I . Introduction
2012 has been declared the year of history in our country. We will celebrate the 400th anniversary of the Militia of K. Minin - D. Pozharsky, the expulsion of the interventionists and the restoration of Russian statehood.
The War of 1812 occupied a special place in the military chronicles of our Fatherland. The victory of the Russians over the combined forces of the largest powers in Europe became a source of national pride for their contemporaries and to this day awakens high patriotic feelings among their descendants.
Interest in the War of 1812 has never waned. The main peaks of scientific works, publications, television programs and speeches by politicians usually occur around anniversaries. Also this year we celebrated the 200th anniversary of the Patriotic War of 1812.
Napoleon's defeat in Russia was largely predetermined by the fact that the armed struggle took on a nationwide character. Together with generals, officers and soldiers, patriotic representatives of the nobility, merchants, and peasants made their personal contribution to the defeat of the enemy. Thus, a unique historical precedent was created when the strongest army in the world, which had not lost a single major battle at the beginning of its retreat, was virtually completely destroyed in a short time.This is probably why the collapse of Napoleon’s Russian campaign does not find a sufficiently reasoned explanation among many, primarily foreign analysts .
The War of 1812, which ended with the collapse of the Napoleonic empire and a radical change in the entire political situation in Europe, left an indelible mark on world history. There is still debate on many issues in the history of the epic of 1812. Therefore, this topic remains relevant in history. Nowadays, the history of the Napoleonic invasion of Russia includes thousands of works by Soviet and Russian historians - monographs, collective works, brochures, articles, reviews, and documentary publications.
There is a need to summarize some of the results of the great and fruitful work done by domestic historians and publicists in studying the Patriotic War of 1812.
The farther the formidable events of the Patriotic War of 1812 go, the more attention and increased interest historians return to the study of this period in the history of the Russian state. Napoleon's invasion of Russia has become an inexhaustible research problem, the relevance of which can be explained by the following circumstances:
Firstly , the epochal nature of historical events.1812 The year became a turning point in the fate of the Russian people. It was during this relatively short historical period of time that the paths for the further development of Russian society were determined.
Secondly , the scale and inconsistency of the events of 1812, which objectively create difficulties in their study. The accumulation of facts, their systematization and generalization were carried out gradually. This process is not completed at this time.Thirdly , the controversial and debatable nature of the scientific problem under study.Fourth , the international nature of the war. Other European states were directly or indirectly drawn into it. For this reason, the history of Napoleon’s campaign in Russia is of interest not only to domestic, but also to foreign historians.Fifthly, enormous moral potential contained in the examples of high patriotism shown by the army and people in the fight against the conquerors.
For me, the impetus for this research was a problematic question that arose in a history lesson." The storm of '12 has arrived - who are we here? helped? Frenzy people, Barclay, winter or Russian God?
I wanted to know; Where, in addition to the textbook, can you read more about the Napoleonic invasion? How has the war been described from different perspectives over the years? What is historiography?
As part of my small work, I conducted a study that, to some extent, allows me to answer the above questions. Besides thisthe material of this research project can be used in history lessons, as well as in extracurricular activities during class hours and discussions.
Object of study is Napoleon's campaign in Russia. Patriotic War of 1812. Estimates of military losses on both sides.
Subject of research selected historiography with XIX to the beginning of the XXI century after the Patriotic War of 1812.
Purpose and objectives of the work . Purpose work is an analysis of a complex of historiographical and source studies published in XIX - early XXI centuries. Realization of this goal required a solution to a complex of interrelatedtasks :
1. Give a periodization of the historiography of the War of 1812, highlight the main stages of its development.
2. Determine the contribution of scientists to the study of the topic as a whole, as well as its key problems.
3. Identify controversial issues on the topic.
4. Trace changes in historians’ views on the topic.
Research methods:
Collection of information (Library, media, Internet resources).
Comparative analysis.
Research.
Presentation of results.
II .Historiography of the War of 1812
Historiographic reviews of literature in scientific research first appeared in the second half of the 19th century. One of the first to accompany his work with a detailed historiographical commentary was the military historian M.I. Bogdanovich. (2) He characterized the most famous Russian and foreign works, which he used in preparing his scientific work. The author's assessments of the positive and negative aspects of these works formed the basis for this analysis. From the second half of the 19th century they acquired a critical orientation. The most typical example in this regard is the responses of I.P. Liprandi on published monographs and articles. For example, the reviewer was quite skeptical about foreign military historiography,which explained the defeat of Napoleonic army by the geographical and climatic features of the theater of military operations. As a direct participant in the war, I.P. Liprandi critically assessed contemporary official histories of A.I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky and M.I. Bogdanovich for factual inaccuracies contained in their works. A critical analysis of military literature is also characteristic of the works of B.M. Kolyubakina and N.P. Polikarpova. (9)
Later, at the beginning of the 20th century, historiographical reviews began to approach independent historiographical research. Some of them show a tendency towards deeper generalizations and conclusions. Indicative in this regard is the introductory part of the work of Yu. Kartsov and K. Voensky, in which they attempted to create a scientific periodization of the historiography of the topic. At the same time, historians tried to identify certain trends in the development of historiography and show its dependence on social factors. (7)
Reviews acquired the character of criticism at the beginning of the 20th century, for which such criticism was already an obligatory element. Their distinctive feature was that the author’s views on the social side of the war began to be assessed. The most revealing in this regard are the analytical analyzes of new publications by S.P. Melgunov and M.N. Pokrovsky. (12)
The beginning of a special and targeted scientific study of the domestic historiography of the War of 1812 can only be said in relation to the beginning of the 20th century, when the entire body of literature devoted to this topic became a special subject of research. One of the first works of this kind was the publication by V.P. Alekseev “The Patriotic War in Russian Historical Literature”, in which the author, along with an analytical analysis of the main scientific works, tried to prove the direct dependence of the historiography of the topic on the surrounding socio-cultural environment.
The War of 1812 in Soviet historiography
During the Soviet period, the tradition of characterizing previous historiography was continued and actually became the norm for monographic works. Analysis of works published in the 50s and 60s. of the past century, indicates that the historiography of the Patriotic War of 1812 is gradually beginning to take shape into an independent scientific direction.
The most common form of historiographic analysis is reviews of printed publications. Initially, in the historiography of the problem under study, reviews were a kind of extended annotations to new books. During the Soviet period, the practice of reviewing essays about 1812 also became widespread.
In the early 60s. L.G. announced himself as the leading historiographer of the War of 1812. Bloodless. The historiographical review he completed in the monograph “The Patriotic War of 1812” was an independent scientific work. The indisputable advantage of the work was the involvement of a wide range of literature in the historiographic analysis. Against the background of the general development of historical science, the historian carefully traced the development of the topic, touching on the evolution of views on the history of Napoleon’s campaign in Russia not only in domestic but also in foreign historiography. However, many of his conclusions were adjusted to a pre-developed scheme, which did not take into account the multifactorial development of historical science from a narrow class position. Therefore, a significant part of the author’s judgments biasedly reflected the real state of affairs in historiography. The researcher’s subjectivism also manifested itself in the characteristics of Soviet historiography, especially in one-sided assessments of the views of K. Marx, F. Engels and V.I. Lenin on the wars of the Napoleonic era. (2) (4)
Subsequently, as the experience of studying literature in the second half of the 80s of the 20th century showed, sharp polemical reviews helped to establish new views on the history of 1812. This tendency was most clearly manifested in the critical articles of N.A. Troitsky, who was the first of the Soviet historians to take the path of a radical revision of the concept of war that developed in the 50s - 80s. The historian resolutely opposed one-sided approaches to explaining the causes of the military conflict between Russia and France. On the basis of archival documents, he criticized the subjectivist judgments widespread in the literature about forces and means, losses of the warring parties, the results of battles and on some other issues. (14)
A.G. devoted his first historiographical works to the study of military journalism. Tartakovsky, in which he examined in detail the development of this type of literature, published during the war years by the printing house at the Main Apartment of the Russian Army. Having studied archival materials and literature, the historian pointed out the relative independence and progressive orientation of the flying publications of the army printing house in the stream of journalism. (14)See appendix.
Among the latest historiographic works, the monograph by B.S. stands out. Abalikhin “1812: current problems of history”, in which the historian opposed the development of opportunistic, in his opinion, approaches to the study of the Patriotic War of 1812, which have emerged in modern historical science. At the same time, the scientist tried to more convincingly substantiate a number of his own, previously expressed, positions. (1)
Among the special studies of the topic, the work of M.A. deserves special attention. Boytsov and V.V. Ilyin, dedicated to the problem of perception of the events of the Patriotic War by Russian contemporaries. (M.A. Boytsov, V.V. Ilyin. (The Patriotic War of 1812 in the epistolary heritage of contemporaries ) In the post-Soviet period, only one monographic study appeared, specifically dedicated to Russian society in 1812 (A.Yu. Andreev).
The fruitful result was the use of the experience of Western historical science (in particular the works of K. Grunwald and P.B. Austin, entirely devoted to the human dimension of the history of the campaign of 1812, the creation of similar works about the Russian army of 1812. This was a real breakthrough for historiography; a fundamentally new look at the era of 1812 is contained in the work of J.A. Westling, devoted to the topic of Napoleon in Russian cultural mythology.
The history of the military operations of 1812 in the northern and southwestern directions remains poorly studied. Historians increasingly began to focus on the mistakes made by the Russian command (in particular, M.I. Kutuzov), began to recognize the high combat effectiveness demonstrated by Napoleon’s army, etc. The story of Borodin attracts special attention from post-Soviet historians. Historians continue to actively debate the outcome of the battle, often caused by the personal biases of the authors. The most thorough of the military topics of 1812 is the history of the people's war and the partisan movement of 1812.
The most controversial topic in the historiography of the War of 1812 is the assessment of military losses, which I also want to focus some attention on.
IV Estimates of military losses in the Battle of Borodino.
The number of losses of the Russian army has been repeatedly revised by historians. Different sources give different numbers:
38-45 thousand people, including 23 generals. The inscription “45 thousand” is engraved on the Main Monument on the Borodino Field, erected in 1839, and is indicated on the 15th wall of the gallery of military glory of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior.
58 thousand killed and wounded, up to 1000 prisoners. Data on losses are given here based on the report of the general on duty of the 1st Army immediately after the battle; the losses of the 2nd Army were estimated by historians of the 19th century, completely arbitrarily, at 20 thousand. These data were no longer considered reliable at the end of the 19th century; they were not taken into account, where the number of losses “up to 40 thousand” was indicated.
42.5 thousand people are indicated as losses of the Russian army in the book by S.P. Mikheev, published in 1911. (11)
According to the surviving reports from the RGVIA archive, the Russian army lost 39,300 people killed, wounded and missing (21,766 in the 1st Army, 17,445 in the 2nd Army), but taking into account the fact that the data in the reports for various reasons is incomplete (do not include losses of the militia and Cossacks), historians usually increase this number to 44-45 thousand people. According to N.A. Troitsky, data from the Military Registration Archive of the General Staff gives a figure of 45.6 thousand people. (13)
Most of the documentation of the Grand Army was lost during the retreat, so estimating French losses is extremely difficult. The question of the total losses of the French army remains open. The most common figure in French historiography for the losses of the Napoleonic army of 30 thousand is based on the calculations of the French officer Denier, who served as an inspector at Napoleon’s General Staff, who determined the total losses of the French for only 3 days of the battle of Borodino at 49 generals, 37 colonels and 28 thousand lower ranks, of these, 6,550 were killed and 21,450 were wounded. (16) In Russian literature, the number of French losses was often given as 58,478 people. This number is based on false information from the defector Alexander Schmidt, who allegedly served in the office of Marshal Berthier. Subsequently, this figure was picked up by patriotic researchers and indicated on the Main Monument. (10)
For modern French historiography, the traditional estimate of French losses is 30 thousand with 9-10 thousand killed (14). Russian historian A. Vasiliev points out, in particular, that the number of losses of 30 thousand is achieved by the following calculation methods - comparing data on the personnel of the surviving statements with a deduction losses in vanguard affairs and the approximate number of sick and retarded.
V. Zemtsov is trying to cast doubt on the calculations of P. Denier Jr. However, he had at his disposal mainly only secondary research and memoirs, including Martinien’s reference book, which Zemtsov gives preference to, believing, for example, that the number of losses according to the report - an official document - of the commander of the 57th linear regiment J.-L. Shariera (1,215 people) "clearly overpriced" ( 14)
According to Vasiliev, it is known exactly (33,854 people, including 42 generals and 1,820 officers; at Borodino, according to Vasiliev, 1,792 people are considered to have been lost among the command staff, of which 49 generals).
The losses of the generals of the parties in killed and wounded amounted to the French - 49 generals, including 8 killed: 2 divisional ones (Auguste Caulaincourt and Montbrunsee appendix ) and 6 brigade. The Russians lost 23 generals, but it should be noted that 70 French generals took part in the Battle of Borodino against 43 Russians.
However, V.N. Zemtsov showed that Vasiliev’s calculations are unreliable, since they are based on inaccurate data. Thus, according to the lists compiled by Zemtsov, “1,928 officers and 49 generals were killed and wounded,” that is, the total loss of command personnel amounted to 1,977 people, and not 1,792, as Vasiliev believed. Vasiliev’s comparison of data on the personnel of the Great Army also, according to Zemtsov, gave incorrect results, since the wounded were not taken into account. Vasiliev did not take into account all parts of the French army.
It should be noted that to the several thousand killed should be added those who died from wounds, and their number was enormous. In the Kolotsky monastery, where the main military hospital of the French army was located, according to the testimony of the captain of the 30th linear regiment, Ch. Francois, in the 10 days following the battle, 3/4 of the wounded died. French historians believe that to the several thousand killed should be added those who died from wounds, and their number was enormous.(See attachment)
Conclusion
Having examined the degree of scientific development of the problem, the following conclusions can be drawn:
1 . Over the 200-year period that has passed since the end of the Patriotic War of 1812, historians have paid great attention to its historiography and achieved positive results in this. Today, historiographical works reflect varying degrees of generalization of scientific knowledge about the history of Napoleon’s invasion of Russia. However, most of them are limited in chronology or have a narrow thematic focus.
2 . As a rule, researchers of the topic determined their attitude to the analyzed works in connection with the prevailing political situation in the country. Combined with insufficient research equipment and a narrow source base, this often led to schematism and superficial theoretical analysis, formulations of generalizations and conclusions adjusted to the required ideological guidelines.
3 . A study of the historiographical works of the last decade shows that currently a fundamentally new attitude is emerging in historical science towards the scientific heritage of previous generations of historians. New, more objective approaches to covering the topic of war are noticeable.
At present, it can be stated that the further development of the historiography of the War of 1812 will be based on the study and interpretation of memoirs of contemporaries and participants in the war, and a change in attitude towards the sources themselves as carriers of diverse information. This huge layer (more than 700 items in total) has enormous information potential and, in fact, has not yet been mastered in world historiography.
So, in this way, I found out that historiography plays an important role in the process of studying history. The changes taking place in modern society imply the formation of new directions for improving research. A large place in this process is occupied by working with sources of knowledge, primarily with fragments of texts, memoirs of domestic and foreign literature.
The study of history is unthinkable without documents, historical primary sources, and works of outstanding historians.
Students’ independent work with sources of knowledge is more successful if it is based on a specific program of action, built in accordance with a specific task and content of educational material, taking into account preparedness and competence.
The selection of sources should be carried out in such a way that they reflect different views on the problem. Working with historical sources brings us closer to the event being studied and creates a special emotional background of perception. This allows you to develop your own attitude to the problem at hand. The educational process takes on a research character.
List of used literature.
1. Abalikhin B. S. 1812: current problems of history. Elista, 2000. P. 10.
2. Essay by Major General M.I. Bogdanovich: In 3 volumes. St. Petersburg, 1859-1860. T. 3. P. 529-5412.
3. Beskrovny L.G. Patriotic War of 1812. pp. 7-104
4. Beskrovny L.G. Some questions of the history of the Patriotic War of 1812 // Questions of history. 1962. No. 10. P. 50-60; His own. Patriotic War of 1812: some results of the study and tasks for further research // Bulletin of the USSR Academy of Sciences. 1962. No. 9. P. 97-103.
5. Vasilevskaya M. Patriotic War of 1812 on the pages of Russian magazines of the first quarter of the 19th century. (1802-1825): Dis. . Ph.D. Philol. Sci. M., 1950.
6. Zhilin P.A. Kutuzov's counteroffensive in 1812. M., 1950. P. 6-30.
7. Kartsov Yu., Voensky K. Causes of the War of 1812. St. Petersburg, 1911. S. V-XIV.
Borodino field: history, culture, ecology. Borodino, 2008.
8. IlyinV.V. Classics of non-classics - neoclassics: three eras in the development of science // BulletinMoscow State University.1993. No. 2. P. 16-34. (Ser. "Philosophy")
9. Liprandi I.P. Some comments about two essays published under the title “Small War”. St. Petersburg, 1851. “History of the Patriotic War of 1812.” Major General M. Bogdanovich. St. Petersburg, 1859. Book. 3. pp. 165-221
10. Inscription on the Main Monument. 6th side: “Europe mourned the fall of its brave sons on the fields of Borodino - Enemy: Generals Killed - 9 Wounded - 30 Warriors Killed - up to 20,000 Wounded - 40,000
11. Mikheev S.P. History of the Russian army. – M.: published by S. Mikheev and A. Kazachkov, 1911
12. PokrovskyM.N. To the report on the activities of the Academy of Sciences for 1926 // Links: Historical Almanac. M., 1992. Issue. 2. pp. 552-589.
13. Troitsky N.A. Field Marshal Kutuzov: myths and facts. M., 2002. P. 11-50
5.M. [Review] // Son of the Fatherland. 1813.
14. Troitsky N.A. A treasure trove of errors: About the book by O.V. Orlik "The Thunderstorm of the Twelfth Year." // In the world of books. 1988. No. 4. P. 86-87. Repetition of the past // Questions of history. 1989. No. 2. P. 155-162
15. Tartakovsky A.G. From the history of Russian military journalism of 1812 // 1812: to the 150th anniversary of the Patriotic War: Sat. Art. M., 1962. pp. 233-16. Russian army journalism of the Patriotic War of 1812: Dis. . Ph.D. ist. Sci. M., 1965
17. Patriotic War of 1812: Encyclopedia. – M, 2004..
adjutant. ru/ fr- march
www. patriot. ru/ borodino. ht
Appendix No. 1
Polikarpov Nikolai Petrovich. On the history of the Patriotic War of 1812.
Appendix No. 2
COMPOSITION AND LOSSES OF THE GREAT ARMY
NAPOLEON IN THE BATTLE OF BORODino
(based on French archival data)
G. Saint-Cyr, as a member of the staff, took part in the work of the National Defense Commission and, due to the nature of his activities, often visited the Military Depot at the French Ministry of Defense (Depotde la guerre).From 1820 to 1830, Pele actively worked with documents collected in the depot, as a result of which studies of Marshal Massena’s campaign on the Danube (1809) appeared, which were then included in the four-volume set of his memoirs . Having created, together with former fellow soldiers, a (and privately funded) magazineLe Spectateur militaire,Pele assumed that the new publication would be dedicated to the glorious events of the wars of the Revolution and the First Empire. In one of the issues, Pele published a tactical study about the Battle of Borodino, which was then translated into Russian. .
In his work, Pele pointed to the general composition of the army before the Battle of Borodino, as well as its strength on September 2, 1812. According to his calculations, “according to the roll call, it is clear” that there were 123,662 soldiers and officers in the ranks , and taking into account the formations that arrived on September 3-6 (and the losses that occurred), the number of the main forces of the Great Army that took part in the general battle on September 7 could easily exceed 130 thousand people. However, in his diary, published in 1842 by Baron Pierre Denier Jr., Pele gives a figure of 140 thousand people .
Of greatest interest in this group of primary sources are two separate documents devoted directly to the Battle of Borodino - the results of “extracts of the composition of various corps” on the second and third of September 1S12 This data, collected together and compiled in the form of a table, is not addressed to anyone in particular and is not signed. The “extract” for September 2 looks like a hastily compiled rough sketch and is a laced brochure of three sheets of thick yellowish A4 paper. These are the very calculation figures attached to Pele’s article, which are present, one way or another, in most publications. However, when recalculating the “Extract” on September 2, mathematical errors were identified; the difference, however, is small - the total amount is 131,026 soldiers and officers against the figure of 130,580 reflected in the archival document .
The “semi-monthly” reports of corps commanders are characterized by the most complete information content - inSHD/ DATcomplete data available (situationdestroupes), presented by the chiefs of staff of the 4th and 5th Army Corps on September 1 and the 8th Corps on September 15, 1812
To get a picture of the paperwork, consider, for example, the report of the Viceroy's 4th Army Corps, compiled by his chief of staff, Brigadier General A.-S. Guillemino . The corps consisted of a headquarters (49 people, including officers and generals of various ranks, their adjutants, as well as military administration employees); forces of the 13th, 14th, 15th infantry divisions, the Italian Royal Guard, a light cavalry division, reserve artillery and a large park. The report included information about the available personnel for the period from August 15 to September 1, 1812 and includes, according to estimates on August 15, 43,286 people in the infantry (including the Italian Guard), and on September 1 - 43,275 soldiers and officers; in the light cavalry, respectively, 2786 on August 15 and 2787 on September 1, 1812. Data on divisional and reserve artillery (108 guns), ammunition and materiel are summarized in a separate table. In total, according to the report, on September 1, 1812, the corps' forces numbered 48,649 soldiers and officers with 8,187 horses.
However, when transferred to the “extract” of September 2, the composition of the corps decreased by almost half (25,021 people)! Here we can assume how aware the corps headquarters was of the real state of affairs with personnel in regiments and divisions. Despite the meticulously collected data presented by Guillemino for September 1, the real picture seems completely different, which is indirectly confirmed by the additional “extract” data for September 3 (22,416 people). A similar picture can be seen in the report of the chiefs of staff of the 5th Army Corps (August 20 - September 1), and the 8th Corps (August 31 - September 15).
Further, in the same edition of 1842 on p. 186-188 provides a “Name list of generals and colonels killed and wounded on the fifth and seventh of September 1812,” compiled on September 21 in Moscow, also signed by Denier. In the 1997 reissue, this information is placed on p. 40 (losses at Borodino) and p. 80-83 (“Name list...”) respectively. The data, compiled in the form of a table, is not addressed to anyone in particular, except for the mention at the bottom that this ““Name list...” was confirmed by His Excellency the Prince and the Chief of General Staff on the basis of data provided by the chiefs of staff of the army.”
The original report has not yet been found in the archives. However, along with Denier, in the lists of the General Staff (for the period of the Battle of Borodino) there is also a certain Baron Dufresne (Dufrense), responsible for the total strength of the army (inspectorauxrevueslepersonneldescorps). No documents drawn up by this military official have yet been discovered.
But, as you know, a report, even the most general one, cannot be drawn up immediately after a battle. The army was coming to its senses, gatheringcforces, many teams were sent for food, to search for the wounded, etc. Documents flowed to the chiefs of staff of the corps slowly. For example, in the 1st Infantry Corps of Marshal L.-N. Davout, the new chief of staff of L.-F. Lejeune (instead of the deceased J. Romefa) was appointed to the post only on September 23, i.e. when Denier had already handed in his lists.
On September 28, 1812, the headquarters of Marshal Berthier submitted a report addressed to Emperor Napoleon, which provided data on the state of the troops as of September 20; this report is also given in Chambray's work . Surviving archival data from the 2nd Reserve Cavalry Corps indicates that such a roll call took place (as well as the subsequent roll call on September 25 - according to the surviving report of the 5th Infantry Corps).
The same report by Berthier, only with a separate account of the officers (where he appears), is cited in his work by the military writer General V.-B. Derekage in the book "Marshal Berthier" . The total number of the army located in Moscow is 95,585 people, including 2,373 officers (this list does not include parts of Junot's corps, artillery, convoys and the Main Imperial Apartment).
Two days earlier, on September 26, General O.-D submitted his list. Belliard, Chief of Staff of the Grand Army Reserve Cavalry. This list was published by the same General V.-B. Derekage in his new work “Divisional General Count Belliard” . However, when compared with his above-mentioned work on Berthier, it turns out that for cavalry this summary has all the same numerical indicators. The figures were probably taken from Chambray (only this time without taking into account the officers). Thus, there is a clear rewriting of known facts, rather than an analytical approach.
And finally, the last list of casualties of officers and generals under Borodino dated October 11, 1812, also compiled in Moscow signed by Denier. It was published in the work of E.-M. Saint Hilaire "History of the Campaign to Russia" . The surviving report of the 1st Army Corps of Marshal Davout dated October 10, signed by his chief of staff, General Lejeune, confirms this roll call .
Attempts to calculate the total losses due to attrition of officers, made using the well-known reference book by A. Martinien “Lists of... killed and wounded officers,” are also not entirely valid. , compiled almost a century after the events described. So, for example, according to the regimental history of the 9th Line Regiment, in the Russian campaign (with references to archival documents 8NB/E)AT), upon arrival in Moscow on September 15, 1812, the 4th Corps of the Great Army (which included the 9th 1st line regiment) numbered 1,331 officers and 26,996 non-commissioned officers and soldiers in its ranks .
According to the same archival data, officer losses in the 9th Line Regiment amounted to 38 people (including four killed and four mortally wounded). However, according to Martinien's reference book, there are 44 of them (the number of killed and mortally wounded corresponds, but there are six more wounded); in other words, there is no doubt about the discrepancy between the original report and the data of the French researcher .
The discrepancy with Martinien’s reference book was also confirmed when studying the report of officer losses of the 15th light regiment in the Russian campaign, compiled in July 1813 and sealed with the seal of the regiment’s administrative council (the discrepancy in losses at Borodino is six officers down) .
In his well-known work on the Battle of Borodino, V. Zemtsov rightly tries to question the calculations of P. Denier Jr. However, at his disposal were mainly only
Appendix No. 3
Report
ABOUT THE DEPARTURE AND ARRIVAL OF GENERALS AND SENIOR OFFICERS OF ALL RUNS ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS AND ALL OTHER BRANCHES OF THE FORCES
The 8th [army] corps [under the command of division general A. Junot, Duke of Abrantes] showed itself worthily in the battle of September 7, in which it lost 13 officers killed and 117 wounded; in the same case, 294 were killed and 1676 were wounded soldiers and non-commissioned officers.
Killed
Brigadier General Dama
Battalion Commander La Grave, Aide-de-camp to His Lordship [Duke d'Abrantes]
Captain [Headquarters Assistant] Laumann
Captain Saint-Cernay, aide-de-camp to [Brigadier] General Hammerstein
Injured and temporarily unable to serve
Divisional General Baron Tarro
Colonel Hessberg, [commander] 2nd Hussars
Major Müldner, Grenadier [Battalion] Guard
Squadron commanders Czernicki, Stockhausen, 1st Hussars
Captains [assistants at headquarters] de Coisy, de Leuven, Barbara
Captain [Assistant at Staff] 23rd Infantry Division De Wulf
The compliance of this according to the states of individual units was certified on September 16, 1812 at the headquarters of the city of Mozhaisk by adjudan-commander, chief of staff of the 8th [army] corps [Jean] Reve
SHD/DAT C2 529. Situation des troupes composant
8 Corps d"armee, 15 September 1812 (Mojaisk).
Appendix No. 4
Document 1
“There were no local residents in sight; no prisoners could be taken; there were no stragglers along the way; We had no spies. We were among Russian settlements, and yet, if I may be allowed to use this comparison, we were like a ship without a compass, lost in the vast ocean, and did not know what was happening around us. Finally, from two peasants we captured, we learned that the Russian army had gone far ahead and that it had begun its movement four days ago.”
A. Caulaincourt, Napoleon's adjutant
Document 2
“Here comes the end of such places where the population is for us; everyone is ready to either defend or flee; Everywhere I was greeted with hostility, with reproaches and abuse. Nobody wanted to give anything; I had to take it myself, forcefully and at risk; I was released with threats and curses. The men are armed with pikes, many on horseback; the women were ready to run away, and they scolded us just as much as the men. The horsemen ride from place to place, reporting what is happening; They have boards for signaling, and the landowners manage them.”
French officer Roos.
Document 3
“Napoleon’s entry into Smolensk was even more ominous than it was even in Vilna, despite the fact that our entry into Vilna was accompanied by its complete destruction. The entire army considered Smolensk the end of its tedious campaign. The troops, tired of the difficult and disastrous campaign, seeing how the goal of this campaign was getting further and further away from them, began to worry, remembering the enormous distance separating them from France; it was decided to stop in Smolensk, but now this has become impossible. No wonder the troops lost heart! Now this city was just a huge fire, covered with corpses and wounded.”
French officer Jomini
Document 4
“In the morning we were amazed: the Russian army had disappeared. What a sad sight the battlefield presented! No disaster, no lost battle can compare in horror to the Borodino field, where we remained victorious. Everyone is shocked and depressed. The army is motionless, it now looks more like a vanguard. Many soldiers go into the surrounding area to look for food or firewood.
I have never seen such a terrible sight on any battlefield before. Everywhere you look, there are corpses of people and horses, dying, moaning and crying wounded, pools of blood, heaps of abandoned weapons; here and there there are burnt or destroyed houses.”
French officer Bosse
Document 5
“Many batteries changed hands up to ten times. Bombs, cannonballs and grapeshots flew here as thickly as bullets usually fly: and how many bullets flew here!.. Evening was coming, and the enemy began to evade. The Russians held out... They fought under the Russian sky and stood on their native soil.”
Russian officer F.N. Glinka
Document 6
“The French army was crushed by the Russian army.”
A.P. Ermolov.
“Of all my battles, the most terrible is the one I fought near Moscow. The French showed themselves worthy of victory, and the Russians acquired the right to be invincible.”
Napoleon
Document 7
“We are now standing on the Kaluga road, 63 versts from Moscow.
Our parties took about 3 thousand people prisoner in a few days, burned a huge amount of their convoy and several boxes with shells... 20 Cossack regiments are coming from the Don and are already beginning to unite with the army. The enemy suffers a great lack of everything, but our army has everything...
... The current situation of our army has all the benefits. Our army is supplied with food until November 1, but the enemy, deprived of all means of supply, suffers from a shortage of everything, feeds on horses and has no intention of getting bread from anywhere. The peasants, animated by love for their homeland, having forgotten their peaceful life, all generally arm themselves against the common enemy. Every day they come to the main apartment and ask for guns and gunpowder. Both are given to them without the slightest detention, and the French fear these soldiers more than the regular ones, for embittered by the devastation caused by the enemy, they exterminate him without any mercy.”
Russian officer S.N. Marin
Document 8
“From September 23 to October 1, our army near the village of Tarutino gained formidable power through the addition of reserves, recruit depots, parties and teams of those who had recovered from wounds and illnesses...”
Colonel M. M. Petrov
The popular nature of the war
Document 9
“And the war against the invading Napoleon was a truly people's war. Napoleon calculated the number of his troops and Alexander's troops in his strategy, and he had to fight with the Russian people, which Napoleon forgot about. It was the hand of the people that dealt the greatest commander in world history an irreparable, mortal blow.”
Historian E.V. Tarle
Document 10
“The peasants of one Kaluga province, from the time the enemy touched their borders, being assisted by Bykhalov’s Cossacks, killed and captured more than 6,000 enemy people; Every day they come to ask for weapons, beg the commanders of the detachments to give them an opportunity to defeat the enemy, and their requests are fulfilled as far as possible.
... Artillery Captain Figner, as well as Colonel Prince Kudashev and Guard Captain Seslavin, are still inflicting a great defeat on selected enemy troops everywhere in their very rear and flanks by delivering many prisoners; the destruction of his reserves, wherever he collected them, and the taking away of the treasures of our sacrilegiously robbed temples. Adjutant General Baron Wintzengerode, who was with a detachment of light troops on the roads of St. Petersburg, Yaroslavl and Vladimir, over the past three weeks captured up to 50 headquarters and chief officers and up to 3,000 lower ranks... " catch, killed and captured more than 6,000 enemy people; Every day they come to ask for weapons, beg the commanders of the detachments to give them an opportunity to defeat the enemy, and their requests are fulfilled if possible.”
From leaflets from the Patriotic War of 1812.
Document 11
“One more such victory,” the soldiers said, “and Napoleon will no longer have an army.” The second truth was that we had to abandon the campaign against Kaluga and Tula, and with this we lost our last hope for a calmer retreat, since the enemy, having gotten ahead of us after this battle, not only prevented our columns from retreating along the road through Yelnya, providing We, therefore, have a sad need to return to Mozhaisk.”
French officer Labre
Document 12
“To such numerous disasters should be added the hosts of Cossacks and armed peasants who surround us. Every day it gets colder, and soon the frost must combine with hunger to destroy our army, this army that was so beautiful when crossing the Niemen!
French officer Francois
Document 13
“... They have nothing to eat except horse meat. After leaving Moscow and Smolensk, they eat human bodies... They died mostly from hunger, exhaustion, disorder, robbery and loss of all discipline, and the cavalry - from the same reasons and from very bad and reckless shoeing of horses.”
Russian General Kreutz
Howard D. Jean-Jacques Pelet: Warrior of the Sword and Pen // The Journalof Military History. 1989. Vol. 53. January, No. 1. P. 1-22; Pelet J.Mémoires sur laguerrede1809 en Allemagne...parle generalPelet. P., 1824-1826. Vol. 1-1.
Battle of Borodino: Extract from the notes of General Pele about the Russian War of 1812 // Reading in the Society of Russian History and Antiquities. M., 1872. Book. 1.C SHD/DAT.WITH2 529 Relevédesseuilles d'appeldesdeférenscorpsd"armee,au 2 Septembre containsoriginalarticlesPeleFormagazine"Le Spectateur militaire"AAlsoFine 1664-1812-1962 / Pref. dugeneral P.Koenig.P., 1966.ColinkonSHD/DAT.WITH2 527 . Situation des troupes composant le 4eme Corps de la Grande Armee.
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On October 17, 2012, as part of the Year of Russian History and in honor of the 200th anniversary of the victory of the Russian people in the Patriotic War of 1812, the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI) held an international scientific conference on the topic “1812. Liberation of Russia from enemy invasion. Lessons from history and challenges of our time."
The conference was opened by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Director of RISI Leonid Reshetnikov, briefly talking about historians who came to Moscow thousands of kilometers away - from the space from Yekaterinburg to Paris. The first to speak was given Petru Multatuli, Candidate of Historical Sciences, leading researcher at the Center for Humanitarian Research at RISS. He reviewed modern historiography of the Patriotic War of 1812, focusing especially on cases of malicious distortion of historical facts. The topic of his report was: “The false myth of the preventive war of 1812.” Just as the traitor to the Motherland V. Rezun invented and spread a pseudo-historical myth about the USSR’s intention to be the first to attack Germany in 1941, so a certain Oleg Sokolov copied the same technique in application to the events of the early 19th century, namely: Alexander I as if he intended to attack Napoleon, and Bonaparte only forestalled the “potential aggressor” by striking first. Peter Multatuli named his book presented at the conference by analogy with Rezunov’s title: “Icebreaker” for Napoleon.” In this book, the author showed in detail the complete inconsistency of accusations against Russia of allegedly planning aggression.
It should be recalled that the desire to evoke in the reader a certain pre-programmed reaction by creating in him the illusion that this or that development of events likely, is an attribute of modern ideological sabotage, the content of which is not invented by some individual pseudo-historians, but developed by analytical centers of leading countries. For the first time, American specialists carried out such large-scale and massive sabotage in 1970 in Chile during the presidential elections. Then, on the walls of houses in Chilean cities, posters suddenly appeared depicting Soviet tanks and with the comment: “These tanks will immediately appear in Chile as soon as Allende wins.” And groups of young people, supposedly members of a socialist youth organization, went around the houses of wealthy Chileans and conducted a survey: what is your living space? How many residents live on it? How many homeless people can we move in with you after our election victory?
Doctor of History from the National Institute of Oriental Languages in Paris Andrey Rachinsky devoted his speech to a narrower topic - the failed coronation of Napoleon in Moscow. Based on the study of archival data, he reconstructed the original plans of the French emperor, which were supposed to be implemented during the “Russian campaign” (as this war is called in French historiography), as well as the plans of Alexander I. Bonaparte assembled a huge military force that Russia was unable to resist . Therefore, predicting a war on the territory of our country, the Russian government “planned” back in 1810 to leave Moscow and retreat deeper into the country. These plans are clear from the correspondence of the Russian Emperor, from the papers of F.V. Rostopchin - Moscow Governor General in 1812 ( By the way, the awareness of one’s military weakness and plans to leave Moscow in the event of a French offensive absolutely exclude the lie about Russia as a potential aggressor, supposedly intending to attack), from other sources.
Napoleon prepared for the invasion seriously and comprehensively. In addition to purely military operations, he also developed a powerful psychological, corrupting effect on the Russian army and on the civilian population of Russia. While still in Paris, he prepared a Decree on the abolition of serfdom in Russia, which was translated into Russian in Moscow, printed in a field printing house and posted around the city. Of course,” Andrei Rachinsky emphasized, “Bonaparte did not care about the Russian peasants; he sought to pit the peasants against the landowners, and in the Russian army, respectively, the soldiers against the officers. And thus make our army and country incapable of conducting combat operations. To create confusion among the Cossacks, Napoleon's dignitaries were looking for a candidate for the role of the new Pugachev. Russia was supposed to be divided into several parts-countries: Ukraine, Cossacks, Tataria, Siberia... He only managed to create Lithuania, whose government even mobilized into the army.
Large-scale preparations were underway for Napoleon's coronation. A ballet came from Paris, an opera house came from Italy to Moscow. Imperial regalia were also delivered to the Russian capital.
Alexander I knew about all these plans of Napoleon. The coronation did not take place. For a number of reasons, fires started in Moscow and devastated the city. There was simply no one to read the decree on liberation from serfdom. And the requisitioning of food and fodder from the surrounding peasants was a bad illustration of the liberation declarations. It was impossible to stay in Moscow any longer, let alone be crowned. Of course, the French army could move, for example, to Tver, which had not yet been plundered (it was only three days' march away) and from there threaten St. Petersburg. But it was impossible to be crowned in Tver...
Senior Researcher at the Center for Humanitarian Research, RISS, Candidate of Historical Sciences Denis Maltsev in his speech “The problem of the readiness of the Russian imperial army for the war of 1812 in the works of historians and reality”, he drew an analogy between Napoleon and Hitler. In both cases, Russia was threatened by the combined forces of Western Europe. Napoleon still failed to draw Turkey and Sweden into hostilities against Russia in 1812. The diplomacy of Alexander I turned out to be stronger than the French. Austria and Prussia, although they sided with Napoleon, put into his army significantly smaller forces than those that they were able to provide in 1813 for the war against Napoleon.
The assessments given by Denis Maltsev of Russia and the Russian army in 1812 were very optimistic. But his thesis about the significant superiority of the Russian soldier - in terms of weapons and training - over the French one still seems excessive. The French soldier's weapons and training were excellent. And M.I. Kutuzov decided to withdraw Russian troops after the Battle of Borodino due to irreparable losses suffered. The French guns hit the Russian ranks effectively, and the French riflemen fired their charges accurately.
Professor of St. Petersburg State University Doctor of Historical Sciences Leonid Vyskochkov made a report on the topic “The peoples of Russia in the Patriotic War of 1812.” He clearly, “with numbers in his hands,” showed that representatives of different ethnic groups and ethnic groups fought on both sides. Only half of Napoleon's army was French. The rest are citizens of 25 European countries, among whom soldiers and officers of various German states dominated (170,000 people). A significant share fell on the Poles (85,000 people), who were joined by ethnic Poles from the estates of the western regions of Russia (15,000 people), which on their part was treason, if the fate was that the nobles owned estates for their service to the emperor during the war.
In the Russian army, in addition to regular units, there were also numerous militias, recruited including from the Minsk province, from Little Russia, from Courland, from the Volga region. By the way, the Poles also fought for the Russian Empire. No recruitment was carried out on the territory of Kartli and Kakheti, but Georgian generals and officers served in the Russian army. Of course, we cannot forget about the Don Cossacks, who numbered 55,000 people in the ranks of the army that defeated Napoleon. Among the 31 national cavalry regiments were Bashkir, Kalmyk, Nogai units, and there were militias from among the Meshcheryaks (Finno-Ugrians).
At the end of his report, Leonid Vyskochkov emphasized that the participation of different peoples of Russia in the Patriotic War was an important stage in the formation of the national identity of the people of Russia as the identity of a nation.
Head of the Department of General History of the Ural State Pedagogical University in Yekaterinburg, Doctor of Historical Sciences Vladimir Zemtsov spoke about the results of the study of the panorama by F.A. Roubaud "The Battle of Borodino" in the context of later mythology. Showing slides with fragments of the canvas, the speaker analyzed each plot fragment, correlating the episode depicted on it with the real timing of events. In many cases, the artistic images on the canvas did not correspond to real events and even the elementary real appearance of the soldiers and officers who were supposed to be in a certain place at a certain moment of the battle. For example, one fragment of the panorama depicted a village, which in fact simply did not physically exist at that time. The experience of historical reconstruction makes it possible today to understand, for example, how many artillerymen actually had to stand near a gun for the gun to be able to fire, and how many charging boxes actually were located near each gun. And this experience of historical reconstruction convincingly shows the lack of realism in the images depicted in the panorama (one Russian soldier is depicted in a French cuirass). In some places in the canvas, soldiers in Prussian uniforms appear in the foreground, and not in Russian or French. The speaker made the assumption that such an emphasis arose due to the fact that the canvas was painted in Munich...
Senior Researcher, Center for Economic Research, RISS Nikolay Troshin made a report “The Continental System: History and Modernity”. He reminded the conference participants that the main contradiction of the era under study was the conflict between the two most dynamically developing power centers in the world (the power of which lay in a powerful financial system and the corresponding military superiority) - London and Paris. Moreover, it was not the French, but the British who were the first to resort to economic methods of warfare. They began to blockade the ports of third countries trading with France. Napoleon announced a blockade of British ports only as a retaliatory measure. From this response measure grew the phenomenon that in historiography is designated by the words “continental blockade.” Nikolai Troshin cited interesting evidence from a Russian observer that the blockade did not have a significant impact on the English economy. However, this opinion was already disputed at that time, if we take into account the need of the main striking force of Foggy Albion, the British fleet, for hemp - a strategically important product purchased by Britain (monopoly) in Russia since time immemorial.
The most important historical Rubicon, which made the beginning of Napoleon's invasion of Russia inevitable, was the violation, from the second half of 1811, of the conditions prescribed by the continental system. The speaker put it more diplomatically: Russia no longer strictly observed the continental system. However, it should be assumed that it was precisely this “laxness of compliance” that paved the way for the invasion. Alexander I chose London from two evils.
Professor of the Belarusian State Economic University Doctor of Historical Sciences Nadezhda Ablova spoke about how the Patriotic War of 1812 is reflected in modern Belarusian historiography. She was given a detailed analysis of all historical literature published in the fraternal republic, and she also told a downright anecdotal story. Preparing for her speech, the speaker looked in particular at the website of the French Embassy in Minsk. One could have guessed in advance that the French did not call that war patriotic, preferring to designate it as “Napoleon’s Russian campaign.” However, one phrase in the title on the French website surprised me with its very unusual wording: “Plan of events dedicated to the 200th anniversary of the crossing of the Berezina”...
A cross-section of historical memory about the Patriotic War of 1812 in the Little Russian regions was analyzed by the head of the Department of History of Ukraine and World History of the Kharkov State Academy of Culture, Doctor of Historical Sciences Sergey Potrashkov. More precisely, the topic of the report contained a turn of phrase “in the memory of Ukrainians,” which involuntarily prompts one to ask the question: do the Great Russians, Little Russians and Belarusians still constitute one people living in three newly formed states, or have they already been born (by some miracle for two decades) the Ukrainian nation. No explanation was given for this. In any case, Nadezhda Ablova from Belarus categorically refused attempts to determine the settlement zone of “ethnic Belarusians” (both during the War of 1812 and today), as a obviously impossible task.
Deputy Head of the Center for Research and Problems of Near Abroad Countries, RISS, Doctor of Historical Sciences Alexander Sytin, drawing historical parallels in his report “1812 as the apogee of the Russian Empire,” called the events of 1813–1814 “the First World War.”
The Deputy Director of the Institute of CIS Countries, Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences, fully agreed with this analogy Igor Shishkin, who read a report on the topic “Russia and the contenders for world domination: 1812 – 2012.” In his opinion, throughout the history of Russia in the West, some two forces were constantly fighting for leadership, and our country was only involved in this foreign struggle on one of the sides. He recalled the opinion of Nikolai Danilevsky on this matter, who wrote that such a situation is even beneficial for Russia, since it is free to choose one ally from two – at its own discretion. However, Igor Shishkin immediately noticed that this choice was invariably associated with the most terrible disasters - with military clashes in which millions of Russian people died. And this allows us to consider both opposing sides as invariably hostile to the Russian people.
Next, the speaker, starting from the historical conflicts “Paris – London” (which caused the so-called Napoleonic wars) and “Berlin – London” (which caused the First World War), moved to our time and drew the attention of conference participants to the global confrontation between Washington and Beijing . In their struggle for world leadership, both sides, according to Igor Shishkin, are hostile to Russia. And the best course of action for our country is not to choose any of the warring parties as our allies.
It should be noted that such a conclusion seems somewhat naive if we seriously rely on knowledge - the historical experience of previous global confrontations. From the experience of the past, we know that the Anglo-Saxon center of the world, be it London or Washington, throughout the centuries of its existence preferred to use a kind of battering ram to achieve its geopolitical goals - a third country (or third countries), which were destined to be the bones in every future conflict. And on these bones the Anglo-Saxon world invariably established its dominance - each time more and more global. Yes, AlexanderIstopped observing the continental blockade of England not at all because Russia really needed some English goods, but solely because of England’s need for Russian raw materials necessary to equip the British fleet, as well as for income from trade, which was complicated by Napoleon in other trade routes. NikolayII in 1914 he gave the order for mobilization - an act clearly hostile towards Germany and inevitably leading to the outbreak of hostilities - in conditions when there were no antagonistic contradictions between Russia and Germany. It was London that sought to destroy Berlin as the second most powerful financial center in the world at the beginningXXcentury; and destroyed it with the Treaty of Versailles! Finally, after the First World War, the German government (Weimar Republic) passionately desired to enter the civilized family of nations - the Western world, not understanding and not wanting to understand that Germany can only be a “poor relative” in this world - a junior partner on whom the powerful members of the community will push their problems away and will have to do the dirtiest work of serving the West. At that time, such work was the war against the USSR, which, unlike the Russian Empire, had become the new center of the world - financial, ideological, military, political. The Weimar Republic did not enjoy the support of the Germans and was not able to fulfill such an “order.” A. Hitler was able to do this, who, just like the Weimar Republic, continued to go against the tide; he acted contrary to the traditional foreign policy of Germany, namely: he intensified confrontation with Russia (which the Prussian kings never allowed themselves) and became increasingly closer to the West (probably Rudolf Hess also flew to Scotland in 1940).
Next, the chairman of the Society of European Genealogy and Heraldry of Estonia, the head of the Russian Writers' Organization of Estonia, gave a report “The Patriotic War of 1812: the Northern Direction and the Baltics” Vladimir Ilyashevich. This report was based on the fundamental work “The Baltic People in the Patriotic War of 1812” ( Under the general editorship of V.N. Ilyashevich. Tallinn, 2011). Its compilers (V.N. Ilyashevich, M.S. Gainullin), one might say, showed an example of how themes of world history - through the Patriotic War of 1812 - are combined with work of a local history nature. More than half of this weighty volume (656 pp. in total) consists of biographical materials about outstanding Baltic (Baltic Sea) military men who distinguished themselves during military operations.
Other historians also spoke at the conference and touched upon a number of important topics of local history related to the Patriotic War of 1812.
Vyacheslav Rumyantsev, editor-in-chief of the Chronos portal
The Patriotic War of 1812 has been studied in historical science for a very long time. More than 10 thousand books and articles have been published on this topic. The history of the Patriotic War of 1812 continues to attract steady interest from researchers.
Noble historians of the war of 1812 took a subjective idealistic position. The noble concept of the war viewed it as a war of the great commanders Alexander I and Napoleon. In their works they tried to prove the decisive role of Alexander the Blessed in the victory over Napoleon, as well as the “unity of the classes around the throne.” These were the works of generals D.P. Buturlin, A.I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky (Kutuzov’s adjutant), M.I. Bogdanovich.
*I The Decembrists, who were direct participants in the Patriotic War of 1812, considered it not a war of generals, but a “people’s” war. Democratic revolutionaries pointed to the popular nature of the war, as well as its influence on the development of liberalism in Russia. V. G. Belinsky assessed it as a patriotic war of liberation. That is why the war gave rise to such a powerful patriotic upsurge, which was the source of victory, and had important historical consequences (the emergence of the roots of Decembrism). A. I. Herzen sees the cause of the war in the aggressive policy of Napoleon, who strove for world domination. Herzen considers the War of 1812 to be a just war for the Russian people for the preservation of national independence, in which the active, creative role of the masses in history and their heroism were clearly demonstrated.
Domestic bourgeois-liberal researchers (A.N. Popov, Voensky, V.I. Kharkevich, A.A. Kornilov) focused on the economic factor, comparing the economies of two opponents. 58
After 1917, M. N. Pokrovsky and his followers began to deny in the strongest terms the popular nature of the war with Napoleon, arguing that this war was waged by Russia solely in the interests of the elite elite. M.N. Pokrovsky placed all responsibility for the start of the war on Russia, and for Napoleon the war was only a necessary defense. At the same time, the definition of the War of 1812 as a Patriotic War was officially rejected.
Only shortly before the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union, Academician E.V. Tarle returned this term. In the spirit of new attitudes, the point of view according to which the War of 1812 was an act of aggression by France against peace-loving Russia began to be actively asserted in Soviet historiography. E. V. Tarle’s major work “Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia,” published in 1937, became the pinnacle of Soviet historiography of the war of 1812 for many years. He argued that the war of 1812 was “an openly imperialist war, dictated by the interests of Napoleon’s aggressive policy and the big French bourgeoisie,” and “for Russia, the fight against this attack was the only way to preserve its economic and political independence.” These ideas were adopted by other historians and moved into textbooks and monographs. However, later domestic historians found shortcomings in the works of E.V. Tarle and criticized him for overestimating the role of natural and climatic factors in the victory and belittling the class struggle.
The Great Patriotic War had a serious impact on the development of the historiography of this problem. It manifested itself in its entirety in the literature of the first post-war decade and ultimately led to a significant adjustment in the concept of the Patriotic War of 1812. As a result, the 40s and 50s of the 20th century were characterized by an obvious decline in the coverage of this event. In 1946, Stalin stated that “our brilliant commander Kutuzov... ruined Napoleon and his army with the help of a well-prepared counteroffensive,” and from that moment on, all the attention of Soviet historians focused exclusively on the personality of M. I. Kutuzov. Stalin highlighted the provisions that the basis of the military leadership of M.I. Kutuzov was actions on enemy communications, and the main form of warfare was pursuit. The idea of the superiority of the Kutuzov strategy of protracted military operations over the Napoleonic strategy of defeating the enemy in one general battle was later developed by P. A. Zhilin and L. G. Beskrovny. The dominant position in the newly adjusted concept of the events of 1812 began to be given to the role of Kutuzov in them. Kutuzov's military leadership was recognized as the main factor in achieving victory over the enemy who had invaded the country. At the same time, the counteroffensive was defined as the main form of military action that ensured the success of the Russian army. The idea of the Patriotic War of 1812 as a chain of brilliant victories of the Russian army, when the Russian command allegedly did not make mistakes, was persistently introduced into the public consciousness. Subjectivism at that time was expressed in the falsification of available archival data on the balance of forces before the war and the losses of the sides in a number of battles, including Borodino.
The first steps towards the destruction of numerous stereotypes were taken only during the years of perestroika - by publications of those years, primarily by books and reviews by Professor N. A. Troitsky. N. Troitsky draws attention to the fact that almost all digital data on the balance of forces and losses of the parties in 1812, contrary to the truth, were calculated in our favor. The obvious successes and victories of French weapons were ignored. N. Troitsky rejects the current version of the suddenness of Napoleon’s attack. The War of 1812, as the historian emphasizes, was a product of contradictions between bourgeois France and feudal Russia. N. Troitsky proposes to part with another myth - about Kutuzov. The researcher points to the role of Barclay de Tolly, who with a skillful retreat saved the Russian army from inevitable defeat in the first months of the war and even then began to plan and prepare a counteroffensive, subsequently carried out by Kutuzov. It cannot be said that these facts were completely unknown before N. Troitsky - they were simply ignored for the sake of the familiar.
In the post-Soviet years, the influence of ideology on the domestic historiography of the War of 1812 was reduced to a minimum for the first time, which opened up wide opportunities for scientific understanding of this topic. In the 1990s. in fact, for the first time, cooperation between domestic and Western experts on the history of the war of 1812 began. Modern researchers of the events Vladimir Zemtsov and Oleg Sokolov are studying the motivation for victory of Napoleonic and Russian soldiers. Considerable attention is paid to the diplomatic history of the era of 1812. Historians have moved away from the ideologically charged interpretation of the history of diplomacy from the positions of “aggressive” - “peace-loving”. In domestic historiography, the theory of national-state interests in international relations has prevailed, which proceeds from the fact that international politics, “like any politics, is a struggle for power” (M. I. Meltyukhov and others).
The main object of research remains various aspects of military history. Versions about the role of the Smolensk operation, military operations in the vicinity of Moscow in the fall of 1812, the battle of Tarutino, etc. were revised and corrected. Historians began to focus on the mistakes made by the Russian command and recognize the high combat effectiveness of Napoleon’s army. Historians are still actively debating the results of the Battle of Borodino. The most thorough of the military topics of 1812 is the history of the people's war and the partisan movement of 1812.
The most innovative among all post-Soviet studies of the Russian army of 1812 was the monograph by V. M. Bezotosny, dedicated to Ataman M. I. Platov and the Don generals in 1812. The author shed new light on the problem of the participation of the Cossacks in the war of 1812 (pointed out conflicts Cossack generals and representatives of the command of the Russian regular army, described the behavior of the Cossacks during the war, etc.). The works of V. M. Bezotosny, devoted to the intelligence and plans of Russia and France in 1810---1812, allow us to take a new look at the military-political aspects of the history of 1812.
Speaking about the military results of the campaign, post-Soviet historians show the predominant role of non-combat factors in the death of the Napoleonic army in Russia (exhaustion, hunger, disease, cold), which was completely denied by Soviet historiography of the 1940s-1980s. The data on the number of warring armies has been greatly adjusted (according to updated data, about 560 thousand people took part in the Russian campaign on the French side, and not 600-650 thousand as previously thought, on the Russian side - about 480 thousand people who actually participated in battles).
Modern Russian historians (A.I. Sapozhnikov, M.A. Davydov) turn to the history of Russian wartime society. In fact, for the first time, historians began to show the people of the era of 1812 as living people, with their own merits and demerits, as well as the inconsistency inherent in all people. Experts emphasize the enormous role played by the Russian Orthodox Church in 1812; in fact, it was the main and only force that cemented the then Russian society (L. V. Melnikova, A. I. Popov).
Post-Soviet historiography of the Patriotic War of 1812 is also represented by a group of traditionalist historians who adhere to the basic propaganda principles of the Soviet and partly pre-revolutionary period. This group is characterized by the works of B. S. Abalikhin. He defends the thesis about the enormous superiority of the French side at Borodino, substantiates the version of the retreat of the Napoleonic army to Kyiv in the fall of 1812, and actively proves the thesis about the exclusive guilt of Alexander I in the incomplete success of the Berezina operation. His concepts have been refuted by modern researchers (V. M. Bezotosny, O. V. Sokolov, A. I. Popov, etc.). It can be stated that by the end of the 1990s. the influence of traditionalist traditions of historiography has weakened sharply.
Historiography and sources
The historiography of the Patriotic War of 1812 is extensive, according to the calculations of I. P. Liprandi and N. F. Dubrovin; by the end of the last century, almost 1800 works were written. In the first decade of the 20th century, in connection with the centenary of the war, which was widely celebrated in Russia, about 600 more works were published. The historiography of the Patriotic War of 1812 has been significantly expanded in connection with the celebrations of the 150th and 175th anniversaries.
A historiographic analysis of the literature about the War of 1812 published before 1962 was given by L. G. Beskrovny, who examined the works of not only pre-revolutionary and Soviet historians, but also the works of French, English, German and American historians. Referring the reader to the study of Beskrovny L.G., we will only briefly dwell on those works that are directly devoted to Smolensk and the Smolensk region. The struggle for Smolensk was covered in almost all the works of both pre-revolutionary and Soviet historians.
One of the first to reflect the mood of the population of Smolensk and the Smolensk province in his “Letters of a Russian Officer” was the poet and publicist, future Decembrist F. P. Glinka. As Napoleon’s troops approached Smolensk, he wrote that “no one wants to fall into the hands of the enemy. It seems that in Russia, as well as in Spain, he will conquer only lands, not people.” The Smolensk residents were ready to fight hand in hand with the army, go into the forests, create rubble on the roads, ambushes and block the enemy’s path.
At the height of the fighting in the Smolensk region, Glinka noted that “the people’s war is constantly appearing in new splendor. It seems that burning villages kindle the fire of vengeance in the inhabitants. Thousands of villagers, hiding in the forests and turning the sickle and scythe into defensive weapons, without art, repel the villains with sheer courage. Even women fight."
The same idea about the patriotism of the Smolensk people, about the national character of the war, was expressed in his “Notes” by the chief of staff of the 1st Western Army, General L.P. Ermolov. He noted that the Smolensk residents offered to “assist the army, not sparing property, not sparing life itself.”
The work of V. M. Voronovsky, a hereditary nobleman, a member of the Krasninsky district zemstvo, is dedicated to the Battle of Smolensk. The author has collected a large and interesting factual material, but he examined it from his class positions. Voronovsky believed that the main hero of the war was the nobility, which clearly expressed the people’s feelings and thoughts, and in “his person a selfless patriot-citizen entered the arena of public activity.” Class strife was temporarily forgotten in the country.
Other Smolensk authors also shared a similar point of view. These include V.I. Grachev and V. Fedorov, who believed that during the war of 1812 there was complete “class peace” in the Russian village between landowners and peasants. In fact, in the Smolensk province there was often a lack of unity between the nobles and peasants and conflicts arose that turned into popular uprisings. Unrest occurred in the possessions of Prince Golitsyn - in Dorogobuzhsky, Vyazemsky, Sychevsky and Porechsky districts. The peasants refused to fulfill their duties and “attempted to revolt.” On the estates of Vyazemsky, Dorogobuzhsky and Sychevsky districts, “landowner peasants divided the master’s estate among themselves, even tore up and burned houses.” The peasants of Baryshnikov’s estate, after the master’s flight to Nizhny Novgorod, declared themselves free and stopped performing duties. Similar facts occurred in other counties. All this does not confirm the above point of view of Smolensk historians. Of course, among the nobles there were organizers of resistance to the enemy. Tver Governor L. S. Kologradov gathered in Rzhev the Smolensk nobles who had fled from their estates, and called on them to be imbued with patriotic feelings, return home and help their people: “Today I am sending an official to the Smolensk districts, he will form detachments from the peasants, and you will take command over them." Some of the Smolensk nobles returned and took part in the partisan movement, to which a number of historical works are devoted. One of the first studies was the work of A. Slezskinsky on the actions of Smolensk partisans in 1812. The author of this work noted that the majority of Smolensk nobles did not return to “the boundaries of the Smolensk province” even after the meeting in Rzhev. Many nobles tried to prevent peasants from joining partisan groups, fearing that the peasants might turn their weapons against them. As F.N. Glinka testifies, the manager of one estate in Gzhatsky district, where the partisan movement was widespread, ordered all weapons to be taken away from the peasants. Similar tactics were followed by many officers who tried to prevent peasants from creating self-defense units. But in most cases they did not succeed, which was well noted by the Decembrist I. D. Yakushkin, who wrote that “the orders and efforts of the government would not have been sufficient to expel the Gauls who invaded Russia and with them the twelve pagans if the people had still remained in a daze. Not by order of their superiors, when the French approached, the inhabitants withdrew into the forests and swamps, leaving their homes to be burned.” The main force of resistance to the enemy were the peasants. This also applies to those cases when nobles were at the head of partisan detachments formed from serfs and courtyards. P. G. Andreev dedicated his monograph to the study of the people's war in the Smolensk region. It showed the development of the popular movement and its role in the first stage of the war. The issue of the formation of the people's militia is briefly covered, but its military actions in the struggle for Smolensk and the Smolensk lands are not shown. His second work, dedicated to the Patriotic War of 1812, also belongs to this author. This work examines in some detail the course of military operations on the approaches to Smolensk, the struggle for Smolensk, the reasons for the retreat of the Russian army and preparations for the general Battle of Borodino.
A valuable work on the organization of the militia was written by P. G. Rydzyunsky. It showed an intensified recruitment crisis and the need to create a people's militia. However, in this work, the author’s idea that the creation of militias “was not a sudden emergency measure of the government and that their organization was thought out in advance” raises objections. The work of P. A. Zhilin “Counter-offensive of the Russian army in 1812” shows the role of the militia in combat operations at various stages of the war. The question of the numerical composition of I-II and 111 militia districts seems controversial. According to P. A. Zhilin, there were 5 * 67 192976 people, but in fact there were 233919 people.
Of significant interest is the work of L. N. Bychkov, dedicated to the peasant partisan movement of 1812. The author managed to show the class basis of public sentiments of various layers of society, the fear of the government of Alexander I and the nobility that the development of a broad popular movement, the aggravation of the class struggle of peasants and the growth of the partisan patriotic movement could develop into peasant uprisings against their oppressors. Bychkov's work is complemented by an article by V.I. Babkin, published in the journal History of the USSR. It is devoted to the specifics of the class struggle during the Patriotic War of 1812. Babkin rightly criticizes one of Bychkov’s works, who believed that “during the occupation of Moscow by Napoleon, there was no aggravation of the class struggle in the provinces occupied by Napoleonic army.”
It should be recognized as correct the conclusion of G. T. Ryabkov that in 1812 “The highest patriotism of the peasants did not drown out, but intensified the class struggle.” The weakening of administrative and patrimonial power “during the war created favorable conditions for peasant unrest in an active form.”
L. G. Beskrovny dedicated his article to the partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812, who analyzed the struggle of the Sychevsky district partisans with Napoleonic troops. The Patriotic War of 1812 is the subject of general monographs by L. G. Beskrovny, P. A. Zhilin, E. V. Tarle, and the collective collection of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the GDR Academy of Sciences “The Immortal Epic. To the 175th anniversary of the Patriotic War of 1812 and the War of Liberation of 1813 in Germany” and others. These monographs comprehensively elucidate the role of the masses, the army, the militia, and advanced Russian military art in the victory over Napoleon. The Battle of Smolensk and the entire route of the Russian army from Smolensk to Borodino also found detailed coverage. The counter-offensive of Russian troops, the actions of the militia, partisans, the battle of Vyazma, the battle of Krasnoye and the defeat of the Napoleonic army on the Berezina are well shown.
However, not all conclusions can be accepted unconditionally. In the work of Academician E.V. Tarle, serious errors were made in assessing the state of the French army. In his opinion, the French army was defeated due to cold and hunger. Such an assessment was rejected by Soviet historical science as anti-scientific. The work of E.V. Tarle has already been criticized in our historical literature. The assessment of Kutuzov’s military leadership was given incorrectly - in him “there was a lot of cunning and the ability to play with people.” Tarle's statement that Kutuzov did not want a complete victory over Napoleon was deeply erroneous. “Kutuzov,” writes Tarle, “did not want to catch up with Napoleon in Vyazma and hesitated in the village of Linen Plants. Kutuzov did not want to catch up with Napoleon, and nothing could be done with him,” Tarle created an extremely contradictory image of Kutuzov. His assessment of “the activities of Kutuzov and the Patriotic War of 1812 clearly does not correspond to reality.”
The Battle of Smolensk in 1812 attracted the attention of V.I. Vyalikov, who successfully defended his thesis on the topic “The First Smolensk Operation of Russian Troops in 1812.” . The dissertation covers issues related to the Smolensk operation from July 22 to August 5, showing its significance in the history of the Patriotic War of 1812.
The participation of militias in the battles of the village also attracted the attention of historians. Napoleon's army. In the Smolensk province, a militia was created in Smolensk and Dorogobuzh with a total number of 13,800 people. The militia was formed by nobles from among their serfs, and it was divided not into regiments, but into district detachments of five hundred, hundred and fifty-hundred. About 5 thousand people were armed with firearms, and the rest with homemade pikes and axes. Smolensk and Dorogobuzh militias took part in the Smolensk battle on August 4-5, in the defense of Dorogobuzh, in the Battle of Borodino, in the Battle of Tarutino, in the attack on individual enemy units, in the construction of fortifications, bridges, crossings, carried out reconnaissance service and served as orderlies. They showed deep feelings of patriotism in the struggle for national independence.
“In villages and hamlets,” wrote S. Glinka, “fathers, mothers and wives blessed their sons and husbands for the defense of the Russian land. Those who joined the militia were called “zhert penniks,” i.e., warriors who sacrificed to the fatherland through extraordinary recruitment, spiritual involvement... kindness and sincere greetings greeted them everywhere. And they have long gotten used to guns and military formations.”
Among the abundance of publications about the Patriotic War of 1812, periodicals played a huge role. Articles, documents, and memories of the war were published in many magazines, collections, and newspapers. Among them is “Smolensk Antiquity,” which published an interesting work by N. Redkov. The systematization and relatively complete publication of documents was undertaken for the 100th anniversary of the Patriotic War. In 1900-1917, 24 volumes of documents and materials were published under the general title “Patriotic War of 1812”. This also included materials on the history of the Smolensk land. In total, about 70 volumes of documents and materials were published about the Patriotic War of 1812.
An important source for studying the Patriotic War of 1812 were works of a memoir nature, diaries and memoirs written during the war or shortly after its end. Among them are “Letters of a Russian Officer” by F. N. Glinka, “Military Notes” and “Diary of Partisan Actions of 1812” by D. V. Davydov, “Notes of Alexei Petrovich Ermolov” and others.
Denis Davydov in his “Notes” reflected the difficult situation of the retreat of the Russian armies and their unification near Smolensk. He supported Bagration's idea of preparing a general battle against Napoleon's troops and preventing his further invasion into the interior of Russia. As the initiator of the organization of partisan detachments, he received the approval of Bagration, and then Kutuzov, for expanding the base of their actions. Denis Davydov's detachment dealt significant blows to the enemy between Vyazma and Mozhaisk. In his “Notes,” D. Davydov sharply polemicizes with Napoleon and his marshals, who sought to belittle the feat of the Russian and other peoples in the Patriotic War of 1812 and explain their defeat by severe frosts and “non-military” conduct of the war. In this way they tried to hide their hatred of the actions of the partisan detachments. D. Davydov’s “Military Notes” make it possible to create a concrete idea of the development of the partisan movement, of the broad participation of peasants in the common struggle against the enemy.
