China, which stated that the transfer of so many divisions from the Chinese front to the north “would mean oblivion of the Chinese incident.” In the end, the center agreed with this argument.
At the end of June 1941, the War Ministry and the General Staff decided to reduce the number of divisions allocated for the war against the USSR to 25. Then in July, it was decided to deliver the main blow with 20 divisions. Finally, on July 31, at a meeting between the Chief of Operations of the General Staff, Shinichi Tanaka, and Minister of War, Hideki Tojo, the final decision was made to allocate 24 divisions for the war against the USSR. This was explained by the fact that the Japanese command intended to achieve the goals of the war against the USSR with “little loss of life.”
As noted above, as a result of mobilization in Manchuria and Korea, a group of Japanese troops of 850 thousand people was created, which in size corresponded to 58-59 Japanese infantry divisions. After all, the Japanese General Staff and the command of the ground forces, when developing a plan for the war against the USSR, proceeded from the fact that about 30 Soviet divisions were stationed in the Far East and Siberia. Therefore, they sought to create the double superiority necessary for offensive operations.
By the beginning of August, the group allocated for the invasion of the Soviet Union was basically prepared. The deadline set by the schedule for making a decision on the start of war—August 10—was approaching. However, the ruling circles of Japan showed indecisiveness, expecting the defeat of the Soviet Union on the Soviet-German front.
In the summer of 1931, clashes between Chinese and Korean settlers occurred in Manchuria, leading to pogroms of the Chinese in Korea. Since the Koreans living in Manchuria were Japanese subjects, they took advantage of these events. In the fall of 1931, it occupied the most important points in the South Manchurian Railway zone and in the Mukden area. This act of aggression began a serious military conflict in the Far East.
Carrying out the plans outlined in the Tanaka Memorandum, Japan at the end of 1931 - beginning of 1932 captured the Jinzhou region in southern Manchuria and launched an attack on Shanghai. In the spring of 1932, Tokyo signed an agreement with the Chinese government, and hostilities ceased.
On March 4, 1932, with the help of the Japanese, the puppet state of Manchukuo was formed, the ruler of which was the last representative of the Manchu dynasty, Qing Pu II. In the fall of the same year, a protocol on a “military alliance” was signed between Japan and Manchukuo, which allowed the deployment of Japanese troops on the territory of the newly formed state. Japan sought recognition by the League of Nations of its actions in China and official recognition of Manchukuo. The refusal of the League of Nations to satisfy Tokyo's claims led to Japan's withdrawal from this international organization in March 1933.
The Japanese continued to expand their presence in China. At the end of 1933, they sent troops into Chahar Province, and in May 1935, into the demilitarized zone of Hebei Province. In Northern China, the Japanese organized a movement for autonomy for Inner Mongolia.
The rapprochement of Japanese government structures with Hitler's Germany and the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact were fully consistent with its policy of a “great war” in China.
Preparations for this war were accompanied by intense indoctrination of the Japanese. The armed forces were brought up on the moral and ethical code of the bushido samurai. The warrior's morality was supposed to become the core of the Japanese national spirit, embodying love for the emperor and the fatherland.
Japan's new offensive against Northern China began on July 7, 1937. Soon hostilities covered the entire territory of the country. Up to 80% of Japan's budget expenditures were for military needs.
The Konoe government was forced to intensify the fight against anti-war sentiment in the country. Officially, this policy was called the “movement for the mobilization of the national spirit.” By March 1938, the number of people arrested for participating in anti-war protests reached 10 thousand people.
The League of Nations in October 1937 expressed its moral support for China, condemning Japanese aggression. The Brussels Conference, convened by the League of Nations in November 1937, once again condemned Japan's aggressive actions. In response, the Kanoe government refused to participate in the conference, ignoring the declaration adopted by its participants.
On November 11, 1937, Japanese troops occupied Shanghai, and two days later Nanjing. Beginning in January 1938, the Japanese began bombing southern Chinese cities. In October 1938, the important strategic centers of Southern China, Canton and Hankou, were occupied.
On December 22, 1938, Prime Minister Kanoe announced the establishment of a “new order in East Asia” in a government declaration. Japan demanded China's accession to the Anti-Comintern Pact, its recognition of Manchukuo and the placement of Japanese military bases on Chinese territories.
It was the military conflict unleashed by Japan against the USSR in the area of Lake Khasan. This lake is located 130 kilometers southwest of Vladivostok at the junction of the borders with China and Korea.
The appearance of the troops of the maritime country of Japan near the land borders of the Soviet Union was caused by the fact that in 1931 the Japanese army invaded two of the three northeastern provinces of China. Having taken possession of them, she created there the puppet state of Manchukuo, headed by Emperor Pu Yi. At the same time, she began deploying the Kwantung Army near the Soviet borders, which included a third of the Japanese ground forces, more than 400 tanks, 1,200 guns, 500 aircraft.
At the same time, Japan did not particularly hide its intentions regarding the existing plans to seize the Soviet Far East. To achieve its goals, on November 25, 1936, it joined the so-called Anti-Comintern Pact led by fascist Germany, which provided for an armed struggle against communism and the Soviet Union. Western countries provided Japan with significant economic and military-technical assistance and pushed it to start a war against the USSR.
In mid-1937, Japan went to war with China. In response, the Soviet Union concluded a non-aggression pact with China, began providing it with political and military assistance, and also sent its troops into Mongolia.
In conditions of a real military threat, on July 1, 1938, the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army was transformed into the Far Eastern Front under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union V.K. Blucher. Tension between the parties grew.
From 1936 to 1938, Japanese military units violated our border more than 230 times. During this period, 35 major incidents occurred at Lake Khasan alone, each of which could lead to a large-scale military conflict.
There were more than enough reasons for the possible escalation of conflict situations into war. In particular, two tactically important heights, Bezymyannaya and Zaozernaya, were at the center of events, which provided surveillance over a significant part of Soviet territory.
It should be noted that these heights were located on the border that was determined by the Treaty of Beijing of November 2, 1860 between China and Russia, as well as the Hunchun (1886) Protocol, and fell under the jurisdiction of Russia (the Soviet Union). However, the Manchu rulers and Japan, behind their backs, disputed their ownership.
Japanese troops repeatedly tried to capture these heights and place their observation posts and positions on them. In response to these attempts, Soviet border troops deployed permanent border posts on them on July 8, 1938. This fact was used by the Japanese government to present a note to the Soviet Union demanding the withdrawal of troops. It was presented by the Japanese ambassador on July 20 in Moscow. On July 22, the Soviet government decisively rejected this demand.
It should be noted that the Japanese side prepared in advance for a military solution to this problem and in early July transferred three infantry divisions (15, 19 and 20 infantry divisions), a mechanized brigade, a cavalry regiment, three machine-gun battalions and other units to this area. At the mouth of the Tumen-Ula River (25 km south of the lake) 15 Japanese warships and 15 combat boats were gathered. In total, more than 20 thousand people, 200 guns, 70 aircraft, and three armored trains were concentrated in the conflict area.
On July 22, the Japanese Emperor approved the plan of action for troops in the area of Lake Khasan. On July 29, up to two Japanese infantry companies attacked Soviet border guards at Bezymyannaya heights, captured it, but the forces of the approaching infantry battalion of the 40th Infantry Division (SD) and border guards were thrown back beyond the border line by the end of the day. Apparently, this success had a calming effect on our command and troops and they did not expect a further deterioration of the situation.
However, a day later, at 1.00 on July 31, under the cover of darkness and heavy fog, the advanced units of the 75th Infantry Regiment of the 19th Infantry Division of Japan secretly reached the heights of Bezymyannaya and Zaozernaya and, with the support of artillery, began an attack again, which came as a complete surprise to our units. The border guards resisted desperately, repulsed several attacks, but suffered heavy losses.
In the forward infantry battalions and artillery battalions of the 40th infantry division supporting their actions, panic began due to poorly organized interaction and interrupted communications, and they left their positions without orders. By morning, the Japanese forces of the 19th Infantry Division captured these heights, penetrated into Soviet territory four kilometers north of Lake Khasan, and part of their forces infiltrated past the Podgornaya height south of the lake.
The command of the Far Eastern Front urgently began transferring the remaining units of the 40th Rifle Division to the conflict area. It was complicated by the fact that the only dirt road leading to the combat area was muddy from prolonged rains. In this regard, the formations arrived very late. At the same time, since August 2, the command tried to introduce units of the division into battle as they arrived. However, due to low organization and weak interaction between units, the division's attempts to capture the heights were unsuccessful.
Subsequently, units of the 32nd Rifle Division and 2 mechanized brigades of the 39th Rifle Corps arrived in the area. By August 5, the Soviet command managed to concentrate up to 15 thousand people, 237 guns, and 285 tanks in the conflict area. The actions of the ground forces were supported by about 250 aircraft. The general management of the operation was carried out by the chief of staff of the front, corps commander G.M. Stern.
On August 6, after two air strikes by 180 bombers under the cover of 70 fighters and a 45-minute artillery preparation, at 16.00 the Red Army formations began an assault on the positions of the Japanese troops. At the same time, the 32nd Infantry Division, with the support of a tank battalion, delivered the main blow north of the lake in the direction of Bezymyannaya Height. And the 40th infantry division with support units - an auxiliary strike from the southeast in the direction of the Zaozernaya heights.
According to the official Soviet version, on August 8, the Red Army troops, overcoming fierce enemy resistance, captured the Zaozernaya height, and on August 9, the Bezymyannaya height. On August 10, Japanese troops tried unsuccessfully to regain their lost positions, but suffered heavy losses and began to go on the defensive, which threatened to develop into a protracted war. Japan was not ready for this.
Therefore, on the same day, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow proposed to begin negotiations on a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of troops from the border. The Soviet leadership agreed with this proposal and ordered a ceasefire from 12:00 local time on August 11. After this, both sides began to withdraw troops from the border.
But there is another version of the end of the events at Lake Khasan. It is mentioned, in particular, by Colonel General L. Shevtsov (former Commander-in-Chief of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Advisor to the Director of the Russian Guard) in the article “The Last Operation of Marshal Blucher” (VPK, No. 27, July 17–23, 2018). It says that after two days of fierce fighting, the Red Army troops failed to capture the heights, and they went on the defensive. The threat of a protracted defensive war arose, for which neither the Red Army nor the Japanese troops were prepared. In this regard, the parties began negotiations on a ceasefire and the withdrawal of troops from the border, that is, in essence, on the restoration of the previously existing situation in the area. Both sides presented these events as a landslide victory for their troops.
The losses of the parties are comparable to the level of losses in local wars. The Red Army lost 792 people killed, 2752 wounded; the Japanese are 525 and 913 people, respectively.
No matter how far from us the events in the area of Lake Khasan ended, the fact remains that Japan committed an act of aggression against the USSR and received its first cruel lesson from the Red Army. Subsequently, the aggressive course of its leadership led to defeat in the conflict on the Khalkhin Gol River in Mongolia in 1939. This forced Japan to finally abandon the declaration of war on the USSR, as demanded by allied Germany, and plans to seize the Soviet Far East.
Japan, being among the countries that won the First World War, made huge gains at the expense of the losing countries in the Far East and the Pacific. The success, which was achieved without much effort, fueled the expansionist sentiments of the ruling elite and the samurai spirit of the military. Tokyo dreamed of new conquests, of establishing Japanese domination throughout the Far East.
Japan's aggressive aspirations led to the aggravation of Anglo-Japanese contradictions. British imperialism penetrated the Far East at a time when Japan was not yet a serious competitor for it. England owned such important military and economic strongholds in the East as Hong Kong, Singapore, etc. Large English trading and industrial companies operated in China. But by the beginning of the 30s. Japanese imperialists began to expand their influence. Japan had larger forces in the Far East than the British Empire, whose possessions and armed forces were scattered across all continents.
The governments of the USA and England were most satisfied with the reorientation of Japanese aggression from China to the USSR. English conservative circles believe, the Soviet plenipotentiary in England wrote on this issue in 1933, that the Japanese seizure of Manchuria could lead to war between the USSR and Japan, and this, in their opinion, would be “a real blessing of history.” Taking the path of aggression in 1931, the Japanese captured Northeast China (Manchuria). They formed the puppet state of Manchukuo there. Along with plans to continue aggressive actions in China, the Japanese turned their attention to the Soviet Far East and the Mongolian People's Republic. Japan has repeatedly rejected Soviet proposals to conclude a non-aggression pact.
On July 7, 1937, Japanese militarists opened extensive military operations against China. Japanese aggression created a mortal threat to the Chinese people. At the same time, Japanese conquests in the Far East undermined the positions of the US and British imperialists. China filed another complaint to the League of Nations. Soviet diplomacy energetically demanded that action be taken against Japan. However, this organization, as usual, did not take any countermeasures. By decision of the League of Nations, on November 3, 1937, a conference of powers interested in Far Eastern affairs opened in Brussels. Representatives of the USSR, USA, England, China, France and a number of other states took part in it. The Soviet delegation proposed collective measures to prevent the use of force in international relations. The Anglo-Americans rejected this path, suggested by life itself. As a result, the conference was limited to the adoption of a declaration appealing to the prudence of Japan. But American and British diplomats in Brussels persistently convinced the Soviet delegation that the USSR must act alone against Japan. Many years later, US Secretary of State C. Hell admitted in his memoirs that these proposals were based on the desire to obtain the same opportunity that Theodore Roosevelt had in 1904 to “put an end to the Russo-Japanese War.” There is hardly any need to moralize about this: the governments of the United States and Great Britain religiously followed the policy of “balance of power.”
On August 21, 1937, a non-aggression pact was concluded between the USSR and China. In 1938 - 1939 The USSR provided China with three loans totaling $250 million. There was a continuous flow of weapons, military materials, and fuel from the Soviet Union through Northwest China. Columns of tanks moved under their own power and planes were ferryed. Soviet pilots not only defended the skies over Chinese cities, but also struck deep behind enemy lines. As a result of bomb attacks by Soviet volunteer aviation, the Japanese command was forced to move the bases of its bomber aircraft 500 - 600 km from the front line, while previously they were at a distance of 50 km. Soviet pilots bombed Japanese warships on the Yangtze and destroyed Taipei on the island of Taiwan. At the beginning of 1941, when China was in especially dire need of aviation, bombers and fighters arrived from the USSR and took part in the battles until the start of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union.
Although the Japanese conquests infringed on their imperialist interests in China, Washington and London believed that through the hands of Japanese militarists it was possible to achieve the cherished goals of international reaction - to strangle the national liberation movement of the Chinese people, as well as to cause a war between Japan and the USSR. Japan's military-industrial potential was extremely limited due to the country's poverty of natural resources. Japan's factories producing weapons and war materials were critically dependent on imported raw materials, which were supplied from the USA and England. In 1937, Japan received 54% of the necessary military materials from the United States, in 1938 - 58%, another 17% came from Great Britain. 50% of Japanese military transport to China was carried by foreign freight, mainly English. Even the Chiang Kai-shek ambassador to the United States in 1940 was forced to publicly admit that 54 out of every 100 Chinese civilian deaths were killed by American weapons!
16. The Nazis came to power in Germany and the policies of the Western powers. "Pact of Four".
The foreign policy of the Nazi regime was determined by the search for a way to realize the task of “national self-determination of the Germans” as formulated by Hitler. But in Berlin they understood that an immediate breakthrough to the goal was not possible. Germany was still weak, and it could not enter into conflict at once with all the states from which the Nazis expected resistance to their plans. Resources were needed for internal purposes. Hitler's government wanted to ensure strong political support within Germany. It was able to find funds to allocate 2 billion marks for housing construction and the construction of new roads and another 1 billion marks to support those entrepreneurs who created new jobs.
With “German self-determination” in mind, the Nazi regime sought to achieve rapprochement primarily with Catholic Austria. Hitler's next step was to normalize relations with the USSR. According to the terms of the Soviet-German protocol of June 1931 on the extension of the Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression of 1926 between the USSR and Germany, the German side could declare its intention to denounce it after June 1933. The actual state of Soviet-German relations under the governments , which preceded the Nazi one, was such that the cancellation of the treaty could be expected at any moment.
But on May 5, 1933, Hitler made it clear that the 1931 Treaty and Protocol would continue to apply. This was seen around the world as a sign of Berlin's desire to maintain stable relations with Moscow.
The coming to power in Germany of a government that openly declared its intention to change the existing state of affairs in Europe was met with sympathy in Rome. Italy, not satisfied with the results of the First World War, had long been looking for an opportunity to raise the issue of revising them. However, her attempts met with the rejection of stronger powers. With Hitler coming to power, Italy could count on German support.
But, despite the parallel interests of Italian fascists and German Nazis, the foreign policy views of the leaders of Italy and Germany did not coincide in everything. The Italian dictator was not close to Hitler's mystical belief in the superiority of the Aryan race. He did not claim messianism on a worldwide scale. The Duce did not hesitate to tell Hitler that he did not share his crude anti-Semitism. Finally, Rome could not be captivated by the idea of “national self-determination” of the Germans, since its implementation would mean the inclusion of Austria into Germany, while Rome preferred to have a border in the north with weak Austria rather than with powerful Germany. Italy tended to see itself as a mediator between rival European powers. She did not see the need for the complete destruction of the Versailles order, but sought its modernization taking into account her requirements. Italian diplomacy came up with a proposal to sign a pact between Italy, France, Great Britain and Germany, which would recognize the fundamental possibility of a new peaceful pan-European reconstruction.
The project proposed by Italy provided for the creation of a kind of closed privileged club of leading powers that could coordinate their positions in advance in order to then influence third countries - including through the League of Nations. In an effort to win Germany over to its side, the Italian side included in its draft a clause granting Germany and its former allies (Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria) equal rights in the field of armaments. Italian diplomats began negotiations on concluding a “Pact of Four” in Western European capitals in March 1933.
Small and medium-sized states reacted painfully to the “Pact of Four” plan, seeing in it an attempt at another “conspiracy of the strong” at the expense of the weaker. The possibility of revising peace treaties almost automatically created a threat to the territorial integrity of small countries. The creation of the Quartet would also consolidate the isolation of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the USSR also reacted negatively to attempts to regulate the international situation without its participation.
By concluding the “Pact of Four,” Western countries intended to create an alliance capable of playing the role of the supreme arbiter in Europe, and in the future to replace the League of Nations and take the decision of the most important international issues into their own hands. The leaders of the Western powers intended to collude with the fascist powers in order to use their ideology, expansionist aspirations, and militarism to fight against the Soviet Union and the anti-fascist democratic movement in their own countries.
17. Soviet-French negotiations on the Eastern Pact (1933–1934). USSR and the League of Nations. Treaties of the USSR with France and Czechoslovakia.
The new situation in Europe led to the intensification of anti-German sentiment in France. Security interests argued for the need to contain Germany from the east through an alliance with the Soviet Union. The most prominent supporter of the Franco-Soviet rapprochement was the French conservative-nationalist politician Louis Barthou, who became the French Foreign Minister in February 1934.
L. Bart had to act in a difficult situation. The government he entered did not have a strong base in parliament. France withstood the first onslaught of the crisis in 1929-1933 better than other states. The depression hit it in 1933, exacerbating social contradictions to the limit. Neither party had a strong majority in the Chamber of Deputies.
Barth's fundamental idea was the creation of a multilateral mutual assistance pact consisting of Germany, Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Czechoslovakia, and, of course, the Soviet Union. Such a bloc was supposed to become a means of stabilizing interstate relations in the center and east of Europe, from where, as Bartu believed, the threat to peace came. The proposed scheme represented a new option for containing Germany. Unlike the ideas proposed in the time of Georges Clemenceau, Barthou's concept envisioned containing Germany through its deeper integration into the international system, rather than simply pitting Germany against one or more French allies in the east.
Barthou's plan provided that France would act as the guarantor of the new bloc, that is, it would undertake the obligation to act on the side of the state that had been subjected to aggression if the other participants in the bloc for some reason did not do so. At the same time, the USSR was supposed to join the guarantors of the Locarno Pact of 1925. At the same time, France was not supposed to officially become a party to the “Eastern Pact”. The mutual obligations of France and the USSR were supposed to be formalized in a bilateral treaty of mutual assistance. In this way, it was intended to give the subsystem of European relations the internal proportionality it lacked: the three most powerful powers of the continent - Germany, France and the USSR - would find themselves in a position of mutually balancing forces. Bartu did not exclude Italy from joining the system of mutual guarantees he proposed.
The Soviet leadership, as already mentioned, was concerned about possible challenges from Poland and Germany. Finding themselves within the same organization, the USSR could count on easing tensions in relations with Berlin and Warsaw. And if this had not happened, the situation could have been “secured” by the existence of a Soviet-French mutual assistance pact. In addition, rapprochement with France opened the way for Moscow to finally overcome isolation in world politics: Paris firmly promised to facilitate the admission of the USSR to the League of Nations. Barthou's ideas were favorably received in Moscow. In May 1934, the draft pact was agreed upon by Soviet and French representatives. The other powers had to be convinced of its usefulness.
The Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact is an agreement on military assistance between France and the USSR, concluded on May 2, 1935. The treaty marked a significant shift in Soviet policy from a position of opposition to the Treaty of Versailles to a more pro-Western policy associated with the name of Litvinov. The ratification of the treaty by the French parliament was used by Hitler as a pretext for the remilitarization of the Rhineland, which was strictly prohibited by the Treaty of Versailles.
Article I established that in the event of a threat of attack by a European state on one of the parties to the treaty, France and the USSR would immediately begin consultations. Article II obliged the parties to provide immediate assistance and support to the other side if it became the object of an unprovoked attack by a third “European state,” thereby avoiding the involvement of France in a possible conflict between the USSR and Japan. Articles III and IV established the treaty's compliance with the League of Nations charter. Article V specified the procedure for ratification and extension of the treaty. The contract was concluded for five years with automatic renewal.
The protocol of signing the treaty of May 2, 1935 specified that a decision of the League of Nations was not required:
“It is agreed that the consequence of Article 3 is the obligation of each contracting party to provide immediate assistance to the other, complying without delay with the recommendations of the Council of the League of Nations as soon as they are made by virtue of Article 16 of the Charter. It is also agreed that both contracting parties will act in agreement in order to ensure that the Council makes its recommendations with all the speed that circumstances require, and that if, despite this, the Council does not, for one reason or another, make any recommendation or if it does not reaches unanimity, the obligation of assistance will nevertheless be fulfilled.”
However, the very next section of the protocol emphasized the consistency of the obligations imposed by the treaty with the position of the League of Nations: these obligations “cannot have such an application that, being incompatible with the treaty obligations accepted by one of the contracting parties,. would subject this latter to international sanctions.”
Treaty of Mutual Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Republic (Smlouva o vzajemne pomoci mezi republikou Ceskoslovenskou a Svazem Sovetskych Socialistickych republik) - an agreement signed in Prague on May 16, 1935 by plenipotentiary representatives of the USSR and Czechoslovakia. The main provisions of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty are identical to the provisions of the Soviet-French treaty of 1935. The only exception was the 2nd article of the protocol on signing the treaty, which stated that both governments recognize “... that obligations of mutual assistance will operate between them only if, under the conditions provided for in this treaty, assistance will be provided to the Party that is the victim of the attack from France."
The parties undertook obligations to conduct immediate consultations in the event of a threat or danger of an attack by any European state on the USSR or Czechoslovakia and to provide mutual assistance in the event of direct aggression against the contracting states. Thus, the agreements of the USSR with France and Czechoslovakia acquired the character of a tripartite agreement, which could become the basis for creating collective security in Europe. On May 11, the Council of the Balkan Entente spoke in favor of the development of the Danube Pact in order to guarantee the independence of Austria, in which the participation of the USSR, France, Italy, Austria, Czechoslovakia and the countries of the Balkan Entente was assumed. The USSR government gave its consent to negotiations, proposing Hungary as one of the participating countries. Preliminary negotiations for the conclusion of mutual assistance pacts in 1935 took place between the Soviet government and the governments of Turkey, Romania and Latvia. But these negotiations did not lead to positive results.
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