Last weekend, the closing ceremony of the 2017 search season was held on the territory of the New Moscow memorial complex “Field of Military Glory of 1812 and 1941, Long Height.” The event took place with the support of the NPO Resource Center in TiNAO

Every year, from April to late autumn, thousands of caring people go to the battlefields of the Great Patriotic War to find the remains of fallen soldiers and write new names on the pages of Russia’s military glory. At the height "Long" near the settlement Rogovskoe bloody battles took place both in 1812 during the Napoleonic invasion, and in 1941, during the days of the defense of the capital from the Nazis. Now a memorial complex has been created here for the repose of fallen soldiers. Since 2014, the military-patriotic association “Narsky Frontier” has been operating in these areas, which now includes 15 children and adult search teams.

On Friday, October 27, search teams from Moscow, the Moscow and Kaluga regions gathered together at the Sokolenok children's health camp to sum up the 2017 expeditions. This year, the remains of 84 fighters were found, four of whom were identified by their death medallion. 13 fighters were raised by guys from the search teams of the “Nara Frontier”. The most active searchers this season received commemorative books dedicated to the Battle of Moscow from the NGO Resource Center in TiNAO.

On Saturday, October 28, a ceremonial reburial of the fighters found this year took place. The closing ceremony of the “Memory Watch” was attended by military personnel, veterans, activists of public organizations, representatives of authorities in Moscow, the Moscow region and the Kaluga region, military-patriotic clubs and search teams. According to established tradition, the soldiers were seen off on their last journey with a three-shot salute, and the search parties marched in ceremonial formation along the Walk of Fame.

The 70th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War, to which our “Military Track” series of trips was dedicated, has passed, but military-themed trips have been and continue to be popular. In this regard, it was decided to continue mini-travels in this direction, and the first trip of 2016 was the Nara border.

It was from the Nara line that our army began its offensive both in the war with Napoleon and in the Great Patriotic War. Both times, it became a turning point - from defeat to Victory!

01/30/16 we drove along forgotten military roads, visited military memorials, and thanks to our guide, Dmitry, the trip participants heard a story about actual events, without unnecessary embellishment, which usually abounds in the media.

The gathering of the column was scheduled, as always, at 10 am, this time the starting point was the village of Dubna, Chekhov district. We were accompanied by the crews of Ivan on the Patriot, Yuri on the Patriot, Maxim on the Pathfinder, Vladimir on the Patriot, Alexander on the Kairon, Andrey on the Patriot, Andrey on the Kairon and Mikhail on the Patriot.

Gathering of participants, this time without a single delay!

Briefing before the start of the movement.

In the 20th of September 1941, on the western borders of the Chekhov district of the Moscow region, a defense line began to form, which a little later would be called the “Stremilovsky line.” We can say that the Stremilovsky line is one of the components of the Nara line.

Memorial "Stremilovsky Frontier".

Dmitry talks about how in the fall the fascist army launched frantic activity in the Volokolamsk direction. The Germans were rushing to Moscow. Despite the fierce resistance of the Soviet troops, the enemies were approaching the capital along the Volokolamsk Highway. Then the Soviet command decided to conduct a diversionary maneuver at the Stremilovsky line of defense - to go on the offensive.

At that time, the 17th Moscow Rifle Division of the People's Militia (Moskvoretsky district of Moscow) held the defense at the Stremilovsky line; it included mainly workers and employees of the Vladimir Ilyich plant, tannery, Goznak factory, and worsted spinning factory named after M. I. Kalinin and some other enterprises of the Moskvoretsky district. In a word, workers with no combat experience and minimal preparation for combat operations. Before the start of the fighting in Spas-Demensk, the division had about 11,000 people.

The division fought its way back along the Warsaw Highway. The soldiers fought off attacks by German tanks and were subjected to brutal bombing. By October 25, 1941, 1,420 people remained alive.

Also, to strengthen the defense of the Stremilovsky line, the front command sent the 26th tank brigade, commanded by Colonel Mikhail Ilyich Levsky.

We're poisoning ourselves.

Now the convoy is ready for off-road adventures, and we moved along the forest road along the Nara border.

The weather always brings us surprises, and this trip was no exception. Only a week has passed since the ride, but the snow has decreased by a factor of 2. Unfortunately, the snow-white winter forest has lost its charm, but the road has acquired thawed patches, and the ruts have filled with porridge. Where before we had jumped over the ice without caring at all about the depth of the rut, now the cars fell through and rowed desperately.

Crouched Patriot.

Yuri tried out the winch for the first time, which he has had for half a year.

The extraction was successful.

The place where the road crosses the stream, if it had completely thawed, we would have had to build a crossing, but we were lucky.

Field site. Here it was only the leading car that had a hard time getting into the rut.

The leader’s natural squat at the edge of the field, where the tractor plowed the road.

People come to see how they get Hunter and what maneuver needs to be taken so as not to repeat his fate.

The rest had no problems.

Finally, we are near the Ryazan ravine - the place from which the French retreat began in 1812.

Despite the capture of Moscow, Napoleonic army suffered from malnutrition and continuous attacks by Russian army and amateur partisan detachments. The soldiers put horses under the knife, boiled rye grains, and extracted salt from gunpowder. The commander of the French vanguard, Joachim Murat (by the way, the husband of Napoleon’s sister, Caroline Bonaparte, who, thanks to this relationship, received all conceivable and inconceivable titles and titles) was forced to beg meat for his table from the thrifty Germans, who had driven a herd of cattle from the border.

Realizing that he had fallen into a trap, Bonaparte sent his envoy, the Marquis and Marshal Lauriston, to Kutuzov to conclude an honorable peace. Kutuzov received him cordially, drank tea, but Mikhail Illarionovich avoided making any promises. And he recommended to his staff officers not to enter into conversations about anything other than the bad Russian weather with the retinue of the Napoleonic envoy.

Meanwhile, among the Russian generals, a plan was brewing to defeat the French vanguard, separated from the main forces. Kutuzov reluctantly and only under pressure from glory-hungry military leaders agreed to give battle to Murat. Few people know that Kutuzov had many envious people who reported denunciations to St. Petersburg. In one of them, General Bennigsen informed the emperor that Kutuzov was doing nothing in Tarutino, just sleeping, and a Moldavian woman dressed as a Cossack was “warming his bed.” The military department did not allow the matter to proceed; General Knorring imposed a resolution: “This is not our business. And what sleeps, let him sleep. Every hour of this old man’s sleep brings us inexorably closer to victory.”

The plan was prepared in the strictest secrecy; even the corps commanders were not notified of the idea. But, as some researchers believe, there was a Napoleonic spy in the Russian headquarters, who occupied a high position and was invested with the confidence of the commander-in-chief: Murat learned about the Russian preparations.

On October 4, in the evening, Kutuzov arrived in Tarutino (we went there a little later) from the nearby village of Letashevki to make sure the troops were ready. When the commander-in-chief's carriage drove up to the camp of the Russian army, an idyllic picture of general peace and prosperity appeared before his eyes. The horses were led to watering, music thundered, songs were sung. It turned out that the order to march to the troops had not been received: the messenger sent with him from the main apartment was unable to find the chief of staff, General Ermolov, who was passing the time at a dinner party. But the head of his office did not dare to open the package. Never before have those around seen Kutuzov so enraged. He postponed the attack to the morning of October 6th.

On the night of October 6, Murat and his convoy left headquarters in the village of Vinkovo ​​(now Chernishnya) and moved to a landowner’s estate near the village of Teterinka. From Teterinka, Murat sent his adjutant to the chief of artillery with an order to retreat and withdraw the convoy to the rear. But the chief of artillery was asleep, having spent the previous night in vain anticipation of a Russian attack, and the adjutant, not knowing the importance of the dispatch, did not dare to wake him up. Russian guns woke him up.

A carefully developed battle plan provided for a simultaneous attack on French positions by three columns of Russian troops, the main forces of which had to overcome the forest separating the two armies at night.

The forest that separated the armies is visible on the horizon.

But, as often happens in war, “it was smooth on paper, but they forgot about the ravines.” The advancing columns got lost in the forest. By dawn, only the Cossack regiments of Adjutant General Orlov-Denisov reached the designated place - the edge of the forest opposite the village of Dmitrievsky, between which and the village of Teterinka the left flank of the French positions began. A Pole defector made his way to the Russians from near Teterinka and offered his services in capturing Murat, who spent the night in a landowner's house with a small guard. Count Orlov-Denisov sent two Cossack regiments with him, promising the defector one hundred ducats in case of success and the gallows in case of deception. But an awakening began in the French camp, fearing to be discovered by the enemy, Orlov-Denisov returned the expedition. Without waiting for the cannon to fire at the agreed time, which should have become the signal of a general attack of the Russian troops, Orlov-Denisov, at his own peril and risk, gave the order to the Cossacks to launch an offensive, going through Dmitrovka to the enemy’s rear. The attack was swift and unexpected for the French. They fled in panic beyond the Ryazanovsky ravine, abandoning the guns and their camp. A Cossack horse artillery company opened fire on them.

In conditions of general confusion, Murat showed amazing courage and composure. Being slightly wounded in the arm, he managed to avert a catastrophe and carry out a more or less organized retreat. The Russian infantry, which finally appeared at the edge of the Selivanovsky forest south of Teterinka, was met by fire from a French battery placed outside the village. One of the very first cannonballs fired by the French, according to a participant in the battle, “cut in half” the commander of the grenadiers, General Baggovut, causing confusion in the ranks of the attackers. In addition, the rich carts were a tasty bait for our Cossacks; they engaged in robbery, got drunk and did not intend to prevent the enemy from retreating. True, it must be said that the French team, which Murat ordered to burn the convoy that was interfering with the retreat, got their hands on the wine supplies that were in it and lost their combat effectiveness. Almost the entire convoy went to the Russians.

The French retreating along the Old Kaluga Road were pursued by insignificant forces. In order to avoid large losses, Kutuzov did not bring the main formations of the Russian army into battle, he ordered the attacks to stop and the troops to return to the camp. Our losses in the Battle of Tarutino amounted to about three hundred people killed and 904 people wounded. The French lost more than two thousand, including generals Dery and Fischer.

Nearby there is another field, where no less important and heroic events took place - the Great Patriotic War. Here, at an altitude of 180.7, one of the first counter-offensive strikes against the Nazis was carried out, i.e. For many months we only retreated and defended ourselves, and then we made an attempt to return the occupied territory. Why exactly here and who came up with such a decision? It is interesting that there is no answer to this question as such: in his memoirs, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov writes that Stalin demands massive counterattacks against enemy troops in November 1941. Whereas Zhukov himself considered counterattacks inappropriate - he did not want to spend his last reserves. However, from other sources it follows that Stalin made the decision on counterattacks after a meeting at which, in addition to him, members of the State Defense Committee Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, heads of the General Staff Shaposhnikov, Vasilevsky, member of the Military Council of the Western Front Bulganin and Zhukov were present, and the latter behaved like this: “Zhukov’s behavior surprised me. He spoke sharply, in a commanding tone. The impression was that Zhukov was the senior boss here. And Stalin took it for granted. Sometimes even some kind of confusion appeared on his face.” Those. counterattacks are the initiative of Georgy Konstantinovich. Why didn't he want to admit it? Because due to counterattacks, Soviet troops suffered very heavy losses.

An example of counter-offensive actions is the battle for height 180.7.

On October 28, 1941, the 2nd Special Lyubertsy Rifle Regiment was thrown at it. It was formed a few days earlier and sent to the front on 95 on-board vehicles (each vehicle accommodated 10-20 people). Almost all the soldiers died on the approaches to height 180.7, and the regiment ceased to exist as a separate combat unit.

Along the same route from the southeast, with an eye on the village of Petrovo, the soldiers of the 12th regiment moved next; they were supported by tanks from the northeast. As soon as the tanks with the landing party jumped out onto the field between Solokha and the Selivanovsky forest, they were hit by anti-tank guns from positions equipped by the Germans in the village of Ilyinka. One of them stood in a ravine, the other was installed under the floor in one of the huts, the artillery positions were covered by a machine-gun nest. The tanks that had exposed their sides were hit by the first shots, and one burned down along with its crew. The turret of the T-34 tank was torn off by a shell or an explosion of ammunition, and it, turretless, stood in a bend of the Chernishna River until the fifties. By the way, officially the tanks got stuck in deep snow in ravines and therefore did not return from the battle. At the same time, it is known for sure that there was no deep snow yet on November 14, 1941. The paratroopers who jumped from the tanks were mowed down by a German machine gun.

Counterattacks did not produce results: an attempt to dislodge the enemy from the villages of Petrovo and Ilyino failed; the 2/475th Infantry Regiment could not move forward under heavy machine-gun and mortar fire from bunkers located in a grove 1 km east. Ilyina."

Soviet troops suffered even greater losses when trying to capture the area of ​​​​the village of Kuzovlevo and the Dlinnaya height on the old Kaluga road, where we headed next.

Military equipment was recently installed near the memorial.

On October 25, 1941, on the very first day of hostilities, three regiments of the 93rd Siberian Rifle Division suffered colossal losses: the task was set: to take the villages of Gorki, Olkhovo and Kuzovlevo. Olkhovo was located in a lowland in front of a river, and above was a large open field. “During reconnaissance in force,” says the report on the action of the 93rd Siberian Rifle Division, “near the villages of Kuzovlevo and the villages of Kashcheevo, everything immediately went wrong. Firstly, the order to attack came on November 13, 1941 at night at 3.00. While they dug up the buried tanks, while they set the task and issued ammunition, morning came. The personnel of the regiments participating in the battle were not provided with camouflage white coats; snow had already fallen, and the soldiers were visible in the white snow. When moving out of the forest, the units moved carelessly, constantly touching the branches of fir trees, which were immediately hit by artillery and machine-gun fire. In Kashcheyeva Grove, camouflaged bunkers were not scouted; when entering the clearing, the units came under heavy fire from mortars and machine guns and suffered heavy losses. It was not possible to clear the passages in the minefields; the 31st Tank Battalion (separate tank battalion) suffered heavy losses.”

The 24th Tank Brigade, consisting of 69 tanks, including 6 heavy KVs and 30 “the best tanks of the Second World War” T-34, was thrown into the counterattack. After the attacks, which did not achieve their goals, but forced the Germans to go on the defensive, 30 tanks remained in service, of which 1 KV and 12 T-34. Such wasteful disposal of armored vehicles outraged even the imperturbable Zhukov. In an order dated October 22, which sent the 17th and 53rd divisions to their deaths, he reprimands General Golubev: “I am subordinating another tank brigade to you, but keep in mind that if you don’t spare the tanks just as you didn’t spare them today, abandoning head-on to the anti-tank defense (anti-tank defense), and there will be nothing left of this brigade, just as there was nothing left of the good 9th brigade.”

By October 20, 1941, the 201st Airborne Brigade was transferred to the Nara River. On the night of October 26, 1941, the 201st Airborne Forces, with the support of tanks, together with the 9th Tank Brigade launched a counterattack and reached the eastern bank of the Nara River in the area of ​​the village of Gorki. On October 27, 1941, together with the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 10th Airborne Forces, the eastern outskirts of the Gorki region reached the line and fought for the capture of the Olkhovka region and in the direction of the Chernishnya region: the parachute regiment together with T-34 tanks, not paying attention to defensive fire broke through the German front line and penetrated the ranks of the fascist infantry. Suffering heavy losses and abandoning the wounded, the Germans fled to the Nara and hid under a steep slope near the river. Later they will be able to connect with the 2nd battalion of their regiment north of Olkhov. Our troops were again driven back, but remained on the heights at the edge of the forest, from where tanks were sweeping the area below.

At what cost were these counterattacks given? The commander of Army Group Center wrote in his diary on November 21, 1941: “I went from Gzhatsk to the location of the XII Corps. The corps commander is clearly impressed by the fierce battles that took place and describes in the darkest colors the state of his divisions, whose capabilities, according to him, are completely exhausted. Losses, especially among officers, are making themselves felt. Many lieutenants command battalions, one chief lieutenant heads a regiment. The number of some regiments was reduced to 250 people. The personnel suffer from cold and inadequate accommodation conditions.”

But those who survived gained combat experience and learned to fight. An exemplary example of organizing mobile anti-tank defense was shown by the 24th Tank Brigade in the Kamenka-Chubarovo area north of the river. Nara. All tanks of the brigade were ambushed in groups of 2-3 vehicles, and telephone communication was established between them. Ahead of the tank ambushes, the tankers set up a zone of anti-tank obstacles under tank fire. Thus, all likely directions for the appearance of German tanks were controlled by the fire of tanks and anti-tank artillery of the brigade. On October 28, 1941, the 24th Tank Brigade of the Western Front had 58 tanks, including: 4 KV-1, 22 T-34, 1 BT, 9 T-26, 22 T-40. Having repelled the attacks of enemy tanks with fire from ambushes, the strike group counterattacked and forced the enemy to go on the defensive. Traces of tank caponiers are still visible near the Kaluga highway.

Near the road, dugouts, trenches, and trenches have been recreated. The resemblance to the real ones and their location are very conditional.

An armored cap on which a plywood machine gun stands.

We leave the highway along a swept field along the old Kaluga road.

A slight difficulty is caused by crossing the stream, after which you need to climb a snow-covered slope.

At the border of the field and forest, the column stops for lunch.

Pies and hot tea are what you need on this damp, albeit winter day.

On the road again, again not always obvious ruts hidden by subsiding snow.

The first cars have the hardest time.

Melted stream. He looked very scary, but walked through unexpectedly easily.

We made it onto the asphalt onto the Kaluzhskoye Highway without any losses.

We crossed the Nara River.

And they moved along it, actually repeating the Germans’ retreat route after the surrender of the village of Gorki.

Soon we found ourselves near the memorial complex of two wars at once in the village of Tarutino.

Fast forward to 1812: Napoleon was in the Kremlin receiving a parade of his troops and was preparing to reward those who had distinguished themselves when a messenger reported to him about Murat’s defeat, described above. The Emperor gave the order for the immediate departure of the army from Moscow, and the disastrous exodus of the French from Russia began. In June, 700 thousand people crossed its border from west to east, speaking almost all European languages. In December, only 81 thousand demoralized people moved from east to west.

The significance of the “sitting” of the Russian army in the Tarutino camp and Kutuzov’s reluctance to shower the enemy with the corpses of Russian soldiers were not appreciated by his contemporaries. Only His Serene Highness Prince Golenishchev-Kutuzov noted in a letter to his wife: “For the first time, the French lost so many guns and for the first time they fled like hares.”

At Kutuzov’s personal request, the fortifications made near the village of Tarutina remained untouched and now here you can see the ditch that protected the artillery positions of the Russian army in 1812.

In 1829, having received the “Highest permission,” Count Sergei Petrovich Rumyantsev freed 745 souls of peasants and courtyard servants from serfdom. Tarutin and nearby villages (Granishcheva, Agafyina, Dubrovka, Zhukov and Cherikova) and releases them as “free cultivators”, giving them land and other lands in these places for communal use.

According to the agreement concluded with Rumyantsev, the peasants assumed the obligation to erect (as well as maintain, care for and repair in the future) with their own money a monument in honor of the Russian military glory of 1812. 44 thousand rubles were collected.

The grand opening of this monument took place on June 25 (July 7), 1834, 101 cannon shots were fired, and a parade of troops took place.

In November of the same year, Pushkin found himself in Tarutino, traveling along the Old Kaluga Road to the estate of his wife’s parents. He wrote in his diary: “In Tarutino, drunken coachmen almost killed me. But I stood my ground. “What kind of robbers are we? - they told me. “We were given freedom, and a pillar was erected in our honor.” Count Rumyantsev is not praised at all for his monument and they are assured that the church would be more decent. I pretty much agree with this. A church, and with it a school, is more useful than a column with an eagle and a long inscription, which our illiterate peasant will not understand for a long time.” Those. The pillar is not in honor of the victory over Napoleon, but in honor of the men who are now playing pranks without their master. And in general, a pillar is not needed, unlike another church.

However, even now the monument makes a very strong impression! Moreover, for the celebration of the centenary and then the bicentennial of the Patriotic War of 1812, the monument was restored, by the way, at the expense of the state.

The Second World War did not bypass these places; fierce battles took place here.

After a hasty and unplanned withdrawal from the line of the Protva River prepared for defense in the area of ​​the Ugodsky plant, part of the 17th Infantry Division of Colonel P.S. Kozlov. (sentenced to death by the command of the Western Front) reached Tarutino by 10/20/41. It turns out that they retreated from the river within a day. Protva to the river Nara, having left a convenient defense line and more than 25 km of territory without a fight, did not take up defense here either. A day later the Germans arrived and began shelling. “...Tarutino is under fire, tanks are coming, the infantry of the 17th and 53rd rifle divisions are fleeing from the first shots. Tarutino is burning...”

The Nazis quickly occupied Tarutino and moved along the Kaluga Highway towards Moscow. Trying to save the situation, Zhukov sent the commander of the 43rd Army, General Golubev, such a deliberately impossible order: “The 17th Division, the 53rd Division must be forced to return on the morning of 10/22/41 Tarutino at all costs, including self-sacrifice.”

The attack on Tarutino began, the enemy also went on the offensive with the support of a company of tanks, mortars, artillery and aircraft along the Old Kaluga Road to Korsakovo. Our units were crushed and, suffering losses, began to retreat. As a result of a blockbuster counterattack by Soviet troops, the Germans captured strategically important settlements on the left bank of the Nara and advanced northeast to Ilyinka and Teterinka.

The logical result of the “self-sacrifice” of the two divisions was Zhukov’s order to create a consolidated division from what was left after the Tarutino meat grinder. Colonel Alexander Naumov, who was appointed its commander, recalled: “Each of these formations consisted of no more than several hundred combat-ready soldiers and commanders, completely exhausted by continuous battles and difficult retreat, which scattered them over a large territory.” A week later, the combined division was replenished with people and transformed into the 53rd Infantry Division, which liberated Tarutino on December 25, 1941.

The Nazis failed to cross the Nara.

Soviet soldiers at the monument to Russian Military Glory, 1941.

Now opposite this monument there is another one.

We return to the shore of the Nara again and, going down and up rather steep and slippery hills, we go to the last attraction for today - the ruins of the Leonovsky school.

Wall of Leonovskaya school.

In 1941, the troops of the 17th Infantry Division were located at the edge of the forest before the start of the offensive. They were separated from the villages of Leonovo and Tunaevo by a huge field, as if sloping down towards the villages. The entire field was covered with freshly fallen snow. After entering the field, Soviet troops were in full view.

Not far from Leonovo, almost in the center of the field, there was a small brick school.

On the morning of November 14, artillery preparation began. The snow-white field was covered with black craters from shell explosions. Soviet artillerymen suppressed the fire of two fascist batteries.

The Red Army soldiers, supported by tanks from the 26th brigade, quickly advanced towards the villages.

By that time, the fascist invaders left Leonovo and Tunaevo without a fight. However, on the way to the school, our fighters ran into an ambush. Several fascists settled in the basement of the school, punched embrasures in the brickwork and fired at point-blank range with heavy machine guns.

Infantrymen bombarded the school with anti-tank grenades. But a lot of our soldiers remained lying in the ravine in front of the school.

By 12 o'clock our troops occupied the villages of Leonovo and Tunaevo, and the enemy retreated to Maryino and Melikhovoye. However, the villages did not remain ours for long.

The next day, November 15, 1941, 15 enemy tanks and a German infantry regiment, with air support, struck the weakly protected right flank. The blow was unexpected, the enemy's superiority in military equipment was significant. Soviet soldiers were unable to fight back and retreated to their original positions.

A couple of years ago, we heard a different version from one of the local residents: on November 15, the 26th Tank Brigade mistakenly came under Soviet artillery fire, and the Nazis could only take advantage of the moment and re-occupy the villages.

Due to the superiority of enemy military equipment or due to a mistake by Soviet artillerymen, Soviet troops were unable to hold the villages captured during the offensive and remained in the same place. Moreover, in two days of fighting, the 17th Infantry Division and the 26th Tank Brigade lost about 600 people killed, wounded and missing, and the commander of the tank brigade, Colonel Levsky, was killed.

At the cost of thousands of human lives, the Nazi offensive on the Nara line was stopped, from here, in the winter of 1941, the enemy began to roll back to the west under the pressure of Soviet troops. This period is full of dramatic and tragic events characteristic of the first year of the war. Archival documents contain a lot of all kinds of operational reports, orders, certificates about the successful raids of our reconnaissance officers, about the effective actions of artillerymen and anti-aircraft gunners, about the fact that the soldiers have done a lot of work to strengthen the defense line. But there is no less other information: about the failures that befell, about tactical mistakes, about serious losses among personnel. We must always remember this!

This concludes the excursion part. The column returned a little and, having passed along the very edge of the river, stood to rest in a cozy clearing.

For dinner there was soldier's porridge.

The “Magic Suitcase” competition was also held here - today, like the outing, it was on a military theme.

Forest, river, high starry sky - what could be better?! Even the rain and snow, which replaced each other all day, allowed us to sit calmly by the fire.

But we still had to get to the asphalt: in a short distance we managed to overcome a ford, take a steep snow-covered climb, and trim a loose wheel. But everything ended well and the column in full force returned to the assembly point, as planned.

It was a great trip! Thank you all for the company!

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LLC "Alhambra" INN 3259843351 OGRN 2118423911151 registered on February 24, 2015 at the legal address 367048, Republic of Tatarstan, Naberezhnye Chelny city, Academician Koroleva street, building 4, apartment 297. Organization status: liquidated. The head is director Rassolov Sergey Nikolaevich (TIN 139110315016). The size of the authorized capital is 8,126,612,911 rubles. More details >

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Road of death. 43rd Army in battles on the Warsaw Highway. Fight with Typhoon. 1941-1942 Mikheenkov Sergey Egorovich

Chapter 8 Tarutinsky line, Stremilovsky line...

"Big losses on our part

Departure to the Nara River. – Rains. - Lagging artillery. – The 34th Infantry Division continues to attack. – Creation of anti-tank detachments. – The Germans are attacking the Nara line. – Complete superiority of the enemy in tanks and aircraft. – Von Kuge’s final push. - The Germans are exhausted. – Podolsk is a warrior city. – Operational “pause”. - An order that no one wanted to carry out. - Bathhouse and welding. – Gifts for November 7th. - “...to defend our native Moscow with all the power of fire and bayonet.” – Creation of shock troops. - War of attrition. – Local attacks on all sectors of the front. - Reconnaissance in force. – The village of Stepanovka, where his beloved lived...

So, one of the most likely directions for a new attack by Army Group Center on Moscow was determined by the General Staff in the center of the Western Front along the axis of the Warsaw Highway in the Maloyaroslavets-Tarutino area.

On October 19 it started to rain. The roads immediately deteriorated. Russian clay became another obstacle to the German movement towards Moscow. But the lack of roads also became a hindrance for units of the 43rd Army, which were regrouping the main forces in the Tarutin area. In addition, by October 19, the enemy approached the Tarutino line, and on the 21st, with the support of aviation, he attacked. The attacks were carried out in the same direction - along the Warsaw Highway. So bad weather could not have been a big hindrance to the Germans during this period. It was not the rain that burned the German tanks at Tarutin and Korsakov, but the soldiers of the 53rd, 312th and 17th rifle divisions.

The enemy was still late in his maneuver, and his artillery lagged behind. But attack aircraft reigned supreme in the air, perhaps completely making up for the lack of artillery: “25 enemy dive bombers from the 2nd half of 10/21/1941 several times bombed and machine-gunned the defending units of the 53rd SD and units of the 312th and 17th rifle divisions. And each time after aviation training, units of the enemy’s 34th Infantry Division went on the offensive with aviation support.”

The Tarutino line was abandoned. The troops retreated to the Nara River and entrenched themselves on its left bank. The whole situation of the tense days of the end of October, all the preceding events indicated that right now, in these days and nights, here, on the Warsaw highway, a decisive thing could happen - either the Germans would break through along the highway and along secondary roads along the highway deep into Moscow ( and there is no one in their way!), or everything will begin to develop according to a completely different plot.

The day before, General Golubev sent an order to the divisions to create anti-tank detachments. The order of the army commander appeared after the directive of the commander of the Western Front, General Zhukov, No. 80 of October 18, 1941, which was called: “On the creation of anti-tank detachments” and prescribed the following:

“TO THE COMMANDERS OF THE 5th, 16th, 33rd, 43rd, 49th ARMIES

Copy: START. FRONT

START ING. MANAGEMENT

In order to organize blocking the movement paths of enemy tanks, by the morning of October 20, 1941, place anti-tank detachments on the rear lines and rear roads, consisting of 1–2 anti-tank guns, a platoon of fighters with grenades and KS bottles, a platoon of sappers with mines, a company of riflemen allocated due to passive sections and outgoing parts.

It is mandatory to have anti-tank detachments on the lines: 1) Volokolamsk, Ruza, Dorokhovo, Maurino, Naro-Fominsk, Kamenka, Tarutino, r. Protva, Serpukhov;

2) Teryaeva Sloboda, Novopetrovskoye, Pokrovskoye, Kolyubakino, Kubinka, Rassudovo, Kresty, Lopasnya.

The diagram of the VET barrage detachments must be presented to me by the morning of October 20, 1941 by courier, signed by members of the Army Military Council.”

Shtarm 43 melted this directive into the following form, filling it with its content:

“...to create one detachment in each rifle regiment, consisting of: at the head of the middle commander, 15 fighters, including a group of sappers with anti-tank mines. Armament: 150 anti-tank grenades, 75 bottles of KS, 3 PPSh, an armor-piercing rifle with cartridges and one truck. Each rifle division has two detachments; in the army there are three fighter squads.

Form the detachments from the most courageous, dexterous and skillful fighters, ensuring in them the proper party-Komsomol layer. The detachments must act suddenly, daringly, and short-handedly.”

That's how they acted. But not all.

When a small detachment fell into the disposition of enemy troops, its method of conducting combat operations changed dramatically. It’s one thing to occupy a certain area of ​​defense, to defend it, knowing that there is a neighbor nearby who is doing the same, when behind your back there may be a small, but still some kind of artillery, pillboxes, reserves, headquarters, which, in case of complications of the situation, are here will take action to correct the situation. It’s another matter to act autonomously, with small forces, playing the role of, in essence, sabotage and semi-partisan detachments. True, after a series of failures on enemy territory, anti-tank detachments were used mainly as mobile reserves and acted on the orders of regimental and division commanders.

What was the defense of General Golubev’s army on the Nara River like?

A line of trenches, in some places with wire fences, rubble and anti-tank ditches. The following units and divisions were on the defensive: the 312th Infantry Division of Colonel Naumov, consisting of three combined regiments of three, in fact, broken divisions; 152nd Motorized Rifle Brigade; 9th Tank Brigade, which had only 12 light and one medium T-34 tank; 5th Airborne Corps, two-brigade. On the evening of October 24, already in the midst of the battle, the 24th Tank Brigade of Colonel V.P. approached the line. Zelinsky, which had 24 tanks. The enemy again concentrated his attack force in the center, along the Warsaw Highway, as well as on the left flank, and outnumbered our troops four times in number of soldiers and seven times in artillery. In terms of tanks and aircraft, as in previous battles, the Germans had complete superiority.

The battle went on all day, all evening, and in some places did not subside even on the night of October 25th. The Germans attacked stubbornly, with all their strength, and in some places achieved success, crossing the Nara and Chernichka rivers.

200 years ago, in August 1812, it was here that the Maloyaroslavets battle of Russian troops with the French army of Napoleon Bonaparte took place. In combat reports to the headquarters of Field Marshal Kutuzov, Tarutino, Spas-Kuplya, Kuzovlevo, the Nara River and its tributaries were often mentioned. And now, 129 years later, again a Russian soldier had to die on these historical lines, half a meter soaked in blood.

In the evening, scouts brought a captured German officer to the army headquarters in the village of Yasenok, who testified that the 57th Motorized and 12th Army Corps had received reinforcements and would begin an offensive in the coming days.

On the evening of the next day, the commander of the 312th Infantry Division, Colonel Naumov, reported to army headquarters:

“The enemy is moving from the village of Ilyino to the village of Klimovka. The regiment defending to the west of this defense (223 SP) came under enemy flank fire, heavy losses on our side, the Germans took the village of Klimovka and rushed to a height of 196.7.

Having occupied this height, the Germans were unable to advance further, since a rifle company, bakers, riders, and clerks were advanced from the village of Krucha, who stopped the advance of the Germans, and night fell. On October 25, 1941, 30 people were killed and 80 were wounded in the battle.”

Neither side had any reserves. All reserves were absorbed by battles for populated areas and continuous battles in the Warsaw Highway area. Therefore, the fate of the battle was decided by the last rifle company and a platoon of company and battalion clerks, cooks and drivers. As a rule, these were not so hot soldiers, non-combatant people who were accidentally rejected by military registration and enlistment offices and medical commissions, “dads”, as the over-aged soldiers were called in the troops, in a word, not eagles. But the rifle in their hands, the assigned line and the order, coupled with the realization that there was nowhere to retreat further, that Moscow was already behind them, turned these people into real warriors, and the enemy was no longer able to overcome the lines occupied by these last soldiers of the Red Army.

It was during these days that news of the approach of a fresh Siberian division arrived at army headquarters. To the right, the 33rd Army of General Efremov intensified its actions and stabilized the front in the Naro-Fominsk direction. To the left, the 49th Army of General Zakharkin stood to death, closing the Serpukhov and Aleksin directions and not allowing the right wing of the Typhoon, aimed at Tula, to maneuver freely.

On October 25, the 93rd Infantry Division, consisting of the 51st, 129th and 26th Infantry Regiments, howitzer and light artillery regiments, an anti-tank fighter division and the 11th Tank Battalion, as well as communications units and other services, approached Nara. According to the state, there were 10,032 people in the division. The division was commanded by Major General K.M. Erastov. The regiments immediately took up defensive positions, positioned in two echelons. The division closed the most dangerous direction - the Warsaw Highway area. From that moment on, the balance of forces in the defense zone of the 43rd Army began to change in our favor. Although numerical superiority still remained on the enemy's side. But the spirit grew in the ranks of the Red Army much more powerfully than the replenishment of people and weapons.

On the night of October 26, the 43rd Army attacked the enemy. Here is the text of the order, according to which General Golubev moved his strike force forward:

"1. In order to prevent enemy tanks from breaking through to the city of Podolsk - the Gorki line - cover this line with 2 infantry battalions and 2 KV tanks of the 24th TB and anti-tank divisions.

2. The 201st Airborne Brigade will advance at the front south of the village of Gorki, 1 km on the western bank of the Nara River. The 152nd Motorized Rifle Brigade advances on the Nikolskoye front. The offensive will be supported by 64 GAP, 1 KV tank and 7 T-60 tanks. Border on the left: Kamenka and (exclusively) Nikolskoye, Okatovo.

3. 93 SD strikes the villages of Kuzovlevo, Tarutino with the task of reaching the eastern bank of the Nara River, at the front

the villages of Olkhovo, Tarutino with the task of going out and seizing crossings and a bridgehead near the villages of Nikolskoye, Orekhovo, Borisovo, Tarutino. The offensive will be supported by 998 APRGKA and will launch a salvo with 3 M-13 batteries. 320 PAPs are working against enemy artillery. To enhance the strike, 3 tanks are attached - KV, 3 T-34 tanks and 15 T-60 tanks. Border on the left: the village of Bogorodskoye (excl.), Ilyino, Dubrovka with access to the Tarutino front.

4. The combined 312 SD advances in the second echelon behind the 93 SD in the direction of the villages of Ilyino, Dubrovka and goes to the front (excl.) Tarutino, Kurilovo. Divisions will be supported: 403 APRGK and attached tanks: 2 KV tanks and

8 T-34 tanks.

5. The reserve of the 43rd Army - one battalion of the 93rd SD and a battalion of the 10th Airborne Brigade from the village of Kresty - move to the grove northeast of the village of Kamenka.

6. The 10th Airborne Brigade battalion, consisting of 3 SVSP 17 SD in the village of Stremilovo, remains and conducts active reconnaissance in Chubarovo-Begichevo.

7. Conduct reconnaissance to the settlements of Balabanovo, Maloyaroslavets, Novaya Slobodka.

8. I set the start of the offensive at 7.00 on October 2, 1941, artillery fire raids to open fire from 6.00, PC salvo at 7.00.

9. During the offensive, place troops on heavy tanks, also have tractors and reinforce everything with sappers.”

On the day of the attack, it was drizzling with light autumn rain in the morning. There was fog in the lowlands. Weather reports indicate a positive temperature that day: four degrees Celsius.

The weather was deteriorating, and this circumstance, of course, did not have the best effect on the pace of the German advance. But, as I already noted, bad weather also hindered our troops. German historians and memoirists, former Wehrmacht soldiers and officers who lost their decisive battle near Moscow, are inclined to see the main reason for the failure of Operation Typhoon in unfavorable weather. In the summer, Army Group Center (and not only it) was hampered by heat and dust - tank and car engines deteriorated, air filters became clogged, etc., soldiers sweated heavily and suffered from gastrointestinal diseases, mainly diarrhea; in the fall, rain and dirt hampered - Tanks and armored personnel carriers got stuck, and the footwear of the infantrymen quickly wore out. The coming winter, which the German tank crews had been waiting for so that they could quickly roll towards Moscow along frozen highways and fields, again, as it turns out, turned into a misfortune - the Wehrmacht began to catastrophically freeze in thin overcoats. Well, that’s what war is for, to crush the enemy with all your might and means. This means there were not enough funds. This is what Western historians should be blamed for. And dust, impassability, rain and frosts in Russia are not an attack at all, but a common thing, familiar to us. Look how many years have passed, but there are still no roads. Maybe that's why we're invincible.

The offensive was unsuccessful. Companies and battalions were burned in fierce attacks on German strongholds. Tanks were burning. The enemy, as a rule, feeling the tenacity of the attackers, abandoned certain settlements and high-rise buildings, but then, having regrouped and brought up artillery and tanks, counterattacked and restored the situation, inflicting huge losses on the regiments and battalions of the 43rd Army. This is evidenced by reports from divisions, brigades and individual regiments.

But here is what the German author, former commander of the 98th Franconian-Sudeten Infantry Division Martin Gareis, tells about this battle:

“The enemy’s main attack is now directed at Gorki. At 8 o'clock in the morning, the attack of the parachute regiment, together with a dozen T-34 super-heavy tanks, begins on the eastern outskirts of Gorki, where the 3rd battalion of the 282nd infantry regiment is stationed. Ignoring the defensive fire, the tank wedge breaks through the weak German front line and wedges itself into the ranks of the infantry. Jumping from one shelter to another, defenseless and stunned infantrymen try to flee to the bend of Nara, leaving their wounded with heavy hearts. The remnants of the battalion gather under a steep slope near the river. Later they will be able to connect with the 2nd battalion of their regiment north of Olkhov. The losses are horrific.

Emmert's battalion, at the battalion's main positions, hears the muffled rumble of heavy T-34 engines, and then disaster strikes his fighters. Even here in the village, the old trees cannot hold back the advance of the steel colossi. And this is where their complete superiority comes into play. Wooden huts and adobe houses are completely collapsing, wide tracks grind machine guns, mortars and even 3.7 cm anti-tank guns with an eerie roar. Grenade-thrower corporal of the 1st company of the 282nd infantry regiment Eckhard jumps out in front of three light tanks and successfully throws grenades, stopping them, so that in close combat they are soon finished off. Later, Eckhardt will be crushed by the tracks of a tank in a rifle trench. The house where the battalion command post was located is collapsing. The wounded cannot get out from under the rubble and find their mass grave here. In small groups, fighters from the disbanded companies are making their way back to Nara. The furious fire of the enemy, paratroopers armed to the teeth with automatic weapons, allows few people to survive on this path.

The success of the enemy counterattack leads to heavy losses in manpower and equipment of the 98th Infantry Division, but the bridgehead on the other side of the Nara was still retained.

The enemy's plan - to break through the gap between Gorki and Olkhov - was thwarted by sappers and a bicycle platoon, as well as signalmen from the headquarters of the 282nd Infantry Regiment together with units of the 2nd battalion of the regiment. The headquarters lost three killed and three wounded. The enemy is repulsed, but remains on the heights at the edge of the forest. From here his tanks freely sweep the terrain below.

Having dug in on a high bank west of Gorki, the rifle battalion receives the fighters of the defeated 1st battalion of the 282nd infantry regiment. Among them is Chief Lieutenant Dr. Emmert, who was left without his battalion. This evening, Lieutenant Dr. Maul of the 289th Infantry Regiment writes in his diary: “The division is undoubtedly smashed to smithereens. Our fellow countrymen, lying in the mud in the rain, have been fighting for three weeks now. They did everything they could as soldiers."

On October 27, the Germans decided to finally seize the initiative. The artillery preparation lasted 50 minutes. Then the attack began. Infantry and tanks attacked with the support of attack aircraft. But now the enemy had to share the sky above the battlefield with Soviet fighters. The 177th Aviation Fighter Regiment disrupted the formations of German bombers and did not allow bombing of designated targets. It was on this day that Hero of the Soviet Union fighter pilot junior lieutenant Viktor Talalikhin died over the positions of the 43rd Army. His plane, attacked by Messerschmitts, crashed near the village of Lopatino not far from the Warsaw highway.

The intensity of the fighting is evidenced by a report received that day from the headquarters of the 93rd Infantry Division. It said that near the village of Olkhovo, where the rifle battalion of the 129th regiment and parts of the 5th Airborne Corps were defending, after seven attacks on both sides, the enemy was stopped.

And again, as if to a German historian:

“On October 27, at dawn, the Bolsheviks launch a new offensive along the entire front of the division, bringing into battle all their firepower: artillery, heavy mortars, rocket launchers and tanks - with an unprecedented consumption of ammunition. This time the main blow is aimed at Chernizhnaya and Kuzovlevo. The command post of the 1st Battalion of the 290th Infantry Regiment was destroyed by a direct hit; two liaison officers were killed, Major Dr. Klotz, Lieutenant Ammer, Lieutenant Astfalk, senior physician Dr. Schröter and the liaison officer of the II Battalion, Lieutenant Kolb, were wounded. Lieutenant Eggerstorfer takes command of the "battalion". The combined companies are led into battle by the sergeant major. A handful of defenders and a certain number of personnel from the “backbone” are melting before our eyes. Near Orekhovo, the commander of the 3rd battery of the 198th artillery regiment, Lieutenant Dörflein, was killed as a result of a direct hit. In him, the 1st Division lost one of its bravest officers.

The blow was particularly powerful at the junction of the 290th and 289th infantry regiments. Panic breaks out there. The parts are running. But already at the southern exit from Chernizhnaya, Colonel Geiger comes out to meet them. The presence of a commander in the right place, at the right time, instantly brings the faint-hearted to their senses. They return and retake positions.

In the 282nd Infantry Regiment, the remnants of the defeated 1st Battalion are collected, the 3rd Company is disbanded and a complete reorganization is carried out. The battalion's combat strength consists of 148 people. Just one day near Gorki cost him 90 soldiers. Most of them went missing, crushed by tanks or mercilessly destroyed by parachute units.”

It must be admitted that the 43rd Army, with its tenacity and bravery of its soldiers and commanders, was able to turn the battles on the Nara line into a real hell for the Germans.

The Nara line held. The enemy was stopped on the line Inino - Gorki - Olkhovo - Kuzovlevo - Ilino - Teterenki - Kolontaevo - Dmitrovka - Stremilovo.

Interesting fact. Looking through the lists of those awarded following the battles, I discovered that among those nominated for the Order of the Red Banner was a political instructor, deputy. political instructor, detective officer of the NKVD 00, military commissar, head of the 1st department of the division headquarters, etc. The trench people received mostly medals. True, the medals of 1941, as is known, were equated with the highest orders. And yet…

On October 30, the commander of the Western Front, General Zhukov, the chief of staff of the front, General Sokolovsky, and a member of the Military Council of the front, Bulganin, arrived at the location of the 43rd Army. Zhukov ordered him to be escorted to the first echelon position. From the command post of the first battalion of the 120th Infantry Regiment of the 93rd Infantry Division, he spent a long time examining the forefield, craters, abandoned trenches, and a half-burnt village on the other side. This was his homeland. I spent my childhood and youth here. Here he knew every path, every bend of the river. And the fact that the enemy was stopped by the troops of his front right here, in the vicinity of the Ugodsky Plant and Maloyaroslavets, was especially worrying.

In the evening, Zhukov ordered the gathering of all commanders, up to and including the regiment commander, and held a meeting. Listened to reports and proposals. Set tasks. The main task was to stay where you are and not take a step back. Those who are unstable will be put on trial and shot in front of the line. He repeated this several times. The commanders looked at him silently, as if frozen. He saw the looks of people ready to do anything. That is why he will tell the Supreme Commander with such confidence that the enemy will not pass, that the Germans will not see Moscow.

Before the meeting, a conversation took place with the army commander. Zhukov still doubted that the enemy was exhausted and stopped here, at the Stremilovsky line, on the approaches to Podolsk.

“And yet,” he said, “report what happened on your line of defense in more detail.” Today I will report on the situation in your area to the Supreme Commander.

“The enemy troops have stopped,” Golubev confirmed.

– How can this be confirmed?

– Today at 7.00 there was no artillery preparation for our positions. At 8.00 the enemy did not go on the offensive. His aircraft did not appear either. Our observers noted the following: at 8.50 in the center and on the left flank the enemy began to improve their defense. On the right flank, units of the 57th Motorized Corps also began building defensive fortifications.

– What does intelligence report?

- Military, army and aviation intelligence, as well as front line commanders at 19.00 once again confirmed that the troops of the 98th and 34th infantry divisions of the 12th Army Corps had created a defense throughout the entire depth of their battle formations within 24 hours. Tank units of the second echelon of the 57th motorized corps from the village of Vorobyi turned right in the direction of the village of Balabanovo and moved on. This morning, in the defense zone of the 53rd Infantry Division, an officer of the 289th Infantry Regiment of the 98th Infantry Division was captured by its reconnaissance. He showed the following: in the infantry companies of his regiment there were 15–20 people left, all the uniforms were summer, tattered, the food was poor. Almost all of the horses were killed and eaten. The personnel carry ammunition and other loads on themselves and drag guns and mortars. The mood of the soldiers and junior officers is depressed. Kluge promised, he said, that the Russians did not have the strength to defend themselves, that in a day or two we would be in Moscow, but we soldiers did not believe it. He also said the following: they have not experienced such powerful resistance since the beginning of the campaign in the East.

– What conclusions do you draw from what is happening?

“In our opinion, the enemy is exhausted. I think that the Germans understand that there is no prospect of a further attack on Moscow along the Warsaw Highway through Podolsk. I report that in the area of ​​the Warsaw Highway, including Podolsk and the surrounding area, the Podolsk combat area is being created. The central axis of the combat area is the highway and adjacent settlements. Currently, intensive work is underway to improve the defense of the Podolsk combat area and echelon it in depth. - And the army commander pointed to a map on which the staff had carefully drawn a diagram of the combat area and indicated the defense lines of rifle units, air defense, anti-tank areas and traps, minefields and barbed wire obstacles.

In the publications of many researchers of the history of the battles of the 43rd Army, the period of late October (after the change of army commander and the “execution” of the colonels) - early November is characterized as a short operational pause, which arose as a result of the fatigue of the attacking side and the tenacity of the defending side. The Germans carried out a partial regrouping for a new push forward.

Indeed, there was relative calm near Maloyaroslavets and Tarutin. Both sides were preparing for new battles.

From a report prepared by General Staff officers in November 1941 based on the results of past battles, which were already called the first stage of the Moscow battle:

“By November 1, 1941, the following operational-strategic situation had developed on the Western Front.

1. The German offensive against MOSCOW, launched on October 2, ran out of steam by the end of October, and the German divisions, weakened as a result of the October battles, were forced to interrupt their offensive;

2. Hitler’s plan for the lightning capture of MOSCOW failed, and the German command, apparently taking into account the failure of such a plan, decided to take MOSCOW with a “breather” - interrupt the offensive operation, replenish troops, raise reserves, although in the history of offensive operations of the German armies to capture VIENNA , PRAGUE, WARSAW, PARIS and other capitals of Western European countries there are no breaks.

There, the offensive operations of the German troops were certainly continuous.

On the Eastern Front, the Nazis encountered a different army, a different country and a different Soviet system, which forced the German occupiers to abandon the lightning capture of MOSCOW.

Therefore, the German armies will apparently have to gain a foothold at the starting line for the next offensive on MOSCOW, tighten up reserves and prepare in all respects a new offensive operation.

3. Thus, Hitler did not manage to approach MOSCOW from the line of the Dnieper in one leap and take possession of it. Moreover, he failed to defeat the RED ARMY and end the war in the East before the onset of winter.

...Conclusions:

a) Having suffered heavy losses in previous battles and not having the strength to further attack MOSCOW, the enemy went on the defensive, regrouped forces and pulled up reserves in the direction of VOLOKOLAMSK, SKIRMANOVO with the goal of attacking KLIN and ISTRA and in the area of ​​GORKI, BALABANOVO with the aim of attacking in the direction of LOPASNYA, PODOLSK.

b) Operating reserves are not included in the calculation due to the lack of accurate data about them. The same forces that were in the first echelon of the Germans were only sufficient to consolidate the achieved boundaries.

c) It is unlikely that the enemy will

2-3 days later he was able to resume the attack on MOSCOW. To bring up operational reserves, supply food and other materiel, the enemy will need to spend at least half a month, provided that everything necessary for a new offensive is brought to the SMOLENSK-VYAZMA area in advance.”

However, the German group was still strong, and a new forward blow could be expected from von Bock. Which soon happened. But the attacking side lost time. Basic resources, including human resources, were spent. Headquarters in Moscow, on the contrary, took advantage of the pause that arose and energetically brought fresh troops from the rear areas. Zhukov signed a directive on the evening of October 30, which ordered the 16th, 5th, 33rd, 43rd and 50th armies:

“Immediately carry out the following measures:

a) Create barriers, destroy all highways adjacent to your front line of defense.

b) Destroy all bridges, mine all tank-hazardous areas with anti-tank mines and COP bottles.

c) In possible directions of initial attacks, place wire barriers, blockages, barricades, anti-personnel minefields and prepare fire barriers. Build barricades in all populated areas.

d) To create fire barriers, bring in oil, kerosene, fuel oil, gasoline and prepare for rapid ignition. Build traps in all directions, place hedgehogs and other surprises.”

From that day on, Podolsk became not just a city in the near rear. The city began to build reinforced defenses on the Nara line, echeloning it in depth. Thousands of Podolsk residents worked on the construction of the defensive line, repaired weapons and military equipment in workshops, and supplied the army with food and uniforms. “There is a people’s war, a holy war” - these words were not just words, but the essence of that difficult, full of tragedy, intense life that the whole country, the whole people lived. Podolsk, like dozens of other front-line cities, became a warrior city. The 186th reserve rifle regiment was stationed in Podolsk. This meant that both in the city and in the surrounding villages and hamlets there was a mobilization of the male population of military age; those called up were passed through the reserve regiment, and marching companies and battalions were replenished by divisions and brigades of the 43rd Army. There were accelerated courses for junior commanders. The specialists who were especially needed by the front line were trained: machine gunners, mortar men, sappers, tank crews, artillerymen. Here, in the reserve regiment, the crew of the armored train “Podolsk Worker” was formed. Researcher of military history of Podolsk I.A. Krasilnikov testifies that every day the 186th reserve regiment sent eight marching companies to the front line.

In November, the 43rd Army received another full-blooded rifle division - the 19th. The division was commanded by Colonel N.I. Utvenko. Its regiments occupied a section of the front on the line Semenkovo ​​- Kresty - height 236.6 - Bogoyavlenskoye - Alekseevka.

The 112th Tank Division was transferred from the General Headquarters reserve to the army. Golubev immediately transferred the tanks to the most threatened area - the area of ​​​​the Warsaw highway. The division was transferred from the Far East, from the city of Voroshilov-Ussuriysky to Podolsk. But soon Zhukov transferred the division to Golubev’s left-flank neighbor, General Zakharkin. In the zone of action of the 49th Army in the Serpukhov region, a serious matter was planned - an offensive. Stalin insisted on this offensive.

Nevertheless, the army's battle formations became denser. The crisis is over. But it was clear that the Germans were preparing for a new attack. Prisoners and aerial reconnaissance confirmed these fears.

November brought the first frosts. And - a new directive from the front headquarters. It was an order that no one, neither soldiers nor generals, wanted to carry out.

"HEAD OF THE SUPREME HIGH COMMAND

ABOUT THE CREATION OF SPECIAL TEAMS FOR

DESTRUCTION AND BURNING OF POPULATIONS

POINTS IN THE REAR OF THE GERMAN-FASCIST

Moscow

The experience of the last month of the war showed that the German army was poorly adapted to war in winter conditions, did not have warm clothing and, experiencing enormous difficulties from the onset of frost, huddled in the front line in populated areas. The enemy, arrogant to the point of impudence, was planning to spend the winter in warm houses in Moscow and Leningrad, but this was prevented by the actions of our troops. On vast sections of the front, German troops, having encountered stubborn resistance from our units, were forced to go on the defensive and settled in populated areas along roads 20–30 km on both sides. German soldiers live, as a rule, in cities, towns, villages, peasant huts, sheds, barns, bathhouses near the front, and the headquarters of German units are located in larger settlements and cities, hiding in basements, using them as shelter from our aviation and artillery. The Soviet population of these points is usually evicted and thrown out by the German invaders.

To deprive the German army of the opportunity to be stationed in villages and cities, to drive the German invaders out of all populated areas into the cold fields, to smoke them out of all rooms and warm shelters and to force them to freeze in the open air - this is an urgent task, the solution of which will largely determine the acceleration of the defeat of the enemy and the disintegration of his army. This text is an introductory fragment.