Functions of the special department during the war. The life of a special sergeant is hard and unprepossessing

Chapter 8. DEPARTMENTS OF "SMERSH" (January 1944 - September 1945) The last hopes of the fascist intelligence services. - Assignment to Kvast. - What did the German prisoners of war talk about? - Confession of Eckert Brist. - Organ capture groups "Smersh". - Payback. - The bandits confess. -

There is a lot in the history of the Great Patriotic War that we, modern people, simply cannot understand. We not only live in a different time, we live in a different dimension. We are accustomed to the fact that we are obliged to confirm the fact of our existence in this world with a whole mountain of all kinds of documents and certificates; every day we prove that we are us. Bureaucrats of all kinds of offices and housing offices demand a photocopy of your passport for any reason. Few people know that in the first and most difficult year of the war in the Red Army, at the front, ordinary and junior commanders generally did not have any documents confirming the identity of the serviceman; this seems incredible. And so, in order... The Red Army Book, as the main document, was introduced by NKO order No. 171 of 04/20/1940, but clause 7 of this order was canceled in the active army. With the outbreak of the war on June 22, 1941, a situation arose when millions of Red Army soldiers and junior commanders at the front did not have documents. The first months of the war are an endless series of retreats, encirclements and exits from the “ring”. Huge masses of people moved across the front line, and the majority did not have documents... If you imagine all this, then the attention of special departments to the “encirclement” no longer seems excessive and paranoid. The stereotype of the “special officer” was formed under the influence of perestroika and post-perestroika films and publications. The image that emerged was as follows: a stupid fanatic, a maniac, seeking to imprison anyone he could get his hands on, a Red Army soldier or commander at the slightest suspicion. In fact, an unbearable burden fell on the special departments: in the conditions of confusion and chaos that reigned, to identify enemy agents, despite the fact that it was impossible to reliably establish the identity of the serviceman. On the contrary, the task of infiltrating agents was easier than an orange; you didn’t even have to bother making fakes. And the Abwehr used this to the fullest. The rear of the Red Army was flooded with saboteurs and spies. It is enough to read the memoirs of war participants and you will find lines about the “rocket men” who aimed German bombers at trains and warehouses with missiles, about pseudo-regulators who stood on the roads, etc. And the phrase familiar to everyone from movies: “Show your documents, comrade soldiers!” - a myth, there was nothing to present. It turned out that either his commander or his colleagues could actually verify the identity of a Red Army soldier, and the groups leaving the encirclement consisted of military personnel from different units. In order to restore order in the rear, barrage detachments were created.

Here is an excerpt from the instructions for special departments of the NKVD of the North-Western Front to combat deserters, cowards and alarmists

... § 4 Special departments of a division, corps, army in the fight against deserters, cowards and alarmists carry out the following activities: a) organize a barricade service by setting up ambushes, posts and patrols on military roads, refugee roads and other traffic routes in order to exclude the possibility of any infiltration of military personnel who left their combat positions without permission;

b) carefully check every detained commander and Red Army soldier in order to identify deserters, cowards and alarmists who fled from the battlefield;

c) all identified deserters are immediately arrested and investigated for trial by a military tribunal. The investigation must be completed within 12 hours;

d) all military personnel lagging behind the unit are organized into platoons (teams) and, under the command of proven commanders, accompanied by a representative of a special department, sent to the headquarters of the corresponding division;

e) in particularly exceptional cases, when the situation requires taking decisive measures to immediately restore order at the front, the head of the special department is given the right to shoot deserters on the spot. The head of a special department reports each such case to a special department of the army and front;

f) carry out the sentence of a military tribunal on the spot, and, if necessary, in front of the line;

g) maintain a quantitative record of all those detained and sent to the unit and a personal record of all those arrested and convicted;

h) daily report to the special department of the army and the special department of the front about the number of detainees, arrested, convicted, as well as the number of commanders, Red Army soldiers and equipment transferred to the unit.

The functions of the barrier detachment were not to sit in the trenches with machine guns and shoot at their retreating units; this is another “perestroika” myth.

Their tasks were completely different, excerpt from the directive

on strengthening the work of barrage detachments to identify and expose enemy agents being transferred across the front line. One of the serious means of identifying German intelligence agents sent to us are organized barrage detachments, which must carefully check all, without exception, military personnel who unorganizedly make their way from the front to the front line, and also military personnel, in groups or alone, ending up in other units. However, the available materials indicate that the work of the barrage detachments is not yet sufficiently organized; the check of detained persons is carried out superficially, often not by the operational staff, but by military personnel. In order to identify and mercilessly destroy enemy agents in Red Army units, I propose:

1. Strengthen the work of barrage detachments, for which purpose assign experienced operational workers to the detachments. Establish, as a rule, that interviews with all detainees without exception should be carried out only by detectives.

2. All persons returning from German captivity, both detained by barrage detachments and identified through intelligence and other means, should be arrested and thoroughly interrogated about the circumstances of captivity and escape or release from captivity. If the investigation does not obtain information about their involvement in German intelligence agencies, such persons will be released from custody and sent to the front in other units, with constant surveillance established over them both by the special department and by the unit commissar.

Particular attention was paid to commanders if they lost their documents while leaving the encirclement. There were enough cases when Red Army commanders wore the uniform of privates and destroyed their documents for fear of being captured. Let’s remember “The Living and the Dead” by K. Simonov, there was such a Colonel Baranov, emerging from encirclement in a Red Army uniform and without documents... Another, not at all literary character, General A.A. Vlasov performed the trick of changing clothes twice, in 1941 near Kiev and in the summer of 1942 near Novgorod.

Regarding this, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army issued an order No. 270 dated August 16, 1941, marked “Without publication,” but to be read “in all companies, squadrons, squadrons, commands and headquarters,” quotes from the order:

“...1. Commanders and political workers who, during battle, tear off their insignia and desert to the rear or surrender to the enemy, are considered malicious deserters...

2. Those units and subunits who are surrounded by the enemy, selflessly fight to the last possible opportunity, take care of their material as the apple of their eye, fight their way to their own behind the rear of the enemy troops, defeating the fascist dogs. Oblige every serviceman, regardless of his official position, demand from a superior commander, if part of him is surrounded, to fight to the last opportunity in order to break through to his own, and if such a commander or part of the Red Army soldiers, instead of organizing resistance to the enemy, prefer to surrender to him, destroy them all means, both ground and air..."

The order, as we see, is unique. If you call a spade a spade, the order abolished the principle of unity of command in the army, this says a lot. Only on October 7, 1941 the order was issued

Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 330 October 7, 1941 Moscow “On the introduction of the Red Army book in wartime in the rear and at the front”

The Red Army book, introduced by NKO order No. 171 in 1940, was abolished for the active army by paragraph 7 of the same order. Because of this, Red Army soldiers and junior commanders found themselves at the front without documents proving their identity. The enemy took advantage of this disorder and sent his people dressed in our uniforms to some parts of the Red Army. In one of the divisions of the North-Western Front, a group of 7 such people sent by the enemy for espionage and sabotage purposes was discovered and shot. There can be no doubt that in the complete absence of identification documents for military personnel, such facts exist in other parts of the Red Army. Further, there can be no doubt that many people hanging out in the rear of divisions and armies, dressed in Red Army uniforms, are enemy agents passing on information about our units, the fight against which is impossible due to the lack of documents among the Red Army soldiers so that they can distinguish their own people from enemy agents. And, finally, the lack of documents on hand for reinforcements sent to the front and sick and wounded soldiers and junior commanders leaving the front for evacuation made it impossible for supply authorities to check their provision of uniforms, weapons, equipment and other types of allowances.

In order to correct the mistake, free the units from hostile elements and streamline the accounting of Red Army personnel

I ORDER: 1. Immediately introduce in all units and institutions of the Red Army, both in the rear and at the front, a Red Army book with a photograph according to the announced model. Order of NKO No. 171 dated April 20, 1940 is cancelled.

2. The Red Army book should be considered the only document identifying the Red Army soldier and junior commander. In the Red Army book, record the serviceman's military service and his receipt of allowances (weapons, equipment and uniforms) from the military department.

3. Red Army books are issued to Red Army soldiers and junior commanders from the moment they are enrolled in the unit. The books should be kept by commanders or deputy commanders of companies, squadrons, batteries and teams. When checking the recorded information, the chiefs of staff of military units must attach the official seal of the unit to the books.

4. Red Army books should be issued strictly according to lists, against the personal receipts of Red Army soldiers and junior commanders.

5. Check the availability of Red Army books among Red Army soldiers and junior commanders: in units located in the rear - daily during morning inspections, in combat units - at the first opportunity at the discretion of company commanders, but at least once every three days.

6. Every Red Army soldier and junior commander should have a Red Army book with him at all times.

7. Red Army books are issued for the entire period of service of a Red Army soldier and junior commander in the Red Army. When transferring from one unit to another or to another unit, Red Army soldiers and junior commanders keep the Red Army books with them, presenting them at the new duty station. Red Army soldiers and junior commanders who do not have Red Army records are to be detained as suspicious and sent to the military commandant's office to determine their identity.

8. Commanders of companies, squadrons, batteries and teams must note in the book any change in the service of Red Army soldiers and junior commanders, the issuance and surrender of military equipment received by them, only in the presence of the Red Army soldier and the junior commander to whom the book belongs.

9. Upon dismissal from the Red Army, hand in Red Army books through the unit commanders to the unit headquarters for destruction. Instead of Red Army books, those being discharged will be given military ID cards.

10. Put into effect the announced “Instructions on the procedure for filling out and maintaining the Red Army book.”

11. Regardless of the Red Army books, maintain in companies, squadrons, batteries and commands established personal lists for recording personnel and summary reinforcement lists for recording military property issued to Red Army soldiers and junior commanders for individual use.

12. The Chief Quartermaster of the Red Army, within 15 days, must produce and provide the active army and internal districts with Red Army books of the type approved by me, and also give instructions to the troops on the procedure for producing photographic cards.

13. Inspectors of military branches and services, as well as all direct superiors, when visiting subordinate units, check that Red Army soldiers and junior commanders have Red Army books and that they are maintained correctly.

People's Commissar of Defense I. STALIN

The situation with Red Army books began to change, but first of all they were issued to conscripts; in the active army, all military personnel received books only by June-July 1942. From the beginning of the war to October 1941, special departments and detachments of the NKVD troops detained 657,364 military personnel who lagged behind their units and fled from the front. Among this mass, 1,505 spies and 308 saboteurs were identified and exposed. As of December 1941, special departments arrested 4,647 traitors, 3,325 cowards and alarmists, 13,887 deserters, 4,295 distributors of provocative rumors, 2,358 self-shooters, and 4,214 for banditry and looting. After the liberation of the temporarily occupied territories, about 900 thousand people were conscripted into the Red Army. These people were surrounded in 1941-1942 and, naturally, had no documents. Such military personnel were checked in filtration camps, after which the majority were sent to the active army. This is not to say that all these measures were unnecessary...

Everyone had their own war. The pilot sees the war in his own way. A sapper in his own way.

And for a front-line special officer, war means endless looters, deserters, self-shooters, defectors.

Before the war and in the first years of the war, there were no officer ranks in the army. There were division commanders, platoon commanders, and even a deputy commander - deputy commander for naval affairs. There were officer ranks in the NKVD. But very unique. Sergeants were equivalent to today's lieutenants, and major - to today's major general. Then, after the introduction of officer ranks in the army, the ranks in the NKVD and the army were equalized. Sergeants were promoted to lieutenants. And they gave him the right to detain (Only detain!) if there were grounds, an army officer two ranks higher than him. That is, the major could detain the colonel.

The battalion special officer had a plan: each department should have its own informant. Not an easy task at the front! It happened that in a month half of the battalion dropped out. Some go to the hospital, and some go under a rock. So fill it up! There was no time to be very sophisticated and secretive when working with agents. The agent was usually covered up using the simplest method. They called everyone in for questioning one by one. And they hid an agent among everyone. During the day there was a war. It was impossible to tear the soldiers away. Only at night. When the German was sleeping. So they woke us up one by one and interrogated each one for half an hour. Everyone except the agent was asked the same questions for the hundredth time. Can you imagine how the soldiers “loved” the special officer? As soon as I fell asleep (and there was a lot at the front. Even sometimes there were women, alcohol and food - even if you were hungry. Besides sleep. The most valuable thing at the front is sleep) As soon as I fell asleep, they pushed the special officer away and dragged him into the dugout. Where he asks the same stupid questions that the soldier has already answered twenty times. And not just once a month.

The special officer himself felt somewhat better. But not much. He could sometimes sleep during the day, but not for long. During the day, first of all, there is war. And secondly, the headquarters also work during the day. They're getting fed up with visits and calls. And weekly reports on the work done and the situation in the unit entrusted to his care must be written. And then there are monthly summary reports. And do not confuse the data in both. In the higher-level special department, these reports were still (sometimes) read. If at night a soldier can sometimes still catch three hundred to four hundred minutes of sleep, but a special officer cannot. We need to work - plan! It happened that the special officer fell asleep together with the interrogated person at the same table. They slept like that until they woke them up.

The special officer also had a plan to replenish the penal battalions. (Also a lot of paperwork for everyone.) They say that 3% of the personnel. It had to be done. Otherwise they will add it themselves. And there is no need to overdo it. Nobody will appreciate it. (Although our home-grown liberals describe it differently in their opuses. The more you imprison, the higher the rank they will give.) The rank will be raised - the position does not allow it. We need to be promoted to the division. And there are enough of their own there. With higher education! Unless one of them dies. But who has a greater chance of dying: an army officer or a battalion special officer? But the configuration plan can be increased from what has been achieved. To cover the shortcomings of other special officers.

Let me explain:Not all units have an objective opportunity to fulfill the plan for completing the penal battalion. Some suffered heavy losses. Those who survived were nominated for awards. And who will send the heroes to the penal battalion? Those who approved the award lists? And why should we judge them? They have nothing more criminal than drunkenness. A hero for drinking in a penal battalion? Where have you seen this? And who will allow the warhead to be exposed? And so few were left under fire.
New recruits were sent to the unit. Or rather, they haven’t sent it yet. Only the roster was replenished on paper. And the recruits themselves were stuck somewhere in the trains on the tracks. Maybe they won't arrive at all. They will get bombed. And some are listed as fully equipped according to documents. So work here... So the higher-level special department is looking for someone to load with work. Redistributes the load. And everyone is whining. We can’t cope, they say! Objective reasons are given. And why the hell should the special officer show off his high performance? So they will load up the upstart. Whoever is lucky is driven...

In our films, the special officer in this case must look for the white guard’s grandfather from the hero. And on this basis and...

Well, our filmmakers are capable of all sorts of nonsense. Think about it: the archives have been evacuated. They lie undisassembled in the evacuation. Some remained or were destroyed under the Germans. Archivists were mobilized into the army. A request, of course, can be sent, but who will answer it? Well, even someone from some Siberian archive will answer. So what? In civilian life, half of the Russians had grandfathers who fought in the wrong place. And after the civil OGPU, for 20 years, they searched the archives to find enemies. If someone was not repressed or rehabilitated, then it is not your business to cancel it. Since he’s alive and free, that means it’s necessary. Comrades who were more competent than you worked there. And the answer will come no earlier than in a year. A year at the front is an eternity. Either the hero will die, or the special agent will die. Or some will be reorganized and scattered across different fronts. Or to hospitals...

And where do you get the time and energy for this writing? And the authorities will be interested: this special officer apparently doesn’t have enough work. He writes and writes. It's time to inspect. And add more work.

In the newly formed part, there were usually enough clients to fulfill the plan. And if there wasn’t enough, they simply registered, in addition to defectors and deserters, AWOLs and rowdies. For a fight with senior ranks. Letters from the front were rarely processed. Only if the scribblers were really going wild. Or the directive was issued precisely on this occasion. And so they simply crossed out lines of letters from the front. And this was not done by a special department, but by the political department of the unit. Sometimes the entire letter was crossed out. Apart from “alive and well”. If they found fault with the letters, everyone could have been transferred to penal battalions. And who will fight in ordinary units? (Penal units are poorly armed infantry. But in war, other types of troops are needed.) And there are not enough barrier detachments to guard the greatly expanded penal battalions. And then there will be nothing left to scare the military personnel. So at least they were still afraid of the penal battalions. (Someone).

They had to answer for their agents. If an agent was killed, additional interrogation protocols were required. Who did you go with? When was the last time you saw? Etc. And at the same time it was impossible to expose the agent even after death. How can you avoid being exposed when asking such questions? Should you always ask this about every murdered person? They'll definitely put you in a mental hospital. So they messed around. He will compose interrogation reports and say that “that’s how it happened.” There's no one to check anyway. And it was even worse if the agent ran over to the Germans. Then, in addition to all of the above, you had to write your own explanation, how did you come to live like this?

There was also a plan to identify and punish special officers. Another reason not to stick your neck out. You never know who at the top will not like your activity. And you can always find a reason to find fault. Yes, here you go: for careerist reasons, he fabricated a case against the hero. And he let a traitor pass through his ranks. One consolation was that they would not send us further than the front. And they were not transferred to the infantry as privates. Unless it's for something really creepy. There were not enough competent special officers. They simply demoted him in rank and sent him back. Sometimes in a year the rank was reduced twice, and then restored again for military merits.

Army officers did not like the special officers, but they appreciated their work. And not because they were afraid. The front-line officer was no longer afraid of anything. It’s just that at the beginning of the war, when not only there were not enough officers in the units, but also special officers (and both of them had not yet learned to do their job), power in the units was often seized by criminal elements. Yes, this happened later too. Especially if a hundred people from one village were sent to the unit. Or even from one zone. The commanders were written off as battle losses, and they themselves began to loot rather than fight. Or the whole unit deserted with weapons.

And experienced warriors learned to use special forces. An experienced soldier sensed it long before the attack (whether ours or the Germans). When he smells it, he begins to talk: “But at lunchtime the German trenches smelled of fried cutlets. My mouth is already watering! They feed the Germans well! Not like us." And so on until they inform the special officer. According to the instructions, the special officer in this case must arrest the “agitator” and transfer him to a special department of the army for further investigation. Which is what he did. There he was interrogated for two weeks. (The deadline for the inquiry was set this way. There was no point in rushing and shortening the time frame for the inquiry. Other cases would be pinned on the nimble investigator), and then they were returned, but to another unit. (And the offensive had already run out of steam by this time). Again, according to the instructions. So that the military collective does not disintegrate. Where else should I put it? To the rear? Or against the wall? Who will fight? And they weren’t always sent to the penal battalion. There was no configuration plan. And there were some cunning soldiers too. We learned to get out.

After the war, some said this when they met a special officer they knew: “Thank you to the special department. It was only thanks to him that I remained alive!” They were mocking you, you bastards!

During the offensive, the special officer moved forward along with the headquarters. Behind the part. According to the charter. Well, so that your own people don’t get shot. (And the headquarters was guarded by the commandant’s platoon of machine gunners). When retreating too. Contrary to the stupid films of the post-perestroika era, special officers did not leave the unit for the army headquarters to sit out during the battles. Firstly, because they don’t go to higher headquarters without an order. If you leave a unit without an order, the patrols will be intercepted on the way and you yourself may end up in a penal battalion. And secondly, there was no point. Especially in the first years of the war. German aviation and artillery, and especially German intelligence officers and saboteurs, hunted headquarters and staff vehicles even more than tanks and infantry. And even in the conditions of chaos in the front line of the first days of the war, our dear deserters and marauders could have been intercepted along the way. (Companies of machine gunners will not be allowed to cover redeployment to the rear). But these ones will definitely finish you off. It's good if there is no torture or bullying. And later, to avoid chaos in the front line, barrier detachments were set up. And these first shot, and then found out. (If found out). And patrols combed the area. AND SMERSH. And they had their own instructions. They could also lean it against the wall. Or “for insubordination and resistance” we can do without any kind of wall. No person - no problem! If he stays alive, then unsubscribe for him. To prevent something like this from happening, when moving around the rear of your army, you had to pre-order a pass. If the command approves, they will discharge you. Will it approve? You can try and sneak by, but at your own risk. If you get caught, at least you will receive a disciplinary action. If you stay alive. Do you need it?

So it was wiser to stick with our own people. It's safer in a pack. During the war, everyone, including special officers, firmly knew the principle: stay away from the command and closer to the kitchen!

The special officers themselves did not judge anyone. They had no right. They drew up documents for the criminal and handed them over to the army special department. And they could hand it over to the tribunal. Or they might not have conveyed it. The authorities know better.

Special officers rarely shot anyone during the war. Only together with army commanders, when they stopped panic. Or according to the verdict of the tribunals. However, the tribunals had their own executors. Although, in some cases they also brought in outsiders. Including special officers. But not regimental ones. Closer was enough. (It was only in our post-perestroika films that the special officers did nothing but torture and shoot military officers. They had no greater pleasure than torturing a hero. And in the end, shoot him if he did not die from torture.)

Although, at the front they were most often shot without any sentences. Or barrage detachments, or commanders. Alarmists and deserters. And sometimes the soldiers themselves. (“Dad! This is what’s going on here, Dad! We killed one of us here... He turned out to be a bastard.”)

And not special departments and tribunals at all.

However, about the tribunals another time.

Special departments are military counterintelligence units of the KGB, which were part of the Soviet army. Special departments were created on December 19, 1918 by a decree of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), according to which the front and army Chekas were merged with the bodies of Military control, and on their basis a new body was formed - the Special Department of the Cheka under the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR.

Subsequently, with the formation of Special Departments of fronts, military districts, fleets, armies, flotillas and special departments under the provincial Chekas, a unified centralized system of security agencies in the troops was created.

On February 3, 1941, special departments of the NKVD were transferred to the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy. On April 17, 1943, the Special Departments were reorganized into the counterintelligence agencies SMERSH, in the words of Stalin, “Death to Spies,” and returned to the NKVD.

SMERSH - short for "Death to Spies" - Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "SMERSH" of the People's Commissariat of Defense NGOs of the USSR - military counterintelligence.

Transformed from the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD by Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of April 19, 1943. The same Resolution created the SMERSH Counterintelligence Directorate of the NKVMF of the USSR and the SMERSH Counterintelligence Department of the NKVD of the USSR.

On April 19, 1943, on the basis of the Directorate of Special Departments of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" was created and transferred to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR.

Former special officers became subordinate to the People's Commissar of Defense. In this regard, almost all of them were awarded general army ranks, that is, the comrades lost the state security prefix in their personal rank.

However, at the same time, there are enough examples when military counterintelligence officers-Smershevites held personal state security ranks. A little later, on May 15, 1943, in accordance with the above-mentioned resolution of the Council of People's Commissars, the Counterintelligence Department - OKR "Smersh" of the NKVD of the USSR - Chief Commissar of the GB was created by order of the NKVD of the USSR No. S. P. Yukhimovich.

Employees of all three Smersh departments were required to wear uniforms and insignia of the military units and formations they served.

With the first order on the personnel of the GUKR "Smersh", April 29, 1943, order No. 1/ssh, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin solved the problem of the ranks of the officers of the new Main Directorate, which had predominantly KGB special ranks.

The activities of the GUKR SMERSH also included the filtration of soldiers returning from captivity, as well as the preliminary clearing of the front line from German agents and anti-Soviet elements together with the NKVD Troops for protecting the rear of the army and the territorial bodies of the NKVD.

SMERSH took an active part in the search, detention and investigation of Soviet citizens who were active in anti-Soviet armed groups fighting on the side of Germany, such as the Russian Liberation Army.

The main opponent of SMERSH in its counterintelligence activities was the Abwehr, the German intelligence and counterintelligence service in 1919–1944, the field gendarmerie and the Main Directorate of Imperial Security of the RSHA, Finnish military intelligence.

The service of the GUKR SMERSH operational staff was extremely dangerous - on average, an operative served for 3 months, after which he dropped out due to death or injury. During the battles for the liberation of Belarus alone, 236 military counterintelligence officers were killed and 136 went missing.

The activities of GUKR SMERSH are characterized by obvious successes in the fight against foreign intelligence services; in terms of effectiveness, SMERSH was the most effective intelligence service during the Second World War.

From 1943 until the end of the war, the central apparatus of the GUKR SMERSH NPO of the USSR and its front-line departments held 186 radio games alone. During these games, they managed to bring over 400 personnel and Nazi agents to our territory and seize tens of tons of cargo.

At the same time, SMERSH's reputation as a repressive body is often exaggerated in modern literature. Contrary to popular belief, SMERSH authorities could not sentence anyone to imprisonment or execution, since they were not judicial authorities.

The verdicts were handed down by a military tribunal or a Special Meeting under the NKVD of the USSR. Counterintelligence officers had to receive authorization for arrests of mid-level command personnel from the Military Council of the army or front, and for senior and senior command personnel from the People's Commissar of Defense.

At the same time, SMERSH performed the function of the secret police in the troops; each unit had its own special officer who conducted cases on soldiers and officers with problematic biographies and recruited agents. Often, SMERSH agents showed heroism on the battlefield, especially in situations of panic and retreat.

SMERSH operatives preferred individual firearms in search practice, since a lone officer with a machine gun always aroused the curiosity of others. The most popular were pistols and revolvers of various Soviet and foreign systems.

Chief Abakumov, Viktor Semyonovich from April 19, 1943 to May 4, 1946, GB commissar of the 2nd rank, from July 9, 1945 - Colonel General. The head of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence GUKR SMERSH reported directly to J.V. Stalin as People's Commissar of Defense.

The functions of the Special Department of the NKVD: chief, deputy, investigators, commandant, fighters, pre-trial detention cell - included monitoring the political and moral state of the military unit, identifying state criminals: traitors, spies, saboteurs, terrorists, counter-revolutionary organizations and groups of people leading anti-Soviet agitation, and others, conduct investigations into state crimes under the supervision of the prosecutor's office and transfer cases to military tribunals.

The first department is a department in Soviet organizations involved in maintaining the regime of secrecy and political security. There was such a department in every organization that had something to do with scientific and technical information, such as a plant, or a research institute, or that had the ability to print texts.

The first department was part of the KGB structure and was not subordinate to the management of the enterprise. The department controlled access to classified information, travel abroad and publications.

Also, the first department controlled the use of typewriters, photocopiers and other printing devices to prevent the spread of samizdat.

Russia, deceived by the twentieth century, is now trying to find the path that would lead it from the rear to the holiday of the rich and happy. Nobody rushes to her aid. She will have to go her way alone and on her own.

Studying the past is unlikely to help avoid repeating past mistakes. And yet, knowledge of history is useful, at least because it allows you to soberly assess the present.

The history of pre-revolutionary counterintelligence is an interesting but difficult topic to study. Few scientific works have been devoted to it. In any case, little has been published.

But there are a fair number of works of fiction in which counterintelligence officers are the heroes. These works have an important drawback, from a historian’s point of view: the writer’s imagination takes readers away from reality.

Writers who use stories from the past of the Russian special services can be divided into two groups. The first category includes mainly domestic writers who are inclined to praise and exaggerate in every possible way the virtues of mysteriously omnipotent organs.

The second group consists of foreign authors who, on the contrary, try to present Russian intelligence and counterintelligence as expensive and useless organizations, usually unable to withstand British, German and other intelligence services, depending on the nationality of the writer himself.

In both cases, we are dealing with myth-making and, moreover, far from harmless. The meaning of myths born of ill-wishers is clear without comment, but overly patriotic myths should not be welcomed.

Legends about the eternal power of the Russian special services, no matter what they are called in different historical eras, strengthen in the public consciousness the false belief in the historical autonomy and inexhaustibility of their reserve of strength, which supposedly will allow them to maintain strength, regardless of any breakdowns and restructuring of the state system .

Meanwhile, intelligence and counterintelligence is a very complex and therefore fragile instrument, the creation of which took generations of effort and which, as the experience of the last century has shown, can very easily be destroyed by the state itself.

Russian intelligence and counterintelligence in the pre-revolutionary period of its development was not a monster towering over the state apparatus of the empire.

It was just one of the tsarist special services, small in number and not the strongest, with very limited rights and dependent on the favor of other government agencies towards it.

The special services focus on three main problems: the development by the state, military departments and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the optimal option for organizing intelligence and counterintelligence services, the search for the most effective methods of combating espionage, the influence of the nature of interdepartmental relations on the effectiveness of measures to identify and suppress the activities of foreign intelligence services in Russia.

These problems are located, as it were, at three levels: all-Russian, interregional - within Asian Russia, and regional - using the example of Siberia.

Such a gradation makes it possible to combine the study of the main directions of government policy in the field of combating espionage and the actions of local authorities to solve the corresponding set of theoretical and practical problems.

It was not by chance that Siberia was chosen as the base region for the study. The fact is that after Japan strengthened its military positions on the continent, the role of Siberia in the defensive plans of the Russian General Staff increased.

A by-product of the policy of agreements and balancing pursued by the tsarist government until 1912 was the clearly evident interest of the intelligence services of the largest world powers in studying the military-political situation on the Asian outskirts of Russia, including in Siberia.

And finally, far from potential and then actual fronts, Siberia is an ideal object in terms of studying the process of developing a regional mechanism for coordinating the actions of military bodies, security departments of the Police Department, gendarmerie departments and general police in the field of combating espionage.

This process was not accelerated by the mobilizing effect of the proximity of the borders with a potential enemy, similar to that which influenced the behavior of the authorities of the western military districts.

On the other hand, the Siberian authorities were not allowed to relax by the periodically received evidence of the presence of foreign intelligence services in the region.

The unsuccessful war of 1904–1905 and the subsequent revolution forced the autocracy to make changes to foreign and domestic policies and carry out reforms in the army. During the reform process, a military counterintelligence service was created. The revolutionary explosion of 1917 led to the collapse of the Russian intelligence services.

In the historical literature, the topic “Russian intelligence and counterintelligence”, as a subject of special research, is reflected extremely poorly. Those few works, mainly journal articles about Russian counterintelligence, that have been published in recent years, are almost impossible to divide into problematic or original author's approaches.

All of them pursue a single goal: to convey to the reader the maximum amount of information extracted by the author from the archives, and thus at least partially fill this aura of historical consciousness.

The study of the history of intelligence services today is based on the accumulation and analysis of factual material, and not on the synthesis and rethinking of established scientific concepts, which increases the objectivity of the study, although to a certain extent deprives them of theoretical depth.

Under the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR. Subsequently, with the formation of special departments of fronts, military districts, fleets, armies, flotillas and special departments under the provincial Chekas, a unified centralized system of security agencies in the troops was created. In 1934-38. military counterintelligence, as the Special, then the 5th Department, is part of the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) of the NKVD of the USSR. In March 1938, with the abolition of the GUGB, the 2nd Directorate (special departments) of the NKVD of the USSR was created on the basis of the 5th Department. Already in September 1938, the Special Department was recreated as the 4th Department of the GUGB.

Subordinate to special departments (DS) in the Red Army, the Red Army, and the NKVD troops.

Functions

The functions of the chief, deputy and detective officers of the special department of the NKVD included the following:

• monitoring the political and moral state of the unit;
• identification of persons whose activities were classified by Soviet legislation as a state crime - treason, espionage, sabotage, terrorism;
• identification of counter-revolutionary organizations and groups of individuals conducting anti-Soviet agitation;
• conducting investigations into state crimes under the supervision of the prosecutor's office with the transfer of cases to military tribunals.

From the beginning of the war to October 1941, special departments and detachments of the NKVD troops detained 657,364 military personnel who lagged behind their units and fled from the front. Among this mass, 1,505 people were identified and prosecuted on charges of espionage and 308 people on charges of sabotage. As of December 1941, special departments arrested:

• 4,647 people on charges of treason;
• 3,325 people on charges of cowardice and alarmism;
• 13,887 on charges of desertion;
• 4,295 people on charges of spreading provocative rumors;
• 2,358 people on charges of manufacturing and storing self-fired weapons;
• 4,214 people on charges of banditry and looting.

Ranks, uniforms and insignia

The Regulations on Special Bodies of the GUGB NKVD of the USSR, announced on May 23, 1936 by joint order of the NKO/NKVD of the USSR No. 91/183, and which established, among other things, insignia and uniforms for military counterintelligence officers, stipulated that in the case of joint permission of the chiefs OO GUGB NKVD USSR and the Directorate of Command Staff of the Red Army, employees of special agencies who had a military or special military-technical education or army command experience were granted the right to wear uniforms and insignia of the command or military-technical personnel of the units they serve.

At the same time, the personnel of the central apparatus of the GUGB NKVD of the USSR and the apparatus of special departments of the UGB of territorial internal affairs bodies, as well as persons working outside the Red Army and the Navy and their subordinate institutions, are given the uniform of the NKVD state security command staff. Both before the formation of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, and after July 1934, operational workers of special bodies used uniforms and buttonholes (in the ground forces) or sleeve patches (in the navy) of those military units or institutions to which they were assigned for service.

Insignia

For employees of special departments, insignia were established by category in accordance with their position:

• 13th category (4 diamonds):
  • Head of the Special Department (SO) of the OGPU Center and his deputies.

• 12th category (3 diamonds):
  • assistants to the head of the OGPU Center;
  • heads of the OGPU military district and their deputies;
  • heads of PA regional authorized representations (PP) of the OGPU/GPU.

• 11th category (2 diamonds):
  • heads of department, part of the OGPU Center;
  • Secretary of the OGPU Center;
  • deputies and assistant heads of OO regional PP OGPU/GPU;
  • heads of the OGPU corps, the regional navy, groups of troops and their deputies.

• 10th category (1 diamond):
  • employees for special assignments, detectives of the OGPU Center;
  • heads of the branch of the OO regional PP OGPU/GPU, OO NKVD VO, army, navy, regional navy, group of troops;
  • heads of the OGPU division, separate brigade, flotilla.

• 9th category (3 rectangles):
  • authorized by the OGPU Center;
  • assistant department heads and detective officers of the regional PO OGPU/GPU;
  • detectives of the OO OGPU VO, army, navy, group of troops, division, brigade, flotilla.

• 8th category (2 rectangles):
  • assistants to the commissioner, assistant secretary of the OGPU Center;
  • authorized representatives, secretaries of PA regional PP OGPU/GPU;
  • authorized by the OO OGPU VO, army, navy, group of troops, division, brigade, flotilla and regiment.

• 7th category (1 rectangle):
  • assistants to the authorized public organization of regional PP OGPU/GPU;
  • assistants to the authorized representative of the OGPU VO, army, navy, group of forces, division, brigade, flotilla.

• 6th category (4 squares):
  • secretaries of the OGPU division, brigade, flotilla.

• 5th category (3 squares):
  • commandants of the OGPU divisions and brigades.

Form

After the introduction of personal ranks for the GUGB in the fall of 1935, the question of uniforms arose among the leaders of the NKVD. The regulatory documents clearly noted that the employees of the special bodies of the GUGB NKVD “were assigned the uniform of the units they served,” and it also contained a somewhat strange condition: “... and with the insignia of the GUGB.” A lively correspondence began between the People's Commissariat and the Authorities. The NKVD's reasoning was quite understandable. Finally, on May 23, 1936, the Regulations on the special bodies of the GUGB NKVD of the USSR were announced, according to which uniforms and uniforms were established for employees of OO corps, fleets, special sections of divisions, brigades, fortified areas, flotillas, as well as individual operatives attached to units and institutions of the Red Army. insignia of the military-political composition of the relevant branches of the military according to the special ranks assigned to them by the state security agencies:

1. 2 diamonds - senior GB major;
2. 1 diamond - major GB;
3. 3 rectangles - captain GB;
4. 2 rectangles - senior lieutenant of the State Security Service;
5. 1 rectangle - GB lieutenant;
6. 3 squares - junior lieutenant and sergeant of the State Security Service.

Thus, the special officers, in the form of the political composition of the branch of the military to which the unit they served belonged, began to have, as it were, two ranks - the actual assigned special GB rank and the rank by which they were known in the unit (for example, GB major - brigade commissar). The personnel of the central apparatus of the GUGB NKVD of the USSR and the apparatus of special departments of the UGB of territorial internal affairs bodies, as well as persons working outside the Red Army and the Navy and their subordinate institutions, were assigned uniforms of state security command personnel. This situation remained until 1941, when military counterintelligence for a short time came under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense (On the basis of the GUGB NKVD, the 3rd NPO Directorate was formed). In May-July 1941, employees of the PA (now 3 Directorates/departments) began to be certified in the ranks of political personnel. After the return of military counterintelligence to the NKVD (since August 1941 - the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR), special officers again began to be recertified for special GB ranks. However, these re-certifications had no effect on the uniform.

Until February 1941, military counterintelligence officers directly in their units wore the uniform of the service branch with insignia of political personnel (the presence of sleeve stars of political personnel and the absence of sleeve insignia of state security) and were called either special ranks of state security or ranks of political personnel. Personnel 4th department Main Directorate of State Security of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR (at the moment, the military counterintelligence directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine has also been renamed the 4th directorate of the Counterintelligence Department)(from September 29, 1938 to February 26, 1941, he performed the functions of military counterintelligence) wore uniforms and state security insignia and had the rank of “GB sergeant - GB Commissioner General” - special state security ranks. In the period from February 1941 to July-August 1941, military counterintelligence officers also wore the uniform of the service branch of the armed forces with insignia of political personnel and had only political personnel ranks. Employees of the central apparatus (3rd NPO Directorate) during the same period wore GB uniforms and GB special ranks (Head of the 3rd NPO Directorate, GB Major A. N. Mikheev, deputy chief - GB Major N. A. Osetrov, and so on) . Since July 17, 1941, with the formation of the Directorate of Special Departments of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, counterintelligence officers in the troops switched to the special ranks of the GB (but also, probably, used the ranks of political personnel). The uniform remained the same - political personnel.

On April 19, 1943, on the basis of the Directorate of Special Departments of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" was created and transferred to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR. Former special officers became subordinate to the People's Commissar of Defense. In this regard, almost all of them were awarded general army ranks, that is, without the prefix “state security” in their personal rank. On May 3, 1946, the GUKR "SMERSH" NGOs of the USSR were reorganized again into the MGB OO.

See also

• Third Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR

Notes

Links

Literature

• Degtyarev K. SMERSH. - M.: Yauza Eksmo, 2009. - 736 p. - (Encyclopedia of Special Services). - 4000 copies. - ISBN 978-5-699-36775-7

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