Causes and nature of the war. The outbreak of the Patriotic War of 1812 was caused by Napoleon's desire for world domination. In Europe, only Russia and England maintained their independence. Despite the Treaty of Tilsit, Russia continued to oppose the expansion of Napoleonic aggression. Napoleon was especially irritated by her systematic violation of the continental blockade. Since 1810, both sides, realizing the inevitability of a new clash, were preparing for war. Napoleon flooded the Duchy of Warsaw with his troops and created military warehouses there. The threat of invasion looms over Russia's borders. In turn, the Russian government increased the number of troops in the western provinces.
Napoleon became the aggressor. He began military operations and invaded Russian territory. In this regard, for the Russian people the war became a liberation and Patriotic war, since not only the regular army, but also the broad masses of the people took part in it.
Correlation of forces. In preparation for the war against Russia, Napoleon gathered a significant army - up to 678 thousand soldiers. These were perfectly armed and trained troops, seasoned in previous wars. They were led by a galaxy of brilliant marshals and generals - L. Davout, L. Berthier, M. Ney, I. Murat and others. They were commanded by the most famous commander of that time - Napoleon Bonaparte. The weak point of his army was its motley national composition. The aggressive plans of the French emperor were deeply alien to the German and Spanish, Polish and Portuguese, Austrian and Italian soldiers.
Active preparations for the war that Russia had been waging since 1810 brought results. She managed to create modern armed forces for that time, powerful artillery, which, as it turned out during the war, was superior to the French. The troops were led by talented military leaders - M. I. Kutuzov, M. B. Barclay de Tolly, P. I. Bagration, A. P. Ermolov, N. N. Raevsky, M. A. Miloradovich and others. They were distinguished by extensive military experience and personal courage. The advantage of the Russian army was determined by the patriotic enthusiasm of all segments of the population, large human resources, food and fodder reserves.
However, at the initial stage of the war, the French army outnumbered the Russian one. The first echelon of troops that entered Russia numbered 450 thousand people, while the Russians on the western border were about 210 thousand people, divided into three armies. The 1st - under the command of M.B. Barclay de Tolly - covered the St. Petersburg direction, the 2nd - led by P.I. Bagration - defended the center of Russia, the 3rd - under General A.P. Tormasov - was located in the southern direction .
Plans of the parties. Napoleon planned to seize a significant part of Russian territory up to Moscow and sign a new treaty with Alexander to subjugate Russia. Napoleon's strategic plan was based on his military experience acquired during the wars in Europe. He intended to prevent the dispersed Russian forces from uniting and deciding the outcome of the war in one or more border battles.
Even on the eve of the war, the Russian emperor and his entourage decided not to make any compromises with Napoleon. If the clash was successful, they intended to transfer hostilities to the territory of Western Europe. In case of defeat, Alexander was ready to retreat to Siberia (all the way to Kamchatka, according to him) to continue the fight from there. Russia had several strategic military plans. One of them was developed by the Prussian General Fuhl. It provided for the concentration of most of the Russian army in a fortified camp near the city of Drissa on the Western Dvina. According to Fuhl, this gave an advantage in the first border battle. The project remained unrealized, since the position on Drissa was unfavorable and the fortifications were weak. In addition, the balance of forces forced the Russian command to initially choose a strategy of active defense. As the course of the war showed, this was the most correct decision.
Stages of war. The history of the Patriotic War of 1812 is divided into two stages. First: from June 12 to mid-October - the retreat of the Russian army with rearguard battles in order to lure the enemy deep into Russian territory and disrupt his strategic plan. Second: from mid-October to December 25 - a counter-offensive of the Russian army with the goal of completely expelling the enemy from Russia.
The beginning of the war. On the morning of June 12, 1812, French troops crossed the Neman and invaded Russia by forced march.
The 1st and 2nd Russian armies retreated, avoiding a general battle. They fought stubborn rearguard battles with individual units of the French, exhausting and weakening the enemy, inflicting significant losses on him.
The Russian troops faced two main tasks - to eliminate disunity (not to allow themselves to be defeated individually) and to establish unity of command in the army. The first task was solved on July 22, when the 1st and 2nd armies united near Smolensk. Thus, Napoleon's original plan was thwarted. On August 8, Alexander appointed M.I. Kutuzov Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army. This meant solving the second problem. M.I. Kutuzov took command of the combined Russian forces on August 17. He did not change his retreat tactics. However, the army and the whole country expected a decisive battle from him. Therefore, he gave the order to look for a position for a general battle. She was found near the village of Borodino, 124 km from Moscow.
battle of Borodino. M.I. Kutuzov chose defensive tactics and deployed his troops in accordance with this. The left flank was defended by the army of P.I. Bagration, covered by artificial earthen fortifications - flushes. In the center there was an earthen mound where the artillery and troops of General N.N. Raevsky were located. The army of M.B. Barclay de Tolly was on the right flank.
Napoleon adhered to offensive tactics. He intended to break through the defenses of the Russian army on the flanks, encircle it and completely defeat it.
The balance of forces was almost equal: the French had 130 thousand people with 587 guns, the Russians had 110 thousand regular forces, about 40 thousand militias and Cossacks with 640 guns.
Early in the morning of August 26, the French launched an offensive on the left flank. The fight for flushes lasted until 12 noon. Both sides suffered huge losses. General P.I. Bagration was seriously wounded. (He died from his wounds a few days later.) Taking the flushes did not bring any particular advantages to the French, since they were unable to break through the left flank. The Russians retreated in an organized manner and took up a position near the Semenovsky ravine.
At the same time, the situation in the center, where Napoleon directed the main attack, became more complicated. To help the troops of General N.N. Raevsky, M.I. Kutuzov ordered the Cossacks of M.I. Platov and the cavalry corps of F.P. Uvarov to carry out a raid behind French lines. The sabotage, which was not very successful in itself, forced Napoleon to interrupt the assault on the battery for almost 2 hours. This allowed M.I. Kutuzov to bring fresh forces to the center. The battery of N.N. Raevsky changed hands several times and was captured by the French only at 16:00.
The capture of Russian fortifications did not mean Napoleon's victory. On the contrary, the offensive impulse of the French army dried up. She needed fresh forces, but Napoleon did not dare to use his last reserve - the imperial guard. The battle, which lasted more than 12 hours, gradually subsided. The losses on both sides were enormous. Borodino was a moral and political victory for the Russians: the combat potential of the Russian army was preserved, while Napoleonic's was significantly weakened. Far from France, in the vast Russian expanses, it was difficult to restore it.
From Moscow to Maloyaroslavets. After Borodino, Russian troops began to retreat to Moscow. Napoleon followed, but did not strive for a new battle. On September 1, a military council of the Russian command took place in the village of Fili. M.I. Kutuzov, contrary to the general opinion of the generals, decided to leave Moscow. The French army entered it on September 2, 1812.
M.I. Kutuzov, withdrawing troops from Moscow, carried out an original plan - the Tarutino march-maneuver. Retreating from Moscow along the Ryazan road, the army turned sharply to the south and in the Krasnaya Pakhra area reached the old Kaluga road. This maneuver, firstly, prevented the French from seizing the Kaluga and Tula provinces, where ammunition and food were collected. Secondly, M.I. Kutuzov managed to break away from Napoleon’s army. He set up a camp in Tarutino, where the Russian troops rested and were replenished with fresh regular units, militia, weapons and food supplies.
The occupation of Moscow did not benefit Napoleon. Abandoned by the inhabitants (an unprecedented case in history), it burned in the fire. There was no food or other supplies in it. The French army was completely demoralized and turned into a bunch of robbers and marauders. Its decomposition was so strong that Napoleon had only two options - either immediately make peace or begin a retreat. But all the peace proposals of the French emperor were unconditionally rejected by M. I. Kutuzov and Alexander I.
On October 7, the French left Moscow. Napoleon still hoped to defeat the Russians or at least break into the unravaged southern regions, since the issue of providing the army with food and fodder was very acute. He moved his troops to Kaluga. On October 12, another bloody battle took place near the town of Maloyaroslavets. Once again, neither side achieved a decisive victory. However, the French were stopped and forced to retreat along the Smolensk road they had destroyed.
Expulsion of Napoleon from Russia. The retreat of the French army looked like a disorderly flight. It was accelerated by the unfolding partisan movement and the offensive actions of the Russians.
The patriotic upsurge began literally immediately after Napoleon entered Russia. Robbery and looting French. The Russian soldiers provoked resistance from local residents. But this was not the main thing - the Russian people could not put up with the presence of invaders on their native land. History includes the names of ordinary people (G. M. Kurin, E. V. Chetvertakov, V. Kozhina) who organized partisan detachments. “Flying detachments” of regular army soldiers led by career officers (A.S. Figner, D.V. Davydov, A.N. Seslavin, etc.) were also sent to the French rear.
At the final stage of the war, M.I. Kutuzov chose the tactics of parallel pursuit. He took care of every Russian soldier and understood that the enemy’s forces were melting every day. The final defeat of Napoleon was planned near the city of Borisov. For this purpose, troops were brought up from the south and north-west. Serious damage was inflicted on the French near the city of Krasny in early November, when more than half of the 50 thousand people of the retreating army were captured or died in battle. Fearing encirclement, Napoleon hastened to transport his troops across the Berezina River on November 14-17. The battle at the crossing completed the defeat of the French army. Napoleon abandoned her and secretly left for Paris. The order of M.I. Kutuzov on the army of December 21 and the Tsar's Manifesto of December 25, 1812 marked the end of the Patriotic War.
The meaning of war. The Patriotic War of 1812 is the greatest event in Russian history. During its course, heroism, courage, patriotism and selfless love of all layers of society and especially ordinary people for their Motherland were clearly demonstrated. However, the war caused significant damage to the Russian economy, which was estimated at 1 billion rubles. During the hostilities, about 300 thousand people died. Many western areas were devastated. All this had a huge impact on the further internal development of Russia.
46. Internal policy of Russia 1812 – 1825. Decembrist movement
And invaded Russian lands. The French rushed to the offensive like a bull during a bullfight. Napoleon's army included a European hodgepodge: in addition to the French, there were also (forcedly recruited) Germans, Austrians, Spaniards, Italians, Dutch, Poles and many others, totaling up to 650 thousand people. Russia could field approximately the same number of soldiers, but some of them, along with Kutuzov was still in Moldova, in another part - in the Caucasus. During Napoleon's invasion, up to 20 thousand Lithuanians joined his army.
The Russian army was divided into two lines of defense, under the command of General Peter Bagration And Michael Barclay de Tolly. The French invasion fell on the latter's troops. Napoleon's calculation was simple - one or two victorious battles (maximum three), and Alexander I will be forced to sign peace on French terms. However, Barclay de Tolly gradually, with small skirmishes, retreated deeper into Russia, but did not enter the main battle. Near Smolensk, the Russian army almost fell into encirclement, but did not enter the battle and eluded the French, continuing to draw them deeper into its territory. Napoleon occupied the empty Smolensk and could have stopped there for now, but Kutuzov, who arrived from Moldova to replace Barclay de Tolly, knew that the French emperor would not do that, and continued his retreat to Moscow. Bagration was eager to attack, and he was supported by the majority of the country's population, but Alexander did not allow it, leaving Peter Bagration on the border in Austria in case of an attack by France's allies.
All along the way, Napoleon received only abandoned and scorched settlements - no people, no supplies. After the “demonstrative” battle for Smolensk on August 18, 1812, Napoleon’s troops began to get tired of Russian campaign of 1812, since the conquest was somehow negative: there were no large-scale battles or high-profile victories, there were no captured supplies and weapons, winter was approaching, during which the “Great Army” needed to winter somewhere, and nothing suitable for quartering was captured.
Battle of Borodino.
At the end of August, near Mozhaisk (125 kilometers from Moscow), Kutuzov stopped in a field near a village Borodino, where he decided to give a general battle. For the most part, he was forced by public opinion, since a constant retreat did not correspond to the sentiments of either the people, the nobles, or the emperor.
On August 26, 1812, the famous Battle of Borodino. Bagration approached Borodino, but still the Russians were able to field just over 110 thousand soldiers. Napoleon at that moment had up to 135 thousand people.
The course and result of the battle are known to many: the French repeatedly stormed Kutuzov’s defensive redoubts with active artillery support (“Horses and people mixed up in a heap…”). The Russians, hungry for a normal battle, heroically repelled the attacks of the French, despite the latter’s enormous superiority in weapons (from rifles to cannons). The French lost up to 35 thousand killed, and the Russians ten thousand more, but Napoleon only managed to slightly shift Kutuzov’s central positions, and in fact, Bonaparte’s attack was stopped. After a battle that lasted all day, the French emperor began to prepare for a new assault, but Kutuzov, by the morning of August 27, withdrew his troops to Mozhaisk, not wanting to lose even more people.
On September 1, 1812, a military incident took place in a nearby village. council in Fili, during which Mikhail Kutuzov with the support of Barclay de Tolly, he decided to leave Moscow to save the army. Contemporaries say that this decision was extremely difficult for the commander-in-chief.
On September 14, Napoleon entered the abandoned and devastated former capital of Russia. During his stay in Moscow, sabotage groups of the Moscow governor Rostopchin repeatedly attacked French officers and burned their captured apartments. As a result, from September 14 to 18, Moscow burned, and Napoleon did not have enough resources to cope with the fire.
At the beginning of the invasion, before the Battle of Borodino, and also three times after the occupation of Moscow, Napoleon tried to come to an agreement with Alexander and sign peace. But from the very beginning of the war, the Russian emperor adamantly prohibited any negotiations while enemy feet trampled Russian soil.
Realizing that it would not be possible to spend the winter in devastated Moscow, on October 19, 1812, the French left Moscow. Napoleon decided to return to Smolensk, but not along the scorched path, but through Kaluga, hoping to get at least some supplies along the way.
In the battle of Tarutino and a little later near Maly Yaroslavets on October 24, Kutuzov repelled the French, and they were forced to return to the devastated Smolensk road along which they had walked earlier.
On November 8, Bonaparte reached Smolensk, which was ruined (half of it by the French themselves). All the way to Smolensk, the emperor constantly lost person after person - up to hundreds of soldiers a day.
During the summer-autumn of 1812, a hitherto unprecedented partisan movement was formed in Russia, leading the war of liberation. Partisan detachments numbered up to several thousand people. They attacked Napoleon's army like Amazonian piranhas attacking a wounded jaguar, waited for convoys with supplies and weapons, and destroyed the vanguards and rearguards of the troops. The most famous leader of these detachments was Denis Davydov. Peasants, workers, and nobles joined the partisan detachments. It is believed that they destroyed more than half of Bonaparte's army. Of course, Kutuzov’s soldiers did not lag behind, they also followed Napoleon on his heels and constantly made forays.
On November 29, a major battle took place on the Berezina, when admirals Chichagov and Wittgenstein, without waiting for Kutuzov, attacked Napoleon’s army and destroyed 21 thousand of his soldiers. However, the emperor was able to escape, with only 9 thousand people left at his disposal. With them he reached Vilna (Vilnius), where his generals Ney and Murat were waiting for him.
On December 14, after Kutuzov’s attack on Vilna, the French lost 20 thousand soldiers and abandoned the city. Napoleon fled to Paris in a hurry, ahead of the remnants of his Great Army. Together with the remnants of the garrison of Vilna and other cities, a little more than 30 thousand Napoleonic warriors left Russia, while at least about 610 thousand invaded Russia.
After the defeat in Russia French Empire started to fall apart. Bonaparte continued to send envoys to Alexander, offering almost all of Poland in exchange for a peace treaty. Nevertheless, the Russian emperor decided to completely rid Europe of dictatorship and tyranny (and these are not big words, but reality) Napoleon Bonaparte.
Russia's war for freedom and independence against the aggression of France and its allies.
It was a consequence of deep political contradictions between the France of Emperor Napoleon I Bonaparte, which sought European dominance, and the Russian Empire, which opposed its political and territorial claims.
On the French side, the war was of a coalition nature. The Confederation of the Rhine alone supplied 150 thousand people to Napoleonic army. Eight army corps were composed of foreign contingents. In the Great Army there were about 72 thousand Poles, over 36 thousand Prussians, about 31 thousand Austrians, and a significant number of representatives of other European states. The total strength of the French army was about 1200 thousand people. More than half of it was intended for the invasion of Russia.
By June 1, 1812, Napoleonic invasion forces included the Imperial Guard, 12 infantry corps, cavalry reserve (4 corps), artillery and engineering parks - a total of 678 thousand people and about 2.8 thousand guns.
Napoleon I used the Duchy of Warsaw as a springboard for the attack. His strategic plan was to quickly defeat the main forces of the Russian army in a general battle, capture Moscow and impose a peace treaty on the Russian Empire on French terms. The enemy invasion forces were deployed in 2 echelons. The 1st echelon consisted of 3 groups (total 444 thousand people, 940 guns), located between the Neman and Vistula rivers. The 1st group (left wing troops, 218 thousand people, 527 guns) under the direct command of Napoleon I concentrated on the line Elbing (now Elblag), Thorn (now Torun) for an offensive through Kovno (now Kaunas) to Vilna (now Vilnius) . The 2nd group (general E. Beauharnais; 82 thousand people, 208 guns) was intended to attack in the zone between Grodno and Kovno with the aim of separating the Russian 1st and 2nd Western armies. The 3rd group (under the command of the brother of Napoleon I - J. Bonaparte; troops of the right wing, 78 thousand people, 159 guns) had the task of moving from Warsaw to Grodno to pull back the Russian 2nd Western Army to facilitate the offensive of the main forces . These troops were supposed to encircle and destroy piece by piece the Russian 1st and 2nd Western armies with sweeping blows. On the left wing, the invasion of the 1st group of troops was supported by the Prussian corps (32 thousand people) of Marshal J. MacDonald. On the right wing, the invasion of the 3rd group of troops was supported by the Austrian corps (34 thousand people) of Field Marshal K. Schwarzenberg. In the rear, between the Vistula and Oder rivers, there remained the troops of the 2nd echelon (170 thousand people, 432 guns) and the reserve (the corps of Marshal P. Augereau and other troops).
After a series of anti-Napoleonic wars, the Russian Empire remained in international isolation by the beginning of the Patriotic War, also experiencing financial and economic difficulties. In the two pre-war years, its expenses for the needs of the army amounted to more than half of the state budget. Russian troops on the western borders had about 220 thousand people and 942 guns. They were deployed in 3 groups: the 1st Ignite Army (infantry general; 6 infantry, 2 cavalry and 1 Cossack corps; about 128 thousand people, 558 guns) constituted the main forces and was located between Rossieny (now Raseiniai, Lithuania) and Lida; The 2nd Western Army (infantry general; 2 infantry, 1 cavalry corps and 9 Cossack regiments; about 49 thousand people, 216 guns) concentrated between the Neman and Bug rivers; The 3rd Western Army (cavalry general A.P. Tormasov; 3 infantry, 1 cavalry corps and 9 Cossack regiments; 43 thousand people, 168 guns) was stationed in the Lutsk area. In the Riga area there was a separate corps (18.5 thousand people) of Lieutenant General I. N. Essen. The nearest reserves (the corps of Lieutenant General P.I. Meller-Zakomelsky and Lieutenant General F.F. Ertel) were located in the areas of the cities of Toropets and Mozyr. In the south, in Podolia, the Danube Army (about 30 thousand people) of Admiral P.V. Chichagov was concentrated. The leadership of all armies was carried out by the emperor, who was with his main apartment at the 1st Western Army. The commander-in-chief was not appointed, but Barclay de Tolly, being the Minister of War, had the right to give orders on behalf of the emperor. The Russian armies stretched out on a front stretching over 600 km, and the main forces of the enemy - 300 km. This put Russian troops in a difficult position. By the beginning of the enemy invasion, Alexander I accepted the plan proposed by his military adviser, the Prussian general K. Fuhl. According to his plan, the 1st Western Army, having retreated from the border, was supposed to take refuge in a fortified camp, and the 2nd Western Army would go to the flank and rear of the enemy.
According to the nature of military events in the Patriotic War, 2 periods are distinguished. The 1st period - from the invasion of French troops on June 12 (24) to October 5 (17) - includes defensive actions, the Tarutino flank march-maneuver of Russian troops, their preparation for the offensive and guerrilla operations on enemy communications. 2nd period - from the transition of the Russian army to a counteroffensive on October 6 (18) to the defeat of the enemy and the complete liberation of Russian land on December 14 (26).
The pretext for the attack on the Russian Empire was Alexander I’s alleged violation of the main, in the opinion of Napoleon I, provision - “to be in an eternal alliance with France and in the war with England,” which manifested itself in the sabotage of the continental blockade by the Russian Empire. On June 10 (22), Napoleon I, through the ambassador in St. Petersburg J. A. Lauriston, officially declared war on Russia, and on June 12 (24), the French army began crossing the Neman across 4 bridges (near Kovno and other cities). Having received news of the invasion of French troops, Alexander I attempted to resolve the conflict peacefully, calling on the French emperor to “withdraw his troops from Russian territory.” However, Napoleon I rejected this proposal.
Under pressure from superior enemy forces, the 1st and 2nd Western armies began to retreat into the interior of the country. The 1st Western Army left Vilna and retreated to the Drissa camp (near the city of Drissa, now Verhnedvinsk, Belarus), increasing the gap with the 2nd Western Army to 200 km. The main enemy forces rushed into it on June 26 (July 8), occupying Minsk and creating the threat of defeating the Russian armies one by one. The 1st and 2nd Western Armies, intending to unite, retreated in converging directions: the 1st Western Army from Drissa through Polotsk to Vitebsk (to cover the St. Petersburg direction, the corps of Lieutenant General, from November General of Infantry P.Kh. Wittgenstein), and the 2nd Western Army from Slonim to Nesvizh, Bobruisk, Mstislavl.
The war shook up the entire Russian society: peasants, merchants, commoners. By mid-summer, self-defense units began to spontaneously form in the occupied territory to protect their villages from French raids. foragers and marauders (see Looting). Having assessed the significance, the Russian military command took measures to expand and organize it. For this purpose, army partisan detachments were created in the 1st and 2nd Western armies on the basis of regular troops. In addition, according to the manifesto of Emperor Alexander I of July 6 (18), recruitment into the people's militia was carried out in Central Russia and the Volga region. Its creation, recruitment, financing and supply were led by the Special Committee. The Orthodox Church made a significant contribution to the fight against foreign invaders, calling on the people to protect their state and religious shrines, collecting about 2.5 million rubles for the needs of the Russian army (from the church treasury and as a result of donations from parishioners).
On July 8 (20), the French occupied Mogilev and did not allow the Russian armies to unite in the Orsha region. Only thanks to persistent rearguard battles and maneuver did the Russian armies unite near Smolensk on July 22 (August 3). By this time, Wittgenstein’s corps had retreated to a line north of Polotsk and, having pinned down the enemy’s forces, weakened his main group. The 3rd Western Army, after the battles on July 15 (27) near Kobrin, and on July 31 (August 12) near Gorodechnaya (now both cities are in the Brest region, Belarus), where it inflicted great damage on the enemy, defended itself on the river. Styr.
The beginning of the war upset the strategic plan of Napoleon I. The Grand Army lost up to 150 thousand people killed, wounded, sick and deserters. Its combat effectiveness and discipline began to decline, and the pace of the offensive slowed down. On July 17 (29), Napoleon I was forced to give the order to stop his army for 7-8 days in the area from Velizh to Mogilev to rest and await the arrival of reserves and rear forces. Submitting to the will of Alexander I, who demanded active action, the military council of the 1st and 2nd Western armies decided to take advantage of the dispersed position of the enemy and break the front of his main forces with a counterattack in the direction of Rudnya and Porechye (now the city of Demidov). On July 26 (August 7), Russian troops launched a counteroffensive, but due to poor organization and lack of coordination, it did not bring the expected results. Napoleon I used the battles that broke out near Rudnya and Porechye to suddenly transport his troops across the Dnieper, threatening to capture Smolensk. The troops of the 1st and 2nd Western armies began to retreat to Smolensk in order to reach the Moscow road before the enemy. During the Battle of Smolensk in 1812, the Russian armies, through active defense and skillful maneuver of reserves, managed to avoid a general battle imposed by Napoleon I in unfavorable conditions and on the night of August 6 (18) retreat to Dorogobuzh. The enemy continued to advance on Moscow.
The length of the retreat caused grumbling among the soldiers and officers of the Russian army and general discontent in Russian society. The departure from Smolensk exacerbated hostile relations between P. I. Bagration and M. B. Barclay de Tolly. This forced Alexander I to establish the post of commander-in-chief of all active Russian armies and appoint to it the infantry general (from August 19 (31) Field Marshal General) M. I. Kutuzov, the head of the St. Petersburg and Moscow militias. Kutuzov arrived in the army on August 17 (29) and took over the main command.
Having found a position near Tsarev Zaymishcha (now a village in the Vyazemsky district of the Smolensk region), where Barclay de Tolly on August 19 (31) intended to give the enemy a battle that was unfavorable and the army’s forces were insufficient, Kutuzov withdrew his troops to several crossings to the east and stopped in front of Mozhaisk, near the village Borodino, on a field that made it possible to position troops advantageously and block the Old and New Smolensk roads. The arriving reserves under the command of the general from infantry, the Moscow and Smolensk militias made it possible to increase the forces of the Russian army to 132 thousand people and 624 guns. Napoleon I had a force of about 135 thousand people and 587 guns. Neither side achieved its goals: Napoleon I was unable to defeat the Russian army, Kutuzov was unable to block the path of the Great Army to Moscow. The Napoleonic army, having lost about 50 thousand people (according to French data, over 30 thousand people) and most of the cavalry, turned out to be seriously weakened. Kutuzov, having received information about the losses of the Russian army (44 thousand people), refused to continue the battle and gave the order to retreat.
By retreating to Moscow, he hoped to partially make up for the losses suffered and fight a new battle. But the position chosen by cavalry general L.L. Bennigsen near the walls of Moscow turned out to be extremely unfavorable. Taking into account that the first actions of the partisans showed high efficiency, Kutuzov ordered to take them under the control of the General Staff of the field army, entrusting their leadership to the duty general of staff, General-L. P. P. Konovnitsyna. At a military council in the village of Fili (now within the boundaries of Moscow) on September 1 (13), Kutuzov ordered to leave Moscow without a fight. Most of the population left the city along with the troops. On the very first day the French entered Moscow, fires began, lasting until September 8 (20) and devastating the city. While the French were in Moscow, partisan detachments surrounded the city in an almost continuous mobile ring, not allowing enemy foragers to move further than 15-30 km from it. The most active were the actions of the army partisan detachments, I. S. Dorokhov, A. N. Seslavin and A. S. Figner.
Leaving Moscow, Russian troops retreated along the Ryazan road. After walking 30 km, they crossed the Moscow River and turned west. Then, with a forced march, they crossed to the Tula road and on September 6 (18) concentrated in the Podolsk area. After 3 days they were already on the Kaluga road and on September 9 (21) they stopped at a camp near the village of Krasnaya Pakhra (since July 1, 2012, within Moscow). Having completed 2 more transitions, Russian troops concentrated on September 21 (October 3) near the village of Tarutino (now a village in the Zhukovsky district of the Kaluga region). As a result of a skillfully organized and executed marching maneuver, they broke away from the enemy and took up an advantageous position for a counterattack.
The active participation of the population in the partisan movement turned the war from a confrontation between regular armies into a people's war. The main forces of the Great Army and all its communications from Moscow to Smolensk were under the threat of attacks from Russian troops. The French lost their freedom of maneuver and activity. The routes to the provinces south of Moscow that were not devastated by the war were closed to them. The “small war” launched by Kutuzov further complicated the enemy’s position. Bold operations of army and peasant partisan detachments disrupted the supply of French troops. Realizing the critical situation, Napoleon I sent General J. Lauriston to the headquarters of the Russian commander-in-chief with peace proposals addressed to Alexander I. Kutuzov rejected them, saying that the war was just beginning and would not stop until the enemy was completely expelled from Russia.
The Russian army located in the Tarutino camp reliably covered the south of the country: Kaluga with military reserves concentrated there, Tula and Bryansk with weapons and foundries. At the same time, reliable communications were ensured with the 3rd Western and Danube armies. In the Tarutino camp, the troops were reorganized, re-equipped (their number was increased to 120 thousand people), and supplied with weapons, ammunition and food. There was now 2 times more artillery than the enemy, and 3.5 times more cavalry. The provincial militia numbered 100 thousand people. They covered Moscow in a semicircle along the line Klin, Kolomna, Aleksin. Under Tarutin, M.I. Kutuzov developed a plan for encircling and defeating the Great Army in the area between the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers with the main forces of the active army, the Danube Army of P.V. Chichagov and the corps of P.H. Wittgenstein.
The first blow was struck on October 6 (18) against the vanguard of the French army on the Chernishnya River (Battle of Tarutino 1812). The troops of Marshal I. Murat lost 2.5 thousand killed and 2 thousand prisoners in this battle. Napoleon I was forced to leave Moscow on October 7 (19), and advanced detachments of Russian troops entered it on October 10 (22). The French lost about 5 thousand people and began to retreat along the Old Smolensk Road, which they had destroyed. The Tarutino battle and the battle of Maloyaroslavets marked a radical turning point in the war. The strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Russian command. From that time on, the fighting of Russian troops and partisans acquired an active character and included such methods of armed struggle as parallel pursuit and encirclement of enemy troops. The persecution was carried out in several directions: a detachment of Major General P.V. Golenishchev-Kutuzov operated north of the Smolensk road; along the Smolensk road - the Cossack regiments of the cavalry general; south of the Smolensk road - the vanguard of M. A. Miloradovich and the main forces of the Russian army. Having overtaken the enemy's rearguard near Vyazma, Russian troops defeated him on October 22 (November 3) - the French lost about 8.5 thousand people killed, wounded and captured, then in battles near Dorogobuzh, near Dukhovshchina, near the village of Lyakhovo (now Glinsky district of Smolensk region) - more than 10 thousand people.
The surviving part of Napoleon's army retreated to Smolensk, but there were no food supplies or reserves there. Napoleon I hastily began to withdraw his troops further. But in the battles near Krasnoye and then near Molodechno, Russian troops defeated the French. Scattered enemy units retreated to the river along the road to Borisov. The 3rd Western Army was approaching there to join the corps of P.H. Wittgenstein. Her troops occupied Minsk on November 4 (16), and on November 9 (21), P. V. Chichagov’s army approached Borisov and, after a battle with the detachment of General Ya. Kh. Dombrovsky, occupied the city and the right bank of the Berezina. Wittgenstein's corps, after a stubborn battle with the French corps of Marshal L. Saint-Cyr, captured Polotsk on October 8 (20). Having crossed the Western Dvina, Russian troops occupied Lepel (now Vitebsk region, Belarus) and defeated the French at Chashniki. With the approach of Russian troops to the Berezina, a “sack” was formed in the Borisov area, in which the retreating French troops were surrounded. However, Wittgenstein's indecision and Chichagov's mistakes made it possible for Napoleon I to prepare a crossing across the Berezina and avoid the complete destruction of his army. Having reached Smorgon (now Grodno region, Belarus), on November 23 (December 5), Napoleon I left for Paris, and the remnants of his army were almost completely destroyed.
On December 14 (26), Russian troops occupied Bialystok and Brest-Litovsk (now Brest), completing the liberation of the territory of the Russian Empire. On December 21, 1812 (January 2, 1813), M.I. Kutuzov, in an order to the army, congratulated the troops on expelling the enemy from the country and called on “to complete the defeat of the enemy on his own fields.”
The victory in the Patriotic War of 1812 preserved the independence of Russia, and the defeat of the Great Army not only dealt a crushing blow to the military power of Napoleonic France, but also played a decisive role in the liberation of a number of European states from French expansion, strengthened the liberation struggle of the Spanish people, etc. As a result of the Russian army in 1813 -14 and the liberation struggle of the peoples of Europe, the Napoleonic empire collapsed. The victory in the Patriotic War was at the same time used to strengthen autocracy both in the Russian Empire and in Europe. Alexander I headed the Holy Alliance created by European monarchs, whose activities were aimed at suppressing the revolutionary, republican and liberation movements in Europe. The Napoleonic army lost over 500 thousand people in Russia, all the cavalry and almost all the artillery (only the corps of J. MacDonald and K. Schwarzenberg survived); Russian troops - about 300 thousand people.
The Patriotic War of 1812 is distinguished by its large spatial scope, tension, and variety of strategic and tactical forms of armed struggle. The military art of Napoleon I, which surpassed that of all the armies of Europe at that time, collapsed in a clash with the Russian army. Russian strategy surpassed Napoleonic strategy, designed for a short-term campaign. M.I. Kutuzov skillfully used the popular nature of the war and, taking into account political and strategic factors, implemented his plan to fight the Napoleonic army. The experience of the Patriotic War contributed to the consolidation of column and loose formation tactics in the actions of troops, increasing the role of aimed fire, improving the interaction of infantry, cavalry and artillery; The form of organization of military formations - divisions and corps - was firmly established. The reserve became an integral part of the battle formation, and the role of artillery in battle increased.
The Patriotic War of 1812 occupies an important place in the history of Russia. She demonstrated the unity of all classes in the fight against foreigners. aggression, was the most important factor in the formation of Russian self-awareness. people. Under the influence of the victory over Napoleon I, the ideology of the Decembrists began to take shape. The experience of the war was summarized in the works of domestic and foreign military historians; the patriotism of the Russian people and army inspired the creativity of Russian writers, artists, and composers. The victory in the Patriotic War was associated with the construction of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow and numerous churches throughout the Russian Empire; military trophies were kept in the Kazan Cathedral. The events of the Patriotic War are captured in numerous monuments on the Borodino field, in Maloyaroslavets and Tarutino, reflected in triumphal arches in Moscow and St. Petersburg, paintings of the Winter Palace, the panorama “Battle of Borodino” in Moscow, etc. A huge amount of memoir literature has been preserved about the Patriotic War.
Additional literature:
Akhsharumov D.I. Description of the War of 1812. St. Petersburg, 1819;
Buturlin D.P. The history of Emperor Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812. 2nd ed. St. Petersburg, 1837-1838. Part 1-2;
Okunev N.A. Discourse on the great military actions, battles and battles that took place during the invasion of Russia in 1812. 2nd ed. St. Petersburg, 1841;
Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky A.I. Description of the Patriotic War of 1812. 3rd ed. St. Petersburg, 1843;
Bogdanovich M.I. History of the Patriotic War of 1812 according to reliable sources. St. Petersburg, 1859-1860. T. 1-3;
Patriotic War of 1812: Materials of the Military Scientific Archive. Dept. 1-2. St. Petersburg, 1900-1914. [Vol. 1-22];
Patriotic War and Russian society, 1812-1912. M., 1911-1912. T. 1-7;
Great Patriotic War: 1812 St. Petersburg, 1912;
Zhilin P.A. Counter-offensive of the Russian army in 1812. 2nd ed. M., 1953;
aka. The death of Napoleonic army in Russia. 2nd ed. M., 1974;
aka. Patriotic War of 1812. 3rd ed. M., 1988;
M.I. Kutuzov: [Documents and materials]. M., 1954-1955. T. 4. Parts 1-2;
1812: Sat. articles. M., 1962;
Babkin V.I. People's militia in the Patriotic War of 1812. M., 1962;
Beskrovny L.G. Patriotic War of 1812. M., 1962;
Korneychik E.I. The Belarusian people in the Patriotic War of 1812. Minsk, 1962;
Sirotkin V.G. Duel of two diplomacy: Russia and France in 1801-1812. M., 1966;
aka. Alexander the First and Napoleon: a duel on the eve of the war. M., 2012;
Tartakovsky A.G. 1812 and Russian memoirs: Experience in source study. M., 1980;
Abalikhin B.S., Dunaevsky V.A. 1812 at the crossroads of the opinions of Soviet historians, 1917-1987. M., 1990;
1812. Memoirs of soldiers of the Russian army: From the collection of the Department of Written Sources of the State Historical Museum. M., 1991;
Tarle E.V. Napoleon's invasion of Russia, 1812. M., 1992;
aka. 1812: El. works. M., 1994;
1812 in the memoirs of contemporaries. M., 1995;
Gulyaev Yu.N., Soglaev V.T. Field Marshal Kutuzov: [Historical and biographical sketch]. M., 1995;
Russian archive: History of the Fatherland in evidence and documents of the 18th-20th centuries. M., 1996. Issue. 7;
Kircheisen F. Napoleon I: In 2 vols. M., 1997;
Chandler D. Napoleon's military campaigns: The triumph and tragedy of the conqueror. M., 1999;
Sokolov O.V. Napoleon's army. St. Petersburg, 1999;
Shein I.A. The War of 1812 in Russian historiography. M., 2002.
Confrontation between two armies. Guerrilla warfare. The Russian army was stationed near Tarutino, 80 km from Moscow, covering the Tula arms factories and the fertile southern provinces. Reserves were brought in, wounds were healed. Having settled in Moscow, Napoleon believed that the campaign was over and was waiting for proposals for peace. But no one sent ambassadors to him. The proud conqueror had to make his own requests to Kutuzov and Alexander I. Kutuzov answered evasively, citing a lack of authority. However, the army he led was resolutely against peace negotiations. Meanwhile, a behind-the-scenes struggle was going on at court. The Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna, the Tsar's brother Constantine and the Tsar's favorite Arakcheev led the court group that demanded peace with Napoleon. They were joined by Chancellor N.P. Rumyantsev. Tensions arose between the army and the court, and the generals brought to the attention of the tsar their wish for Rumyantsev’s resignation. Alexander considered such an act the greatest insolence, but suppressed his anger. Rumyantsev remained as chancellor. But the tsar refused to enter into negotiations with Napoleon.
I. M. Pryanishnikov. "In 1812." 1874
The position of Napoleonic army quickly deteriorated. Having been cut off from its rear bases, it existed by seizing food from the local population. Foragers and marauders were rampant everywhere. Peasants near Moscow, like those from Smolensk before, went into the forests. A partisan movement developed on Smolensk soil and in the Moscow region. The partisan detachments were led by soldiers who had escaped from captivity, local landowners, and particularly authoritative peasants. Under the command of the serf Gerasim Kurin, over 5 thousand foot and 500 horse peasants fought in the Moscow region. In the Smolensk province, elder Vasilisa Kozhina, who led a detachment of teenagers and women, became widely known. The partisans hunted down and destroyed small groups of Napoleonicsoldier.
Kutuzov, who quickly appreciated the importance of partisan warfare, began sending flying cavalry detachments behind enemy lines. Using the support of the population, they delivered sensitive blows to the enemy. One of the first to join the partisans was the poet and hussar Denis Vasilyevich Davydov (1784). Lieutenant Colonel Figner penetrated into occupied Moscow and sent reports to Kutuzov’s headquarters. He then organized a partisan detachment from stragglers and peasants. His reports contributed to the success of Russian troops in the battle of Tarutino. Seslavin's detachment carried out bold raids behind enemy lines. Dorokhov’s detachment, interacting with peasant rebels, liberated the city of Vereya at the end of September. In OctoberThe partisan detachments of Davydov, Figner, Seslavin and Orlov-Davydov, acting together, surrounded and captured 2 thousand French. During the month of its stay in Moscow, the French army lost about 30 thousand people.
Vereshchagin V.V. “On the high road. Retreat and flight." 1895
Napoleon's retreat from Moscow and the death of his army. The cold weather was approaching, and Napoleon realized that spending the winter in the Moscow ashes would be madness. In early October, a battle took place near the village of Tarutina between the French vanguard and units of the Russian army. The French retreated with heavy losses. As if in order to “punish” the Russians. Napoleon withdrew his army from Moscow on October 7. The advanced units of the two armies met at Maloyaroslavets. While the city was changing hands, the main forces arrived. Napoleon faced a question:whether to give a general battle to break through to the Kaluga road, or to retreat along Smolenskaya, where burned and plundered villages and an embittered population awaited him. This time, the invincible Napoleon decided not to tempt fate and gave the order to retreat to Smolensk.It turned out that you cannot escape fate.
The retreating French troops were subjected to continuous attacks by Cossacks, flying cavalry units, and partisans. Horses died from lack of food, the French cavalry dismounted, and artillery had to be abandoned. Kutuzov's army moved parallel to Napoleonic's, all the time threatening to break ahead and cut off the route of retreat. Because of this, Napoleon was unable to stay in Smolensk for more than four days. In November, cold weather began, and the position of the French army became critical. Only the guard and the two corps that joined it remained combat capable. The Napoleonic army suffered huge losses while crossing the Berezina River on November 14. Soon after this, Napoleon left for Paris, leaving the army. In mid-December, its pitiful remnants crossed back across the Neman. The Russian army pursuing Napoleon also suffered heavy losses.
Seeing the plight of the army and the country, Kutuzov was inclined to end the war. But Alexander was convinced that Napoleon, remaining in power, would pose a constant threat to the world. Soon the Russian army resumed military operations.
Historical significance of the Patriotic War of 1812. The Napoleonic invasion was a huge misfortune for Russia. Many cities were reduced to dust and ashes. In the fire of the Moscow fire, precious relics of the past disappeared forever. Industry and agriculture suffered enormous damage. Subsequently, the Moscow province quickly recovered from the devastation, and in Smolensk and Pskov, until the middle of the century, the population was less than in 1811.
But a common misfortune, as we know, brings people together. In the fight against the enemy, the population of the central provinces, which formed the core of the Russian nation, closely rallied. Not only the provinces that were directly affected by the invasion, but also the lands adjacent to them, which received refugees and the wounded, sent warriors, food and weapons, lived in those days with one life, one thing. This significantly accelerated the complex and lengthy process of consolidation of the Russian nation. Other peoples of Russia became closer to the Russian people.
The sacrificial role that befell Moscow in the dramatic events of 1812 further increased its importance as the spiritual center of Russia. On the contrary, dignitary Petersburg, the court, and the official government found themselves on the periphery of events. It was as if they were almost forgotten about in that terrible year. Alexander I never managed to get closer to the people. And that’s probably why he didn’t like Kutuzov so much that he couldn’t, unlike the old field marshal, easily drink tea with the peasants.
It was no coincidence that Kutuzov, who happily combined the best traits of the Russian character, found himself at the center of events. Nominated by the people, by society, that year he became essentially a national leader. In the very name of the Patriotic War;as if its social, folk character is emphasized. In 1812, Russian society again took, as in the times of Minin and Pozharsky, the matter of defending the Fatherland into its own hands. In the fight against foreign invaders, Russia defended its independence and territorial integrity.http://clarino2.narod.ru/
THE LAST DAYS OF THE PATRIOTIC WAR OF 1812
The moment of Alexander I’s departure to the army was approaching. He decided to leave St. Petersburg immediately, since Kutuzov, citing the fact that the army was bleeding and upset, did not consider it possible for it to cross the Neman.
On December 6, Alexander granted Kutuzov the title of “Prince of Smolensky,” and now his title in full sounded like this: “His Serene Highness Prince Golenishchev-Kutuzov-Smolensky.”
That same evening, Alexander held a prayer service in the Kazan Cathedral, asking for good luck in his upcoming plans and well-being on his journey, and the next morning he left St. Petersburg for Vilna.On December 11, he arrived in Vilna, and on December 12, his birthday, he solemnly awarded Kutuzov the Order of St. George, 1st degree - the first and only Russian military commander in the War of 1812. Then, in 1813-1814, during a foreign campaign, after the capture of Paris, Barclay de Tolly and Bennigsen received the same award.
On the same day, Alexander said to the generals gathered in the palace: “You saved not only Russia, you saved Europe.” Those who were present and heard these words understood well what was being said - a liberation campaign lay ahead of them. The coming days fully confirmed this guess - the army began to prepare for the crossing of the Neman.
And then the Tsar’s Manifesto of amnesty was announced to all Poles who served in Napoleon’s troops or provided any services to his army or administration.
On December 23, 1812, Kutuzov gave the order to transfer the Main Apartment from Vilna to the border town of Merech.
Just before leaving Vilna, an incident occurred about which the field marshal notified his wife and which is not without interest for us. “Now here’s the commission: the Don Cossacks brought from their loot forty pounds of silver in ingots and asked me to make use of it, whatever I decide. We came up with this: to decorate the Kazan Church with this (Kazan Cathedral in St. Petersburg - V.B.). Here I am sending a letter to the Metropolitan and another to the Archpriest of Kazan. And take care that the letters are delivered correctly, and that good artists are used. We will pay all expenses."
In a letter to the church hierarchs, Kutuzov supplemented his message with the fact that the silver was taken by the French from robbed churches, and asked that it be used for the image of the four evangelists and the decoration of the cathedral, “sculpting the faces of the holy evangelists from silver. In my opinion, it would be very appropriate for these statues to stand near the royal doors in front of the iconostasis... The following inscription should be carved at the foot of each statue: “The Zealous Offering of the Don Army.”
The Kazan Cathedral occupied a special place in the fate of Kutuzov. Despite the fact that the cathedral was consecrated at the end of 1811, it turned out to be firmly connected with the life of Kutuzov and his activities in the Patriotic War.
Leaving for the army, Kutuzov stood here at a solemn prayer service, when the Metropolitan, with the clergy of the Kazan Cathedral, prayed for victory for the Russian army.
As if anticipating the purpose of the St. Petersburg Cathedral, the sculptor S. S. Pimenov placed in the niches of the main portico statues of warrior-saints - Vladimir of Kyiv and Alexander Nevsky, in whose honor military orders were established in Russia.
The trophies of the Patriotic War and the foreign campaign were brought to the Kazan Cathedral: one hundred and five banners and standards of the Napoleonic army and twenty-five keys to the cities and fortresses of Europe. When sending silver to Metropolitan Ambrose of Novgorod and St. Petersburg, Kutuzov also remembered that the clergy of St. Petersburg donated seven hundred and fifty thousand rubles to the people’s militia and that many “people of clergy” signed up as warriors in this militia. Subsequently, the Kazan Cathedral became the tomb of the field marshal.
Engraving by Vorobyov M.N. "Funeral of Kutuzov", 1814
December 25, 1812 (January 6 1813 ) Alexander I signed the HIGHEST MANIFESTO ON BRINGING THANKS TO THE LORD GOD FOR THE LIBERATION OF RUSSIA FROM THE ENEMY INVASION (manifesto on the end of the Patriotic War), whichmarked the end of the Patriotic War. In the manifestoit was reported that in honor of the end of the war the Cathedral of Christ the Savior would be built, in itIt was also prescribed that the great Victory Day should be celebrated annually on the day of the Nativity of Christ. The holiday was canceled after the October Revolution of 1917.
Alexander remained firm in his decision to cross the Neman andOn December 28, the main forces of the Russian army left Vilna and moved to Merech on the Neman.
On January 1, 1813, after serving a prayer service, Alexander and Kutuzov, together with the army, crossed the Neman.
The foreign campaign of 1813-1814 began. But that is another story...
The French invasion of Russia, also known as the Russian Campaign of 1812, was a turning point in the Napoleonic Wars. After the campaign, only a small part of their former military power remained at the disposal of France and the allies. The war left a huge mark on culture (for example, “War and Peace” by L.N. Tolstoy) and national identification, so necessary during the German attack in 1941-1945.
We call the French invasion the Patriotic War of 1812 (not to be confused with the Great Patriotic War, which is called the attack of Nazi Germany on). In an attempt to gain the support of Polish nationalists by playing on their feelings of nationalism, Napoleon called this war the “Second Polish War” (“The First Polish War” was a war for Polish independence from Russia, Prussia and Austria). Napoleon promised to revive the Polish state in the territories of modern Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine.
Causes of the Patriotic War
At the time of the invasion, Napoleon was at the pinnacle of power and had virtually crushed the entire continental Europe under his influence. He often left local government in defeated countries, which earned him fame as a liberal, strategically wise politician, but all local authorities worked to benefit the interests of France.
None of the political forces operating in Europe at that time dared to go against the interests of Napoleon. In 1809, under the terms of a peace treaty with Austria, it undertook to transfer western Galicia under the control of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Russia saw this as an infringement of its interests and the preparation of a springboard for an invasion of Russia.
This is what Napoleon wrote in an attempt to enlist the help of Polish nationalists in his decree of June 22, 1812: “Soldiers, the second Polish war has begun. The first ended in Tilsit. In Tilsit, Russia swore an eternal alliance with France and war with England. Today Russia is breaking its oaths. Russia is led by fate and the destined must be fulfilled. Does this mean that we must be degenerate? No, we will move on, we will cross the Neman River and start a war on its territory. The second Polish war will be victorious with the French army at its head, just as the first war was.”
The First Polish War was a war of four coalitions to liberate Poland from Russian, Prussian, and Austrian rule. One of the officially declared goals of the war was the restoration of an independent Poland within the borders of modern Poland and Lithuania.
Emperor Alexander the First took over the country in an economic hole, since the industrial revolution that was taking place everywhere bypassed Russia. However, Russia was rich in raw materials and was part of Napoleonic strategy to build the economy of continental Europe. These plans made it impossible to trade in raw materials, which was vitally important for Russia from an economic point of view. Russian refusal to participate in the strategy was another reason for Napoleon's attack.
Logistics
Napoleon and the Grande Armée developed the ability to maintain combat effectiveness beyond territories where they were well supplied. This was not so difficult in densely populated and agricultural central Europe with its network of roads and well-functioning infrastructure. The Austrian and Prussian armies were stymied by rapid movements, and this was achieved by timely supplies of fodder.
But in Russia, Napoleon's war strategy turned against him. Forced marches often forced troops to do without supplies, since supply caravans simply could not keep up with the fast-moving Napoleonic army. The lack of food and water in the sparsely populated and undeveloped regions of Russia led to the death of people and horses.
The army was weakened by constant hunger, as well as diseases caused by dirty water, as they had to drink even from puddles and use rotten fodder. The forward detachments received everything they could get, while the rest of the army was forced to starve.
Napoleon made impressive preparations to supply his army. Seventeen convoys, consisting of 6,000 carts, were supposed to provide the Grand Army with supplies for 40 days. A system of ammunition depots was also prepared in the cities of Poland and East Prussia.
At the beginning of the campaign there were no plans to take Moscow, so there were not enough supplies. However, the Russian armies, dispersed over a large area, could not oppose Napoleon's army, consisting of 285,000 thousand people, in one major battle separately and continued to retreat in an attempt to unite.
This forced the Grand Army to advance along muddy roads with bottomless swamps and frozen ruts, which led to the death of exhausted horses and broken wagons. Charles José Minard wrote that the Napoleonic army suffered most of its losses while advancing towards Moscow in the summer and autumn, and not in open battles. Hunger, thirst, typhus and suicide brought more losses to the French army than all the battles with the Russian army combined.
Composition of Napoleon's Grand Army
On June 24, 1812, the Grand Army, numbering 690,000 men (the largest army ever assembled in European history), crossed the Neman River and advanced towards Moscow.
The Grand Army was divided into:
- The army for the main attack numbered 250,000 men under the personal command of the emperor.
The other two advanced armies were commanded by Eugène de Beauharnais (80,000 men) and Jerome Bonaparte (70,000 men). - Two separate corps under the command of Jacques Macdonald (32,500 men, mostly Prussian soldiers) and Karl Schwarzenberg (34,000 Austrian soldiers).
- Reserve army of 225,000 people (the main part remained in Germany and Poland).
There was also a National Guard of 80,000 who remained to protect the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Including these, the strength of the French imperial army on the Russian border was 800,000. This huge accumulation of human power greatly thinned out the Empire. Because 300,000 French soldiers, along with 200,000 thousand Germans and Italians, fought in Iberia.
The army consisted of:
- 300,000 French
- 34,000 Austrian corps led by Schwarzenberg
- about 90,000 Poles
- 90,000 Germans (including Bavarians, Saxons, Prussians, Westphalians, Württembergers, Badeners)
- 32,000 Italians
- 25,000 Neapolitans
- 9,000 Swiss (German sources specify 16,000 people)
- 4,800 Spaniards
- 3,500 Croats
- 2,000 Portuguese
Anthony Joes, in the Journal of Conflict Research, wrote: Accounts of how many of Napoleon's soldiers served in the war and how many of them returned vary widely. Georges Lefebvre writes that Napoleon crossed the Niemen with more than 600,000 soldiers, and only half of them were French. The rest were mostly Germans and Poles.
Felix Markham claims that 450,000 soldiers crossed the Niemen on June 25, 1812, of whom less than 40,000 returned in some semblance of an army. James Marshall-Cornwall writes that 510,000 imperial soldiers invaded Russia. Eugene Tarle estimates that 420,000 were with Napoleon and 150,000 followed behind, making a total of 570,000 soldiers.
Richard K. Rhyne gives the following figures: 685,000 people crossed the Russian border, of whom 355,000 were French. 31,000 were able to leave Russia as a united military formation, while another 35,000 people fled individually and in small groups. The total number of survivors is estimated at approximately 70,000.
Whatever the actual exact numbers, everyone agrees that practically the entire Grand Army remained killed or wounded on Russian territory.
Adam Zamoyski estimates that between 550,000 and 600,000 French and Allied soldiers, including reinforcements, took part in the crossing of the Niemen. At least 400,000 soldiers died.
The infamous graphs of Charles Minard (an innovator in the field of graphical analysis methods) plotted the size of an advancing army on a contour map, as well as the number of retreating soldiers as temperatures dropped (temperatures that year dropped to -30 Celsius). According to these charts, 422,000 crossed the Niemen with Napoleon, 22,000 soldiers separated and headed north, only 100,000 survived the journey to Moscow. Of these 100,000, only 4,000 survived and joined with 6,000 soldiers from a collateral army of 22,000. Thus, only 10,000 of the original 422,000 soldiers returned.
Russian Imperial Army
The forces that opposed Napoleon at the time of the attack consisted of three armies totaling 175,250 regular soldiers, 15,000 Cossacks and 938 cannons:
- The First Western Army, under the command of Field Marshal General Michael Barclay de Tolly, consisted of 104,250 soldiers, 7,000 Cossacks and 558 cannons.
- The Second Western Army under the command of Infantry General Peter Bagration numbered 33,000 soldiers, 4,000 Cossacks and 216 cannons.
- The Third Reserve Army, under the command of cavalry general Alexander Tormasov, consisted of 38,000 soldiers, 4,000 Cossacks and 164 cannons.
However, these forces could count on reinforcements, which amounted to 129,000 soldiers, 8,000 Cossacks and 434 cannons.
But only 105,000 of these potential reinforcements could take part in the defense against the invasion. In addition to the reserve, there were recruits and militia, totaling approximately 161,000 men of varying degrees of training. Of these, 133,000 took part in the defense.
Although the total number of all formations was 488,000 people, only approximately 428,000 thousand of them opposed the Grand Army from time to time. Also, more than 80,000 Cossacks and militias and about 20,000 soldiers garrisoned fortresses in the combat zone did not take part in the open confrontation with Napoleon’s army.
Sweden, Russia's only ally, did not send reinforcements. But the alliance with Sweden allowed 45,000 soldiers to be transferred from Finland and used in subsequent battles (20,000 soldiers were sent to Riga).
Beginning of the Patriotic War
The invasion began on June 24, 1812. Shortly before, Napoleon sent the last peace proposal to St. Petersburg on terms favorable to France. Having received no answer, he gave the order to advance to the Russian part of Poland. At first, the army did not encounter resistance and quickly advanced through enemy territory. The French army at that time consisted of 449,000 soldiers and 1,146 artillery pieces. They were opposed by Russian armies consisting of only 153,000 soldiers, 15,000 Cossacks and 938 cannons.
The central army of the French forces rushed to Kaunas and crossings were made by the French Guards, numbering 120,000 soldiers. The crossing itself was carried out to the south, where three pontoon bridges were built. The crossing location was chosen by Napoleon personally.
Napoleon had a tent set up on a hill from where he could watch the crossing of the Niemen. The roads in this part of Lithuania were little better than just muddy ruts in the middle of a dense forest. From the very beginning, the army suffered, as supply trains simply could not keep up with the marching troops, and the rear formations experienced even greater hardships.
March on Vilnius
On June 25, Napoleon's army, crossing along an existing crossing, met an army under the command of Michel Ney. The cavalry under the command of Joachim Murat was in the vanguard along with Napoleon's army, Louis Nicolas Davout's First Corps followed. Eugene de Beauharnais with his army crossed the Niemen to the north, MacDonald's army followed and crossed the river on the same day.
The army under the command of Jerome Bonaparte did not cross the river with everyone and only crossed the river on June 28 in Grodno. Napoleon rushed to Vilnius, not giving rest to the infantry, languishing under the torrential rains and unbearable heat. The main part covered 70 miles in two days. Ney's Third Corps marched along the road to Suterva, while on the other side of the Vilnia River marched the corps of Nikola Oudinot.
These maneuvers were part of an operation whose purpose was to encircle the army of Peter Wittgenstein with the armies of Ney, Oudinot and Macdonald. But MacDonald's army was delayed and the opportunity for encirclement was missed. Then Jerome was assigned to march against Bagration in Grodno, and Jean Rainier's Seventh Corps was sent to Bialystok for support.
On June 24, Russian headquarters were located in Vilnius, and messengers rushed to notify Barclay de Tolly that the enemy had crossed the Neman. During the night, Bagration and Platov received orders to go on the offensive. Emperor Alexander I left Vilnius on June 26, and Barclay de Tolly took command. Barclay de Tolly wanted to fight, but assessed the situation and realized that there was no point in fighting, due to the numerical superiority of the enemy. Then he ordered the ammunition depots to be burned and the Vilnius bridge to be dismantled. Wittgenstein and his army advanced towards the Lithuanian town of Perkele, breaking away from the encirclement of Macdonald and Oudinot.
It was not possible to avoid the battle completely, and Wittgenstein’s detachments following behind nevertheless came into conflict with Oudinot’s advanced detachments. On the left flank of the Russian army, Dokhturov's corps was threatened by Phalen's third cavalry corps. Bagration was given the order to advance to Vileika (Minsk region) to meet the army of Barclay de Tolly, although the meaning of this maneuver remains a mystery to this day.
On June 28, Napoleon, almost without battles, entered Vilnius. Replenishment of fodder in Lithuania was difficult, since the land there was mostly unfertile and covered with dense forests. Forage supplies were poorer than in Poland, and two days of non-stop marching only made the situation worse.
The main problem was the ever-increasing distances between the army and the supply region. In addition, not a single convoy could keep up with the infantry column during the forced march. Even the weather itself became a problem. This is what historian Richard K. Rhine writes about it: Thunderstorms with lightning and heavy rains on June 24 washed out the roads. Some argued that there are no roads in Lithuania and there are bottomless swamps everywhere. Carts sat on their bellies, horses fell exhausted, people lost their shoes in puddles. Stuck convoys became obstacles, people were forced to go around them, and forage and artillery columns could not go around them. Then the sun came out and baked the deep potholes, turning them into concrete canyons. In these ruts, horses broke their legs and carts broke their wheels.
Lieutenant Mertens, a subject of Württemberg who served in Ney's Third Corps, wrote in his diary that the oppressive heat that followed the rain killed the horses and forced them to set up camp practically in the swamps. Dysentery and influenza raged in the army, despite field hospitals designed to protect against the epidemic, hundreds of people were infected.
He reported the time, place and events that took place with high accuracy. So on June 6 there was a strong thunderstorm with thunder and lightning, and already on the 11th people began to die from sunstroke. The Crown Prince of Württemberg reported 21 dead in the bivouac. The Bavarian corps reported 345 seriously ill people by June 13th.
Desertion was rampant in the Spanish and Portuguese formations. Deserters terrorized the population, stealing everything they could get their hands on. The areas where the Grand Army passed remained destroyed. A Polish officer wrote that people abandoned their houses, and the area was depopulated.
The French light cavalry were shocked at how vastly outnumbered they were by the Russians. The superiority was so noticeable that Napoleon ordered infantry to support his cavalry. This even applied to reconnaissance and reconnaissance. Despite thirty thousand cavalry, they were never able to locate Barclay de Tolly's troops, forcing Napoleon to send columns in all directions in the hope of identifying the enemy's position.
Chasing the Russian Army
The operation, which was intended to prevent the unification of the armies of Bagration and Barclay de Tolly near Vilnius, cost the French army 25,000 dead from minor skirmishes with Russian armies and disease. Then it was decided to move from Vilnius in the direction of Nemencine, Mihalishka, Oshmyany and Maliata.
Eugene crossed the river at Prenn on June 30, while Jerome was leading his Seventh Corps to Bialystok along with units crossing to Grodno. Murat advanced to Nemenchin on July 1, pursuing Dokhturov's third cavalry corps on the way to Dzhunashev. Napoleon decided that this was Bagration's second army and rushed in pursuit. Only after 24 hours of infantry chasing the cavalry regiment, reconnaissance reported that it was not Bagration’s army.
Napoleon then decided to use the armies of Davout, Jerome and Eugene to catch Bagration's army between a rock and a hard place in an operation covering Oshmyana and Minsk. The operation failed on the left flank, where MacDonald and Oudinot did not make it. Dokhturov, meanwhile, moved from Dzhunashev to Svir to meet Bagration’s army, avoiding battles with the French army. 11 French regiments and a battery of 12 artillery pieces were too slow to stop him.
Conflicting orders and lack of intelligence almost brought Bagration's army between the armies of Davout and Jerome. But even here Jerome was late, stuck in the mud and experiencing the same problems with food supplies and weather as the rest of the Grand Army. Jerome's army lost 9,000 men during the four days of pursuit. Disagreements between Jerome Bonaparte and General Dominique Vandamme further aggravated the situation. Meanwhile, Bagration linked his army with Dokhturov's corps and had 45,000 men at his disposal in the area of the village of Novy Sverzhen by July 7th.
Davout lost 10,000 men during the march to Minsk and did not dare to engage in battle without the support of Jerome's army. Two French cavalry corps were defeated, outnumbered by the corps of Matvey Platov, leaving the French army without intelligence. Bagration was also not sufficiently informed. So Davout believed that Bagration had about 60,000 soldiers, while Bagration believed that Davout's army had 70,000 soldiers. Armed with false information, both generals were in no hurry to engage in battle.
Bagration received orders from both Alexander I and Barclay de Tolly. Barclay de Tolly, out of ignorance, did not provide Bagration with an understanding of the role of his army in global strategy. This stream of conflicting orders created disagreements between Bagration and Barclay de Tolly, which later had consequences.
Napoleon reached Vilnius on June 28th, leaving behind 10,000 dead horses. These horses were vital to supplying an army that so desperately needed them. Napoleon assumed that Alexander would sue for peace, but to his disappointment this did not happen. And this was not his last disappointment. Barclay continued to retreat to Verkhnedvinsk, deciding that the unification of the 1st and 2nd armies was the highest priority.
Barclay de Tolly continued his retreat and, with the exception of an accidental skirmish between the rearguard of his army and the vanguard of Ney's army, the advance took place without haste or resistance. The Grand Army's usual methods now worked against it.
Rapid forced marches caused desertion, starvation, forced troops to drink dirty water, there was an epidemic in the army, logistics trains lost horses in the thousands, which only aggravated the problems. The 50,000 stragglers and deserters became an uncontrollable mob fighting the peasants in an all-out guerrilla war, which only worsened the supply situation for the Grande Armée. By this time, the army had already been reduced by 95,000 people.
March on Moscow
Supreme Commander-in-Chief Barclay de Tolly refused to join the battle, despite Bagration's calls. Several times he attempted to prepare a powerful defensive position, but Napoleon's troops were too fast, and he did not have time to complete the preparations and retreated. The Russian army continued to retreat inland, adhering to tactics developed by Karl Ludwig Pfuel. Retreating, the army left behind scorched earth, which caused even more serious problems with forage.
Political pressure was put on Barclay de Tolly, forcing him to give battle. But he continued to reject the idea of a global battle, which led to his resignation. The boastful and popular Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov was appointed to the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Despite Kutuzov's populist rhetoric, he continued to adhere to Barclay de Tolly's plan. It was obvious that attacking the French in open battle would lead to the pointless loss of the army.
After an indecisive clash near Smolensk in August, he finally managed to create a decent defensive position at Borodino. The Battle of Borodino took place on September 7th and became the bloodiest battle of the Napoleonic Wars. By September 8, the Russian army was halved and was again forced to retreat, leaving the road to Moscow open. Kutuzov also ordered the evacuation of the city.
By this point, the Russian army had reached its maximum strength of 904,000. Of these, 100,000 were in the immediate vicinity of Moscow and were able to join Kutuzov's army.
Capture of Moscow
On September 14, 1812, Napoleon entered an empty city, from which, by order of Governor Fyodor Rostopchin, all supplies were removed. According to the classic rules of warfare of the time, aimed at capturing the enemy's capital, although the capital was St. Petersburg, Moscow remained the spiritual capital, Napoleon expected Emperor Alexander I to announce surrender on Poklonnaya Hill. But the Russian command did not even think about surrender.
As Napoleon prepared to enter Moscow, he was surprised that he was not met by a delegation from the city. When a victorious general approached, local authorities usually met him at the gates with the keys to the city in an attempt to protect the population and city from plunder. Napoleon sent his assistants to the city in search of official authorities with whom it would be possible to conclude agreements on the occupation of the city. When no one could be found, Napoleon realized that the city was unconditionally abandoned.
In a normal capitulation, city officials were forced to make arrangements to house and feed the soldiers. In this case, the situation forced the soldiers to look for a roof over their heads and food for themselves. Napoleon was secretly disappointed at the lack of adherence to customs, as he believed it robbed him of his traditional victory over the Russians, especially after taking such a spiritually significant city.
Before the order to evacuate Moscow, the city's population was 270,000 people. After most of the population left the city, those who remained robbed and burned food so that the French would not get it. By the time Napoleon entered the Kremlin, no more than a third of its inhabitants remained in the city. Those who remained in the city were mainly foreign traders, servants and people who could not or did not want to evacuate. The remaining people tried to avoid the troops and the large French community, numbering several hundred people.
Burning of Moscow
After the capture of Moscow, the Grand Army, dissatisfied with the conditions of detention and the honors not given to the victors, began to plunder what was left of the city. The fires started that evening and only grew over the following days.
Two-thirds of the city was made of wood. The city was burned almost to the ground. Four-fifths of the city was burned, leaving the French homeless. French historians believe the fires were sabotaged by the Russians.
Leo Tolstoy, in his work War and Peace, states that the fires were not caused by Russian sabotage or French looting. The fires were a natural result of the fact that the city was filled with strangers during the winter season. Tolstoy believed that the fires were a natural consequence of the invaders lighting small fires for heating, cooking and other domestic needs. But they soon got out of control, and without an active fire service there was no one to put them out.
Retreat and defeat of Napoleon
Sitting in the ashes of a ruined city, having failed to receive Russian surrender and facing a rebuilt Russian army driving him out of Moscow, Napoleon began his long retreat by mid-October. At the Battle of Maloyaroslavets, Kutuzov was able to force the French army to use the same Smolensk road for retreat that they used to march to Moscow. The surrounding area had already been deprived of food supplies by both armies. This is often presented as an example of scorched earth tactics.
Continuing to blockade the southern flank to prevent the French from returning via another route, Kutuzov again deployed guerrilla tactics to constantly hit the French procession at its most vulnerable points. Russian light cavalry, including mounted Cossacks, attacked and destroyed the scattered French troops.
Supplying the army became impossible. The lack of grass weakened the already few horses, which were killed and eaten by starving soldiers back in Moscow. Without horses, the French cavalry disappeared as a class and were forced to march on foot. In addition, the lack of horses meant that the cannons and supply trains had to be abandoned, leaving the army without artillery support or ammunition.
Although the army quickly rebuilt its artillery arsenal in 1813, thousands of abandoned military trains created logistical problems until the end of the war. As fatigue, hunger, and the number of sick people grew, so did the number of desertions. Most of the deserters were captured or killed by the peasants whose lands they plundered. However, historians mention cases when soldiers were pitied and warmed up. Many remained to live in Russia, fearing punishment for desertion, and simply assimilated.
Weakened by these circumstances, the French army was beaten three more times in Vyazma, Krasnoye and Polotsk. The crossing of the Berezina River was the last disaster of the war for the Great Army. Two separate Russian armies defeated the remnants of Europe's greatest army in their attempt to cross the river on pontoon bridges.
Losses in the Patriotic War
In early December 1812, Napoleon finds out that General Claude de Male attempted a coup in France. Napoleon abandons the army and returns home on a sleigh, leaving Marshal Joachim Murat in command. Murat soon deserted and fled to Naples, of which he was king. So Napoleon's stepson Eugene de Beauharnais became commander-in-chief.
In the following weeks, the remnants of the Grand Army continued to dwindle. On December 14, 1812, the army left Russian territory. According to popular belief, only 22,000 of Napoleon's army survived the Russian campaign. Although some other sources claim no more than 380,000 dead. The difference can be explained by the fact that almost 100,000 people were captured and that about 80,000 people returned from side armies not under Napoleon's direct command.
For example, most Prussian soldiers survived thanks to the Taurogen Neutrality Convention. The Austrians also escaped, having withdrawn their troops in advance. Later, the so-called Russian-German Legion was organized from German prisoners and deserters in Russia.
Russian casualties in open battles were comparable to French ones, but civilian casualties greatly exceeded military casualties. In general, according to early estimates, it was believed that several million people died, but historians now believe that losses, including civilians, amounted to about a million people. Of these, Russia and France lost 300,000 each, about 72,000 Poles, 50,000 Italians, 80,000 Germans, 61,000 residents of other countries. In addition to the loss of life, the French also lost approximately 200,000 horses and over 1,000 artillery pieces.
It is believed that winter was the decisive factor in Napoleon's defeat, but this is not so. Napoleon lost half his army in the first eight weeks of the campaign. Losses were due to the abandonment of garrisons in supply centers, disease, desertion, and minor skirmishes with Russian armies.
In Borodino, Napoleon's army no longer numbered more than 135,000 people and the victory with losses of 30,000 people became Pyrrhic. Stuck 1000 km deep in enemy territory, having declared himself the winner after the capture of Moscow, Napoleon humiliatingly fled on October 19th. According to historians, the first snow that year fell on November 5th.
Napoleon's attack on Russia was the deadliest military operation of its time.
Historical assessment
The Russian victory over the French army in 1812 dealt a huge blow to Napoleon's ambitions for European dominance. The Russian campaign was the turning point of the Napoleonic Wars, and ultimately led to Napoleon's defeat and exile on the island of Elba. For Russia, the term "Patriotic War" formed a symbol of national identity that had a huge influence on Russian patriotism in the nineteenth century. An indirect result of the Russian patriotic movement was a strong desire to modernize the country, which led to a series of revolutions, starting with the Decembrist uprising and ending with the February Revolution of 1917.
Napoleon's Empire was not completely defeated by the lost war in Russia. The following year he would assemble an army of some 400,000 French, supported by a quarter of a million French-allied soldiers, to contest control of Germany in an even larger campaign known as the War of the Sixth Coalition.
Although outnumbered, he won a decisive victory at the Battle of Dresden (August 26-27, 1813). Only after the decisive battle of Leipzig (Battle of the Nations, October 16-19, 1813) was he finally defeated. Napoleon simply did not have the necessary troops to prevent a coalition invasion of France. Napoleon proved himself to be a brilliant commander and still managed to inflict heavy losses on the vastly superior Allied armies at the Battle of Paris. The city was nevertheless captured and Napoleon was forced to abdicate in 1814.
However, the Russian campaign showed that Napoleon was not invincible, ending his reputation as an invincible military genius. Napoleon foresaw what this would mean, so he quickly fled to France before news of the disaster became known. Sensing this and enlisting the support of Prussian nationalists and the Russian Emperor, German nationalists rebelled against the Confederation of the Rhine and. The decisive German campaign would not have taken place without defeating the most powerful empire in Europe.
