Nevsky patch of history. Memorial complex Nevsky Piglet in the Leningrad region

“Nevsky Piglet” is a name memorable to all defenders of Leningrad, a symbol of the courage and fortitude of its defenders. Despite the fact that over the past decades, many publications have appeared questioning the need for so many sacrifices for an unknown piece of land, both veterans and representatives of the younger generation agree that these battles played an extremely important role in defending the Northern capital, that the sacrifices made here, in no case can be considered in vain.

Nevsky "patch" on the map of the Leningrad region. Features of the geographical location

The importance of the bridgehead, which went down in the history of the Great Patriotic War as the “Nevsky Piglet,” becomes clear as soon as you look at the map of the Leningrad region. Of course, now many of the settlements and industrial facilities for which battles took place in 1941-44 can no longer be found: almost all of them were destroyed during shelling and bombing. However, natural relief and wartime maps make it possible to fairly accurately recreate the picture.

Going down the Neva, about twelve kilometers from Lake Ladoga, you can come across a convenient bend about three hundred meters wide. Here in the pre-war years the village of Dubrovka was located, which was divided by the Neva into four parts: Nevskaya, Vyborgskaya, Moscow Dubrovka and Novy Poselok.

On the left bank, not far from the bend, there was the ancient fortress of Shlisselburg, from which a convenient road led to Leningrad. On the same side there was also a railway line connecting Nevskaya Dubrovka and Petrokrepost, which allowed the Soviet command to quickly transfer reinforcements to the bridgehead.

On the right bank of the bend were the settlements of Arbuzovo, 1st and 2nd Gorodki. However, the 8th State District Power Plant, which the enemy quickly turned into the main stronghold, was of key importance here.

Thus, the Nevsky “patch” on the map of the Leningrad region was a small bridgehead 2 km deep and 800 meters wide, shot right through by Wehrmacht units. At the same time, by holding it, the Soviet command created a constant threat of a counteroffensive with access to the enemy’s rear.

First period of fighting

The history of the Nevsky "patch" is divided into two periods. The first of them includes battles and operations that took place from September 19, 1941 to April 29, 1942. The decision to cross the Neva near the village of Dubrovka and to create a bridgehead for a counterattack on the left bank was made by the commander of the Leningrad Front Zhukov on September 18, 1941 The situation around the city pushed him to this: on September 8, Leningrad found itself under siege, the German command began preparing for a decisive assault on the city.

On September 19, the crossing of the Neva began with the forces of one battalion of the 115-5 rifle division. The crossing was successful, after which the Soviet infantrymen, with the support of artillery, managed to occupy Moscow Dubrovka and cut the road to the city of Mga. At the same time, the Wehrmacht pulled up reserves and began to conduct constant counterattacks in order to knock out Soviet fighters from the bridgehead.

Subsequently, until the end of April 1942, the Nevsky “patch” constantly attracted enormous human and technical resources from both sides. The Red Army made several attempts to expand the bridgehead and capture the 8th State District Power Plant and MGU, but they all ended in failure. The German command of Army Group North was forced to keep significant reserves here, from time to time launching counterattacks. Perhaps it was precisely this circumstance that prevented him from concentrating large forces to storm Leningrad.

Due to the spring thaw and the impossibility of transporting ammunition along the Neva, the leadership of the 54th Army was forced to withdraw from the captured bridgehead. This happened on April 29, 1942, but soon the Nevsky “patch” reappeared on the map of military operations.

The main operations of the second period of the battles for the Nevsky "patch"

A new period in the history of the Nevsky “patch” began on August 26, 1942, when, after a powerful artillery shelling, units of two rifle divisions and one special brigade landed in the area of ​​Moscow Dubrovka (or rather, what was left of it). They managed to cling to the right bank, but the enemy, who transferred reserves here, did not allow them to move deeper.

The Nevsky "patch" was considered by the Soviet command as the most important element in breaking the siege of Leningrad in January 1943. During Operation Iskra, units of the Soviet army managed to first liberate Shlisselburg and then, in a joint strike from the bridgehead and the mainland, capture the buildings of the 8th State District Power Plant.

Activities on the Nevsky "patch" in 1943 included attempts to capture the Sinyavinsky Heights and the city of Mga. Despite the fact that neither side was able to achieve decisive superiority, the battles were extremely fierce and were accompanied by a huge number of losses from both the Wehrmacht and Soviet units.

The last weeks of the bridgehead

The second half of 1943 was marked by important offensive successes of the Soviet army. On the Northwestern Front, the capture of the Sinyavin Heights by units of the Volkhov Front was important. After this, the situation in the Nevsky “patch” area for the German command deteriorated sharply. In fact, their Army Group North was under threat of encirclement; only the lack of reserves in this direction did not allow the Soviet command to finally lift the blockade during this period.

By the winter of 1943-44. the necessary human, fire and technical resources were pulled up, the enemy was under the threat of complete encirclement. Based on the forces they had in this direction, the command of Army Group North decided to withdraw its units from the city of Mga. This happened on February 17, 1944, and the history of the Nevsky Piglet bridgehead ends on the same day.

Bridgehead today

Today "Nevsky Piglet" is a memorial complex located on the site of the legendary battles of 1941-1944. It includes several monuments, lovingly planted on all sides with poplars. There are also several mass graves on which there are fresh flowers at any time of the year.

But this place is not remarkable for its monuments. Many visitors note the unique atmosphere, which is literally permeated with the courage and heroism of the people who fought here. In this place of the Neva bend there are no ramparts or protective walls, but it can well be called a fortress. A fortress whose walls towered in the souls and hearts of its defenders.

"Nevsky Piglet": how to get there

You can get here by taking a bus from St. Petersburg to the city of Kirovsk, and then by minibus directly to the complex. Official events are held here on special occasions, but tour guides are available daily. "Nevsky Piglet" is a memorial complex that is visited daily by hundreds of tourists.

Nevsky Piglet is the conventional name of a bridgehead on the left (eastern) bank of the Neva opposite Nevskaya Dubrovka, captured and held by Soviet troops of the Leningrad Front from 09/19/1941 to 04/29/1942 and from 09/26/1942 to 02/17/1943 during the defense of Leningrad.

From this bridgehead, Soviet troops repeatedly tried to launch an offensive on Mgu and Sinyavino to meet the troops striking from the east and thereby break the blockade of Leningrad. All attempts to expand the bridgehead and develop the offensive inevitably ended in failure.

The obvious military-tactical futility of holding the Nevsky patch and the huge losses in manpower did not force the Soviet military leadership to abandon such a bloody defense, since for the command this bridgehead had symbolic significance as the fact of the presence of Soviet troops on the eastern bank occupied by German troops. The losses of their soldiers in the Red Army were traditionally taken into account little and such a mind-boggling figure - 250,000 dead Soviet troops on an area of ​​about 2 sq. km in 11 and a half months, apparently did not greatly impress the front command and the Supreme High Command Headquarters.

The Nevsky “piglet” bridgehead was located on the left bank of the Neva near the village of Dubrovka, approximately 12 kilometers downstream of the river from Lake Ladoga. At this point, the Neva forms a bend and is only 270-350 m wide and has fairly flat banks. Directly opposite the Nevsky “patch” there was a difficult terrain with numerous quarries, covered with bushes and forest.

The terrain features in the bridgehead area most directly influenced the course of hostilities. On the one hand, the presence of the Petrokrepost-Nevskaya Dubrovka railway line on the right bank of the Neva and the relatively small width of the river in the Dubrovka area allowed the Soviet command to quickly deliver reinforcements to this area and transport them to the left bank. On the other hand, because of the Neva bend, the enemy could fire from strongholds at the territory of the Nevsky “patch” and the crossings across the Neva from all sides. Every day, up to 50,000 shells, mines and aerial bombs fell on the defenders of the “patch”. Losses of rifle units reached 95% of the original strength. Moreover, most of the total losses were irrevocable losses, since the evacuation of the wounded to the right bank was difficult. The crossing from one bank to the other until mid-November was carried out mainly at night, and after the formation of a strong ice cover on the Neva - at dusk or even during the day, since at night there was a very high risk of falling into an ice hole and drowning.

In addition, exceptionally difficult weather conditions (in November-December frosts reached −25°), the lack of equipped dugouts and dugouts, and problems with providing soldiers on the bridgehead with food contributed to an increase in the number of various diseases, which increased the already large losses.

The dead, with very rare exceptions, were buried right on the bridgehead in craters and trenches. Some found themselves buried twice or three times - explosions of shells and mines raised the remains from the graves, and then the corpses were covered with earth again.

Yu. R. Poresh, veteran of the 115th Infantry Division, participant in the battles on the Nevsky Patch in November 1941: “By the time our company landed, all the trenches and communication passages were filled with frozen corpses. They lay across the entire area of ​​the “patch”, where they were overtaken by a bullet or shrapnel. It’s hard to remember this, but it was like this: the shelter in which I and my two comrades happened to be accommodated was, instead of a rampart, blocked by numb corpses, the walls were partially lined with corpses, embrasures for firing were equipped between the corpses, laid along the trenches instead of a parapet. The entire area of ​​the patch was a cemetery of unburied soldiers and officers. Not a single tree or bush, not a single brick on a brick - everything was demolished by fire... All this against the backdrop of the constant roar of our and German cannonade, the specific smell of mine powder, the disgusting sound of German attack aircraft, the groan of the wounded, the swearing of the living, covering the Germans, the war and this perishing patch, and sometimes our artillerymen, who were hitting their positions.”

At the end of April 1942, ice drift began on the Neva, which significantly complicated the connection of the “patch” garrison with the main forces of the Neva operational group on the right bank. The German command decided to take advantage of this and liquidate the bridgehead. In total, on the left bank of the Neva in the Shlisselburg-Ivanovskoye sector, the Germans had forces of 9-10 battalions numbering about 5,200 people.

At that time, the defense on the “patch” was held by the 330th Regiment of about 1000 people. The regiment occupied a defensive position on a front of 4 kilometers - from the ravine north of Arbuzov to the outskirts of the 1st Gorodok. The depth of the bridgehead was 500-800 meters on the right flank and in the center, and on the left flank - only 50-70 meters.

On the evening of April 24, after artillery barrage, German troops launched a surprise attack on the left flank of the Soviet defense on the bridgehead. Units of the 43rd and 1st regiments of the 1st German Infantry Division, after a fierce battle, reached the Neva and cut off the 2nd battalion from the main forces of the 330th regiment. In the morning, new attacks followed, as a result of which the enemy managed to push the 3rd battalion back 100-150 meters. All attempts by the bridgehead garrison to restore the situation on their own were unsuccessful.

On April 25-26, 250 reinforcements were transported to the bridgehead. On the afternoon of April 27, the Germans, striking from the north and south in converging directions, went on the offensive. Despite the desperate resistance of the defenders, after two hours of fierce battle, most of the bridgehead was in the hands of the Germans. At the end of April 27, the last radiogram was transmitted from the bridgehead - communication with the 330th regiment was interrupted. The chief of staff of the regiment, Major A.M. Sokolov, was sent to the right bank with a report, who, being wounded three times, still managed to swim to the opposite bank and talk about the critical situation of the defenders of the bridgehead. Further resistance was of a focal nature. Attempts by units of the 284th Regiment to cross the Neva and counterattack the enemy were unsuccessful.

At the beginning of September, it was decided to force the Neva Operational Group to cross the Neva in the Annenskoye - 1st Gorodok section, and then advance towards Sinyavino. On September 10, all attempts to cross the Neva failed, and on September 11, several more groups managed to cross the river, but were unable to gain a foothold and were knocked out from the left bank by enemy counterattacks. September 12 The Supreme Command headquarters ordered the operation to be stopped, “since the Leningrad Front was unable to intelligently organize the crossing of the Neva and, through its actions, stupidly killed a large number of commanders and soldiers” .

On September 26, Soviet troops began a new crossing of the Neva and managed to gain a foothold on the left bank in several places, but German troops managed to eliminate two bridgeheads. Only the “patch” in the Moscow Dubrovka area remained under the control of Soviet units.

On October 5, 1942, the Supreme Command Headquarters ordered the withdrawal of the main forces of the Neva operational group to the right bank of the Neva due to the operational inexpediency of further holding the bridgehead on the eastern bank.

On January 12, 1943, Operation Iskra began. The 67th Army had to cross the Neva on a wider (13 kilometers) section of the front than in previous operations - from Shlisselburg to the Nevsky “patch” and advance east to connect with the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front.

On the first day of the offensive, the 131st Regiment of the 45th Guards Division, striking directly from the bridgehead, managed to advance only 500-600 meters. All enemy attempts to counterattack were repulsed, but the Soviet units again failed to advance.

On February 13, units of the Soviet army went on the offensive in large forces. The attack was carried out directly from the bridgehead by the 138th Infantry Brigade, which replaced the 46th Division. Pursuing the retreating enemy, by the morning of February 17, the main forces of the 67th Army reached the Nevsky Patch and linked up with the 138th Brigade. Success was achieved thanks to effective artillery support.

The number of dead and wounded Soviet soldiers in the battles for the Nevsky “patch” varies significantly in different sources, but, according to absolutely all estimates, the losses in the battles for the bridgehead were enormous.

In the 1960s, the Pravda newspaper first published the figure of 200,000 soldiers who died on the Nevsky “patch,” which was established for a long time in Russian military-historical literature. In recent years, other estimates have emerged. According to the calculations of the historian G. A. Shigin, Soviet troops in the battles for the bridgehead (only in 1941) lost 64,000-68,000 people killed and wounded, and V. V. Beshanov gives the figures - 140,000 wounded and 250,000 killed.

The dimensions of the Nevsky “patch” were constantly changing: from 4 to 1 kilometer in width and from 800 to 350 meters in depth, sometimes literally within a day.

The losses of German troops in battles in the Nevsky Piglet area are not known for certain. According to rough estimates, they ranged from 10,000 to 40,000 soldiers and officers killed.

As of 2005, there were 16 mass military graves on the territory of the memorial with the remains of 17,607 soldiers and commanders of the Red Army; the names of only 1114 of them have been established.

We suspect that after reading the report about the rise of the tank from the bottom of the Neva, many readers may have a logical question: “How did it end up there? It’s clear that he drowned, but where and why was he going?” Here is a very brief history of the events that took place during the siege of Leningrad, 30 km east of the city on the bridgehead, which, due to its small size, received the name Nevsky Piglet.

By August 1941, the motorized corps of Gepner's fourth tank group covered 750 km across the Baltic states and found themselves practically at the walls of Leningrad, anticipating its fairly quick capture. At that moment, the Germans could not even imagine that the battle for the city on the Neva would divert almost a fifth of the Wehrmacht’s forces, would last a year and a half, and would ultimately be lost.

Environment

The record pace of advance of the North armies compared to other German fascist attack groups also had a downside. The combat units were dangerously separated from the rear, and they needed a respite before delivering the final blow. Hitler's command understood perfectly well that it would not be possible to storm the huge city with the Red Army units retreating to it. Therefore, the main attack was delivered in a detour, between Lake Ilmen and Narva, with the expectation of connecting with the Finnish army. In this case, the cessation of communication with the rest of the country made the capitulation of the city of 2.5 million inevitable. The date of the German offensive was postponed several times, but it was impossible to delay it any longer: the Soviet troops, having received a temporary respite, hastily fortified themselves at the Luga line.

The operation began on August 8. But at first, the German divisions advanced only 3-5 km, where they were stopped. Only after a day of battle did the 1st and 6th tank divisions break through into the depths of the defense in the direction of Krasnogvardeysk. And on August 10, the German infantry attacked Novgorod. The attack of the SS Polizei division on Luga was unsuccessful. Moreover, its commander, General Mühlferstedt, tried to inspire soldiers on the battlefield by personal example and was immediately killed. Being under constant pressure from the enemy, on August 22, Soviet units received an order to withdraw. The ring was finally closed on September 8, when the Germans captured Shlisselburg on the shores of Ladoga, two days ahead of the counterattack of the 54th Army.

The first attempt to break through the encirclement followed on the night of September 20. Units of the 115th Infantry Division and the 4th Marine Brigade crossed the Neva in the area of ​​Moscow Dubrovka and captured a small bridgehead on the left bank (length - 4 km, depth - up to 800 m). At the same time, they cut the Leningrad-Shlisselburg highway. Ten days later, together with units of the 10th Infantry Brigade, six BT-7 tanks appeared on the bridgehead. By this time, under enemy attacks, the area had been reduced to two kilometers along the front, but was still held. And it was at this time that a piece of land appeared on the command’s working maps, later called the Nevsky Piglet.

On defense

The Soviet command decided to reinforce the rifle units that had occupied the bridgehead with military equipment. The tankers faced a completely non-trivial task. The Neva in this place had a width of about 400 m, and the German artillery, being on a higher bank, immediately opened fire with every attempt to establish a crossing... First of all, the Leningrad metro builders, together with engineering units, prepared the site; a pit was dug for the vehicles to approach the water covertly. The ferries were assembled from metal containers delivered from the Baltic Shipyard. The pontooners of the 42nd battalion secured the rope on the opposite bank, and the loading of the first tank, the 52-ton KEM, began. Its driver, Sergeant Vasily Chernov, volunteered to go on the first voyage... Against the background of the water surface, there was nothing to camouflage the tank, and as soon as it entered the ferry, shells began to explode nearby. The damaged ferry began to settle on its side. To prevent it from capsizing, Chernov reversed and brought the tank back to shore through the shallow water. Until two o'clock in the morning, three vehicles were transported, but while loading the next one, a shell hit the “harbour” directly. I had to build a new one to the side. Thus, accumulating forces on the bridgehead, the command of the Nevsky Operational Group (NOG) hoped to strike at the connection with the main forces of the Red Army, but each time the reserves literally burned up in flames.

The first breakthrough attempt in September was unsuccessful. The next one was undertaken only at the end of November. But due to the aggravated situation near Tikhvin, it was also terminated. All this time the Nazis did not give up trying to throw Piglet’s defenders into the river. On other days, the number of attacks on positions reached 12-16. The shells broke the ice countless times, people and cars went into the frozen Neva water. Even now, so many years after the war, magnetometers respond to continuous stripes of pieces of metal crossing the river bottom. Our artillery from across the river also responded to the German guns. By the way, the armored train “Stalinets-28” (built in Leningrad in the fall of 1941) also took part in this duel. He cruised along the branch line laid to Nevskaya Dubrovka almost until the spring of next year, supporting the defenders of Piglet with fire from 100-mm naval guns.

STATISTICS

The bridgehead lasted 12 months with a short break. During this time, 9 rifle divisions and 4 separate brigades, as well as more than 140 other units, fought on it. The total losses of Soviet troops, according to official data, amounted to 200 thousand people (more than a quarter of them were irrecoverable). German losses in this area are estimated at 35-40 thousand soldiers and officers.

First winter of the blockade

In winter, the Soviet command repeatedly tried to expand the bridgehead. But on terrain devoid of any kind of cover, the tanks were quickly knocked out by the enemy. And in early December, an incident occurred that was unique by any standards. A T-34 from the 107th Tank Regiment, being at the forefront of the attack, was blown up by a mine at the front line of the Germans. The tankers, who had come to their senses, saw a couple more frozen 34s nearby (the third was on fire). There was no need to wait for help. The German infantry was driven off several times by machine-gun fire. By nightfall the battle had died down and the crew was able to inspect the damage to the tank from the outside. The left side was badly damaged: the sloth was torn off, the drive wheel and one of the rollers were broken. On the right, the caterpillar simply tore apart. There was no contact with headquarters. The gunner, Loginov, suggested that his comrades stay in the tank and support their own with fire during a second attack. Gunner-radio operator Yudenko and wounded driver-mechanic Kotov agreed. At night there was shooting nearby, but no one approached the tank. As it turned out later, the regiment commander sent a group of three people to find out the fate of the crew, but they stumbled upon the Germans who came with the same goals. Since the tankers did not react in any way to the shooting, the scouts considered them dead, and the Germans mistook the soldiers for a departing crew and also lost interest in the damaged vehicle.

As a result, the completely frozen tank stood in front of the enemy defense line for 77 hours! The three tankers had neither food nor water. On the third night, the crew managed to finish repairing one track, and the next morning they attempted to return to their own. At dawn the diesel engine was warmed up with torches. When it started up, Loginov opened fire point-blank at the dugouts and gun positions (he managed to study their location well). And since the German guns did not even have crews at such an early hour, the tanker shot them with impunity, like targets at a shooting range. Finally the engine warmed up and the driver moved the tank. The return journey, just one and a half kilometers long, took several hours. From our front line we noticed a strange zigzag movement of the tank and, realizing what was happening, called barrage fire on the enemy trenches. After returning to their team, the tankers were awarded orders. Luck did not abandon them later either: all three continued to fight and met Victory.

More than once, tanks on Piglet turned out to be a last resort, deciding the outcome of the battle in our favor. At the end of February, the Nazis tried twice unsuccessfully to break through the defenses in the center of the positions. Having achieved nothing, they tried to walk along the shore, but came across cars that had just crossed. It was very inconvenient to maneuver on a narrow strip of coastal sand; two tanks fell into gullies or craters almost up to their turrets. Nevertheless, the tankers managed to drive away the enemy.

Taking advantage of the unexpected ice drift that took away all the crossings, the Nazis launched an assault. After two days of continuous battle, the front line disappeared and the enemy positions were mixed up. Both sides did not take losses into account; the earth was literally burning. The Germans, who had a numerical superiority, managed to eliminate the bridgehead on April 29. The surviving defenders of the Nevsky Patch tried to make their way to the right bank along the floating ice floes under machine-gun fire. Few managed to do this.

Return to the bridgehead

Hitler finally formalized the decision to capture Leningrad in an order dated July 23. Army Group North was ordered to complete the assault on the city by early September 1942. The plan, called “Northern Lights,” involved cutting off the city from troops in the area of ​​the Neva and Lake Ladoga. (After the completion of the assault on Sevastopol, the 11th Army under the command of Erich von Manschtein was transferred to Leningrad.) The Soviet side also sought to take the initiative into their own hands and prepared a breakthrough to the city along the shortest distance through Sinya-Vino. In this area, the positions of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts were separated by a strip only 16 km wide. Soviet troops under the command of Meretskov made their first move almost a month before the start of the German offensive. The assault groups of the 2nd Shock Army slowly advanced through the dense enemy defenses. By the beginning of September, there were only a few kilometers left to the Neva. The troops of the Leningrad Front struck from the ring and again captured two bridgeheads on the left bank: one in almost the same place where it was last time, and the second downstream, near the village of Annenskoye.

In the Pyatochka area, the Neva was crossed by three rifle divisions and a separate brigade, which were reinforced by the 86th and 118th separate tank battalions (OTB) of mixed composition (T-26, BT-2 and -5, T-34, KV-1 ) and a battalion of light amphibious tanks T-37 and T-38 (OLTB). On the night of September 26, the first ten tanks from the OLTB approached the crossing. Due to breakdowns, three stopped near the water, and seven cars rushed to the opposite shore. The Germans illuminated the river with rockets and opened fire. Only three tanks reached the right bank, but they were quickly knocked out. Over the next four nights, they managed to transport 16 amphibious vehicles, seven light T-26s with cannon armament, as well as a pair of T-26s and one BT-2 with machine guns in the turrets. The shore was swampy and littered with the remains of broken boats and logs, making it difficult to exit the pontoon. It was possible to move in open areas only with great difficulty, since the entire ground was cut up by trenches and craters from shells and bombs. Under constant artillery fire and air raids, the number of combat-ready tanks decreased before our eyes. As a result, by October 5, only one car was left running. On this day, taking advantage of the insufficient support at the junction of the 70th and 86th rifle divisions, about 40 German soldiers “infiltrated” along the narrow-gauge railway almost to the very shore. Some of our infantrymen succumbed to panic and ran. Two tanks standing in firing positions (one of them simply got stuck in a swamp, and the other was damaged) opened fire with machine guns. A group of commanders and tank soldiers took two boxes of grenades and threw them at the Germans. The battle turned into hand-to-hand combat. The mechanic-driver of the OLTB Bay-da stabbed a German officer with a knife, and another driver, Rozhkov, killed several Germans with a revolver.

On the night of October 6-7, two repair teams crossed the Neva, and over the next day they restored the mobility of five vehicles and prepared them for evacuation. But the enemy again defeated them with artillery fire, and the BT-2 burned out from a direct hit when approaching the ferry. Only one T-26 was able to be withdrawn from the bridgehead.

Lost illusions

Instead of storming the city, Manche-tein had to organize an impromptu counter-offensive. Six infantry divisions and one tank, supported by a battalion of the latest Tiger tanks and a battalion of self-propelled guns, struck from different sides at the base of the wedge driven into the German defense. As a result, the 2nd strike was again surrounded. After the creation of the “cauldron”, part of the German forces turned towards the Neva. On September 29, the 28th Jaeger and 12th Tank Divisions liquidated the bridgehead at Annensky. The Nevsky patch survived again.

Meanwhile, Hitler demanded that the attack on Leningrad be launched as quickly as possible. Heavy artillery was transferred to the “cauldron”, intended for shelling the city. By mid-October, the resistance was suppressed, and the opponents, having suffered thousands of losses, found themselves again in the positions of a month ago. But the heavy rains that began washed away the few roads and thereby put an end to large-scale operations. Soon Manstein’s army was transferred to Velikiye Luki, and then to the Don. The threat of a direct assault on the city had finally passed.

Operation Spark

The front command began to develop a new plan for lifting the blockade immediately after the end of the autumn battles. Since December, the troops began to prepare for a breakthrough at specially built training grounds similar to German defenses in the rear. The fighters had to run across the ice of the Neva in seven and a half minutes. Rifle units were trained simultaneously with those tank units with which they were to go into battle together. By January, it was possible to gather reserves from the entire front at the site of the offensive. The formation had a numerical superiority over the enemy in infantry by 4.5 times, in artillery by 6-7 times, and in tanks by 10 times.

On the morning of January 12, the troops made a breakthrough after artillery preparation. The infantry was the first to descend onto the ice; the tanks crossed only on the third day of the battle along fortified crossings. The 45th Guards Division, advancing from Piglet, knocked the Germans out of the first trench, but was unable to advance further under heavy fire. The connection of the two fronts took place on the morning of January 18 in the area of ​​1st Gorodok.

Of course, the events on the Nevsky patch cannot be judged simplistically and one-sidedly. The fire that raged over this piece of our land for a whole year illuminated a picture too contradictory for clear assessments. Everything was here: the real heroism of the soldiers who fought to the death, and the unjustified orders of commanders who aimlessly killed people, and the notorious NKVD blocking detachments. Moreover, these battles became one of the bloodiest episodes not only in the battle for Leningrad, but in the entire Second World War.

In the 60s of the last century, search engines conducted the following experiment: they sifted soil taken from one randomly selected square meter of the Nevsky patch. It turned out that it contained about 10 kg of fragments and 38 bullets! As you might guess, such finds are not uncommon here to this day...

text: Andrey AKSENOV
photo: from the archive

"You who are alive know that from this earth
We didn’t want to leave and didn’t leave.
We stood to the death by the dark Neva.
We died so that you could live."
Robert Rozhdestvensky
inscription on the memorial "Boundary Stone"

It’s difficult for me to restrain excessive pathos when talking about this place, and I don’t really want to use other people’s words. Therefore, do not judge for the clumsiness and “unnovelty” of the text.
Wikipedia characterizes the Nevsky Piglet as “a bridgehead on the left bank of the Neva River, which was held by Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War. It is located between the city of Kirovsk and the village of Pavlovo. Before the war, the village of Arbuzovo was located on this territory.”
Theoretically, this is a very correct and logical description, but in order to understand the entire feat of the defenders of the Nevsky Piglet, you need to at least approximately imagine what this place looked like during the Great Patriotic War.

Imagine a rectangle of land 2 km long and 800 meters wide. For comparison, 800 meters is the length of Zvenigorodskaya Street in the center of St. Petersburg (metro station Pushkinskaya, between Marata Ave. and Zagorodny Ave.), and 2 kilometers is the length of Nevsky Prospekt from the Admiralty to the street. Rubinstein. Now imagine that on one side (which is 2 km) of this piece of land there is the Neva, on the opposite side and along the edges there is a forest. So, Soviet troops held this small patch for about 400 days. From all sides except the Neva there were Germans who constantly attacked the bridgehead. The average life expectancy of a soldier there was about 52 hours. In just 3 years, about 250 thousand people died on the patch.

You’d better read the history of the Neva patch in “Northern Fortresses”, because... I can’t write better or more clearly, and copying the entire text is simply not decent. There you can also watch several good reports about tanks found at the bottom of the Neva.

I want to tell you a little about something else...
This is how H. Kardel recalled the capture of the patch in “The History of the 170th Infantry Division” (Bad Nauheim, 1953): “Only old commanders who experienced the carnage of the First World War could remember that they saw something like the Nevsky bridgehead. Only occasionally a crushed tree stump stuck out on the ground, plowed up by heavy artillery, rocket-propelled mortars and aerial bombs. Destroyed tanks stood near deep craters and trenches leading to Russian trenches. The arms and legs of dead Russian soldiers stuck out from the walls of the trenches. Everything else was covered with earth after the shells exploded. There were minefields all around."

The echoes of these battles are still heard. When you arrive at the Neva patch, the first thing that catches your eye is the absence of wild trees on the bridgehead territory. As they say, they do not grow there due to the high iron content in the soil. The forest that is visible in the photo in the background is already on the other bank of the Neva, and the obelisk marks the front line of defense.

If we walk along the path past the tank deep into the bridgehead, we will come straight to the mass graves. I don’t know when they began to be created, but their number is growing every year. In fact, the entire Nevsky patch is one big mass grave and digging there seems to be unethical, but people are driven by the desire to identify the dead, inform relatives about the place of death of their ancestors and give them the opportunity to say goodbye to each other. Therefore, you have to choose, either leave everything as it is, fence it off and mark it as a mass grave, or continue digging for noble purposes.

On May 8, 1999, a small chapel of St. George the Victorious was erected next to the graves. It was built in just 11 days. Many may doubt the wisdom of having religious symbols here, since the Soviet Union denied belief in God. But many of the soldiers who died there were born and raised before the era of total atheism.

Every year search groups work here and the work does not decrease. The remains of soldiers, shells, and everyday details are found.

It is very rare for anyone to be identified. Mortal Tokens are found in 1 in 30 fighters at best. The inscription on the slab reads “456 soldiers and commanders were buried. It was possible to identify:” and a list of 10 names.

If you get off the road and go for a walk on the grass, you can discover a lot of interesting things. What is considered an exhibit in many museums lies simply underfoot here. Of course, this is primarily the merit of black archaeologists, but it creates an amazing atmosphere.
For example, here is a hose from a gas mask:

Or a filter for a gas mask and other parts of something. Unfortunately, I don't understand it well.

And this piece of brick was clearly once part of a house in the disappeared village of Arbuzovo. Or maybe he was transported from a destroyed house in Dubrovka for the construction of fortifications. And this brick was presumably produced at the plant of Peter Lenin.

But the exhibit in the photo below was honestly taken home by me. True, his belonging to the Great Patriotic War is a big question. There are traces of enamel on the mug. Does anyone know if there were enamel mugs at that time and whether they could have ended up in a war zone?

I left all the finds in place, and many take them to the graves. I don’t even know what to do better.

Even 10 years ago at school, I was sure that only Leningraders fought on the Leningrad Front. I still wondered where so many people in the city came from. Later, when I began to read more historical literature, I realized how wrong I was.

After visiting the Nevsky Piglet, I was left with a very difficult impression. This place exhausts both soul and body. I’m usually not sensitive to “aura,” but I can say for sure that this place is thoroughly saturated with pain and despair.

<Сюда приходили умирать, чтобы жили другие...

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Nevsky patch

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The Nevsky Piglet bridgehead was located on the left bank of the Neva near the village of Dubrovka, approximately 12 kilometers downstream of Lake Ladoga. At this point, the Neva forms a bend and is only 270-350 meters wide and has fairly flat banks.

The village of Dubrovka in the mid-20th century was divided into Nevskaya Dubrovka and Novy Poselok (on the right bank of the Neva south of the Dubrovka River), Vyborgskaya Dubrovka (along the right bank of the Neva north of the Dubrovka River) and Moskovskaya Dubrovka (along the left bank of the Neva).

General S.N. Borshchev, in the fall of 1941 - chief of staff of the 168th Infantry Division

On the night of September 20, the battalion of the 576th Infantry Regiment of the 115th Infantry Division under the command of Captain V.P. Dubik on fishing boats and homemade rafts from the Nevskaya Dubrovka area managed to secretly cross to the left bank of the Neva and with a decisive attack knock out units of the 20th Motorized divisions from forward positions. Since the division operated without the support of aviation and tanks, having only divisional and regimental artillery, artillery preparation was not carried out, which made it possible to achieve the effect of surprise.

Over the course of a day of fierce fighting, the advance detachment cleared Moscow Dubrovka of the enemy and captured a bridgehead over two kilometers wide and up to one and a half kilometers deep. In the following days, it was possible to transport additional forces to the bridgehead and increase the number of division units operating there to 1,166 people. In addition, four 76 mm guns were delivered to the left bank. Simultaneously with units of the 115th Infantry Division, the battalion of the 4th Marine Brigade crossed the Neva opposite the Teplobeton platform and captured a small bridgehead in the area of ​​the 1st Gorodok. However, the advance detachment of Marines was soon driven out of the captured position. The survivors were withdrawn to the right bank, and the main forces of the brigade were soon transported to a bridgehead in the Moscow Dubrovka area.

Units of the 115th Infantry Division and the 4th Marine Brigade managed to maximally expand the bridgehead to 4 kilometers along the front, but the German command immediately made active attempts to eliminate the bridgehead. First, two regiments from the 126th and 96th Infantry Divisions, and then a battalion of the 8th Tank Division, were transferred to this area. Fierce fighting continued until early October. Units of the Neva Operational Group, having strengthened the group on the left bank with the 11th Rifle Brigade, managed to keep the bridgehead in their hands, but its size was reduced to 2 kilometers along the front and to 500-700 meters in depth. Both sides suffered heavy losses. Thus, by the end of September, the 115th Infantry Division lost 865 people, and the 4th Marine Brigade lost up to 80% of its personnel. The German units also suffered heavy losses: the 20th Motorized Division lost its combat capability and was withdrawn to the rear for rest and replenishment. Its place was taken by the main forces of the 96th Infantry Division.

Having localized the Soviet bridgehead, German units began to methodically build defensive positions around it, long-term firing points, minefields, and barbed wire barriers. At the end of September 1941, the Germans created three artillery groups. Having taken a position from Shlisselburg to Otradny, German large-caliber artillery, relying on intelligence data, began systematic shelling of crossings and concentration areas of Soviet troops on the right bank, which significantly complicated the transfer of reinforcements to the bridgehead and the evacuation of the wounded to the right bank.

During the day, the wide ribbon of the Neva is deserted. During daylight hours, not a single boat dared to cross the 500-meter distance - from shore to shore. She would certainly have been shot before she managed to reach the middle of the river... But then night came. Enemy missiles swarmed over the Neva. Their light picked out from the pitch darkness the silhouettes of the ruins of a paper mill and the skeletons of pontoons, boats, and boats scattered all over our shore.

General V.F. Konkov, in the fall of 1941 - commander of the 115th Infantry Division, then of the Nevsky Operational Group.

Fighting in the Nevsky Piglet area, October - December 1941.

“Nevsky Piglet”, October - December 1941

The idea of ​​the operation remained the same - with counter strikes from the Neva Operational Group, advancing from the west, and the 54th Army, advancing from the east, with the assistance of units of the 55th Army, to break the blockade of Leningrad.

To accomplish the assigned task, reinforcements were transferred to the bridgehead - the 265th, 86th Rifle Divisions and the 20th NKVD Division. Until the end of October, these forces attacked the enemy more than once with these forces, but were unable to achieve significant success. In addition, by this time the situation in the Tikhvin direction had sharply worsened as a result of the German offensive. The front command decided to temporarily suspend the operation and adjust the offensive plan.

According to the decision of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, the main blow was now to be delivered from the bridgehead on the left bank of the Neva by units of the 8th Army, to whose headquarters all the forces of the “Neva Operational Group” were transferred. The proposal of the army commander, Lieutenant General T.I. Shevaldin, to only divert the enemy’s attention by actions on the “Neva Patch”, and to cross the Neva with the main forces and deliver the main blow in another area, were rejected.

It was planned that at the first stage of the offensive, the forces of five rifle divisions would expand the bridgehead, and then, strengthening the attacking group with four rifle divisions and a tank brigade, advance in the direction of Sinyavino to join the troops of the 54th Army. At the same time, the 55th Army was supposed to launch an auxiliary attack in the direction of Ivanovskoye - Mga.

For the offensive from the bridgehead, the 86th, 115th, 265th, 168th, 177th rifle divisions and the 20th NKVD division were concentrated. In reserve on the right bank of the Neva were the 10th Rifle Division, the 11th and 4th Naval Rifle Brigades, and the 123rd Red Banner Heavy Tank Brigade.

On November 3, after a short artillery barrage, a new offensive began. The headquarters of the rifle formations and forward observation posts of the artillery units were located on the bridgehead and, due to the lack of reliable communications, could not promptly adjust the fire of the batteries that occupied positions on the right bank of the Neva. In addition, a strict limit on ammunition consumption per day was established for artillery units, which was clearly not enough to conduct full-fledged artillery preparation. As a result, most of the enemy’s firing points were not suppressed and the advancing rifle units were met with heavy machine-gun and mortar fire from different sides, suffered heavy losses and were forced to retreat to their original lines.

The unsuccessful attacks continued for several days, but neither the support of light tanks, transported with great difficulty to the bridgehead, nor the order to the division and regiment commanders to personally lead the soldiers into the attack helped to achieve any significant success. The front command was forced to suspend the offensive due to heavy losses in the rifle units. Thus, in the 168th Infantry Division and in the 20th NKVD Division, after a 3-4-day battle, only 200-300 people remained in the ranks.

Three shock communist regiments, each numbering 2,750 people, were immediately formed and immediately transferred to the Nevskaya Dubrovka area. Rear, artillery, communications and air defense units were reduced to the limit. The released soldiers and commanders were sent as riflemen to replenish the divisions fighting on the bridgehead. 40 light and medium tanks were prepared for the crossing to the left bank, and most of the KV-1s, which could not be transported to the bridgehead, were transferred to the disposal of the 55th Army. The number of artillery groups in the Nevskaya Dubrovka area was increased to 600 guns and mortars, not counting three rocket artillery batteries. However, the offensive plan remained unchanged.

When one of the staff officers began to complain about the difficulties of attacking from an open “patch”, where neither maneuver nor a flank attack could be used, the division commander, looking closely at him, said in an even, calm voice: “The “Nevsky patch” is marked on Comrade Stalin’s map. . Do you think people at Headquarters understand less than you?

General S. N. Borshchev, in the fall of 1941 - chief of staff of the 168th Infantry Division

On the morning of November 10, another offensive began. Having crossed to the bridgehead, the 1st Shock Communist Regiment went on the attack, but, met by hurricane fire from the enemy, it suffered heavy losses and did not achieve success. By the end of the day, out of 1,500 fighters, no more than 500 remained in the ranks.

On November 11, the German positions were unsuccessfully attacked three times by the 2nd Communist Regiment, with the support of the significantly thinned 168th, 177th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Shock Communist Regiment. Once again, Soviet troops were unsuccessful.

On November 12, after a 30-minute artillery barrage, Soviet units attacked with all their forces on the bridgehead. But 5 divisions (168th, 115th, 86th and 177th and 20th NKVD) and 2 communist regiments suffered such losses in previous battles that, combined, they could hardly form one division by the number of bayonets and only the 3rd Communist Regiment has not yet suffered losses. The offensive was supported by about 10 tanks, including several heavy KV tanks. If the attack in the center on the Figurnaya grove immediately floundered, the attack on the left flank initially developed more successfully. The soldiers of the 86th Infantry Division managed to drive the enemy to the 1st Gorodok and began an assault on the 8th State District Power Plant. However, there was nothing to support this success, and after several days of fierce fighting, the 86th Division was forced to abandon its conquered positions. According to incomplete data, in five days of fighting, units of the 8th Army lost over 5,000 people.

On November 16, the chief of staff of the Leningrad Front, D.N. Gusev, assured the top leadership that he and A.A. Zhdanov were “absolutely convinced of a breakthrough to the east”, since “the enemy is badly strained.” However, repeated attacks by Soviet units, which continued until the end of 1941, did not achieve any significant success. By the end of November, they managed to transport 20 KV tanks, 10 T-34 tanks and 16 light tanks to the bridgehead, but this did not significantly change the situation. Soviet units continued to unsuccessfully attack the enemy in order to expand the bridgehead, and the Germans, in turn, tried to throw the defenders of the “patch” into the Neva. So, on December 20, one regiment of the 86th Infantry Division, with the support of units of the 123rd Tank Brigade, attacked the enemy in the direction of Arbuzovo-Annenskoye, but were unsuccessful. Moreover, at the same time, German troops on the left flank of the bridgehead from the area of ​​the 1st Gorodok went on the offensive. Fierce fighting, turning into hand-to-hand combat, continued for several days, but the Soviet units, having received reinforcements, managed to hold the bridgehead.

According to German data, from November 15 to December 27, Soviet units attacked in combat groups 79 times, with up to two companies - 66 times, with battalions and above - 50 times. While repelling 16 tank attacks, 51 Soviet tanks were destroyed.

In total, in September - December 1941, a Soviet group of about 10 divisions (115th, 86th, 265th, 177th, 10th, 168th rifle divisions, 20th NKVD division) operated on the bridgehead , 4th Marine Brigade, 11th Infantry Brigade, as well as three Communist shock regiments, the 107th Tank Battalion and part of the forces of the 123rd Tank Brigade), but it is extremely difficult to more accurately indicate its strength. Often, after several days of fighting, rifle formations suffered such losses that they lost all combat effectiveness. If the situation permitted, their remnants were withdrawn to the right bank for rest and replenishment, but, as a rule, the surviving soldiers and commanders from different units transferred to other divisions and continued to fight.

One of the commanders crawled up. Asks who I am. I answer that he is a soldier of the 502nd Infantry Regiment.

What 502? We don't have that. And this is the 277th divisions probably. So it was already removed from our site, and the personnel were handed over to us. So you are now a machine gunner in the 330th Regiment of the 86th Infantry Division.

M.A. Pavlov, participant in the battles on the Nevsky Piglet

Soviet units suffered heavy losses even in days of relative calm, since the entire bridgehead was shot through and through by enemy artillery and small arms and machine-gun fire and was, in fact, the front line. Even units that did not directly participate in the battles for the bridgehead suffered heavy losses. For example, the 712th separate cable-pole company, which laid an armored cable along the bottom of the Neva and ensured the connection of the bridgehead with the right bank, or the 41st and 42nd engineering pontoon battalions, which transported troops to the bridgehead.

The gloomy bulk of the 8th State District Power Plant dominated the river and the patch, giving the enemy not only excellent observation opportunities, but also excellent conditions for setting up firing positions with reliable shelters in the underground floors. In the depths of the enemy’s defense, no more than a thousand meters from the shore line, there were two huge mounds of slag accumulated over 10 years of operation of the state district power plant. Reconnaissance in force showed that the Nazis had equipped them with machine gun emplacements and had perfectly camouflaged them. In front of the mounds there were two deep sand pits, in which the Nazis prepared firing positions for mortars of all calibers. These positions were not visible and were protected from flat fire... The river and the patch, thanks to the bend of the Neva, were also shot from the village of Arbuzovo, into the back of our units advancing on the overpass and the state district power plant.

Yu. R. Poresh, veteran of the 115th Infantry Division, participant in the battles on the Nevsky Patch in November 1941.

In the period from October to December 1941, Soviet troops in the Nevsky Piglet area were opposed by the 96th Infantry and 7th Parachute Divisions and the 1st Infantry Division, which later arrived in the Nevsky Piglet area. German units “experienced very difficult weeks there and suffered significant losses.” Thus, by the end of November, many battalions of the 1st Infantry Division had less than a hundred people left in service.

Liquidation of the Nevsky Piglet. April 1942

At the beginning of 1942, the main efforts of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts were concentrated in the area of ​​the Volkhov River, from where Soviet troops delivered the main blow in the operation, which initially had the goal of completely liberating Leningrad from the siege (Lyuban operation). The offensive developed with great difficulty and absorbed almost all the reserves of the two fronts. For this reason, from the beginning of 1942, relative calm established itself in the Nevsky Piglet area. This circumstance made it possible, for example, to evacuate 9 damaged KV tanks from the bridgehead to the right bank that were subject to restoration.

At the end of April 1942, ice drift began on the Neva, which cut off the Nevsky Piglet garrison from the main forces on the right bank of the river. At that time, the bridgehead was defended by the 330th Regiment (Commander Major S.A. Blokhin), part of the forces of the 284th Regiment and some other units of the 86th Infantry Division - about 1000 people in total.

On the evening of April 24, after artillery bombardment and an air strike, German troops with six battalions of the 1st Infantry Division (up to 3,000 soldiers and officers) went on the attack.

The bridgehead defenders defended with exceptional tenacity and repelled more than 12 enemy attacks. The crossing of reinforcements to the bridgehead was made difficult not only by ice drift, but also by the fact that most of the boats were destroyed by enemy artillery and mortar fire. But still, on April 24, the soldiers of the 1st Infantry Battalion of the 284th Infantry Regiment managed to reach the left bank. At the same time, a group of commanding officers of the 86th Infantry Division moved to the bridgehead to organize defense and evacuate the wounded.

Despite the desperate resistance of the defenders, after several days of fierce fighting, the enemy managed to cut through the defenses of the Soviet units and reach the Neva in several places. By the end of April 27, the bridgehead was liquidated. The last thing seen from the right bank was a piece of camouflage clothing on which was written: “Help.”

Most of the defenders of the bridgehead, including the head of the political department of the division, battalion commissar A.V. Shchurov, and the chief of staff of the division, Major Ya.V. Kozlov, died. One of the few who managed to avoid captivity and not die was the chief of staff of the regiment, Major A. M. Sokolov, who, being wounded three times, still managed to swim to the opposite shore at the end of April 27. 117 Soviet soldiers and officers, including the thrice wounded commander of the 330th regiment S.A. Blokhin, were captured. According to the St. Petersburg historian V.S. Pravdyuk, who knew S.A. Blokhin personally, the Germans amputated both legs of the major in the hospital and handed him over to local residents with the words: “This is your hero - you take care of him.”

According to German data, the losses of the Soviet side in these battles amounted to 1,400 people. The 1st Infantry Division suffered 489 casualties, including 100 soldiers killed or missing in action.

Recreation of the Nevsky Piglet

By the end of September, another plan for crossing the Neva was prepared. The Neva Operational Group was tasked with the forces of the 86th, 46th, 70th Rifle Divisions and the 11th Rifle Brigade with reinforcements to cross the Neva in the Peski section - the Teplobeton platform, break through the enemy’s defenses and connect with units of the Volkhov Front. About 90 T-38 amphibious tanks were allocated to support rifle formations. The general management of the operation was carried out by the chief of staff of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General D. N. Gusev.

By this time, the units of the Volkhov Front advancing from the east as a result of the German counter-offensive found themselves in a critical situation and there was no longer any chance of breaking the blockade. However, the operation of the Neva Operational Group forced the German command to transfer the 28th Jaeger Division from the Sinyavin area to strengthen the defense on the Neva, which somewhat eased the position of the encircled group of the Volkhov Front.

On September 26, Soviet troops began crossing the Neva and managed to gain a foothold on the left bank in several places. Thus, the 86th Infantry Division fought in the Anensky area, the 70th in the Moscow Dubrovka area, and the 11th Infantry Brigade near the 1st Gorodok. German troops with the forces of the 12th Panzer and 28th Jaeger Divisions continuously counterattacked and the Soviet command, in order to hold the bridgeheads, decided to begin crossing tanks. From September 30 to October 3, 26 tanks were transported to the left bank of the Neva, but by early October, Soviet troops were unable to build on their initial success. Moreover, German troops managed to eliminate two bridgeheads. Only the “patch” in the Moscow Dubrovka area remained under the control of Soviet units.

On October 5, 1942, the Supreme Command Headquarters ordered the withdrawal of the main forces of the “Neva Operational Group” to the right bank of the Neva due to the operational inexpediency of further holding the bridgehead on the eastern bank. Immediately, units of the Neva operational group began to retreat to the right bank. However, the Germans did not attack the bridgehead left by the Soviet troops over the next two days. Taking this into account, the Soviet command decided to transport a reinforced company from the 70th Infantry Division to the left bank, which on October 8-9 took up defense on the recreated “Nevsky patch” along the lines: on the right - the ravines north of Arbuzov, along the front - the highway, and on the left are the ruins of a school in Moskovskaya Dubrovka. From October 20, 1942 to January 1943, the bridgehead was held by one battalion from the 46th Infantry Division.

According to the report of the commander of the Leningrad Front L.A. Govorov to I.V. Stalin dated October 4, according to incomplete data, the losses of the 86th, 70th rifle divisions and the 11th rifle brigade in the battles of September 26-29 amounted to 8244 people.

Breaking the blockade of Leningrad, January-February 1943

The systematic destruction of enemy fortifications was carried out for several days, and only on the morning of February 15, units of three rifle brigades from different sides went on the offensive. Units of the 102nd Brigade attacked from the north, units of the 142nd Brigade - from the east, and units of the 138th Brigade - from the south, from the territory of the Nevsky Piglet. By February 17, Soviet troops had completely eliminated all enemy defense centers in this area. Success was achieved thanks to effective artillery support. Thus, artillery fire did not allow German reinforcements to get through to the 1st and 2nd Gorodok, and in the building of the 8th State District Power Plant almost the entire garrison was destroyed.

The elimination of these most important enemy defense centers made it possible to create a land connection with the Nevsky Piglet. On February 17, German units that continued to hold positions directly in front of the bridgehead were forced to retreat, but units of the 67th Army were unable to advance beyond the ruins of the village of Arbuzovo. Although Nevsky Pyatachok ceased to be a bridgehead, this area was completely cleared of the enemy only in January 1944.

It is extremely difficult to isolate the losses of the 45th Guards Rifle Division and other units fighting in the bridgehead area from the total number of losses of the Leningrad Front in Operation Iskra. Based on official data on the losses of Soviet troops in this operation, it can be assumed that this time they were significant.

Losses

Mass graves of Soviet soldiers. Memorial "Nevsky Piglet".

The number of dead and wounded Soviet soldiers in the battles for the Nevsky Piglet differs significantly in different sources, but, according to absolutely all estimates, the losses in the battles for the bridgehead were enormous.

In addition, wanting to emphasize the unprecedented level of losses in the battles for the “patch”, the number of killed per square meter of the bridgehead is often indicated. At the same time, here the estimates differ significantly - from 2 to 17 dead soldiers. However, such statements are incorrect and clearly exaggerated. The dimensions of the “Nevsky Piglet” were constantly changing: from 4 to 1 kilometer in width and from 800 to 350 meters in depth, sometimes literally within a day.

Having learned from me that at army headquarters they believe that the bridgehead on the left bank of the Neva extends 4 kilometers along the front and has a three-kilometer depth, Colonel [commander of the 115th Infantry Division A.F. Mashoshin] waved his hand.

It was yesterday,” he said with a sigh, “and then we were squeezed.” Now the “patch” has two kilometers along the front and goes seven hundred to eight hundred meters deep, no more. Every day from morning to evening, either we attack or the enemy attacks us. Thank God they kept that too.

S. N. Borshchev, in the fall of 1941 - chief of staff of the 168th Infantry Division.

In addition, Soviet units suffered significant losses both in places of concentration on the right bank of the Neva, and during the crossing, and in attacks at a considerable distance from their positions. If we take into account that the average size of the bridgehead was 2 kilometers along the Neva and 1 kilometer in depth (that is, one million square meters), then the number of deaths here should have been 2-17 million people.

One way or another, all estimates of losses of Soviet troops in the battles for the bridgehead are approximate and exact figures are probably impossible to indicate.

The losses of German troops in battles in the Nevsky Piglet area are also not known for certain. According to rough estimates, they ranged from 10,000 to 35,000-40,000 soldiers and officers killed.

Currently, the opinion is often expressed that all the Soviet soldiers who died on the Nevsky Piglet died in vain, since “the bridgehead became a huge mass grave, without playing any operational role.” A participant in the battles on the Nevsky patch in the fall of 1941 as part of the 115th Infantry Division, Yu. R. Poresh, answered the question “whether holding the bridgehead was worth such huge sacrifices”:

In the conditions of Leningrad blockaded by the Nazis and all the severe troubles caused by this blockade, such a question could not arise. It was later, when the losses in killed, wounded, and maimed were counted, that we, the survivors, became terrified of the real cost of this “patch” and the question arose: “Was it worth it?” And at that time, Nevskaya Dubrovka was the only hope for breaking the blockade and removing the threat of starvation of the remaining Leningraders, because from the Nevsky patch to the battle formations of the Volkhov Front it was only seven kilometers