On November 28 (old style), 1877, Russian troops captured Plevna (Pleven). Four long months of siege and four assaults were required to capture the Ottoman stronghold, which chained the main forces of the Russian army to itself and slowed down its advance in the Balkans. “Plevna - this name has become the subject of general attention. The fall of Plevna was an event that everyone expected with intense attention from day to day... The fall of Plevna decided the whole issue of the war.”, - this is how one of the capital’s newspapers of that time wrote about the significance of Plevna. “In almost every war, events often occur that have a decisive influence on all further operations. Such a decisive event was undoubtedly the battle of Plevna on November 28, 1877...”- Major General of the General Staff A.I. Manykin-Nevstruev asserted in turn.
Plevna was located at the intersection of roads leading to Ruschuk, Sofia and Lovche. Wanting to stop the advance of the Russian troops, the Turkish mushir (marshal) Osman Pasha, making a swift rush with his troops, occupied Plevna, ahead of the Russians. When our troops approached the city, the Turks appeared before their eyes, erecting defensive fortifications. The first assault on Turkish positions, launched on July 8, 1877, did not bring success - having overcome three lines of trenches, Russian soldiers burst into the city, but were driven out of there by the Turks.
Having received reinforcements that ensured numerical superiority over the Turkish garrison, the Russian army launched a second assault on July 30, which also did not bring the expected result: having captured two trenches and three fortifications with huge losses, our troops were stopped at the redoubt and then knocked out by the Turkish counteroffensive. “This Second Plevna almost turned into a disaster for the entire army,” noted military historian A.A. Kersnovsky . - The defeat of the IX Corps was complete, the entire rear of the army was gripped by panic, under the influence of which the only bridge crossing at Sistov was almost destroyed. We had 32,000 soldiers at Plevia with 176 guns. There were 26,000 Turks and 50 guns. (...) Our losses: 1 general, 168 officers, 7167 lower ranks. The only trophies are 2 guns. The Turks lost 1,200 people. (...) The Grand Duke Commander-in-Chief completely lost his head and turned to the Romanian King Charles for help in terms that corresponded neither to the dignity of Russia nor the honor of the Russian army.”.
In order to cut off Plevna and prevent the Turks from freely receiving provisions, the Russian command decided to attack Lovcha, which was occupied by a small Turkish garrison. The detachment of General M.D. Skobelev coped with this task brilliantly, taking Lovcha by August 22.
Meanwhile, intensive preparations were underway for the third assault on Plevna, under which all free Russian forces were pulled together. On August 25, a military council was held, at which the majority of military leaders spoke in favor of an immediate assault, so as not to prolong the siege until winter. The Commander-in-Chief of the entire Danube Army, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, who agreed with this argument, set the day of the assault on August 30, the day of the Sovereign’s name day. “And the assault on August 30 became the Third Plevna for Russia! This was the bloodiest affair in all the wars that the Russians ever fought with the Turks. The heroism and self-sacrifice of the troops did not help, nor did the desperate energy of Skobelev, who personally led them into the attack, help... The “Keys of Plevna” - the redoubts of Abdul Bey and Reggie Bey - were taken, but General Zotov, who was in charge of all the troops, refused to support Skobelev, preferring to give up victory rather than weaken the “barriers” and “reserves”. With his last effort, Osman (who had decided to abandon Plevna) snatched victory from a handful of Gortalov’s heroes, who were bleeding in front of Zot’s “reserves,” standing with a gun at their feet.”, - wrote A.A. Kersnovsky.
“White General” M.D. Skobelev, who showed himself brilliantly in this battle, was outraged: “ Napoleon was happy if one of the marshals won him half an hour of time. I won a whole day with it - and they didn’t take advantage of it.”.
Having lost up to 16 thousand soldiers and officers (13 thousand Russians and 3 thousand Romanians) during the last fierce assault, the Russian command decided to begin a blockade of the city.
Meanwhile, Osman Pasha's army received new reinforcements and provisions, and the marshal himself received the title "Ghazi" (invincible) from the Sultan for his successes. However, successful Russian operations near Gorny Dubnyak and Telish led to a complete blockade of Plevna. The Russian-Romanian army besieging Plevna numbered 122 thousand people against almost 50 thousand Turks who had taken refuge in the city. Constant artillery fire, depletion of provisions and the onset of disease led to a significant weakening of the Turkish garrison. Squeezed in Plevna by an iron ring of Russian troops four times larger than it, the army of Osman Pasha began to suffocate in this vice. However, the Turkish commander responded with a decisive refusal to all offers to surrender. Knowing the iron character of the “invincible” Osman Pasha, it was clear that in the current conditions he would make a last attempt to break through the army besieging him.
Early in the morning of November 28, taking advantage of the fog, the besieged Turkish army attacked the Russian troops. Having taken the advanced fortifications thanks to an unexpected and fierce blow, Osman Pasha's army was stopped by artillery fire from the second line of fortifications. And after the attack by Russian-Romanian troops in all directions and Skobelev’s capture of Plevna itself, abandoned by the Turks, Osman Pasha’s position became hopeless. Seriously wounded in the leg, the Turkish commander realized the hopelessness of his situation and suspended the battle, ordering the white flag to be thrown out. The Turkish army surrendered unconditionally. During the last battle, Russian-Romanian losses amounted to about 1,700 people, and Turkish losses - about 6,000. The remaining 43.5 thousand Turkish soldiers and officers, including the army commander, were taken prisoner. However, highly appreciating the courage shown by Osman Pasha, Emperor Alexander II ordered that the wounded and captured Turkish commander be given marshal honors and the saber returned to him.
In just four months of the siege and fighting near Plevna, about 31 thousand Russian soldiers died. But the capture of Plevna became a turning point in the war, allowing the Russian command to free up over 100 thousand people for the offensive, after which the Russian army occupied Andrianople without a fight and approached Constantinople.
In 1887, on the tenth anniversary of the capture of Plevna, a monument to the Russian grenadiers who distinguished themselves in this battle was unveiled in Moscow. The monument was designed by architect V.O. Sherwood; inside the monument there was a chapel, the walls of which were lined with tiles and decorated with seven bronze plaques with the names of the fallen soldiers and two with a description of the battle and construction of the monument. The memorial chapel was built on the initiative and with voluntary donations from the surviving grenadiers who took part in the Battle of Plevna. At the opening of the monument, for the edification of descendants, the senior adjutant of the headquarters of the grenadier corps, Lieutenant Colonel I.Ya. Sokol, said the following important words: “Let this monument, erected by grateful grenadiers to their fallen comrades, remind future generations from year to year, from century to century, how her faithful sons know how to stand for the honor and glory of the Motherland when they are inspired by the holy Orthodox faith, boundless love for the Tsar and To the Fatherland!.
During the years of Soviet power, the Plevna Chapel miraculously survived, but at the same time fell into a dilapidated state. Only in December 1993, the Moscow Government transferred the chapel-monument to the Russian Orthodox Church, which, by decree of Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus' Alexy II in 1999, acquired the status of the Patriarchal Compound. And from now on, every year at the chapel-monument, traditional events are held in memory of the Russian heroes - the liberators of Bulgaria.
After three unsuccessful assaults Plevna, its siege began. Near Plevna, the sovereign summoned the engineer-generalTotlebena E.I., September 15 (27) he arrived in the army. “There will be no fourth assault on Plevna,” said Eduard Ivanovich. Totleben was a recognized authority on the conduct of serf warfare, he was supposed to develop a plan for the siege of Plevna.
Russian soldiers were ordered to dig in vigorously. To completely encircle Plevna it was necessary to capture fortified points Mountain Dubnyak, Dolny Dubnyak and Telish; block the Sofia-Plevna road in order to tightly lock Osman Pasha in the city.
Totleben E.I. ordered General Gurko I.V. take possession of the Sofia Highway and occupy all the space on the left bank of the Vid River. On the same day, General Zotov was ordered to occupy the Lovchinskoe highway, fortify himself south of Brestovets on Ryzhaya Mountain, and other units to organize a demonstration in the direction of Plevna. And all other troops of the Western detachment were ordered to demonstrate on that day. Totleben and his headquarters worked tirelessly, sending instructions to the troops and developed dispositions for each unit separately.
Attack by General Gurko's troops Mountain Dubnyak was carried out successfully, but it cost four and a half thousand Russian soldiers and officers incapacitated. Of course, the price is too high... Totleben and many military leaders again started talking about the need for more thoughtful actions of the army, about the need for thorough artillery preparation for the attack, about reconnaissance, finally, as an obligatory prerequisite for the attack. We had to take two more settlements located on the Sofia Highway.
Gurko developed a disposition for mastering Telish mainly with artillery fire. In response to this report, Totleben gave the following instructions to Gurko’s detachment: “I fully share your Excellency’s considerations, set out in the report of October 13 No. 28, regarding the need to capture Telish and, at the same time, predominantly with an artillery attack, avoiding an assault if possible...” In addition, Totleben also ordered actions other units entrusted to him in order to strengthen the connection between all parts. Totleben attached particular importance to the actions of the 16th division of M.D. Skobelev. as the most reliable in all respects.
The sad experience of taking Mountain Dubnyak was too expensive to repeat: twenty-five thousand selected troops, with the most heroic courage, with the skillful leadership of the talented General Gurko, were barely able to capture two weak Turkish redoubts, which were defended by small detachments of the Turks. Why resort to this method of taking fortresses when there is an excellent way - to starve them to death and force them to surrender.
Chief of Staff of Gurko's detachment, General Naglovsky, on the eve of the attack Telisha reported in a report to the command that when Telisha was captured, it was planned to fire 100 shells per gun, for a total of 7200 shells. Having approached the position, the infantry and batteries must dig in. Alexander II, the commander-in-chief, a large retinue surveyed Plevna and the Turkish position from the lunette of the Kaluga regiment.
An artillery attack on Telish began, the batteries fired volley after volley, but the Turks almost did not respond to them, hiding from the fire in dugouts. But the concentrated volleys of several batteries, directed first at one or another Turkish redoubt, made a strong moral impression on the enemy, and the losses were sensitive, on the order of 50-60 people per day.
At 12 o'clock, in accordance with the disposition developed by Totleben and Gurko, Skobelev made a demonstration along Green Mountain towards the Krishin Heights. But soon he retreated, and silence fell on all lines, only from the direction of Telish the cannonade was dully heard, which had been going on for two hours.
At four o'clock on October 16, Totleben received a report that Telish had been taken, the garrison had completely capitulated along with Ishmael Khaki Pasha and 100 officers. Our losses turned out to be the most insignificant. All that remained was to take Dolny Dubnyak to complete the complete investment of Plevna. And even now Osman Pasha is so surrounded that any attempt to break through from Plevna or to Plevna is doomed to failure: everywhere he will be met by fortified positions with Russian troops. A breakthrough will cost him dearly if he dares to make one.
Two guards divisions of General Gurko I.V. drove the Turks out of the redoubt Dolny Dubnyak, forcing them to retreat to Plevna. After which Plevna was completely blocked.
Thus began a systematic siege of Plevna. Osman Pasha found himself surrounded. His army was left to its fate by the military council in Constantinople.
By the end of November 1877, the besieged units found themselves in a critical situation: food supplies were exhausted, epidemics were raging, and soldiers were deserting. The Bulgarians increasingly crossed the front line and obtained important information. On December 9, 1877, one Bulgarian came to the headquarters of the Russian army and reported: “The last supplies have been distributed. The Turkish population leaves the city on carts, heading towards the Vit River.”
Near Pleven there was a “horseshoe” of enemy defensive structures. This “horseshoe” had six defense areas (sectors). The total length of the enemy position reached 40 kilometers. It began north of the villages of Opanets, Bukovlyk and the Tuchenitsa River, then turned south along the Tuchenitsa Hollow, Uchin-Dol, the Zelenite-Gori and Kyshin areas and ended in the west on the bank of the Vit River.
The position in the sixth section of the siege, along the left bank of the Vit River, was occupied by the grenadier corps; 1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division with two batteries; 4th Romanian Division with all its artillery; 9th Kazan Dragoons; 9th Bug Uhlan; 9th Kiev Hussars and 4th Don Regiment, as well as the 7th Horse Artillery Battery; 2nd Don Battery and a regiment of Romanian cavalrymen.
Early in the morning of December 10, 1877, in the sixth section of the besiegers, the Turks led by Osman Pasha. The Russian outposts retreated. A signal signal soared high into the sky, and drums sounded the alarm all along the Russian rear positions. Half an hour later the Turks appeared in front of the Russian trenches. With exclamations of “Allah,” they rushed to the attack. They were met by the grenadiers of the Siberian regiment. A brutal hand-to-hand fight ensued. Russian soldiers did not retreat. Having captured the trenches of the first line, the Turks rushed to the battery of the 3rd Grenadier Artillery Brigade.
Osman Pasha's guard reached the second line of Russian trenches. But here she came across reinforcements that had come to help the Siberians, the Little Russian Grenadier Regiment, which immediately rushed into a swift bayonet attack.
Turkish units sought to break through to the north, to the Danube. The 9th Cavalry Division prepared for battle in case the enemy managed to break through. On the left flank the Turkish riflemen were met Arkhangelsk and Vologda regiments. The Turks again concentrated in the center of the Russian defense. It was there that the Russian reserves were sent.
Russian and Romanian artillery carried out powerful artillery preparation. Then the infantry launched a decisive attack. At this moment Osman Pasha was wounded. There was a rumor that he had been killed. The enemy's ranks wavered. To the sound of the drum, the grenadiers launched a general offensive. In hand-to-hand combat, Private Yegor Zhdanov knocked the Turkish standard bearer to the ground, taking away his regimental banner.
The Turks rolled back to the Vit River. There was a traffic jam on the bridge, carts and people were falling into the water... After some time, the enemy raised a white flag. Acting Chief of Staff of the Turkish Army in Plevna Tefik Pasha began negotiations, declaring that Osman Pasha was wounded and could not come.
The Turks agreed to unconditional surrender. Surrendered 10 Turkish generals, 2 thousand. officers and 30 thousand soldiers. The winners captured rich trophies: artillery, ammunition, convoys. This is how the last battle near Plevna, which was destined to become a city of Russian military glory, ended ingloriously for the Ottoman army.
The Russo-Turkish War began in April 1877. Its main goals were the liberation of the Slavic peoples from the Ottoman yoke and the final revision of the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty, concluded following the unsuccessful Crimean War for Russia.
16 (4 according to the old style) July, one of the detachments of the Russian army, after crossing the Danube, captured the Nikopol fortress. From here the troops had to move south to take the city of Plevna, which lay at the crossroads of important routes. 7 thousand infantrymen and about one and a half thousand cavalrymen with 46 cannons under the command of General Yuri Schilder-Schuldner advanced to the fortress. However, Osman Pasha, the commander of the Turkish troops in this direction, was almost half a day ahead of the Russian soldiers. By the time the advanced units approached the fortress, the Turks had already gained a foothold in Plevna. The number of their garrison was 15 thousand people. Despite the minority, 20 (8 O.S.) July Russian troops launched the first assault on Plevna. After the artillery shelling, the infantry regiments went on the attack. In one place, Russian soldiers almost reached the Turkish batteries, but were driven back by a numerically superior enemy. In the other direction, they managed to occupy three rows of forward trenches and put the Turks to flight, but, not receiving reinforcements and not having enough strength to continue the attack, the Russian units retreated back. Their losses amounted to more than 2,500 people, Turkish - about 2,000.
Over the next ten days, a 30,000-strong Russian army with 140 cannons was concentrated near Plevna. But the Turks also strengthened the garrison, bringing its number to 23 thousand soldiers and 57 guns, in addition, they erected new fortifications around the city. Deciding to take advantage of the numerical advantage, 30 (18 O.S.) July, the Russian army, after artillery preparation, launched a second assault. At the same time, the troops actually launched a frontal attack on the most fortified Turkish positions. At first, Russian soldiers took several trenches and fortifications, but were stopped. The detachment of the skillfully and bravely acting General Mikhail Skobelev (in the battle under him one horse was killed and the other was wounded) also had to retreat. The second assault on Plevna ended in failure. The Russians lost about 3 thousand killed and a thousand captured, the Turks - about a thousand killed. A month later, Skobelev captured Lovcha, through which Plevna was supplied, and the sortie to support the Lovech garrison, organized by Osman Pasha, ended in vain.
The failure of the second assault on Plevna did not bother the commander-in-chief of the Russian troops, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. At the end of August, he decided to launch another attack, receiving reinforcements in the form of allied Romanian troops. This time the fortress already had more than 80,000 soldiers with 424 cannons, while the Turkish army had about 35,000 people and 70 cannons. But the offensive of the Romanian troops, who incorrectly assessed the number and location of Turkish fortifications, floundered. Although Skobelev occupied the redoubts that approached the city itself, from which it was possible to continue the offensive, he again did not receive reinforcements and was forced to abandon his occupied positions. The third assault on Plevna was repulsed, leaving 13,000 Russian soldiers and 3,000 Romanian soldiers out of action. After this, the command invited a talented military engineer, General Eduard Totleben, on whose recommendation it was decided to abandon subsequent assaults, focusing on the blockade. Meanwhile, the Turks increased the size of the garrison to 48 thousand people and already had 96 guns. For his success in the defense of Plevna, Osman Pasha received from the Sultan the honorary title “Gazi” (which meant “invincible”) and an order not to surrender the city under any circumstances.
Subsequently, with the capture by Russian troops of a number of fortifications near Plevna, a blockade ring closed around the city. The Turks had nowhere else to wait for reinforcements, ammunition, or provisions. Nevertheless, Osman Pasha refused all proposals for surrender. But he understood that the position of the besieged was becoming hopeless, and decided to make a breakthrough. November 28 (December 10, O.S.) The Turkish garrison, led by the commander, went on the attack. The Turks, thanks to a sudden attack, took the advanced Russian fortifications, were stopped, and then began to retreat; Osman Pasha was wounded. After this, the Turkish troops capitulated, and 43.5 thousand soldiers were captured.
The capture of Plevna became one of the key episodes of the Russian-Turkish War of 1877–1878. The victory allowed the Russian army to successfully continue hostilities and ultimately successfully end the war. The memory of the heroes of Plevna was immortalized in 1887 by the creation of a memorial chapel in Ilyinsky Park in Moscow.
Tragedy near Plevna
After the capture of Nikopol, Lieutenant General Kridener had to occupy Plevna, which was not defended by anyone, as quickly as possible. The fact is that this city was of strategic importance as a junction of roads leading to Sofia, Lovcha, Tarnovo, Shipka Pass, etc. In addition, on July 5, the forward patrols of the 9th Cavalry Division reported that large enemy forces were moving towards Plevna. These were the troops of Osman Pasha, urgently transferred from Western Bulgaria. Initially, Osman Pasha had 17 thousand people with 30 field guns.
The Chief of Staff of the Active Army, General Nepokochitsky, sent a telegram to Kridener on July 4: “...immediately move a Cossack brigade, two infantry regiments with artillery to occupy Plevna.” On July 5, General Kridener received a telegram from the commander-in-chief, in which he demanded to immediately occupy Plevna and “cover in Plevno from a possible offensive of troops from Vidin.” Finally, on July 6, Nepokoichitsky sent another telegram, which said: “If you cannot immediately march to Plevno with all the troops, then immediately send Tutolmin’s Cossack brigade and part of the infantry there.”
The troops of Osman Pasha, making daily 33-kilometer marches, covered a 200-kilometer path in 6 days and occupied Plevna, while General Kridener failed to cover a distance of 40 km in the same time. When the units allocated to them finally approached Plevna, they were met by fire from mounted Turkish reconnaissance. Osman Pasha's troops had already settled on the hills surrounding Plevna and began to equip positions there. Until July 1877, the city had no fortifications. However, from the north, east and south, Plevna was covered by dominant heights. Having successfully used them, Osman Pasha erected field fortifications around Plevna.
Turkish general Osman Pasha (1877-1878)
To capture Plevna, Kridener sent a detachment of Lieutenant General Schilder-Schuldner, who only approached the Turkish fortifications on the evening of July 7. The detachment numbered 8,600 people with 46 field guns. The next day, July 8, Schilder-Schuldner attacked the Turks, but was unsuccessful. In this battle, called “First Plevna,” the Russians lost 75 officers and 2,326 lower ranks killed and wounded. According to Russian data, Turkish losses amounted to less than two thousand people.
The presence of Turkish troops only two days' march away from the only crossing of the Danube near Sistovo greatly worried Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. The Turks could threaten from Plevna the entire Russian army and especially the troops advanced beyond the Balkans, not to mention the headquarters. Therefore, the commander demanded that the troops of Osman Pasha (whose forces were significantly exaggerated) be defeated and Plevna captured.
By mid-July, the Russian command concentrated 26 thousand people with 184 field guns near Plevna.
It should be noted that the Russian generals did not think of encircling Plevna. Reinforcements freely approached Osman Pasha, ammunition and food were delivered. By the beginning of the second assault, his forces in Plevna had increased to 22 thousand people with 58 guns. As we see, the Russian troops did not have an advantage in numbers, and the almost triple superiority in artillery did not play a decisive role, since the field artillery of that time was powerless against well-made earthen fortifications, even of the field type. In addition, the artillery commanders near Plevna did not risk sending cannons into the first ranks of the attackers and shooting the defenders of the redoubts at point-blank range, as was the case near Kars.
However, on July 18, Kridener launched a second assault on Plevna. The assault ended in disaster - 168 officers and 7,167 lower ranks were killed and wounded, while Turkish losses did not exceed 1,200 people. During the assault, Kridener gave confused orders, the artillery as a whole acted sluggishly and spent only 4073 shells during the entire battle.
After the Second Plevna, panic began in the Russian rear. In Sistovo they mistook the approaching Cossack unit for Turks and were about to surrender to them. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich turned to the Romanian King Charles with a tearful request for help. By the way, the Romanians themselves had offered their troops before, but Chancellor Gorchakov categorically did not agree to the Romanians crossing the Danube for some political reasons known to him alone. Turkish generals had the opportunity to defeat the Russian army and throw its remnants over the Danube. But they also did not like to take risks, and they also intrigued against each other. Therefore, despite the absence of a continuous front line, for several weeks there was only a positional war in the theater.
On July 19, 1877, Tsar Alexander II, deeply depressed by the Second Plevna, ordered the mobilization of the Guards and Grenadier Corps, the 24th, 26th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions, a total of 110 thousand people with 440 guns. However, they could not arrive before September - October. In addition, it was ordered to move to the front the already mobilized 2nd and 3rd Infantry Divisions and the 3rd Infantry Brigade, but these units could not arrive before mid-August. Until reinforcements arrived, they decided to confine themselves to defense everywhere.
By August 25, significant forces of Russians and Romanians were concentrated near Plevna: 75,500 bayonets, 8,600 sabers and 424 guns, including more than 20 siege guns. The Turkish forces numbered 29,400 bayonets, 1,500 sabers and 70 field guns. On August 30, the third assault on Plevna took place. The date of the assault was timed to coincide with the tsar’s name day. Alexander II, the Romanian King Charles and Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich personally arrived to observe the assault.
The generals did not bother to provide massive artillery fire, and there were very few mortars near Plevna; as a result, the enemy fire was not suppressed, and the troops suffered huge losses. The Turks repulsed the assault. The Russians lost two generals, 295 officers and 12,471 lower ranks killed and wounded; their Romanian allies lost approximately three thousand people. A total of about 16 thousand against three thousand Turkish losses.
Alexander II and Prince Charles of Romania near Plevna
“Third Plevna” made a stunning impression on the army and the whole country. On September 1, Alexander II convened a military council in the town of Poradim. At the council, the commander-in-chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, suggested immediately retreating back across the Danube. In this he was actually supported by Generals Zotov and Massalsky, while Minister of War Milyutin and General Levitsky categorically opposed the retreat. After much reflection, Alexander II agreed with the latter’s opinion. It was decided to go on the defensive again until new reinforcements arrived.
Despite the successful defense, Osman Pasha was aware of the riskiness of his position in Plevna and asked permission to retreat until he was blocked there. However, he was ordered to remain where he was. From the garrisons of Western Bulgaria, the Turks urgently formed the army of Shefket Pasha in the Sofia region, as reinforcement for Osman Pasha. On September 8, Shevket Pasha sent the Akhmet-Hivzi division (10 thousand bayonets with 12 guns) with a huge food transport to Plevna. The collection of this transport went unnoticed by the Russians, and when the lines of convoys stretched past the Russian cavalry (6 thousand sabers, 40 guns), its mediocre and timid commander, General Krylov, did not dare to attack them. Encouraged by this, Shevket Pasha sent another transport on September 23, with which he went himself, and this time the entire guard of the convoy consisted of only one cavalry regiment! General Krylov let both the transport and Shevket Pasha through, not only to Plevna, but also back to Sofia. Truly, even an enemy agent in his place could not have done more! Due to Krylov’s criminal inaction, Osman Pasha’s army received food for two months.
On September 15, General E.I. arrived near Plevna. Totleben, summoned by the Tsar's telegram from St. Petersburg. Having toured the positions, Totleben categorically spoke out against a new assault on Plevna. Instead, he proposed tightly blockading the city and starving the Turks, i.e. something that should have started right away! By the beginning of October, Plevna was completely blocked. By mid-October, there were 170 thousand Russian troops there against 47 thousand Osman Pasha.
To relieve Plevna, the Turks created the 35,000-strong so-called “Sofia Army” under the command of Mehmed-Ali. Mehmed-Ali slowly moved towards Plevna, but on November 10-11 his units were thrown back near Novagan by the western detachment of General I.V. Gurko (Gurko also had 35 thousand people). Gurko wanted to pursue and finish off Mehmed-Ali, but Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich forbade this. Having burned himself at Plevna, the Grand Duke was now cautious.
By mid-November, surrounded Plevna began to run out of ammunition and food. Then, on the night of November 28, Osman Pasha left the city and went for a breakthrough. The 3rd Grenadier Division, vigorously supported by artillery, stopped the Turks. And in the middle of the day the main forces of the Russian army approached the battlefield. The wounded Osman Pasha gave the order to surrender. In total, more than 43 thousand people surrendered: 10 pashas, 2128 officers, 41,200 lower ranks. 77 guns were taken. The Turks lost about six thousand people killed and wounded. Russian losses in this battle did not exceed 1,700 people.
The stubborn resistance of Osman Pasha in Plevna cost the Russian army huge losses in manpower (22.5 thousand killed and wounded!) and a five-month delay in the offensive. This delay, in turn, negated the possibility of a quick victory in the war, created thanks to the capture of the Shipka Pass by General Gurko’s units on July 18-19.
The main reason for the tragedy at Plevna was the illiteracy, indecisiveness and outright stupidity of such Russian generals as Kridener, Krylov, Zotov, Massalsky and the like. This is especially true for the use of artillery. The clueless generals did not know what to do with a large number of field guns, although they could at least remember how Napoleon concentrated batteries of 200-300 guns in the decisive place of the battle and literally swept away the enemy with artillery fire.
On the other hand, long-range, rapid-fire rifles and effective shrapnel made it almost impossible for infantry to attack fortifications without first suppressing them with artillery. And field guns are physically unable to reliably suppress even earthen fortifications. For this you need mortars or howitzers of 6-8 inch caliber. And there were such mortars in Russia. In the western fortresses of Russia and in the siege park of Brest-Litovsk, about 200 units of 6-inch mortars of the 1867 model stood idle. These mortars were quite mobile, it was not difficult to transfer even all of them to Plevna. In addition, on June 1, 1877, the siege artillery of the Danube Army had 16 units of 8-inch and 36 units of 6-inch mortars of the 1867 model. Finally, close combat weapons could be used to fight infantry and artillery hidden in earthen fortifications - half-pound smooth mortars, hundreds of which were available in fortresses and siege parks. Their firing range did not exceed 960 meters, but the half-pound mortars easily fit into trenches; crews carried them to the battlefield manually (this is a kind of prototype of mortars).
The Turks in Plevna did not have mortars, so Russian 8-inch and 6-inch mortars from closed positions could shoot Turkish fortifications with almost impunity. After 6 hours of continuous bombardment, the success of the attacking troops could be guaranteed. Especially if the 3-pound mountain and 4-pound field guns supported the attackers with fire, moving in the advanced infantry formations on horseback or human traction.
By the way, back in the late 50s of the 19th century, tests of chemical munitions were carried out near St. Petersburg on Volkovo Pole. Bombs from a half-pound (152 mm) unicorn were filled with cyanide cacodyle. In one of the experiments, such a bomb was exploded in a log house where twelve cats were located, protected from shrapnel. A few hours later, a commission headed by Adjutant General Barantsev visited the site of the explosion. All the cats lay motionless on the floor, their eyes were watering, but they were all alive. Upset by this fact, Barantsev wrote a resolution stating that it was impossible to use chemical ammunition either now or in the future due to the fact that they do not have a lethal effect. It did not occur to the adjutant general that it is not always necessary to kill the enemy. Sometimes it is enough to temporarily disable him or force him to flee by throwing away his weapon. Apparently, the general actually had sheep in his family. It is not difficult to imagine the effect of the massive use of chemical shells near Plevna. In the absence of gas masks, even field artillery is capable of forcing any fortress to surrender.
In addition to all that has been said, the true disaster for the Russian army in this war was the invasion of the titular locusts. Before the start of the war, the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, addressed a letter to Alexander II, in which he argued the undesirability of the Tsar’s presence in the army, and also asked not to send the Grand Dukes there. Alexander II answered his brother that “the upcoming campaign is of a religious-national character,” and therefore he “cannot remain in St. Petersburg,” but promised not to interfere with the orders of the commander-in-chief. The Tsar was going to start rewarding distinguished military personnel and visiting the wounded and sick. “I will be a brother of mercy,” Alexander finished the letter. He also refused the second request. They say, due to the special nature of the campaign, Russian society can understand the absence of grand dukes in the army as their evasion from fulfilling their patriotic and military duty. “In any case,” wrote Alexander I, “Sasha [Tsarevich Alexander Alexandrovich, future Tsar Alexander III], as the future Emperor, cannot help but participate in the campaign, and at least in this way I hope to make a man out of him.”
Alexander II still went to the army. The Tsarevich, Grand Dukes Alexei Alexandrovich, Vladimir Alexandrovich, Sergei Alexandrovich, Konstantin Konstantinovich and others were also there. They all tried to give advice, if not to command. The trouble from the Tsar and the Grand Dukes was not only incompetent advice. With each of them rode a large retinue of confidants, lackeys, cooks, their own guards, etc. Together with the emperor, there were always ministers in the army - military, internal and foreign affairs, and other ministers visited regularly. The tsar's stay in the army cost the treasury one and a half million rubles. And it’s not just about money - there were no railways in the theater of military operations. The army experienced constant supply shortages; there were not enough horses, oxen, fodder, carts, etc. The terrible roads were clogged with troops and vehicles. Is there any need to explain the chaos caused by the thousands of horses and carts that served the Tsar and the Grand Dukes?
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The beginning of the siege. After the successful crossing of the Danube by Russian troops at Sistovo, the Turkish command on July 2 (14) began the transfer of Osman Pasha’s corps to Plevna from Vidin (northwest Bulgaria), which was tasked with striking the right flank of the Russian troops. On July 4, 1877, the 9th Army Corps of Lieutenant General N.P. Kridener captured the Nikopol fortress on the banks of the Danube north of Plevna.
The Russian command allocated a nine-thousand-strong detachment of Lieutenant General Schilder-Schuldner to occupy Plevna, which on the evening of July 7 reached the outskirts of the city and the next morning attacked Turkish positions. The 15,000-strong garrison of Plevna repelled scattered attacks by Russian regiments, inflicting serious losses on them (2.5 thousand people).
After the concentration of Kridener's entire corps (26 thousand soldiers, 140 guns) near the city, a second assault on Plevna was launched on July 18. By this time, Osman Pasha concentrated about 23 thousand people and 58 guns in the city. Kridener had no information about the Turkish forces, exaggerated their numbers and acted indecisively. The attacks were carried out from the east and southeast head-on against the most fortified areas, troops were brought into battle in parts. The assault ended in failure. Russian losses amounted to 7 thousand people, Turks - about 4 thousand people.
Plevna was of great strategic importance; its strong garrison threatened the crossings of the Danube and could attack the advancing Russian army in the flank and rear. Therefore, the Russian command postponed the transfer of the main forces through the Balkan Mountains (the Shipka Pass was captured on July 8) and during July-August concentrated an 83,000-strong army with 424 guns near Plevna, of which 32,000 people and 108 guns were from the allied Romanian army.
Third assault on Plevna. The Allies besieged Plevna from the south and east. On the right flank, opposite the Grivitsky redoubts, the Romanians settled down. From the east the city was besieged by Kridener's corps, from the southeast by General Krylov's 8th corps. In the southern direction there was a left-flank detachment of General M.D. Skobelev. From the north, the Turkish garrison was reliably covered by the heights of Yanyk-Bair, and from the west it was supplied along the Sofia-Plevna road. By the end of summer, the Turks increased the size of the Plevna garrison to 34 thousand people with 72 guns. The nominal commander of the allied army near Plevna was the Romanian king Carol I; in fact, his chief of staff, Lieutenant General P. D. Zotov, was in charge. But near Plevna there was also the headquarters of the Russian Emperor Alexander II and the commander-in-chief of the entire Danube Army, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich Sr.
The third assault on Plevna took place on August 26-31. The Turks predicted the directions of attack of the Russian and Romanian troops and managed to hold their line of defense, inflicting heavy losses on the attackers. The decisive day was August 30, when the Romanians, with the support of the Russian 18th Infantry Regiment, managed to capture one of the two Grivitsky redoubts. On the same day, Skobelev’s detachment, delivering an auxiliary attack, found a weak point in the Turkish positions, broke through their defenses in the Green Mountains area, captured the Issa and Kavanlyk redoubts and reached the southern outskirts of the city. The Turks hastily transferred reserves from the north and east against Skobelev.
On August 31, the Russian command did not take offensive actions and did not support Skobelev with reserves. As a result, under the pressure of superior forces, Skobelev’s detachment was forced to return to its original positions. In the third assault on Plevna, Russian and Romanian troops lost 16 thousand people, the Turks - about three thousand.
Siege and capture of Plevna. On September 1, it was decided to proceed to a thorough siege of Plevna, for the leadership of which the best specialist in siege work in Russia, engineer-general E. I. Totleben, was called in. To successfully conduct a siege, the Russians needed to cut the Sofia-Plevna road, along which the Turks received reinforcements. To solve this problem, a strike detachment of General I.V. Gurko was created from the guards units. He managed to capture Gorny Dubnyak on October 12, Telish on October 16, Dolny Dubnyak on October 20 - strongholds on the Sofia road, thereby completely closing the blockade ring of the Pleven garrison, whose number by that time amounted to 50 thousand people.
The lack of food forced the Turkish commander Osman Pasha to attempt an independent liberation of Plevna. On November 28, having withdrawn troops from defensive positions, he attacked Russian troops northwest of Plevna. Units of the 2nd and 3rd Grenadier Divisions and the 5th Infantry Division of the Russian Army repelled the Turkish attack. Having lost 6 thousand soldiers and unable to escape from encirclement, Osman Pasha surrendered with 43 thousand soldiers. The fall of Plevna freed up a hundred thousand Russian-Romanian army for a subsequent offensive across the Balkans.
In the fighting near Plevna, forms and methods of besieging fortresses were further developed. The Russian army developed new methods of infantry combat tactics, a combination of movement and fire from rifle chains, and the use of infantry self-entrenchment in the offensive began. At Plevna, the importance of field fortifications, the interaction of infantry with artillery, the role of heavy artillery in preparing an attack on fortified positions was revealed, and the possibility of controlling artillery fire when firing from closed positions was determined. In memory of the battles for Plevna, a mausoleum in memory of fallen Russian and Romanian soldiers (1905), a park-museum of M. D. Skobelev (1907), and an artistic panorama complex “Liberation of Plevna in 1877” were built in the city. In Moscow, at the Ilyinsky Gate, there is a monument to the grenadiers who fell near Plevna.
Based on materials from Internet resources
