The size of the 2nd Shock Army is 42 years. Tragedy of the second strike

In blessed memory of the soldiers and commanders

2nd Shock Army, who fell in battles with the Germans

Dedicated to the fascist invaders.

During the Great Patriotic War, seventy Soviet combined arms armies fought with the enemy. In addition, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command formed five more shock troops - intended for operations in offensive operations in the directions of the main attack. At the beginning of 1942 there were four of these. The fate of the 2nd strike turned out to be tragic...

The year two thousand was coming to an end. The clock impassively counted down the time remaining until the new millennium. TV channels and radio stations, newspapers and magazines pushed the theme of the millennium to the max. Forecasts were made by politicians, scientists, writers, palmists, and sometimes outright charlatans.

The results were summed up. Lists of the “most-most” outstanding people and events of the past century and millennium were widely circulated. Everyone is different. Yes, it could not be otherwise in a world where momentary conjunctures constantly prevail over historical objectivity.

Russia was deeply affected by the Kursk tragedy. The society wanted to receive complete information about the tragedy. In the meantime, only versions were expressed, rumors multiplied...

And in this huge stream of messages about past and future disasters, accomplishments and anniversaries, information about the opening of a monument-memorial to the soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front on November 17 in the village of Myasnoy Bor, Novgorod Region, was somehow lost, not being distinguished from other news. Have you opened it? Well, good. Thanks to the sponsors - they gave money for a holy cause.

Sounds cynical, doesn't it? But, nevertheless, life is life. The Second World War has long since faded into history. And there are fewer and fewer veterans of the Great Patriotic War on the streets. And more of them are quite young people with medal bars for other wars - Afghan, Chechen. New time. New people. New veterans.

So the St. Petersburg authorities did not delegate anyone to the opening of the monument to the soldiers of the 2nd shock. And again, from the point of view of modern bureaucratic formalism, it is true: a foreign region. And the fact that the army, through its actions, forced the Germans to finally abandon their plans to capture Leningrad, played a crucial role in the operations to break through and completely lift the blockade, knocked out the last German units from the territory of the Leningrad region in the battles near Narva... Well, let them do it historians.

But historians did not study the combat path of the 2nd Shock Army separately. No, of course, in numerous monographs, memoirs, reference books, encyclopedias and other literature devoted to the Second World Army, the Army is mentioned repeatedly and its combat operations in specific operations are described. But there is no research available to a wide range of readers about the 2nd shock. Only graduate students preparing a dissertation on a specialized topic will rummage through the heap of literature in order to get a real idea of ​​​​her combat path.

It comes to something amazing. The whole world knows the name of the Tatar poet Musa Jalil. Both in literary and in any “general” thick Big and Small encyclopedic dictionaries you will read that in 1942, having been wounded, he was captured. In a fascist prison he wrote the famous “Moabit Notebook” - a hymn to the fearlessness and perseverance of man. But nowhere is it noted that Musa Jalil fought in the 2nd Shock Army.

However, writers still turned out to be more honest and persistent than historians. Former TASS special correspondent on the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, Pavel Luknitsky, published a three-volume book “Leningrad is Acting...” in the Moscow publishing house “Soviet Writer” in 1976. The author managed to overcome censorship obstacles, and from the pages of his most interesting book openly declared:

“The feats accomplished by the warriors of the 2nd Shock are countless!”

It would seem that in 1976 the ice broke. The writer spoke in as much detail as he could about the army soldiers and described their participation in operations. Now historians must pick up the baton! But... they remained silent.

And the reason here is an ideological taboo. For a short time, the 2nd Shock was commanded by Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov, who later became a traitor to the Motherland. And although the term “Vlasovites,” which usually characterizes the fighters of the “Russian Liberation Army” (ROA), cannot in any way refer to the veterans of the 2nd shock, they are nevertheless (so that the name of the traitor does not come to mind once again) from the history of the Great Patriotic War , as far as possible, we tried to cross them out. And the collection “2nd Shock in the Battle of Leningrad”, published in 1983 in Lenizdat, could not fill this gap.

It’s a strange situation, you’ll agree. Books have been written about the traitor Vlasov, and historical and documentary films have been made. A number of authors are seriously trying to present him as a fighter against Stalinism, communism, and a bearer of some “lofty ideas.” The traitor was convicted and hanged long ago, and discussions around Vlasov’s personality do not subside. The last (!) veterans of the 2nd shock, thank God, are alive, and if they are remembered at all, it will be on Victory Day, along with other participants in the war.

There is obvious injustice, since the role of the 2nd shock and the role of Vlasov in the history of the Great Patriotic War are incomparable.

To see this, let's look at the facts.

... Army Group North was advancing towards Leningrad. Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb led to the city that Hitler so wanted to destroy, the 16th and 18th armies of Colonel Generals Busch and von Küchler, and the 4th Panzer Group of Colonel General Hoepner. A total of forty-two divisions. From the air, the army group was supported by over a thousand aircraft of the Luftwaffe 1st Fleet.

Oh, how the commander of the 18th Army, Colonel General Karl-Friedrich-Wilhelm von Küchler, rushed forward! In 1940, with his invincible fellows, he had already crossed Holland, Belgium, and marched under the Arc de Triomphe in Paris. And here is Russia! Sixty-year-old Küchler dreamed of a field marshal's baton, which was waiting for him on the first street in Leningrad - all he had to do was bend down and pick it up. He will be the first of the foreign generals to enter this proud city with an army!

Let him dream. He will receive the field marshal's baton, but not for long. Küchler's military career would end ingloriously under the walls of Leningrad on January 31, 1944. Enraged by the victories of the soldiers of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, Hitler would throw Küchler, who by that time commanded the entire Army Group North, into retirement. After this, the field marshal will be revealed to the world only once - in Nuremberg. To be tried as a war criminal.

In the meantime, the 18th Army is advancing. It has already become famous not only for its military successes, but also for its brutal massacres of civilians. The soldiers of the “Great Fuhrer” did not spare either the inhabitants of the occupied territories or prisoners of war.

During the battles for Tallinn, not far from the city, the Germans discovered three reconnaissance sailors from a combined detachment of sailors and Estonian militias. During a short bloody battle, two scouts were killed, and a seriously wounded sailor from the destroyer "Minsk" Evgeniy Nikonov, unconscious, was captured.

Evgeniy refused to answer all questions about the location of the detachment, and torture did not break him. Then the Nazis, angry at the Red Navy man’s stubbornness, gouged out his eyes, tied Nikonov to a tree and burned him alive.

Having entered the territory of the Leningrad region after heavy fighting, von Küchler’s wards, whom Leeb called “a respected man with fearlessness and composure,” continued to commit atrocities. I'll give just one example.

As the documents of the Trial in the case of the Supreme High Command of Hitler's Wehrmacht irrefutably testify, “in the area occupied by the 18th Army ... there was a hospital in which 230 mentally ill and other women suffering from other illnesses were placed. After a discussion during which the opinion was expressed , that “according to German concepts” these unfortunates “were not worth living any longer”, a proposal was made to liquidate them, an entry in the combat log of the XXVIII Army Corps for December 25-26, 1941 shows that “the commander agreed with this decision” and ordered its implementation by the SD forces."

Prisoners in the army of the “respected” and “fearless” Küchler were sent to clear the mines in the area and were shot at the slightest suspicion of wanting to escape. Finally, they simply starved. I will quote only one entry from the combat log of the chief of the intelligence department of the 18th Army headquarters for November 4, 1941: “Every night 10 prisoners die from exhaustion.”

On September 8, 1941, Shlisselburg fell. Leningrad found itself cut off from southeastern communications. The blockade began. The main forces of the 18th Army came close to the city, but were unable to take it. Strength collided with the courage of the defenders. Even the enemy was forced to admit this.

Infantry General Kurt von Tippelskirch, who at the beginning of the war held the post of Oberquartiermeister IV (chief of the main intelligence department) of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, wrote irritably:

“German troops reached the southern outskirts of the city, but due to the stubborn resistance of the defending troops, reinforced by fanatical Leningrad workers, the expected success was not achieved. Due to a lack of forces, it was also not possible to oust the Russian troops from the mainland...”.

Continuing the offensive on other sectors of the front, units of the 18th Army came close to Volkhov in early December.

At this time, in the rear, on the territory of the Volga Military District, the 26th Army was formed anew - for the third time after the battles near Kiev and in the Oryol-Tula direction. At the end of December it will be transferred to the Volkhov Front. Here the 26th will receive a new name, with which it will pass from the banks of the Volkhov River to the Elbe, and will forever remain in the history of the Great Patriotic War - the 2nd shock!

I specifically described in such detail the methods of warfare by the Nazi 18th Army so that the reader would understand what kind of enemy our 2nd Shock Army would have to face. There was very little time left before the start of the most tragic operation in 1942 in the North-West of the country.

In the meantime, headquarters on both sides of the front were assessing the results of the 1941 campaign. Tippelskirch noted:

“During the heavy fighting, Army Group North, although it inflicted significant losses on the enemy and partially destroyed his forces... however, did not achieve operational success. The planned timely support by strong formations of Army Group Center was not provided.”

And in December 1941, Soviet troops launched a strong counterattack near Tikhvin, defeated and routed the Germans near Moscow. It was at this time that the defeat of the Nazis in the northwestern and Moscow directions was predetermined.

In military science there is such a concept - analytical strategy. It was developed by the Prussians - great experts in all kinds of teachings on how to kill more people better, faster and more. It is no coincidence that all the wars with their participation, starting with the Battle of Grunwald, went down in world history as the bloodiest. The essence of the analytical strategy, if we omit all the complicated and long explanations, comes down to the following: you prepare and you win.

The most important component of the analytical strategy is the doctrine of operations. Let us dwell on it in more detail, since without this the course of the described operations and battles, the reasons for successes and failures, will be difficult to understand.

Don’t be too lazy to take a sheet of paper and put on it the coordinate system you know from school. Now, just below the X-axis, start drawing an elongated capital letter S so that its “neck” makes an acute angle with the axis. At the point of intersection, put the number 1, and at the top, at the point where the letter begins to bend to the right, put the number 2.

So here it is. Up to point 1, the preparatory stage of the military operation is underway. At the very point it “starts” and begins to develop rapidly, at point 2 it loses momentum and then fades away. The attacking side strives to go from the first to the second point as quickly as possible, attracting maximum forces and resources. The defender, on the contrary, tries to stretch it out in time - the resources of any army are not unlimited - and, when the enemy is exhausted, crushes him, taking advantage of the fact that at point 2 the phase of extreme saturation has begun. Looking ahead, I will say that this is what happened during the Lyuban operation of 1942.

For the German divisions, the “neck” of the letter S on the way to Leningrad and Moscow turned out to be prohibitively long. The troops stopped at both capitals, unable to advance further and were beaten almost simultaneously - near Tikhvin and near Moscow

Germany did not have enough strength to conduct the 1942 campaign along the entire front. On December 11, 1941, German losses were estimated at 1 million 300 thousand people. As General Blumentritt recalled, in the fall “...in the troops of the Center armies, in most infantry companies the number of personnel reached only 60-70 people.”

However, the German command had the opportunity to transfer troops to the Eastern Front from the territories occupied by the Third Reich in the West (from June to December, outside the Soviet-German front, fascist losses amounted to about 9 thousand people). Thus, divisions from France and Denmark ended up at the disposal of the 18th Army of Army Group North.

Today it is difficult to say whether Stalin counted on the opening of a second front in 1942 at a time when the Headquarters was planning a number of upcoming operations, including the liberation of Leningrad. At least the correspondence between the Supreme Commander regarding the need to open a second front with the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain was quite lively. And on January 1, 1942, in Washington, representatives of the USSR, USA, England, China and 22 other countries signed a United Nations declaration on an uncompromising struggle against the states of the fascist bloc. The governments of the USA and Great Britain officially announced the opening of a second front in Europe in 1942.

Unlike Stalin, the more cynical Hitler was convinced that there would be no second front. And he concentrated the best troops in the East.

"Summer is the decisive stage of the military dispute. The Bolsheviks will be driven so far that they can never touch the cultural soil of Europe... I will see to it that Moscow and Leningrad are destroyed."

Our Headquarters did not intend to give Leningrad to the enemy. On December 17, 1941, the Volkhov Front was created. It included the 2nd shock, 4th, 52nd and 59th armies. Two of them - the 4th and 52nd - have already distinguished themselves during the counterattack near Tikhvin. The 4th was especially successful, as a result of a decisive attack on December 9, which captured the city and inflicted serious damage on enemy personnel. Nine of its formations and units were awarded the Order of the Red Banner. In total, 1,179 people were awarded in the 4th and 52nd armies: 47 with the Order of Lenin, 406 with the Order of the Red Banner, 372 with the Order of the Red Star, 155 with the medal “For Courage” and 188 with the medal “For Military Merit”. Eleven soldiers became Heroes of the Soviet Union.

The 4th Army was commanded by Army General K.A. Meretskov, the 52nd Army by Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov. Now one army commander led the front, the other was to command the 2nd shock. The headquarters set a strategic task for the front: to defeat the Nazi troops, with the help of units of the Leningrad Front, to carry out a breakthrough and complete lifting of the blockade of Leningrad (this operation was called “Lyubanskaya”). Soviet troops failed to cope with the task.

Let us give the floor to Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, who traveled to the Volkhov Front and is well acquainted with the situation. In the book “The Work of a Whole Life,” the famous marshal recalls:

“Almost the entire winter, and then the spring, we tried to break through the ring of the Leningrad blockade, striking at it from two sides: from the inside - by the troops of the Leningrad Front, from the outside - by the Volkhov Front, with the goal of uniting after the unsuccessful breakthrough of this ring in the Lyuban region. The main role in the Lyuban operation The 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhovites entered the breach of the German defense line on the right bank of the Volkhov River, but failed to reach Lyuban, and got stuck in the forests and swamps. The Leningraders, weakened by the blockade, were almost unable to solve their part of the overall task. moved. At the end of April, the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts were united into a single Leningrad front, consisting of two groups: a group of troops of the Volkhov direction and a group of troops of the Leningrad direction. The first included troops of the former Volkhov Front, as well as the 8th and 54th armies. , previously part of the Leningrad Front. The commander of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General M.S. Khozin, was given the opportunity to unite actions to eliminate the blockade of Leningrad. However, it soon became clear that it was extremely difficult to lead nine armies, three corps, two groups of troops separated by an enemy-occupied zone. The decision of the Headquarters to liquidate the Volkhov Front turned out to be erroneous.

On June 8, the Volkhov Front was restored; it was again headed by K.A. Meretskov. L.A. Govorov was appointed to command the Leningrad Front. “For failure to comply with the order of the Headquarters on the timely and rapid withdrawal of troops of the 2nd Shock Army, for paper and bureaucratic methods of command and control of troops,” said the order of the Headquarters, for separation from the troops, as a result of which the enemy cut off the communications of the 2nd Shock Army and the latter was placed in an exceptionally difficult position, remove Lieutenant General Khozin from the post of commander of the Leningrad Front" and appoint him commander of the 33rd Army of the Western Front. The situation here was complicated by the fact that the commander of the 2nd Army, Vlasov, turned out to be a vile traitor and went over to the enemy’s side.”

Marshal Vasilevsky does not disclose the very course of the Lyuban operation (little has been written about it at all), limiting himself to stating the negative result achieved. But, please note, neither he nor the Headquarters make any accusations against the 2nd Shock units at their disposal. But the following quote is extremely far from objectivity. Although, to be honest, it’s hard to accuse the authors of the major work “The Battle of Leningrad” of deliberate bias (and in our uncensored era, many people adhere to this point of view). I quote:

“In the first half of May 1942, fighting resumed on the western bank of the Volkhov River in the Lyuban direction. Our attempts to expand the breakthrough in the enemy’s defenses in order to develop a subsequent attack on Lyuban were unsuccessful. The fascist German command was able to pull up large forces to this area and, having delivered strong blows to the flanks of the Soviet troops moving forward, created a real threat of their destruction. The Supreme Command Headquarters in mid-May 1942 ordered the withdrawal of the troops of the 2nd Shock Army to the eastern bank of the Volkhov River, however, as a result of the treacherous behavior of General Vlasov, subsequently. surrendered, the army found itself in a catastrophic situation, and it had to escape the encirclement with heavy fighting."

So, from the above text it logically follows that the failure of the army is the result of Vlasov’s betrayal. And in the book “On the Volkhov Front”, published in 1982 (and, by the way, published by the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Military History), the following is generally categorically stated:

“Inaction and betrayal of the Motherland and the military duty of its former commander, Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov, is one of the most important reasons that the army was surrounded and suffered huge losses.”

But this is clearly too much! The army was surrounded by no fault of Vlasov, and the general had no intention of surrendering it to the enemy. Let's take a brief look at the progress of the operation.

The commander of the Volkhov Front, Army General K.A. Meretskov, made a well-founded decision to attack with two fresh armies - the 2nd shock and the 59th. The offensive of the strike group had the task of breaking through the German defense front in the Spasskaya Polist area, reaching the line of Lyuban, Dubrovnik, Cholovo and, in cooperation with the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, defeating the enemy’s Lyuban-Chudov group. Then, having built on the success, break the blockade of Leningrad. Of course, Meretskov, who held the post of Chief of the General Staff before the war, was aware that it would be extremely difficult to carry out the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters, but he made every effort to do this - an order is an order.

The offensive began on January 7. For three days, our troops tried to break through the German defenses, but were unsuccessful. On January 10, the front commander temporarily stopped the attacking actions of the units. On the same day, the 2nd Shock received a new commander.

“Although a change of command is not an easy matter... we still took the risk of asking the Supreme High Command Headquarters to replace the commander of the 2nd Shock Army,” recalled K.A. Meretskov. Kirill Afanasyevich spoke about G.G. Sokolov not in the best way:

“He got down to business ardently, made any promises. In practice, nothing worked out for him. It was clear that his approach to solving problems in a combat situation was based on long-outdated concepts and dogmas.”

It was not easy for Meretskov to contact Headquarters with a request to remove the army commander. The former chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, repressed and only miraculously not sharing the fate of many senior military leaders, Kirill Afanasyevich proposed (before the start of the strategic operation!) to remove from office not just General Sokolov, but, in the very recent past, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Sokolov.

However, precisely because it was before the offensive, Meretskov asked to replace the army commander. And... a few days later G.G. Sokolov was recalled to Moscow. Open the latest edition of the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary - there you will find articles about all the commanders of the 2nd Shock. Besides Sokolov...

But let's go back to 1942. On the Volkhov Front, forces were regrouped and reserves were concentrated. On January 13, after an hour and a half of artillery preparation, the offensive resumed along the entire area of ​​​​the deployment of front troops from the village of Podberezye to the city of Chudovo in the north-west direction from the original lines. Unfortunately, only the 2nd Shock Army, commanded by Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov from January 10, had the main and only success in this operation.

This is what Pavel Luknitsky, an eyewitness, writes in the Leningrad Diary:

“In January, in February, the initial excellent success of this operation was achieved under the command of... G.G. Sokolov (under him, in 1941, the 2nd Shock was created from the 26th, which was in the reserve of the Army High Command and some units of the Volkhov ... front...) and N.K. Klykov, who led it on the offensive... The army had many brave soldiers, selflessly devoted to the Motherland - Russians, Bashkirs, Tatars, Chuvash (the 26th Army was formed in the Chuvash Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic ), Kazakhs and other nationalities."

The war correspondent did not sin against the truth. The onslaught was truly terrible. Reinforced by reserves transferred from other sectors of the front, the troops of the second shock wedged themselves in a narrow strip into the location of the enemy's 18th Army.

Having broken through the deeply echeloned defense in the zone between the villages of Myasnoy Bor - Spasskaya Polist (about 50 kilometers northwest of Novgorod), by the end of January the advanced units of the army - the 13th Cavalry Corps, the 101st Separate Cavalry Regiment, as well as units of the 327th 1st Infantry Division reached the city of Lyuban and enveloped the enemy group from the south. The remaining armies of the front practically remained at their original lines and, supporting the development of the success of the 2nd Shock Army, fought heavy defensive battles. Thus, even then Klykov’s army was left to its own devices. But it was coming!

In the diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, Franz Halder, there were entries one more alarming than the other:

January 27. ...On the front of Army Group North, the enemy achieved tactical success on Volkhov.

Feeling a serious threat from the connection of units of the 2nd shock with units of the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front of General I.I. Fedyuninsky, located 30 kilometers northeast of Lyuban, the Germans are strengthening their 18th Army. In the period from January to June 1942, 15 (!) full-blooded divisions were transferred to the area of ​​operations of the Volkhov Front to eliminate the offensive of the 2nd Shock Army. As a result, the command of Army Group North was forced to abandon plans to capture Leningrad forever. But the tragic fate of the 2nd shock was a foregone conclusion.

On February 27, the Germans attacked the exposed flanks of the Soviet troops. Our units that reached Ryabovo found themselves cut off from the main forces of the front and only after many days of fighting did they break out of the encirclement. Let's take another look at Halder's diary:

March 2. ...Conference with the Fuhrer in the presence of the commander of Army Group North, army commanders and corps commanders. Decision: go on the offensive on Volkhov on March 7 (until 13.03.). The Fuhrer demands that aviation preparations be carried out several days before the start of the offensive (the bombing of warehouses in forests with super-heavy caliber bombs). Having completed the breakthrough on Volkhov, one should not waste energy on destroying the enemy. If we throw him into the swamp, it will doom him to death."

And from March 1942 until the end of June, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army, surrounded and cut off from their communications, fought fierce battles, holding the Germans in the southeastern direction. Just look at the map of the Novgorod region to be convinced: the battles were fought in wooded and swampy areas. In addition, in the summer of '42, the level of groundwater and rivers sharply increased in the Leningrad region. All bridges, even on small rivers, were demolished, and the swamps became impassable. Ammunition and food were supplied by air in extremely limited quantities. The army was starving, but the soldiers and commanders honestly performed their duty.

Circumstances were such that in mid-April Army Commander N.K. became seriously ill. Klykov - he had to be urgently evacuated by plane across the front line. At this time, the deputy commander of the Volkhov Front, Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov (who, by the way, arrived at the front on March 9) was at the army’s disposal. And it was quite natural that he, who had proven himself well as an army commander in the battles near Moscow, was appointed to act as commander of the encircled army.

Veteran of the 2nd Shock I. Levin testifies to the conditions under which they had to fight in his notes “General Vlasov on both sides of the front”:

“The situation with ammunition was desperate. When vehicles and carts could not get through the neck to us, the soldiers carried the shells - two ropes over their shoulders - on themselves. Junkers, Heinkels, Messers literally hung over their heads and in during the daylight hours we hunted (with passion, I’m sure) for every moving target - be it a soldier or a cart. There was nothing to cover the army from the air... Our native Volkhov forest saved us: it allowed us to play hide and seek with the Luftwaffe.”

In May the situation worsened. This is how the commander of the 327th Infantry Division, Colonel (later Major General) I.M., remembers it. Antyufeyev:

“The situation on the line occupied by the division was clearly not in our favor. The forest roads had already dried up, and the enemy brought tanks and self-propelled guns here. He also used massive mortar fire. And yet the division fought on this line for about two weeks... Finev Lug passed from hand to hand several times. Where did our soldiers get their physical strength and energy!... In the end, at this line, a critical moment came, to the left of us, between the lakes, a partisan detachment was defending itself, which was pushed back by the enemy. to be completely surrounded, we were forced to retreat. This time we had to part with almost all of our heavy weapons... By that time, there were no more than 200-300 people in each rifle regiment. They were no longer capable of any maneuver. In one place they still fought, literally clinging their teeth to the ground, but the movement was unbearably difficult for them.”

In mid-May 1942, the command of the 2nd Shock received a directive to leave the army beyond the Volkhov River. This was more than difficult to achieve. When the enemy closed the only corridor in the Myasny Bor area, the very possibility of an organized breakthrough became unlikely. As of June 1, in 7 divisions and 6 brigades of the army there were 6,777 commanding officers, 6,369 junior command personnel and 22,190 privates. A total of 35,336 people - approximately three divisions. It should be taken into account that the command lost operational control over the troops, the units were scattered. Nevertheless, Soviet soldiers offered heroic resistance to the enemy. The fighting continued.

On the night of June 24-25, 1942, as a result of the failed operation of the troops of the Volkhov Front and the remaining combat-ready units of the 2nd Shock Army to break through the encirclement ring from Myasny Bor and the withdrawal of the remaining groups of fighters and commanders, the army command decided to fight their way to their own, breaking into small groups (soldiers and army officers have already done this).

When leaving the encirclement, the chief of staff of the 2nd shock, Colonel Vinogradov, died under artillery fire. The head of the special department, State Security Major Shashkov, was seriously wounded and shot himself. Surrounded by fascists, member of the Military Council Zuev saved the last bullet for himself, and the head of the political department Garus also did the same. The head of army communications, Major General Afanasyev, went to the partisans, who transported him to the “mainland.” The Germans captured the commander of the 327th division, General Antyufeev (who refused to cooperate with the enemies of the division commander and was subsequently sent to a concentration camp). And General Vlasov... surrendered to a patrol of the 28th Infantry Corps in the village of Tukhovezhi (together with the chef of the army military council canteen, M.I. Voronova, who accompanied him).

But our own people were looking for him, trying to save the army commander! On the morning of June 25, officers who emerged from the encirclement reported: Vlasov and other senior officers were seen in the area of ​​the narrow-gauge railway. Meretskov sent there his adjutant, Captain Mikhail Grigorievich Boroda, a tank company with an infantry landing force. Of the five tanks in the German rear, four were blown up by mines or were knocked out. M.G. Boroda, on the last tank, reached the headquarters of the 2nd strike - there was no one there. By the evening of June 25, several reconnaissance groups were sent to find the Army Military Council and withdraw it. Vlasov was never found.

After some time, a message was received from the partisans of the Oredezh detachment F.I. Sazanov: Vlasov went over to the Nazis.

When, many days later, the surviving soldiers of the 2nd Shock found out about this, they were simply shocked. “But how they believed this heroic general, scolder, joker, eloquent speaker! The commander of the army turned out to be a despicable coward, betrayed everyone who, not sparing their lives, went into battle on his orders,” wrote Pavel Luknitsky.

“The question arises: how did it happen that Vlasov turned out to be a traitor?” Marshal Meretskov writes in his book “In the Service of the People.” It seems to me that only one answer can be given. Vlasov was an unprincipled careerist. His behavior before that It may well be considered a disguise behind which his indifference to the Motherland was hidden. His membership in the Communist Party was nothing more than a path to high positions. His actions at the front, for example in 1941 near Kiev and Moscow, were an attempt to distinguish himself in order to demonstrate his professional abilities and quickly. move forward."

During the trial of the ROA command, when asked why he surrendered, Vlasov answered briefly and clearly: “I was faint-hearted.” And you can believe it. Surrendering on July 12, the general, who did not have the courage to shoot himself, was already a coward, but not yet a traitor. Vlasov betrayed his Motherland a day later, when he ended up at the headquarters of the commander of the 18th German Army, Colonel General Gerhard Lindemann. It was to him that he described in detail the state of affairs on the Volkhov front. A photograph has been preserved: Vlasov with a pointer bent over the map, Lindemann standing next to him carefully follows his explanations.

Here we will leave the traitor. He has nothing to do with the further fate of the 2nd strike.

Despite Vlasov’s betrayal, the entire army was not blamed for the failure of the Lyuban operation. And in those days, just the slightest suspicion of betrayal was enough for the very name “2nd Shock” to disappear forever from the lists of the Red Army. In addition, none of the army units lost their battle flags.

This means that the Headquarters correctly assessed its role: despite the tragic outcome of the operation, the army buried the enemy’s hopes of capturing Leningrad. The losses of Hitler's troops were too heavy. Pavel Luknitsky also reports this in the three-volume book “Leningrad is Acting...”:

“...it (the 2nd strike motor vehicle) destroyed a lot of enemy forces: six German divisions, pulled from Leningrad to Volkhov, were bled dry by it, the fascist legions “Netherlands” and “Flanders” were completely defeated, many remained in the swamps enemy artillery, tanks, airplanes, tens of thousands of Nazis..."

And here is an excerpt from a leaflet issued by the political department of the Volkhov Front shortly after the 2nd shock fighters left the encirclement:

"Valiant warriors of the 2nd Shock Army!

In the fire and roar of guns, the clang of tanks, the roar of airplanes, and fierce battles with Hitler’s scoundrels, you won the glory of the valiant warriors of the Volkhov borders.

Courageously and fearlessly, during the harsh winter and spring, you fought against the fascist invaders.

The military glory of the soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army is etched in golden letters in the history of the Great Patriotic War..."

However, Hitler, unlike his commanders, who did not abandon his obsession with taking and destroying Leningrad, demanded from the Wehrmacht representative at the Finnish headquarters, General Erfurt, to achieve an offensive by the Allied units from the north. But the Finnish command turned Hitler’s envoy away, declaring: since 1918, our country has been of the opinion that the existence of Finland should not pose a threat to Leningrad. Apparently, the Finns, who carefully assessed both the international and military situation, were then groping for a way out of the war into which Germany had dragged them.

But Hitler did not let up. He took an unprecedented step: he transferred the victorious 11th Army of Field Marshal von Manstein from the southern borders to Leningrad. Manstein took Sevastopol! Manstein “figured out” the Kerch operation of the Russians! Let Manstein take Leningrad!

Manstein has arrived. I didn’t take Leningrad. In his memoirs he wrote:

“On August 27, the headquarters of the 11th Army arrived on the Leningrad Front to find out the possibilities of striking here in the zone of the 18th Army and draw up a plan for an attack on Leningrad. It was agreed that then the headquarters of the 11th Army would occupy part of the front of the 18th Army , facing north, while the eastern part of the front along the Volkhov remained behind the 18th Army."

And the 11th Army entered into heavy fighting with Soviet troops, which lasted until the beginning of October. Actually. Manstein had to solve the problems of the 18th Army, which was badly beaten during the Lyuban operation by units of the 2nd shock and was no longer capable of large-scale actions.

The field marshal managed to destroy a number of our formations, but did not have enough strength to take the city. Manstein would later remember these autumn battles in 1942:

“If the task of restoring the situation on the eastern sector of the 18th Army’s front was completed, the divisions of our army nevertheless suffered significant losses. At the same time, a significant part of the ammunition intended for the attack on Leningrad was used up. Therefore, there could be no talk of a quick offensive and speeches. Meanwhile, Hitler still did not want to give up his intention to capture Leningrad. True, he was ready to limit the tasks of the offensive, which, naturally, would not lead to the final liquidation of this front, and in the end everything came down to this liquidation (emphasis added). - author). On the contrary, the headquarters of the 11th Army believed that it was impossible to begin the operation against Leningrad without replenishing our forces and without having sufficient forces at all. October passed by discussing these issues and drawing up new plans."

In November, the situation was such that the presence of the 11th Army was required in other sectors of the Eastern Front: the decisive battle for Stalingrad was approaching. Manstein's headquarters was transferred to Army Group Center. In addition to the unsuccessful attempt to take Leningrad, fate dealt the German commander another terrible blow. On October 29, the 19-year-old son of the field marshal, infantry lieutenant Gero von Manstein, who fought in the 16th Army, died on the Leningrad Front.

Many years later, after the events described, while working on his book “Lost Victories,” the old field marshal, always stingy in his praise of the enemy, would pay tribute to the heroic warriors of the 2nd Shock (an army at that time was only in name; the eight-thousandth infantry fought against the enemy division and one rifle brigade). He will appreciate their courage in a military way, clearly and concisely:

"The enemy's casualties in killed were many times greater than the number captured."

And in 1942, another important event took place on the Volkhov Front, which at first glance had no direct relation to the development of hostilities. A song was born that soon became popularly known and loved. Because it sounded truthful and, most importantly, it was already victorious!

Songs that raise the morale of soldiers sometimes mean more than new weapons, plentiful food, and warm clothes. The time of their appearance rightly takes its rightful place in military chronology. In 1941, it became “Get up, huge country!”, in 1942 - “Volkhov Table” to the words of the front-line poet Pavel Shubin.

They didn't sing then:

Let's drink to the Motherland, let's drink to Stalin,

Let's drink and pour again!

They didn’t sing because such lines had never been written before. but, you see, it sounded great:

Let's drink to the meeting of the living!

These words fully applied to all soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army.

At the end of 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided at the beginning of the next year to carry out an operation to relieve the siege of Leningrad, better known in history as Operation Iskra.

From the Leningrad Front, the 67th Army was assigned to the strike group. The Volkhov Front again entrusted this task to the 2nd Shock. The almost completely renewed army (only about ten thousand people emerged from the encirclement) included: 11 rifle divisions, 1 rifle, 4 tank and 2 engineer brigades, 37 artillery and mortar regiments and other units.

The fully equipped 2nd Strike continued its combat path. And he was nice!

On January 18, 1943, the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front, in cooperation with the 67th Army of the Leningrad Front, broke the blockade of Leningrad. The course of this operation is described in detail both in fiction and in special military literature. Numerous documentaries and feature films have been made about her. Every year, January 18 was celebrated in Leningrad, is and will be celebrated in St. Petersburg as one of the main city holidays!

Then, in the cold January days of 1943, the main thing happened: conditions were created for land and transport communications with the entire country.

For the courage and bravery shown in breaking the blockade, about 22 thousand soldiers of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts received state awards. The 122nd Tank Brigade, which interacted with units of the 2nd Shock Brigade, became the Red Banner Brigade. And in the army itself, the 327th Rifle Division was transformed into the 64th Guards Rifle Division. The chest of the commander of the newly minted guardsmen, Colonel N.A. Polyakov, was decorated with the Order of Suvorov, II degree. The commander of the 2nd attack, Lieutenant General V.Z. Romanovsky, was awarded one of the highest military leadership insignia - the Order of Kutuzov, 1st degree.

Since April 1943, already operating as part of the Leningrad Front, the army took part in the Leningrad-Novgorod offensive operation, and with its active participation from the Oranienbaum bridgehead in January 1944, it ensured the final liberation of Leningrad from the siege.

In February-March - liberated Lomonosovsky, Volosovsky, Kingiseppsky, Slantsevsky and Gdovsky districts of the Leningrad region, reached the Narva River and Lake Peipsi. In April-August she fought with German troops on the Narva Isthmus and successfully carried out an operation to liberate Narva. In September forty-four, in the successful Tallinn operation, the territory of Estonia was liberated from the invaders.

How were things going for the long-no longer victorious German 18th Army? Tippelskirch writes:

"On January 18 (1944 - author), that is, a few days after the start of the Russian offensive on the northern sector of the 18th Army front, the troops of the Volkhov Front went on the offensive from a wide bridgehead north of Novgorod with the aim of striking the flank of the 18th Army It was impossible to prevent this breakthrough, and it led to the withdrawal of the entire army group. The very next day we had to leave Novgorod."

But, true to its tradition of smashing and destroying everything, the 18th Army continued the practice of “scorched earth”!: out of the almost fifty thousand population of Novgorod, only fifty people survived, out of 2,500 buildings - only forty. Colonel General Lindemann, already familiar to us, ordered the famous monument “Millennium of Russia”, which is still located on the territory of the Novgorod Kremlin, to be dismantled into parts and sent to Germany. They dismantled it, but they didn’t have time to take it out - they had to run away from the rapidly advancing Soviet army.

Under the blows of the Soviet troops, the 18th Army rolled back further and further until, together with the 16th Army, it was blocked as part of the Courland group. Together with her, the failed conquerors of Leningrad laid down their arms on the night of May 9. And then a terrible panic began among the soldiers of the 16th and 18th armies. General Gilpert, who commanded the group, was seriously afraid. It turns out that the Nazis “miscalculated.” Pavel Luknitsky says in his narration:

“Before accepting the ultimatum, Gilpert did not know that Marshal Govorov was in command of the Leningrad Front, he believed that they would surrender to Marshal Govorov, the “commander of the 2nd Baltic Front,” - this seemed to the Germans who committed atrocities near Leningrad not so terrible: “Baltic people,” Having not experienced the horror of the blockade, they have no reason to take such “merciless revenge” as the Leningraders allegedly will.”

You should have thought earlier when they were executed at the walls of the Neva Stronghold, dying of hunger, but not surrendering!

On September 27, 1944, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, transferring the 2nd strike to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, addressed its troops with the words:

“The 2nd Shock Army as part of the front forces played a big role in lifting the blockade of Leningrad, winning the Great Victory near Leningrad and in all the battles for the liberation of Soviet Estonia from the Nazi invaders.

The victorious path of the 2nd Shock Army on the Leningrad Front was marked by brilliant successes, and the battle banners of its units were covered with unfading glory.

The working people of Leningrad and Soviet Estonia will always sacredly cherish in their memory the military merits of the 2nd Shock Army, its heroic warriors - the faithful sons of the Fatherland."

At the final stage of the war, the 2nd Shock Division, as part of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky, fought in East Prussia and participated in the East Pomeranian operation. In his memoirs, Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky more than once noted her skillful actions:

“The 2nd Shock Army fought through a strong defensive line on the outskirts of Marienburg, which in ancient times was a crusader fortress, and on January 25 reached the Vistula and Nogat rivers. With part of its forces, it crossed these rivers in several places and captured small bridgeheads. Capture Elbing the troops could not move on the move... I.I. Fedyuninsky (commander of the 2nd shock - author) had to organize an assault on the city according to all the rules of military art. The battles lasted for several days until the 2nd shock captured the city."

Together with the 65th Army and a separate tank brigade of the Polish Army, the 2nd Shock Brigade played a decisive role in the assault on Danzig - the Polish city of Gdansk.

“On March 26, the troops of the 2nd shock and 65th armies, having broken through the enemy defenses to their entire depth, approached Danzig,” wrote K.K. Rokossovsky. “In order to avoid senseless losses, the garrison was given an ultimatum: it is useless to continue resistance. In the event, If the ultimatum was not accepted, residents were advised to leave the city.

Hitler's command did not respond to our proposal. The command was given to begin the assault... The fight was for every house. The Nazis fought especially stubbornly in large buildings, factory buildings... On March 30, Gdansk was completely liberated. The remnants of the enemy troops fled to the swampy mouth of the Vistula, where they were soon captured. The Polish national flag soared over the ancient Polish city, which was hoisted by soldiers - representatives of the Polish Army."

From East Prussia the army's route lay in Pomerania. The Germans understood perfectly well that Soviet soldiers had every right to take revenge. The memories of how the Nazis treated prisoners of war and civilians were too fresh. And even in the May days of 1945, living examples almost constantly appeared before our eyes.

On May 7, units of the 46th division of the 2nd shock cleared the island of Rügen from the Germans. Our soldiers discovered a concentration camp in which our compatriots were languishing. In his book “From the Neva to the Elbe,” the division commander, General S.N. Borshchev, recalled the incident on the island:

“Our Soviet people, liberated from concentration camps, were walking along the road. Suddenly a girl ran out of the crowd, rushed to our famous intelligence officer Tupkalenko and, hugging him, shouted:

Vasil, my brother!

And our courageous, desperate intelligence officer, Vasily Yakovlevich Tupkalenko (full holder of the Order of Glory - author), on whose face, as they say, never moved a single muscle, cried..."

But the winners, to the surprise of the local population, did not take revenge. On the contrary, they helped as best they could. And when a column of young men in fascist soldier’s uniforms came across the 90th Rifle Division, division commander General N.G. Lyashchenko simply waved his hand to the teenagers:

Go to mom, to mom!

Naturally, they happily ran home.

And the Great Patriotic War ended for the 2nd Shock with participation in the famous Berlin operation. And our soldiers had their own “meeting on the Elbe” - with the 2nd British Army. Soviet and English soldiers celebrated it solemnly: with a football match!

Over the four years of war, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army were expressed gratitude to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief twenty-four times, and the sky over Moscow was colored with victorious volleys of fireworks. For heroism, courage and bravery, 99 formations and units were given honorary names of liberated and captured cities. 101 formations and units attached the Order of the Soviet Union to their banners, and 29 formations and units became guards. 103 soldiers of the 2nd shock were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

History has given everyone what they deserve. Soldiers, officers and generals of the 2nd Shock Army found themselves on the heroic pages of the chronicle of Victory. And General Vlasov - to the gallows. The execution took place on the night of August 1, 1946 in Tagansk prison according to the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. And with this we could have parted ways with the traitor, if not for certain circumstances.

Our country entered the new millennium without a textbook on the history of Russia. Well - nothing surprising: too many idols in the previous decade were overthrown from their pedestals, not all heroes were pulled out of oblivion. And the history of any state is made up of the actions of individuals.

But when scientists thoroughly shook the flask with the historical cocktail of the twentieth century, many strange and sometimes terrible personalities appeared on the surface, whom the “independently-minded” pseudo-chroniclers, quick to hand, immediately began to present to us as heroes misunderstood by the people. A sort of Don Quixote of modern history, not at all concerned with the fact that, unlike Mister La Mancha, the knights are not of a sad, but rather of a bloody image.

General Vlasov was also included in the category of such “Don Quixotes”. His defense is based mainly on two positions (everything else is verbal fluff): the general is not a traitor, but a fighter against the regime, which collapsed anyway, and Vlasov is the Soviet analogue of Stauffenberg.

Not noticing such statements is dangerous. Our country is rightly called the most reading country in the world. But to this we must add that for the most part the Russian people are accustomed to believing the printed word: once it is written, so it is. That is why expositions are so popular among us and refutations often go unnoticed.

Without intending to engage in refutations of the arguments of Vlasov’s supporters in this narrative, I invite readers to consider only the factual side of the matter.

So, Vlasov and Stauffenberg. The German colonel never fought against Prussian militarism - the main opponent of Stauffenberg and his like-minded people was the Hitlerite elite. A competent General Staff officer could not help but understand that preaching the idea of ​​the superiority of one nation cannot build a “thousand-year Reich.” It was planned to replace key figures with less odious ones, abandon the most unacceptable Nazi principles - and that’s all. The world is for a certain period of time. One could not expect anything more from a graduate of a German military school, initially accustomed to planning wars and offensive actions. Stauffenberg did not consider himself a traitor to Germany, since he ultimately acted in its interests.

Oath to the Fuhrer? But we should not forget: for the hereditary aristocrat Count Klaus Philipp Maria Schenck von Stauffenberg, the son of the Chief Chamberlain of the King of Württemberg and the queen's lady-in-waiting, a descendant of the great Gneisenau, Hitler was a plebeian and an upstart.

Stauffenberg led the military conspiracy while on the territory of his country, fully understanding the inevitability of death in case of failure. Vlasov simply chickened out when danger threatened him personally and surrendered. And the next day he laid out to Colonel General Gerhard Lindemann not plans to fight the communist regime, but military secrets that he owned as deputy commander of the Volkhov Front.

At the beginning of the war, Stauffenberg actively pushed through the General Staff his ideas for creating national volunteer armies. Consequently, Vlasov, who eventually headed the ROA, was considered no more than the commander of one of these legions.

For the Germans, Vlasov was not a person; he was not assigned any serious role in military and political plans. Hitler repeated more than once: “Revolution is made only by those people who are inside the state, and not outside it.” And at a meeting in the summer of 1943 he said:

“...I don’t need this General Vlasov in our rear areas at all... I only need him on the front line.”

Leaders on whom they place a serious bet in the hope of a successful outcome of the war, as is known, are not sent there - it is dangerous. The order of Field Marshal Keitel dated April 17, 1943 stated:

“...in operations of a purely propaganda nature, Vlasov’s name may be required, but not his personality.”

Moreover, in the order, Keitel calls Vlasov a “Russian prisoner of war general” - and nothing more. But that’s what they called him on paper. In colloquial speech, harsher expressions were chosen, for example: “This Russian pig is Vlasov” (Himmler, at a meeting with the Fuhrer).

Finally, Soviet historians, unwittingly, played a significant role in “perpetuating” the memory of A.A. Vlasov, calling all ROA fighters “Vlasovites.” In fact, they never were.

The "Russian Liberation Army" was formed from traitors and prisoners of war. But the soldiers surrendered and were captured by the enemy, and the traitors went to serve the Germans, and not Vlasov. Before the war, his name was not widely known in the USSR, and after the transition to the Germans, Vlasov was known only as a traitor. They didn’t go to him the way they went to Denikin or Kolchak, Petlyura or Makhno - not the same figure.

And he didn’t behave like a leader. The same Denikin, at the end of the civil war, refused an English pension, rightly noting that only the Russian government could pay a Russian general. Vlasov willingly ate in German kitchens; when he was arrested in 1945, they found thirty thousand Reichsmarks in his possession, hidden “for a rainy day.” He lived comfortably - he even got a German wife - the widow of SS officer Adele Billingberg (after the war she will try to receive a pension for her hanged husband, like a general's widow).

One of the commanders of the White Guard corps, General Slashchev, did not wear shoulder straps during the civil war, believing that the volunteer army had disgraced them with robberies and violence. Vlasov also did not wear epaulettes among the Germans, but he gladly donned the comfortable overcoat of a Wehrmacht general. “Just in case” I kept the book of the commanding staff of the Red Army and... my party card.

Well, Vlasov was not a leader. But maybe then he is a fighter for the people’s happy lot? Many refer to his so-called “Smolensk appeal” to the people and other propaganda speeches. But Vlasov himself subsequently explained that the texts of the appeals were compiled by the Germans, and he only slightly edited them. The former general complained:

“Until 1944, the Germans did everything themselves, and they used us only as a sign that was profitable for them.”

And, by the way, they did the right thing, because an unedited Vlasov would hardly have been perceived by Russian people as a patriot.

As already mentioned, in the spring of 1943 he made a “tour” of units of Army Group North. The kind of “love for the Motherland” that the speeches of the former army commander were imbued with can be judged by the occasion at the banquet in Gatchina.

Believing in his own importance, the distraught Vlasov assured the German command: if they now give him two shock divisions, he will quickly take Leningrad, since the residents are exhausted by the blockade. And then he, Vlasov the victor, will arrange a luxurious banquet in the city, to which the Wehrmacht generals invite him in advance. As you already know, Hitler, outraged by such impudence, recalled Vlasov from the front and even threatened him with the death penalty.

As a result, the Fuhrer still had to put the ROA into action - there was not enough “cannon fodder” at the front and in the Reich they formed units even from teenagers. But the ROA no longer had any “liberation” character. And the German command did not have much hope for it. The same Tippelskirch will write after the war that the “Vlasov army,” despite its large numbers, was a stillborn fetus.

And how the Soviet units perceived it is clearly demonstrated by the memories of 2nd Shock Veteran I. Levin:

“In the sector of our 2nd Shock Army, I remember only one battle with the Vlasovites. Somewhere in East Prussia, near Koenigsberg, our tank landing came across a large German unit, which included a battalion of Vlasovites.

After a fierce battle, the enemy was scattered. According to reports from the front line: they took many prisoners, Germans and Vlasovites. But only the Germans reached the army headquarters. Not a single person with the ROA badge was brought in. You can say a lot of words about this... But no matter what they say, no one has the right to condemn our paratroopers, who have not cooled down from the battle, who have just lost their friends at the hands of traitors...”

The Vlasov army, in principle, had nothing to count on. In the thirties and forties of the twentieth century in our country, the power of personal example was of great importance to people. Hence the Stakhanov movement, the Voroshilov riflemen. During the war, fighters deliberately repeated Matrosov's feat, pilots - Talalikhin, snipers - Smolyachkov's achievements. And an example of civil courage for people was the feat of Kosmodemyanskaya, and not the activities of Vlasov. He could not find a place in this row.

At that time, the word “SS man” was the worst curse word—nothing to do with sometimes kindly Russian swearing. And Vlasov conducted propaganda with the help of SS Obergruppenführer Goebbels, equipped and armed the ROA under the leadership of Reichsführer SS Himmler, and chose an SS widow as his life partner. And finally, the official ID of the commander of the “Russian (!) Liberation Army” for Vlasov was signed by SS General (!) Kroeger. Isn't the attraction to the security forces of the Nazi Party too strong for a “carrier of high ideas”, a fighter for a “free Russia”?

In the historical period described, a person who had any connection with the SS could, at best, count on a place in a prison cell. But not on the political Olympus. And this opinion was held not only in the USSR.

After the war, traitors were tried throughout Europe. Quisling was shot in Norway, and the Belgian king Leopold III, who signed the capitulation to Germany, was forced to abdicate. Marshal Petain was sentenced to death in France, which was later commuted to life imprisonment. By the verdict of the people's tribunal, Antonescu was executed as a war criminal in Romania. If such punishment befell traitors of the first magnitude, then what could smaller fry like Vlasov count on? Only for a bullet or loop.

And presenting today an obvious traitor in the role of a martyr and “sufferer for the people” means deliberately engaging in false patriotic propaganda. This is much worse than selling from the stalls of Hitler's Mein Kampf. Because it has long been the custom - sufferers in Rus' are loved and pitied. But Vlasov is not a holy cripple. And a scaffold instead of a platform was erected for him according to his merits.

Russia had other generals. During the Great Patriotic War, one of the leaders of the White Guard movement and an irreconcilable enemy of Soviet power, Lieutenant General A.I. Denikin, called on White emigrants to fight the Germans in order to support the Red Army. And Soviet Lieutenant General D.M. Karbyshev preferred martyrdom in a concentration camp to treason.

How did the fates of other commanders turn out? Lieutenant General Nikolai Kuzmich Klykov (1888-1968), after recovery, from December 1942, was assistant to the commander of the Volkhov Front, participated in breaking the siege of Leningrad. In June 1943, he was appointed to the post of deputy commander of the Moscow Military District. In 1944-1945 he commanded the troops of the North Caucasus Military District. Having led the 2nd Shock Army before the operation to break through the blockade ring, Valery Zakharovich Romanovsky (1896-1967) subsequently became deputy commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front and in 1945 received the rank of Colonel General. After the war, he commanded troops in a number of military districts and worked in military educational institutions.

Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General Ivan Ivanovich Fedyuninsky (1900-1977), who replaced him as army commander in December 1943, also commanded district troops in 1946-47 and 1954-65. He again had the opportunity to serve his Motherland on already peaceful German soil: in 1951-54, he was deputy and first deputy commander-in-chief of a group of Soviet troops in Germany. Since 1965, Army General Fedyuninsky worked in the group of inspectors general of the USSR Ministry of Defense. In 1969, as a participant in the battles in Mongolia, a veteran of the famous Khalkhin Gol, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic.

Colonel-General Gerhard Lindemann (1884-1963), who opposed the 2nd shock at the head of the 18th German Army - the same one who wanted to remove the Millennium of Russia monument from Novgorod - led Army Group North on March 1, 1944, but for military failures in early July of the same forty-fourth, he was removed from office. Commanding German troops in Denmark at the end of the war, he surrendered to the British on May 8, 1945.

Field Marshals Wilhelm von Leeb and Karl von Küchler were tried as war criminals by the Fifth American Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. On October 28, 1948, the verdict was announced: von Leeb (1876-1956) received an unexpectedly lenient sentence - three years in prison. Von Küchler (1881-1969) was treated more strictly. No matter how much he lied, no matter how he dodged, no matter how he referred only to the exact execution of orders by the “respected” and “fearless” field marshal, the tribunal turned out to be inexorable: twenty years in prison!

True, in February 1955, Küchler was released. From the beginning of the fifties, many “Fuhrer soldiers” began to be released and amnestied - in 1954, the Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO and “experienced specialists” were required to form units of the Bundeswehr.

They had a lot of “experience”! Suffice it to say that soon after the formation of the Bundeswehr, the fascist General Ferch, one of the leaders of the artillery shelling of Leningrad, was appointed its commander. In 1960, Wehrmacht Major General, former head of the General Staff of the Ground Forces Adolf Heusinger became the chairman of the NATO Permanent Military Committee. The same Heusinger who calmly gave orders for punitive expeditions and reprisals against the civilian population of the occupied territories of the Soviet Union.

However, these are different times now. But, you see, historical facts are stubborn things. And it is necessary to remember them - evidence of the bloodiest war of the twentieth century!

Every year on May 9, Moscow salutes the Winners. Alive and dead. Majestic monuments and modest obelisks with red stars remind us of their exploits.

And in Myasny Bor there is a memorial in memory of the feat of the soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army, which cannot be erased from History!

2002-2003

P. S. HIS MEAT BOR

In memory of N.A. Shashkova

Businessmen are different. Some love to shine in front of television cameras, others love to support “high-profile” projects, sanctified by the patronage of statesmen. Still others engage in charity work, receiving in return laureate badges of various awards - from literary to fence-building (the main thing is to hang a beautiful diploma in the office).

My longtime acquaintance, the general director of the BUR mining company, Leonid Ivanovich Kulikov, did not belong to any of the above categories. But if there was a need to support an interesting and necessary initiative, he helped. True, having first made sure that the money will go to a good cause, and not into the pocket of the initiator.

Therefore, in Kulikov’s office one could often meet writers and poets, officials, generals, and scientists. And I was not at all surprised when several years ago, on one hot June day, I found a tall, gray-haired old man in the uniform of a vice admiral at Leonid Ivanovich’s. He was talking animatedly, walking around the table. The star of the Hero of the Soviet Union swayed above the order bars in time with the movements.

Shashkov. Nikolai Alexandrovich,” the admiral extended his hand. “It’s good that you came.” “We are just discussing one important topic,” explained Leonid Ivanovich. “You, of course, have heard about the Second Shock Army?”

Lyuban operation of 1942?

You see!” exclaimed Shashkov. “He knows.” And he didn’t tell me, like this idiot (the name of one official was mentioned): Vlasov’s army.

Well, Vlasov is Vlasov, and the army is an army. In the end, she later broke the blockade of Leningrad and took part in the East Prussian operation.

Because of Vlasov, little was written about her, but we heard a lot about the heroism of the fighters. After all, he worked as a city reporter for a long time. I met different people.

I know, for example, that the brother of the famous BDT artist Vladislav Strzhelchik fought in the Second Shock. The mother of the writer Boris Almazov, Evgenia Vissarionovna, was the senior operating sister of an army field hospital in 1942. In Yakutia - God grant him many years to come - lives a unique person - Sergeant Mikhail Bondarev. He was drafted from Yakutia and spent the entire war as part of the Second Shock! In a rare case, she was born again three times. And the son of Eduard Bagritsky, war correspondent Vsevolod, died during the Lyuban operation.

Just like my father, Alexander Georgievich. “He was the head of a special department of the army,” Shashkov interrupted.

We talked for a long time that day. About heroes and traitors. Memory and unconsciousness. About the fact that the recently opened memorial to the fallen soldiers in Myasny Bor needs to be equipped, but there is no money. The surviving veterans are very old people. Businessmen are not interested in them, so they don’t try to help.

We’ll help, we’ll help,” Kulikov reassured Admiral every time.

We also talked about search engines who are absolutely disinterestedly engaged in a holy cause - searching for and burying the remains of fighters. About officials who give vague answers to all proposals to perpetuate the memory of the fallen.

It was firmly stuck in their heads: the Vlasov army,” Shashkov got excited. - When I was still an assistant to the Minister of Defense of the USSR, I told the head of Glavpur many times (the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy - author) - it is necessary to prepare and publish a normal history of the Second Shock. And this old wood grouse answered me: let’s see, let’s wait. We waited...

Listen. I have read some of your historical essays. Maybe you'll take up this. You see, it is necessary to briefly and clearly reflect the entire battle path. Young people will not read the Talmud. And she definitely needs to know this page of history.

What happens: they write and make films about Vlasov, this bastard, a traitor. And they forgot about the army that actually saved Leningrad!

Since then we began to meet quite often.

What was striking about Nikolai Alexandrovich was, first of all, his irrepressible energy and determination. He constantly shuttled between St. Petersburg and Moscow. And not in the "SV" carriage - at the wheel of his own "nine". He made his way into high offices - he persuaded, proved, signed the necessary papers. It seemed that he no longer needed anything in this life except to perpetuate the memory of the soldiers of the Second Shock. It was largely thanks to the efforts of Shashkov that the memorial appeared in Myasnoy Bor in the Novgorod region.

Many wondered: why does a respected and honored person need all this trouble? At such a respectable age, with such merits and, let us note in parentheses, connections, you can calmly rest on your laurels. And sometimes - decorate the presidium of some important forum with your ceremonial admiral's uniform.

But the fact of the matter is that Shashkov was not a “wedding general.” In the full sense of the word, a combat commander (it was his submarine that, during the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1968, was ready to fire missiles at the Promised Land), he felt personally responsible for returning from oblivion the names of his father’s comrades. With the help of the FSB, he installed a memorial plaque at the memorial. But how many more nameless heroes lie in the Novgorod land! And Shashkov continued to act.

In Kulikov’s office, which became our headquarters, Nikolai Alexandrovich prepared requests and letters, copied and sent out documents, and met with potential sponsors. Here we made clarifications to the manuscript of the story.

He came to this office on May 8, 2003, after a meeting with Valentina Ivanovna Matvienko, who then held the post of presidential plenipotentiary representative in the North-West, joyfully excited:

Valentina Ivanovna was more attentive to my proposals than she expected. Now things will move forward.

And indeed, it has moved. We were convinced of this a few months later, when we arrived on August 17 - the next anniversary of the opening of the memorial - in Myasnoy Bor.

Nikolai Alexandrovich told us what still needs to be done. And, knowing his ability to achieve his goal, I, Kulikov, and everyone involved in this work by the admiral had no doubt: so be it.

Throughout the fall, winter and spring, Shashkov was engaged in routine and, as he put it, bureaucratic work. On May 1, the phone rang in my apartment.

I just arrived from Moscow. Lots of interesting news about the memorial. As I said before, a film will be made about Second Impact. Vladimir Leonidovich Govorov (Army General, Hero of the Soviet Union, Deputy Chairman of the Pobeda Foundation - author) is actively promoting this idea. By the way, I brought you a letter from him thanking you for the story.

Yes. Remember when you scanned photos for me? So...

And we delved into a discussion of technical issues. In parting, Nikolai Alexandrovich reminded us: we will meet on May 9, in Myasnoy Bor. But fate decreed differently.

...On May 7, I stood in the large funeral hall of the crematorium and looked at the portrait of the admiral displayed in front of the closed coffin. The artificial light reflected dimly in the orders resting on scarlet cushions.

The night after our conversation, a fire broke out in the Shashkovs’ apartment. Nikolai Alexandrovich and his wife Valentina Petrovna died in the fire. The apartment itself was completely burned out.

...The farewell fireworks died down. The sailors removed the Navy flag from the coffin. Vice Admiral Shashkov passed away into eternity.

A man who fought all his life to preserve the names of fallen heroes in our history has passed away, leaving only a memory of himself. Like a true Patriot of the Motherland, a man of Honor and Duty.

This is a lot, and not everyone has it...

June 2004

___________________________

Musa Jalil (senior political instructor Musa Mustafievich Dzhalilov) was executed in the terrible Nazi prison Moabit on August 25, 1944. Shortly before his death, the poet wrote the following lines:

I'm leaving this life

The world may forget me

But I'll leave the song

Which will live.

The homeland did not forget Musa Jalil: in 1956 - posthumously - he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and the next year he was awarded the Lenin Prize. And today his poems are widely known in Russia.

After the war, one of the streets in Tallinn was named after Hero of the Soviet Union Evgeniy Aleksandrovich Nikonov. Now you won’t find a street with this name on the city map. In recent years, in Estonia, on whose territory the Nazis killed 125 thousand local residents, history has been carefully rewritten...

One of the best commanders of the Great Patriotic War, Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov (1897-1968) - later Marshal of the Soviet Union, holder of the highest military order "Victory". After the war - Assistant Minister of Defense of the USSR. Since 1964, Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal K.A. Meretskov worked in the group of general inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

As an example of Sokolov’s “commander’s skill,” in his book “In the Service of the People,” Marshal Meretskov cites an excerpt from Army Commander Order N14 dated November 19, 1941:

“1. I abolish walking like the crawling of flies in the fall, and I order from now on in the army to walk like this: a military step is a yard, and that’s how you walk. Accelerated - one and a half, and keep pressing.

2. Food is out of order. In the midst of the battle they have lunch and the march is interrupted for breakfast. In war, the order is this: breakfast is in the dark, before dawn, and lunch is in the dark, in the evening. During the day you will be able to chew bread or crackers with tea - good, but not - and thank you for that, fortunately the day is not particularly long.

3. Remember to everyone - commanders, privates, old and young, that during the day you cannot march in columns larger than a company, and in general in war it is night to march, so then march.

4. Don’t be afraid of the cold, don’t dress up like Ryazan women, be brave and don’t succumb to the frost. Rub your ears and hands with snow."

“Why not Suvorov?” comments K.A. Meretskov. “But it is known that Suvorov, in addition to issuing catchy orders that penetrate the soldier’s soul, took care of the troops... Sokolov thought that it was all about a dashing piece of paper, and limited mainly to orders."

Of the 2,100 people of the “Netherlands” legion, 700 remained alive. As for the “Flanders” legion, its strength was reduced threefold in just a few days of fighting.

The war spares no one - neither the marshals nor their children. In January 1942, the son of the famous Soviet commander Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze, aviation lieutenant Timur Frunze, died on the Leningrad Front. Posthumously, pilot T.M. Frunze was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Here is the full text of “The Volkhov Table,” written by Pavel Shubin in 1942:

Rarely, friends, do we meet,

But when it happened,

Let's remember what happened and drink, as usual,

How it happened in Rus'!

Let's drink to those who spent many weeks

Lying in frozen dugouts,

Fought on Ladoga, fought on Volkhov,

He didn't take a step back.

Let's drink to those who commanded the companies,

Who died in the snow

Who made their way to Leningrad through the swamps,

Breaking the enemy's throat.

They will be glorified forever in legends

Under a machine gun blizzard

Our bayonets are on the heights of Sinyavin,

Our regiments are near Mga.

Let the Leningrad family be with us

He sits nearby at the table.

Let us remember how Russian soldier strength

She drove the Germans for Tikhvin!

Let's stand up and clink glasses, standing we -

Brotherhood of fighting friends,

Let's drink to the courage of the fallen heroes,

Let's drink to the meeting of the living!

Around the same time, the traitor Vlasov, traveling around German headquarters, visited Riga, Pskov, and Gatchina. He spoke to the population with “patriotic” speeches. Hitler became enraged and ordered Vitia to be placed under house arrest: the 2nd Shock Strike was beating Wehrmacht units, and its former army commander was carrying all sorts of nonsense about victory in the rear of the suffering Army Group North. By the way, the Fuhrer ordered Vlasov to be executed if he allowed anything like that to happen again. It is clear how “highly” he valued the traitor.

By May 14, 1945, 231,611 Germans with all their weapons, including 436 tanks, 1,722 guns, and 136 aircraft, surrendered to the troops of the Leningrad Front in Courland.

All those who surrendered were guaranteed life, as well as the preservation of personal property.

Formation and units of the 2nd shock army of the 1st formation before the start of the Lyuban operation

Citizens are brave,

What did you do then?

When did our city not keep count of deaths?

B.C. Vysotsky. "Leningrad Siege"

Until December 1941, the 2nd Shock Army was called the 26th Reserve Army. It was formed in accordance with the Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 004097 “On the formation of the 26th Reserve Army.”

Lieutenant General G.G. Sokolov, commander of the Volga and Oryol military districts, heads of the Main Political Directorate and the Main Directorate for the Formation and Recruitment of Troops, Logistics of the Red Army.

1. Form the 26th Reserve Army with direct subordination to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

2. The 26th Reserve Army will include seven rifle divisions from the Defense and Military District and the Ordnance Military District with their deployment at the following points:

338th Infantry Division - in Sergach

354th Infantry Division - in Shumerla

344th Infantry Division - in Cheboksary

340th Infantry Division - in Kanash

331st Infantry Division - in Alatyr

327th Infantry Division - in Saransk

329th Infantry Division - in Ruzaevka.

3. Appoint Lieutenant General Sokolov as commander of the 26th Army.

4. Appoint Major General Vizzhilin as chief of staff of the 26th Army

5. The Chief of the General Staff and the Head of the Main Directorate of Formations will form the 26th Army by 10/30 and transfer army control and service units to it. The army headquarters will be deployed in the Alatyr area by 10/30.

6. Report receipt and execution of the directive.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command I. Stalin, A. Vasilevsky

Initially, the army was formed for the battles near Moscow. According to the Supreme Command Headquarters directive No. 494 of November 25, 1941, the army, consisting of seven rifle and two cavalry divisions, began transferring to the area - Noginsk, Voskresensk, Kolomna, Orekhovo-Zuevo to cover a possible enemy breakthrough in the Kolomna direction. Accordingly, by December 1, 1941, only two rifle and two cavalry divisions remained from the army, and there was a need for additional staffing. The army was replenished in the same military districts.

It must be said that few people thought about the rather interesting national composition of the fallen soldiers who remained at Myasny Bor. Only Russians, Tatars and Bashkirs are found there en masse. Meanwhile, the directive explains everything perfectly - Oryol VO - Black Earth Region and Volga VO - Kazan and surrounding areas. For the same reason, search engines most often worked and are working in the “Valley of Death” from Kazan University, Volga region cities, from Voronezh, not counting, of course, Novgorodians, on whose land Myasnoy itself is located

Command staff Commanders

Lieutenant General Sokolov G.G. from 12/25/1941 to 01/10/1942

Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov from 01/10/1942 to 04/16/1942

Lieutenant General Vlasov A.A. from 04/16/1942 to 07/01/1942

Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov from 07/24/1942 to 12/02/1942

Chiefs of Staff

Major General Vizzhilin V.A. from 12/25/1941 to 03/07/1942

Colonel Rozhdestvensky S.E. from 12/25/1941 to 03/07/1942

Colonel Vinogradov P.S. from 04/04/1942 to 24/05/1942

Colonel Kozachek S.B. from 07/15/1942 to 08/11/1942

Members of the Military Council

Brigade Commissar Mikhailov A.I. from 12/25/1941 to 02/11/1942

Divisional Commissioner Zelenkov M.N. from 02/11/1942 to 03/05/1942

Divisional Commissioner Zuev I.V. from 03/05/1942 to 07/17/1942

Monthly combat strength of the army

As we see, at all stages of the unsuccessful Lyuban operation, the 327th Infantry Division took an active part. And in its fate, the fate of the fighters and commanders, as in a mirror, the fate of the entire 2nd Shock Army was reflected.

From the book Generalissimo. Book 1. author Karpov Vladimir Vasilievich

Formation of the Polish Army On July 30, 1941, diplomatic relations were restored with the Polish government, which was in exile in London. These relations were interrupted due to the events that followed the signing of the secret protocol on

From the book Empire of the GRU. Book 2 author Kolpakidi Alexander Ivanovich

Special military formations in the Spanish Republican Army in 1936-38 When the civil war began in Spain on July 18, 1936, only the Soviet Union came to the aid of the legitimate republican government of the country. Already in August 1936, the first

From the book History of Russia from the beginning of the 18th to the end of the 19th century author Bokhanov Alexander Nikolaevich

§ 1. Formation of a new army We have already said that the core of the future army of Peter I became his amusing regiments. In principle, Peter’s army was practically born in the fire of the long years of the Northern War. Based on the experience of the 17th century, the army was formed through forced

author Popov Alexey Yurievich

To the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks, member of the military council of the 3rd Shock Army, Comrade. Ponomarenko Sov. secretSpecial message About manifestations of banditry in the districts of the Vitebsk region as of May 30, 1942. On the territory of Zapolsky, Shabrovsky and other village councils of the Surazhsky district of the Vitebsk region

From the book Stalin's Saboteurs: NKVD behind enemy lines author Popov Alexey Yurievich

Sov. secret to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPB(b), member of the military council of the 3rd shock army, comrade. Ponomarenko In the territory of the temporarily occupied regions of Belarus and especially from the Vitebsk region, an exceptionally large number of the local population crosses into our territory. IN

author Ivanova Isolda

P. I. Sotnik Combat actions of the 25th cavalry division in the Lyuban operation At the beginning of January 1942, our 25th cavalry division became part of the 13th cavalry division of the Volkhov Front. The corps was commanded by Major General N. I. Gusev, the commissar was regimental commissar M. I. Tkachenko, and the chief of staff was

From the book “Valley of Death” [Tragedy of the 2nd Shock Army] author Ivanova Isolda

K. A. Zlobin 111th Infantry in the Lyuban operation I was born in 1921 in the village of Bardakovka, Kursk region, into a peasant family. In 1939 I graduated from a pedagogical school and worked as a rural teacher before being drafted into the Red Army. The war found me as a cadet at the Military-Political School in

From the book “Valley of Death” [Tragedy of the 2nd Shock Army] author Ivanova Isolda

P.V. Bogatyrev 191st Infantry in the Lyuban operation On October 26, our division was transferred from Leningrad across Lake Ladoga near Tikhvin to the Sitomli region, where it fought offensive and defensive battles with the German invaders. On November 7, the enemy breaks through our defenses and

From the book “Valley of Death” [Tragedy of the 2nd Shock Army] author Ivanova Isolda

N.I. Kruglov About the combat operations of the 92nd SD as part of the 2nd Shock Army I arrived at the 96th separate engineer battalion from the junior lieutenant course at the end of August 1938. At that time, the armed conflict in the area of ​​the island ended. Hassan. The units involved in the conflict were cited

From the book Big Landing. Kerch-Eltigen operation author Kuznetsov Andrey Yaroslavovich

Appendix 4 Aviation units of the 4th Air Army and the Black Sea Fleet Air Force that took part in the Kerch-Eltigen operation a) 4th Air Army Divisions Regiments, dept. squadrons Aircraft Bases Notes 132 bad 46 gnlbap U-2 Blue beam (Peresyp district) Operated

From the book War at Sea (1939-1945) by Nimitz Chester

Planning the naval part of the operation The naval forces, mainly British, bore great responsibility for the invasion of Normandy. They were supposed to transfer landing troops to the landing sites and unload them there along with equipment, and also allocate

From the book The Battle of Crecy. History of the Hundred Years' War from 1337 to 1360 by Burn Alfred

FORMATION OF THE ARMY From the time of the Norman Conquest until the beginning of the reign of Edward I, the medieval army consisted of two parts: the national militia (the fyrd) and the feudal army. The first included every healthy man between the ages of 16 and 60; military

From the book History of the Far East. East and Southeast Asia by Crofts Alfred

Formation of the Red Army Communist fighters in the Nationalist armies who had escaped the general purge gathered in Nanchang, the provincial capital south of the Yangtze. Here on August 1, 1927 they formed the Red Army, fighting under a flag with a sickle and

From the book The Death of Vlasov's Army. Forgotten tragedy author Polyakov Roman Evgenievich

Formation and path of the 327th Infantry Division before the start of the Lyuban operation After all, we have such a people: If the Motherland is in danger, That means everyone should go to the front.B.C. VysotskyIn August 1941, the Voronezh Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in agreement with the Military Council of the Oryol Military District, was

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Scheme 12. Tasks and actions of the 13th Army with a strike group under order No.

From the book Liberation of Russia. Political party program author Imenitov Evgeniy Lvovich

The principle of formation and structure of the army As mentioned above, effective use is possible for any conventional weapon only if it is used on a massive scale. In terms of the main types of mass weapons, we do not have parity with potential adversaries. That


This summer, search groups, who had a little money from the Ministry of Defense for their search, were brought for a week to raise and bury a grandfather who fought in the 42nd in the 2nd Shock. He is 86 years old (God bless him), he is a former junior military technician of the 1102nd rifle regiment, and miraculously survived. At the funeral he began to speak his mind:

""" If Vlasov had not appeared in April 1942, we would all have died here. Our group took the regiment's banner out of the encirclement, several people from the regiment headquarters left us here, if not for Vlasov, Khozin would have rotted us here (general Khozin commanded the Leningrad Front and temporarily the 2nd Shock) We stood here because Vlasov was with us all spring, Vlasov every day, either in the artillery regiment, then with us, then with the anti-aircraft gunners - always with us, if it weren’t for the general. if we would have given up back in May"""
The cameras were immediately turned off, the organizers began to make excuses that the old man was in captivity, etc. And the grandfather went wild, little puny, almost no hair, and began to scald: “we ate bark before Vlasov, and drank water from the swamp, we were animals, our 327th division was CROSSED OUT from the production certificates of the Leningrad Front (Khrushchev later restored the Voronezh 327th yu).

The death of the 1102nd Infantry Regiment, the feat of these Voronezh guys, is not noted anywhere. They died (the regiment died, unlike other units that surrendered) in battle. In all materials of TsAMO, the 1102nd regiment died a heroic death. It is not in the reports of the Volkhov Front, it is not in the reports of the Leningrad Front, there is no 1102nd infantry regiment yet, there are no fighters. There are no 1102nd regiments.

On March 9, A. Vlasov flew to the headquarters of the Volkhov Front, on 03/10/42 he was already at CP 2 Ud.A in Ogoreli, and on 03/12/42 he led the battle to capture the ill-fated Krasnaya Gorka, which was taken by the 327th Infantry Division along with the 259th Infantry Division, 46th Infantry Division, 22 and 53 OBR 03/14/42. Krasnaya Gorka is almost the farthest section of the ring; staff commanders almost never came there, limiting themselves to control through an intermediate point in Ozerye, where there was a small task force of officers, medical battalions, a food warehouse, and the place was not marshy. Krasnaya Gorka had no significance, but it was like a thorn. And then a whole lieutenant general appeared with her and immediately established control and interaction between the formations, since they often beat each other, especially at night. Then the Germans blocked the corridor at Myasnoy Bor for the first time on March 16, 1942. The blame for this lies entirely with the commanders of 59 and 52 A (Galanin and Yakovlev) and the front commander Meretskov. He then personally led the clearing of the corridor, sending 376 Rifle Division there and pouring in 3,000 non-Russian reinforcements 2 days before. Those who came under bombing for the first time, some died (many), some fled without breaking through the corridor. One regiment commander, Khatemkin (as he was called - both Kotenkin and Kotenochkin) shot himself after that. Meretskov was confused, he clearly speaks about this in his memoirs. The main action to break through the ring was carried out by 2 Ud.A itself from the inside. Who do you think led these efforts? That's right, A. Vlasov, personally commanding in the area east of Novaya Keresti units of the 58th Specialized Brigade and 7th Guards Tank Brigade, as well as courses for junior lieutenants.

During his stay in the 2nd Ud.A from March 9 to June 25, 1942, Lieutenant General A. Vlasov did everything he could, as a military man and as a person, including while surrounded at Myasny Bor. In a situation where, instead of food and ammunition, fresh newspapers are dumped into the cauldron, it is unlikely that anyone would have done more. When, at the moment of the greatest concentration of encirclement (by the way, most of those who had time, dressed in clean clothes, going into the last battle, fortunately they managed to bring in supplies of new underwear and summer uniforms before the complete encirclement) before the breakthrough on the night of 06.25.42 west of the Polist River in 20 minutes Before the appointed hour, 2 regiments of guards mortars (28 and 30 Guards Minp) deliver a concentrated attack directly on them with four regimental salvoes, there is no time for sentimentality. Nevertheless, even on the night of June 25, 1942, he made an attempt to exit the ring towards Lavrentiy Palych’s bullet, trying to refuse the task assigned to him, but no luck...

Three times loyal general. The last secret of Andrei Vlasov.

http://www.epochtimes.ru/content/view/10243/34/

So - autumn 1941. The Germans attack Kyiv. However, they cannot take the city. The defense has been greatly strengthened. And it is headed by a forty-year-old Major General of the Red Army, commander of the 37th Army, Andrei Vlasov. A legendary figure in the army. He has gone all the way - from private to general. He went through the civil war, graduated from the Nizhny Novgorod theological seminary, and studied at the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army. Friend of Mikhail Blucher. Just before the war, Andrei Vlasov, then still a colonel, was sent to China as military advisers to Chai-kan-shi. He received the Order of the Golden Dragon and a gold watch as a reward, which aroused the envy of all the generals of the Red Army. However, Vlasov was not happy for long. Upon returning home, at the Alma-Ata customs, the order itself, as well as other generous gifts from Generalissimo Chai-kan-shi, were confiscated by the NKVD...

Even Soviet historians were forced to admit that the Germans “got punched in the face for the first time,” precisely from the mechanized corps of General Vlasov.

This has never happened in the history of the Red Army, possessing only 15 tanks, General Vlasov stopped Walter Model’s tank army in the Moscow suburb of Solnechegorsk, and pushed back the Germans, who were already preparing for the parade on Moscow’s Red Square, 100 kilometers away, liberating three cities.. There was something to earn him the nickname “Savior of Moscow.” After the battle of Moscow, the general was appointed deputy commander of the Volkhov Front.

Andrei Vlasov understood that he was flying to his death. As a person who had gone through the crucible of this war near Kiev and Moscow, he knew that the army was doomed, and no miracle would save it. Even if this miracle is himself - General Andrei Vlasov, the savior of Moscow.



Troops 59 A already from 12/29/41 fought to break through enemy fortifications on the river. Volkhov, suffering heavy losses in the zone from Lezno - Vodosje to Sosninskaya Pristan.
The commissioning of 2 Ud.A only complemented the almost continuous attacks of formations 52 and 59 A, the battles took place on January 7 and 8.
The target of the offensive of 2 Ud.A also on January 27 was not Lyuban, but the city of Tosno; on 02/10-12/42 a joint offensive of 2 Ud.A from the south, 55 A from the north, 54 A from the east, 4 and 59 A from southeast in the direction of Tosno, but it did not happen for a number of reasons; only at the end of the 3rd decade of February did the redirection of attacks from 2 Ud.A to Lyuban take shape, in order to at least cut off the Germans in the Chudovsky Cauldron; 54 A also hit there in March.
59 A did not have any instructions to connect with 4 A, it was breaking through the German defense to connect with 2 Ud.A, advancing from the southwest both towards Lyuban and towards Chudovo; 59 A, putting more than 60% of its initial l / s, was withdrawn to the south into the breakthrough zone, and its strip north of Gruzino was occupied by 4 A; to unite with 4 Moreover, there was no need due to the fact that both armies had the closest connection in the elbow connection in the Gruzino region.
The Germans blocked the corridor at Myasny Bor for the first time not on 03/16/42; the corridor was restored only on March 28, 1942 with a narrow thread of 2 km.
General A. Vlasov flew to 2 Ud.A already on 03/10/42, by 03/12/42 he was already in the Krasnaya Gorka area, which, under his leadership, on 03/14/42 units of 2 Ud.A were able to take; from 03/20/42 he was transferred to lead the breakthrough of the intercepted corridor from inside the boiler, which he did - the corridor was broken through from the inside, not without help, of course, from the outside.
On May 13, 1942, not only I. Zuev flew to Malaya Vishera - how can one imagine the flight of only one member of the Military Council without the army commander to report to the front commander M. Khozin; All three flew out for the report - Vlasov, Zuev, Vinogradov (NS Army); there was no talk of any hopelessness in Vlasov’s report; There, a counter-offensive plan was approved 2 Ud. and 59 And towards each other by cutting off the German “finger” hanging over the corridor - in TsAMO there are maps, sweepingly signed by Vlasov’s hand (approximately as in the photo) with an offensive plan and dated around 05/13/42; the plan for a joint offensive appeared because before that the attempt of the 59th A alone to break through the “finger” from the outside with the forces of the Arkhangelsk fresh 2nd Infantry Division towards its own 24th Guards, 259th and 267th Infantry Division inside ended in complete failure, while the 2nd Infantry Division lost on the battlefield in 14 days, 80% of their fighters were surrounded and barely escaped with the remnants.
The withdrawal of troops did not begin on 05/23/42, and the headquarters near the village of Ogoreli was suddenly moved from its place due to the news of the appearance of the Germans in the village of Dubovik in the rear of our troops (and this was just reconnaissance), the troops behind the headquarters panicked, but quickly recovered; the withdrawal was not massive, but planned, this is a more precise word, since they retreated along lines that had been previously developed and approved and prepared in detail.
The first time the corridor was breached was on 06/19/42, it lasted until the evening of 06/22/42, during which time about 14,000 people came out.
On the night of June 25, 1942, a decisive assault on the city was planned. positions, before this our units received a massive attack in their concentrated battle formations at 22.40-22.55 by several regimental salvoes of two regiments of our RS (28 Guards and 30 Guards Minp); from 23.30 the units began to break through, about 7,000 people came out; The fighting inside the ring continued actively for another 2 days.

The total number of our prisoners from units 2 Ud.A in the cauldron ranged from 23,000 to 33,000 people. together with several parts 52 and 59 A; About 7,000 people died in the cauldron and during a breakthrough from inside.
http://www.soldat.ru/forum/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=23515

Note to the head of the special department of the NKVD of the Volkhov Front

To Senior Major of State Security Comrade MELNIKOV

In accordance with the tasks set by you for the period of your business trip in the 59th Army from 06/21 to 06/28/42, I report:

By the end of the day on June 21, 1942, units of the 59th Army broke through the enemy defenses in the Myasnoy Bor area and formed a corridor along the narrow-gauge railway. approximately 700–800 meters wide.

In order to hold the corridor, units of the 59th Army turned their front to the south and north and occupied combat areas parallel to the narrow-gauge railway.

A group of troops covering the corridor from the north with its left flank, and a group covering the corridor from the south with its right flank, bordered the pore. Gain weight...

By the time units of the 59th Army reached the river. It turned out that the message from Shtarm-2 about the allegedly occupied lines of the 2nd Shock Army along the river. To gain weight were unfaithful. (Base: report of the commander of the 24th Rifle Brigade)

Thus, there was no ulnar connection between units of the 59th Army and the 2nd Shock Army. This connection did not exist subsequently.

The resulting corridor on the night from 21 to 22.06. Food products were delivered to the 2nd Shock Army by people and on horses.

From 21.06. and until recently, the corridor was under fire from enemy mortar and artillery fire, and at times individual machine gunners and machine gunners infiltrated into it.

On the night of June 21-22, 1942, units of the 2nd Shock Army advanced towards units of the 59th Army, approximately in the corridor with forces: the first echelon of the 46th Division, the second echelon of the 57th and 25th Brigades. Having reached the junction with units of the 59th Army, these formations went through the corridor to the rear of the 59th Army.

In total, on the day of June 22, 1942, 6,018 wounded people and about 1,000 people left the 2nd Shock Army. healthy soldiers and commanders. Both among the wounded and among the healthy there were people from most of the formations of the 2nd Shock Army.

From 06/22/42 to 06/25/42 no one left the 2nd UA. During this period, the corridor remained on the western bank of the river. Gain weight. The enemy fired strong mortar and artillery fire. fire. In the corridor itself there was also infiltration of machine gunners. Thus, the exit of units of the 2nd Shock Army was possible with battle.

On the night of June 24-25, 1942, a detachment under the overall command of Colonel KORKIN, formed from Red Army soldiers and commanders of the 2nd Shock Army who emerged from encirclement on June 22, 1942, was sent to reinforce units of the 59th Army and secure the corridor. measures taken to resist the enemy in the corridor and on the western bank of the river. The plumpness was broken. Units of the 2nd UA moved in a common flow from approximately 2.00 on June 25, 1942.

Due to almost continuous enemy air raids during 06/25/42, the flow of people leaving the 2nd UA was stopped at 8.00. On this day, approximately 6,000 people came out. (according to the calculations of the counter standing at the exit), 1,600 of them were sent to hospitals.

From surveys of commanders, Red Army soldiers and operational personnel of the Special Divisions of the formations, it is obvious that the leading commanders of units and formations of the 2nd UA, when organizing the withdrawal of units from encirclement, did not count on leaving in battle, as evidenced by the following facts.

Detective officer 1st department OO NKVD front lieutenant state. security comrade ISAEV was in the 2nd Shock Army. In a report addressed to me, he writes:

“On June 22, it was announced in hospitals and units that those who wish could go to Myasnoy Bor. Groups of 100–200 soldiers and commanders, lightly wounded, moved to M. Bor without orientation, without signs and without group leaders, ending up at the front line of the enemy’s defense and captured by the Germans. Before my eyes, a group of 50 people wandered into the Germans and were captured. Another group of 150 people walked towards the German front line of defense, and only with the intervention of a group of the Special Department of 92 pages div. switching to the enemy's side was prevented.

At 20 o'clock on June 24, by order of the division's logistics chief, Major BEGUNA, the entire division's personnel, about 300 people, set off along the clearing of the central communication line to M. Bor. Along the route, I observed the movement of similar columns from other brigades and divisions, numbering up to 3,000 people.

The column, having passed from the Drovyanoe Pole clearing up to 3 km, was met by a strong barrage of machine gun, mortar and artillery fire. enemy fire, after which the command was given to move back to a distance of 50 meters. When retreating back, there was mass panic and groups fleeing through the forest. We split into small groups and scattered through the forest, not knowing what to do next. Each person or small group solved their further task independently. There was no single leadership for the entire column.

Group 92 page div. 100 people decided to go the other way, along the narrow-gauge railway. As a result, we passed through a barrage of fire to Myasnoy Bor with some losses.”

The detective officer of the 25th Infantry Brigade, political instructor SHCHERBAKOV, writes in his report:

“June 24 this year. From early morning, a barrier detachment was organized, which detained all passing military personnel capable of carrying weapons. Together with the remnants of units and subunits, the brigades were divided into three companies. In each company, an operative, an employee of the NKVD OO, was assigned for maintenance.

When reaching the starting line, the command did not take into account the fact that the first and second companies had not yet moved to the starting line.

Having pushed the third company forward, we placed it under heavy enemy mortar fire.

The company command was confused and could not provide leadership to the company. The company, having reached the flooring under enemy mortar fire, scattered in different directions.

The group moved to the right side of the flooring, where there were detective officer KOROLKOV, platoon commander - ml. Lieutenant KU-ZOVLEV, several soldiers of the OO platoon and other units of the brigade, came across enemy bunkers and lay down under enemy mortar fire. The group consisted of only 18–20 people.

In such numbers, the group could not go to the enemy, then the platoon commander KUZOVLEV suggested returning to the starting line, joining other units and leaving on the left side of the narrow-gauge railway, where enemy fire was much weaker.

Concentrating on the edge of the forest, the head of the OO comrade. PLAKHAT-NIK found Major KONONOV from the 59th Rifle Brigade, joined his group with his people, with whom they moved to the narrow-gauge railway and left together with the 59th Rifle Brigade.”

Operative officer of the 6th Guard. mortar division, state security lieutenant Comrade LUKASHEVICH writes about the 2nd division:

- All brigade personnel, both privates and command staff, were informed that the exit would begin by assault at exactly 23.00 on June 24, 1942 from the starting line of the river. Gain weight. The first echelon was the 3rd battalion, the second echelon was the second battalion. No one from the brigade command, service chiefs, or battalion commands came out of the encirclement due to the delay at the command post. Having broken away from the main body of the brigade and, obviously, starting to move in a small group, one must assume that they died along the way.

An operative of the reserve OO of the front, Captain GORNOSTAYEV, working at the concentration point of the 2nd Shock Army, had a conversation with those who had escaped the encirclement, about which he writes:

“Through our workers, commanders and soldiers who came out, it is established that all units and formations were given a specific task about the order and interaction of entering the formation in battle. However, during this operation, a disaster occurred, small units were confused, and instead of a fist, there were small groups and even individuals. The commanders, for the same reasons, could not control the battle. This happened as a result of heavy enemy fire.

There is no way to establish the actual position of all the parts, because no one knows. They declare that there is no food, many groups are rushing from place to place, and no one will bother to organize all these groups and fight to connect.

This briefly characterizes the situation in the 2nd Shock Army at the time of its exit and during its exit from encirclement.

It was known that the Military Council of the 2nd Shock Army was supposed to leave on the morning of June 25, but their exit did not take place.

From conversations with Deputy Head of the NKVD OO of the 2nd Shock Army Art. State Security Lieutenant Comrade GORBOV, with the soldiers accompanying the Military Council of the Army, with the driver of the Member of the Military Council, comrade. ZUEVA, from Beginning. chemical services of the Army, the Prosecutor of the Army and other persons, to one degree or another, aware of the attempt to escape from the encirclement of the Military Council, the following is obvious:

The Military Council came out with security measures in front and from the rear. Having encountered enemy fire resistance on the river. Plump, head guard under the command of Deputy. The head of the 2nd Shock Army, Comrade GORBOV, took the lead and went to the exit, while the Military Council and rear guards remained on the western bank of the river. Gain weight.

This fact is indicative in the sense that even when the Military Council left, there was no organization of the battle and control of the troops was lost.

Persons who went out individually and in small groups after June 25 of this year know nothing about the fate of the Military Council.

To summarize, it should be concluded that the organization of the withdrawal of the 2nd Shock Army suffered from serious shortcomings. On the one hand, due to the lack of interaction between the 59th and 2nd Shock Armies to secure the corridor, which largely depended on the leadership of the Front headquarters, on the other hand, due to confusion and loss of control of the troops of the 2nd Shock Army headquarters and headquarters connections when leaving the environment.

As of June 30, 1942, 4,113 healthy soldiers and commanders were counted at the concentration point, among them there were persons who came from encirclement under very strange circumstances, for example: on June 27, 1942, one Red Army soldier came out and said that he lay in the crater and is now returning. When he was asked to eat, he refused, declaring that he was full. The route to the exit was described by a route that was unusual for everyone.

It is possible that German intelligence used the moment of leaving the encirclement of the 2nd UA to send in converted Red Army soldiers and commanders who had previously been captured by them.

From a conversation with Deputy I know from the head of the PA Army - Comrade GORBOV that in the 2nd UA there were facts of group betrayal, especially among Chernigov residents. Comrade GORBOV in the presence of the Head. OO 59th Army Comrade NIKITIN said that 240 people from Chernigov betrayed their Motherland.

In the first days of June, in the 2nd UA there was an extraordinary betrayal of the Motherland on the part of the assistant. the head of the encryption department of the Army headquarters - MALYUK and an attempt to betray the Motherland by two more employees of the encryption department.

All these circumstances suggest the need for a thorough check of all personnel of the 2nd UA by strengthening security measures.

Beginning 1 branch of the NKVD organization

Captain of State Security - KOLESNIKOV.

Top secret
DEPUTY People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR to Commissar of State Security 1st Rank Comrade ABAKUMOV

REPORT

About the disruption of the military operation

On the withdrawal of troops of the 2nd Shock Army

From the enemy environment
According to agent data, interviews with commanders and soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army who emerged from encirclement, and personal visits to the site during combat operations of units and formations of the 2nd, 52nd and 59th armies, it was established:

The enemy managed to encircle the 2nd Shock Army consisting of the 22, 23, 25, 53, 57, 59th Rifle Brigades and 19, 46. 93, 259, 267, 327, 282 and 305th Rifle Divisions only because the criminally negligent attitude of the front commander, Lieutenant General Khozin, who did not ensure the implementation of the Headquarters directive on the timely withdrawal of army troops from Lyuban and the organization of military operations in the Spasskaya Polist area.

Having taken command of the front, Khozin from the village area. Olkhovki and the Gazhi Sopki swamps brought the 4th, 24th and 378th rifle divisions into front reserve.

The enemy, taking advantage of this, built a narrow-gauge railway through the forest to the west of Spasskaya Polist and freely began to accumulate troops to attack the communications of the 2nd Shock Army Myasnoy Bor - Novaya Kerest.

The front command did not strengthen the defense of communications of the 2nd Shock Army. The northern and southern roads of the 2nd Shock Army were covered by the weak 65th and 372nd Rifle Divisions, stretched out in a line without sufficient firepower on insufficiently prepared defensive lines.

The 372nd Rifle Division by this time occupied a defense sector with a combat strength of 2,796 people, stretching 12 km from the village of Mostki to mark 39.0, which is 2 km north of the narrow-gauge railway.

The 65th Red Banner Rifle Division occupied a 14 km long defense sector with a combat strength of 3,708 people, stretching from the corner of the forest of the southern clearing of the flour mill to the barn 1 km from the village of Krutik.

The commander of the 59th Army, Major General Korovnikov, hastily approved the raw diagram of the division's defensive structures, presented by the commander of the 372nd Infantry Division, Colonel Sorokin; the defense headquarters did not check it.

As a result, of the 11 bunkers built by the 8th company of the 3rd regiment of the same division, seven turned out to be unusable.

The front commander Khozin and the front chief of staff, Major General Stelmakh, knew that the enemy was concentrating troops against this division and that they would not provide defense of the communications of the 2nd Shock Army, but they did not take measures to strengthen the defense of these sectors, having reserves at their disposal.

On May 30, the enemy, after artillery and air preparation with the help of tanks, launched an attack on the right flank of the 311th Regiment of the 65th Infantry Division.

The 2, 7 and 8 companies of this regiment, having lost 100 soldiers and four tanks, retreated.

To restore the situation, a company of machine gunners was sent out, which, having suffered losses, withdrew.

The Military Council of the 52nd Army threw its last reserves into battle - the 54th Guards Rifle Regiment with 370 reinforcements. The reinforcements were introduced into battle on the move, uncoupled, and at the first contact with the enemy they fled and were stopped by barrage detachments of special departments.

The Germans, having pushed back units of the 65th Division, came close to the village of Teremets-Kurlyandsky and cut off the 305th Infantry Division with their left flank.

At the same time, the enemy, advancing in the sector of the 1236th Infantry Regiment of the 372nd Infantry Division, broke through the weak defenses, dismembered the second echelon of the reserve 191st Infantry Division, reached the narrow-gauge railway in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bmark 40.5 and linked up with the advancing units from the south.

The commander of the 191st Rifle Division repeatedly raised the question with the commander of the 59th Army, Major General Korovnikov, about the need and advisability of withdrawing the 191st Rifle Division to Myasny Bor in order to create a strong defense along the northern road.

Korovnikov did not take any measures, and the 191st Rifle Division, inactive and not erecting defensive structures, remained standing in the swamp.

Front commander Khozin and commander of the 59th Army Korovnikov, being aware of the concentration of the enemy, still believed that the defense of the 372nd division had been broken through by a small group of machine gunners, and, therefore, reserves were not brought into battle, which enabled the enemy to cut off the 2nd shock army.

Only on June 1, 1942, the 165th Infantry Division was brought into battle without artillery support, which, having lost 50 percent of its soldiers and commanders, did not improve the situation.

Instead of organizing the battle, Khozin withdrew the division from the battle and transferred it to another sector, replacing it with the 374th Infantry Division, which moved back somewhat at the time of the change of units of the 165th Infantry Division.

The available forces were not brought into battle in a timely manner; on the contrary, Khozin suspended the offensive and began moving division commanders:

He removed the commander of the 165th Infantry Division, Colonel Solenov, and appointed Colonel Morozov as the division commander, releasing him from the post of commander of the 58th Infantry Brigade.

Instead of the commander of the 58th Infantry Brigade, the commander of the 1st Infantry Battalion, Major Gusak, was appointed.

The chief of staff of the division, Major Nazarov, was also removed and Major Dzyuba was appointed in his place; at the same time, the commissar of the 165th Infantry Division, senior battalion commissar Ilish, was also removed.

In the 372nd Rifle Division, the division commander, Colonel Sorokin, was removed and Colonel Sinegubko was appointed in his place.

The regrouping of troops and the replacement of commanders dragged on until June 10. During this time, the enemy managed to create bunkers and strengthen the defense.

By the time it was encircled by the enemy, the 2nd Shock Army found itself in an extremely difficult situation; the divisions numbered from two to three thousand soldiers, exhausted due to malnutrition and overworked by continuous battles.

From 12.VI. to 18.VI. 1942, soldiers and commanders were given 400 g of horse meat and 100 g of crackers, on subsequent days they were given from 10 g to 50 g of crackers, on some days the fighters received no food at all; which increased the number of exhausted fighters, and deaths from starvation appeared.

Deputy beginning The political department of the 46th division, Zubov, detained a soldier of the 57th rifle brigade, Afinogenov, who was cutting a piece of meat from the corpse of a killed Red Army soldier for food. Having been detained, Afinogenov died of exhaustion on the way.

Food and ammunition in the army ran out, they were transported by air due to white nights and the loss of the landing site near the village. Finev Meadow was essentially impossible. Due to the negligence of the army's logistics chief, Colonel Kresik, the ammunition and food dropped by planes into the army were not fully collected.
Total Sent to the Army Collected by the Army 7.62mm rounds 1,027,820 682,708 76mm rounds 2,222 1,416 14.5mm rounds 1,792 Not received 37mm anti-aircraft rounds 1,590 570 122mm rounds 288 136

The position of the 2nd Shock Army became extremely complicated after the enemy broke through the defense line of the 327th Division in the Finev Lug area.

The command of the 2nd Army - Lieutenant General Vlasov and the division commander, Major General Antyufeev - did not organize the defense of the swamp west of Finev Lug, which the enemy took advantage of, entering the division's flank.

The retreat of the 327th division led to panic, the army commander, Lieutenant General Vlasov, was confused, did not take decisive measures to detain the enemy, who advanced to Novaya Keresti and subjected the rear of the army to artillery fire, cut off the 19th Guards and 305th from the main forces of the army rifle divisions.

Units of the 92nd Division found themselves in a similar situation, where, with an attack from Olkhovka by two infantry regiments with 20 tanks, the Germans, with the support of aviation, captured the lines occupied by this division.

The commander of the 92nd Rifle Division, Colonel Zhiltsov, showed confusion and lost control at the very beginning of the battle for Olkhovka.

The withdrawal of our troops along the Kerest River line significantly worsened the entire position of the army. By this time, the enemy artillery had already begun to sweep the entire depth of the 2nd Army with fire.

The ring around the army closed. The enemy, having crossed the Kerest River, entered the flank, penetrated our battle formations and launched an attack on the army command post in the Drovyanoye Pole area.

The army command post turned out to be unprotected; a special department company of 150 people was brought into battle, which pushed back the enemy and fought with him for 24 hours - June 23. The military council and army headquarters were forced to change their location, destroying communications facilities and, essentially, losing control of the troops. The commander of the 2nd Army, Vlasov, and the chief of staff, Vinogradov, showed confusion, did not lead the battle, and subsequently lost all control of the troops.

This was used by the enemy, who freely penetrated into the rear of our troops and caused panic.

On June 24, Vlasov decides to withdraw the army headquarters and rear institutions in marching order. The entire column was a peaceful crowd with disorderly movement, unmasked and noisy.

The enemy subjected the marching column to artillery and mortar fire. The Military Council of the 2nd Army with a group of commanders lay down and did not emerge from the encirclement. The commanders heading for the exit safely arrived at the location of the 59th Army. In just two days, June 22 and 23, 13,018 people emerged from encirclement, 7,000 of them wounded.

The subsequent escape from the encirclement of the enemy by the 2nd Army soldiers took place in separate small groups.

It has been established that Vlasov, Vinogradov and other senior officials of the army headquarters fled in panic, withdrew from the leadership of combat operations and did not announce their location, they kept it under wraps.

The military council of the army, in particular in the persons of Zuev and Lebedev, showed complacency and did not stop the panicky actions of Vlasov and Vinogradov, broke away from them, this increased the confusion in the troops.

The head of the special department of the army, state security major Shashkov, did not take decisive measures in a timely manner to restore order and prevent betrayal at the army headquarters itself:

On June 2, 1942, during the most intense combat period, he betrayed his Motherland - he went over to the enemy’s side with encrypted documents - pom. beginning 8th Department of the Army Headquarters, 2nd Rank Quartermaster Technician Semyon Ivanovich Malyuk, who gave the enemy the location of the 2nd Shock Army units and the location of the army command post. There have been cases of voluntary surrender to the enemy by some unstable military personnel.

On July 10, 1942, German intelligence agents Nabokov and Kadyrov, who we arrested, testified that during the interrogation of captured servicemen of the 2nd Shock Army, the following were present in the German intelligence agencies: the commander of the 25th Infantry Brigade, Colonel Sheludko, the assistant chief of the army's operational department, Major Verstkin, and quartermaster 1st rank. Zhukovsky, deputy commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Colonel Goryunov, and a number of others who betrayed the command and political composition of the army to the German authorities.

Having taken command of the Volkhov Front, Army General Comrade. Meretskov led a group of troops of the 59th Army to join forces with the 2nd Shock Army. From 21 to 22 June this year. units of the 59th Army broke through the enemy defenses in the Myasnoy Bor area and formed a corridor 800 m wide.

To hold the corridor, army units turned to the south and north and occupied combat areas along the narrow-gauge railway.

By the time units of the 59th Army reached the Polnet River, it became clear that the command of the 2nd Shock Army, represented by Chief of Staff Vinogradov, had misinformed the front and had not occupied defensive lines on the western bank of the Polnet River. Thus, there was no ulnar connection between the armies.

On June 22, a significant amount of food was delivered to the resulting corridor for units of the 2nd Shock Army by people and on horseback. The command of the 2nd Shock Army, organizing the exit of units from the encirclement, did not count on leaving in battle, did not take measures to strengthen and expand the main communications at Spasskaya Polist and did not hold the gates.

Due to almost continuous enemy air raids and shelling of ground troops on a narrow section of the front, exit for units of the 2nd Shock Army became difficult.

Confusion and loss of control of the battle on the part of the command of the 2nd Shock Army completely aggravated the situation.

The enemy took advantage of this and closed the corridor.

Subsequently, the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Lieutenant General Vlasov, was completely at a loss, and the chief of staff of the army, Major General Vinogradov, took the initiative into his own hands.

He kept his latest plan a secret and didn’t tell anyone about it. Vlasov was indifferent to this.

Both Vinogradov and Vlasov did not escape the encirclement. According to the chief of communications of the 2nd Shock Army, Major General Afanasyev, who was delivered on July 11 on a U-2 plane from behind enemy lines, they walked through the forest in the Oredezhsky region towards Staraya Russa.

The whereabouts of members of the military council Zuev and Lebedev are unknown.

The head of the special department of the NKVD of the 2nd Shock Army, State Security Major Shashkov, was wounded and shot himself.

We continue to search for the military council of the 2nd Shock Army by sending agents behind enemy lines and partisan detachments.

Head of the special department of the NKVD of the Volkhov Front Senior Major of State Security MELNIKOV

REFERENCE

on the situation of the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front for the period JANUARY - JULY 1942

Army Commander - Major General VLASOV
Member of the Military Council - divisional commissar ZUEV
Chief of Army Staff - Colonel VINOGRADOV
Beginning Special Department of the Army - State Major. safety checkers

In January 1942, the 2nd Shock Army was tasked with breaking through the enemy’s defense line in the Spasskaya Polist - Myasnoy Bor sector, with the task of pushing the enemy to the northwest, jointly with the 54th Army, capturing the Lyuban station, cutting the Oktyabrskaya railway , completing its operation by participating in the general defeat of the enemy’s Chudov group by the Volkhov Front.
Fulfilling the assigned task, the 2nd Shock Army on January 20–22 of this year. broke through the enemy's defense front in an area of ​​8–10 km indicated to her, brought all units of the army into the breakthrough, and for 2 months in persistent bloody battles with the enemy, she advanced to Lyuban, bypassing Lyuban from the southwest.
The indecisive actions of the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, which was marching to join the 2nd Shock Army from the northeast, extremely slowed down its advance. By the end of February, the offensive impulse of the 2nd Shock Army ran out of steam and the advance stopped in the area of ​​Krasnaya Gorka, southwest of Lyuban.
The 2nd Shock Army, pushing back the enemy, drove into its defenses in a wedge stretching 60–70 km through wooded and swampy terrain.
Despite repeated attempts to expand the initial breakthrough line, which is a kind of corridor, no success was achieved...
March 20–21 this year the enemy managed to cut off the communications of the 2nd Shock Army, closing the corridor, with the intention of tightening the ring of encirclement and complete destruction.
Through the efforts of the 2nd Shock Army, units of the 52nd and 59th armies, the corridor was opened on March 28th.
May 25 this year Headquarters of the Supreme High Command gave the order from June 1 to begin the withdrawal of units of the 2nd Shock Army to the southeast, i.e. in the opposite direction through the corridor.
On June 2, the enemy closed the corridor for the second time, having carried out a complete encirclement of the army. From that time on, the army began to be supplied with ammunition and food by air.
On June 21, in a narrow area 1–2 km wide in the same corridor, the enemy’s front line was broken through for the second time and the organized withdrawal of units of the 2nd Shock Army began.
June 25 this year the enemy managed to close the corridor for the third time and stop leaving our units. From that time on, the enemy forced us to stop supplying the army with air due to the large loss of our aircraft.
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on May 21 this year. ordered units of the 2nd Shock Army, retreating from the northwest to the southeast, firmly covering themselves at the Olkhovka-Lake Tigoda line from the west, striking the main forces of the army from the west and simultaneously striking the 59th Army from the east to destroy the enemy in the Priyutino-Spasskaya salient Polish...
Commander of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General KHOZIN hesitated to carry out the order from Headquarters, citing the impossibility of moving equipment off-road and the need to build new roads. By the beginning of June this year. units did not begin to withdraw, but to the General Staff of the Red Army, signed by KHOZIN and the beginning. Staff of the STELMAKH front sent a report about the beginning of the withdrawal of army units. As it was later established, KHOZIN and STELMAKH deceived the General Staff, by this time the 2nd Shock Army was just beginning to pull back the rear of its formations.
The 59th Army acted very indecisively, launched several unsuccessful attacks and did not complete the tasks set by Headquarters.
Thus, by June 21 this year. formations of the 2nd Shock Army in the amount of 8 rifle divisions and 6 rifle brigades (35-37 thousand people), with three regiments of the RGK 100 guns, as well as about 1000 vehicles, concentrated in an area several kilometers south of N. Kerest on an area of ​​6x6 km.
According to data available from the General Staff as of July 1 of this year, 9,600 people with personal weapons left the units of the 2nd Shock Army, including 32 employees of division headquarters and army headquarters. According to unverified data, the head of the Special Barma came out.
According to data sent to the General Staff by an officer of the General Staff, Army Commander VLASOV and member of the Military Council ZUEV on 06.27. They reached the western bank of the Polist River, guarded by 4 machine gunners, ran into the enemy and scattered under his fire; supposedly no one else saw them.
Chief of Staff STELMAKH 25.06. on HF reported that VLASOV and ZUEV reached the western bank of the Polist River. The withdrawal of troops was controlled from the destroyed tank. Their further fate is unknown.
According to the Special Department of the NKVD of the Volkhov Front on June 26 of this year, by the end of the day 14 thousand people had left the units of the 2nd Shock Army. There is no information about the actual position of army units and formations at the front headquarters.
According to the commissar of the separate communications battalion PESCOV, Army Commander VLASOV and his headquarters commanders were moving towards the exit in the 2nd echelon; the group led by VLASOV came under artillery and mortar fire. VLASOV ordered to destroy all radio stations by burning, which led to the loss of command and control of the troops.
According to the head of the Special Department of the Front, as of June 17 The situation of the army units was extremely difficult; there were numerous cases of exhaustion of soldiers, illnesses from hunger, and an urgent need for ammunition. By this time, according to the General Staff, passenger planes daily supplied air to army units with 7–8 tons of food with a requirement of 17 tons, 1900–2000 shells with a minimum requirement of 40,000, 300,000 rounds, a total of 5 rounds per person.
It should be noted that, according to the latest data received from the General Staff on June 29. this year, a group of military personnel from units of the 2nd Shock Army entered the sector of the 59th Army through enemy rear lines into the area Mikhaleva, with absolutely no losses. Those who came out claim that in this area the enemy forces are few in number, while the passage corridor, now tightened by a strong enemy group and targeted by dozens of batteries of mortars and artillery, with daily intensified air strikes, is today almost inaccessible for the breakthrough of the 2nd Shock Army from the west, as well as the 59th Army from the east.

It is characteristic that the areas through which 40 servicemen leaving the 2nd Shock Army passed were precisely indicated by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for the exit of units of the 2nd Shock Army, but neither the Military Council of the 2nd Shock Army nor the Military Council The Volkhov Front did not ensure the implementation of the Headquarters directive.





On April 6 of this year, in the village of Tesovo-Netylsky, Novgorod district, Novgorod region, a military-historical reconstruction of several combat episodes of April-May 1942 took place. Soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army fought here with the Germans for a rather narrow supply corridor. The official name of the event is international festival "Forgotten feat - Second Shock Army". Several hundred reenactors took part in an unusual festival, which was filmed for the military-historical portal WarSpot.

The action turned out to be noteworthy for several details: exhibits from the Tesovsky Museum of Narrow-Gauge Railway Transport were used, and the reconstruction took place in the same places where heavy fighting took place. For the first time I saw that some elements of drama were included in the script of a military-historical reconstruction, and I noticed a decent number of participants who thoughtfully worked on their appearance. Well, “civilians” turned out to be extremely appropriate. Perhaps this was one of the most interesting reconstructions I have ever seen.

*****

Brief historical background: when the city on the Neva was already blocked and, without surrendering, was subjected to constant attacks by the Germans, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command took measures to relieve the blockade of Leningrad. In December 1941, attempts were made to counter-offensive in the area of ​​​​the city of Tikhvin, and the success of the attackers was to be supported by the troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov and North-Western fronts. A joint simultaneous powerful strike by all forces did not work out, the operation stalled, from the Tikhvin strategic offensive it turned into the Lyuban offensive, first, and then defensive, which in turn transformed into an operation to withdraw troops from encirclement.

The Volkhov Front began the Lyuban operation in January 1942, in a fierce winter with forty-degree frosts. Several stages of the offensive led to the formation of a breakthrough zone, shaped like a bottle with a neck in the Myasnoy Bor area. Our troops managed to push back the Germans, but there was a threat of encirclement, the Red Army’s offensive stopped and the “bottle” began to rapidly turn into a “cauldron”.

In April 1942, the army switched from unsuccessful offensive actions to defensive ones. On April 20, 1942, General A. A. Vlasov was appointed commander of the 2nd Shock Army. Under his leadership, the already surrounded troops tried to break out of the “bag” to their own. Being almost completely isolated, the soldiers and commanders of the Second Shock fought fiercely with the enemy.

The encircled troops were supplied through the only “corridor” that remained just near Myasny Bor, between Polist and Glushitsa. It was he who later received the name “Valley of Death” due to the large number of those who were breaking through the encirclement who died under German fire. The "Valley" was known to the Germans as "Eric's Corridor". In June 1942, the Germans managed to eliminate this only corridor. The encirclement was completed, and the destruction of the Second Shock soldiers by the Germans continued.

During May-June, the Second Shock Army under the command of A. A. Vlasov made desperate attempts to break out of the bag. Having given his troops the order to leave the encirclement as best he could, Vlasov himself, with a small group of soldiers and staff workers, after several weeks of wandering, was captured by the Germans. While in the Vinnitsa military camp for captured senior officers, Vlasov agreed to cooperate with the Nazis and headed the “Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia” (KONR) and the “Russian Liberation Army” (ROA), composed of captured Soviet military personnel. So, because of one person, an undeserved shadow of betrayal fell on the tragedy and death of an entire army.

I wrote more (but still quite briefly) about these places here. If the topic interests you, read the very detailed and difficult in every sense book by B.I. Gavrilov entitled “In Myasnoy Bor, in the Valley of Death. The feat and tragedy of the 2nd Shock Army."

“I saw this sleeper after the war. It is kept in the Novgorod museum. In the fall of 1966, Nikolai Ivanovich Orlov, a lineman at the Spasskaya Polist station, found her. We managed to find the address of one of the authors of the unusual poster - Sergei Ivanovich Veselov. He told me that there were six of them: Russians Anatoly Bogdanov, Alexander Kudryashov, Alexander Kostrov and he, Sergey Veselov, Tatar Zakir Uldenov and Moldavian Kostya (his friends did not remember his last name). All from the 3rd Saber Squadron, 87th Cavalry Division. For five days, hungry, they wandered around enemy lines. During the day they sat in shelter, at night they walked east, guided by the lightning of a distant cannonade. When the sounds of battle began to be heard clearly, the friends decided to make a last stop and gather their strength. A dugout was spotted in the railway embankment. We went into it. The floor of the dugout was strewn with spent cartridges, apparently our machine gunners were fighting off the enemy here. Kostya picked up the shell casing and placed it on the blackened sleeper that lay right there in the dugout.

“Look how great it stands out. It will be visible from afar,” he said (as S.I. Veselov writes). - Let's write a letter.

What letter? - we were surprised.

But let’s hammer the cartridges into the sleeper so that the words come out. Let everyone read it.

I liked the idea. But what to knock out on the sleeper?

You seem to be a party member, you know better,” Kostya told me.

I suggested:

- “We will win anyway.”

It’s long,” Kostrov objected. - Let's just say: “We will win!”

Kostya found a stone and began to hammer the cartridge case. She entered tightly - she bent. Kostya corrected her and hit her with the stone again. He was replaced by Sasha Kostrov. He beat me until he hurt his hand. So we took turns. And someone was on duty outside. Having finished the “letter”, they laid the sleeper across the path: let everyone see who passes here.

They crossed the front line under fire. Sasha Kostrov was killed. Both my legs were broken. Kostya and Anatoly Bogdanov carried me out to their people.”

from the book by K. F. Kalashnikov “The Right to Lead”

Before, in fact, the reconstruction, those who wished could get acquainted closely with the narrow-gauge variety of railway transport.

A rally was supposed to take place at the village memorial in the middle of the day. So that festival guests do not have doubts “Where should we go first?”, a narrow gauge train ran between the site and the memorial. It might seem like a small thing, but it’s quite possible to take off your hat to the organizers for this alone. It was imperative to attend the rally, and at the same time we also took a ride on a rare narrow-gauge train. Personally, this is my first time.

Funeral salvo. The word “pleased” in this context is not very appropriate, but when the boys, after laying wreaths by the adults, rushed to collect spent cartridges, it somehow let go inside. They are normal guys, their values ​​are normal and their memory of the event will remain correct. What they all say is true: it’s not the dead who need it, the living need it.

Heavy German weapons. This is the first time I've seen this during a reconstruction. Schwere Wurfgerat 40 (Holz). Wooden frame with a 32-cm Wurfkorper Flamm inside. A 32 cm incendiary rocket filled with crude oil. The maximum flight range of the missile was about 2000 meters with a maximum speed of 150 m/s. It was launched directly from the packaging frames, flew to the target very reluctantly, there was no need to talk about any accuracy. However, when firing across a dry meadow or forest, a mine explosion caused a fire of up to 200 square meters with a flame height of up to two to three meters. The explosion of a mine charge (weighing 1 kg) created an additional fragmentation effect.

English-language sources report that it was this installation that received the nickname “Land Stuka” (U87 dive bomber), because of the... roar (howl) that the missiles emitted at launch. The rocket engine operates in the first third of the flight path, and then it flies by inertia. That is, they jammed the missiles of their crew, and then fell silently on enemy positions. “Im Soldatenjargon wurde es als “Stuka zu Fu?” (auf Grund des ahnlich charakteristischen Pfeifgerauschs wie bei der Ju 87 "Stuka") oder "Heulende Kuh" bezeichnet."

Jokes aside: At the end of 1941, the command of the Leningrad Front, in preparation for breaking the blockade of Leningrad surrounded by German troops, instructed engineers of the Leningrad artillery range S.M. Serebryakov and M.N. Aleshkov to develop heavy high-explosive and incendiary rocket mines. The need for such mines arose due to the fact that, despite the presence of a significant number of guns for the destruction of enemy defensive structures, the Leningrad Front did not have a sufficient amount of ammunition for them. The task assigned to the engineers was significantly facilitated by the fact that in mid-March, Soviet troops operating in the Volkhov area captured a German ammunition depot in the village of Konduya, which also stored 28Wurkor-per Spr turbojet shells. (280 mm high explosive mine) and 32 Wurkurper M.F1.50 (320 mm incendiary mine). Their design was adopted as the basis for the creation of Soviet turbojet shells M-28 (MTV-280) and M-32 (MTV-320). On the Leningrad Front, the abbreviated name “MTV” (heavy rotating mine) was used.

By July 1942, military representatives accepted 460 M-28 mines and 31 M-32 mines from Leningrad enterprises. The first were equipped with the explosive "sinal", and the second - with a flammable liquid. Military tests were carried out on July 20, 1942 in combat conditions: 192 heavy M-28 mines (more than 12 tons of explosives and steel) immediately covered two enemy battalions - Spanish volunteers from the Blue Division and the Germans who were changing them at that hour in the fortified area of ​​​​Staro-Panovo . The shooting was carried out using “frame” type launchers, on which sealed boxes with mines were placed (four for each installation). These boxes were used both for storing and transporting mines, and for launching them. The same principle was used to create the Soviet M-30 and M-31 missiles.

Well, it's time to start. To make it even more believable, cold rain fell mercilessly, the wind grew stronger, and everything in nature became the way I like it.

Inscriptions on the pillar (from top to bottom):

Field Gendarmerie

Sapper battalion

Berlin - 1321km

250th Infantry Division

Inscriptions on the pillar (from top to bottom):

Finev Meadow. Under fire! Drive without stopping!

Field Gendarmerie

Sapper battalion

Berlin - 1321km

250th Infantry Division

The Germans reoccupied the station.

These days, 73 years ago, the battles in the Myasny Bor area were coming to a sad conclusion. The chain of events that followed the Lyuban offensive operation, which was carried out by units of the 2nd shock, 4th, 52nd, 54th and 59th Soviet armies, was ending. The goal of this operation, which began in winter, was to break the blockade of Leningrad and defeat units of the 18th German Army, and the capture of the city of Lyuban, after which the operation was later named, was a private task of the large offensive operation of the Volkhov Front. The center of defense of the German group in the Lyuban direction was the city of Chudovo. The 54th Army, with a strike from Pogostye to Lyuban, was supposed to meet there with units of the 2nd Shock Army, which had broken through the German front between the villages of Myasnoy Bor and Spasskaya Polist, which corresponded to the plan to encircle the enemy’s Chudovskaya group.

Due to the voluntary surrender of the last commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov, and his subsequent activities in creating the Russian Liberation Army, as well as the unsuccessful completion of the operation with a large number of killed and missing, these battles are poorly described in literature, and the soldiers of the 2nd shock, who survived the meat grinder of the “Volkhov Cauldron”, but were captured, were branded traitors.

The situation in the area of ​​operations of the 2nd Shock and 54th armies that had developed by the beginning of spring 1942 was mirrored for the German and Soviet troops: the 2nd Shock Army broke through the German front north of Novgorod, cut the Novgorod-Chudovo and Novgorod-Leningrad railways, and half the distance to the positions of the troops defending the besieged city. The supply of Soviet troops passed through a bottleneck created in German positions at the very beginning of the operation, which could not be expanded despite repeated attempts; a corridor was formed on the German side, in the center of which was the city of Lyuban. Soviet troops made efforts to encircle the Germans, and they, in turn, tried to cut the neck through which the 2nd Shock Army was supplied. The main and most important difference in the position of the two opposing sides was in the supply routes for the warring troops. The Red Army did not have a developed network of roads; the area between Spasskaya Polist and Myasny Bor was very swampy and with a large number of small rivers and streams. While there were frosts, this was not a big problem, but with the onset of spring the ice melted and roads had to be built. Construction proceeded under constant shelling, and the delivery of goods to the 2nd Shock Army proceeded intermittently, accompanied by great difficulties and losses. The Germans had a favorable situation for supplying their units; they controlled a section of the Leningrad-Moscow railway and a parallel highway between the same cities at that point, which made it possible to use both a large number of trucks and captured Soviet locomotives and wagons.

Map of the Lyuban offensive operation

As a result of bloody battles, the Soviet offensive fizzled out by mid-April 1942 without achieving its goals. The troops suffered heavy losses, units found themselves in a semi-encirclement - a pocket, and by the end of April the focus of the fighting shifted to the supply corridor of the 2nd Shock Army, the fighting became fierce, often turning into hand-to-hand combat. At the same time, on April 20, 1942, Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov was appointed to the post of commander of the 2nd Shock Army.


Major General A. A. Vlasov during the battles near Moscow

Vlasov was not new to the war, he fought on the Southwestern Front, first as commander of the 4th Mechanized Corps, and then as commander of the 37th Army, defended Kyiv, commanded the troops of the 20th Army in the Battle of Moscow, from March 8 In 1942, he was appointed to the post of deputy commander of the Volkhov Front.

Having taken control of the troops, Lieutenant General Vlasov assessed the current situation: the condition of the troops inside the bag was quite deplorable, people were weakened and starving, there were problems with uniforms, especially with shoes, there was a huge shortage of personnel in the units, most of the units were such only on paper. In addition, the defense lines pass through areas flooded with melt water and swamps, there are very few places where you can dry and warm up, in addition, such places are under regular artillery fire and bombing by German aircraft, there are problems with evacuating the wounded, there is a disdainful attitude towards the bodies of the dead, etc. .To. there is no strength and opportunity to remove and bury them, all this contributes to the spread of diseases and a decline in the morale of the troops. However, troops continue to fight and there are no mass surrenders.



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