THE TURKISH ARMY BEFORE THE WAR OF 1877-1878 TURKISH NAVAL FORCES

Its new organization was based on the principles of the Prussian Landwehr system. The reorganization was carried out by Prussian instructors. The reorganized Turkish army consisted of Nizam, Redif, Mustakhfiz, irregular and Egyptian troops.

The Nizam represented the active service troops. According to the staffing table, there were 210,000 people in it, of which 60,000 people, after 4-5 years, 1-2 years before the expiration of the full term of active service, went on leave; these contingents of leave pay (ikhtiat) in case of war were intended to replenish the Nizam. The total period of service in the Nizam was six years. The Nizam fielded a certain number of infantry camps (battalions), cavalry squadrons and artillery batteries.

Redif was intended to be trained reserve troops. According to the states, there were 190,000 people in it at the beginning of the war. Redif was divided into two (later three) classes; in the first, for three years, there were persons who had served 6 years of service in the Nizam and Ikhtiat, as well as persons aged 20 to 29 years, who for some reason did not serve in the Nizam; Persons who served 3 years in the first class were transferred to the second class for 3 years. In peacetime, only weak personnel were kept in Redif, but stocks of small arms and uniforms were required by law to be available at full strength during the deployment period. In wartime, it was envisaged that a certain number of camps, squadrons and batteries would be formed from the redif, separately from the nizam.

Mustakhfiz was a militia. According to the states, there were 300,000 people in it; Mustakhfiz was formed from among the persons transferred there for eight years at the end of their stay in Redif. Mustakhfiz did not have personnel, clothing or combat mobilization reserves in peacetime, but in wartime, a certain number of camps, squadrons and batteries were created from mustakhfiz, separately from the nizam and redif.

The total period of stay in the Nizam, Redif and Mustakhfiz was 20 years. In 1878, all three categories were to provide Turkey with 700,000 troops.

Irregular troops were recruited in case of war from the Circassians who moved to Turkey from Russia, mountainous Asia Minor tribes (Kurds, etc.), Albanians, etc. Some of these troops were assigned to the field army called the Bashi-Bazuks (Assakiri-Muawine), the rest were formed into local garrison troops (assakiri-rimullier). Their numbers were not taken into account even in Turkey itself.

The Egyptian troops numbered 65,000 people and 150 guns.

To recruit the army, the entire territory of the Turkish Empire was divided into six corps districts, which theoretically should have fielded an equal number of camps, squadrons and batteries. In fact, the Danube and Rumelian districts were stronger, the Arabian and Yemenite districts were weaker than others, and only the Anatolian and Syrian districts approached the average norm. The Guards Corps was recruited extraterritorially from all districts.

All Muslims aged 20 to 26 were subject to annual conscription by lot; Christians were not called up for military service and paid a cash tax (bedel) for this.

The described organization of the Turkish army was not fully implemented by the time of the war. The fact is that out of the annual conscription of 37,500 people, a significant part of the people did not enter the nizam due to financial difficulties and were transferred directly to the redif. Because of this, the nizam had significantly fewer people in its ranks than was required in the states, and redif and mustakhfiz were filled with people who had no military training at all. Ultimately, the 700,000 trained troops that the law on the organization of the army provided for by 1878, in large part, did not have any military training. This shortcoming was further aggravated by the fact that the adopted organization did not provide for the presence of reserve troops either in peacetime or in wartime. Therefore, consequently, all persons conscripted into Redif and Mustakhfiz from among those who did not have military training had to receive it directly in those units to which they were conscripted. In addition, the wartime deployment of redundant artillery and cavalry remained largely on paper; this was explained both by the lack of mobilization reserves of artillery and cavalry, and by the particular difficulty of creating and training these branches of troops and their personnel during the war.

The matter of recruiting officers, as well as the organization of military administration, was very unsatisfactory in the Turkish army. Only 5-10 percent of Turkish infantry and cavalry officers were recruited from among those who graduated from military schools (military, artillery, engineering, military medical), since the schools produced very few officers. The rest of the infantry and cavalry officers were recruited from among those promoted to officers of non-commissioned officer rank, that is, those who had only completed a training team, in which even basic literacy was not required. The situation was even worse with the Turkish generals. The Turkish pashas were mainly either foreign adventurers and rogues of all kinds, or court intriguers with minimal combat experience and military knowledge. There were very few people with higher military education or even experienced front-line practitioners among the Turkish generals.

At the head of the highest military administration was the Sultan with a secret military council created under him for the duration of the war; the Sultan and the Privy Council discussed and approved all plans of action of the commander-in-chief. The latter, in addition, was obliged to take into account in all his actions the Minister of War (seraskir), as well as the military council (dari-hura) that was attached to the Minister of War. At the same time, the chief of artillery and engineering troops (mushir-top-khane) was not subordinate to either the commander-in-chief or the minister of war, being at the disposal of the sultan alone. Thus, the commander-in-chief was bound in the implementation of even his private plans and plans.

The Turkish general staff consisted of 130 officers who graduated from the highest military school. These officers were used for the most part inappropriately, since there were no headquarters in the full sense of the word in the Turkish army. Instead of systematic staff work, general staff officers often served as personal advisers to the pashas and carried out their individual assignments.

There was no firmly established organization of military branches in the Turkish army. It was established as an exception only for the lower echelon - a camp (battalion) of infantry, a cavalry squadron and an artillery battery, but even then the lower units were always smaller in number than provided for by the states. As for the highest organizational levels, in practice they were either completely absent or were created from time to time and were very diverse in their structure. Theoretically, three camps should have constituted a regiment, two regiments a brigade (liwa), two brigades a division (furq), and two infantry and one cavalry division a corps (horde). In practice, 6-10 camps were sometimes united directly into a brigade or division, sometimes they acted without any intermediate organizational association, directly reporting to a senior commander or temporarily joining detachments of different sizes.

The camp (or tabur) consisted of eight companies (beyluk) and had a staff of 774 people; in fact, the size of the camp fluctuated between 100-650 people, so that the company often did not exceed the platoon size accepted in European armies; Partly before the war, the camps were reorganized and had a four-company composition.

The battery consisted of six guns and twelve charging boxes, numbering 110 combat soldiers.

The squadron numbered 143 horsemen, but in fact there were, at best, 100 people.

The small arms of the Turkish army were represented by three systems of rifled guns, loaded from the treasury, as well as various systems of outdated rifled and smooth-bore guns, loaded from the muzzle. The first and most advanced system was the single-shot American Peabody-Martini rifle. It was loaded from the breech using a bolt that folded down, had a caliber of 11.43 mm, and weighed 4.8 kg with a bayonet; the initial speed of the bullet was 415 m/sec; the sight was cut to 1,830 paces (1,500 yards); the cartridge was metal, unitary, weighed 50.5 g. According to ballistic data, this rifle was close to the Russian rifle of the Berdan system No. 2, but in some respects inferior to it; Thus, the Peabody-Martini bolt folding down prevented shooting while lying down and from a wide rest (embankment); in tests in the United States, up to 60 percent of cases of shutter failure in case extraction were noted. These guns were ordered by the Turkish government to the United States in the amount of 600,000 pieces along with 40 million rounds of ammunition for them. By the beginning of the war, the Turkish army had 334,000 Peabody-Martini rifles, which accounted for 48 percent of all guns loaded from the treasury in the Turkish army. Basically, Peabody-Martini rifles were in service with troops fighting in the Balkans.

The second highest quality system was a single-shot rifle, loaded from the treasury, by the English designer Snyder, model 1867, converted from a Minie rifle loaded from the muzzle. In terms of ballistic qualities, this rifle was only slightly superior to the Russian rifle of the Krnka system - its initial bullet speed was 360 m/ sec. The Snyder rifle had a caliber of 14.7 mm, with a bayonet (scimitar) it weighed 4.9 kg, the sight was rifled at 1300 steps (1000 yards), the metal cartridge weighed 47.2 g; the cartridges were partly drawn, partly composite. Snyder was mostly purchased in England and the USA, a certain number were converted at Turkish factories. 325,000 Snyder rifles were in service, which was equal to 47% of all Turkish army rifles, part of the Turkish troops in the Balkans were armed with this rifle system; theater and the overwhelming number of troops in the Caucasian theater.

The third system was an American rifle designed by Henry Winchester with an under-barrel magazine for 13 rounds, one round in the receiver and one in the barrel; all cartridges could be fired in 40 seconds. The rifle was a carbine with a caliber of 10.67 mm, the sight was cut to 1300 steps. The carbine weighed 4.09 kg, the cartridge - 33.7 g. There were 39,000 of these rifles in service - 5-6% of all rifles in the Turkish army, loaded from the treasury. The Turkish cavalry and some of the bashi-bazouks were armed with this rifle.

Mustakhfiz, part of the Redif and irregular troops were armed mainly with muzzle-loading guns of various systems. The Egyptian troops were armed with a treasury-loaded rifle of the American Remington system. In addition, the Turks had a number of mitrailleuses of the Montigny system.

Before the war, Turkey purchased a very significant amount of ammunition for all systems of its small arms, loaded from the treasury (500-1000 rounds per weapon, that is, at least 300-400 million rounds) and during the war, it replenished the consumption of ammunition with regular purchases from border, mainly in England and the USA.

The combat set of cartridges was carried by the soldiers, the transported supply was in the packs available at each camp or on ordinary carts.

Field artillery at the beginning of the war was represented in the Turkish army by the first examples of rifled 4- and 6-pound guns loaded from the treasury, not fastened with rings and with an initial projectile speed of no more than 305 m/sec, as well as bronze mountain 3-pound guns of the English Whitworth systems; the latter began to be replaced by 55-mm steel German Krupp guns during the war. Nine-centimeter steel Krupp cannons, fastened with rings, with a range of 4.5 km and an initial speed of 425 m/sec, mounted on a carriage, which made it possible to give the barrel a large elevation angle and thereby increase the firing range, were initially few in number; in the Balkans, for example, at first there were only 48 of them. The Turks had little field artillery - 825 guns.

Turkish field artillery had three types of shells: 1) a grenade with a shock tube of poor quality; most grenades, especially at the beginning of the war, did not explode; 2) shrapnel with a spacer tube, technically quite good; 3) buckshot. The Turkish army was supplied with shells in sufficient quantities.

Turkish fortress and siege artillery were armed with 9-cm caliber cast-iron smooth-bore cannons and 28-cm howitzers; bronze smoothbore 9-, 12- and 15-cm guns; 12- and 15-cm guns, 15-cm howitzers and 21-cm mortars, rifled and loaded from the treasury; steel 21-, 23- and 27-cm Krupp guns fastened with rings; cast iron mortars of 23- and 28-cm caliber, bronze mortars of 15-, 23- and 28-cm caliber

Officers, cavalry and irregular troops, in addition to guns (officers did not have them), were armed with revolvers, sabers and scimitars.

The military industry in Turkey was represented by a number of medium and small plants and factories owned by the state. The production of weapons was carried out by the artillery arsenal in Tophane and the foundry in Zeytin-Burnu; in the arsenal, individual small arms parts were manufactured, guns of old systems were remade, artillery barrels were drilled, bolts for them were made, etc.; at the foundry, barrels for bronze cannons were cast, shells of all calibers were produced, and bladed weapons were also produced for the entire army. Powder factories in Makri-kei and Atsatlu produced saltpeter gunpowder and loaded up to 220,000 rifle cartridges daily. The cartridge plant in Kirk-Agach produced daily up to 100,000 cartridges for Snyder guns, 150,000 primers and 250,000 bullets for them. The factory of pipes and explosive compositions produced up to 300 pipes daily. A number of factories were equipped with small and medium-power steam engines, as well as the latest machinery, but mostly water engines and manual labor were used. The factory management and technical personnel overwhelmingly consisted of highly paid foreigners, mainly English, while the workers were recruited entirely from the Turkish population. The quality of the products was low. All of the listed enterprises did not fully satisfy the needs of the Turkish armed forces; they only partially (with the exception of bladed weapons) met this need; the main way of replenishment was the import of weapons and ammunition from the USA and England. The naval military industry was represented by a naval arsenal in Constantinople and a number of shipyards (in Terskhan, Sinop, Rushchuk, Basor, etc.).

Ultimately, the following conclusions can be drawn regarding the organization and armament of the Turkish army, as well as regarding the Turkish military industry.

The organization of the Turkish troops for the war of 1877-1878 was undoubtedly in a better state than during the Crimean War, but still it in no way satisfied the military requirements of that time. The virtual absence of permanent formations from the regiment and above, the poor supply of trained personnel, the lack of reserves of horses and artillery spare guns, the completely unsatisfactory situation with the staffing of the army with officers and the creation of headquarters put the Turkish army in a worse position compared to any of the armies of the major European powers. .

As for weapons, the Turkish army was equipped with models of small arms that were quite advanced for that time and, on the whole, was in an equal position with the Russian army, even somewhat superior to it in the supply of ammunition. In terms of artillery weapons, the Turkish army was not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively inferior to the Russian army; the presence of “long-range” steel Krupp guns in the Turkish army could not give it an advantage, since there were few such guns.

The Turkish military industry could not provide the Turkish army with weapons and played a secondary role in equipping it with weapons, so it could not be compared with the Russian military industry.

The combat training of the Turkish army before the war of 1877-1878 was at an extremely low level.

To a large extent this depended on the low level of military education of Turkish officers and on the almost complete lack of officer training in peacetime. Only a small number of Turkish officers - about 2,000 people - were educated at a military school; the majority of them, produced from non-commissioned officers for length of service and distinction (the so-called alaili), had absolutely no education; as the Turkish historian testifies, of these latter “rarely anyone knew how to read and write, and, meanwhile, they were in high ranks, up to and including general.”

Turkish General Izzet Fuad Pasha wrote about the state of officer training before the war: “Since in our language there are almost no books on strategy or works on the history of great wars, theoretically we knew very little, and practically nothing at all, because During the entire reign of Abdul-Aziz, only one maneuver can be recalled, and even that lasted only... one day.”

It is impossible, however, to completely agree with this description of the Turkish officers of the 70s, since many of them developed quite valuable military qualities during the war with Serbia and Montenegro and received something in relation to the development of their horizons from their English and German instructors. But in principle, it cannot be denied that the majority of Turkish officers were extremely poorly prepared tactically, especially for offensive combat.

In accordance with the low level of officer training, the level of combat training of Turkish soldiers and non-commissioned officers was also very low. In the Turkish infantry, only the numerically insignificant Sultan's Guard, satisfactorily trained by German instructors, was capable of offensive combat. All the rest of the infantry, even the lower ones, were prepared for an offensive battle. weak; the formation and battle formations were maintained only at the beginning of the offensive, after which in most cases they were crowded; the fire was poorly accurate due to poor shooting training; They tried to compensate for this deficiency with a mass of bullets fired on the move. The positive side of the Turkish infantry was its widespread use of self-entrenchment.

In defense, the Turkish infantry was accustomed to make extensive use of fortifications, for which purpose a sufficient supply of entrenching tools was carried at each camp. The Turkish infantry knew sapping; fortifications were erected quickly and technically performed well;

The main role in the construction of Turkish fortifications was played by the local population.

The Turkish infantry was abundantly supplied with ammunition and opened fire on the attackers from long distances, which made it well adapted to defensive combat; Counterattacks by Turkish troops were less successful, which is why their defense was predominantly passive.

The success of the Turkish troops in passive defense is not an accidental phenomenon and cannot be explained by the “innate” properties of the Turkish soldier and officer. The fact is that for an offensive with equal weapons, much more than for a passive defense, initiative, conscious and trained soldiers are needed, as well as officers with great organizational abilities. The backward social system of Turkey did not contribute to the development of either proactive soldiers or trained officers.

In marching movements, the Turkish infantry was hardy, but the lack of convoys in units larger than a camp made it difficult to maneuver.

Turkish artillery fired from long distances, accurately fired grenades, but did not use shrapnel. Concentration of artillery fire was used weakly, and cooperation with the infantry was not established.

The Turkish regular cavalry was so insignificant in number that, even despite the tolerable level of its tactical training, it could not have any influence on the war of 1877-1878.

The irregular Turkish cavalry, despite the fact that a significant part of it was armed with repeating rifles, was completely unprepared for proper combat. The headquarters in the Turkish army were not prepared for military operations.

The combat training of Russian troops on the eve of the war, despite all its major shortcomings, was significantly higher than the training of the Turkish army.

Comparing the Russian and Turkish armies with each other, we can come to the following conclusions. The Russian army had an undoubted superiority over the Turkish in everything except small arms, in relation to which it was in approximately an equal position with the Turkish. In single combat with Turkey, the Russian army had every chance of success. However, the strength of the Turkish passive defense, with the Russian army insufficiently prepared to overcome it, forced it to be taken seriously.

By 1877, Türkiye had a fairly significant navy. On the Black and Marmara Seas there was an armored squadron consisting of 8 armored battery frigates of ranks I and II, armed with 8-15 guns, mainly of 7-9 dm caliber (only Mesudieh had 12 guns of 10 dm caliber); 7 battery corvettes and monitors of rank III, armed with 4-5 guns, mostly also of 7-9 dm caliber. The speed of most ships in the squadron reached 11 knots or even slightly higher; the armor of most ships was 6 inches thick. Basically, all these ships were acquired by Turkey in England and France.

In addition to the armored squadron, Türkiye had 18 unarmored warships on the Black Sea with a speed of up to 9 knots and a number of auxiliary military vessels.

Thus, Türkiye, although at the cost of state bankruptcy, created a fleet in the Black Sea capable of conducting offensive operations.

But if Turkey was quite happy with the quantity and quality of ships, then with the personnel of the fleet the situation was much worse. The combat training of the personnel of the Turkish Navy was unsatisfactory, discipline was weak. There were almost no practical voyages, there were no mine weapons on the ships, mine warfare was in the background. An attempt to raise the level of training of fleet personnel by inviting experienced foreign officers, mainly British, to the Turkish fleet (Gobart Pasha - the head of the armored squadron, Montourne Bey - his assistant and chief of staff, Sliman - a mine specialist, etc.) was unsuccessful success. The Turkish fleet entered the war ill-prepared.

The Russian fleet won the fight for the sea - it was able to cover its shores and preserved the main communications. At the same time, the Turks, who had many times the numerical superiority, were unable to reliably protect even navigation off their own shores, and the success of their operations off the Caucasian coast turned out to be temporary. However, wars are won not by defense and protection of communications, but by offensive actions - this is what the Russian naval command intended to switch to. Unable to resist the Turks in a classic naval battle, the Russians decided to use the latest shipborne weapons - mines.

The birth of mine boats

By the 70s of the 19th century, sea mines were divided into stationary and mobile. The first were anchored underwater at a certain depth and exploded either from their own impact fuse or through an electrical cable from the shore. They were first used in the Crimean War, were actively used during the American Civil War and are still used today without fundamental changes.

Mobile mines required a carrier - a small boat that would hit the side of the enemy ship with a long pole with a mine suspended from it, or bring the mine to the enemy in tow. In Russia, experiments with mine boats began in 1862, when Major General Baron E. B. Tizenhausen proposed the design of a pole mine, which he called "mine ram". A mine with a charge of one and a half pounds of explosives on a 15 m long pole was tested on the gunboat "Experience" - it blew up the schooner "Meteor" at anchor. In 1868, the report of the commission of Admiral E.V. Putyatin, which conducted tests of pole mines, already spoke of the need “immediately... develop the issue of using underwater mines on destroyer ships in our country”. By the mid-1870s, the Russian fleet was armed with about ten types of pole mines with a charge of 3.2 to 182 kg of artillery gunpowder. These mines were supposed to arm a wide variety of ships - from small boats to gunboats and even cruisers.

The first special mine boat, designed to operate with pole mines, was built in England in 1873 - it had a displacement of 7.5 tons and a huge speed of 15 knots for those times. In Russia, similar boats began to be ordered from the Berda plant in the fall of 1876, on the eve of the war with Turkey - they were armed with both pole mines and towed “lionfish” mines. The latter were less reliable and more difficult to use, but somewhat safer, since they did not require bringing the boat close to the target.

Whitehead self-propelled mine

The main disadvantage of movable mines remained the extremely short distance for attack, which made the carrier ships of these weapons extremely vulnerable not only to artillery, but even to rifle fire. This pushed for the creation of a mine capable of reaching an enemy ship on its own. Such weapons were developed in different countries, but the greatest success was achieved by the English engineer Robert Whitehead, who worked in the workshops of the Austrian port of Fiume - he was the first to create a reliable and technologically advanced hydrostatic device that allowed the mine to move steadily at a predetermined depth.

The Luppis-Whitehead "fish torpedo" was first tested in Austria in 1868. A year later, England bought a patent for the production of self-propelled mines; in 1872, France acquired a batch of these weapons; in 1873, Italy and Germany. In Russia, Admiral A. A. Popov insisted on completing the development of a domestic self-propelled mine of the I. F. Aleksandrovsky system, so the contract with Whitehead was concluded only in March 1876. By the end of the year, the first three batches of torpedoes (20 pieces) were delivered to Russia, in 1877 - another 55 copies, in 1878 - 25. The new weapon was very expensive, so for the war with Turkey... it was simply not issued.

Mine boats are heading to the Danube

At the end of 1876, the massive dispatch of mine boats to the Danube began - they were supposed to operate only with pole and towed mines. The boats had to be delivered from the railway on carts, so they arrived on the Lower Danube only at the beginning of hostilities (in mid-April), and on the Middle Danube their concentration ended in early June. From the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, special detachments of sailors were allocated (Baltic - 445 people, Black Sea - 200 people), intended to staff the Danube River Flotilla. Already in November 1876, both detachments were sent to Chisinau at the disposal of the commander of the Russian army in Bessarabia.

The Turks maintained a strong Danube squadron on the Danube under the command of Admiral Mehmet Arif Pasha, the basis of which was the turret armored corvettes Lutf-yu Jelil and Hivz-ur Rahman, stationed in Tulcea. These were large seaworthy ships with a displacement of 2540 tons, protected by an armor belt up to 140 mm thick. Each of them carried two 229 mm and two 178 mm muzzle-loading guns, as well as one 120 mm breech-loading gun.

In addition, there were small river monitors "Khizber" and "Seifi" (404 tons, two 120-mm muzzle-loading guns each), as well as five armored gunboats of the "Feth-ul-Islam" type (335 tons, two 150-mm muzzle-loading guns). Both monitors and the gunboat "Semendire" were stationed in the port of Sulin at the very mouth of the Danube, the remaining ships were located higher up the river: in Machina - the paddle steamers "Kiliji Ali" and "Arkadion", in Gabrovo - the armored gunboat "Feth-ul-Islam", the wooden gunboat Akkia and the paddle steamer Hayredan. In Silistria there was the wheeled steamer "Islahat", in Rushchuk - the armored gunboats "Boportlen" and "Iskodra", the wooden gunboats "Varna" and "Shefket-Numa". In Vidin there were the armored gunboat Podgorica, the iron gunboat Sunna and the paddle steamer Nusretie. In addition, the Danube squadron had 9 transport ships and two dozen small ships.

Turkish river monitor “Hizber” of the same type as “Seyfi”, 1875.
B. Langensiepen, A. Guleryuz, J. Cooper. The Ottoman Steam Navy 1828–1923

The main disadvantage of the Turkish ships was the lack of horizontal armor - only the Khizber-type monitors, in addition to the 76-mm side, carried a 32-mm armored deck.

The main bases of the Turkish squadron were located in the Sulina arm and the Machinsky branch of the Danube - out of sight of Russian observers from the left bank of the river. Together with the Danube Army of Abdulkerim Nadir Pasha and a chain of fortresses, the squadron was supposed to prevent Russian and Romanian troops from crossing the Danube and invading Dobruja and Bulgaria. Thus, the success of the land campaign depended entirely on victory in the river war.

The beginning of the mine war

The fighting began on April 12 (according to the new style - 24) April 1877, when Russian troops entered Romania, formally a vassal of the Ottoman Sultan. By mid-May, almost the entire territory of Romania along the left bank of the Danube was occupied.

The Turks did not intend to defend the northern bank of the Danube, but the river line itself along the border with Bulgaria was covered by a chain of powerful fortresses: Vidin, Nikopol, Rushchuk, Turtukai, Silistra. The main crossing point was Zimnitsa, which lies between Nikopol and Rushchuk - the main forces of the Russian army were concentrated here. Assistance in crossing the river was provided by the Danube River Flotilla, the basis of which was steam boats transported overland, armed with pole or towed mines.

The general course of hostilities in the European theater of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877–1878. Marine atlas. Volume III military history. Part one

At the same time, the Lower Danube detachment as part of the 14th Infantry Corps operated in the lower reaches of the Danube against Dobrudzha. Back in April, to support it, a Black Sea detachment of ships was formed and transferred by sea to the Kiliya arm, consisting of 4 steam mine boats, 2 towing ships adapted for laying mines (“Explosion” and “Barrage”), as well as Romanian ships: one gunboat boats, two armed steamers and one steam launch.

Already on the night of April 17 to 18 (from 29 to 30) the Black Sea detachment, consisting of the steamship "Zazhdanie" and several rowing boats under the command of Lieutenant Commander Bekleshev, placed the first minefield of 9 automatic and 12 galvanic shock mines at Reni (at the mouth of the Prut River) min. On April 18 (30), two steam boats from the detachment placed a barrage of 9 galvanic shock mines on the Seret River below Brailov. On the afternoon of April 18 (30), a detachment from boats and rowboats placed a minefield of 5 galvanic mines in one line on the Seret River in front of the Barboshsky railway bridge (later it was reinforced by a second line). To cover the barriers, large-caliber field batteries were installed on the left bank of the Danube.

First Russian victories

On April 29 (May 11) one of the most striking events of that war took place. Several Turkish ships, led by the battleship Lutf-yu Jelil, emerged from the lower reaches of the Machinsky branch. They soon entered into a firefight with Russian field batteries at Brailov. During the firefight, a 229-mm field mortar shell hit the unprotected deck of a Turkish battleship. The ship's cellars exploded and it sank almost instantly, while the Turkish squadron hastily took refuge in the Machinsky sleeve. This accidental hit made a huge impression on the Russian sailors - 229-mm mortars were considered such an effective weapon that they even tried to arm the battleship Peter the Great with them.

Turkish armored corvette Lutf-yu Jelil.

However, ships in the Machinsky branch, controlled by the Turks, still posed a serious danger, so on May 4 (16), a detachment of the Danube flotilla consisting of mine boats “Ksenia” (commander - Lieutenant Shestakov), “Dzhigit” (commander - midshipman Persin) and “Tsarevna” ( commander - midshipman Bal), together with five rowboats, under fire from Turkish ships, placed a barrage of 32 galvanic mines in two lines in the lower part of the Machinsky sleeve (above Brailov). On May 12 (24), Russian ships made a demonstrative performance - in front of the Turks, they dumped sandbags into the water at the exit from the Machinsky sleeve.

Mine boat "Ksenia".

On the night of 13 to 14 (25 to 26) May, Russian sailors won their first victory. A detachment consisting of four mine boats (“Tsarevich”, “Ksenia”, “Dzhigit” and “Tsarevna”) left Brailov for the Machinsky sleeve to attack the anchorage of Turkish ships. Near Machin, the boats found the Seyfi monitor standing in the middle of the river, and to the left of it the armored gunboat Feth-ul-Islam and the armed steamer Kiliji Ali. The boats turned into two columns and attacked enemy ships under enemy fire. “Tsarevich” hit the monitor with a pole mine in the aft part of the starboard side, and “Ksenia” - in the left side under the turret. After the second explosion, the Seyfi quickly sank.

The sinking of the monitor "Safe" at Machin on the night of May 13-14, 1877.

On May 27 (June 8), a detachment of ships consisting of the Romanian gunboat “Grand Duke Nicholas”, as well as the mine boats “Tsarevich” and “Ksenia”, which left Gura-Yalomitsa to the Turkish-occupied Girsov (now the Romanian city of Hirsov), met here the Turkish monitor and attacked him. The monitor considered it best to retreat, and the boats pursued him all the way to Girsov in order to determine the fire zone of the Turkish coastal artillery, after which they returned. The next day, the same ships and the boat “Dzhigit” discovered two Turkish gunboats in the upper part of the Machinsky sleeve, which immediately retreated, opening the entrance to the sleeve. After this, Russian boats laid a minefield in the upper reaches of the Machinsky branch.

Due to the spring flood, the crossing of the Danube was scheduled for mid-July. Preparations for the operation began a month in advance: from June 7 to 11 (from 19 to 23) minefields were placed on both sides of the intended crossing site (between Sistovo and Nikopol). At the same time, on June 8 (20), a detachment under the command of Captain 1st Rank M.D. Novikov, consisting of 10 steam boats, met the Turkish military steamer Ereklik at Parapan, coming from the direction of Rushchuk. The steamer opened grapeshot fire at the boats and boats with mines and in response was attacked by the boat “Shutka” (commander - midshipman Nilov). The attack was unsuccessful - the bullets broke the electrical conductors to the charge of the pole mine, and it did not explode, even when it hit the side of the ship. Deciding not to tempt fate, “Ereklik” turned around and went to Rushchuk. As a result of this operation, the Turkish ships were separated and locked in their bases (Ruschuk and Nikopol). It is interesting that the artist V.V. Vereshchagin, who received a bullet wound in the battle on June 8, was on the “Joke” as a volunteer.

Mine boat "Shutka".
Magazine "Naval Campaign". 2011, No. 1

On June 11 (23), while the boats of the Upper Danube detachment were laying mines near Flamunda, the Turkish monitor “Podgorica” left Nikopol. The boats “Mina” (commanded by midshipman Arens) and “Shutka” tried to attack him, but were repulsed by grapeshot and rifle fire; The monitor also turned back.

On June 12 (24), on the fairway near Corabia (above Nikopol), the rowing boats of Captain 1st Rank M.D. Novikov placed another barrage of 23 galvanic shock mines in two lines, and from June 13 to 15 (from 25 to 27) the barrier at Flamunda was reinforced with another line of 36 minutes.

Crossing the Danube

The Lower Danube detachment was the first to take action, with the goal of diverting the attention of the Turks from the direction of the main attack. Early in the morning of June 10 (22), Russian troops began crossing the Danube at Galati and Brailov, where the Danube turns sharply to the Black Sea. At the same time, a detachment consisting of the gunboat “Grand Duke Nikolai”, the boats “Tsarevna” and “Ptichka” made a diversionary exit to the Turkish batteries. As a result, the Galati detachment (two regiments) successfully crossed the Danube, occupied Budzhak and captured the Budzhak Heights.

On this day, the main forces of Zimmerman's 11th Corps were crossing at Brailov. On June 11 (23), the boats “Tsarevich” (commander – Lieutenant Shestakov), “Ptichka” (commander – Midshipman Arkas) and “Tsarevna” (commander – Midshipman Bal) carried out reconnaissance near Machin and discovered that the city had been abandoned by the Turks. On June 13 (25), Zimmermarn’s corps occupied Galati, 14 (26) – Tulcea and Isaccia, 15 (27) – Brailov. On June 26 (July 8), Girsov was occupied by an attack from the north, after which the entire Machinsky branch came under Russian control. By the beginning of July, Russian troops occupied the entire Northern Dobruja, reaching the Cernavode-Constanza line. The Turkish Danube squadron was blocked at the mouth of the Danube, a difficult-to-reach area between the Kiliya and Sulina arms.

Fighting on the Danube in 1877.
Marine atlas. Volume III military history. Part one

On the night of June 14 to 15 (from 26 to 27) the main Russian forces began crossing the Danube at Zimnitsa opposite the city of Sistova. The first to cross the river on iron rowing pontoons was the detachment of General M.I. Dragomirov. The Turks had about 4,000 people at the crossing site and were unable to offer serious resistance - all their forces were diverted to other areas and the defense of fortresses. A Turkish ship (according to some sources, the armored corvette Khivz-ur Rahman) came out from Nikopol to the crossing, but the demonstration of an attack by the boats Peter the Great, Experience and General Admiral forced it to turn back.

By the end of June 15 (27), 30,000 people had already been transported to the southern bank of the Danube. Construction of a pontoon bridge across Ada Island began and was completed in three days. Two weeks later, all four Russian corps were already on the Bulgarian coast.

Crossing of Russian troops across the Danube at Zimnitsa and its support.
Marine atlas. Volume III military history. Part one

On the night of 16 to 17 (28 to 29) June, the barrier at Parapan on the main fairway of the Danube was reinforced with another 25 mines, placed in a checkerboard pattern. Now the Turkish ships had no chance of breaking through from Rushchuk up the Danube. On June 18 (30), a team of guards sappers from rowboats set up a barrage of 42 galvanic mines in three lines near the island of Vardin, and on June 19 (July 1) the barrage at Flamunda was reinforced by laying new mines from boats. During these days, the Russian flotilla suffered its first setback: on June 17 (29), near Turnu Severin, the steamer Ada was overtaken by a Turkish monitor and scuttled by its crew to avoid capture.

On June 23 (July 5) Byala was taken, and two days later - Tarnovo. On July 2 (14), Russian troops reached the Khankioi Pass, and on July 5 (17) they occupied the Shipka Pass. The corps of Lieutenant General N.P. Kridener began the siege of the Nikopol fortress - on the morning of July 3 (15), Russian troops began bombing, and in the afternoon they occupied several redoubts covering the fortress. The assault was scheduled for the next day, but never began - early in the morning of July 4 (16), the Turkish garrison threw out a white flag. On the same day, on the Osma River near Nikopol, the river gunboats Podgorica and Iskodra, partially damaged by field artillery, with their boilers disabled, were discovered. The gunboats were repaired, included in the Russian Danube Flotilla and renamed Nikopol and Sistovo.

Turkish river armored gunboat "Feth-ul-Islam". “Iskodra” and “Podgorica” belonged to the same type.
Magazine "Naval Campaign". 2011, No. 2

Fighting in the lower Danube and the end of the campaign

From that moment on, the Turkish flotilla on the Danube was cut into three parts: above Nikopol; on the section from Ruschuk to Silistra (above Chernavode); in the lower reaches of the river (Sulina branch). Even the Turkish ships that retained their combat capability no longer posed a significant threat. On July 9 (21), a Russian detachment (gunboat "Grand Duke Nikolai", boats "Tsarevich" and "Ptichka") left Cernavode up the Danube to reconnoiter the location of enemy troops retreating to Silistria and fought with enemy ships near the village of Budzhaki; According to reports from the crews, a fire broke out on the Turkish ship, identified as the monitor, from the fire of the 10-pound bow gun of the gunboat.

After this, the activity of the river flotillas finally moved to the lower reaches of the Danube, where the Turks had the most powerful ships, and most importantly, access to the sea through Sulin. Here the Russians needed, at a minimum, to lock the enemy in girts, not allowing him to rise higher, and, if possible, to attack the enemy and deprive him of striking power. For this purpose, on July 28 (August 9), a flotilla of Lieutenant-Commander Dikov, holding the flag on the armed steamer “Experience,” arrived from Odessa to the Kiliya Arm to help the Lower Danube detachment. On August 12 (24), “Experience”, with the support of four mine boats, placed a barrier of 20 galvanic mines in two lines at the entrance to the Georgievskoe arm.

At the beginning of September, Dikov’s detachment was reinforced by ships that came from Odessa - the schooner “Raven”, the steamer “Sister” and three mine boats. On September 27 (October) Dikov tried to attack Sulin, located at the very mouth of the branch, and from the land covered by floodplains and swamps. The steamship "Opyt", the armed steam schooners "Voron", "Duck" and "Swan", as well as a mortar barge, descended along the Sulinsky arm to the third mile, where at night the boats laid a minefield. The steamship Kartal and the gunboat Sunne came out to meet them. The fire of the schooner "Voron" (900 tons, three 153-mm cannons) forced the "Kartal" to retreat to Sulin, and the gunboat "Sunne" (200 tons, 4 guns) ran into mines and sank. Dikov's detachment went even further and entered into a firefight with the battleships Khivz-ur Rahman and Mukadem-i Khair. At 13:00, due to the creeping fog, the battle was stopped, and Dikov’s detachment retreated up the river.

The battle of Dikov’s detachment near Sulin on September 27–28, 1877.
Marine atlas. Volume III military history. Part one

The next day, Dikov’s detachment again went down to Sulin and, hiding behind a minefield, entered into a firefight with two Turkish monitors. “Hivz-ur Rahman” was hit by a 153-mm shell from the schooner “Raven” and retreated, after which “Mukadem-i Khair” also retreated to the mouth of the Danube.

At this point, attempts to storm Sulin from the upper reaches of the Danube stopped. In January 1878, Chikhachev’s detachment that came from Odessa made an unsuccessful attempt to attack Sulin from the sea, but this no longer had strategic significance - the Turkish fleet was inactive.

In the middle reaches of the Danube, military clashes were also sporadic. Thus, on October 2 (14), Lieutenant Dubasov’s detachment, consisting of the gunboat “Experience” and four mine boats, tried to burn Turkish ships near Silistria with six fire ships - the only case of the use of fire ships in this war. One fire-ship was sent adrift towards a Turkish patrol ship, but to no avail. On November 30 (December 12), the Nikopol monitor exchanged fire with three Turkish ships off Mechka Island near Rushchuk, and also fired at the location of enemy troops.

"Grand Duke Konstantin" - carrier of mine boats

The armed steamship "Grand Duke Konstantin" (formerly one of the best liners of the Russian Society of Shipping and Trade) became the most active Russian cruiser of the war of 1877–1878. Enormous credit for this belonged to its commander - lieutenant (later - captain of the 2nd rank) S. O. Makarov, later a famous admiral and shipbuilder.

However, Makarov, who was appointed to this position on December 13 (25), 1876 and was personally involved in the re-equipment of the Konstantin, dreamed of turning it into a real attack ship, capable of fighting not only transports, but also Turkish battleships. In his opinion, the main weapon of the cruiser should have been four mine boats - “Chesma”, “Sinop”, “Navarin” and “Miner”. The last three were ordinary ship boats, and the Chesma was distinguished by its speed, reaching a speed of 12 knots (twice as fast as the others). Armed with pole and towed mines, Makarov’s boats were supposed to attack Turkish ships in harbors and roadsteads, where the seaworthy Konstantin delivered them.

Steamship "Grand Duke Konstantin".
Magazine "Naval Campaign". 2011, No. 1

Alas, the first attack on the Batumi roadstead on the night of April 28-29 (May 10-11) was unsuccessful: Chesma was able to place a towed mine under the stern of the Turkish yacht Sultaniye, but the electric fuse did not work. Exactly a month later, boats from the Konstantin tried to attack Turkish ships in the Sulina roadstead, but were unable to force the booms; the Chesmy towed mine got entangled in this obstacle. As a result, only two larger and faster destroyers No. 1 and No. 2 (with a displacement of 6 and 24 tons, purchased just before the war in England and Denmark, respectively) went on the attack. Both of them were able to detonate their mines on the side of the armored corvette Ijaliye - alas, too early, so the Turkish ship was not damaged. Destroyer No. 1 was damaged by rifle and grapeshot fire and sank, its entire crew being captured.

The next attack attempt by mine boats took place on the evening of August 11 (23) in Sukhum-Kale Bay. By this time, the Turks had already defended all their ports and anchorages with booms, but the Russian sailors used new tactics: the boat "Sinop" brought its mine under the barrier and detonated it, after which the "Navarin" and "Miner" entered the harbor and attacked with towed mines a Turkish ship that turned out to be an armored corvette "Assar-i Tevfik". One of the mines exploded near the side, the battleship received an underwater hole, but remained afloat and was taken to Batum for repairs.

It became clear to Makarov that pole mines, and especially towed mines, are extremely unreliable weapons. If on rivers with their narrow fairways mines still had a chance of success, then on the open sea they were completely powerless. The boat could not keep up with a seaworthy ship, that is, it was possible to attack the enemy only in harbors protected by booms, patrol ships and artillery. Under these conditions, the chances of a mine boat getting close to the victim became illusory. Thus, a weapon was required that could hit the enemy from a distance of at least several tens of meters - a self-propelled mine. There were already such mines in Russia, and Makarov, promoted to captain of the 2nd rank in September 1877, made every effort to obtain them. The boats “Sinop” and “Chesma” were equipped with new weapons. “Sinop” was dragging a raft with a mine in tow, during an attack it pulled it to the side and aimed it with its hull. On the Chesma, a wooden pipe was installed under the keel, into which the Whitehead mine was placed.

Torpedoes go into battle

The first attack with self-propelled mines took place on December 15 (27), 1877. Late in the evening, “Grand Duke Constantine” approached the Batumi roadstead and launched the boats into the water. “Chesma” and “Sinop” successfully overcame the boom without getting caught on anything. In the darkness of the southern night, three masts were discovered off the coast, and the sailors decided that it was a large three-masted ship, standing on its side to the shore. In fact, these were three battleships, standing in a row with their stern to the shore. The fired torpedoes passed between them and jumped ashore - the Turks later stated that they found them unexploded and even announced their serial numbers. However, according to reports from the boat crews, one explosion did occur - perhaps one of the torpedoes hit the anchor chain and broke in two, the warhead fell to the bottom and exploded, and the tail with the propellers moved on.

The failure did not discourage Makarov. On his next trip to the Caucasian coast, he decided to attack the ships off Batum again. On the night of January 13 to 14 (25 to 26), 1878, “Chesma” and “Sinop” again penetrated the Batumi roadstead. There were many ships moored here, including three battleships, but the roadstead was illuminated by the moon, and the boat crews were strictly instructed to attack for sure. Therefore, they chose a separate patrol ship as victims and fired torpedoes at it from a distance of 30–40 fathoms (64–85 m). Both torpedoes hit their target, the ship exploded and quickly sank, killing 23 Turkish sailors.

It later turned out that the torpedoes had sunk the small gunboat Intibakh with a displacement of 163 tons, armed with three 18-pound muzzle-loading cannons. The sunken ship did not have great military significance, but the explosion on the Batumi roadstead became a symbolic final chord of the war: on January 19 (31) a truce was signed in Adrianople.

Turkish gunboat "Intibah".
Magazine "Naval Campaign". 2011, No. 2

The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 was not the first conflict in which mines were actively used, but it was the first to demonstrate that these weapons could become decisive in a naval war - this was facilitated by the passivity of the Turkish fleet. As a result, this led to some exaggeration of the capabilities of mine boats as a means capable of neutralizing the enemy's superiority in large ships. It was in 1878 that the massive construction of torpedo weapon carriers—destroyers and torpedo boats—began all over the world.

Sources and literature:

1. Marine atlas. Volume III military history. Part one. General Staff of the Navy, 1959
2. Marine atlas. Volume III military history. Part one. Descriptions for cards. General Staff of the Navy, 1959
3. Battle chronicle of the Russian fleet: Chronicle of the most important events in the military history of the Russian fleet from the 9th century. to 1917 M.: Voenizdat, 1948
4. N.V. Skritsky. Corsairs of Russia. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2007
5. V. Chubinsky. On the participation of sailors in the war with Turkey of 1877–1878. St. Petersburg, 1899
6. V. G. Andrienko. Round ships of Admiral Popov. St. Petersburg: Gangut, 1994
7. William Allen, Pavel Muratov. Battles for the Caucasus. History of wars on the Turkish-Caucasian front. 1828–1921. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2016
8. Magazine "Naval Campaign". 2007, No. 1
9. Magazine "Naval Campaign". 2007, No. 2
10. V.V. Yarovoy. Steamship "Grand Duke Konstantin" // Magazine "Gangut", 2001, No. 21
11. B. Langensiepen, A. Guleryuz, J. Cooper. The Ottoman Steam Navy 1828–1923. Conway Maritime Press, 1995

COURSE OF EVENTS

The inability to improve the situation of Christians in the Balkans by peaceful means and the rise of national self-awareness in the Balkan countries led to Russia declaring war on Turkey in April 1877. The Russian army crossed the Danube, captured the Shipka Pass, and after a five-month siege forced the Turkish army of Osman Pasha to capitulate in Plevna.

The size of the Russian expeditionary force in the Balkans at the beginning of the war was about 185 thousand people, and by the end of the war it reached half a million. The raid through the Balkans, during which the Russian army defeated the last Turkish units, led to the Ottoman Empire's withdrawal from the war.

As a result of the war, the San Stefano Preliminary Treaty was concluded. However, its terms provoked a sharply negative reaction from the great powers, who feared Russia's enormously increased influence in the Balkans. They forced Russia to revise the treaty, and it was actually replaced by the Berlin Treaty signed at the Berlin Congress on June 1/13, 1878. As a result, the acquisitions of Russia and the Balkan states that fought on the side of Russia for their independence were greatly reduced, and Austria-Hungary and England They even received certain gains from a war in which they did not take part. The statehood of Bulgaria was restored, the territory of Serbia, Montenegro and Romania was increased. At the same time, Turkish Bosnia and Herzegovina went to Austria-Hungary.

Having occupied Tyrnov, General Gurko collected information about the enemy and on June 28 moved to Kazanlak, bypassing the Shipka Pass. In extreme heat and along mountain paths, the Advance Detachment covered 120 miles in 6 days. Shipka's double attack from the north (July 5) and south (July 6) was unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the news of Gurko’s crossing of the Balkans had such an effect on the Turks that their detachment occupying Shipka abandoned its excellent position, abandoned all its artillery at the pass and retreated to Philippopolis.

On July 7, Shipka was taken without a fight. We lost about 400 people and captured 6 guns and up to 400 prisoners at the pass. […]

By the evening of the 17th, Gurko's detachments came into contact with the enemy. On the 18th and 19th a number of battles took place, which were generally successful for us. The 4th Rifle Brigade covered 75 versts in the mountains in one day on July 17-18. On July 18, near Yeni Zagra, the riflemen shot down a Turkish detachment, capturing 2 guns and losing 7 officers and 102 lower ranks. On July 19, a stubborn battle took place near Juranly, where we lost 20 officers and 498 lower ranks, but killed up to 2,000 Turks. At Eski-Zagra, the Bulgarian militia lost 34 officers and 1000 lower ranks; the entire flower of the Turkestan riflemen officers fell here. However, we suffered a setback at Eski Zagra, where the Bulgarian militia was defeated. On July 19, Gurko's troops retreated to Shipka and Khanikioy. They risked finding themselves in a hopeless situation, but Suleiman did not pursue, being carried away by beating the Bulgarian population, and we could save Shipka. This was the only, but major positive result of the summer transition of the Balkans: by holding Shipka, we separated the actions of all three Turkish armies. Weak in numbers, Gurko's detachment did everything it could do and came out of its predicament with honor. […]

Having lost 19 days after the affair at Eski Zagra (when he could have captured Shipka almost unhindered), on August 7 Suleiman with 40,000 and 54 guns approached the Shipka Pass. Radetzky's troops, who defended the Balkans, and also had the task of covering the left flank of the Plevna group and the right flank of the Rushchuk detachment, were scattered along the front 130 miles from Selvi to Kesarev. On Shipka itself there were 4,000 people (the Oryol regiment and the remnants of the Bulgarian militia) with 28 guns. Having spent another day, Suleiman stormed the strongest part of the Russian positions at the pass head-on on August 9.

Thus began the famous six-day Battle of Shipka. Attacks followed attacks, camp followed camp. Having fired their cartridges, tormented by a cruel thirst, the defenders of the “Eagle’s Nest” - Oryol and Bryansk - fought back with stones and rifle butts. On August 11, Suleiman was already celebrating victory, but then at the decisive moment, like a bolt from a clear sky, “Hurray!” 4th Infantry Brigade, which marched 60 miles with lightning speed in forty-degree heat. Shipka was saved - and on these hot cliffs the 4th Infantry Brigade earned its immortal name of the “Iron Brigade”.

The 14th division of General Dragomirov arrived here, Radetsky himself began to personally control the battle, and on August 13, the buglers of the Suleiman camps began to play the all-clear. On August 9, by the evening we had 6,000 people; the Turks who stormed had 28,000 and 36 guns. On August 10, Radetzky moved reserves to Shipka; The Turks, repelled the day before, fought an artillery battle all day. August 11 was a critical day. The Russian position was covered from three sides. The 16th Rifle Battalion arrived in time at a critical moment on the croup of Cossack horses, rushing from the spot with bayonets. On August 12, the 2nd brigade of the 14th division arrived, and on August 13, the Volyn regiment arrived. Radetzky launched a counterattack (personally leading a company of Zhytomyr residents with bayonets). On August 13 and 14, battles were fought with varying degrees of success. Dragomirov was wounded, and the commander of the 2nd brigade of the 9th division, General Derozhinsky, was killed. Our damage: 2 generals, 108 officers, 3338 lower ranks. The Turks showed theirs at 233 officers and 6527 lower ranks, but in fact it is twice as large - in a letter to Seraskiriat, Suleiman urgently demanded 12,000 - 15,000 people to replenish the loss. To have an idea of ​​the conditions of protection for Shipka, it is enough to note that water for our wounded had to be delivered 17 miles away!

RESTRICTIONS AT SEA

Since the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877–1878. Makarov's energy, ingenuity and perseverance found new application. As is known, by virtue of the Paris Treaty of 1856, Russia was deprived of the right to have a combat fleet in the Black Sea, and although this treaty was annulled in 1871, Russia still had to create a strong military fleet in the Black Sea by the beginning of the Russian-Turkish War did not have time and, except for floating batteries, wooden corvettes and several schooners, had nothing there. Türkiye by this time had a large fleet with strong artillery. On the Black Sea, she could use 15 battleships, 5 screw frigates, 13 screw corvettes, 8 monitors, 7 armored gunboats and a large number of small ships.

The balance of forces in the Black Sea was far from being in Russia's favor. Given the small number of naval forces, it was necessary to find effective methods of combating the strong Turkish fleet. The solution to this problem was found by Makarov.

CAPTAIN-LIEUTENANT MAKAROV

At the end of 1876, the inevitability of war with Turkey became clear. Makarov received command of the ship "Grand Duke Konstantin". After a stubborn struggle, he realized his idea of ​​arming the ship with high-speed mine boats, raised on special davits, and placed on it artillery of 4-inch rifled guns and one 6-inch mortar.

At first, the boats were armed with pole and towing mines, the use of which required that the boat approach almost closely to the enemy ship.

The first attack with such mines was carried out on May 12, 1877 on a Turkish patrol ship. The mine touched its side, but did not explode due to a malfunction of the fuse (as the study showed, 30% of the fuses did not explode due to their careless manufacture). The Sulina attack on June 9 also failed. On August 24, a mine attack was carried out on the Sukhumi roadstead: the Turkish battleship was damaged, but did not sink and was taken by the Turks in tow to Batum. Although there were Whitehead self-propelled mines [torpedoes] in the warehouse in Nikolaev, they were released to Makarov only in July 1877, i.e. almost four months after the start of the war, considering that the mines, which cost 12,000 rubles apiece, were “too expensive to waste.”

The torpedo attack launched on the night of December 28 failed: the torpedoes did not hit the enemy battleship and jumped ashore. But the next torpedo attack was successful. On the night of January 26, 1878, a Turkish patrol steamer was attacked and sunk in the Batumi roadstead.

Makarov’s most brilliant deed was the diversion of an enemy battleship assigned to guard Colonel Shelkovnikov’s detachment (the latter was to retreat under pressure from superior Turkish forces along a narrow road that ran along the edge of a steep cliff rising above the sea). Makarov caused the battleship to chase after the Konstantin, and at this time Shelkovnikov, unnoticed, led his detachment without any losses.

For the brilliant actions of the steamship "Konstantin" Makarov received the highest military awards in his rank (St. George 4th degree and golden weapons) and was additionally promoted to the rank of lieutenant captain, and then captain of the 2nd rank and awarded the rank of aide-de-camp.

SAN STEFAN PRILIMINAR PEACE TREATY

The Sublime Porte will have the right to use passage through Bulgaria to transport troops, military supplies and provisions along certain routes to areas outside the Principality and back. Within three months from the date of ratification of this act, in order to avoid difficulties and misunderstandings in the application of this right, the conditions for its use will be determined, by agreement of the Sublime Porte with the administration in Bulgaria, by a special charter, ensuring, among other things, the military needs of the Sublime Porte.

It goes without saying that the above-mentioned right applies exclusively to Ottoman regular troops, while the irregulars - Bashi-Buzouks and Circassians - will certainly be excluded from it. […]

ARTICLE XII

All fortresses on the Danube will be demolished. From now on there will be no more fortifications on the banks of this river; There will also be no military courts in the waters of the Romanian, Serbian and Bulgarian principalities, except for ordinary stationary and small vessels intended for the needs of the river police and customs administration. […]

ARTICLE XXIV

The Bosporus and Dardanelles will be open, both in time of war and in time of peace, to the merchant ships of neutral powers coming from or going to Russian ports. As a result, the Sublime Porte undertakes to no longer establish an invalid blockade of the ports of the Black and Azov Seas, as inconsistent with the exact meaning of the declaration signed in Paris

San Stefano Preliminary Peace Treaty San Stefano, February 19/March 3, 1878 // Collection of treaties between Russia and other states. 1856-1917. M., 1952 http://www.hist.msu.ru/ER/Etext/FOREIGN/stefano.htm

FROM SAN STEFAN TO BERLIN

On February 19, 1878, a peace treaty was signed in San Stefano. Under its terms, Bulgaria received the status of an autonomous principality. Serbia, Montenegro and Romania gained complete independence and significant territorial increments. Southern Bessarabia, seized by the Treaty of Paris, was returned to Russia, and the Kars region in the Caucasus was transferred.

The provisional Russian administration that ruled Bulgaria developed a draft constitution. Bulgaria was proclaimed a constitutional monarchy. Personal and property rights were guaranteed. The Russian project formed the basis of the Bulgarian Constitution, adopted by the Constituent Assembly in Tarnovo in April 1879.

England and Austria-Hungary refused to recognize the terms of the Peace of San Stefano. At their insistence, in the summer of 1878, the Berlin Congress was held with the participation of England, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Turkey. Russia found itself isolated and was forced to make concessions. The Western powers categorically objected to the creation of a unified Bulgarian state. As a result, Southern Bulgaria remained under Turkish rule. Russian diplomats only managed to achieve that Sofia and Varna were included in the autonomous Bulgarian principality. The territory of Serbia and Montenegro was significantly reduced. The Congress confirmed the right of Austria-Hungary to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In a report to the Tsar, the head of the Russian delegation, Chancellor A.M. Gorchakov wrote: “The Berlin Congress is the darkest page in my career!” The king noted: “And in mine too.”

The Berlin Congress, undoubtedly, did not brighten the diplomatic history of not only Russia, but also the Western powers. Driven by petty momentary calculations and envy of the brilliant victory of Russian weapons, the governments of these countries extended Turkish rule over several million Slavs.

And yet the fruits of the Russian victory were only partially destroyed. Having laid the foundations for the freedom of the fraternal Bulgarian people, Russia has written a glorious page in its history. Russo-Turkish War 1877–1878 entered into the general context of the era of Liberation and became its worthy completion.

Bokhanov A.N., Gorinov M.M. from the beginning of the 18th to the end of the 19th century, M., 2001. http://kazez.net/book_98689_glava_129_%C2%A7_4._Russko_-_ture%D1%81kaja_vojj.html

[…] ARTICLE I

Bulgaria forms a self-governing and tribute-paying principality, under the leadership of the e.i.v. Sultan; it will have a Christian government and a people's militia. […]

ARTICLE III

The Prince of Bulgaria will be freely elected by the population and confirmed by the Sublime Porte with the consent of the powers. None of the members of the dynasties reigning in the great European powers can be elected prince of Bulgaria. If the title of Prince of Bulgaria remains unfilled, the election of a new prince will be carried out under the same conditions and in the same form. […]

The following principles will be adopted as the basis of the state law of Bulgaria: Differences in religious beliefs and confessions cannot serve as a reason for the exclusion of anyone, or the non-recognition of someone’s legal capacity in everything that relates to the enjoyment of civil and political rights, access to public positions , official occupations and distinctions, or before the departure of various free occupations and crafts in any locality. All Bulgarian natives, as well as foreigners, are guaranteed freedom and external performance of all religious services; Nor can any restrictions be made in the hierarchical structure of various religious communities and in their relations with their spiritual heads. […]

ARTICLE XIII

A province will be formed to the south of the Balkans, which will receive the name “Eastern Rumelia” and which will remain under the direct political and military authority of the e.i.v. Sultan on terms of administrative autonomy. She will have a Christian governor general. […]

ARTICLE XXV

The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary. […]

ARTICLE XXVI

The independence of Montenegro is recognized by the Sublime Porte and by all those high contracting parties who have not yet recognized it. […]

ARTICLE XXXIV

The High Contracting Parties recognize the independence of the Serbian Principality […]

ARTICLE LVIII

The Sublime Porte cedes to the Russian Empire in Asia the territories of Ardahan, Kars and Batum, with the port of the latter, as well as all the territories contained between the former Russian-Turkish border and the next border line. […]

The Alashkert Valley and the city of Bayazet, ceded to Russia by Article XIX of the Treaty of San Stefano, are returned to Turkey. […]

Actions in the Asian theater of war

Russian troops, gathered on the borders of Asian Turkey, occupied the following location at the beginning of April: the main forces - up to 30 thousand - stood at Alexandropol; Akhaltsykh detachment (up to 7 thousand) Lieutenant General Devely - at Alkhalkalak; Erivan detachment (up to 11.5 thousand) Lieutenant General Tergukasov - at Igdyr. These troops were under the main command of Admiral General Loris-Melikov. In addition, a special Kobulet detachment of Major General Oklobzhio was located at Ozurget, having minor posts along the Black Sea coast.

Fedor Danilovich Devel Arzas Artemyevich Tergukasov

Mikhail Tarielovich Loris-Melikov

By the day war was declared, the commander-in-chief of the Turkish forces in Asia Minor, Mukhtar Pasha, had at his disposal only 25-30 thousand, including the garrisons of fortresses; but in addition, almost the same number of troops were in Batum under the command of Dervish Pasha.

Mahmud Mukhtar Pasha

On April 12, the Russian side opened an offensive on all fronts: the main forces moved in small marches to Kars and on April 16 concentrated on a position near Yengikei.

Mukhtar had left the fortress the day before, having 7 battalions with him and, retreating before Russian cavalry detachments sent for reconnaissance, managed to escape beyond the Saganlug mountain range. - Meanwhile, Devel approached Ardahan, which turned out to be so strongly fortified that to assist in its capture, part of the main forces was separated, entrusted to the superiors of General Gaiman.

Vasily Alexandrovich Gaiman

The capture of Ardahan is the first major success of the Russian army in the Caucasus in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878.

Ardahan is a city in Northeastern Turkey. It is located on the Ardagan Plateau in the upper reaches of the Kura River, which is divided into two parts. Ardahan had an important strategic position, covering the routes to Batum and the fortresses of Erzurum and Kars. The Turkish command turned Ardahan into a heavily fortified fortress with forts and lunettes. The main defense positions were the Gelyaverdinsky (Gyulyaverdinsky) heights from the east and Mount Manglas from the north. The fortress garrison numbered 8,100 people with 95 fortress guns. At the end of April 1877, the Akhaltsikhe detachment of the active Caucasian Corps under the command of Lieutenant General F.D. Devel (8.5 thousand infantry and cavalry men with 28 guns) approached Ardahan and surrounded it. Devel did not dare to storm the city on his own and turned for help to the corps commander, cavalry general M. T. Loris-Melikov. The latter singled out a detachment under the command of Lieutenant General V.A. Gaiman and together with him headed to the fortress to carry out general leadership of the assault. Together with the arriving reinforcements, the Akhaltsikhe detachment amounted to 15 thousand bayonets and sabers with 56 field and 20 siege weapons.

On May 4 and 5, a reconnaissance was carried out and a plan was drawn up to storm the fortress, designed for two days - May 5 and 6. On the night of May 4, positions of 10 artillery batteries were equipped for shelling the fortifications. At dawn, the attack on the Gelyaverdyn Heights began, supported by massive fire from 20 guns. In the afternoon the fortifications were taken. Then preparations began for the assault on Ardahan. The first column of troops under the command of Devel was to carry out a demonstrative attack on the Ramazan fort; the second, led by V. A. Gaiman, delivered the main blow from the south, and part of the forces from the east from Gelyaverda (Gyulyaverdy). Before the assault, a massive artillery bombardment was carried out, and on May 5 the infantry went on the offensive. It began earlier than planned due to the fact that reconnaissance discovered the enemy’s hasty retreat into the mountains. By nightfall Ardahan was taken. The losses of the Russian troops amounted to 296 people killed and wounded, and the enemy - about 3,000 people.

Meanwhile, Lazarev’s detachment, which approached Kars, began siege work on October 13, and on November 6 the fortress was already in Russian hands. After this important event, the main goal of action seemed to be Erzurum, where the remnants of the enemy army were hiding and funds were collected to form new troops. But here the Turks’ allies were the onset of cold weather and the extreme difficulty of delivering all kinds of supplies along mountain roads. Among the troops standing in front of the fortress, disease and mortality reached terrifying proportions.

On January 21, a truce was concluded, under the terms of which Erzurum was handed over to Russian troops on February 11.

During military operations near Aladzhi and near Kars, the Ardagan detachment was assigned to guard peace in the vicinity of Ardagan. After the fall of Kars, this detachment was strengthened and its commander, Colonel Komarov, was ordered to move to Ardanuch and Artvin to establish Russian influence in the river valley. Chorokh and to facilitate the proposed operation against Batum. The troops allocated for this, starting the movement on December 2, occupied Ardanuch, and on December 9 defeated the Turkish detachment at a position near Dolis Khan. The news of the truce stopped them at Artvin. The Kobuleti detachment, reduced in composition around mid-June, received a strictly defensive purpose and fortified itself on Mukha-Estat, and the enemy troops facing it occupied the heights of Khutsubani. On August 1 and 12 they tried to dislodge our detachment from its position, but both times they were unsuccessful.

On November 15, Dervish Pasha withdrew his troops beyond the river. Kintrishi and stopped at the heights of Tsikhijiri. On January 18, the Kobuleti detachment attacked him, but was repulsed, and on January 22, news was received of the conclusion of a truce. The eastern coast of the Black Sea also entered the area of ​​military operations, and here the Turks, thanks to the dominance of their fleet, could control almost unhindered, since there were no coastal fortified points. To counter enemy landings and maintain calm in the country, there were only small detachments in

The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 was a war between the Russian Empire and Ottoman Turkey. It was caused by the rise of the national liberation movement in the Balkans and the aggravation of international contradictions in connection with this.

Uprisings against the Turkish yoke in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1875-1878) and Bulgaria (1876) sparked a social movement in Russia in support of the fraternal Slavic peoples. Responding to these sentiments, the Russian government came out in support of the rebels, hoping that if they were successful, they would strengthen their influence in the Balkans. Great Britain sought to pit Russia against Turkey and take advantage of the weakening of both countries.

In June 1876, the Serbo-Turkish War began, in which Serbia was defeated. To save it from death, Russia in October 1876 turned to the Turkish Sultan with a proposal to conclude a truce with Serbia.

In December 1876, the Constantinople Conference of the Great Powers was convened and tried to resolve the conflict diplomatically, but the Porte rejected their proposals. During secret negotiations, Russia managed to obtain guarantees of non-interference from Austria-Hungary in exchange for the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In April 1877, an agreement was concluded with Romania on the passage of Russian troops through its territory.

After the Sultan rejected a new reform project for the Balkan Slavs, developed at the initiative of Russia, on April 24 (April 12, old style), 1877, Russia officially declared war on Turkey.

In the European theater of operations, Russia had 185 thousand soldiers; together with its Balkan allies, the size of the group reached 300 thousand people. Russia had approximately 100 thousand soldiers in the Caucasus. In turn, the Turks in the European theater had a 186,000-strong force, and in the Caucasus they had approximately 90,000 soldiers. The Turkish fleet almost completely dominated the Black Sea; in addition, the Porte had the Danube flotilla.

In the context of the restructuring of the entire internal life of the country, the Russian government was unable to prepare for a long war, and the financial situation remained difficult. The forces allocated to the Balkan theater of operations were insufficient, but the morale of the Russian army was very high.

According to the plan, the Russian command intended to cross the Danube, cross the Balkans with a swift offensive and move on the Turkish capital - Constantinople. Relying on their fortresses, the Turks hoped to prevent Russian troops from crossing the Danube. However, these calculations of the Turkish command were disrupted.

In the summer of 1877, the Russian army successfully crossed the Danube. An advance detachment under the command of General Joseph Gurko quickly occupied the ancient capital of Bulgaria, the city of Tarnovo, and then captured an important passage through the Balkans - the Shipka Pass. Further advance was suspended due to lack of forces.

In the Caucasus, Russian troops captured the fortresses of Bayazet and Ardahan, defeated the Anatolian Turkish army during the Battle of Avliyar-Alajin in 1877, and then captured the fortress of Kars in November 1877.

The actions of Russian troops near Plevna (now Pleven) on the western flank of the army were unsuccessful. Due to gross mistakes by the tsarist command, the Turks managed to detain large forces of Russian (and somewhat later Romanian) troops here. Three times Russian troops stormed Plevna, suffering huge losses, and each time without success.

In December, the forty thousand-strong garrison of Plevna capitulated.

The fall of Plevna caused the rise of the Slavic liberation movement. Serbia entered the war again. Bulgarian militias fought heroically in the ranks of the Russian army.

By 1878, the balance of power in the Balkans had changed in favor of Russia. The Danube Army, with the assistance of the Bulgarian population and the Serbian army, defeated the Turks while crossing the Balkans in the winter of 1877-1878, in the battle of Sheinovo, Philippopolis (now Plovdiv) and Adrianople, and in February 1878 reached the Bosporus and Constantinople.

In the Caucasus, the Russian army captured Batum and blocked Erzurum.

The ruling circles of Russia faced the specter of a big war with the European powers, for which Russia was not ready. The army suffered heavy losses and experienced supply difficulties. The command stopped the troops in the town of San Stefano (near Constantinople), and on March 3 (February 19, old style), 1878, a peace treaty was signed here.

According to it, Kars, Ardahan, Batum and Bayazet, as well as Southern Bessarabia, were ceded to Russia. Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina received broad autonomy, and Serbia, Montenegro and Romania received independence. In addition, Türkiye was obliged to pay an indemnity of 310 million rubles.

The terms of the treaty caused a negative reaction from Western European states, which feared Russia's enormously increased influence in the Balkans. Fearing the threat of a new war, for which Russia was not prepared, the Russian government was forced to revise the treaty at the international congress in Berlin (June-July 1878), where the San Stefano Treaty was replaced by the Berlin Treaty, which was unfavorable for Russia and the Balkan countries.

The material was prepared based on information from open sources