Kalinin Front - an operational association of the Soviet armed forces during the Great Patriotic War, operated in 1941-1943, created on October 19, 1941 from the right wing of the Western Front. Initially, the Kalinin Front included the 22nd, 29th, 30th, 31st armies. Colonel General I.S. took command of the front. Konev, a member of the military council during the entire period of the front’s existence was corps commissar D.S. Leonov (since December 1942, lieutenant general). The first chief of staff of the Kalinin Front was Major General I.I. Ivanov, who was replaced in November 1941 by Major General E.P. Zhuravlev.
During the Battle of Moscow, the Kalinin Front fought against the forces of the German Army Group Center, covering the northwestern approaches to the capital of the USSR. The front troops failed to hold Kalinin, but they stopped the further advance of the enemy, in particular, they defeated the enemy group that broke through from Kalinin in the direction of Torzhok. In November-December 1941, the headquarters of the Kalinin Front was headed by Colonel A.A. Katsnelson, in January 1942 he was replaced by Major General M.V. Zakharov (since May 1942 - Lieutenant General).
During the counteroffensive near Moscow, troops of the Kalinin Front carried out the Kalinin Operation and liberated the city of Kalinin on December 16, 1941. From January 22, 1942, the troops of the right wing of the front participated in the Toropetsko-Kholm operation. After the end of the Battle of Moscow, during 1942, the Kalinin Front participated in the Battle of Rzhev: two offensive operations: the First Rzhev-Sychevsk Operation (July 30 - October 1, 1942) and the Second Rzhev-Sychevsk Operation (November 25 - December 20, 1942). In cooperation with the Western Front, the troops of the Kalinin Front were supposed to defeat the German 9th Army and eliminate the Rzhev salient. Both operations failed. On August 26, 1942, Lieutenant General M.A. took command of the front. Purkaev (from November 18, 1942 - Colonel General).
Simultaneously with the Second Rzhev-Sychevsk Operation, on November 25, 1942, troops of the Kalinin Front began the Velikolukskaya Operation, by December 10 they reached Novosokolniki and cut the railway connecting the German Army Groups “North” and “Center” in two sections. On January 17, 1943, Soviet troops liberated the city of Velikiye Luki. In the spring of 1943, the Battle of Rzhev ended: during the Rzhev-Vyazma operation, troops of the Kalinin Front, together with troops of the Western Front, liquidated the Rzhev ledge, advanced 130-160 km, and liberated the city of Bely on March 10, 1943. In April 1943, there was a change of command of the Kalinin Front: Colonel General A.I. became the front commander. Eremenko (from August 27, 1943 - army general), and the chief of staff was Lieutenant General V.V. Kurasov.
In the autumn of 1943, the Kalinin Front took part in the Smolensk offensive operation. On September 14, 1943, front troops went on the offensive against the Dukhovshchinsko-Demidov group of the enemy (Dukhovshchinsko-Demidov operation). During four days of fighting, the German defense was broken through to its full depth. On September 19, 1943, the city of Dukhovshchina was liberated, on September 21 - Demidov, on September 29 - Rudnya. In October 1943, the Kalinin Front carried out the Nevel operation, crushed the German defenses in the Nevel, Novosokolniki, Velikiye Luki areas, and liberated the city of Nevel. On October 20, 1943, the Kalinin Front was renamed the First Baltic Front.
At various times, the front included: 22nd Army (October 19, 1941 - April 21, 1943), 29th Army (October 19, 1941 - August 31, 1942), 30th Army (October 19, 1941 - August 31, 1942), 31st Army (October 21, 1941 - July 23, 1942), 39th Army (December 22, 1941 - July 27, 1942), 3rd Shock Army (January 21, 1942 - October 13, 1943), 4th Shock Army (with January 22, 1942), 41st Army (May 16, 1942 - March 20, 1943), 58th Army (June 25, 1942 - July 20, 1942), 43rd Army (from October 1, 1942), 20th Army (10 August 1942 - September 1, 1942), 3rd Air Army (from May 16, 1942).
Kalinin Front formed on October 19, 1941 on the western direction of the Soviet-German front on the basis of a directive from the Supreme Command Headquarters on October 17, 1941 from the troops of the right flank of the Western Front (22, 29, 30 and 31 armies), covering Moscow from the north west. Subsequently, the Kalinin Front included the 3rd and 4th shock troops, the 20th, 31st, 39th, 41st, 43rd and 58th armies, and the 3rd air army.
From October 10 to December 4, 1941, front troops carried out the Kalinin defensive operation, which was an integral part of the Moscow strategic defensive operation (September 30 to December 5, 1941). During the offensive near Moscow (December 5, 1941 - April 20, 1942), they carried out the Kalinin operation (December 5, 1941 - January 7, 1942) and liberated Kalinin (December 16).
In the Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation (January 8-April 20, 1942), carried out together with the Western Front, the troops of the Kalinin Front went to the rear of the Rzhev-Sychevsky enemy group.
From January 22, 1942, the troops of the right wing of the front participated in the Toropetsko-Kholm operation (January 9-February 6, 1942).
In the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation (July 30-August 23, 1942), the troops of the left wing of the front broke through the previously prepared, deeply echeloned enemy defenses near Rzhev.
During the further offensive, they liquidated the enemy's bridgehead on the left bank of the Volga in the Rzhev region and, together with the troops of the right wing of the Western Front, pinned down large forces of the German Army Group Center, thereby disrupting the transfer of its troops to Stalingrad.
During the Velikiye Luki operation (November 24, 1942 - January 20, 1943), front troops broke through the enemy defenses and liberated Velikiye Luki (January 17).
In the Rzhev-Vyazemsk operation of 1943, front troops, together with troops of the Western Front, advanced 130-160 km and liberated the city of Bely (March 10).
Participating in the Smolensk operation of 1943 (August 7-October 2), troops of the Kalinin Front carried out the Dukhovshchinsko-Demidov operation on September 14-October 2, which resulted in the liberation of Dukhovshchina (September 19), Demidov (September 22), Rudnya (September 29) .
During the Nevel operation (October 6-10, 1943), front troops liberated Nevel (October 6) and in October reached the eastern borders of Belarus.
On October 20, 1943, based on the order of the Supreme Command Headquarters dated October 16, 1943, the Kalinin Front was renamed.
Front commanders: Colonel General I. S. Konev (October 1941 - August 1942); Lieutenant General, from November 1942 - Colonel General M. A. Purkaev (August 1942 - April 1943); Colonel General, from August 1943 - Army General A. I. Eremenko (April-October 1943)
Member of the Military Council of the Front - Corps Commissar, from December 1942 - Lieutenant General Leonov D.S. (October 1941 - October 1943)
Chiefs of the front headquarters: Major General Ivanov I.I. (October-November 1941); Major General Zhuravlev E.P. (November 1941), Colonel Katsnelson A.A. (November-December 1941); Major General, from May 1942 - Lieutenant General M. V. Zakharov (January 1942 - April 1943); Lieutenant General Kurasov V.V. (April-October 1943)
Military maps with the situation - Kalinin Front
A selection of military maps with the situation on the Kalinin Front from the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense. Years of card issue from 1926 to 1943. Scanned pages of the fund 213 in excellent quality, 171 pages in the archive. All archives must be downloaded into one folder and unpacked.
Content
Map of additional defensive structures on the rear defensive line of the 31st Army 1941-11-12
Map of the position of the KalF troops from 10/17 to 10/21/1941. Appendix to file No. 31 KalF 1941-10-21
Map of the situation in KalF from October 21 to 26, 1941. Appendix to file No. 31 KalF 1941-10-26
Map of the position of the KalF troops from October 27 to October 31, 1941. Appendix to file No. 31 KalF 1941-10-31
Map of the position of the KarF troops from October 27 to October 31, 1941. Appendix to file No. 35 KalF 1941-10-31
Map of the position of the KalF troops from November 6 to November 10, 1941. Appendix to file No. 35 KalF 1941-11-10
Map of the position of the KalF troops from November 11 to November 15, 1941. Appendix to file No. 35 KalF 1941-11-15
Map of the situation in KalF from November 16 to November 20, 1941. Appendix to file No. 35 KalF 1941-11-20
Map of the position of the KalF troops from November 21 to November 25, 1941. Appendix to file No. 35 KalF 1941-11-25
Map of the position of the KalF troops from November 26 to November 30, 1941. Appendix to file No. 35 KalF 1941-11-30
Map of the situation on Kalf by the end of December 16 and the front command’s plan for encircling the enemy group. Appendix to case No. 42 KalF 1941-12-16
Map of the position of the KalF troops from 1 to 5.12.1941 KalF 1941-12-05
Map of the position of KalF troops from 6 to 12/10/41 KalF 1941-12-10
Map of the position of the KalF troops from 12/11/1941 - 12/15/1941 ZapF 1941-12-15
Map of the position of KalF troops from 16-20.12.41 KalF 1941-12-20
Map of the position of the KalF troops from 12/21 to 25/12/41 KalF 1941-12-25
Map of the position of the KalF troops from December 26 to 31.12.41 KalF 1941-12-31
Route map 54 cd from the 29th Army to the 31st Army, remaining in the KalFront reserve from active defense to action behind enemy lines 54 cd 1941-12-19
Map of the battle route traveled 54 CD 54 CD, Lieutenant Colonel Saburov, Col. Commissar Potapov, Lieutenant Colonel Bondarenko 1942-06-19
Map of the completed battle path of the 54th division. CD KalF 1942-06-19
Map of battle formations of units of the 186th Infantry Division as of 10.9.42 22 A, Colonel Yablokov 1942-09-15
Map of the defense scheme of the 41st Army Kalinin Front 1942-11-18
Defense map of the 31st Army 1942-06-06
Map of camouflage activities of 31 Army 31 A, 1942-06-10
Map of false directions of army roads of the 31st Army (point 15 of the plan) 1942-06-10
Map of the army commander's decision on the offensive operation Mars KalF, 41 A, 1942-10-15
Map of the decision of the commander of 41 A for Operation "Mars" 41 Army 1942-11-21
Report card 30 A, 1942-06-18
Map of the defensive sectors of the 46th Cavalry Division as of 12.6.42
Map of the situation at 20.00 1.4.42 11 kk, 1942-04-01
Map of the situation of 11 kk as of May 25, 1942, KalF, 1942-05-25
Map of the position of the troops of the Kalinin Front on November 14, 1941 KalF 1942-11-14
34a Map of roads and horse-drawn roads of the 4th Shock Army as of 13.6.42
Report card for the description of the military operations of the 2nd GSK during the winter period of 1942.
Map of the deployment of units of 3 VA on May 17, 1742
Report card 22, 30, 39, 29, 31 A 11 kk gr. Tarasova KalF, 1942-05-05
Report card 41, 22, 30, 39, 29, 31 A 41 A, 22 A, 30 A, 39 A, 29 A, 31 A, 1942-05-10
Report card 41 A, 22 A, 30 A, 39 A, 29 A, 31 A KalF, 1942-05-15
Report card 41, 22, 30, 29, 31, 39 A 11 kk KalF, 1942-05-20
Report card 41, 22, 30, 39, 29, 31 A, 11 kk from May 21 to 25 KalF
Report card 11 kk 39, 41, 22, 30, 29, 31 A KalF, 1942-05-30
Report card 3, 4 A from May 16 to 20 KalF, 1942-05-20
Report card of the position of troops 3 A and 4 A from May 21 to 25 KalF, 1942-05-25
Map of the position of troops 3 and 4 A from May 26 to 30 KalF, 1942-05-30
Map of the position of troops 3 A (attachment to file No. 376) from May 1 to May 5 KalF, 1942-05-05
Report card 3 A KalF, 1942-05-10
Map of the position of troops 3 A (attachment to file No. 376) from May 11 to 15 KalF, 1942-05-15
Report card 4 A 4 A, 1942-05-05
Map of the position of troops 4 A from May 6 to May 10.
Map of the position of troops 4 A from May 11 to 15 4 A, 1942-05-15
Report card 11 kk 39, 41, 22, 30, 29, 31 A KalF, 1942-06-05
Report card 3, 4 A KalF, 1942-06-11
Report card KalF KalF, 1942-06-16
Report card KalF KalF, 1942-06-23
Report card KalF KalF, 1942-06-30
Report card 3, 4 A from June 1 to June 5. Appendix to case No. 392 KalF, 1942-06-05
Report card 11 kk, 39, 41, 22, 30, 29, 31 A from 6 to 11.6.42 KalF
Report card KalF KalF, 1942-07-07
KalF report card from 8 to 13.7.42 KalF 1942-07-13
KalF report card from 14 to 18.7.42 KalF 1942-07-18
Report card of KalF from 19 to 23.7.42 KalF, 1942-07-23
KalF headquarters report card KalF
Report card of the KalF headquarters from July 22 to July 26, 1942
Report card KalF from 24 to 28.7.42 KalF,
Report card of KalF headquarters from 29.7 to 1.8.42.
Report card of the KalF headquarters from July 24 to July 28, 1942
Map of the situation 22, 41, 39 A KalF, 1942-07-02
Map of the position of troops 22, 41, 39 A on July 5 KalF 1942
Map of the position of troops 22, 41, 39 A and 11 kk on July 6 KalF 1942
Situation map of 22, 41, 39 A and 11 kk on 7.7.42 KalF
Map of the situation 22, 41, 39 A 11 kk KalF, 1942-07-08
Map of the position of troops 22, 41, 30 A and 11 kk on July 9-10 KalF, 1942-07-10
Map of the position of troops 22.39, 41 A and 11 kk on July 11-13, 1942
Position map 30, 29 A KalF 1942-07-31
Report card KalF from 2 to 6.8.42 KalF
KalF report card from 7 to 11.8.42
KalF report card from 12 to 16.8.42
Report card of the front headquarters from 17 to 21.8.42.
Situation report card 4 A 8/21/42
Report card of KalF for 22-26.8.42.
KalF report card from 27 to 31.8.42 KalF 1942-08-31
Map of the position of the 4th Shock Army 1942-08-06
Situation map 30A, 29A 1942-08-04
213 2002 442 KalF report card from 1 to 5.9.42
KalF report card from 6.9 to 15.9.42 KalF 1942-09-15
Report card of the Kalinin Front from 16 to 20.9.42.
Report card of the KalF headquarters from 21 to 25.9.43.
Report card of the Kalinin Front from 26 to 30.9.42.
KalF report card from 1 to 5.10.42.
KalF report card from 6 to 10.10.42
Report card KalF from 11 to 15.10.42 KalF
KalF report card from 16-20.10.42.
KalF report card from 21 to 31.10.42.
Report card of the Kalinin direction from 1.11 to 6.11.42
KalF report card from 7 to 11.11.42.
KalF report card from 12 to 16.11.42.
KalF report card from 17 to 21.11.42
KalF report card from 22 to 26.11.42
KalF report card from 11/27 to 12/1/42
Map of the position of the KalF troops on 11/27/42, on 11/28/42 3 Ud. A (V. Luki)
Map of the position of KalF troops 1942-12-01
KalF report card from December 1 to 8 KalF, Colonel Potapov 1942-12-08
Map of the position of the front troops. Appendix to the KalF report card, art. Lieutenant Khrenov 1942-12-03
Map of the position of front troops from December 2 to 5. Appendix to the KalF report card 1942-12-05
Map of the position of the front troops. Appendix to the KalF map, art. Lieutenant Khrenov 1942-12-11
Map of the position of KalF troops 1942-12-14
Map of the position of KalF troops 1942-12-15
Map of the position of the front troops. KalF Appendix 1942-12-18
Map of the position of the front troops. Appendix to the KalF map 1942-12-20
Map of the position of front troops from December 21 to 23. (Appendix to case No. 464) KalF 1942-12-23
Map of the position of front troops from December 23 to 27. (Appendix to case No. 464) KalF 1942-12-27
Map of the position of the front troops. Appendix to the KalF map 1942-01-02
Map of the position of KalF troops 1942-12-31
Map of the position of the front troops. 1942-12-31
Map on 24 sheets 3 Shock Army, 1942-04-29
Troop situation report card 3 Ud. And as of 15.5.42
Troop situation report card 3 Ud. And for the period from 15.5.42 to 20.5.42
Troop situation report card 3 Ud. And as of 25.5. to 31.5
Troop situation report card 3 Ud. And as of 31.5.42 to 5.6.42
Troop situation report card 3 Ud. And when standing at 5.6.42 to 10.6.42
Troop situation report card 3 Ud. And as of 10.6.42 to 15.6.42
Troop situation report card 3 Ud. And as of 15.6.42 to 20.6.42
Report card of the situation at the front 3 Ud. And as of 3 Ud. A, 1942-07-05
Report card of the situation at the front 3 Ud. And as of 1 to 10.7.42.
Report card of the situation at the front 3 Ud. And as of July 19 to July 20, 1942
Report card of the situation at the front 3 Ud. And as of 20.7 to 1.8.42
In Turginov, by order of the commander of the Western Front, the brigade was again reassigned to the 30th Army, whose commander clarified its mission. It consisted of, moving along the Volokolamsk highway, destroying enemy reserves in the area of the villages of Krivtsovo, Nikulino, Mamulino and, together with units of the 5th Infantry Division, capturing Kalinin.
On the morning of October 17, the brigade's tank regiment, consisting of 27 T-34 tanks and eight T-60 tanks, headed for Kalinin. The tankers met stubborn enemy resistance in Efremov and Pushkin. Along the entire route from Pushkin to Kalinin, the tanks were subjected to continuous bombardment from the air, and when approaching Troyanov and Kalinin they were met by powerful fire from anti-tank guns. Only eight tanks managed to reach the southern outskirts of Kalinin, and only one T-34 tank (commander senior sergeant S. Kh. Gorobets) broke into the city and made a heroic raid on it. The remaining surviving tanks reached the Pokrovskoye area on the Turginovskoe highway.
The brigade caused some damage to the enemy and caused panic. But the task assigned to the brigade turned out to be impossible. In the Kalinin area, the Germans had two tank, one motorized divisions and one motorized brigade. Our tank regiment was thrown into battle without infantry support or air cover. The territory captured by the tankers was not secured by infantry. In addition, the brigade's offensive was not supported by the active actions of other formations of the 30th Army. The operational report of the army headquarters at 17.00 on October 17 indicated that the 5th Infantry Division was still regrouping its forces during the day. In this battle, the brigade lost 11 T-34 tanks and 35 people killed and wounded. The regiment commander, Hero of the Soviet Union, Major M.A. Lukin, and the tank battalion commander, Hero of the Soviet Union, Captain M.P. Agibalov, were killed.
Attaching exceptional importance to the Kalinin operational direction, the Supreme Command Headquarters on October 17 decides to create the Kalinin Front.
HQ DIRECTIVE ON THE CREATION OF THE KALININ FRONT
Commander of the North-Western, Western Fronts
Deputy Commander of the Western Front, Comrade KONEV
October 17, 41 6 p.m. 30 min.
For the sake of convenience in controlling troops in the Kalinin direction, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:
1. The troops operating in the Ostashkov, Rzhev directions and in the Kalinin region are to be separated into an independent Kalinin Front with direct subordination to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.
2. Include 22, 29 and 30 A Western troops in the Kalinin Front troops. fr., 183, 185 and 246 SD, 46 and 54 CD, 46 Motorcycle Regiment and 8 Tank Brigade North-West. front.
3. Appoint Colonel General Konev as commander of the Kalinin Front. To strengthen the front headquarters, turn the headquarters of the 10th Army. The front headquarters will be deployed in the Bezhetsk area.
4. Boundary lines: from the North-West. fr. - Poshekhonye - Volodarsk, st. Ostolopovo, st. Akademicheskaya, lake Istochino, everything for the Kalinin Front inclusive; from Western front - st. Berendeevo, st. Verbilki, st. Reshetnikovo, st. Princely Mountains, Sychevka, everything for the West. fr. inclusive.
5. The next task of the front is to clear the Kalinin area from enemy troops and eliminate it in cooperation with the Western and North-West. fronts of the enemy's attempts to bypass Moscow from the north.
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
Stalin
Vasilevsky
In total, the front consisted of 16 rifle and two cavalry divisions, one motorized rifle and two tank brigades. Front troops operated in a zone of 220 km. By October 17, superiority in forces was on the enemy's side: in infantry - 1.9 times, in tanks - 2.8 times, in guns - 3.3 times, in machine guns - 3.2 times.
The creation of the Kalinin Front was timely and responded to the current situation. This made it possible to reliably strengthen the central section of our strategic front, firmly connecting it with the northwestern direction.
The Kalinin Front did not receive aviation. Requests for air support were to be fulfilled by aviation from the North-Western Front. Significant difficulties arose due to the fact that at first the front did not have its own rear. In this extremely difficult situation, local Soviet and party bodies, and above all the regional party committee, headed by First Secretary I. P. Boytsov, provided enormous assistance to the front troops.
Simultaneously with the creation of the Kalinin Front, it was decided to restore the field control of the 31st Army in order to unify the command and control of the troops operating in the Torzhok and Kalinin directions. Major General V. A. Yushkevich was appointed commander of the army. It included units of General Vatutin’s operational group, as well as the 119th and 133rd rifle divisions. However, in the following days, part of the task force’s formations was transferred to the 29th and 30th armies and transferred to the front reserve.
In this regard, it should be noted that the command of the Kalinin Front made a mistake by undertaking the disbandment of General Vatutin’s operational group at a crucial moment in the defensive operation. It was a real strike force of five formations. The transfer of these formations to the armies disrupted smooth management. The opportunity for immediate action to liberate the city of Kalinin was missed.
Here is how General Vatutin indicated this in the report on the combat operations of the task force:
“On October 17, 1941, the Kalinin Front was created. The troops of the operational group are included in the troops of the Kalinin Front. 18.10 Colonel General Konev issues combat order No. 00122, setting the troops the task of encircling and destroying the enemy’s Kalinin group.
The main blow was to be delivered by the troops of the operational group of the North-Western Front, with the crossing of the Volga River and actions in general directions: Mednoye - Kalinin; Stanishino, Danilovskoye, Kalinin. However, this order arrived to the group late and without taking into account the element of time to eliminate the Mednov enemy group and concentrate troops. Despite this, the situation in the Kalinin area was still favorable for the implementation of this order. The enemy has not yet brought up fresh reserves to the area of the proposed crossings of the operational group of the North-Western Front.
On the most critical days, the troops of the task force were transferred to the 31st Army, which could not quickly establish contact with the troops. In the following days, new orders follow from the Kalinin Front for the army, according to which the entire group of troops of the operational group is distributed among the armies and some divisions are withdrawn to the front reserve...
Thus, the troops of the operational group of the North-Western Front, as a single organism, disappeared. The only striking force in the Kalinin area was dispersed among the armies.
This was a mistake by the command of the Kalinin Front, since while the divisions were being regrouped among armies, the enemy, anticipating a possible crossing of our troops at Nesterov and Akishev, threw in the fresh 6th Infantry Division, preempted us and thwarted the planned active actions of the 46th, 54th 1st cavalry and 183rd rifle divisions."
October 20 The front commander issues a directive to the troops, in which the armies are given the task of encircling the enemy group in the Kalinin area. 22nd Army - firmly defend the line of the lake. Seliger - r. Volga to Staritsa, preventing the enemy from breaking through to Torzhok from the south and southwest. The 29th Army, defending on the right flank in the area of Staritsa, Akisheva, on the night of October 20-21, with its main forces, crossed the Volga in the Izbrizhye, Danilovskoye sector. By the end of the day, capture Nekrasov, Danilovsky, cut off the enemy’s escape route to the southwest, establish cooperation with the 21st Tank Brigade (30th Army) in the Negotino area. The 31st Army advances from the northwest and north to Kalinin and, in cooperation with the 30th Army, captures the northwestern and southern part of the city of Kalinin by the end of October 21. The 30th Army should attack Kalinin from the northeast and southeast and, by the end of October 21, capture the southern and northeastern part of the city, preventing the enemy from retreating to the south and southeast.
Due to the fact that part of the formations of the 29th Army (commanded by Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov) fought fierce battles with the enemy group retreating from the Maryino-Mednoe area, the task set in the directive of the front commander of October 20 was not it at the specified time completed. Only October 22 The 246th Infantry Division of this army crossed the Volga in the Khvastovo, Chapaevka sector and captured a bridgehead on the right bank in the Putilov area. Within two days, units of the 246th and 119th rifle divisions were transported here. By October 25 They managed to significantly expand the bridgehead and cut off the enemy's main transport route Staritsa - Kalinin in the Talutin, Danilovsky area. There was a real threat of encirclement of the Kalinin enemy group.
To liquidate the bridgehead, the fascist command was forced to transfer two new divisions to this area (14th motorized and 161st infantry). At the same time, fascist German troops began a new operation to capture Torzhok with the further development of the offensive on Vyshny Volochek. To carry it out, the 23rd and 6th Army Corps of the 9th Army, reinforced by two motorized divisions of the 3rd Tank Group, were involved.
October 24 The enemy managed to cross to the left bank of the Volga in the Staritsa - Brody section and launch an attack on Struzhnya - Torzhok.
Through the efforts of the troops of the 22nd and 29th armies, the enemy offensive by the end of October was stopped. But at the same time, the 29th Army had to leave the bridgehead in the area of Putilov, Talutin, Danilovsky and retreat to the line of the river. Darkness.
In the offensive zone of the 31st Army, the fighting became stubborn and intense. Units of the 133rd Rifle Division liberated the village of Kiselevo (0.5 km north of Kalinin) and captured several blocks on the northern outskirts of the city.
Units of the 30th Army were the first to enter the battle for Kalinin. In five days (from October 14 to 19), they lost over 1,600 people and 25 tanks. In the 256th Rifle Division, 400 people were killed and wounded, in the 5th Rifle Division - 525 people, the 21st Tank Brigade lost 450 people, 21 T-34 tanks, three BT tanks and one T-60 tank. But, despite this, the army fought fierce battles on the eastern and southeastern outskirts of the city. Bolshaya and Malye Peremerki, Elevator, Koltsovo, Vlasyevo changed hands several times.
The fighting at the end of October did not bring victory to our troops, but in the end the enemy abandoned attempts to attack and was forced to go on the defensive. In the Kalinin area the front has stabilized.
An interesting statement by the former commander of the 3rd Panzer Group, General G. Hoth:
“Due to a lack of fuel, the 3rd Tank Group was stretched between Vyazma and Kalinin and got stuck in this area, getting involved in heavy fighting near Kalinin, and was already short of ammunition. Large in number, combat-ready enemy forces, concentrated along the left bank of the Volga and north-west of Rzhev, hung over its flank. Thus, the chances of bypassing Moscow from the north and south at the same time were very slim.”
Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin was particularly concerned about the bridges across the Volga in Kalinin that were not destroyed during the retreat. He demanded from Konev:
“Destroy the railway and highway bridges in the city of Kalinin by means of aviation.”
The Kalinin Front did not yet have its own aviation at that time, and this task was assigned to long-range aviation.
Here is what the former commander of the 12th Guards Long-Range Aviation Bomber Regiment Nikolai Bogdanov writes about this in his book “In the Sky Guards Gatchinsky”:
“The most difficult task for us was the destruction of the Kalinin railway and highway bridges. And not only for us. They turned out to be a tough nut to crack, which the crews of other units were unable to crack.”
The Nazis reliably covered the approaches to the bridges and concentrated a large amount of anti-aircraft artillery of various calibers and anti-aircraft machine guns on both banks of the river. In addition, fighter aircraft were also brought in to protect the bridges.
Starting from October 16, 1941, our pilots regularly bombed bridges. A variety of bombing methods were used. However, the bridges remained intact.
It should be noted that at the beginning of the war, bridges were usually bombed with 100-kilogram high-explosive bombs. Some of them flew through the openwork trusses of the railway bridge and exploded in the water without causing any harm to it. In one of the raids on a railway bridge, the crew of Lieutenant Koryakin’s aircraft repeated the feat of Captain Gastello. In the book “In the Sky Guards Gatchinsky” Nikolai Bogdanov writes:
“On the day of departure for the mission, November 12, the weather was cloudy... The flight promised to be difficult. At the target, enemy anti-aircraft artillery and machine guns met us with hurricane fire. I focus all my attention on accurately maintaining the course set by the navigator. Due to the dense anti-aircraft fire, this was very difficult to do. Finally, out of the darkness, behind the bright splashes of exploding anti-aircraft shells, a bridge appeared large, at an acute angle, as if floating towards us, a few more seconds, and from a height of six hundred meters bombs flew at it from the hatches of our vehicles.
At this time, Koryakin’s plane caught fire to my right. The shells apparently hit the cockpit and gas tanks. In a split second, the entire plane was engulfed in flames. I only managed to see the pilot’s head, bowed to the instrument panel; I couldn’t see the radio operator gunner because of the thick black smoke that enveloped the fuselage.
The plane went into a dive. But this was not an arbitrary fall; it was clear that the pilot’s hand was still controlling the machine. Obeying her, the plane turned sharply towards the group of guns, which were still throwing out tongues of flame with their long muzzles, and, as if covering us with a flattened steel body from their destructive shells, fell onto the battery and at the same moment exploded, blazing with a huge fire. This is how our young comrades died the death of heroes - crew commander Koryakin, navigator Belov, gunner-radio operator Shilenko and gunner Vishnevsky.”
It was decided to destroy the Kalinin railway bridge using the radio guidance system of an aircraft filled with explosives. For this purpose, a design bureau was brought in to develop a radio control system for unmanned aircraft.
Two bombers were allocated for the experiment: TB-3, intended to be a torpedo aircraft, and DB-ZF, from which it was supposed to be controlled by radio. While the test flights were underway, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive near Moscow, liberated Kalinin and the need to destroy the bridges disappeared.
Having occupied Kalinin, fascist German troops turned it into a major stronghold. They concentrated a large amount of equipment and manpower here. All measures were taken to hold the city. From here the Nazis supported their hordes advancing on Moscow, guarding their left flank. Here, in warm apartments, they hoped to restore the strength of their battle-weary divisions.
By the end of October the front had stabilized and passed along the line: Selizharovo, the Bolshaya Kosha and Darkness rivers, the northern and eastern outskirts of Kalinin, Malye Peremerki, Vishenki, Turginovo, Dorino, Sintsovo. The total length of the front line reached 270 km.
In October, the Kalinin Front managed to solve the problem: repel the enemy’s attack on Torzhok, Vyshny Volochek and prevent his advance around Moscow from the north-west.
At the end of October, the front commander issues a directive on the transition to defense and the construction of front-line rear and intermediate army defense lines.
The weakest line of defense was the 30th Army, which covered the Klin-Solnechnogorsk direction. By mid-November, its combat strength included rifle and motorized rifle divisions, a tank brigade, motorized and reserve regiments. With these forces the army defended on a front of about 70 km. There were no second echelons or reserves. The defense was focal in nature, the gaps between strong points reaching four kilometers.
Back at the end of October, the commander of the 30th Army reported to the front commander that “the army does not have enough combat personnel and equipment, and few mining equipment... The left flank of the army is a particularly weak point.” At the same time, according to information received from local residents and from interviews with prisoners, it was already known that the fascist command was concentrating troops and preparing a new attack on Moscow in the defense zone of the 30th Army.
Reliable defense and preventing enemy troops from breaking through to Moscow from the north-west, according to the Supreme Command Headquarters, was one of the main tasks of the troops of the Kalinin Front. However, the commander and his staff did not take the necessary measures to strengthen the combat strength of the 30th Army and strengthen its defense. It was against this that the fascist German troops struck the main blow in November 1941.
By mid-November against the left flank of the 30th Army, the fascist command concentrated a strike group consisting of the 27th Army Corps of the 9th Army and part of the forces of the 41st and 56th Motorized Corps of the 3rd Tank Group.
