The feat of Zinovy ​​Kolobanov's crew. Battle on the Tsar's Road

At the beginning of the war with the Soviet Union, the Germans used the same lightning war tactics on the Eastern Front that they had used in Europe. In the border battles, our tank divisions tried to stop the German armored columns with counterattacks, but this led to disaster. The Germans were better prepared; the Wehrmacht had perfectly organized interaction between the branches of the military. Gradually, Soviet tank crews began to move from counterattack tactics to very effective tank ambush tactics, and it was this that became a kind of “antidote” to Blitzkrieg.

August 1941 was truly a time of tank ambushes. It was during this month that Soviet tankmen of the 1st Red Banner Tank Division on the distant approaches to Leningrad began to massively use this new tactic. The 4th German Panzer Group unexpectedly encountered a deep-echelon system of tank ambushes, and this became a very unpleasant surprise for the Panzerwaffe.

On August 20, 1941, the crew of the KV-1 heavy tank, senior lieutenant Zinovy ​​Kolobanov, conducted one of the most effective tank battles in world history. On the distant approaches to Leningrad, during the defense of the foothills of the Krasnogvardeisky fortified area, our tankers in an ambush destroyed 22 enemy tanks, and in total Kolobanov’s company, consisting of 5 KV tanks, destroyed 43 tanks that day. The tank pogrom that Zinovy ​​Kolobanov’s tankers perpetrated on the Panzerwaffe was the peak of development of this tactic, a kind of perfectly executed tank ambush.

For many years now, fierce debates have been raging among historians.

Do German documents confirm the phenomenally high results of Soviet tankers? Which German division's equipment were destroyed by our soldiers? How did Kolobanov’s battle affect the situation near Leningrad as a whole?

“...14.00...were reported about the appearance of a tank column at the Voyskovitsy state farm. With the approach of the lead tank to the state farm, comrade. Kolobanov gave the command to the artilleryman to open fire...”

These lines from Zinovy ​​Kolobanov’s award list tell the story of the beginning of the most famous tank battle of the Great Patriotic War, in which the KV-1 destroyed 22 German tanks. There is fierce debate among historians about which German division the column belonged to. The difficulty lies in the fact that all three German tank divisions passed through the intersection at different times (according to the author). The question is whose tank column reached the intersection at 14.00 Moscow time or at 12.00 Berlin time (in 1941, the difference between Moscow and Berlin time was two hours - one hour astronomical and one hour “maternity” time). Without figuring out which division came to Kolobanov’s ambush, it is incorrect, in the author’s opinion, to describe the course of the famous tank battle.

Column No. 1. Based on the travel time, this is a column of the 113th Motorized Infantry Regiment of the 1st German Tank Division, reinforced by the 6th Tank Company. But the time does not exactly match: the log of combat operations of this tank division indicates that, while maneuvering along the front, it actually passed along the route Syaskilevo - Seppelevo - Ilkino - Chernitsy - Suyda, and it ended up in Seppelevo at 13.45 Moscow time or 11.45 Berlin time. There the column met enemy resistance, and the motorized infantry unit covered the distance of 3.5 kilometers from Seppelevo to Ilkino in 3 hours and 35 minutes, arriving in Ilkino at 17.20 Moscow time or 15.20 Berlin time. In other words, the speed of advance of the convoy of equipment was approximately one kilometer per hour. Obviously, there was a very good reason to carry out a tactically important maneuver at such a snail's pace. The combat log indicates that the cause was a Soviet battle group (of unspecified composition) and minefields. Moreover, Seppelevo is a neighboring village to Uchkhoz, there is one kilometer between them. In Seppelevo there was an observation post of the commander of the Kolobanov tank battalion, Captain Shpiller.

According to the author, the column of the 113th regiment of the 1st German tank division was 15 minutes late for the start of the battle, and was behind the tank column of another division, which was shot by Kolobanov’s tank. After the Soviet combat vehicle left the position to refuel with shells and fuel, the column of the 113th Motorized Infantry Division continued to move, but to do this it had to help evacuate the damaged and burned out tanks of another tank division from the road. Perhaps there were mines along the road, and our combat group was operating against the column. But in this area there were only small scattered groups of militias, and they could not delay the advance of an entire reinforced motorized infantry regiment. Large militia forces were located five kilometers away at the anti-tank ditch in the Korpikovo area. The losses of the entire tank division on August 20, 1941 were four killed and eight wounded. On this day, in the 1st German Tank, only one command tank based on the light Pz.I was irretrievably lost.

Column No. 2. According to German maps, it is clear that a column of the 8th German Tank Division (unidentified composition) came through the forest in the Malye Bornitsy area to the location of Kolobanov’s tank ambush, which cut off the right flank of the cadets from the left flank. She crossed the route of the combat group of the 113th regiment, passed the Kolobanov ambush site at Uchkhoz and, having covered another five kilometers in the direction of Krasnogvardeysk, stopped at the Korpikovo anti-tank ditch. Subsequently, part of the 8th Tank was replaced by parts of the 1st Tank. In the author's opinion, it is unlikely that this column of the 8th Panzer was ambushed. Following her route, she came to Kolobanov’s ambush from the side of the estate, and this does not correspond to the conditions of the battle described by Kolobanov himself. Information about losses in personnel of the 8th Panzer has not been made public. According to the reports of the 4th Tank Group, on August 20, one Pz.38(t) was irretrievably lost, the next, irretrievably lost Pz.38(t,) was noted only on August 22, 1941.

Column No. 3. According to German data, the tanks of the 6th Panzer Division were the furthest from the ambush site. But on the main sector of the 6th Panzer front, on August 20 it was relatively quiet, for this reason the tank columns of all three tank battalions of this division very actively maneuvered over long distances, reaching those sections of the front where their help was needed. This maneuvering of tank columns was not noted in the combat log, but was partially reflected in the diaries of the tank crews of the 6th Panzer Division. From August 20 to 27, the 6th Panzer did not conduct any serious battles; there was a lull in its sector of the front. This is confirmed by the documents of the Soviet units that were its opponents. But for unknown reasons, it was during this period that massive tank losses occurred, comparable to the losses of the 1st Tank Division in the Battle of Moloskovtsy. According to the draft reports of the 4th Panzer Group, on August 22, the 6th Division irretrievably loses nine Pz.35(t). In addition to them, two Pz.IVs were also lost, but the number of the division to which they belonged was not indicated. According to German reports, the division irretrievably lost 13 Pz.35(t) and two Pz.IV during August 23.

The position of the commander's HF was chosen at the intersection of the roads Dubitsa - Vanga - Starasta - Marienburg and Vokhonovo - Voiskovitsy station. The combat vehicle was installed in a caponier on a small hill, behind the lake. It is noteworthy that Kolobanov’s tank took up a position in a historical place. Here, before the revolution, there was a royal hunting estate, which Emperor Nicholas II loved to visit; from here, on the way to Vokhonovo, he went hunting. Therefore, local residents called the road Vokhnovo - Uchkhoz Voyskovitsy - “Tsarskaya”. Pre-revolutionary newspapers are replete with information about the hunting of the emperor and his retinue in this place. It was along the “Tsar’s” road that the enemy tanks were most likely supposed to advance.

In 1937, on the site of the royal hunting estate, the educational farm of the Leningrad Zootechnical Institute was formed. Near the road stood a beautiful wooden building of a former estate with a colonnade in the center and two large wings. Near the estate there were outbuildings, the walls of which were built of stone. These stone buildings have survived to this day. The main position of the tank was supposedly near the ancient lake. The area around it is swampy and the Soviet tank was located on a small high-rise, the only dry area. As a result, in front of the Soviet combat vehicle there was terrain impassable for enemy tanks. An infantry cover, presumably from the 2nd DNO, may have taken up defensive positions near the HF.

Crew of senior lieutenant Zinovy ​​Kolobanov. In front of a shielded KV-1 tank after the battle.

The enemy had to advance along the “Tsar’s” road, which was clearly visible. To the right of it were meadows with haystacks, but August 1941 was rainy and this field became impassable. In fact, the “Tsar’s” road turned into a “mousetrap” that our tankers could “slam” at any moment. The reserve position was, according to Kolobanov, in a nearby village (presumably in the village of Vanga Starasta). About one kilometer from the ambush site, in Seppelevo, there was an observation post of the commander of the tank battalion, Captain Shpiller.

During the day, a German tank column appeared - Kolobanov says in an audio recording that he clearly saw every German tank (there were 22 of them in total). Kolobanov identified enemy tanks T-3 and T-4. A staff car was walking in front of them. Ahead of the column was reconnaissance - three enemy motorcyclists. According to the author, it was a column that consisted of two Pz.IV and 20 Pz.35(t). The presence of a passenger car and three motorcycles in the “warrant” of a German tank column should not confuse anyone. According to the recollections of German tank crews, cars and motorcyclists were allocated to separately operating tank companies of the 6th Panzer; this was normal practice. Even before the battle, Kolobanov chose two landmarks on the ground: landmark No. 1 - two birch trees at the intersection of roads, landmark No. 2 - the intersection itself. Zinovy ​​Grigorievich ordered not to open fire on the motorcyclists, but to wait until the enemy tank column approached the intersection. Suddenly, the voice of the battalion commander was heard over the radio: “Kolobanov, why are you letting the enemy through?”

Captain Shpiller, being at the checkpoint in Seppelevo, was one kilometer from Kolobanov’s tank ambush, and saw the enemy approaching the intersection. But the latter no longer had time to respond to the battalion commander, since the German tanks were already at the crossroads and approaching two birches (landmark No. 1). The senior lieutenant ordered the tank gun commander Usov to open fire on the lead tank. From a short distance (in an interview Kolobanov says that the distance was 150 meters), the first shots hit two tanks walking in front of the column. There was a traffic jam on the road. Then, by order of the commander, Usov transferred the fire to the tanks trailing the column and set them on fire. As a result of well-aimed fire from the Soviet KV, the enemy column was trapped on the road. The Germans did not immediately figure out where they were being fired from, and at first they began to shoot at the haystacks standing in the field. Perhaps the enemy decided that Soviet anti-tank guns hidden in the stacks were firing at them. Disguising a 45-mm gun as a haystack was the most common technique used by Soviet artillerymen in cases where the position had to be taken in an open field.

Shpiller Joseph Borisovich. For the defense of Krasnogvardeisk he was presented with the Order of Lenin and awarded the Order of the Red Banner (photo from the museum of the Kolpino school No. 467).

Soon, enemy tank crews discovered the position of the Soviet combat vehicle. A hail of shells fell on the KV, but fortunately, none of them were able to penetrate the armor and damage the 76-mm gun. Due to intense shooting, the fighting compartment of the Soviet tank was filled with powder gases, which suffocated the crew. German shells, although they did not penetrate the armor, but from their impacts from the inside, scale bounced off the armor and dug into their faces, and the tankers became deaf from the constant impacts of armor-piercing shells. After the battle, 147 dents from enemy shells were counted on the tank. The position of the German tank column continued to get worse and worse. Enemy vehicles, finding themselves in a trap, tried to move off the road, but to the left and right of it there were flooded meadows, and German vehicles got stuck in the mud.

For an hour, Kolobanov’s tank methodically shot the immobilized enemy, 22 enemy tanks were destroyed. According to the recollections of veteran of the 1st Tank Division N.S. Semenov, immediately after the battle, division commander Baranov, battalion commander Shpiller and Izvestia newspaper correspondent Pavel Maisky drove up to the ambush site. The division commander thanked Kolobanov and the tank crew for their courage and decisive actions, and the correspondent filmed the burning enemy column on a movie camera. Soon they left. According to the author, of the two Pz.IV and 20 Pz.35(t) German tank columns, all were either knocked out or destroyed, and two Pz.IV and 13 Pz.35(t) at the head of the column were burned. They were recorded as irretrievable losses on August 23 in the German reporting tables of the condition of equipment.

In an audio recording, Kolobanov said that this was his first battle with enemy tanks. Soon, at the site of the ambush of Kolobanov’s tank, the Germans opened massive fire, then a second enemy column appeared. Unfortunately, in the audio recording, Zinovy ​​Kolobanov does not indicate the composition of this column, and does not indicate the direction of its movement. Perhaps it was a column of the 113th Regiment of the 1st Tank Division. During the unequal battle, the Soviet KV was damaged, but the most dangerous thing was that the combat vehicle ran out of shells. In an interview, Kolobanov said that there were several fragmentation weapons left. He reported the situation to Captain Spiller and received orders to leave the battlefield and move to the rear to repair damage and replenish ammunition.

There is evidence that during the battle the Germans tried to use anti-tank guns against Kolobanov’s tank, but in the audio recording he himself does not say anything about this. The destroyed anti-tank guns are not indicated on the award lists of the KV-1 crew of Kolobanov.

In the audio recording, Kolobanov points to two episodes of the battle. They are reflected in the article by journalist Lisochkin “The World Looks at the Plain.” During the battle, the turret jammed, and the driver had to turn the tank to aim the gun. In fact, the tank turned into an assault weapon. During the battle, the periscope was shot down and Rodinkov (Rodnikov) replaced it. Kolobanov recalls that when the tank was leaving the battlefield, someone knocked on the hatch asking for help. It turned out that not far from the battle site there was a group of wounded soldiers and commanders. Zinovy ​​Grigorievich checked the documents of the soldier who was knocking on the tank hatch, and then the wounded were loaded onto the KV and the combat vehicle went to the rear. The award list of the driver mechanics (there were two driver mechanics in the crew) Rodnikov and Nikiforov indicated that they evacuated seven wounded Red Army soldiers. Moreover, Kolobanov again says nothing about the infantry unit that was attached to the tank - apparently this unit did not exist, otherwise he would have told how it left the battle in the place with the tank, but he reports about a group of wounded who accidentally turned out to be at the tank. Moreover, the fact of saving the wounded is reflected in the award sheets.

Immediately after Kolobanov’s tank left the position, according to the author, units of the 113th motorized infantry regiment, the 6th tank company and the 73rd anti-tank division of the enemy’s 1st tank division broke through along the route Vokhonovo - Uchkhoz - Seppelevo - st. Voykovitsy and reached the Luga road in the area of ​​Bolshiye Chernitsy to take the place of the 8th Panzer Division, which was turning around and leaving towards Luga. This is noted in the combat log of the 1st Panzer Division. Only briefly did the 113th Motorized Infantry Battalion occupy the strategic crossroads at Ilkino, and then the column left for the Kyiv Highway. If the Germans had held Ilkino and the Voyskovitsy station for a long time, this would have been noticed by the border guard cadets of the 2nd battalion, since these two settlements were located on a strategically important road immediately behind their positions. The capture of Ilkino and the Voyskovitsy station meant the encirclement of the battalion, but according to our border guards, neither on August 20, nor 21, nor on August 22, 1941, the enemy was able to break through their positions - the cadets were surrounded only on August 23.

On the evening of August 20, 1941, near Bornitsy, the combat group of the 8th motorized regiment of the 8th Panzer Division tried once again to break through the defenses of the 2nd battalion of cadets. Taking advantage of their advantage in manpower and equipment, the Germans constantly tried to outflank the border guard battalion. The fierce battle lasted from 17.00 to 19.30. During one of these attempts, enemy tanks managed to bypass the positions of the cadets. German combat vehicles again tried to strike at the rear of the battalion, but were ambushed by two Soviet KVs. The tanks of Lieutenant Sergeev and Junior Lieutenant Lastochkin took up defense behind the positions of the cadets of the 2nd battalion at Bolshiye Bornitsa. In the Vyselka-Ryabisi area, Sergeev’s crew prepared for battle; his vehicle was behind the left flank of the border guard cadets. Lieutenant Lastochkin's tank stood in ambush behind the central positions. His position was located approximately one km behind the cadets' trenches near the railway track. The KV was installed in the caponier, and it was ready to repel the German attack if the enemy broke through the front in front of our tank. At 16.00, according to the author, the tanks of the 10th Tank Regiment of the 8th Tank Division, which bypassed the positions of the border guard cadets, appeared before the ambush of Lieutenant Fedor Sergeev. The KV entered the battle, which lasted until the evening. In the Vyselka area, the crew destroyed four vehicles, and in the Ryabisi area, the same number. During the battle, Sergeev's tank was knocked out. One enemy shell knocked out a ball mount with a machine gun, the gun's compressor was damaged, and another shell disabled the tank's engine. The crew suffered losses and was forced to leave the heavily damaged combat vehicle on the battlefield.

The grave of Shpiller Joseph Borisovich at the Nikolskoye cemetery of the Alexander Nevsky Lavra. St. Petersburg (photo by Denis Bazuev).

Photographs have been preserved taken by tankers of the 6th company of the 1st tank regiment, the same company that possibly reinforced the 113th motorized infantry regiment of the 1st German tank division on August 20 (performing a tactical maneuver). The caption in the photograph states that this tank was destroyed by tank crews of the 6th company at the end of August 1941. Almost 100 percent this is a Sergeev tank. Apparently, the 6th tank company tried to deviate from the group’s main route and strike in the back the border guards defending the Bornitsky Line; Sergeev’s tank found itself between a “hammer and a hard place.” From the front he was pressed by the tankmen of the 8th Panzer, and from the rear he was attacked by the 6th company of the 1st Panzer Division. Moreover, the 6th company, as events would later show, was supposedly of mixed composition. In addition to the Pz.III, presumably two Pz.IVs were added for reinforcement. Judging by the shell dents on the rear of the KV-1, it was fired from 50mm tank guns, but they did not penetrate the armor. The tank was heavily damaged by larger caliber shells on the right side of the rear armor plate. It is possible that, in addition to the 6th tank company, the 113th motorized infantry regiment was also reinforced by 88-mm anti-aircraft guns. The photograph shows that the KV-1 turret was torn off by the explosion.

According to the documents of the 1st Red Banner Tank Division, it is indicated that they wanted to court-martial Lieutenant Sergeev for leaving a damaged tank on the battlefield. But they changed their minds, deciding to give him a chance to atone. Attempts to evacuate the valuable KV tank from the battlefield were unsuccessful; in his diary, commander Captain Shpiller reports that at night the light tanks were able to make their way to Lieutenant Sergeev’s car (the Germans later saw their traces at KV Sergeev). Perhaps it was the crews of these light tanks that blew up the KV.

It is very interesting that the soldiers of the 8th Panzer discovered the 6th company of the 1st Tank Division of the KV Sergeev only on August 22, 1941. On this day he was also noted in the preliminary daily report of the 4th Panzer Group.

Here I would like to especially emphasize the fact that the combat logs of the 1st, 6th and 8th tank divisions were kept primarily on the basis of data from motorized infantry units, since German battle groups of tank divisions were most often led by commanders of motorized infantry regiments. So they noted, first of all, the successes of the motorized infantry units. And tank companies and battalions were given to them for a while for reinforcement; the tankers were strangers to them. And their successes and defeats were practically not recorded. In order to draw a final picture of the battle on August 20, 1941, we need reports from tank regiments and battalions for August 20, and they have not been made public at the moment. This gap is partly compensated for by the memories of German tank crews of the 6th Panzer Division. So it turns out that the motorized infantry of the 8th Panzer, according to German data, on August 22 at 16.45 Berlin time, 400 m north-west of Tyaglino (behind Bolshiye Bornitsy) discovered a heavy tank damaged and blown up by the Russians, which the day before had shown stubborn resistance to the Germans . Near it there were traces of light vehicles. The enemy was able to break through further and went to the rear of the cadets, but was ambushed by Lastochkin’s tank. The crew of Junior Lieutenant Lastchtochkin was ready to repel the German attack if they broke through the center of the border guard cadets, but they came in from the rear. The attack was unexpected. Fortunately, the loader was sitting on the turret at that moment and noticed a German tank column. She walked between the railway and the edge of the forest.

The intersection where a German tank column was stopped and destroyed. Enemy tanks were moving from right to left. On the right in the photo you can see an ancient lake (Photo by Denis Bazuev).

Lastochkin’s award sheet states that German tanks appeared at 18.00. According to the recollections of gunner-radio operator Vladimir Fedorovich Melnikov, the KV came out of the caponier, turned around and attacked the enemy tank column.

During the short battle, two enemy tanks were knocked out, but the Germans also managed to damage the gun of our vehicle. The tank could fire guns, but aiming the gun at the target was very difficult. At this moment, Lieutenant Lastochkin ordered driver-mechanic Iovlev to ram the German tank. With a powerful blow, the KV smashed the enemy vehicle, but the tankers were injured.

The last fourth tank made an unsuccessful maneuver, as a result of which it itself fell into the sight of the KV gun and was shot down. The damaged enemy tank was thrown into the swamp by a ramming attack. And this battle ended in complete victory for the Soviet tankers. After the battle, Lastochkin’s tank went to Taitsy for repairs. The award sheets of our tankers indicate the damage to the Soviet combat vehicle: “... 2 lower and one upper roller were shot down, a sloth was broken, many holes.” During the ramming attack, the tank commander suffered the most. Lieutenant Lastochkin did not have time to prepare for the ramming attack, and after the battle he was immediately taken to the hospital.

While Soviet tank crews were engaged in fierce battles with superior enemy forces, repair teams tried to save vehicles that had failed due to technical reasons. In the area of ​​the Voyskovitsy railway station, senior sergeant Pyotr Bagun, under artillery fire, carried out complex repairs on a T-28. Thanks to skill, perseverance and courage, he managed to replace the gearbox and bring the tank to a standstill. The repaired vehicle belonged to our 1st Tank Regiment.

The reports of the 8th Panzer Division noted that on the evening of August 20, three Soviet tanks operated against them, one of which was either 32 or 52 tons. The Germans established this by following the tracks of the caterpillars. According to them, this small group of Soviet tanks managed to knock out 6 armored personnel carriers and one tracked tractor with a heavy gun in the evening. The estimated location of the battle is the area between Bolshie Bornitsy and Ilkino. But perhaps the column of armored personnel carriers was destroyed by the 6th company of the 2nd tank battalion of the 1st tank regiment of the 1st Red Banner Tank Division. The company included eight light T-26s, and the report of the commander of the 1st tank regiment, Pogodin, indicated that the company was sent for a flank attack on a German tank column in the area of ​​Malye Bornitsy, Ilkino, Bolshoye Tyaglino. And it was precisely the traces of these light vehicles that the enemy saw on KV Sergeev, who was shot down near Tyaglino. It is possible that the column of German armored personnel carriers was destroyed by a combined group of KV-1s and light T-26s, which, in the author’s opinion, is most likely. In his report, the commander of the 1st regiment, Hero of the Soviet Union, Pogodin indicates that by the end of the day, August 20:

Stone buildings of the former educational farm of the Voiskovitsky Leningrad Zootechnical Institute. The wooden royal hunting estate burned down after the war (photo by Denis Bazuev).

"5. Having used up ammunition and being left without our infantry, 2 KV tanks operating in the Vost forest. Bol. The BORNITSI retreated to the ILKINO line, where they stopped the retreat of the infantry units with their own forces, forcing them to position themselves on the defensive at the tank line.

6. The KV tanks, having used up their ammunition, went out one at a time to refuel in the Krasnogvardeysk region.

7. The right fighter group is on the move, no information has been received about its action. The left fighter group has reached the ILKINO line and, in joint actions with KV tanks, is holding the line.”

The left fighter group consisted of eight light T-26s, which fought alongside the KV-1. But a third option is also possible - the German column of armored personnel carriers was destroyed by a repaired medium T-28 and two light T-26s.

As a result of the battle on August 20, on our right flank, the German 1st Panzer Division broke through the combat outpost of the 276th OPAB and reached the area of ​​Uchkhoz, Voyskovitsy and Motchino. Units of the 113th motorized infantry regiment, 37th artillery regiment and 37th anti-tank battalion broke through to the Chernitsa-Vopsha-Lyadino area and began to interact with units of the 28th motorized regiment of the 8th tank division. According to Soviet data, the combat guard of the 267th OPAB retreated to Lyadino. In the center, the Germans throughout the day were unable to break through the position of the border guards of the 2nd battalion. Although separate groups of tanks broke through to the rear and tried to strike, the tankers from Kolobanov’s company brilliantly repulsed all these attacks. The Germans were only able to take the positions of the cadets near Bornitsy in a semicircle.

On the left flank, in the evening, after the departure of Soviet tanks in the Chernitsa area, the enemy was still able to knock out the combat outpost of the 3rd company of the 267th OPAB, and the surviving bunker crews retreated to the new defense line Lyadino - Voshpa. German tanks reached the Warsaw railway, and on the evening of August 20, sappers of Lieutenant Mörsch from the 8th Panzer Division blew up the railway track. A local resident led them to the railway. The explosion of the railway completely interrupted the supply of the 41st Rifle Corps from Astana to Leningrad. This was a terrible blow to the Luga defenders.

German sappers tried to break through to the railway in the afternoon with two tanks, but came under fire from our troops and were forced to return. During the battle, one Pz.III from the 1st Tank Division was knocked out, and the Pz.IV was stuck. Most likely, these were tanks from the 6th Tank Company of the 1st Tank Division, which reinforced the 113th Motorized Infantry Regiment. If this is so, then the 6th company was of a mixed composition, it included both Pz.III and Pz.IV.

During the battle on August 20, the total losses of the 1st and 8th tank divisions, according to Soviet data, amounted to about 60 tanks, of which 43 vehicles were destroyed by Kolobanov’s company. Moreover, the company itself irretrievably lost only Lieutenant Sergeev’s tank. The report of the commander of the 1st Tank Regiment contains the following information:

“Total company st. Lieutenant Kolobanov, with five KV tanks that day destroyed 42 enemy tanks, one tankette, one passenger car, a flamethrower battery and up to an infantry company. One motorcycle taken."

The tankers took two of the five damaged KVs (Kolobanov’s and Lastochkin’s vehicles) to the rear. But the next day Kolobanov’s tank was repaired, and he returned to the battlefield. Three vehicles remained in service in the company: Kolobanov, Evdokimenko and Degtyar.

Realizing that the 8th Panzer Division was turning towards the city of Luga, on the night of August 20-21, 1941, the Soviet command tried to evacuate the Siversky military airfield, which was now in the path of German tank columns. A train was allocated for this purpose. At night, loaded with airfield equipment, it went to Krasnogvardeysk, but near Suida the train was blown up by the enemy, and then set on fire by our railway workers so that the valuable property would not fall to the enemy. Wanting to save the airfield equipment, a train with a repair team came out from Krasnogvardeysk to the burning train, which in turn was shot by German artillery.

The destruction of the Soviet personnel by artillery fire is also noted by the Germans. The history of the 1st German Panzer Division states that on August 21, 1941, the 73rd Artillery Regiment of the Panzer Division shot down a railway train.

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...or the methodology of Mythbusters - destruction of the Soviet myth

This article examines (and does not promote) the interweaving of ideological components of the Soviet political regime of the 40s of the last century.

In the formation of the post-Soviet myth about “ feat"Senior Lieutenant Z.G. Kolobanov, absolutely all modern military historians of Russia (Muscovy) took an active part. Such a prominent military historian as Viktor Suvorov (Rezun) generally wrote that the feat of senior lieutenant Z.G Kolobanov is confirmed not only by Soviet, but also by German archival documents (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Scheme of the battle, which is attached in the description of the official version of the last battle. It is the battle scheme that is alarming. And not the same diagram that would be on a topographic map dating back to 1941 or close to it.

However, despite numerous statements, not a single military historian (who repeated more than once about “ feat"Senior Lieutenant Z.G. Kolobanov) never presented evidence that the company commander of KV-1 heavy tanks, Senior Lieutenant Z.G. Kolobanov, between August 19 and 22, knocked out 22 tanks in one battle. And also the fact that on the same day Kolobanov’s company destroyed 43 German tanks.

Moreover, the post-Soviet myth about “ feat"Senior Lieutenant Z.G. Kolobanov lives his own life. Currently, arguments in disputes between adherents and doubters of the commission “ feat“, even translations of combat logs posted online for the corresponding dates of the 1st, 6th and 8th Wehrmacht tank divisions are no longer available.

In general, the situation with “ feat"Senior Lieutenant Z.G Kolobanov - more than does not correspond to reality, but from the category" 28 Panfilovites"(Figure 2). Not a single researcher has ever even tried to find a topographic map of the area close in date to 1941.

And look at the position of the tank of Senior Lieutenant Z.G. Kolobanov from the point of view of the tactics of its possible actions relative to the terrain that existed in August 1941. No researcher has attempted to translate the number of German tanks into the corresponding column length. It is precisely these provisions that will be corrected in this article.

Figure 2. Soviet operational map, with the situation at the end of August 1941, scale 1:100,000. Condition of the area as of 1931.

Destruction of the myth about Kolobanov's feat

In this article, so to speak, for the first time in the vastness of the former Soviet Union, the methodology for the destruction of the post-Soviet “ feat" elevated to the rank of myth. There are several methods for destroying myths. In this article, some of the methods are combined into one, the most significant one - called a topographic map and working with it. In addition, this method is complemented by several more:

• main method- topographic map, it is best if this map dates back to a time close to the accomplished “feat” (topographic maps dating from 1937 - 1944);
• additional method first- tactical and technical, associated with the tactical and technical aspects of the myth. That is, 22 tanks is the total number of tanks in the column, and what was its possible length and could the 76.2 mm L-11 gun mounted on the KV-1 tank fire at such ranges? In addition, these are possible tactical options for the actions of the Soviet tank relative to the terrain on which its position was;
• additional method second- literary, the press of those years, what it wrote, what it published, and what discrepancies are observed between what was written and what actually happened.

By and large, there may be additional methods in the form of alternative information. And this method is certainly correct and valid. However, in such a myth confused by post-Soviet ideologists as “ feat"Senior Lieutenant Z.G. Kolobanov - this method is not suitable.

Since, I repeat, despite the fact that the combat logs of those attacking “ Leningrad"German tank divisions in the context of the days of interest have long been transferred - they are no longer arguments in disputes that the company of senior lieutenant Z. G. Kolobanov did nothing. Officially it is written like this:

“Despite the fact that large tank losses were not recorded in German documents on August 20, this does not refute the number of destroyed tanks declared by the Soviet side. Thus, 14 tanks of the 65th tank battalion of the 6th tank division, written off as irretrievable losses in the period from August 23 to September 4, can be attributed to the results of the battle with Z. G. Kolobanov’s company...”

That is, it literally says the following - no matter what alternative document you present, it will not be evidence. It is for this reason that a methodology for analysis is needed “ feat" than just any documents.

Topographic map - the main method of destroying the myth

The usual topographic map is at a scale of 1:50,000, but it would be better if it was 1:25,000. Much to your surprise, there are both on the Internet. Moreover, the Soviet topographic map at a scale of 1:25,000 turned out to be from the 1939 edition. In 1941 it became a German trophy.

Soviet black and white map of 1939 - senior lieutenant Kolobanov fought on it (Figure 3). And the German topographic map at a scale of 1:50,000 (Figure 4), the terrain as of 1942, does not contradict the Soviet map of 1939. As of August 1941, the area remains unchanged, both for the Soviet map of 1939 and for the German map of 1942.

Figure 3. Soviet topographic map at a scale of 1:25,000, dating from 1939.

Figure 4. German topographic map at a scale of 1:50,000, dating from 1942.

In order to understand where there were swamps and where there were no swamps, Figure 5 was specially made for clarity - this is part of a German map at a scale of 1:50,000, this map is color and it is easier and more clear to show places that were swampy in 1941 . The number 1 (circled) on the map indicates wetlands in the forest. Under the number 2 (circled) there are simply forests in which there are no swamps. If desired, in Figure 5 you can find not only a swampy forest, but also swampy clearings.

Figure 5. Part of a German topographic map, scale 1:50,000, on which swampy forests and forests without swamps are plotted for clarity.

Now we are looking for the position from which Senior Lieutenant Kolobanov “ smashed the fascists" And when clarifying the terrain and the position of Senior Lieutenant Z.G Kolobanov’s tank on it, which existed in 1941, we observe several inconsistencies with those described in the Kolobanov myth.

• Firstly: there are simply no swamps, either to the right or to the left of the road along which the damned Germans were rolling - the side of the road is more than passable for all types of equipment;
• secondly: There was somewhere for German tanks to hide from the possible impact of the 76.2 mm cannon of the tank of Senior Lieutenant Z.G. Kolobanov. However, it is not a fact that German tanks were lost in that battle, even just one tank. The Germans had too few tanks in 1941, and they were too expensive a tool for warfare to be lost even in single quantities;
• thirdly: The firing sector of the tank of Senior Lieutenant Z.G. Kolobanov indicated in the official version is far from what could have been on the ground in 1941. There were no observation devices through the forest on Kolobanov’s tank, since such devices do not exist to this day. In addition, Kolobanov’s tank did not have shells that could freely pass through the forest and hit German tanks.

For clarity, we combine the official battle scheme with the Soviet topographic map of 1939, scale 1:25,000. And we get a detailed drawing with the position of tank No. 864 of senior lieutenant Z. G. Kolobanov relative to the area that was in August 1941 (Figure 6).

Figure 6. Scheme of a possible battle of tank No. 864 by senior lieutenant Z.G. Kolobanov (the position of the tank itself is indicated by a dot in the center of the diamond), transferred to a Soviet topographic map of 1939, scale 1:25,000.

And now, after we have plotted the position of Senior Lieutenant Kolobanov’s tank on the map, it becomes clear to us, understandable, and most importantly, visually, that there was a battle, but it took place somewhat differently than its post-Soviet ideologists describe it:

• Firstly: The position of the tank of senior lieutenant Z. G. Kolobanov was chosen on a country road, the natural cover was a forest, the tactics of action were a nomadic tank. The tank was allowed to operate in this way by the dirt road (passing through the forest) on which the tank was positioned. At the same time, there was one significant drawback of this position - the lack of significant height.
• Secondly: The firing sector of the KV-1 tank No. 864 is far from the one indicated in the official description of the feat. Only the terrain could have a significant impact on the firing sector of a 76-mm tank gun. This sector of fire suggests that the Germans were not expected from the western direction, the Germans were expected from the southern direction and were mistaken.
• Thirdly: for the Germans, in order to suppress or destroy a Soviet tank by fire, there is one position for an artillery gun (at a commanding height), and one workaround for the German infantry - with senior lieutenant Z.G. Kolobanov going to the rear of the tank position.
• Fourth: and this is the most important thing - knowing the attitude of German officers to the map, the terrain and their general professional outlook, based on Figures 3 and 5, we can conclude that there was a battle. But, it took place (to put it mildly) somewhat differently than what is described by official post-Soviet historiography. But this hypothesis will be presented in the final part.

Conclusion to the main method

If in the post-Soviet myth there is a connection to the area - the names of nearby settlements are given, and a battle scheme is given, as well as the type of Soviet equipment, then the first method - a topographic map - puts a lot into place.

You can even answer the first possible question - why didn’t Senior Lieutenant Z.G. Kolobanov himself occupy the dominant height 121.1 located on the northern outskirts of the village of Pitkelevo? In fact, this is a wonderful position. But it all comes down to what is called: a) lack of intelligence; and b) firing range, that is, the direct firing distance of the Soviet 76.2 mm L-11 tank gun - it was limited to 450 meters. And the Soviet tank crews were not trained to introduce adjustments appropriate to the firing range.

In the case of " feat"Senior Lieutenant Z.G. Kolobanov - the topographic map is the most effective and most serious destroyer of the post-Soviet myth. Lack of topographic map in the description " feat"for any researcher - is a signal that communicates what is in the description " feat"There is more than deception.

Deception is the number of destroyed German tanks - in one battle, as well as throughout the day. To put it mildly, it is more than a deception - this is the firing sector of the 76.2-mm L-11 tank gun mounted on the KV-1 tank of Senior Lieutenant Z. G. Kolobanov and the presence of swamps along the road along which the German tank column was walking. Moreover, if you have a topographic map, it turns out that there were no swamps along the road.

Tactical and technical characteristics - an additional method of destroying any myths

The problem, as always, lies in the lack of basic education not among Kolobanov himself, but among those who enroll among his many supporters. No one has ever criticized the description “ feat", and besides, he did not even try to determine the total length of the column of German tanks, which were so successfully " thug"Senior Lieutenant Z.G Kolobanov.

And the main question: why are there only two landmarks on the official battle diagram? Is the area really so poor in landmarks? No, there are quite a few landmarks, even more than that. The absence of a third landmark in the description " feat“puts a lot of things into place.

• Kolobanov's tank position:
  X = 06480 Y = 65680 h = 111.62 m
• landmark 1:
  X = 06140 Y = 65680 h = 111.32 m.
• landmark 2:
  X = 06000 Y = 65260 h = 111.00 m.
• supposedly the last tank in the column:
  X = 06225 Y = 64265 h = 124.00 m.
• corner of the forest - landmark 3(in fact, over time, this landmark shifted somewhat (to the left side along the road) and turned into a “closing German tank”):
  X = 06135 Y = 65040 h = 120.37 m.

Now let's look at the distances that are indicated from the official figure, which actually exist:

• the distance between the lead and trailing tanks is 1,417 m;
• the distance between Kolobanov’s position and the trailing tank is not 800 meters, but 1,438 meters, and most importantly, from the tank’s position this space is not visible or covered by fire.
• Why does the figure of 800 meters appear in the “feat”? 800 meters is not the trailing tank in the column - this is the distance from the position of Kolobanov’s tank to landmark 3 (corner of the forest), this distance is 727 meters. But now we can determine such a distance (by solving the inverse geodetic problem). 800 meters, which were determined by eye, by and large do not contradict anything.

Besides. 800 meters is the maximum possible effective firing range of the Soviet 76.2 mm L-11 tank gun when firing the BR-350A armor-piercing tracer projectile. The stated characteristics of armor penetration at a distance of 1000 meters are 50 mm, but there was a problem with hitting the target. To do this, you need two not entirely noticeable things: good optics on the tank and good training for the tank gunner.

In these two areas, the Soviet " tank school"was lagging behind. Moreover, regardless of the time period under consideration. At least during the Second World War, at least after its end.

Drawing conclusions

In the area where the tank of Senior Lieutenant Z.G. Kolobanov fought, his crew was physically unable to act against 22 enemy tanks.

First. The position of Kolobanov's tank - despite the fact that it was not visible from the advancing Germans - is not at a commanding height. The advancing Germans pass along the road, to the right and left of which there are no swamps. That is, nothing at all prevents not only from suppressing a Soviet tank, but also from destroying it.

Second. In general, the position of Senior Lieutenant Z.G. Kolobanov’s tank relative to the advancing Germans (from any direction) is completely unfavorable. The corner of the forest - landmark 3 is at the same height as the position of the Soviet tank. In general, one gets the impression that the tank’s position was not chosen by the tankers. This position was convenient for the 45 mm anti-tank gun, but not for the KV-1 heavy tank.

Third. If a company of heavy tanks, commanded by senior lieutenant Z.G. Kolobanov, were expecting the Germans from the western direction, then it would be difficult to imagine a better position for a tank than the dominant height on the road (which is indicated on the diagram as the trailing tank) (in fact, this is already the second possible scoring position).

In this case, the position is located on the edge of the forest - this is natural camouflage and at a height, which allows you to shoot through the space passing below. In addition, this place allows you to carry out a convenient tactic of action - simply roll back a few tens of meters along the same road in a different direction. Reappear at irregular intervals and inflict defeat.

With an organized and persistent defense, a tank like the KV-1 can operate in this way until it runs out of ammunition and fuel. Or their supply will not end. Or the tank will be destroyed, which in this case would be difficult to accomplish.

It would be possible to organize a 37-mm anti-aircraft gun to provide cover from aviation if the tank battalion commander desired. And the air bursts of any artillery shells, at a height of even 6 meters, were not scary for the KV-1 tank. But, once again, we’ll talk about the possible nature of the battle in the final part.

But there are also questions regarding the number of tanks.

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On August 20, 1941, a historic tank battle took place, which is called “the most successful battle” in the entire history of tank confrontations. The battle was led by Zinovy ​​Kolobanov, an ace tankman of the Red Army.

Zinovy ​​Kolobanov was born at the end of December 1910, in the village of Arefino, Vladimir province. Kolobanov’s father died during the Civil War, and Zinovy ​​worked constantly from an early age. He graduated from 8 grades of school, entered a technical school, and in the 3rd year he was drafted into the army. Kolobanov was assigned to the infantry troops, but the army needed tankers, and he was sent to study at the armored school named after. Frunze. In 1936, he graduated with honors, and with the rank of senior lieutenant he went to the Leningrad Military District.

Zinoviy Kolobanov underwent a “baptism of fire” during the Soviet-Finnish war. He met her as a tank company commander. In a short period of time, Kolobanov almost died three times in a burning tank, but each time he returned to duty. He was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

After the start of the Great Patriotic War, Kolobanov had to quickly master the heavy Soviet KV-1 tank in order not only to fight on it, but also to train recruits.

Offensive on Gatchina

At the beginning of August 1941, Army Group North launched an attack on Leningrad. The Red Army was retreating. In the area of ​​Gatchina (at that time Krasnogvardeysk), the Germans were held back by the 1st Tank Division. The situation was difficult - the Wehrmacht had tank superiority, and any day now the Nazis could break through the city’s defenses and capture the city. Why was Krasnogvardeysk so important for the Germans? At that time it was a major transport hub in front of Leningrad.

On August 19, 1941, Zinovy ​​Kolobanov received an order from the division commander to block three roads coming from Luga, Volosovo and Kingisepp. The division commander's order was short: fight to the death. Kolobanov's company was on heavy KV-1 tanks. The KV-1 stood up well to the Panzerwaffe, the tank units of the Wehrmacht. But the KV-1 had a significant drawback: lack of maneuverability. In addition, at the beginning of the war, there were few KV-1s and T-34s in the Red Army, so they were taken care of and, if possible, tried to avoid battles in open areas.

The most successful tank battle of 1941

Lieutenant Kolobanov's crew consisted of senior sergeant Andrei Usov, senior driver-mechanic Nikolai Nikiforov, junior driver-mechanic Nikolai Rodnikov and gunner-radio operator Pavel Kiselkov. The crew of the tank was the same as Lieutenant Kolobanov: people with experience and good training.

After Kolobanov received the division commander’s order, he set his team a combat mission: to stop the German tanks. Each tank was loaded with armor-piercing shells, two sets. Arriving at the site near the Voyskovitsy state farm, Zinoviy Kolobanov set up “combat points”: the tanks of Lieutenant Evdokimenko and Degtyar near the Luga Highway, the tanks of Junior Lieutenant Sergeev and Lastochkin near Kingisepp. Senior Lieutenant Kolobanov and his team stood in the center of the defense, on the coastal road. The KV-1 was placed 300 meters from the intersection.

22 tanks in 30 minutes

At 12 o'clock on August 20, the Germans tried to capture the Luga Highway, but Evdokimenko and Degtyar knocked out 5 tanks and 3 armored personnel carriers, after which the Germans turned back. At about 2 p.m., German reconnaissance motorcyclists appeared, but Kolobanov’s team on the KV-1 did not give themselves away. After some time, German light tanks appeared. Kolobanov commanded “fire!” and the battle began.

First, the gun commander Usov knocked out the 3 lead tanks, then poured fire on the tanks closing the column. The passage of the German column was choked, the tanks were burning at the beginning of the column and at the end. Now there was no way to escape the shelling. At this time, the KV-1 revealed itself, the Germans opened fire back, but the heavy armor of the tank was impenetrable. At one point, the KV-1 turret failed, but senior mechanic Nikiforov began to maneuver the vehicle so that Usov would have the opportunity to continue to beat the Germans.

30 minutes of battle - all the tanks of the German column were destroyed.

Even the “aces” of the Panzerwaffe could not imagine such a result. Later, the achievement of Senior Lieutenant Kolobanov was included in the Guinness Book of Records.

On August 20, 1941, five tanks of Kolobanov’s company destroyed a total of 43 German tanks. In addition to the tanks, an artillery battery and two infantry companies were knocked out.

Unappreciated Hero

In 1941, Kolobanov’s crew was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. After a while, the high command replaced the title of Hero with the Order of the Red Banner (Zinovy ​​Kolobanov was awarded), Andrei Usov was awarded the Order of Lenin, driver-mechanic Nikiforov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. They simply “did not believe” in the feat of Kolobanov’s crew, although the documents were provided.

In September 1941, Zinoviy Kolobanov was seriously wounded and returned to the Red Army after the end of the war, in the summer of 1945. He served in the army until 1958, after which he joined the colonel reserve and settled in Minsk.

Monument near Voyskovitsy

In the early 1980s, they decided to erect a monument at the site of the famous battle. Kolobanov wrote a letter to the USSR Ministry of Defense with a request to allocate a tank to perpetuate the heroic feat. Dmitry Ustinov, the Minister of Defense, gave a positive answer, and a tank was allocated for the monument - but not the KV-1, but the IS-2.

He took part in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 as part of the 20th heavy tank brigade as a company commander. It burned repeatedly. For breaking through the Mannerheim line, Kolobanov became a Hero of the Soviet Union and was awarded the extraordinary rank of captain. But for the fraternization of his subordinates with Finnish military personnel after the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty of March 12, 1940, he was deprived of both his title and award. After which - according to one source - he was dismissed from the ranks of the Red Army. According to others, he ended up in a camp, from which he came out only at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

Participant of the Leningrad defensive operation. In the battle near Ivanovsky, Kolobanov managed to distinguish himself - his crew destroyed a tank and an enemy gun.

On August 18, the commander of the 3rd tank company of the 1st tank battalion of the 1st Red Banner Tank Division, senior lieutenant Zinovy ​​Kolobanov, was summoned to the division commander, General V.I. Baranov. The division headquarters was located in the basement of the cathedral, which is a landmark of Gatchina, which was then called Krasnogvardeysk.

I received the task personally from the division commander Baranov,” Kolobanov told Leningrad journalists after the war. - He showed me on the map the fork in the roads going to Luga and Kingisepp and ordered: “Block it and stand to death.” The situation near Leningrad was such that I took the division commander’s order literally.

Kolobanov’s company had five KV-1 tanks. Each tank was loaded with two rounds of armor-piercing shells. This time the crews took a minimal amount of high-explosive fragmentation shells. The main thing was not to miss the German tanks.

On the same day, Kolobanov advanced his company to meet the advancing enemy. The senior lieutenant sent two tanks - Lieutenant Sergeev and Junior Lieutenant Evdokimenko - to the Luga road (Kyiv highway). Two more KVs under the command of Lieutenant Lastochkin and Junior Lieutenant Degtyar headed to defend the road leading to Volosovo. The tank of the company commander himself was supposed to be ambushed near the road connecting the Tallinn highway with the road to Marienburg - the northern outskirts of Krasnogvardeysk.

Kolobanov conducted reconnaissance with the commanders of all crews, indicated the locations of the firing positions and ordered two shelters to be dug for each vehicle - the main one and a spare one, and then carefully camouflaged. The crews had to maintain contact with the company commander by radio.

For his KV Kolobanov determined the position in such a way that the fire sector had the longest, well-open section of the road. A little before reaching the Uchkhoz poultry farm, it turned almost 90 degrees and then went towards Marienburg. It was crossed by another dirt road, along which, apparently, local residents removed hay from the fields after haymaking. Unharvested haystacks could be seen all around; they stood not far from the position chosen by Kolobanov. On both sides of the road leading to Marienburg there were vast swamps. There was even a small lake with ducks swimming carelessly around it.

Gunner-radio operator senior sergeant Pavel Kiselkov suggested going to an abandoned poultry farm and getting a goose, fortunately the people who worked on it, fearing the invasion of the invaders, left it, and the crew, exhausted by hard work, needed to reinforce their strength. Komroty agreed, ordering the radio operator to shoot the bird so that no one would hear:
Under no circumstances was it possible to unmask one’s position. Kiselkov carried out the order exactly; the goose was plucked and boiled in a tank bucket. After dinner, Kolobanov ordered everyone to rest.

As night approached, the military outpost arrived. The young lieutenant reported to Kolobanov. He ordered the infantry to be placed behind the tank, to the side, so that if something happened they would not come under gunfire. The outpost positions also had to be well camouflaged.

In the early morning of August 19, 1941, Kolobanov’s crew was awakened by the disgusting, intermittent roar of German dive bombers flying at high altitude towards Leningrad. After they passed, peace and quiet re-established itself near Voyskovitsy. The day started out clear. The sun was rising higher.
At about ten o'clock shots were heard from the left, from the side of the road going to Volosovo.

The senior lieutenant recognized the nearby “voice” of the KV tank gun. A message came over the radio that one of the crews had entered into battle with German tanks. But everything was still calm for them. Kolobanov summoned the commander of the combat guard and ordered him to have his infantrymen open fire on the enemy only when the KV gun began to speak. For themselves, Kolobanov and Usov outlined two landmarks: No. 1 - two birch trees at the end of the intersection and No. 2 - the intersection itself. The landmarks were chosen in such a way as to destroy the leading enemy tanks right at the crossroads and prevent other vehicles from turning off the road leading to Marienburg.

Only in the second hour of the day did enemy vehicles appear on the road.

Prepare for battle! - Kolobanov commanded quietly.

 
  View of the section of the road along which German tanks were advancing

Having slammed the hatches, the tankers instantly froze in their places. Immediately, the gun commander, senior sergeant Andrei Usov, reported that he saw three motorcycles with sidecars in his sights. The commander's order immediately followed: - Do not open fire! Skip the reconnaissance!

The German motorcyclists turned left and rushed towards Marienburg, without noticing the camouflaged KV lying in ambush. Fulfilling Kolobanov’s order, the infantrymen from the combat guard did not open fire on reconnaissance.

Now all the attention of the crew was focused on the tanks walking along the road. Kolobanov ordered the radio operator to report to battalion commander Captain I.B. Shpiller about the approach of a German tank column and again turned all his attention towards the road, onto which tanks painted dark gray were crawling out one after another. They walked at shortened distances, placing their left sides almost strictly at right angles to the KV gun, thereby representing ideal targets. The hatches were open, some of the Germans were sitting on the armor. The crew could even distinguish their faces, since the distance between the HF and the enemy column was small - only about one hundred and fifty meters.

At this time, battalion commander Shpiller contacted the company commander via radio. He asked sternly:
- Kolobanov, why are you letting the Germans through?!

Shpiller already knew about the morning battle in the Luga and Volosovo directions and about the advance of German tanks towards Kolobanov’s position, and he could not help but be disturbed by the rather prolonged silence of the KV tank company commander.

There was no time to respond to the battalion commander: the lead tank slowly drove into the intersection and came close to two birch trees - landmark No. 1, identified by the tank crews before the battle. Immediately Kolobanov was informed about the number of tanks in the column. There were 22 of them. And when seconds of movement remained before the landmark, the commander realized that he could no longer hesitate, and ordered Usov to open fire.

The lead tank caught fire from the first shot. It was destroyed before it even managed to completely pass the intersection. The second shot, right at the intersection, destroyed the second tank. A traffic jam has formed. The column compressed like a spring, and now the intervals between the remaining tanks became completely minimal. Kolobanov ordered the fire to be transferred to the tail of the column in order to finally lock it on the road.

But this time Usov failed to hit the trailing tank with the first shot - the shell did not reach the target. The senior sergeant adjusted his aim and fired four more shots, destroying the last two in the tank column. The enemy was trapped.

At first, the Germans could not determine where the shooting was coming from and opened fire from their guns at the haystacks, which immediately caught fire. But they soon came to their senses and were able to discover the ambush. A tank duel began between one KV and eighteen German tanks. A hail of armor-piercing shells fell on Kolobanov’s car. One after another, they hammered at the 25-mm armor of the additional screens installed on the KV turret. There was no longer any trace left of the disguise. The tankers were suffocating from the powder gases and deafened from the numerous impacts of the blanks on the tank’s armor. The loader, who is also a junior mechanic-driver, Red Army soldier Nikolai Rodenkov, worked at a frantic pace, driving shell after shell into the cannon breech. Usov, without looking up from his sight, continued to fire at the enemy column.

Meanwhile, the commanders of other vehicles holding defenses on three more roads reported by radio about the situation in their defense sectors. From these reports, Kolobanov realized that there were fierce battles in other directions.

The Germans, realizing that they were trapped, tried to maneuver, but KV shells hit the tanks one after another. But numerous direct hits from enemy shells did not cause much harm to the Soviet vehicle. The KV's obvious superiority over German tanks in terms of fire power and armor thickness was evident.

Infantry units moving behind the column came to the aid of the German tankers. Under the cover of fire from tank guns, for more effective shooting at the KV, the Germans rolled out anti-tank guns onto the road.

Kolobanov noticed the enemy’s preparations and ordered Usov to fire a high-explosive fragmentation shell at the anti-tank guns. The combat guard located behind the KV entered into battle with the German infantry.

Usov managed to destroy one anti-tank gun along with its crew, but the second one managed to fire several shots. One of them broke the panoramic periscope from which Kolobanov was observing the battlefield, and the other, hitting the tower, jammed it. Usov managed to destroy this gun, but the KV lost the ability to maneuver fire. Large additional rotations of the gun to the right and left could now only be done by turning the entire tank body. Essentially, the KV turned into a self-propelled artillery unit. Nikolai Kiselkov climbed onto the armor and installed a spare periscope instead of the damaged one.

Kolobanov ordered the senior mechanic-driver, petty officer Nikolai Nikiforov, to remove the tank from the caponier and take up a reserve firing position. In front of the Germans, the tank reversed out of its cover, drove to the side, stood in the bushes and again opened fire on the column. Now the driver had to work hard. Following Usov's orders, he turned the HF in the right direction.

Finally, the last 22nd tank was destroyed.

During the battle, which lasted more than an hour, senior sergeant A. Usov fired 98 shells at enemy tanks and anti-tank guns, of which all armor-piercing shells were used up (the ammunition load of the KV-1 tank of the first half of 1941 was 114 shells).

Further observation showed that several German tanks were able to break through to the Voyskovitsy state farm from the south.

The battalion commander contacted the crew. Spiller asked in a loud voice:
- Kolobanov, how are you? Are they burning?
- They burn well, comrade battalion commander!

The senior lieutenant reported that the crew destroyed an enemy tank column of 22 combat vehicles. Its crew is no longer able to hold its position, since the ammunition is running out, there are no armor-piercing shells at all, and the tank itself has received serious damage.

Shpiller thanked the crew for the successful completion of the combat mission and reported that the tanks of Lieutenant Lastochkin and Junior Lieutenant Degtyar were already on the way to the Voyskovitsy state farm. Kolobanov ordered Nikiforov to join them. Having placed the remaining infantrymen from the combat guard on the armor (many of them were wounded), the KV with the landing party on the armor rushed to the breakthrough. The Germans did not get involved in a battle with the Russian tank, and the KV easily reached the outskirts of the state farm. Here Kolobanov met with the commanders of the approaching tanks.

From them he learned that in the battle on the Luga road, the crew of Lieutenant Fedor Sergeev destroyed eight German tanks, and the crew of Junior Lieutenant Maxim Evdokimenko - five. The junior lieutenant was killed in this battle, three members of his crew were wounded. Only the driver-mechanic Sidikov survived. The fifth German tank destroyed by the crew in this battle was attributed to the driver: Sidikov rammed it. The HF itself was disabled. The tanks of junior lieutenant Degtyar and lieutenant Lastochkin burned four enemy tanks each on that day.

 
  Heroic crew shortly after the battle

In total, on August 19, 1941, the tank company destroyed 43 enemy tanks. For this battle, the commander of the 3rd tank company, Senior Lieutenant 3. G. Kolobanov, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Battle, and the gun commander of his tank, Senior Sergeant A.M. Usov - Order of Lenin.

Half an hour later, the Voyskovitsy state farm was cleared of the enemy. Having again reported the situation to Shpiller, Kolobanov received an order to withdraw the entire company to the rear to replenish ammunition and repairs. When, after the battle, the crew began to inspect their vehicle, 156 marks from hits from armor-piercing shells were counted on the KV’s armor.

The repair of the tank took almost a month. On the night of September 21, at the cemetery in the city of Pushkin, where the tanks were refueling with fuel and ammunition, a German shell exploded next to KV Kolobanov. At this time, the company commander had just climbed out of the tank, and he was thrown to the ground with monstrous force. The senior lieutenant was sent to the hospital in an unconscious state. The medical history of Zinovy ​​Kolobanov, stored in the Military Medical Archive, states: “Shrapnel damage to the head and spine. Contusion of the brain and spinal cord.”

In 1942, in serious condition, he was transported across Lake Ladoga to the mainland. Then there were months of immobilized lying in hospitals, prolonged unconsciousness, and only then an extremely slow return to life.

By the way, in the hospital, while showing the wounded one of the issues of “Frontline Newsreels,” Kolobanov saw his work - a broken enemy tank column.

Despite being seriously wounded and concussed, Kolobanov asked to return to duty again. The stick on which he leaned while walking had to be thrown away. And at the end of 1944, Kolobanov was again at the front, commanding the SU-76 division. For the battles on the Magnushevsky bridgehead he received the Order of the Red Star, and for the Berlin operation - the second Order of the Red Banner of Battle.

After the war, serving in one of the armies in Germany, he received a battalion of IS-2 heavy tanks. In a very short time, his battalion becomes the best in the army. The commander awarded Zinovy ​​Kolobanov a personalized hunting rifle.

He managed to find his wife and little son. Throughout the war, Kolobanov knew nothing about them; he separated from his pregnant wife on the first day of the war. But Zinovy ​​Grigorievich and Alexandra Grigorievna found each other: one of the radio programs that searched for relatives and friends lost during the war helped.

But it seemed to fate that it had not fully tested this man. A soldier deserted from the battalion and subsequently showed up in the British occupation zone. The threat of a military tribunal hung over the battalion commander. The army commander saved Kolobanov: having announced incomplete service, he transferred him to the Belarusian Military District. Everything that happened did not pass without a trace for the officer: the consequences of the shell shock worsened. Due to disability, he is retiring.

The tanker's troubles did not end there. For a long time, people refused to believe Kolobanov when he talked about the famous battle and the number of tanks destroyed by his crew. There were cases when ironic laughter was heard from the audience, having heard about the number of destroyed tanks: “Like, lie, veteran, but know when to stop!”

Once Kolobanov asked to speak at a military-historical conference held in the Minsk House of Officers. He spoke about the role of tank units in defensive battles, referred to his own example and talked about the battle near Voyskovitsy. One of the speakers, grinning sarcastically, declared that this did not happen and could not happen! Then, barely containing his excitement, Zinovy ​​Grigorievich handed over a yellowed sheet of front-line newspaper to the presidium. The general in charge of the conference quickly scanned the text, called the speaker to him and ordered:

Read aloud so the whole room can hear!

In 1995, Zinoviy Grigorievich Kolobanov, without becoming a Hero of the Soviet Union, died.

The fate of the gun commander Andrei Mikhailovich Usov turned out to be happier. He went through the entire Great Patriotic War, from Leningrad to Berlin, finishing it with the rank of senior lieutenant. He was awarded the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Patriotic War, II degree, the Red Star and medals. After the war, he returned to his hometown of Tolochin, which is located in the Vitebsk region of Belarus, where he worked until his retirement. However, Alexander Mikhailovich will not be able to tell about that amazing battle again - he, like Zinovy ​​Grigorievich Kolobanov, is no longer alive.

Soon after the commander was wounded, gunner-radio operator senior sergeant Pavel Ivanovich Kiselkov died in a battle on the Nevsky Patch. Junior mechanic-driver, Red Army soldier Nikolai Feoktistovich Rodenkov, also did not return from the war.

Former senior mechanic-driver of the KV tank Nikolai Ivanovich Nikiforov, like Usov, went through the entire war to the end, and then remained to serve in the tank forces of the Soviet Army. After being transferred to the reserve, he lived in the city of Lomonosov. In 1974 he died from a serious lung disease.

Materials used:

Leningrad in August 1941 was in a very difficult situation; events at the front on the approaches to the city developed according to a very bad, dramatic scenario for the defending Soviet troops. On the night of August 7-8, German units from the 4th Tank Group launched attacks in the areas of the settlements of Ivanovskoye and Bolshoy Sabsk, advancing towards the settlements of Kingisepp and Volosovo. After just three days of fighting, enemy troops approached the Kingisepp-Leningrad highway, and on August 13, German troops managed to cut the Kingisepp-Leningrad railroad and highway and cross the Luga River. Already on August 14, the 38th Army and 41st Motorized German Corps were able to break into operational space and advance to Leningrad. On August 16, the cities of Kingisepp and Narva fell, on the same day units from the 1st German Corps occupied the western part of Novgorod, the threat of a breakthrough of German troops to Leningrad became more and more real. There were only a few days left before the famous tank battle, which would glorify the name of Kolobanov.

On August 18, 1941, the commander of the 3rd tank company from the 1st battalion of the 1st Red Banner Tank Division, senior lieutenant Zinovy ​​Kolobanov, was personally summoned by the division commander, Major General V. Baranov. At that time, the unit's headquarters was located in the basement of the cathedral, which was one of the landmarks of Gatchina, which at that time was called Krasnogvardeysk. Orally, Baranov gave Kolobanov the order to block at any cost the three roads that led to Krasnogvardeysk from Kingisepp, Volosovo and Luga.

At that time, Kolobonov’s company had 5 KV-1 heavy tanks. The tankers loaded two rounds of armor-piercing shells into their vehicles; they took few high-explosive fragmentation shells. The main goal of Kolobanov’s tankers was not to allow German tanks to reach Krasnogvardeysk. On the same day, August 18, senior lieutenant Zinovy ​​Kolobanov led his company to meet the advancing German units. He sent two of his cars to the Luga road, sent two more to the road to Volosovo, and placed his own tank in an ambush organized at the intersection of the road that connected the Tallinn highway with the road to Marienburg - the northern outskirts of Gatchina.

Zinovy ​​Kolobanov personally conducted a reconnaissance of the area with his crews, giving instructions on where exactly positions should be set up for each of the tanks. At the same time, Kolobanov prudently forced the tankers to equip 2 caponiers (one main and a spare) and carefully camouflage their positions. It is worth noting that Zinoviy Kolobanov was already a fairly experienced tanker. He fought through the Finnish War, burned in a tank three times, but always returned to duty. Only he could cope with the task of blocking three roads leading to Krasnogvardeysk.

Kolobanov set up his position near the Voyskovitsy state farm, located opposite the Uchhoza poultry farm - at the fork in the Tallinn highway and the road leading to Marienburg. He set up a position approximately 150 meters from the highway approaching from Syaskelevo. At the same time, a deep caponier was equipped, which hid the car so that only the tower stuck out. A second caponier for a reserve position was equipped not far from the first. From the main position, the road to Syaskelevo was clearly visible and covered. In addition, on the sides of this road there were swampy areas, which made it very difficult for armored vehicles to maneuver and played a role in the upcoming battle.

The position of Kolobanov and his KV-1E was located at a low altitude with clay soil at a distance of 150 meters from a fork in the road. From this position, Landmark No. 1 had a clear view of two birch trees growing next to the road, and approximately 300 meters from the T-junction, which was designated as Landmark No. 2. In total, the section of the road under fire was about a kilometer. 22 tanks could easily fit in this area while maintaining a marching distance of 40 meters between them.

The choice of location was due to the fact that from here it was possible to fire in two directions. This was important, since the enemy could reach the road to Marienburg either along the road from Syaskelevo or from Voiskovits. If the Germans had appeared from Voyskowitz, they would have had to shoot in the forehead. For this reason, the caponier was dug directly opposite the intersection with the expectation that the heading angle would be minimal. At the same time, Kolobanov had to come to terms with the fact that the distance between his tank and the fork in the road was reduced to a minimum.

After equipping camouflaged positions, all that remained was to wait for the enemy forces to approach. The Germans appeared here only on August 20. In the afternoon, the tank crews of Lieutenant Evdokimov and Junior Lieutenant Degtyar from Kolobanov’s company met a column of armored vehicles on the Luga Highway, chalking up 5 destroyed enemy tanks and 3 armored personnel carriers. Soon the crew of Kolobanov’s tank saw the enemy. They were the first to notice the reconnaissance motorcyclists, whom the tankers let pass further without hindrance, waiting for the main forces of the German troops to appear.

At about 14:00 on August 20, after aerial reconnaissance ended in vain for the Germans, German motorcyclists drove along the seaside road to the Voyskovitsy state farm. Following them, tanks appeared on the road. During those one and a half, two minutes, while the enemy’s lead tank covered the distance to the intersection, Zinoviy Kolobanov managed to make sure that there were no heavy enemy tanks in the column. Then a plan for the upcoming battle matured in his head. Kolobanov decided to skip the entire column to the area with two birch trees (Landmark No. 1). In this case, all enemy tanks managed to pass the turn at the beginning of the embankment road and found themselves under fire from the guns of his shielded KV-1. The column apparently included light Czech Pz.Kpfw.35(t) tanks from the German 6th Panzer Division (a number of sources also attribute the tanks to the 1st or 8th Panzer Divisions). Once the battle plan was drawn up, everything else was a matter of technique. Having knocked out tanks at the head, middle and end of the column, Senior Lieutenant Kolobanov not only blocked the road on both sides, but also deprived the enemy of the opportunity to move onto the road that led to Voyskovitsy.

After a traffic jam formed on the road, a terrible panic began in the enemy column. Some tanks, trying to get out of the fire, went down a slope and got stuck in a swampy area, where Kolobanov’s crew finished them off. Other enemy vehicles, trying to turn around on the narrow road, bumped into each other, knocking out their tracks and rollers. Frightened German crews jumped out of the burning and damaged vehicles and rushed between them in fear. At the same time, many were killed by machine-gun fire from a Soviet tank.

At first, the Nazis did not understand where exactly they were being shot from. They began to hit all the haystacks in sight, thinking that they were hidden tanks or anti-tank guns. However, they soon spotted a camouflaged HF. After this, an unequal tank duel began. A whole hail of shells fell on the KV-1E, but they could not do anything to the Soviet heavy tank dug into the turret, which was equipped with additional 25 mm screens. And although not a trace remained of the camouflage, and the position of the Soviet tankers was known to the Germans, this no longer affected the outcome of the battle.

The battle lasted only 30 minutes, but during this time Kolobanov’s crew was able to defeat the German tank column, knocking out all 22 vehicles that were in it. From the double ammunition load taken on board, Kolobanov fired 98 armor-piercing shells. Subsequently, the battle continued, but the Germans no longer pushed ahead. On the contrary, they began to use Pz.Kpfw.IV tanks and anti-tank guns for fire support, which fired from a long distance. This stage of the battle did not bring any special dividends to the parties: the Germans were unable to destroy Kolobanov’s tank, and the Soviet tank driver did not report destroyed enemy vehicles. At the same time, at the second stage of the battle, all observation devices on Kolobanov’s tank were broken and the turret was jammed. After the tank left the battle, the crew counted more than 100 hits on it.

Kolobanov’s entire company destroyed 43 enemy tanks that day. Including the crew of junior lieutenant F. Sergeev - 8, junior lieutenant V. I. Lastochkin - 4, junior lieutenant I. A. Degtyar - 4, lieutenant M. I. Evdokimenko - 5. There was also a declared destroyed passenger car, an artillery battery and up to two companies of enemy infantry, they managed to take one of the motorcyclists prisoner.

Surprisingly, for such a fight Kolobanov did not receive the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In September 1941, the commander of the 1st tank regiment of the 1st tank division, D. D. Pogodin, nominated all members of the crew of the Kolobanov tank for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, this presentation was signed by the division commander V. I. Baranov. But for some reason, the headquarters of the Leningrad Front changed this decision. This change still defies reasonable explanation and causes a lot of controversy and versions. One way or another, Kolobanov was nominated for the Order of the Red Banner, and gunner A.M. Usov was nominated for the Order of Lenin. Perhaps the Lenfront command simply considered it impossible to award the title of Hero to Kolobanov against the general background of major strategic failures, and Krasnogvardeysk was soon surrendered to the Germans. According to another version, in Kolobanov’s case there was some information compromising him, something that prevented him from receiving the award. In any case, we will never know the truth.

On September 15, 1941, Zinoviy Kolobanov was seriously wounded. This happened at night in the cemetery of the city of Pushkin, where the senior lieutenant’s tank was being refueled with ammunition and fuel. A German shell exploded next to his KV, and the tanker was wounded in the head and spine by shrapnel; in addition, Kolobanov received a concussion of the spinal cord and brain. At first he was treated at the Leningrad Trauma Institute, but then he was evacuated and until March 15, 1945 he was treated in evacuation hospitals in Sverdlovsk. On May 31, 1942, he was awarded the rank of captain.

Despite being seriously wounded and concussed, Kolobanov again enlisted in the tank forces after the war. Zinovy ​​Kolobanov was in service until July 1958, after which he retired to the reserve with the rank of lieutenant colonel. He worked and lived in the capital of Belarus. He died on August 8, 1994 in Minsk, and was buried there.

Today, a monument has been erected at the site of the famous battle of Soviet tank crews on the approaches to Gatchina. There is an IS-2 heavy tank on the monument. Unfortunately, by the time of the construction of this monument, the very KV-1E tanks on which Kolobanov fought could no longer be found, so we had to use what was at hand. A sign appeared on a high pedestal that said: “The tank crew under the command of Senior Lieutenant Z.P. Kolobanov destroyed 22 enemy tanks in the battle on August 19, 1941. The crew included: driver-mechanic foreman Nikiforov N.I., gun commander senior sergeant Usov A.M., gunner-radio operator senior sergeant Kiselkov P.I., loader Red Army soldier N.F. Rodenkov.”

Based on materials from open sources