Second Chechen War Having ousted the enemy from the territory of Dagestan, the Russian leadership was given a choice: to strengthen the border with Chechnya and repel further attacks by Basayev, while simultaneously trying to agree on interaction with President A. Maskhadov, or to repeat

First World War Unfortunately, the experience of snipers in the Anglo-Boer War at the beginning of the twentieth century was not generalized. And during the First World War and the subsequent Civil War, snipers were not used en masse by the troops. There was an acute shortage of sniper weapons, optical sights and

1. The First Cybernetic War Bob Stasio did not intend to become a cyber soldier. After graduating from high school, Stasio attended the University at Buffalo, where he studied in the Reserve Officer Training Corps program. He specialized in mathematics

Book one First Patriotic War

Consequences of military operations in the Chechen Republic in demographic, social and economic terms

S.V. Ryazantsev
(The full material was published in the book: Ryazantsev S.V. Demographic and migration portrait of the North Caucasus. - Stavropol: Service school,
2003, p.26-77)

The demographic consequences of conflicts and military operations consist of two main types: civilian casualties and military casualties. Demographic losses- dead and deceased military personnel and civilians, regardless of the causes of death (death), as well as those who did not return from captivity, i.e. people irretrievably lost to the army and the country. To assess the indicators of demographic losses, we involved a variety of data sources (press reports, scientific works of various authors, data from international humanitarian organizations).

In addition, demographic losses must be divided into types such as irreversible and sanitary. Irrevocable losses- those killed in battle, missing in action, those who died from wounds on the battlefield and in medical institutions, those who died from diseases acquired in the war, or those who died at the front from other causes, those who were captured.

By their nature, it makes sense to divide irretrievable losses into combat and non-combat losses. Combat losses - these are those killed on the battlefield, those who died from wounds during the stages of medical evacuation and in hospitals, those who went missing in action during the battle and those who were captured.

Non-combat losses are not associated with the direct performance of a combat mission, these are those who died due to careless handling of weapons, in accidents, catastrophes and as a result of other incidents, who died from illness in medical institutions, who committed suicide, who were shot by verdict of military tribunals for various military and criminal crimes.

Sanitary losses consists of wounded, shell-shocked and sick military personnel who have lost their combat capability and were evacuated from the combat area to medical institutions for at least one day. Military personnel who received minor wounds, injuries and illnesses that do not entail loss of service are not included in the number of sanitary losses.

In 1992, there were about 1 million permanent residents in the Chechen Republic. After the hostilities, the population decreased significantly. Despite the unambiguity of this phenomenon, several mutually exclusive figures can be given regarding the population of the Chechen Republic. According to minimal estimates, in March 2000, about 300 thousand people remained in all settlements of Chechnya. According to registration data carried out in August 2000 in connection with the elections of a deputy to the State Duma of Chechnya, there were more than 400 thousand people over the age of 18 on its territory.

According to the Moscow authorities, 573.9 thousand people live in Chechnya, according to the passport and visa service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 995.5 thousand, according to local administrations - 1166.3 thousand, according to the Danish Refugee Council - 733.9 thousand, according to According to the results of the accounting of the State Committee on Statistics, at the beginning of 2002, 574 thousand people lived in the republic.

According to experts, in November 2001, 610 thousand people lived in the republic. Most likely, the current population of the Chechen Republic is unlikely to exceed 800 thousand people.

The most reliable of the above data is the information of the Danish Refugee Council, which is based on the results of the population census of the republic, conducted jointly with the UNHCR in November 1999 - January 2000. The disadvantage of the census was the impossibility of conducting it in several mountainous regions of Chechnya (Nozhai-Yurtovsky, Shatoysky, Sharoysky, Itum-Kalinsky districts). In the Shalinsky district lived 106.3 thousand, Urus-Martanovsky - 95.3 thousand, Gudermes - 93.9 thousand, Grozny - 92.1 thousand, including in the city of Grozny - 67.2 thousand, Achkhoy-Martanovsky - 81, 4 thousand, Kurchaloevsky - 59.4 thousand, Nadterechny - 45.8 thousand, Naursky - 37.3 thousand, Shelkovsky - 35.5 thousand, Vvedensky - 19.7 thousand people.

An important demographic consequence was a radical change in the ethnic composition of the population. According to the 1989 All-Union Population Census, 1,270.4 thousand people lived on the territory of the former Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The population of the territory of the modern Chechen Republic in 1989 numbered 1084.4 thousand people, including 269.1 thousand Russians (about 25% of the population of the republic). The bulk of Russians (about 72%), Armenians, Jews and other non-Vainakh peoples lived in cities, primarily in Grozny.

Over eight years, from 1991 to 1998, up to 500 thousand Chechens, 150-180 thousand Russians, 15 thousand Armenians, 10 thousand Ingush, and 2 thousand Jews left the republic. In the first half of 1999, about 4.8 thousand people left Chechnya. In the fall of 1999, about 200 thousand Chechens left for Ingushetia.

In addition, demographic losses among the population of various ethnic groups played a role. According to estimates by the Russian Ministry of Nationalities, from 1991 to 1999, more than 21 thousand Russians were killed by criminals on the territory of the republic (not counting military operations), and more than 100 thousand apartments and houses belonging to “non-indigenous” residents of Chechnya (including Ingush) were seized.

Ethnic migrations have led to the fact that Chechens now make up the overwhelming majority of the republic's population - approximately 97.4% (instead of 70.7% at the time of the 1989 census). Although it should be borne in mind that the assessment of the ethnic structure of the population is very approximate, since the census of the Danish Refugee Council and UNHCR did not take into account the ethnicity of the population, and the data of the State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation are of a calculated nature.

The share of Russians in the population of the Chechen Republic decreased from 25.0% to 1.3%, or more than 30 times! According to our estimates, the Russian population in the region decreased during the 1990s by at least 280-300 thousand people. By the beginning of 1999, no more than 30-50 thousand Russians remained in Chechnya, and by 2001 only 10 thousand Russians remained in the republic. Most of them are pensioners and helpless old people.

In this regard, the situation in some localities is very indicative. By 2000, there were only about 5 thousand Russians left in Grozny (not counting the military). Until 1995, 8,400 Russians lived in the village of Asinovskaya, but by 2000 only 250 people remained. Here, since August 1996 alone, 26 Russian families have been killed and 52 households have been seized. In the Naursky district in 1999, only 500 families (approximately 10%) remained instead of the 12 thousand Russians who lived here before the outbreak of hostilities.

Estimates of demographic losses in military operations on the territory of the Chechen Republic were carried out for two time periods - 1994-1996 and 1999-2002. Criminal genocide against Russians in Chechnya began much earlier. According to official data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 1992, 250 Russians were killed in Grozny alone, and 300 people went missing.

Regarding demographic losses in the first Chechen campaign, there are various mutually exclusive estimates ranging from 35.7 thousand to 120 thousand dead. The data on losses cited by the separatists can be considered clearly inflated estimates. For example, D. Dudayev argued that by February 1995 alone, losses in the Chechen war amounted to 43-45 thousand people, including 18-20 thousand Russian military personnel. According to Z. Yandarbiev, about 100 thousand people were killed, 37 thousand were wounded, about 8 thousand were seriously wounded.

According to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, a total of about 26 thousand people died in Chechnya in 1994-1995, including 2 thousand Russian military personnel, 10-15 thousand militants, and the rest of the losses were civilians. According to General V. Manilov, losses among the military in 1994-1996 amounted to 3.8 thousand killed and 17.9 thousand wounded.

The political opposition in Moscow and some experts believe that the authorities deliberately underestimated the real number of victims. G. Yavlinsky stated that 100 thousand died in the first Chechen war. A similar point of view was also replicated by some media and Russian politicians.

According to General A. Lebed's estimates (which are most likely somewhat exaggerated), the number of deaths among civilians alone was 70-80 thousand people and among federal troops - 6-7 thousand people. The militants gave approximately the same estimate - about 80 thousand dead in the first Chechen campaign. During the first Chechen war, about 40 thousand people were wounded. As military experts testify, in similar wars there are usually four wounded for every one killed, so many of the above figures clearly do not add up and are overestimated.

Obviously, the estimate of losses proposed by a team of researchers led by V. Tishkov, who put the figure of losses at 35.7 thousand people, is close to the truth. According to his calculations, both sides suffered the main losses during the assault on Grozny from December 30, 1994 to February 6, 1995, when the losses of the civilian population amounted to about 3 thousand people, federal troops - 500-600 people, Dudayevites - about 400 people. In 1995, the losses of federal troops amounted to approximately 2.5 thousand people, and militants - up to 1 thousand people. In 1996, the losses of federal troops amounted to 1.8 thousand people, separatists - 700-900 people. As a result, by October 1996, according to official data, 4.1 thousand Russian military personnel were killed, according to the Memorial Society - 4.4 thousand people, 19.8 thousand people were injured.

According to our estimates, the number of people killed in the first Chechen campaign most likely ranges from 44.2 to 50.7 thousand people. It should be borne in mind that approximately half of these demographic losses are civilians.

During the first Chechen campaign of 1994-1996, 2,512 people were wanted, 2,124 of them were released or found, and 388 people were missing. According to other sources, at the end of the campaign the fate of 1.2 thousand Russian troops was unknown. Some of them were captured, died, or were not identified.

By November 1996, 447 bodies of those killed as a result of military action had not been identified. In April 2000, 101 unidentified bodies and fragments of bodies of those killed in 1994-1996 and located in the 124th forensic laboratory in Rostov-on-Don were buried nameless. After this, another 254 bodies of those killed in the first Chechen war remained unidentified in the laboratory. In addition, at the Grozny station in several refrigerated cars in 2000, a group of forensic experts discovered the remains of 125-150 bodies of military personnel and civilians who died in 1994-1996.

During the anti-terrorist operation, or the second Chechen campaign, from October 1, 1999 to December 2002, the losses of the federal armed forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs amounted to 4.7 thousand people killed, more than 13.0 thousand people injured, 28 missing. According to other sources, in the second Chechen military campaign from October 1, 1999 to October 31, 2002, the Ministry of Defense alone lost about 9 thousand military personnel, including more than 6.3 thousand were wounded and about 2.7 thousand people were killed, and 29 military personnel - went missing. According to General V. Manilov, the armed forces lost 2.6 thousand killed and 7.5 thousand wounded. According to the Russian Airborne Forces, during the second Chechen campaign, 310 airborne troops were killed.

Losses among the civilian population were somewhat less compared to the first military campaign and, most likely, did not exceed 5-6 thousand people killed and 1-2 thousand wounded.

In the second Chechen campaign, according to rough estimates, about 13-14 thousand people were lost to bandit formations. According to the Federal Security Service, about 600 militants were killed during 2002 alone.

The number of people missing in the second Chechen campaign cannot be accurately estimated. According to approximate data, as of mid-1999, 719 people were wanted, including 623 military personnel. Of this number, the location of approximately 50-60 people is unknown, about 10 people are on the territory of Chechnya, and the rest died or are among unidentified bodies in the 124th forensic laboratory in Rostov-on-Don. Only from 1996 to mid-1999, 839 bodies were brought here for identification, of which only 556 bodies were identified. In 2000, 254 bodies remained unidentified in Rostov-on-Don.

On the territory of Chechnya, the search group discovered and included in the list 496 mass grave sites. Obviously, the number of people in these graves is much greater than was given in one of the publications (over 350 people). One of the most massive was the burial of Russian hostages discovered in the village of Stary Achkhoi, where the remains of 70-100 headless bodies of former prisoners of a concentration camp created by militants were found. Among the dead were kidnapped energy workers, construction workers, military personnel, and Orthodox priests. According to testimony, a total of about 150 people were held in this concentration camp. According to rough estimates, about 20 thousand people in Chechnya were executed in the 1990s

According to other sources, in 2001-2002 alone, more than 2 thousand people went missing in the Chechen Republic, or an average of three people every day! Many of them became hostages or were killed.

A real scourge for the North Caucasus was “kidnapping” - kidnapping for ransom, which served as a source of income, including for terrorist activities. The first in Chechnya at the beginning of 1994 was the criminal R. Labazanov, who began to kidnap people for ransom, taking hostage newly-minted Chechen millionaires who had made their fortune through transactions with false advice notes. Since the outbreak of hostilities in December 1994, the warring parties have practiced selling and exchanging prisoners and killed to each other. In the first year of the military campaign, militants released captured soldiers and officers mainly for propaganda purposes.

After the Russian army left Chechnya in the fall of 1996, bandits began taking hostage people who collaborated with Russian troops and the Zavgaev regime. Considering that the teip system of Chechen society was destroyed, the bandits were not afraid of blood feud and increasingly they began to demand ransom or exchange for their comrades-in-arms (although kidnapping of people from the Vainakhs is considered a serious crime and is unconditionally condemned by society).

Since mid-1997, when NTV and ORT journalists were kidnapped and a huge ransom was paid for them, the bandits put the hostage business on stream. This became an incentive for many people who had not previously been involved in such a business. New bandit groups were created, intermediaries and guides appeared in neighboring regions, and bases were created where kidnapped people were hiding. Initially, Chechen law enforcement agencies tried to fight this business, but later they became involved in mediation operations and even began to kidnap people themselves. According to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 1995, 1,289 people were kidnapped and transported to Chechnya, in 1996 - 427 people, in 1997 - 1,140 people, in 1998 - 1,415 people.

In the Stavropol Territory alone, directly bordering the Chechen Republic, about 200 people were kidnapped in 1998. In 1999, about 3,200 people were listed in the internal affairs bodies' database of abducted and wanted persons throughout the North Caucasus. Among them are 2,500 military personnel, 71 internal affairs officers, about 40 foreigners, 50 civil servants, 30 entrepreneurs. In 2000, 66 people were kidnapped by Chechen bandits. Over two months (November and December) of 2002, more than 170 people were kidnapped in Chechnya and adjacent regions.

In 1998, about 120 Russian citizens and several dozen foreign citizens from France, Sweden, Great Britain, Hungary, and Lithuania were held hostage on the territory of the Chechen Republic. Other estimates indicate that Chechen field commanders held between 89 and 700 hostages in 1998. In 1999, there were at least 700-800 Russian citizens on the territory of the Chechen Republic, kidnapped for ransom in various regions of the North Caucasus. In 1999, there were 24 Georgian citizens in the Urus-Martan region of Chechnya who were abducted by militants. In August 1999, four scientists were kidnapped by bandits, including two Polish citizens - E. Marshvinskaya and S. Malinovskaya.

According to the assistant to the President of the Russian Federation S. Yastrzhemsky, at the beginning of 2000 there were more than 1 thousand hostages in Chechnya, most of them in the Shatoi region. Among them are 43 military personnel of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops, 60 employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 49 women, 15 children, 12 foreigners. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in April 2000, 872 people were held hostage in the Chechen Republic.

According to the Peacekeeping Mission in the North Caucasus, at the end of 2002, about 1 thousand people - energy workers, miners, military personnel, and clergy - remained hostages or prisoners in the mountains of Chechnya. In total, in Chechnya in the 1990s, more than 46 thousand people were enslaved or used in forced labor - from collecting wild wild garlic to building roads to Georgia through Itum-Kale and Tazbichi. According to other sources, before the start of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya, there were about 70 thousand slaves of various nationalities, including Chechens.

From May to November 1996, a special federal hostage search team released 342 military personnel and 175 civilians, including 146 civilians through the exchange. In 1998, units of the North Caucasus Regional Organized Crime Control Department, together with other services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, released 169 people, most of whom were servicemen of the Russian army. In the region, 41 kidnappings, 9 cases of illegal imprisonment and 1 case of hostage taking were uncovered.

In the first half of 2000, during special operations on the territory of the Chechen Republic and other regions of the North Caucasus, security forces released 144 hostages, including 13 foreign citizens, 23 women, 5 children, 36 military personnel of the Ministry of Defense and internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as 5 law enforcement officers organs The peacekeeping mission in the North Caucasus released a total of 194 people from captivity in 1999-2002 alone and is currently negotiating the release of approximately 30 people.

Table 1. Demographic losses of the Chechen Republic 1994-2001, thousand people

Thus, according to our estimates, the total irretrievable military losses in the Chechen Republic from 1994 to 2002 amounted to 54-62 thousand people, and sanitary losses - approximately 65-66 thousand people. The total demographic losses are, at a minimum estimate, about 120 thousand people, and at a maximum estimate, 128 thousand people.

This section includes the results of a study supported by the Russian Humanitarian Fund project No. 01-02-00010a “Socio-economic and demographic consequences of ethnic conflicts and military operations in the North Caucasus in the 1990s: a comprehensive assessment methodology.”
Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century: a statistical study. - M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2001.-S. 8.

Kosikov I., Kosikova L. The Chechen Republic: results and problems of post-Soviet socio-economic evolution / Russian Economic Journal. - No. 8. -2000. -With. 36.

Sivkova V. Where did the Chechen money go // Arguments and facts. - May 2001. -P.6.

Trier T., Deniev K. Chechnya in Figures: Registration of the Population of the Republic of Chechnya/" Interim Report. - Nazran - Stavropol: DRC. - 2000. - P. 30.

The central street of Grozny, a month and a half after the entry of Russian troops into Chechnya

Facebook.com user Muslim Umarov is asked question, what is the actual number of Chechens killed in the last two wars with Russia... The editors of Info Chechen are publishing a note by Muslima Umarova and will track and publish all the most interesting comments on this topic, preceded by available information on the first Chechen war from Wikipedia - the free encyclopedia:

The first Chechen war was accompanied by large casualties among military personnel of the federal group of troops, Chechen armed forces and civilians of the republic. The beginning of the war, as a rule, is considered to be the entry of Russian troops into the territory of Chechnya (December 11, 1994), and the end is the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements (August 31, 1996). The bloodiest period was the first period of the war, from December 1994 to June 1995, with the bulk of the casualties occurring during the assault on Grozny (January-February 1995). After June 1995, fighting was sporadic. They intensified in the spring and summer of 1996 and reached their climax during the attack by Chechen separatists on Grozny, Argun and Gudermes in August.

As is the case with many other military conflicts, the two sides' estimates of their own, enemy and civilian casualties vary widely, with statistics on civilian deaths being very approximate. Due to these circumstances, it is not possible to name a more or less exact number of casualties in the First Chechen War.

Muslim Umarov writes:

I just wrote - an hour or so ago - that I do not agree that the Russians killed 300 thousand Chechens during the last two wars. No matter how many they kill, it is a huge tragedy for us and a secret joy for the Russians. But 300 thousand, in my opinion, is an exorbitant, fantastic amount. I didn’t have time to publish the post - and then there was controversy.

I did not substantiate my opinion in the previous post; I want to answer the critics here, and not in the comments (although I answered there too).

To get a rough idea of ​​the possible number of Chechens killed by the Russians over the last two wars, let's do this.

All killed Chechens, if possible, are buried in rural cemeteries where these Chechens are from, or in villages where paternal relatives of those killed live. However, they always do the same thing - not only with the dead. Let's count how many villages we have that deserve this status. Let's exclude villages where only a few or dozens of people live. We also have a lot of them, for example, in the Itum-Kalinsky and Sharoysky districts. There will be approximately 300 villages. Among them there are very large ones: Urus-Martan, Shali, Starye Atagi, Achkhoy-Martan, New Atagi, Gudermes, Argun.

I know that some of these settlements are cities, but in our minds they are villages, and besides, in this case it does not matter. In general, we will have 300 cemeteries, no more. But we understand that in all these cemeteries there are not a thousand graves of Chechens killed in the war. Praise be to Allah that no.

If necessary, you can easily determine exactly how many Chechen cemeteries there are in the republic. And it can also be easily established that in none of these cemeteries were there thousands of graves of Chechens killed by the Russians. If the Russians managed to kill 300 thousand Chechens, they would kill at least every fifth Chechen living on earth. This, again, did not happen.

Once again: I would like to understand the logic of those who insist on 300 thousand killed Chechens. The Russians were unable to kill so many Chechens. They tried, but they couldn't. Why should we please them and stroke their pride? I don’t want to comment on some people’s references to the fact that Ramzan Kadyrov named this number.

I agree with Akhmed Zakayev on almost everything, with the exception of the number of Chechens killed in the last two wars with Russia. The number of killed Chechens at 300 thousand people is often found, I could have objected to this before, but in an official statement this estimate seems even more inappropriate than in private conversations. This is a fantastic number; fortunately, the Russians were not able to kill so many Chechens, despite all their efforts. The estimate of 300 thousand Chechens killed is easy to refute, but I cannot understand why we need to constantly repeat that the Russians killed 300 thousand Chechens. Do we want to please the Russians? Or do we want compassion from others? If the Russians killed fewer Chechens, does this make the Russian crime less? Or will our attitude towards Russia change?

21 years ago, on August 6, 1996, a unique large-scale military operation “Jihad” began of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria to liberate the Chechen capital of Grozny (Dzhokhar) and the rest of the territory of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria from Russian invaders, which put an end to the First Russian-Chechen War. As a result, Russia was forced to sign the Khasavyurt Agreements on August 31, 1996.

The world's leading military experts called the Chechen operation "Jihad" - "a diamond military operation that has no analogues in the history of military art."

The political decision on the need for the operation was made by the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Zelimkhan Yandarbiev. The operation was developed and led by the Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Aslan Maskhadov.

850 Chechen soldiers, armed with small arms and grenade launchers, early in the morning at dawn, bypassing checkpoints and secrets of the Russian occupiers, entered Grozny (Dzhokhar) and quickly took predetermined positions in the city. Over the next few days of fighting, the Chechen forces that entered the city were joined by up to one and a half thousand militias from various villages of the ChRI.

A brilliant blocking operation was carried out, paralyzing tens of thousands of Russian soldiers in their places of deployment. Special units of the Chechen forces blocked the main directions of possible assistance from the occupation bases of Khankala, airport named after. Sheikh Mansur, as well as from North Ossetia.

Specially created mobile units of the Chechen troops blocked communications and possible routes of movement of the invaders towards Grozny (Dzhokhar) from other parts of the country.

All enemy attempts using direct armored and artillery strikes (from Khankala and the airport), special forces breakthrough (from North Ossetia), and the transfer of reserves by rail (Argun-Khankala) were stopped by decisive and competent actions of the Chechen armed forces.

Operation Jihad to liberate the homeland from the invaders is not only a heroic and glorious page in the history of the Chechen people, not only a victory and demonstration of the fortitude of the Chechen soldiers, but also an extremely important lesson, both for the Chechen people and for other peoples fighting for your freedom.

Today, after 21 years, August 6, 1996 continues to ring a bell in the hearts of all those who fought for the freedom of their homeland. The small Chechen people survived the terrible tragedy of many years of barbaric Russian wars, starting in December 1994, which claimed the lives of about 300 thousand citizens of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

But we believe in the bright future of the Chechen people, who will certainly come to freedom and independence from the Russian colonial empire.

Facebook user comments:

Turpal Nohcho: Not true! Even Russian puppets: first Taus Dzhabrailov; and then Ramzan Kadyrov himself; Russian media announced such a number of victims.

Treat Altmar: If the death toll includes the Russian-speaking population, then the figure of 300,000 victims is quite acceptable. It must be pointed out that the Russian-speaking part of the population were citizens of the Republic.

Zamid Musanipov: 100 thousand Russian residents of Grozny were killed as a result of bombing by federal troops.

Balata Belyaeva: Suna - m ush khin a dukkha hilla alla heta.. ..ma darra aalcha - mass a welllekh a bashhalla yats. Tskhya ya ezar.. Behk botschu Adamiin Ts1iy do 1аnnarg.. .. 1aniynarg morza dats..

Said Chechensky: These figures have been repeated one after another for years, and none of these people can refute themselves. So many people, praise be to Allah, did not die. Suffered - yes, but did not die. And so many children did not die or even suffer. A drop of lies, as they say, can spoil the ocean of trust, so this must be stopped. Including our human rights activists and journalists.

Zelamkh Kerimov: Once you undertake to refute it, present your evidence to the contrary. Stamp tukhush sanna "no" alarh ma tsa toy.

Said Chechensky: Zelamkh Kerimov - there will be no evidence of this either now or later. There will be different opinions. We are saying that these opinions about 300 or 250 thousand dead, fortunately, are not plausible.

Zelamkh Kerimov: Muslim. Suon voyzash tkhya vokkh sag vu, 4 k1ant vera tsun, 3 khelkhna 1 zhimokhnag t1epaz vaina g1askkhish d1avigan okkh 2-g1 t1amekh.

Tsu dukh diytsan she and zhimokh 15 sho khaich t1akhkhyara k1ant lekhush sha leliynarg. Ezarshkhakh deky kegiyna tsu i lekhush h1arn Nokhchiycho mel yu x1ora kariin admekh duzzan ornashkakh. Rosstovekh likhna tsu i, Osetekh... ishta khechankhya a. Tahana a du i ornash h1ara mokhk mel bu la'ttash t1i buts yal, t1ihlo asphalt, g1ishlonash hittain.

Said Chechensky: With your permission, I would like to add this note to the site and then copy all worthwhile comments there. Otherwise, this conversation will sink into oblivion without any meaning?

Balata Belyaeva: I think there is no need for this topic.. hyuna hala a ma heta.. amma h1ara khuzakh g1askhiin mattakh diytsar niisa tsa heta suna.. .. stenna t1edog1na do x1ara kamel - haa laa?

Muslim Umarov: Balata, I have no secrets in such matters. And certainly this question, it seems to me, is worth clarifying for everyone, not just for us.

Muslim Umarov: Zelamkh Kerimov, the Russians killed my sister and brother. And also many other relatives. And I miraculously survived several times. Tell me, what does the fantastic number of killed Chechens give us? Is truth important to us? Or is there some kind of political effect needed from this? I, for one, am glad that the Russians did not manage to kill so many Chechens. Tell me, what do you think about the logic of those who insist on the huge number of killed Chechens?

Muslim Umarov: Birlant, this is better. Although I don’t believe in this number either. In fact, according to my information, less than 20 thousand people are imprisoned throughout Russia. But this is a huge amount. We don't really do anything for these people. But this is where I don't want to start talking about it.

Muslim Umarov: I am absolutely sure that the number of Chechens killed during the two wars, and in general all residents of the republic, can be very easily calculated. Chechens are easier to count than anyone else. Because we don’t have abandoned, useless people. It's not that it's hard to calculate. The fact is that no one wants to do this - for various, but always unseemly reasons. We need to honestly say what is more important to us - the truth or a politically advantageous lie. And is this lie actually beneficial in any way? And then the number of killed can be quickly established. I don’t want to get involved in arguments now about why this is unprofitable for one side or another. It is not profitable for Russians not to recognize any quantity as reliable.

Turpal Nohcho: First, information attacks on Ichkeria, and now on the figures voiced by many international human rights organizations, as well as by the Russian protege Kadyrov, about the death toll of residents of Chechnya during the two Russian-Chechen wars. Suspicious synchronicity between the authors of the denial of Ichkeria and the number of victims of the Russian genocide of the Chechen people. Who benefits from all this?

Muslim Umarov: Turpal, I definitely don’t need to attack Ichkeria. Attacking Ramzan Kadyrov is also dangerous. I don’t know how many Chechens were killed during the two wars, but the number of 300 thousand Chechens seems fantastic to me. If the Russians were able to kill so many Chechens in two wars, in the third there will not even be a trace of us left.

Balata Belyaeva: vain Mahkakh 300,000 dozal hir bac?... mel lahara a... t1akkha lariisha: x1ora dozalera tshyatsa ben tsa velchi a 300,000 tsa hullu? ur doo khin kh1umma tsa hilchi a..dikka bagarbicha, uysh khin a dukkha hila a tarlo, Muslim... //sihlur dats vai tsetsdiyla a, kiisadala a...

Zelamkh Kerimov: Muslim. What do I think about the logic of those who insist on the huge number of killed Chechens?

Sayg khatch asa 1 viin hilitag vetzar. But, I fully admit that this logic is justified for many reasons. Including because I don’t know a single family that has not lost close relatives in 2 companies. Including because, like you, and the other, and the tenth and thousandth, I am among those who lost them. Including because I know a huge number of families who have lost almost their entire family - brothers, elders, sisters, children, grandchildren... everyone. There are other reasons, a huge number of them.

One of them. About 7 or maybe 10 years ago, while working at a construction site clearing rubble, I first came across the basements of a former institution, as it turned out that the parking lot of the 1st company, apparently. Skeletons, scattered bones mixed with garbage, torture rooms with iron beds and chairs with wires, some kind of pins, pieces of fittings, etc. were discovered. The basement room was flooded knee-deep, the interior door leading to other rooms was blocked, and I don’t know how many or what there was, but I think there are quite a few such rooms and pits. Officially, there are 60 mass graves in the Chechen Republic, only one of them contains 800 people. This is what is officially known. How many unknowns?

Also about 12-13 years ago. A completely peaceful village in the Lenininsky district that was not affected by military operations. Locations of g1askhiys from where the city itself was fired upon from heavy guns. Children are walking, collecting non-ferrous metal, and accidentally stumble upon such a burial place, about 20 corpses with their hands tied behind them with wire and telltale holes in the backs of their heads. All young people, teenagers. Several girls.

The guys raise a fuss, this news eventually reaches the district military commission, they come, dig them up, take away the corpses, and plow up the burial site with infantry fighting vehicles. That's it, no corpses, no crimes. And there are a thousand such cases, everyone, and I’m sure you’ve also encountered similar cases.

Here is a superficial, condensed and very much abbreviated reason why to me personally the logic of 250-300 tons of victims seems to have a basis.

Rustam Nart: And what to do with the dead, PAP 1... Khankala... Chernokozovo.... mass graves... Urus-Martan boarding school.... but they cannot be listed. Block posts where people disappeared.

Muslim Umarov: Rustam Nart, let’s take the village of Gekhi, where there are up to 10 cemeteries. I'm just taking your word for it. Although it's not difficult for me to check. But I'll check and then answer you. For now, let's take other villages. In the villages of Prigorodnoye and the village of Gikalo there is one cemetery for two villages. In the village of Starye Atagi - and this is a very large village - the old cemetery was filled even before the first war (maybe I’m wrong), but now there is also one cemetery there. But there is another way: is it difficult (or impossible) for a person to find out how many people died in his village? Can we do anything at all in this life? I still insist that it is quite easy to find out the true number of those killed. But no one needs this. In such a matter, I would not advise anyone to make fraud. What does it mean - how many are missing? How many are there really?

Why are we still putting up with the fact that no one has counted our losses? Why do some of Kadyrov’s sworn enemies cite the only reference to justify the huge number of losses - this is a reference to the words of Ramzan Kadyrov? Do you have any other authoritative sources? Why does only Kadyrov know about this? How did he know this? Yes, all of you, don’t beat around the bush and tell me directly - what does this insane number of killed Chechens give you (us)? And if the Russians killed only 50 or 100 thousand Chechens, is that not enough for you? Or is this not enough for the Russians? Or is this not enough for Kadyrov? Re-read your own comments and think about why you cling to numbers that should terrify us, even if this number is 10 times smaller.

Rustam Nart: If anything depends on this figure, then it’s worth it. Neither we nor our descendants will forget this dark period of time, but the numbers 300 and 250 have become stronger in the hearts of our people. It would not hurt to know the exact figure, even due to the fact that we are looking for the truth. But this, alas, will not help, neither the mother who buried one and lost two, this figure is of no use, for example, to my nephew who was born after his father was kidnapped.....

Islam Dagalaev: There are FOUR cemeteries in my village. in Gudermes FOUR In the village of Oyskhar (Novogrozny) - THREE, on one of which, in February 1996, we buried 31 people on one day. On the same day, in the same Oyskhar, 6 people were buried in another cemetery. And this is just the arithmetic of one day. How many such days were there?

Isa Ahyadov: Yes, indeed, our relatives and friends, beloved, dear people simply ran away from us in the most difficult time, abandoned us, hid and do not want to return to their parents or parents do not want to return to their children and relatives - they simply ran after the Russian occupiers, live with them like some traitors. No, dear compatriots, this is not and cannot be, all of our relatives died at the hands of the Russian occupiers - this is a fact. We pose the question to us to find out how many of our relatives died. Definitely, more than 300,000 thousand of our relatives and friends, dear and beloved people died. And our relatives definitely died at the hands of the occupation administration and their war criminals, this is a fact. In Mesker-Yurt, for example, people are buried in several cemeteries. In addition, you and I also know that the Russian occupiers did not hand over many bodies and burned corpses. Russian war criminals also used special chemical liquids to vaporize corpses. And how many bodies of our relatives were burned by Russian war criminals themselves secretly and secretly, only relatives know about this, that their parents or sons and daughters were killed by Russian occupiers.

Islam Dagalaev: Muslim Umarov? There are, according to various sources, up to one and a half million Chechens. And each of us had someone killed. I lost two very close friends and several relatives.

Rustam Nart: Do not forget that many people managed to leave the republic.

Balata Belyaeva: Muslim..okha duitsuchunna reza a tsa hilla, khin tskhya "post" yazyi akhya..kamel desh dolu tho dolchchokh ditina, khuza sekhaveli hyo..khuzakh a izza yozanash du..akhya bohuchunna reza bersh tsa haalo..// duk ha ler bakhyana dolush so k1ordina hila a tarlo khu nakhana, amma tskhya hattar do san: dokaza - t1epaza - loraza baynarsh bog1y otsu kho b1e ezarna yukkye?

slam Dagalaev: They say there was no Khaibakh. Such Umarovs are needed so that “historians” can refer to them. And they are already referring to such accountants Mikitkin...

Zareta Aldamova: Muslim is a decent person, tso mukha bokha a khetta so, delakh a suna gergakh t1om setnachu sherashkakh mel della Adam dokha h1uma du, infarctsha a cancer a bakhyan a dolush, usha a bayinachu deqakh bu. 1anakh, tskhana betchokh ala megar dolush 90 gerga Tezet x1ottira Sema1ashkakh.

Balata Belyaeva: Here, Zaret, an interesting point... I just started writing about this, and you got ahead of me: those who died from heart attacks, strokes and other diseases are also included in this figure... should be included..
because it was the war that finished them off... a person does not necessarily have to be shot, blown up or torn to pieces...

Isa Ahyadov: Dear Compatriots, I invite us all to say today who is killing us today.

Balata Belyaeva: tahanlernag tskhya 100 sho dalcha duytsur du...//kerla dissertatsesh, diplomash yazdechara dakkhii sinosh dokhush, b1argekh yovlakhash hyokkhush, kegor yu and materialash....

Isa Ahyadov: And I also suggest that we all write and say where we are being killed, how we are being killed, who is killing us and why, and what diseases we are dying from and why we cannot talk about it.

Apty Teps: The number of deaths in Russia's war against the Chechens, during the two wars, as they are commonly called, is not difficult. There are generally accepted logistics methods for this. This is not the place for a broad discussion on this matter, since no one will allow us to do this today. The victims of the so-called first war could be counted by the then Ichkerian government, as well as much else. But this was not done then. Those who claim that after the Khasayurt agreements this war stopped are mistaken; over the next 2-3 years it acquired a different character, more cynical and insidious. And the Ichkerian government turned out to be completely unable to act adequately to the current situation. It waited like a dog in the manger until Russia again prepared for the next attack.

Lauren Lorsanova: Over the course of our history, a certain amount of our population has been killed. And in these two warriors, a lot of our population died, including Russian speakers. The gene pool of the nation has been killed; if you count those killed, those imprisoned for life and long terms, and those who have gone missing, then this goes to this number. Who counted the number of victims?? If you do a survey in every family, then there is no such family that several people did not die. Therefore, it is quite possible, it may even be more. And the war did not end for our people, it simply moved to another stage.

Rustam Nart: Balata, do not make sudden conclusions about Muslim. I personally understand why and why he writes this. I would be very glad to know that there are 10 times fewer victims of this war, but in order to do this work it is necessary to conduct conversations with people in every village..... in government institutions..... in a word, this is a huge amount of work. Counting how much 200 cargo was taken away from Chechnya, and that 200 cargo that they dropped from planes into the mountains to be devoured by animals, because they were ashamed to take out such a number of corpses from such a small Chechnya.

Maybe in the future they will think twice before coming to us?!!! If you compare the military strength, losses of the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic, then this is an elephant and a fly. The only thing these occupiers succeeded in was killing women, children and the elderly. And the time will come when they will answer for everything.

Zamid Musanipov: I agree with you Muslim Umarov. You can’t take the number of our losses out of thin air. Everyone is dear to us and we must remember and record our murdered brothers and sisters, children and elderly women by name and with all the information. Everyone. And create a memory book. This is our duty. For example, in my village of one hundred households, 8 people are buried. Dala g1azot kobal doyla tseri.

Adam Ibrahim: Jews insist that they were killed by six million, Armenians by one and a half... everything makes sense...

Taus Serganova: This question, in my opinion, is very important. There are no exact data. They operate with different figures without citing sources. Someone's words, unsubstantiated, cannot be a fact or an argument. And this is our fault - those who, neither by position (statistical institutions), nor by professional activity (scientists-historians, researchers of the modern period), nor by social activity (non-governmental organizations, of which there are many), etc., were not involved in establishing the exact (as far as possible) number of killed, wounded, missing, kidnapped, and those who died from qualified medical care not provided on time during the two military campaigns and after it. You can add categories.

There are different forms and methods of calculation among specialists; they have been used in similar situations around the world, in Europe, in the Balkans, in particular. So far, no one “at the top” needs this, and “at the bottom” are either waiting for instructions, or are afraid, or are simply expressing emotions. If we talk about the announced figures of 250-300 thousand, this is still a conditional expression of our losses. In reality there may be more. Each of us has our own martyrology of the dead, those who died and those who disappeared into obscurity. And it is replenished every day...

Isa Ahyadov: And how many children die in the womb, and how many die in maternity hospitals, and how many mothers die during childbirth, are there statistics of this nature, that is, are they allowed to keep such statistics in medical institutions? No. In fact, practically, one might say, relatives are offered to take all patients with serious illnesses from medical institutions home, especially patients with oncology and tuberculosis.

Even in an open form, they offer to take patients home to their relatives, and all such patients, our relatives, heavy with pain, die without painkillers, we can talk a lot about such facts and talk for a long time. Why are our children dying in Russian-occupied territory in Chechnya? We don’t want to talk because it is very, very dangerous, deadly - But the deaths of our children don’t worry us much, and even if they do, we won’t talk about it because we’re afraid. Who are we afraid of? Yes, we are afraid of everyone, unfortunately, except Allah Almighty.

But our children feel bad - they need professional medical help. And for us, professional medical care means giving money to doctors so that we, parents, can be sure that our child is being killed by professional medical killers, and not some trainee at a medical institution - this is how we fight for our temporary life.

And being afraid is a profession and the norm of life in the territory occupied by Russia in the CRI.

Or do we pray to Allah Almighty with a request to “strengthen fear and silence in our hearts and souls in grief and suffering, in matters of life and health of our children and us”???

Besides, we know that we are only allowed to give birth to stillbirths at home. In other cases, they go to maternity hospitals and give birth to half-dead children for money. They are born under the strict regime of the Russian occupiers: if a healthy child is born, put in the money - there won’t be enough, the warden will say, otherwise you won’t go home from the maternity hospital with a healthy child. Or maybe that's not true?

How many times do we, our parents, our children, and we ourselves die from cancer?

The Russian occupiers do not allow statistics to be kept in hospitals, clinics, and medical institutions - “Nokhchiy Lorasha” does not. This is what we must and must talk about - and not only talk about it, but also trumpet it to the whole world - Help! Help! Help! They are killing! They are killing! They are killing!

Against us - the People of Nokhchi, Russian war criminals have used and continue to use biological and bacteriological weapons, help us - the People of Nokhchi, stop the Russian occupiers in the Russian-occupied territory in the CRI of all Russian war criminals!

What are we doing? Just statistics - how many of us were killed and how many were not killed, if Russian war criminals and their accomplices killed us, but not 300,000 thousand were killed by Russian occupiers.

Zalina Lakaeva

And on this day, and every day, we wait for news from those who once left and did not return, from those who were taken from home at night or at dawn and did not return... from those who were taken off the car and taken into the unknown ...

Thousands of stories, thousands of hopes, millions of tears of those who wait, hope, believe... Even if they understand with their minds, no, he (she) will not come, knock on the window at dawn and ask: “Mom, open, it’s me,” my heart can’t reconcile...

I'm waiting too. Mairbek's older brother. Uncle Wahoo...

Mayrbek!. I can’t accept that he’s not there, that I won’t see or hear your cheerful “Nanina! Well, guess what I brought you?” Or: “What am I going to tell you now” (my brother sometimes trusted me with his secrets)...

I'm waiting. I hope. And there is no force in the world that can force you not to wait.

In the photo: my brother Mairbek and uncle Vakha are standing.

https://www.radiomarsho.com/a/chechnya-archive/28705955.html

Monitoring department
Info Chechen

Declaring its state independence at the end of 1991.

The Russian-Chechen war itself began on December 11, 1994 with the invasion of federal troops into Chechnya. This was preceded by a three-year process of distancing the Chechen authorities from Moscow, which began in the fall of 1991 under the leadership of the former Soviet Army general, General Dzhokhar Dudayev, who was elected the first president of Chechnya. After the collapse of the USSR, Dudayev declared the independence of Chechnya from Russia, although he did not break all ties with Moscow, especially in the financial and economic sphere. After the elimination of dual power in October 1993, the Russian authorities tried to restore their control over the Chechen territory in the northern Nadterechny region of the republic, which did not recognize Dudayev's power, opposition units armed with Russian weapons were created with Russian money. On November 26, 1994, with the support of tanks with Russian crews, the opposition tried to capture the capital of Chechnya, Grozny, but were almost completely destroyed and captured by troops loyal to Dudayev. More than 70 Russian military personnel were captured. They were released before the start of the full-scale Russian-Chechen war. Among the dead and captured tankers were officers of the Kantemirovsky division hired by the Russian special services, who shelled the Moscow White House in October 1993.

After the failure of attempts to overthrow Dudayev with the help of the Chechen opposition, a full-scale military operation was launched using several divisions of the army and internal troops. The size of the group reached 60 thousand soldiers and officers, including elite airborne troops and the Moscow division of internal troops (formerly named after Dzerzhinsky). They were opposed by the regular Chechen army created by Dudayev, called the militia and numbering up to 15 thousand people. It was armed with tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), artillery, machine guns and small arms left over from army depots after the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya in 1992. Dudayev later managed to illegally purchase some of the weapons and ammunition in Russia. The Chechens did not have combat aircraft, and all training transport aircraft located at the airfield near Grozny were destroyed before the invasion as a result of bombing by Russian aircraft.

Officially in Russia, the war was called “measures to restore constitutional order in the Chechen Republic” and pursued the goal of “disarmament of illegal armed groups.” Russian politicians and military officials expected that the fighting would not last more than two weeks. Defense Minister General Pavel Grachev said on the eve of the invasion of Chechnya that Grozny could be taken in two hours by one Russian airborne regiment. However, federal troops met fierce resistance and immediately suffered heavy losses.

The Chechens did not have aviation, were many times inferior to the enemy in artillery and tanks, but during the three years of independence they managed to turn into professional fighters, and in terms of the level of combat training and command they were significantly superior to Russian soldiers, many of whom were recently drafted into the army. He directly led operations on the Chechen side Chief of the General Staff General Aslan Maskhadov, former colonel of the Soviet Army. Chechen troops successfully combined positional defense with mobile defense, managing to escape the massive attacks of Russian aviation in time.

Only on December 21 did federal units reach Grozny and on New Year's Eve 1995 launched a poorly prepared assault on Grozny. The Chechens almost unhindered allowed the attackers into the center of Grozny, and then began to shoot armored vehicles and infantry from fortified positions on the pre-targeted streets of the city. The fighters of the federal troops did not have plans for the city and had almost no orientation in it; they acted uncoordinatedly and, in fact, without a single command. Some of them were destroyed, some were blocked in occupied buildings, and only a few managed to break back. Up to 500 people were captured. Almost all Russian tanks brought into Grozny were burned or taken by the Chechens. Prolonged street fighting began as Russian soldiers slowly occupied the city, house by house, block by block. In these battles, the Chechens fought more skillfully, operating in small mobile groups whose commanders could independently make decisions in a rapidly changing environment without a continuous front line. Only a few Russian commanders possessed these qualities. Aircraft bombed Grozny and other cities and villages of Chechnya without targeting, across squares. Almost exclusively civilians suffered from the bombing. The death of relatives and friends only intensified the hatred of Chechen soldiers and officers towards the federals. In Grozny, by an evil irony of fate, the victims of bombs and shells were primarily Russian residents. The civilian Chechen population mostly managed to leave the besieged city and take refuge with relatives in the mountains, while the Russians had nowhere to go. In March, Chechen troops left Grozny. In April and May, the Russian army broke through into the foothills and mountainous regions of southern Chechnya, capturing all the cities of the republic. In order to gain time for the regular army to switch to guerrilla warfare from inaccessible bases in the mountains, in mid-June a detachment of 200 people was commanded by one of the most famous Chechen field forces. commanders Shamil Basayev, a former student and now a general, carried out a raid on the Stavropol city of Budennovsk. Here, Basayev’s soldiers took up to a thousand civilians hostage, drove them to the city hospital and threatened to destroy them unless a ceasefire was declared and Russian-Chechen negotiations began. (the day before, almost the entire Basayev family died under Russian bombs). Federal troops launched an unsuccessful assault on the hospital, during which several dozen hostages died. After this, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin agreed to fulfill the demands of the terrorists, and also provided the terrorists with buses so that they could get to the Chechen mountains with some of the hostages to guarantee safety. In Chechnya, Basayev freed the remaining hostages and was beyond the reach of Russian troops. In total, about 120 civilians died on the streets of Budennovsk and in the hospital. Basayev launched his raid without the sanction of the Chechen command, but subsequently Dudayev and Maskhadov approved his actions.

Basayev's inhumane action, however, led to a temporary cessation of bloodshed in Chechnya while negotiations continued. In October they were interrupted after the head of the Russian delegation, commander of the internal troops, General Anatoly Romanov, was seriously wounded in an assassination attempt (he is still unconscious). The circumstances of this assassination attempt, carried out with the help of a radio-controlled landmine, are not clear today.

After the breakdown of negotiations, federal troops resumed their offensive in the mountainous regions of Chechnya. They captured cities and villages there more than once, but it turned out to be impossible to hold their positions for a long time, since the Chechens blocked supply routes. Russian units are tired of the war. Their combat effectiveness, already low, fell to a critical limit. Federal troops failed to defeat the main Chechen forces. Maskhadov and Dudayev were able to maintain control over their main units. In December, Chechen forces occupied the second largest city of the republic, Gudermes, for several days, demonstrating their strength to Russia and the world.

At the end of December 1996, a detachment of about 200 people under the command of Dudayev’s son-in-law Salman Raduev, later promoted to general, carried out a raid against a helicopter base in the Dagestan city of Kizlyar. The raid ended in failure, and the detachment was threatened with encirclement by federal troops. Then Raduev, following the example of Basayev, took hostages in the city hospital. At first he demanded an end to the war and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, then, under pressure from the authorities of Dagestan, he was satisfied with the promise of free passage to Chechnya under the cover of a human shield of hostages. In January 1996, near the border of Dagestan and Chechnya, a convoy of buses carrying terrorists was fired upon by Russian helicopters. Raduev and his men captured a police post made up of soldiers from the Novosibirsk Special Purpose Police Unit (OMON) and took up defensive positions in the nearby Dagestan village of Pervomaiskoe. Raduev’s detachment was besieged by internal troops and special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the security service, numbering 2.5 thousand people. A few days later, the troops launched an assault, broke into Pervomaiskoye, but were thrown back to their original positions. Police special forces, trained to fight armed criminals, were ill-equipped to conduct conventional street combat with an enemy unit. Under the cover of darkness, most of the Raduevites with some of the hostages managed to break out of the encirclement. The battle at Pervomaisky once again proved to the Chechens the weakness of the Russian troops.

All Moscow's attempts to create a capable Chechen administration ended in failure. In the last period, the pro-Russian government was headed by Doku Zavgaev, the former leader of the Communist Party and chairman of the Supreme Council of Checheno-Ingushetia, which was dispersed by demonstrators on Dudayev’s initiative in the fall of 1991. Trillions of rubles allocated to restore the destroyed economy of Chechnya were embezzled by bankers and officials at various levels. The Zavgaev administration, having no real power, was unable to prevent the shelling and bombing of Chechen villages by Russian artillery and aircraft. As a result, Zavgaev lost popularity in his native Nadterechny district, whose residents had previously been in opposition to Dudayev.

In March 1996, Basayev entered Grozny for several days. “Terrorist No. 1” this time put his fighters in passenger cars. They moved through the streets at high speed, attacking federal checkpoints and commandant's offices, while themselves remaining virtually invulnerable. The Russian army was unable to do anything with the Basayevites, passively waiting for them to leave the city. As it became clear later, Basayev’s March raid was just a rehearsal for a larger-scale operation.

In mid-April, near the village of Yarysh-Mardan, a column of federal troops was ambushed, losing about 100 people. The Chechens suffered virtually no losses in this battle.

On April 21, 1996, Dudayev was killed as a result of the explosion of an aircraft missile aimed at the signal of his cell phone. The post of President of Chechnya was taken by Vice President Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, a famous Chechen poet, but as a politician inferior in popularity to Dudayev, Maskhadov and Basayev. At the end of May, during Yandarbiev’s visit to Moscow, a ceasefire agreement was concluded with him. On the eve of the presidential elections, the Russian leadership was interested in achieving at least temporary peace in Chechnya. It hoped that after the death of Dudayev, the resistance of the Chechens would weaken and it would be possible to establish the Zavgaev government in the country.

After Boris Yeltsin won the election, federal troops resumed their offensive in Chechnya and bombing mountain villages. On August 6, the Chechen army entered Grozny. This operation was developed by Maskhadov back in the spring. However, the Chechen leadership postponed its implementation until after the presidential elections in Russia, believing that Yeltsin's victory would be the least evil for Chechnya. A few days before the start of the operation, special leaflets warned Grozny residents that fighting would begin in the city in the very near future and that they should stock up on water and food and not go out into the streets. However, the command of the federal troops did not attach any importance to these leaflets and were taken by surprise. In the city and its environs there were up to 15 thousand soldiers and officers of the army and internal troops and riot police.

Initially, about 2 thousand Chechen militias entered Grozny under the personal leadership of Maskhadov and Basayev (the latter directly commanded the Grozny group). By that time, the Chechens no longer had armored vehicles and almost no artillery left. However, in terms of combat experience, ability to fight and morale, they were far superior to the soldiers of the federal troops, who did not show any desire to die in the name of “establishing constitutional order in Chechnya.” Many Russian units actually took a position of armed neutrality, not firing at the enemy if he, in turn, did not encroach on the positions they occupied.

During a week of fighting, the Chechens captured most of Grozny, blocking Russian troops in the main administrative buildings and premises of checkpoints and commandant's offices. By that time, the number of the Chechen group in Grozny had increased to 6-7 thousand people, thanks to the defection of part of the city police subordinate to Zavgaev to its side and the transfer of reinforcements from other regions of Chechnya. Counterattacks by federal troops from Khankala and Severny Airport located in the Grozny suburbs were repulsed. Russian units suffered heavy losses. Some units of the federal troops, in order to escape from the encirclement and obtain medicine for the wounded, resorted to the shameful practice of taking hostages among civilians. According to some estimates, up to 200 armored vehicles were burned, and the Chechens managed to capture several tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) unharmed. As the Russian press wrote in those days: “Under the pressure of disparate gangs, our troops abandoned the city of Grozny.” Chechen troops also liberated the cities of Gudermes and Argun and carried out a number of attacks on federal units in the foothills.

The commander of the Russian troops in Chechnya, General Konstantin Pulikovsky, demanded that the residents of Grozny leave the city within two days, intending to subject it to massive bombing and shelling. In this case, the death of not only approximately 2 thousand federal troops, blocked in besieged buildings and left without food, water and ammunition, would have been inevitable, but also tens of thousands of citizens who could not leave the city in such a short time. The Secretary of the Russian Security Council, General Alexander Lebed, who urgently arrived in Chechnya, achieved the cancellation of Pulikovsky’s order for a new assault on Grozny. Lebed became convinced of the complete incapacity of Russian troops in Chechnya, which he stated publicly.

At the end of August, in the Dagestan city of Khasavyurt, he signed agreements with the Chechen leadership, according to which a ceasefire was established, federal troops, with the exception of two brigades, were withdrawn from Chechnya (supporters of independence call the country Ichkeria), and the determination of the political status of the republic was postponed until the end of 2001. The Chechens, however, insisted on the withdrawal of all federal troops and refused to guarantee the safety of the military personnel of the brigades remaining in the vicinity of Grozny.

On November 23, 1996, President Yeltsin signed a decree on the withdrawal of the last two brigades from Chechnya by the end of the year. When federal troops left the republic, presidential elections took place there. Maskhadov won them. His power extended to the entire republic. Local militias who returned to the Nadterechny region forced Zavgaev’s supporters to relinquish power. In May 1997, Presidents Yeltsin and Maskhadov signed a peace treaty between Russia and Chechnya, where the parties pledged never to use force or the threat of force in their relations with each other. This means Russia recognizes Chechnya as de facto independent. However, the Russian leadership is not yet ready to recognize Chechen independence de jure, that is, to officially agree that the Republic of Ichkeria is no longer part of Russian territory and to establish diplomatic relations with it as a foreign state. History knows examples when decades passed between the actual acquisition of independence and its recognition by the former metropolis. Thus, the Netherlands actually separated from Spain by 1572, but the Spanish monarchy recognized the new state after a series of wars only in 1607.

According to official data, during the entire conflict in Chechnya, about 6 thousand Russian military personnel, border guards, police officers and security officers died or went missing. Today we do not have any summary data on the irretrievable losses of the Chechen army. One can only assume that due to their smaller numbers and higher level of combat training, the Chechen troops suffered significantly fewer losses than the federal troops.

The total number of killed residents of Chechnya is most often estimated at 70-80 thousand people, the overwhelming majority of whom were civilians. They became victims of shelling and bombing by federal troops, as well as so-called “cleansing operations” - inspections of cities and villages abandoned by Chechen formations by Russian soldiers and Ministry of Internal Affairs officers, when civilians often died from federal bullets and grenades. The bloodiest “cleansing operations” took place in the village of Samashki, not far from the border with Ingushetia.

The Second Chechen War began after the August 1999 invasion of the Chechen detachments of Shamil Basayev and Khattab into Dagestan, counting on the assistance of local Wahhabis, explosions of residential buildings in Moscow and Buinaksk, and the invasion of federal troops in September. The plan for this invasion, according to some sources, was developed in the spring of 1999. By early February 2000, the Russian army captured Grozny, which was practically wiped off the face of the earth. In February - March, federal troops penetrated into the southern mountainous regions of Chechnya, but were unable to establish effective control over them. A large-scale guerrilla war is currently ongoing throughout Chechnya. By the end of 2000, Russian losses, according to official, probably significantly downplayed data, amounted to about 3 thousand dead and missing. There is no reliable data on the losses of Chechen armed forces and civilians. One can only assume that several times more civilians died than military personnel.

The first Chechen war of 1994-1996: briefly about the causes, events and results. The Chechen wars claimed many lives.

But what initially caused the conflict? What happened in those years in the troubled southern regions?

Causes of the Chechen conflict

After the collapse of the USSR, General Dudayev came to power in Chechnya. Large reserves of weapons and property of the Soviet state ended up in his hands.

The general's main goal was the creation of an independent republic of Ichkeria. The means used to achieve this goal were not entirely loyal.

The regime established by Dudayev was declared illegal by the federal authorities. Therefore, they considered it their duty to intervene. The struggle for spheres of influence became the main cause of the conflict.

Other reasons stemming from the main one:

• Chechnya's desire to secede from Russia;
• Dudayev's desire to create a separate Islamic state;
• Chechen dissatisfaction with the invasion of Russian troops;
• The source of income for the new government was the slave trade, trade in drugs and oil from the Russian pipeline passing through Chechnya.

The government sought to regain power over the Caucasus and restore lost control.

Chronicle of the first Chechen war

The first Chechen campaign began on December 11, 1994. It lasted almost 2 years.

It was a confrontation between federal troops and the forces of an unrecognized state.

1. December 11, 1994 - entry of Russian troops. The Russian army advanced from 3 sides. The very next day, one of the groups approached settlements located near Grozny.
2. December 31, 1994 – storming of Grozny. The fighting began a few hours before the New Year. But at first luck was not on the side of the Russians. The first assault failed. There were many reasons: poor preparedness of the Russian army, uncoordinated actions, lack of coordination, the presence of old maps and photographs of the city. But attempts to take the city continued. Grozny came under full Russian control only on March 6.
3. Events from April 1995 to 1996 After the capture of Grozny, it was gradually possible to establish control over most of the lowland territories. In mid-June 1995, a decision was made to postpone hostilities. However, it was violated many times. At the end of 1995, elections were held in Chechnya, which were won by a protege from Moscow. In 1996, the Chechens attempted to attack Grozny. All attacks were repelled.
4. April 21, 1996 – death of the separatist leader Dudayev.
5. On June 1, 1996, a truce was declared. According to the conditions, there should have been an exchange of prisoners, the disarmament of militants and the withdrawal of Russian troops. But no one wanted to give in, and fighting began again.
6. August 1996 – Chechen operation “Jihad”, during which the Chechens took Grozny and other significant cities. The Russian authorities decide to conclude a truce and withdraw troops. The first Chechen war ended on August 31, 1996.

Consequences of the first Chechen campaign

Brief results of the war:

1. As a result of the first Chechen war, Chechnya remained independent, but still no one recognized it as a separate state.
2. Many cities and settlements were destroyed.
3. Earning income through criminal means began to occupy a significant place.
4. Almost the entire civilian population fled their homes.

There was also a rise in Wahhabism.

Table “Losses in the Chechen War”

It is impossible to name the exact number of losses in the first Chechen war. Opinions, assumptions and calculations vary.

The approximate losses of the parties look like this:

In the “Federal Forces” column, the first figure is the calculations immediately after the war, the second is the data contained in the book on the wars of the 20th century, published in 2001.

Heroes of Russia in the Chechen war

According to official data, 175 soldiers who fought in Chechnya received the title of Hero of Russia.

Most military personnel who took part in hostilities received their rank posthumously.

The most famous heroes of the first Russian-Chechen war and their exploits:

1. Victor Ponomarev. During the battles in Grozny, he covered the sergeant with himself, which saved his life.
2. Igor Akhpashev. In Grozny, he neutralized the main firing points of Chechen thugs with a tank. After which he was surrounded. The militants blew up the tank, but Akhpashev fought in the burning car until the last. Then detonation occurred and the hero died.
3. Andrey Dneprovsky. In the spring of 1995, Dneprovsky’s unit defeated the Chechen militants who were at the height of the fortification. Andrei Dneprovsky was the only one killed in the ensuing battle. All the other soldiers of this unit survived all the horrors of the war and returned home.

Federal troops did not achieve the goals set in the first war. This became one of the reasons for the second Chechen war.

Combat veterans believe that the first war could have been avoided. Opinions differ about which side started the war. Is it true that there was a possibility of a peaceful resolution of the situation? Here the assumptions are also different.