Directive of the Supreme Commander Headquarters "on the procedure for using rocket artillery." Personal and secret message from the Prime Minister

DIRECTIVE of the Supreme High Command Headquarters No. 155452 TO THE MILITARY COUNCIL OF THE FRONT AND ARMIES ON THE REASONS FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE CRIMINAL FRONT IN THE KERCH OPERATION June 4, 1942. In the period from May 8 to May 20, the troops of the Crimean Front fought unsuccessful battles with the advancing enemy on the Kerch Peninsula and were defeated. By the beginning of the enemy offensive, the Crimean Front had sixteen rifle divisions, three rifle brigades, one cavalry division, four tank brigades, nine artillery reinforcement regiments, 401 aircraft, including 176 serviceable fighters and 225 serviceable bombers. The enemy against the indicated forces of the Crimean Front had seven infantry divisions, one tank division, one cavalry brigade, one mechanized brigade and up to 400-500 aircraft. As you can see, the Crimean Front had great superiority over the enemy in infantry and artillery and was only slightly inferior to the enemy in aviation. Nevertheless, our troops on the Crimean front were defeated and, as a result of unsuccessful battles, were forced to retreat beyond the Kerch Strait. The study of the progress of the entire Kerch operation revealed the inconsistency of the leadership of the front troops on the part of the commander of the Crimean Front, Lieutenant General Kozlov, a member of the Military Council of the divisional commissar Shamanin, the chief of staff of Major General Vechny and the representative of the Supreme High Command, Army Commissar 1st Rank Mehlis. The main reason for the failure of the Kerch operation is that the front command - Kozlov, Shamanin, Eternal, the representative of the Mehlis Headquarters, the commanders of the front armies, and especially the 44th Army, Lieutenant General Chernyak and the 47th Army, Major General Kolganov, discovered a complete misunderstanding nature of modern war, which is reflected in the following facts. 1. The experience of modern war, where tanks and aircraft play a big role, shows that the outcome of the battle and the fate of the troops cannot be made dependent only on field fortifications and forces of battle formation linearly stretched along the front edge. Troops stretched out in a line along the front edge of the defense line can be broken through, as numerous facts indicate. Therefore, the main task is to have strong second and third echelons deployed on prepared lines in the depths, army and front reserves that must delay the enemy who has broken through, and then defeat him with a counterattack. At the same time, the deployment of second echelons and reserves must always be carried out with mandatory consideration of the nature of the terrain. For example, open, flat terrain, as was the case on the Kerch Peninsula, requires all commanders to build their battle formations more deeply, to allocate strong reserves in depth, placing them at road junctions, in populated areas sufficiently distant from forward positions, so that have time to deploy these reserves and advance them against the enemy who has broken through. Contrary to this experience, the command of the Crimean Front stretched out its divisions in one line, regardless of the open, flat nature of the terrain, pushed all the infantry and artillery close to the enemy and did not create reserves in depth, and one division accounted for no more than two kilometers at the front, which means , the front had the opportunity to create second and third echelons. As a result, after the enemy broke through the front line, the command was unable to oppose sufficient forces to the advancing enemy. Having belatedly started organizing a counterattack against the enemy who had broken through, the front command could not complete this matter, because the enemy attacked divisions that were separately approaching the battlefield from the right flank of their front. 2. War experience further shows that organized and firm command and control of troops in battle plays a decisive role and that the loss of communication between command and troops has a disastrous effect on the outcome of a combat operation. Headquarters are required to have well-equipped, camouflaged command posts, and must have pre-equipped reserve command posts in order to periodically change their location; headquarters must keep all types of communication means in full readiness (radio, wire, airplane, car, communications officer) so that communication is uninterrupted and trouble-free. The headquarters must finally understand that radio is the most reliable means of communication and that they are obliged to develop and cultivate it in every possible way in the army. Contrary to this experience, the command of the Crimean Front in the very first hours of the enemy’s offensive lost control of the troops. The front and army commands did not change their command posts for a long time, as a result of which the enemy, knowing the location of these points, bombed these points with the first air raid, disrupted wire communications at the command posts of the front and army headquarters and disrupted communication centers, and radio communications due to the criminal negligence of the headquarters the front was corralled. The army headquarters were unprepared for the use of other means of communication. 3. War experience shows that the success of a combat operation is unthinkable without clearly organized interaction of all types of troops in battle. Particularly important is the organization of interaction between ground forces and aviation in combat work. Contrary to this experience, the command of the Crimean Front did not organize the interaction of the armies with each other and did not at all ensure the interaction of ground forces with front aviation. The command of the Crimean Front did not lead the aviation and allowed a situation where our aviation acted scatteredly and outside the general plan of the operation, which is why it did not launch a massive counterattack against German aviation, although it had every opportunity for this. 4. War experience shows that, along with the ability to organize an offensive battle, the command must be able, when the situation requires it, to withdraw its forces from the enemy’s attack. When withdrawing troops, the decisive factor is the command’s ability to correctly outline movement routes, lines and timing for troops to reach them, and the ability to organize cover for the withdrawn forces with sufficiently strong rearguards. Contrary to this experience, the command of the Crimean Front did not organize the withdrawal of troops. The command of the Crimean Front did not understand that the enemy, delivering the main blow against the left flank of the front, deliberately behaved passively against our right flank, being directly interested in ensuring that our troops on this flank remained in their positions, and hoping to strike them with the exit of his strike group to the rear of our troops, who remained inactive on the right flank. When, on the second day after the start of the enemy’s offensive, taking into account the situation on the Crimean Front and seeing the helplessness of the front command, Headquarters ordered the systematic withdrawal of the front armies to the positions of the Turkish Wall, the front command and Comrade. The Mekhlis did not ensure the execution of the Headquarters order in a timely manner; they began the withdrawal two days late, and the withdrawal took place in a disorganized and disorderly manner. The front command did not ensure the allocation of sufficient rearguards, did not establish stages of withdrawal, did not outline intermediate withdrawal lines, and did not cover the approach of troops to the Turkish Wall with the advance deployment of advanced units to this line. II The second reason for the failures of our troops on the Kerch Peninsula lies in the bureaucratic and paper-based method of leading troops on the part of the front command and Comrade. Mehlisa. Tt. Kozlov and Mehlis believed that their main task was to give orders and that the issuance of an order ended their responsibility for leading the troops. They did not understand that issuing an order is only the beginning of the work and that the main task of the command is to ensure the execution of the order, to convey the order to the troops, and to organize assistance to the troops in carrying out the order of the command. As an analysis of the course of the operation showed, the front command gave its orders without taking into account the situation at the front, without knowing the true position of the troops. The front command did not even ensure the delivery of its orders to the army, as was the case with the order for the 51st Army to cover the withdrawal of all front forces beyond the Turkish Wall - an order that was not delivered to the army commander. During the critical days of the operation, the command of the Crimean Front and comrade. Mehlis, instead of personal communication with army commanders and instead of personal influence on the course of the operation, spent time at many hours of fruitless meetings of the Military Council. III The third reason for the failures on the Kerch Peninsula is the indiscipline of the comrades. Kozlov and Mehlis. As noted above, vol. Kozlov and Mehlis violated the instructions of the Headquarters and did not ensure its implementation, did not ensure the timely withdrawal of troops beyond the Turkish Wall. The delay of two days with the withdrawal of troops was disastrous for the outcome of the entire operation. * * * Considering that vol. Mekhlis, Kozlov, Shamanin, Vechny, Chernyak, Kolganov, Nikolaenko (chief of front aviation) showed their incompetence in leading troops and are the direct culprits for the unsuccessful outcome of the Kerch operation. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided: 1. To remove the army commissar of the 1st rank, Comrade Mehlis. from the posts of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and head of the [Main] Political Directorate of the Red Army and reduce him in rank to corps commissar. 2. Remove Lieutenant General Comrade Kozlov from the post of front commander, demote him in rank to major general and test him in another, less complex military job. 3. Remove divisional commissar Comrade Shamanin from his post as a member of the front’s Military Council, demote him in rank to brigade commissar and test him on another, less complex military job. 4. Remove Major General Comrade Eternal from the post of chief of staff of the front and place him at the disposal of the chief of the General Staff for assignment to less responsible work. 5. Remove Lieutenant General Comrade Chernyak from the post of army commander, demote him in rank to colonel and test him in another, less complex military job. 6. Remove Major General Comrade Kolganov from the post of army commander, reduce him in rank to colonel and test him in another, less complex military job. 7. Remove Major General of Aviation Comrade Nikolaenko from the post of commander of the front air force, reduce him in rank to aviation colonel and test him in another, less complex military job. The headquarters considers it necessary that the commanders and military councils of all fronts and armies learn from these mistakes and shortcomings in the leadership of the command of the former Crimean Front. The task is for our command staff to truly understand the nature of modern war, to understand the need for deep echeloning of troops and the allocation of reserves, to understand the importance of organizing the interaction of all branches of the military, and especially the interaction of ground forces with aviation. The task is for our command staff to decisively put an end to the vicious methods of bureaucratic-paper leadership and command and control of troops, not to limit themselves to giving orders, but to visit the troops, armies, divisions more often and help their subordinates in carrying out the orders of the command. The task is to ensure that our command staff, commissars and political workers completely root out elements of indiscipline among large and small commanders. Headquarters of the Supreme High Command I. STALIN A. VASILEVSKY TSAMO. F. 148a. Op. 3763. D. 107. L. 177-184. Script.

ORDER of the Supreme High Command Headquarters No. 30228 ON RENAMING THE CENTRAL, KALININ AND BALTIC FRONTS

From October 20, 1943, the following new names of the fronts will be established: the Central Front will be called the Belorussian Front, the Kalinin Front will be called the 1st Baltic Front, the Baltic Front will be called the 2nd Baltic Front. Report receipt of the order.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command I. STALIN A, ANTONOV

TsAMO. F. 148a. Op. 3763. D. 143. L. 263. Original.

No. 365 ORDER OF THE Supreme Command Headquarters No. 03655 ON PERSONNEL APPOINTMENTS

Assign:

1. Deputy commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front (formerly
of Voronezh) - Colonel General A. A. Grechko, releasing him from his obligation
duties of the commander of the 56th Army.

2. The commander of the 56th Army - Lieutenant General Melnik, having released
him from his duties as commander of the 58th Army.

TsAMO. F. 148a. Op. 3763. D. 143. L. 262. Original.

SOUTH-WESTERN FRONT, REPRESENTATIVES OF HEAD 1 ABOUT SENDING FOUR RIFLE DIVISIONS TO THE STEPPE FRONT

Copy: Commander of the Steppe Front troops

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders from the troops of the Southwestern Front to allocate four divisions of 6 to 7 thousand each, which are sent in marching order to the commander of the Steppe Front with the expectation of their arrival in the Tsarichanka area, Kitay-Gorod no later than the morning of October 20 .

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command I. STALIN A. ANTONOV

TsAMO. F. 148a. Op. 3763, D. 143. L. 264. Original.

DIRECTIVE of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 30230 TO THE COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS OF THE 3RD AND 2ND UKRAINIAN FRONTS, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HEADQUARTERS 2 ON THE TRANSITION OF THE 3rd UKRAINIAN FRONT TO THE OFFENSIVE IN THE DNIPROPETROVSK AREA

Troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front are fighting on the approaches to Krivoy Rog. The Germans begin to withdraw their troops from the Dnepropetrovsk ledge.

1. The 3rd Ukrainian Front should immediately go on the offensive, nano
strike with your right wing in the general direction of Krinichki, Novo-Nikola-
Evka. Simultaneously launch an offensive from the bridgehead [in the area] of Voyskovoye in
direction [to] Solenoye.

2. Report the execution.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command I. STALIN A. ANTONOV

TsAMO. F. 148a. Op. 3763. D. 143. L. 265. Original.

DIRECTIVE of the Supreme High Command Headquarters No. 30231 TO THE COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS OF THE BELARUSIAN FRONT ON RESURRECTION AND REGROUPING

11TH AND 48TH ARMIES

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. Fedyuninsky’s 11th army, consisting of seven divisions with all army-
by reinforcement units and rear units and institutions from 6.00 on October 23
to be transferred to the troops of the Belorussian Front, excluding it from the 2nd
Baltic Front.

2. Commander of the Belorussian Front 23.10 to begin the movement of troops
11th Army to the sector of the front now occupied by the 48th Army, which was transferred
regroup to the Rechitsa direction.

To speed up the regrouping of the 48th Army, begin without waiting for the approach of the 11th Army, leaving two or three infantry divisions in the area it occupies and strengthening it partly at the expense of the 63rd Army.

3. Report the execution.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command I. STALIN A. ANTONOV

TsAMO. F. 148a. Op. 3763. D. 143. L. 266. Original.

VGK RATE DIRECTIVE No. 30232 TO RATE REPRESENTATIVE 1,

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS OF THE 1ST UKRAINIAN FRONT

TO REFINE THE OPERATION PLAN TO CAPTURE Kyiv

1. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command indicates that failure is
attacks on the Bukrinsky bridgehead occurred because they were not timely
the terrain conditions that complicate offensive actions here are taken into account
troops, especially the tank army.

The reference to the lack of ammunition 2 is not valid, since Stepin, having no more ammunition than Nikolaev, but using his troops correctly and operating on somewhat more favorable terrain, successfully fulfills his task.

2. Headquarters orders a regrouping of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian
front in order to strengthen the right wing of the front, with the immediate task of developing
the thunder of the Kyiv enemy group and the capture of Kyiv.

To do this:

a) transfer 3 Guards TA Rybalko to the front sector north of Kyiv, using
her here together with the 1st Guards. cavalry corps. Weak tanks
Rybalko should be left in place to be replenished by the 8th Guards. and 10th tank corps
Pusov. The tanks arriving to replenish the front should be used first of all.
ready to staff Rybalko's tank corps;

b) strengthen the right wing of the front with three or four line divisions at the expense of
left wing of the front;

c) also be used to strengthen the right wing of the front 135 and 202 infantry divisions,
transferred to you from 70 A Reserve Rates;

1 G. K. Zhukov.

2 See attached document No. 49.

d) involve the 60th, 38th and 3rd Guards in the attack on Kyiv. tank army.

3. Offensive actions on the Bukrin bridgehead will be carried out by those remaining
here with forces, including tank units with the task of attracting the forces
as many enemy forces as possible and, under favorable conditions, break through his front
and move forward.

4. Transfer Rybalko so that it goes unnoticed by
enemy using tank models.

5. Start the transfer of Rybalko and three or four line divisions from the left wing
immediately and finish concentrating them on the right wing by November 1-2.

6. The resettlement of the right wing will begin on November 1-2, so that the 3rd Guards. TA
began to operate on November 3-4. The left wing will begin relocation no later than 2
November.

7. Leave the demarcation line between the Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts
the previous one.

From 24.00 on October 25, 1943, from the 61 A Belorussian Front, transfer two left-flank divisions to the 13 A 1st Ukrainian Front.

8. Deliver execution.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command I. STALIN A. ANTONOV

TsAMO. F. 148a. Op. 3763. D. 143. L. 267, 268. Original.

Supreme High Command Headquarters DIRECTIVE No. 30233 TO THE TROOPS COMMANDER

1st UKRAINIAN FRONT ABOUT CANCELLATION OF REGROUPING

60th AND 38TH ARMIES

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. The relocation of Chernyakhovsky and Chibisov, scheduled by you for 25.10.
thread and be guided by Headquarters Directive No. 30232 1.

2. From now on, do not appoint any resettlement without the approval of Headquarters.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command I. STALIN A. ANTONOV

TsAMO. F. 148a. Op. 3763. D. 143. L. 269. Original.

Supreme Command Headquarters DIRECTIVE No. 30234 TO THE COMMANDER OF TROOPS

2nd AND 3rd UKRAINIAN FRONT, REPRESENTATIVES OF STOCK 2

ABOUT THE TASKS FOR DEVELOPING THE OFFENSIVE ON THE RIGHT BANK OF THE R. DNIEPER

As a result of the successful offensive of the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts, the Dnepropetrovsk enemy group retreats to the southwest. At the same time, the Germans are strengthening their Kirovograd group and trying to prevent

1 See Document No. 369.

2 G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky.

to promote the further advance of the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front to the west and southwest.

Taking into account the current situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. 2nd Ukrainian Front, continuing the operation to capture Krivoy
Horn, the main efforts should be directed towards the defeat of the Kirovograd group of pro-
tivnik, why attack with the main forces in the direction of Kirovograd, having
The immediate task is to reach the line Chigirin, Znamenka, Kirovograd, Installation.

In the future, develop the offensive in the general direction towards the station. Khristinovka, firmly securing itself from the south.

The left wing, in cooperation with the 3rd Ukrainian Front, defeat the enemy’s Dnepropetrovsk grouping, for which purpose the 57th Army, reinforced by one TK or one MK, captures the Apostolovo area.

2. 3rd Ukrainian Front in cooperation with the left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian
Ina Front to defeat the retreating Dnepropetrovsk enemy grouping
ka, why, without getting involved in protracted battles and bypassing large populated areas
kty, vigorously pursue the enemy in the general direction of Apostolovo.

The immediate task is to reach the Krivoy Rog, Apostolovo, Nikopol line by November 3-5, and further develop the offensive in the general direction of Nikolaev, covered by part of the forces from Voznesensk.

3. The demarcation line between the fronts: to Mironovka - the former and then Sofi-
evka (for the 2nd Ukrainian Front inclusive). Next the boundary line will be
given additionally.

4. Start execution immediately.

5. Report orders given to the General Staff in a timely manner.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command I. STALIN A. ANTONOV

TsAMO. F. 148a. Op. 3763. D. 143. L. 270, 271. Original.

Supreme Command Headquarters DIRECTIVE No. 30235 TO THE COMMANDER OF TROOPS

2nd AND 3rd UKRAINIAN FRONT, REPRESENTATIVES OF STOCK 1

ABOUT CHANGING THE BUNDERLINE BETWEEN FRONTS

AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE OFFENSIVE

In view of the changed situation at the front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. The demarcation line between the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts from 24.00
29.10 establish the following: to Mironovka - the former and further Adamivka, Alek-
sowing, Krinichevaty, Dolgintsevo. Everything for the 3rd Ukrainian Front incl.
carefully.

2. The commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front to continue the decisive offensive
laziness. The main grouping of the 46th Army should be closer to its right flank.

3. The commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front to use the 57th Army for
strengthening the group of troops operating in the Krivoy Rog region.

4. Deliver execution.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command I. STALIN A. ANTONOV

TsAMO. F. 148a. Op. 3763. D. 143. L. 272. Original. "G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevsky.

Supreme Command Headquarters DIRECTIVE No. 30236 TO THE TROOPS COMMANDER

1st UKRAINIAN FRONT, REPRESENTATIVE OF HEAD 1

ABOUT THE TIMELINE OF THE Kyiv OFFENSIVE OPERATION

The operation begun on the right wing of the front should not be delayed, since every extra day only gives an advantage to the enemy, allowing him to concentrate his forces here, using good roads. Whereas in our country, roads destroyed by the enemy make maneuver difficult and limiting.

Based on this, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. No later than 5.11, cut the Klev-Korosten railway to the east or
west of the river Irpin, depending on the situation and no later than 5-6.11 master go
originally from Kyiv.

2. No later than 9-10.11, cut the Kyiv-Fastov railway.

3. When solving this problem, make sacrifices, keeping in mind that these sacrifices will be
many times less than what will have to be spent if this operation drags on.

4. Take into account that the Kyiv bridgehead is the most important and most profitable
bridgehead on the right bank of the river. Dnieper, which has historically important significance
tion to expel the Germans from Right Bank Ukraine.

5. Report receipt and orders given.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command I. STALIN A. ANTONOV

TsAMO. F. 148a. Op. 3763. D. 143. L. 273, 274. Original.

Supreme High Command Headquarters DIRECTIVE No. 30237 TO THE COMMANDER OF TROOPS

OF THE NORTH CAUCASIAN FRONT AND THE BLACK SEA FLEET TO PREVENT THE EVACUATION OF THE ENEMY FROM THE CRIMEA

The enemy is concentrating watercraft in the ports of Evpatoria and Sevastopol to evacuate troops and equipment from Crimea.

In order to prevent the evacuation of enemy troops and property, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. Conduct continuous aerial reconnaissance of watercraft in the ports of Sevastopol,
Evpatoria with the task of detecting the exit and their movement by sea.

2. Use all bomber and torpedo aircraft for attack
ditch for watercraft in ports and during sea crossings.

3. At the approaches to ports and on communications, deploy at least seven under
water boats.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command I. STALIN A. ANTONOV

TsAMO. F. 148a. Op. 3763. D. 142: L. 195. Original.

1 G. K. Zhukov. 230

Supreme High Command Headquarters DIRECTIVE No. 30238 TO THE COMMANDER OF TROOPS

2nd, 3rd AND 4th UKRAINIAN FRONT, REPRESENTATIVES OF HEAD 1

TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY'S KRIVO ROG-NIKOPOL GROUP

According to available data, the enemy is strengthening its Nikopol group and is pulling part of the tank divisions operating against the 2nd Ukrainian Front into the Nikopol area; an enemy attack from this area is possible on the flank and rear of the troops of the 2nd or 4th Ukrainian Fronts that have advanced forward.

In this regard, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command considers the primary and most important task to be the defeat of the Krivoy Rog-Nikopol enemy group and orders:

1. 2nd Ukrainian Front offensive with main forces in the direction
Kirovograd according to Directive Headquarters No. 30234 to temporarily postpone 2.

Having firmly established itself on the currently occupied line, strike with the forces of the 37th, 57th and 5th Guards. tank armies in the general direction of Lozovatka, Shirokoe, bypassing Krivoy Rog from the west, and in cooperation with the 3rd Ukrainian Front, defeat the Krivoy Rog enemy group, capture Krivoy Rog and reach the Petrovo, Gurovka, (claim) Shirokoe line. The boundary line on the left is the same. The offensive should begin no later than November 12-14.

2. The 3rd Ukrainian Front, continuing the offensive, received the main blow from the nano-
fly with the right wing in the direction of Sofievka, Dolgintsevo, provide assistance
2nd Ukrainian Front in capturing Krivoy Rog and reaching the Shi-
Rokoe, Apostle ovo.

3. 4th Ukrainian Front, continuing the operation to invade Crimea,
direct the main efforts towards eliminating the enemy’s Kamensk bridgehead
(south of Nikopol) and crossing the river. Dnieper on the Nikopol, Bolshaya section
Lepetikha.

5. Report the orders given.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command I. STALIN A. ANTONOV

TsAMO. F. 148a. Op. 3763. D. 143. L. 275, 276. Original.

Supreme Command Headquarters DIRECTIVE No. 30239 TO THE COMMANDER OF TROOPS

FRONTS AND SEPARATE ARMIES, REPRESENTATIVES OF STOCK 3

ON STRENGTHENING SECURITY AND SECURITY MEASURES FOR COMMAND STAFF

Despite repeated instructions, over the past two weeks there have been shameful cases of enemy capture of our senior commanders, who went without proper precautions and security to the front line of troops and lost their orientation. So, for example:

1. On the night of 20.10, the commander of the artillery of the 3rd Shock Army, Major General Petrov, and his chief of staff, Colonel Nedzvizhsky, going on reconnaissance, due to Petrov’s failure to comply with regulatory requirements,

1 G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevsky.

2 See Document No. 371.

3 G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevsky.

kov, mistakenly drove into the location of enemy troops and were captured by the Germans.

2. 21.10 when leaving for our forward units, I drove through the line by mistake
front and was captured by the enemy, having fallen into his tank ambush, the chief
Headquarters 49 sk Colonel Funtikov.

3. 6.11 commander of the 44th Army, Lieutenant General Khomenko and commander-
Major General Bobkov, who was in charge of the artillery of the same army, when leaving for the headquarters of the cor-
Pusov lost their orientation, ended up in the enemy’s area, when
collision with which the engine stalled in the car driven personally by Khomenko
and these persons were also captured by the Germans with all their troops.
documents. This shameful incident occurred despite the warning of
Mandir 10th Guards sk Major General Rubanyuk that Khomenko and the persons, his
accompanying persons, took the wrong road. In response to the warning given to him,
tion, Khomenko self-confidently replied: “You don’t teach me, I can read a map.”
and continued moving towards the enemy.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. Prohibit the travel of army commanders, corps commanders and persons
senior command staff corresponding to the front line of troops without
organized along the route of reconnaissance and security in 2-3 armored vehicles or
tank.

2. When leaving for the troops, from corps headquarters and below, do not take with you any
operational documents, with the exception of a blank map of the travel area.

3. Unquestioningly comply with all requirements of regulators.

5. Assign responsibility for the strict implementation of this directive
personally to the commanders of fronts and individual armies. In case of violation
of this directive, the front commander will personally be held accountable
property.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command I. STALIN A. ANTONOV

TsAMO. F. 148a. Op. 3763. D. 143. L. 277, 278. Original.

VGK RATE DIRECTIVE No. 30202

REPRESENTATIVE OF RATE G.K. ZHUKOV

1. Chistyakov and Kryuchenkin will remain in the reserve of Headquarters, and Chistyakov will be sent to the Toropets area, and Kryuchenkin should remain in the Kharkov area. I believe that the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts can do without them, and Headquarters cannot do without a minimum of reserves.

2. Until the Zaporozhye bridgehead is liquidated, it is inappropriate to take forces from the Southwestern Front to strengthen the Steppe Front. If the Zaporozhye bridgehead is liquidated by 3–5.10, the Steppe Front can count on receiving from the Southwestern Front one or two tank corps and some rifle formations, which will be specially reported.

3. The transfer of Chernyakhovsky and Pukhov to the Voronezh Front will be carried out no later than October 10.

As for coordinating the actions of the left wing of the Central Front and the right wing of the Voronezh Front to capture Kiev, Headquarters entrusts this matter to you.

IVANOV

Note. Ivanov is Stalin’s conventional surname.

Chernyakhovsky I.D. (1904-1945) - Major General, Commander of the 60th Army (07.1942-04.1944). Lieutenant General (02.1943). Colonel General (04.1944), commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front (from 04.1944).

Pukhov N.P. (1895-1958) – Lieutenant General, commander of the 13th Army. Colonel General (08.1944).

Kryuchenkin V.D. (1894-1976) - Major General, Commander of the 69th Army (03.1943-04.1944). Lieutenant General (06.1943), commander of the 33rd Army (04-07.1944).

PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

FROM PREMIER I.V. STALIN

I share your opinion about the desirability of the personal presence of the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, at the upcoming meeting of representatives of the three governments.

At the same time, I must inform you of the great difficulties that would be encountered if the already agreed upon decision to choose Moscow as the site of the upcoming meeting was changed. The fact is that if the meeting were convened not in Moscow, but in England, as you are now proposing, V.M. would not be able to go to this meeting at the scheduled time. Molotov, whose presence at the meeting of the three as a representative of the Soviet Government I consider necessary. Departure from the USSR V.M. Molotov, at least in the near future, is impossible already because, as you know, A.Ya. is expected to travel to Algeria soon. Vyshinsky, who is the First Deputy of V.M. Molotov at the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

In addition, as is known, the press in the USA and England has already widely published that the upcoming meeting will take place in Moscow, and the choice of a new meeting point could give rise to unwanted confusion.

There are no objections on my part to setting October 15 as the date for the meeting. It must be assumed that by this date it will be possible to finally agree on the agenda of the meeting between the three governments.

Ministers of the USSR... P. 460–461.

Note. Roosevelt, in a message on September 27, proposed moving the meeting of the foreign ministers of the USSR, USA and Great Britain from Moscow to England, since US Secretary of State K. Hull, whose personal presence at such a meeting seemed highly desirable, would find it extremely difficult for health reasons to make a long-distance flight. Roosevelt also proposed scheduling the first meeting of this conference for October 15 (see: Ibid., p. 460).

PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET MESSAGE FROM THE PREMIER

I.V. STALIN TO THE PRIME MINISTER Mr. W. CHURCHILL

The Soviet Government is ready to take part in the tripartite Declaration, which must be announced immediately after Italy declares war on Germany. I consider the text of the Declaration you proposed acceptable. For my part, I propose to publish the Declaration simultaneously in London, Moscow and Washington.

For your information, I inform you that I have not yet received the President’s telegram with General Eisenhower’s proposals, sent to me, as you write, on October 1.

Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council

Ministers of the USSR... P. 161–162.

Note. Churchill proposed the following text of the Declaration:

“The Governments of Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union recognize the position of the Royal Italian Government, as formulated by Marshal Badoglio, and accept the active co-operation of the Italian nation and armed forces as joint belligerents in the war against Germany. The military events after September 8 and the brutal treatment of the Italian population by the Germans, culminating in Italy's declaration of war on Germany, effectively made Italy a joint belligerent, and the American, British and Soviet Governments will continue to co-operate with the Italian Government on this basis. The Three Governments acknowledge the obligation of the Italian Government to submit to the will of the Italian people after the Germans have been expelled from Italy, and it is understood that nothing can interfere with the absolute and inalienable right of the people of Italy to decide, by constitutional means, upon the democratic form of government which they shall ultimately have. .

The relationship between the Government of Italy and the Governments of the United Nations, based on the joint prosecution of the war, cannot of itself affect the terms recently signed, which remain in full force and can only be modified by agreement between the Allied Governments in the light of such assistance as the Italian Government can render to the cause. United Nations" (Ibid. p. 161).

The mentioned telegram from Roosevelt, dated October 1 (see: Ibid. pp. 461–462), which outlined the proposals of the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean theater, General Eisenhower, to amend the “Document of Surrender of Italy”, was received by Stalin on October 5, 1943 year.

PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE OF PREMIER I.V. STALIN

TO THE PRESIDENT Mr. F.D. ROOSEVELT

I have no objection to the agreement expressed by you and the British Prime Minister to General Eisenhower's proposal that the document containing the lengthy terms of surrender, once signed by the Italian Government, should be kept secret and not published for the present time.

Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council

Ministers of the USSR... P. 462.

Note. The agreement reached between Roosevelt and Churchill with Eisenhower's proposal on this issue was mentioned in Roosevelt's message on September 28, 1943 (see: Ibid., p. 461).

VGK RATE DIRECTIVE No. 30214

COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS OF THE FRONT

Copies: to representatives of the Headquarters (G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky. - Ed.)

Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command dated May 18, 1943 No. 30130 required, in order to create well-put together corps, to allow the replacement of divisions included in the corps only in exceptional cases. Regrouping is usually carried out by entire corps. The same directive from Headquarters required army commanders not to command divisions over the head of the corps commander.

Practice has shown that on a number of fronts these instructions from Headquarters are not followed and the replacement of divisions in corps is systematic. So, for example:

1. In some armies of the Western Front, the composition of rifle corps for the period from 1.8 to 8.9.1943 changed from three to seven times.

2. In the armies of the Steppe Front, the composition of the rifle corps for the period from July 19 to September 7, 1943 changed from three to six times.

3. In the 57th Army of the Steppe Front, there is a practice of issuing army combat orders directly to the commanders of rifle divisions, and the commanders of the infantry corps receive only copies of these orders, which reduces the corps commander to the role of a simple observer and, at best, a controller.

In addition, the staffing of corps directorates on some fronts with personnel, horses, vehicles and communications equipment is extremely slow and without due attention from the headquarters of the fronts and armies. There are even cases when communications chiefs of some armies take away communications equipment supplied by the Center from newly formed corps directorates.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command once again demands that decisive measures be taken to maintain a stable composition of rifle corps and not allow army commanders to command divisions over the heads of corps commanders.

I. STALIN

A. ANTONOV

VGK RATE DIRECTIVE№ 30213

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS OF THE VORONEZH FRONT N.F. VATUTINA, REPRESENTATIVES OF STAB G.K. ZHUKOV and A.E. GOLOVANOV

I state that the first airborne assault carried out by the Voronezh Front on September 24 failed, causing massive unnecessary casualties. This happened not only through the fault of Comrade. Skripko, but also through the fault of Comrade. Yuryeva and comrade. Vatutin, who were supposed to control the preparation and organization of the landing force.

The release of a mass landing at night indicates the illiteracy of the organizers of this matter, because, as experience shows, the release of a massive night landing, even on one’s own territory, is associated with great dangers.

I order the remaining one and a half airborne brigades to be removed from the subordination of the Voronezh Front and considered as a reserve of the Headquarters.

I. STALIN

Note. Golovanov A.E. (1904-1975) – Lieutenant General, Commander of Long-Range Aviation. Colonel General (03.1943). Air Marshal (08.1943). Air Chief Marshal (08.1944).

Skripko N.S. (1902-1987) – Lieutenant General, Deputy Commander of Long-Range Aviation. Colonel General (03.1944). Air Marshal (08.1944).

We are talking about the Dnieper airborne operation, undertaken to assist the troops of the Voronezh Front (Army General N.F. Vatutin) in crossing the Dnieper. The offensive plan of the front forces envisaged, on the eve of the crossing, to launch an airborne assault force in the Bukrinskaya Bend over two nights, seize a bridgehead and prevent enemy reserves from approaching it from the west and north-west. The implementation of this task was entrusted to the 1st, 3rd and 5th airborne brigades, united for ease of control into an airborne corps under the command of Major General I. I. Zatevakhin. The release of the first echelon of troops consisting of the 3rd and part of the forces of the 5th airborne brigades was carried out on the night of September 24 in difficult weather conditions, with strong enemy anti-aircraft fire. As a result, many aircraft crews lost their bearings and dropped paratroopers from high altitudes over a wide area. Some of the paratroopers found themselves in the presence of enemy troops and suffered heavy losses. The operation revealed serious shortcomings in its technical preparation. Contact between the front headquarters and the brigades was lost, and further landings were stopped.

TO PRIME MINISTER W. CHURCHILL

I received your message dated September 27 regarding the upcoming meeting of the three heads of government. I have no objections to the distracting preparations that you intend to make in Cairo. As for your proposal to throw the British and Russian brigades into a suitable area of ​​​​Cairo 3 a few days before our meeting in this city, I find this action inappropriate, since it may cause unnecessary noise and unmasking. I suggest that each of us take with us a solid police guard. In my opinion, this will be enough to ensure safety.

I have no objections to your other proposals regarding the upcoming meeting, and I agree with the conventional names that you propose to use in correspondence regarding this meeting.

Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council

Ministers of the USSR... P. 162.

Note. Churchill proposed calling the meeting of the heads of government of the USSR, USA and Great Britain the code name “Eureka”, and the meeting place, Tehran, “Cairo-3” (see: Ibid. p. 157).

PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE FROM PREMIER I.V. STALIN

TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

I received your message dated October 1 only today, October 5. On my part, there are no objections to the changes you propose to the “Document of Capitulation of Italy.”

Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council

Ministers of the USSR... P. 463.

Note. This refers to the “Document on the Surrender of Italy”, which was received by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR from the embassies of England and the USA on August 26, 1943. Roosevelt's message talks about changing the following part of the mentioned document:

“Whereas the Italian Government and the Italian High Command recognize that the Italian armed forces have suffered a complete defeat and that Italy can no longer continue the war against the United Nations, and have therefore unreservedly requested a suspension of hostilities; and whereas the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, acting on behalf of the United Nations, agree to lay down the terms upon which they are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy, so far as their military action against Germany and her allies will not be hindered and so far as Italy will not to assist in any way these powers and agrees to the demands of these governments; the following conditions are presented by ... ... ... ..., duly authorized, and accepted by ... ... ... ..., representing the High Command of the Italian Land, Sea and Air Armed Forces, duly authorized by the Italian Government:

1. (a) The Italian land, sea and air forces, wherever located, hereby surrender unconditionally” (Ibid. pp. 635–636).

Roosevelt reported that the allied commander in chief in the Mediterranean theater, D. Eisenhower, recommended the following changes to this document:

“Change the title to “Additional terms of the armistice with Italy.”

Amend the last sentence of the preamble to read as follows: “and were accepted unconditionally by the head of the Italian Government, Marshal Pietro Badoglio.”

Omit the mention of unconditional surrender in paragraph 1" (Ibid. P. 461).

Roosevelt's message also stated: "Eisenhower urgently requests that, pending a decision on these proposals, secrecy be maintained regarding the terms contained in the instrument of surrender, which are 'absolutely essential to our success in Italy.'" (Ibid.).

Personal message from President Nixon. Before that...

VGK RATE DIRECTIVE No. 46051

TO THE COMMANDER OF A SEPARATE ARMY

ABOUT THE ARMY RELOCATION

Copies: Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs 1, Head of the Organizational Directorate of the General Staff

1. Redeploy the Separate Army of Major General Tarasov to a new
district. Relocation should be carried out by railway in the following order:

a) field control of the army with reinforcement units, rear units and training units -
regulations - loading [in the area] st. Sverdlovsk, Iset, Rezh, Kunara from 12.00
02/06/1943 Tempo - 3;

b) Stalingrad division - loading at the station. Chelyabinsk from 12.00 02/06/1943
Tempo - 3;

c) Siberian division - loading at the station. Krasnoufimsk from 18.00 02/08/1943
Tempo - 3;

d) Far Eastern Division - loading at the station. Vereshchagin from 18.00
02/09/1943 Tempo - 3;

d) Ural division - loading at the station. Revda from 18.00 02/09/1943 Tempo - 2;

f) Transbaikal division - loading at the station. Shchadrinsk from 18.00 02/09/1943
Tempo - 3;

g) Central Asian division - loading [in the area] st. Chrysostom, Satka,
Tundush from 18.00 02/11/1943 Tempo - 3.

Send the command and formation of the army completely, with the available personal--
personnel, weapons, transport and property.

The transportation plan should only be known to the commanders of the formations who
convey [it] only personally and to each individual.

All equipment moving on open platforms must be carefully camouflaged...
to sleep

Explain to all personnel and strictly prohibit anyone from telling where the part comes from.

5. Provide those sent with: ammunition - 1 ammunition, fuel -
2 gas stations, food forage - 10 days on the route and, in addition, 10-
daily unloading stock.

Have food supplies, ammunition and fuel in each echelon, ensuring their independence. Under no circumstances should the entire unit be transported in one echelon.

6. Report to the General Staff on the progress of sending each army formation daily...
but by 18.00.

ZHUKOV

TsAMO. F. 48a. Op. 3409. D. 8. L. 51-53. Script.

1 A. N. Apollonov. 68

Supreme Command Headquarters DIRECTIVE No. 46052 TO THE DEPUTY

PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS 1,

TO THE HEAD OF THE MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE FORMATION

AND STAFFING OF THE TROOPS ON INCLUSION INTO THE COMPOSITION

RED ARMY TROOPS OF THE 70TH ARMY

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. Formed by the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR
Separate Army 2 consisting of six rifle divisions with separate units
strengthening and support to be called the 70th Army and from February 1 to be included in the
becoming troops of the Red Army.

2. Assign the following names to the formations of the 70th Army:
102nd Far Eastern Rifle Division,

106th Transbaikal Rifle Division, 140th Siberian Rifle Division, 162nd Central Asian Rifle Division, 175th Ural Rifle Division, 181st Stalingrad Rifle Division.

3. The numbering and staffing of units of the 70th Army shall be established by order...
tion of the head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army.

On behalf of the Headquarters of the Supreme High CommandG. ZHUKOV

TsAMO. F. 96a. Op. 1711. D. 7a. L. 247. Original.

VGK RATE DIRECTIVE No. 46054

COMMANDER OF THE 24TH ARMY, TROOPS

MOSCOW MILITARY DISTRICT AND BRYANSK FRONT

ABOUT THE REMOVAL OF THE ARMY DIRECTORATE INTO RESERVE

SUPREME HIGH COMMAND

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

The Directorate of the 24th Army should be included in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme Glavnoko--
mandate and deploy to Voronezh.

Army command echelons unloaded at the station. If you please, direct
in Voronezh on its own. The echelons on the way should be directed to...
Ruzki at the station Voronezh.

Upon arrival in Voronezh, submit to the command of the military commander--
Kami of the Moscow Military District for the unification of rifle divisions of the reserve -
va rates sent to this area.

The commander of the Moscow Military District troops to organize a meeting and placement of command--
of the 24th Army and enroll him in all types of allowances.

Deliver the execution.

Deputy Supreme Commander-in-ChiefZHUKOV

TsAMO. F. 48a. Op. 3409. D. 8. L. 57. Original.

1 A. N. Apollonov.

2 See Document No. 86.

VGK RATE DIRECTIVE No. 46056

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS OF THE DON FRONT

ABOUT THE FORMATION OF THE CENTRAL FRONT

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

The field department of the Don Front will be renamed to the field department--
tion of the Central Front. The front headquarters will be deployed in the Olydanets area
(10 km east of Yelets).

Assign:

commander of the Central Front - Colonel General Rokossovsky K.K.;

member of the Military Council of the front - Major General K. F. Telegin; Chief of Staff of the Front - Lieutenant General Malinin M.S.

The Central Front will include: field departments 21, 65 and
70th Army; 16th Air Army; 2nd Tank Army; 2nd Guards cavalry-
sky building; 37, 51, 52 and 67th Guards. division page; 23, 69, 112, 149, 193, 194,
246, 325, 354 and 375th divisions; six divisions 70 A; 10th zenartdivi-
zyu; 502, 1180 and 1188 iptap; 114, 136 and 143rd Mining Regiments of the RGK; 56th and 92nd Guards.
min regiments; 12th zen. artillery division; 4th artillery division of the RGK; six linear tan--
kov regiments.

The Chief of the General Staff shall ensure the concentration of units and co-
units included in the Central Front by February 12, 1943; 112,
37 Guards, 51 Guards, 52 Guards, 67 Guards, 193, 23 Infantry Division and 4th Art. divisions - by 02/17/1943;
six SD 70 A - by 02/23/1943

The operational purpose of the front will be determined by a separate director--
tivoy.

Leave your deputy lieutenant general in the Stalingrad area
Trubnikova K.P. with a group of commanders, who will be entrusted with tasks in ru--
leadership of combat training, putting the remaining troops in order and from--
responsibility for their timely dispatch to new locations according to directives
Headquarters and General Staff. Practical instructions for Trubnikov’s work
are given separately.

Receipt is confirmed. Deliver the execution.

I. STALING. ZHUKOV

TsAMO. F. 48a. Op. 3763. D. 142. L. 31, 32. Original.

VGK RATE DIRECTIVE No. 30039

TO THE COMMANDER OF A SPECIAL GROUP OF TROOPS FOR DEFEATLENINGRAD-VOLKHOV ENEMY GROUP

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders: 1. By the end of 02/16/1943, complete the concentration of a group of troops consisting of 1 TA, 68 A, reserve group in the Marevo, Usadba, Slautino area and by the end of 02/18/1943, deploy the group for entry into breakthrough in the area of ​​Ryto, Nikuli-no-2, Kursko, Bolshoy Ostrov. From the morning of February 19, 1943, be in full readiness to enter the group into the breakthrough in the Khodyki, Sluchino sector.

2. The main task of the group is to cut off the communications of the Leningrad-Volkhov-
enemy grouping with access to the Luga, Strugi Krasnye, Por-
Khov, Don and prevent enemy units from approaching to the aid of his Demyansk and
Leningrad-Volkhov groupings.

A group of troops consisting of two infantry divisions, two infantry brigades 1, two tank tanks, two ap RGK, one engineering brigade to capture and hold the city of Pskov.

The 27th Army, after destroying the enemy in the Staraya Russa area, moved...
Dits subordinate to the commander of the Special Group of Forces for a strike on Luga jointly--
closely with the 68th Army so that part of the forces of the 27th Army
used to capture Novgorod together with the 52nd Army of the Volkhov Front.

After the capture of [the area] Luga, Strugi Krasnye by part of the forces of the capture group--
to take the area of ​​Kingisepp, Narva, cutting off the enemy’s escape routes to Estonia.

The main forces, in cooperation with the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts, encircle and destroy the Volkhov and Leningrad enemy groups.

5. Confirm receipt and convey decision by 02/16/1943.

Headquarters of the Supreme High CommandI. STALING. ZHUKOV

TsAMO. F. 148a. Op. 3763. D. 103. L. 253, 254. Original.

VGK RATE DIRECTIVE No. 30040

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS OF THE WESTERN FRONT

ABOUT THE TRANSFER OF THE 61ST ARMY TO THE BRYANSK FRONT

AND THE TASK OF INTERACTION BETWEEN FRONTS

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

On the morning of February 8, 1943, the 61st Army was transferred to the troops of the Bryansk Front--
ta. Since the transfer of the 61st Army, the demarcation line between Bryansk
and the Western fronts establish: Kozelsk, Khvostovichi, Zhurinich (all
for the Western Front).

In order to interact with the Bryansk Front in capturing the Bryansk region -
ska by 02/12/1943 to prepare the offensive of the 16th Army, reinforced by 9 tank tanks, in the region
in the general direction through Zhizdra to Bryansk. The time to go on the offensive will be
specially indicated.

By 02/25/1943, prepare an offensive by the 50th and 10th armies, reinforced
two tank corps in the general direction of Roslavl, and part of the forces -
to Yelnya.

Part of the eleven divisions entering the front from reserve
Rates should be used to strengthen the 50th and 10th armies.

Report your decision personally to Headquarters on February 8, 1943.

Headquarters of the Supreme High CommandI. STALING. ZHUKOV

TsAMO. F. 148a. Op. 3763. D. 103. L. 255, 256. Original.

1 Ski crews.

Supreme Command Headquarters DIRECTIVE No. 30041 TO THE COMMANDER

TROOPS OF THE BRYANSK FRONT ABOUT THE ORDER OF DEFEAT

ORYOL-BRYANSK ENEMY GROUP

In order to quickly encircle and defeat the Oryol-Bryansk enemy group, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. With the entry of the 48th and 13th armies to the Droskovo, Maloarkhangelsk line,
The fate of the 48th Army is to attack Orel, covering it from the southwest. Towards
this blow to prepare the offensive of the 61st Army from the Belev area with a general
board through the Volkhov to Orel.

On the morning of February 8, 1943, the 61st Army came under your subordination. With the arrival of the 48th Army in the Zmievka area, the 3rd Army goes on the offensive, striking in the general direction of Orel.

2. Simultaneously with the offensive of the 48th, 3rd and 61st armies towards Orel of the 13th Army
continue the offensive on Karachev, Bryansk with the task of creating a second ring
encircling the enemy and capturing the city. Bryansk, Karachev.

Keep in mind that to meet the attack of the 13th Army, the 16th Army of the Western Front will advance from the Bryn, Zavod area in the general direction through Zhizdra.

3. Encirclement and defeat of the enemy’s Oryol group by forces of 43, 3 and
The 61st Army was completed by February 15-17, 1943.

The 13th Army, in cooperation with the 16th Army of the Western Front, captured Bryansk by February 23-25, 1943.

Keep in mind that to the left, approximately from the line Fatezh, Lgov, they will turn
troops of Colonel General Rokossovsky and will advance in the general direction--
Research Institute on Sevsk, Art. Unecha.

The demarcation line with the Western Front was established on the morning of 02/8/1943--
Kozelsk, Khvostovichi, Zhurinich are pouring in (all for the Western Front). Once--
the border line with Rokossovsky's troops will be indicated additionally.

Report your decision in Baudot code by 24:00 on 02/06/1943.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command

I. STALIN

G. ZHUKOV

TsAMO. F. 148a. Op. 3763. D. 103. L. 257-259. Script.

DIRECTIVE of the Supreme High Command Headquarters No. 30042 TO THE COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS OF THE NORTH-WESTERN FRONT ON THE ORDER OF DEFEATING THE ENEMY'S DEMYANSK GROUP

Copy to: Commander of the Special Group of Forces

In order to defeat the enemy Demyan group, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

1st Shock Army consisting of eight infantry divisions, one tank brigade, four tank tanks, one
artillery division, seven ap RGK, five min. regiments, 1st Guards mortar division
02/19/1943 to break through enemy defenses in the Shotovo, Ovchinnikovo sector
and, advancing in the northern and northeastern directions, reach the Onuf-
Rievo, Sokolovo.

27th Army consisting of seven infantry divisions, five infantry brigades, four tank tanks, three infantry brigades,
two tank brigades, one artillery division, two ap RGK, two mines. regiments, one guards min.
brigade 02/19/1943 to break through enemy defenses in the Penno, Borisovo sector
and, advancing in the southern and southwestern directions, reach the Onufrievo area,

Sokolov, where to close the encirclement of the enemy Demyansk group.

After closing the encirclement ring of the 1st Shock Army with its subordinates
with two infantry divisions of the 27th Army to advance in an eastern direction with the task of destroying
live the enemy located in the Ramushevsky corridor.

27th Army, after breaking through the enemy’s defenses, advancing with part of its forces in
southern and southeastern directions, turn the main forces to the west in the direction of
the course of Staraya Russa with the task of encircling and destroying the Staraya Russa grouping--
enemy's ki. 27th Army after destroying the enemy in the Staraya area
Russy becomes subordinate to the commander of the Special Group of Forces, General
Colonel Khozin.

After destroying the enemy in the Ramushevsky corridor, the commander
front, quickly regrouping the forces and means of the front, destroy the surrounding...
married Demyansk group.

After the 1st Shock Army breaks through the enemy defenses, ensure pro-
launch of Khozin's group in the direction of [st.] Bottom.

Material support for Khozin’s group of troops is entrusted to the North-
Western Front.

Confirm receipt, decision to convey 02/10/1943

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command

I. STALIN

G. ZHUKOV

TsAMO. F. 148a. Op. 3763. D. 103. L. 260-262. Script.

DIRECTIVE RATES VGK No. 30043 TO THE COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS OF THE CENTRAL FRONT

FOR AN OFFENSIVE WITH THE GOAL OF GETTING TO THE REAR OF THE ENEMY'S RZHEVSK-VYAZEMSKO-BRYANSK GROUP

February 6, 1943 01 h 40 min

In order to further develop the success of the Bryansk and Voronezh fronts and reach the rear of the Rzhev-Vyazma-Bryansk enemy group, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. By February 12, 1943, concentrate:

a) 2nd Tank Army - in the Dolgoye area;

b) 2nd Cavalry Corps with three ski brigades, two tank tanks - in the Chere-
misinovo;

c) 65th Army - in the area north of Dolgoye, south of Livn.

From the concentration areas, by the end of 02/14/1943, 2 TA, 65 A, 2 kk were brought to the deployment line Fatezh, Kursk. The remaining units of the 21st and 70th armies, upon arrival, should be concentrated in the area of ​​Volovo, Dolgorukovo, Livny and sent after the advancing troops of the first echelon of the front.

2. On the morning of 02/15/1943, 2 TA, 65 A, 16 VD went on the offensive in general
direction to Sevsk, st. Unecha with the immediate task of cutting the iron
road Bryansk - Gomel.

Deploy Kryukov’s cavalry rifle group on the left wing and send it through Novgorod-Seversky, Star[y] Bykhov, Mogilev, where they cross to the western bank of the Dnieper and, having secured crossings for themselves, reach the Orsha region.

Keep in mind that to your right the 13th Army of the Bryansk Front will attack Bryansk and the 16th Army of the Western Front will go on the offensive through Zhizdra to Bryansk.

3. When the front armies reached the Bryansk line, Gomel delivered the main blow...
ty through Klimovichi, Khislovichi to Smolensk with the task of capturing the Smo--
Lensk and cutting off the escape routes of the enemy’s Vyazma-Rzhev group.

With the arrival of the main forces in the area of ​​the station. Unecha to capture Gomel with the forces of two divisions and the western bank of the Dnieper in the Rechitsa, Zhlobin sector.

Simultaneously with the transition to the offensive, your troops from the line Bryansk, Gomel to Smolensk will go on the offensive: the Western Front - to Roslavl and further to Smolensk; Kalinin Front - to Vitebsk, Orsha and part of the forces to Smolensk, towards your main attack.

4. Front demarcation lines will be indicated additionally. Keep in mind that to the left of the front the 60th Army of the Voronezh Front will advance in the general direction of Lgov, Glukhov, Chernigov.

Headquarters of the Supreme High CommandI. STALING. ZHUKOV

TsAMO. F. 148a. Op. 3763. D. 103. L. 263-265. Script.

Supreme Command Headquarters DIRECTIVE No. 30044 TO THE COMMANDER

TROOPS OF THE SOUTH-WESTERN FRONT ABOUT THE TASKS OF

PREVENTING THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE DONBASS GROUP

ENEMY FOR THE DNEPR

Instead of the plan for operation 1 you proposed, it would be better to adopt another plan - with limited, but more feasible tasks at the moment.

It should be taken into account that Kharkov has not yet been taken by our troops. With the capture of Kharkov, it will obviously be necessary to expand the plan.

I propose not to split up the 6th Army, not to create the Firsov group, but to preserve the 6th Army in its current form, strengthening it with several rifle divisions, one or two tank formations and a cavalry corps coming to you.

The 6th Army was given the task of firmly occupying Sinelnikovo, and then Zaporozhye, in order to prevent enemy troops from retreating to the western bank of the Dnieper through Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye.

The 6th Army cannot yet be given other tasks, such as advancing to Kremenchug.

As for the tasks of Popov’s group and the 1st Guards. army, then they remain in accordance with your plan.

The general task of the front for the near future is to prevent the enemy from retreating towards Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye and to take all measures to pin the Donetsk enemy group in the Crimea, block the passages through Perekop and Sivash and thus isolate it from the rest of the enemy forces in Ukraine. The operation can begin as soon as possible.

TO THE COMMANDER OF THE TROOPS OF THE VORONEZH FRONT N.F. VATUTIN

August 22, 1943
Copy: to the representative of the Headquarters (G.K. Zhukov. - Ed.)
03:00
The events of recent days have shown that you have not taken into account the experience of the past and continue to repeat old mistakes both in planning and in carrying out operations.

The desire to attack everywhere and to capture as much territory as possible, without consolidating success and firmly securing the flanks of strike forces, is an offensive of an indiscriminate nature. Such an offensive leads to a scattering of forces and means and makes it possible for the enemy to strike at the flank and rear of our far-advanced groups that are not supported on the flanks and beat them piecemeal.

Under such circumstances, the enemy managed to reach the rear of the 1st Tank Army, located in the Alekseevka, Kovyaga area, and then struck the open flank of the 6th Guards formations. armies that reached the line Otrada, Vyazovaya, Panasovka and, finally, the enemy on August 20 struck from the Akhtyrka area to the southeast, against the rear of the 27th Army, 4th and 5th Guards. tank corps.

As a result of these enemy actions, our troops suffered significant, unjustified losses. An advantageous position for defeating the Kharkov enemy group was also lost.

I am once again forced to point out to you the unacceptable mistakes that you repeatedly repeated during operations, and I demand that the task of eliminating the enemy’s Akhtyrka group, as the most important task, be completed in the coming days.

Ministers of the USSR... P. 141, 450–451.
Note. Sobolev A.A. (1903-1964) – Counselor at the USSR Embassy in Great Britain.

A message from Roosevelt and Churchill dated August 19, which spoke about negotiations and terms of an armistice with Italy, was sent by the British Ambassador to the USSR Kerr to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR on August 20 with some omissions. Additions and amendments to the text of the message were sent to the NKID of the USSR on August 22. For the full text of the message, see: Ibid. pp. 136–140, 446–449.

TO THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr W. CHURCHILL

AND TO THE PRESIDENT Mr. F.D. ROOSEVELT

I fully share your opinion and the opinion of Mr. Roosevelt about the importance of the meeting of the three of us. At the same time, I kindly ask you to understand my position at a time when our armies are fighting with exceptional tension against Hitler’s main forces and when Hitler not only does not remove a single division from our front, but, on the contrary, has already managed to transfer and continues to transfer new divisions to the Soviet-German front. At such a moment, in the opinion of all my colleagues, I cannot, without prejudice to our military operations, leave the front for such a distant point as Fairbanks, although if the situation on our front were different, Fairbanks would undoubtedly be a completely suitable place for our meeting, as I thought this before.

As for the meeting of representatives of our states and, perhaps, representatives in charge of foreign affairs, I share your opinion on the advisability of such a meeting in the near future. This meeting, however, should be given not a narrowly exploratory character, but a practical preparatory character, so that after this meeting our governments could make certain decisions and thereby avoid delays in making decisions on urgent issues.

Therefore, I consider it necessary to return to my proposal that the range of issues to be discussed by representatives of the three states should be determined in advance, and proposals should be outlined that should be discussed by them and presented to our governments for a final decision.

2. Yesterday we received from Mr. Kerr additions and amendments to your and Mr. Roosevelt’s message, in which you reported on the instructions sent to General Eisenhower in connection with the terms of surrender worked out for Italy in negotiations with the general. Castellano. My colleagues and I believe that the instructions given by the gene. Eisenhower, entirely follows from the policy of unconditional surrender of Italy and therefore cannot raise any objections.

Nevertheless, I consider the information received so far to be completely insufficient to judge the necessary steps on the part of the Allies during negotiations with Italy. This circumstance confirms the need for the participation of the Soviet representative in decision-making during the negotiations. Therefore, I consider the creation of a military-political commission consisting of representatives of the three countries, about which I wrote to you on August 22, to be completely overdue.

Ministers of the USSR... P. 142, 451–452.
Note. Castellano (Castellano) D. (1893-1977) - brigadier general, was at the headquarters of the ground forces, for special assignments (1942-1943); at the Great General Staff of Italy (1943); commander of the Aosta security division (1944).

Eisenhower D.D. (1890-1969) - general, from 11.1942 - commander in chief, then supreme commander of the allied expeditionary forces in North Africa and the Mediterranean. From 12.1943 – Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in Western Europe.

The message from Roosevelt and Churchill on August 19 emphasized the importance of the meeting of the leaders of the three states. As a possible place for such a meeting, instead of Astrakhan or Arkhangelsk proposed in Stalin’s message to Roosevelt on August 8 (see: Nast. vol. S. ...) Fairbanks in Alaska was named (see: Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR ... P. 140–141, 449 –450).

Stalin had previously expressed his point of view regarding the negotiations of the allies with Italy and the need to create a military-political commission of representatives of the three states in a message to Roosevelt and Churchill on August 22 (see: Present vol. S. ...).

Marshal of the Soviet Union

I. STALIN

PERSONAL AND SECRET MESSAGE FROM PREMIER I.V. STALIN

TO PRESIDENT FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

AND TO THE PRIME MINISTER WINSTON CHURCHILL

September 7, 1943
I received your message dated September 4th. The question you raised in this message about whether the Soviet Government agrees to the signing on its behalf by General Eisenhower of brief armistice conditions for Italy should be considered the exhaustive letter of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov addressed to the British Ambassador Mr. Kerr dated September 2 With. d. This letter stated that the authority given by the Soviet Government to General Eisenhower also applied to his signing of the brief terms of the armistice.

Ministers of the USSR... P. 148–149, 455–456.
Note. Reply to the message from Roosevelt and Churchill of September 3 (see: Ibid. pp. 144–145, 453–454); the date September 4th probably corresponds to the day this message was received.

The "short terms" of Italy's surrender, called here, initially consisted of 11 articles, dealing mainly with military issues. On September 1, 1943, the British Ambassador to the USSR Kerr informed the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov about the addition of Article 12 to the “short conditions”, which read: “Other conditions of a political, economic and financial nature, to which Italy will be obliged to agree, will be transferred later” (Ibid. p. 366). In contrast to the “short”, “exhaustive”, otherwise “lengthy”, conditions for the surrender of Italy consisted of 44 articles containing not only military obligations, but also political, economic and financial requirements associated with the surrender (see: Ibid.).