August 14th, 2012

Exactly 20 years ago, on August 14, 1992, one of the largest and bloodiest conflicts in Transcaucasia broke out - the Georgian-Abkhaz war of 1992-1993. I could not help but write about this conflict, since it affected my relatives and a large number of acquaintances. And besides, the day before yesterday I returned from Abkhazia and I can draw some conclusions.
What caused the conflict? There are quite a few versions, but I don’t really want to get into politics and understand this dirt. However, you can still tell a little about the history of the issue.
The Abkhazian kingdom arose in the 8th century. In the second half of the 9th century it became part of Georgia. In the 13th century, Abkhazia was conquered by the Mongol-Tatars, from the 16th century it was dependent on Turkey, and in 1810 it became part of Russia. But still, even at this time, Turkey’s influence in Abkhazia was extremely great. For the war against the mountaineers, the Russian Empire needed a buffer zone, which until 1864, that is, until the end of the Caucasian War, was Abkhazia. After this, in order to strengthen its power here, Russia eliminated part of the ruling Chachba dynasty. The indigenous people were very dissatisfied with this, and the uprisings of 1866 and 1877 were a consequence of these discontents. However, after the harsh suppression of these uprisings, most of the Muslim population (up to 60%) was forced to move to the Ottoman Empire - this process is called Muhajirism, and it was in honor of the Muhajirs (and about 80% of all Abkhazians currently live outside the borders of Abkhazia itself) that the main embankment of the country's capital - Sukhumi.
Thus, at the end of the 19th century, the fertile coastal territory remained practically uninhabited, since the indigenous Abkhazians preferred (and were forced) to live in the mountainous areas.
After the revolution of 1917, Abkhazia became part of Georgia as an autonomous republic. This was enshrined in the Russian-Georgian treaty of May 7, 1920, which states that “the state border between Georgia and Russia runs from the Black Sea along the Psou River to Mount Akhakhcha” (the Abkhaz section of the modern Russian-Georgian border).
Tensions between the Georgian government and the Abkhaz autonomy appeared periodically during the Soviet period. The migration policy, which began under the auspices of Lavrentiy Beria, reduced the share of Abkhazians in the total population of the republic (by the beginning of the 1990s it was only 17%). The migration of Georgians to the territory of Abkhazia (1937-1954) was formed by settling in Abkhazian villages, as well as the settlement of Greek villages by Georgians that were liberated after the deportation of Greeks from Abkhazia in 1949. The Abkhaz language (until 1950) was excluded from the secondary school curriculum and replaced by compulsory study of the Georgian language, Abkhaz writing was transferred to a Georgian graphic basis (translated to a Russian basis in 1954).
Mass protests and unrest among the Abkhaz population demanding the withdrawal of Abkhazia from the Georgian SSR broke out in April 1957, in April 1967, and - the largest - in May and September 1978.

But what led to an open war, in which, according to official data, approximately 16 thousand people died, including 4 thousand Abkhazians, 10 thousand Georgians and 2 thousand volunteers from various republics of the North Caucasus?

The aggravation of relations between Georgia and Abkhazia began on March 18, 1989. On this day, in the village of Lykhny (the ancient capital of the Abkhaz princes), a 30,000-strong gathering of the Abkhaz people took place, which put forward a proposal for Abkhazia to secede from Georgia and restore it to the status of a union republic.
And here is that same clearing in Lykhny

On July 15-16, 1989, bloody clashes took place in Sukhumi between Georgians and Abkhazians (16 dead). The leadership of the republic then managed to resolve the conflict and the incident remained without serious consequences.
A new aggravation of the situation in Abkhazia occurred in connection with the announcement by the Georgian authorities of the abolition of the Constitution of the Georgian SSR of 1978 and the restoration of the constitution of the Georgian Democratic Republic of 1918, which declared Georgia a unitary state and excluded the existence of territorial autonomies. In Abkhazia, this was perceived as the beginning of a course towards complete assimilation of the small Abkhaz ethnic group, which by that time constituted a minority of the population of the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.
On September 25, 1991, elections were held in the Supreme Council of Abkhazia, a deputy corps was formed on a quota basis: 28 seats for Abkhazians, 26 for Georgians, 11 for representatives of other ethnic groups.
On August 14, 1992, hostilities began between Georgia and Abkhazia, which escalated into a real war with the use of aviation, artillery and other types of weapons. The beginning of the military phase of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict was marked by the entry of Georgian troops into Abkhazia under the pretext of liberating Deputy Prime Minister of Georgia A. Kavsadze, captured by the Zviadists and held on the territory of Abkhazia, and protecting communications, incl. railway, and other important objects. This move provoked fierce resistance from Abkhazians, as well as other ethnic communities of Abkhazia.
At the beginning of the war, the Abkhazians did not have a regular army, there were practically no weapons - the Georgian troops were met with hunting rifles and similar weapons. At this rate, Georgian troops drove the Abkhazians back to Gagra and occupied Sukhumi.
On September 3, 1992, in Moscow, during a meeting between Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze (who at that time held the posts of President of the Russian Federation and Chairman of the State Council of Georgia), a document was signed providing for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Georgian troops from Abkhazia, and the return of refugees. Since the conflicting parties did not fulfill a single point of the agreement, hostilities continued.
By the end of 1992, the war had acquired a positional character, where neither side could win. On December 15, 1992, Georgia and Abkhazia signed several documents on the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of all heavy weapons and troops from the region of hostilities. There was a period of relative calm, but in early 1993 hostilities resumed after the Abkhaz offensive on Sukhumi, which was occupied by Georgian troops.
At the end of September 1993, Sukhumi came under the control of Abkhaz troops. This happened largely thanks to the support (both with weapons and “manpower”) from the peoples of the North Caucasus and Transnistria, including from the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, which declared the readiness of the Chechens and Adygs ethnically related to the Abkhazians to oppose the Georgians. The detachment of Chechen volunteers was led by Shamil Basayev. In Abkhazia, Basayev performed well during battles with Georgian units, was appointed commander of the Gagra Front, commander of the KNK troops corps, deputy minister of defense of Abkhazia, adviser to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of Abkhazia, and was later given the highest award of the republic - hero of Abkhazia.
Gennady Troshev in the book “My War. Chechen diary of a trench general” described Basayev’s activities in the vicinity of Gagra and the village of Leselidze:

“Basayev’s “janissaries” (and there were 5 thousand of them) were distinguished by senseless cruelty in that war. In the fall of 1993, in the vicinity of Gagra and the village of Liselidze, the “commander” himself personally led a punitive action to exterminate refugees. Several thousand Georgians were shot, hundreds of Armenians were slaughtered, Russian and Greek families. According to eyewitnesses who miraculously escaped, the bandits gladly recorded scenes of abuse and rape on videotape."

During the war, multiple war crimes were recorded, both on one side and on the other, but, as they say, it was these mercenaries (North Caucasians and Cossacks) who committed the most atrocities...
In the battles in Abkhazia, Adyghe volunteers led by General Sosnaliev played a huge role. He was awarded the title Hero of Abkhazia. Sosnaliev took the post of Minister of Defense of Abkhazia and received the rank of general of the Abkhaz army. The sending of volunteers to Abkhazia was undertaken by the Congress of the Kabardian People, the Adyge Khase of Adygea, the Chechen Congress, and the KNK. The President of the KNK Shanibov was the leader of the volunteers.
After all this, Georgian troops were forced to completely leave Abkhazia.
Of course, one cannot fail to mention the participation of the Russian armed forces, which, as some argue, took an active part in the conflict on the side of Abkhazia. Most likely this was done in order to put pressure on Shevardnadze, who did not want to join the CIS, but in the end he had to do it. But, of course, we can guess as much as we like, but we will not know the true reasons and secrets of this war for a long time...

But in the photo below you can see the house where my grandparents lived, this is a house almost on the outskirts of the city, not far from the Kelasur River, right under the Abkhaz University. There are three entrances in total, but, as can be seen in the photo, there is no central part of the house - before the war there was a branch of the geological institute (or museum?). It was bombed during the war, and it is not clear whether it was the Georgians, or the Abkhazians themselves. For what? There were a lot of topographical maps, and some did not want others to get these maps. Traces of shrapnel and bullets can still be seen on the walls of the house, and the central burnt-out part of the house remains black in the middle of the street...
At that time, my grandmother’s friend, Baba Shura, lived on the fifth floor with her ancient mother, about 80 years old. So, during the shooting and bombing, they got an unexploded bomb stuck in the ceiling, which stuck there almost until the end of the war. And the old woman had her leg torn off by a shrapnel...
My grandfather is Georgian, and the worst thing that happened to us was that he would not be killed for this, so we were lucky and you took my grandfather in time to the then troubled Tbilisi, where he waited for some time and then returned back to Sukhumi. By the way, he lived there until his death...

Georgian military Abkhaz militias

During the war, Sukhumi, and almost all the cities of Abkhazia, were almost completely destroyed. My grandmother told me that there were mountains of corpses on the streets that no one cleaned up, it was autumn - heat, high humidity, the smell was unbearable and it was simply impossible to go outside...

What is happening now in Abkhazia? After all, it would seem that 20 years have passed. Literally 3 months ago I saw with my own eyes how Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia were restored over the same 20 years - in Abkhazia everything is much sadder... See for yourself - the photographs speak for themselves.
On the central embankment of the capital

Sycamore Alley

Seaport. Very rare ships come here, mainly from Turkey

All that remains of the Tbilisi Hotel

Commercial port

Sukhumpribor

This is what many houses in Abkhazia look like...

Monument "Bayonet stuck in the ground" in the Park of Glory

And here is one of the main symbols of the victory of the Abkhazians in this conflict - the building of the Supreme Council, the City Council, as the locals call it

And here are the Alpha employees accompanying you, do you know who? Young Shoigu leaving the building

"A very significant photographit depicts Gia Karkarashvili, commander of the Georgian army, Shoigu, Minister of Emergency Situations of Russia, Geno Adamia, commander of the 23rd brigade of the Georgian Defense Ministry, based in Sukhumi (killed by the Abkhaz in Sukhumi, after the capture of the city)"

Shevardnadze goes to the City Council building a few days before the storming of Sukhumi by the Abkhazians

But after the assault on September 27, 1993... Shevardnadze miraculously escapes on a Russian boat.

Against the background of the building is a poster with the first president of Abkhazia V. Ardzinba

Monument to Ordzhonikidze

Swings in Voronova Park

Cafe "Old Sukhum"

Gumista is a river on the border of the city of Sukhumi. It was on Gumista that some of the most terrible battles took place

Now a memorial complex has been built behind the bridge on its left bank.

And here is New Athos, which also suffered greatly during the war. Before the conflict, this pond was home to a lot of swans, which they say were eaten during the war...

Memorial complex

Destroyed and inactive Pstsyrkha station. By the way, now you will not find a single inscription in Georgian on the streets of the city - all the signs have been redone, even the famous masterpiece of medieval architecture, known as Queen Tamar's Bridge, is now called Baslet, and travel agencies call it Venetian. In my opinion, the surviving inscription in Georgian from the 10th century was also erased. In any case, I didn't find it there...

However, time passes and the city, like the whole country, is being restored - the city center has already been well restored

New buildings are being built, heavily damaged old ones are being demolished

The bombed and shelled high-rise buildings at the entrance to the city, which frightened tourists there, were restored, sheathed with siding and plastic windows were installed

Since Tuesday morning, the authorities of Abkhazia have closed traffic on the bridge over the Inguri River, where theadministrative boundary between the Zugdidi region of Georgia and the Gali region of the unrecognized republic, a source in the regional police of the Georgian region of Samegrelo told RIA Novosti.

The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict is one of the most acute interethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus. Tensions between the Georgian government and the Abkhaz autonomy appeared periodically during the Soviet period. The migration policy carried out under Lavrentiy Beria led to the fact that Abkhazians began to make up a small percentage of the region’s population (by the beginning of the 1990s they were no more than 17% of the total population of Abkhazia). The migration of Georgians to the territory of Abkhazia (1937-1954) was formed by settling in Abkhazian villages, as well as the settlement of Greek villages by Georgians that were freed after the deportation of Greeks from Abkhazia in 1949. The Abkhaz language (until 1950) was excluded from the secondary school curriculum and replaced by compulsory study of the Georgian language. Mass protests and unrest among the Abkhaz population demanding the withdrawal of Abkhazia from the Georgian SSR broke out in April 1957, in April 1967, and the largest in May and September 1978.

The aggravation of relations between Georgia and Abkhazia began on March 18, 1989. On this day, in the village of Lykhny (the ancient capital of the Abkhaz princes), the 30 thousandth Gathering of the Abkhaz people took place, which put forward a proposal for Abkhazia to secede from Georgia and restore it to the status of a union republic.

On July 15-16, 1989, clashes occurred between Georgians and Abkhazians in Sukhumi. The riots reportedly killed 16 people and injured about 140. Troops were used to stop the unrest. The leadership of the republic then managed to resolve the conflict and the incident remained without serious consequences. Later, the situation was stabilized by significant concessions to the demands of the Abkhaz leadership, made during the period Zviad Gamsakhurdia was in power in Tbilisi.

On February 21, 1992, the ruling Military Council of Georgia announced the abolition of the 1978 Constitution of the Georgian SSR and the restoration of the 1921 Constitution of the Georgian Democratic Republic.

The Abkhaz leadership perceived the abolition of the Soviet Constitution of Georgia as the actual abolition of the autonomous status of Abkhazia, and on July 23, 1992, the Supreme Council of the Republic (with a boycott of the session by Georgian deputies) restored the Constitution of the Abkhaz Soviet Republic of 1925, according to which Abkhazia is a sovereign state (this decision The Supreme Council of Abkhazia was not recognized internationally).

On August 14, 1992, hostilities began between Georgia and Abkhazia, which escalated into a real war with the use of aviation, artillery and other types of weapons. The military phase of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict began with the entry of Georgian troops into Abkhazia under the pretext of liberating Deputy Prime Minister of Georgia Alexander Kavsadze, captured by the Zviadists and held on the territory of Abkhazia, and protecting communications, incl. railway, and other important objects. This move provoked fierce resistance from Abkhazians, as well as other ethnic communities of Abkhazia.

The goal of the Georgian government was to establish control over part of its territory and maintain its integrity. The goal of the Abkhaz authorities is to expand the rights of autonomy and, ultimately, gain independence.

On the part of the central government were the National Guard, paramilitary formations and individual volunteers, on the part of the Abkhaz leadership - the armed formations of the non-Georgian population of the autonomy and volunteers (who arrived from the North Caucasus, as well as Russian Cossacks).

On September 3, 1992, in Moscow, during a meeting between Boris Yeltsin and Eduard Shevardnadze (who at that time held the posts of President of the Russian Federation and Chairman of the State Council of Georgia), a document was signed providing for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Georgian troops from Abkhazia, and the return of refugees. Since the conflicting parties did not fulfill a single point of the agreement, hostilities continued.

By the end of 1992, the war had acquired a positional character, where neither side could win. On December 15, 1992, Georgia and Abkhazia signed several documents on the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of all heavy weapons and troops from the region of hostilities. There was a period of relative calm, but in early 1993 hostilities resumed after the Abkhaz offensive on Sukhumi, which was occupied by Georgian troops.

On July 27, 1993, after lengthy fighting, an Agreement on a temporary ceasefire was signed in Sochi, in which Russia acted as a guarantor.

At the end of September 1993, Sukhumi came under the control of Abkhaz troops. Georgian troops were forced to completely abandon Abkhazia.

The armed conflict of 1992-1993, according to the data released by the parties, claimed the lives of 4 thousand Georgians (another 1 thousand were missing) and 4 thousand Abkhazians. The autonomy's economic losses amounted to $10.7 billion. About 250 thousand Georgians (almost half the population) were forced to flee Abkhazia.

On May 14, 1994, in Moscow, an Agreement on a ceasefire and separation of forces was signed between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides through the mediation of Russia. Based on this document and the subsequent decision of the Council of Heads of State of the CIS, the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces have been deployed in the conflict zone since June 1994, whose task is to maintain the regime of non-renewal of fire.

Collective peacekeeping forces, fully staffed by Russian military personnel, control a 30-kilometer security zone in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. About three thousand peacekeepers are constantly in the conflict zone. The mandate of the Russian peacekeepers is set at six months. After this period, the Council of Heads of State of the CIS decides to extend their mandate.

On April 2, 2002, the Georgian-Abkhazian protocol was signed, according to which Russian peacekeepers and UN military observers were entrusted with patrolling the upper part of the Kodori Gorge (the territory of Abkhazia controlled by Georgia).

On July 25, 2006, units of the Georgian armed forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (up to 1.5 thousand people) were introduced into the Kodori Gorge to conduct a special operation against the local armed Svan formations (“militia” or “Monadire” battalion) of Emzar Kvitsiani, who refused to obey the demands of the Minister of Defense Georgia's Irakli Okruashvili to lay down his arms. Kvitsiani was accused of “treason.”

Official negotiations between Sukhumi and Tbilisi were subsequently interrupted. As the Abkhaz authorities emphasized, negotiations between the parties can only resume if Georgia begins to implement the UN Security Council Resolution, which provides for the withdrawal of troops from Kodori.

On September 27, 2006, on the Day of Memory and Sorrow, by decree of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, Kodori was renamed Upper Abkhazia. In the village of Chkhalta, on the territory of the gorge, the so-called “legitimate government of Abkhazia” is located in exile. Abkhaz military formations controlled by Sukhumi are stationed a few kilometers from this village. The Abkhaz authorities do not recognize the “government in exile” and are categorically against its presence in the Kodori Gorge.

On October 18, 2006, the People's Assembly of Abkhazia appealed to the Russian leadership with a request to recognize the independence of the republic and establish associated relations between the two states. For its part, the Russian leadership has repeatedly stated its unconditional recognition of the territorial integrity of Georgia, of which Abkhazia is an integral part.

The material was prepared based on information from open sources

At the turn of the 80-90s of the 20th century, an ethnopolitical conflict arose between Georgia and Abkhazia. Georgia wanted to secede from the Soviet Union, and Abkhazia, on the contrary, sought to remain part of the USSR, separating, in turn, from Georgia. Tensions between Georgians and Abkhazians led to the creation of Georgian nationalist groups that demanded the elimination of Abkhazian autonomy.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia entered the stage of open confrontation. On April 9, 1991, President Z. Gamsakhurdia proclaimed the independence of Georgia. In January of the following year, he was overthrown, and Eduard Shevardnadze took over as president. On February 21, 1992, the Supreme Council of Georgia abolished the Soviet Constitution and restored the Constitution of the Georgian Democratic Republic, adopted in 1921.

In March 1992, E. Shevardnadze headed the State Council, which controlled the entire territory of Georgia, except for South Ossetia, Adjara and Abkhazia. While it was possible to reach an agreement with South Ossetia and Adjara, things were different with Abkhazia. Abkhazia was part of Georgia as an autonomous region. The abolition of the Soviet Constitution of Georgia and the restoration of the 1921 Constitution deprived Abkhazia of autonomy. On July 23, 1992, the Supreme Council of Abkhazia restored the Constitution of the Abkhazian Soviet Republic, adopted in 1925. Georgian deputies boycotted the session. From that time on, the Council was divided into Georgian and Abkhazian parts.

Mass dismissals of Georgians from security forces and the creation of a national army began in Abkhazia. In response to this, Georgia sent troops into the autonomy under the pretext that it was necessary to protect the railway, which was the only transport route between Russia and Armenia, which was at war with Azerbaijan at that time. On August 14, 1992, detachments of the Georgian National Guard entered Abkhazia and in a few days occupied almost the entire territory of the autonomy, including Sukhumi and Gagra.

The Supreme Council of Abkhazia moved to the Gudauta region. The Abkhazian and Russian-speaking population began to leave the autonomy. The Abkhaz troops received support from the Chechens, Kabardians, Ingush, Circassians, and Adygeis, who declared that they were ready to help the ethnically related people. The conflict has ceased to be only Georgian-Abkhaz, but has grown to include a pan-Caucasian conflict. The formation of militia groups began everywhere and went to Abkhazia. The parties were preparing for war; Russia has not yet intervened, however, offering to act as a mediator and resolve the conflict peacefully.

In October 1992, Abkhazians and militia groups recaptured the city of Gagra from the Georgians, established control over strategically important territory near the Russian border and began preparing for an attack on Sukhumi. According to unconfirmed reports, Russian tanks also took part in the capture of Gagra. Georgia accused Russia of providing Abkhazia with weapons, but the Abkhaz leadership claimed that it only used captured weapons and equipment. In particular, after the capture of Gagra, about ten infantry vehicles and armored personnel carriers passed into the hands of the Abkhazians.

Several units of the Russian Armed Forces found themselves in the conflict zone. They maintained neutrality, guarded the property of the Russian Ministry of Defense, ensured the safety of the evacuation of civilians and vacationers, and the delivery of food to the blockaded city of Tkvarcheli. Despite the neutral position occupied by the Russian side, Georgian troops repeatedly fired at the Russians, and they were forced to respond in kind. Such skirmishes led to civilian casualties.

In the summer of 1993, the Abkhazians launched an attack on Sukhumi. After lengthy battles, the city was completely blocked by the Abkhazians, both sides entered into negotiations. On June 27, 1993, a ceasefire agreement was signed in Sochi. Russia acted as a guarantor at these negotiations. In August, the Georgian side removed almost all heavy weapons from Sukhumi and withdrew most of the troops. According to one version, this was not connected at all with the Sochi agreement, but with the fact that an internal conflict was brewing in Georgia itself at that moment.

The Abkhaz took advantage of the current situation, violated the agreement and on September 16, 1993 began to capture Sukhumi. The Georgians tried to transport troops to the city on civilian planes, but the Abkhazians shot down planes landing at Sukhumi airport with anti-aircraft guns. According to unconfirmed reports, this became possible thanks to assistance from Russia.

On September 27, Sukhumi was captured, and by September 30, the entire territory of the autonomy was already under the control of Abkhaz troops and North Caucasian formations. Ethnic Georgians, fearing the perceived threat from the victors, began to leave their homes in a hurry. Some left for Georgia on their own through mountain passes, others were taken out by sea. During this period, about 300 thousand people left Abkhazia. Only a few of them, and only after a few years, were able to return home. According to unconfirmed reports, about 10 thousand civilians died during the relocation from the autonomy.

Internal problems forced E. Shevardnadze to join the Union of Independent States (CIS) and ask for help from Russia. Then Russia advised Abkhazia to stop the offensive. The Georgian faction of the Abkhaz parliament moved to Tbilisi, but continued to work.

On June 23, 1994, CIS peacekeeping forces entered Abkhazia. Russian units that were here before acted as peacekeepers. A so-called “safety zone” was established along the Inguri River. Only the Kodori Gorge remained under Georgian control. As a result of the Abkhazian war, about 17 thousand people died, about 300 thousand residents (more than half the population) were forced to move to Georgia.

At the beginning of the 21st century, Russia took part in a number of wars. These military actions influenced the subsequent development of the Russian army, military equipment and military doctrine. One of the most striking examples of this is the reflection of Georgian aggression in South Ossetia by Russia and its allies, on the one hand, back in August 2008. Another name for this conflict is the “five-day war.”

Historical background

The border that arbitrarily divided the Ossetians between the RSFSR and the Georgian SSR was established back in Soviet times. Back then they could not even imagine that it would become the border between two unfriendly blocs.

While Georgia was part of the USSR, things were peaceful here, and there was no talk of a possible ethnic conflict. But everything changed after perestroika, when the Georgian authorities began to slowly but surely move towards gaining independence. It was when it became clear that the exit of the Georgian SSR from the Union was quite real, the South Ossetian leadership, mostly gravitating toward Russia, began to think about its own sovereignty. And as a result, already in 1989, the autonomy of South Ossetia was declared, and in 1990 - its full sovereignty.

However, the Georgian government was against it. At the same time, in 1990, the Supreme Council of Georgia declared the decree granting autonomy to South Ossetia invalid.

War 1991-1992

On January 5, 1991, Georgia sent a three-thousand-strong police force into the capital of South Ossetia, the city of Tskhinvali. However, just a few hours later, street battles broke out in the city, often with the use of grenade launchers. During these battles, the futility of the decision of the Supreme Council of Georgia became obvious, and the Georgian detachment itself was gradually pushed back to the city center. As a result, the Georgian contingent was withdrawn to positions in the center of Tskhinvali, where they began to prepare for long-term defense.

On January 25, 1991, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of the Georgian contingent from Tskhinvali and their abandonment of the city, thanks to which the fire ceased for several days. However, new provocations from the Georgian side made the truce short-lived.

What also added fuel to the fire was the fact that, according to the Soviet constitution, autonomous entities within the Soviet socialist republics leaving the Union could independently make decisions about their stay within the USSR. Therefore, when Georgia seceded from the Soviet Union on April 9, 1991, the South Ossetian leadership hastened to announce its continued stay in the USSR.

However, the conflict flared up. The Georgian police and army controlled the territory and heights near Tskhinvali, thanks to which they could launch artillery strikes on the city. The situation there became truly catastrophic: destruction, loss of life and appalling conditions did not add sympathy to the Georgian side.

On December 21, 1991, the Supreme Council of South Ossetia adopted a declaration of independence of the republic, and a month later a corresponding referendum was held. It should be noted that this referendum was mainly boycotted by the Georgian population of the republic, so the absolute majority of votes (about 99%) were cast for independence. Naturally, the Georgian government did not recognize either the independence of the region or the referendum.

The conflict ended quite quickly, and the cause was political instability in Georgia. At the end of 1991, a civil war broke out in this country, which significantly weakened Georgia’s position in the region. In addition, Russia, which was not happy with the smoldering hotbed of tension on the southern border, also intervened in the situation. Pressure was put on the Georgian government (even to the point of the possibility of an airstrike against Georgian forces in the Tskhinvali area), and in mid-July 1992 the shelling of the city stopped.

The result of this war was that the people and government of South Ossetia finally turned away from Georgia and continued to strive with all their might for recognition of their independence in the international arena. Total casualties during the conflict were approximately 1,000 killed and 2,500 wounded.

Period 1992-2008 Rising tensions

The period after the Georgian-South Ossetian war became a time of undulating tension in the region.

As a result of the conflict of 1991-1992. An agreement was reached between the Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian sides on the deployment of a joint peacekeeping contingent to the territory of South Ossetia. This contingent consisted of three battalions (one from each side).

The first half of the nineties was characterized by a big diplomatic game played by all parties. On the one hand, South Ossetia sought to finally separate from Georgia in the eyes of the international community and become part of the Russian Federation. Georgia, in turn, methodically “squeezed out” South Ossetian independence and autonomy. The Russian side was interested in peace in South Ossetia, but soon focused its attention on Chechnya, another far from peaceful region.

However, negotiations continued throughout the first half of the nineties, and in October 1995, the first meeting between the Georgian and Ossetian sides took place in Tskhinvali. Representatives of Russia and the OSCE were present at the meeting. During the meeting, an agreement was reached to cancel the decree of the Georgian Supreme Council on the liquidation of the autonomy of South Ossetia, as well as the republic’s non-secession from Georgia. It is worth noting that, perhaps, the Russian leadership took such a step in exchange for Georgian President E. Shevardnadze’s non-recognition of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and his support for the actions of Russian troops in Chechnya.

In the spring of 1996, a memorandum on the non-use of force in South Ossetia was signed in Moscow. It became a real step forward in Georgian-Ossetian relations. And on August 27 of the same year, the first meeting between Georgian President E. Shevardnadze and the Chairman of the Parliament (and in fact the head of state) of South Ossetia L. Chibirov took place. During this meeting, the parties outlined further ways to normalize the situation, however, after the meeting, E. Shevardnadze said that “it is too early to talk about the autonomy of South Ossetia.”

However, the situation by 2000 contributed to further peace in the region, the return of refugees and economic recovery. However, all the cards were confused by the coming to power in Georgia in January 2004 as a result of the “Rose Revolution” by M. Saakashvili. It was he who represented the young, nationalist-minded generation of Georgia, which, in pursuit of immediate success, did not disdain populist ideas, albeit sometimes very absurd ones.

Even before his official election as President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili visited South Ossetia, and this visit was not coordinated with the South Ossetian authorities. At the same time, he allowed himself the remark that “2004 will be the last year when South Ossetia and Abkhazia do not participate in elections in Georgia.” This statement contributed to the destabilization of the situation.

In 2004-2008 The situation around South Ossetia and the Russian peacekeeping battalion on its territory continued to heat up. In the spring of 2006, the Georgian leadership declared Russian peacekeeping troops in South Ossetia criminals. The reason for such a loud statement was that the servicemen from Russia did not have visas issued by the Georgian side and were allegedly staying on Georgian territory illegally. At the same time, the Georgian side demanded either the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers or their “legalization.”

Meanwhile, fighting flared up in a number of regions of South Ossetia. Skirmishes, provocations and shelling, including mortar attacks, are no longer rare. At the same time, the overwhelming number of provocations were carried out by the Georgian side. It is also worth mentioning the May 2006 statement by then Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili, who stated that by May 1, 2007, South Ossetia would become part of Georgia. In response to this clearly provocative statement, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov guaranteed assistance to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the event of Georgian aggression against them.

It was in 2006 that the process of confrontation between Georgia and South Ossetia took final shape. The Georgian leadership, in its nationalist hysteria, continued to declare that Georgian territory must be inviolable and restored by any means, even military means. It is in this regard that Georgia has set a course for rapprochement with the United States and NATO. American military equipment and instructors arrived in the Georgian army and became frequent guests.

At the same time, South Ossetia from the very beginning of its existence adhered to an exclusively pro-Russian course, so its “peaceful” unification with Georgia after Saakashvili came to power could not happen in principle. In November 2006, a referendum on support for independence was held in South Ossetia. As a result, approximately 99% of the residents of South Ossetia who voted were in favor of maintaining the independence of the republic and continuing its foreign policy course.

Thus, by August 2008, the situation in the region had deteriorated to the limit and a peaceful resolution of the issue was practically impossible. The Georgian “hawks” led by Saakashvili could no longer retreat - otherwise they would have lost their prestige and weight in the eyes of the United States.

Start of hostilities on August 8

On August 8, 2008, approximately 15 minutes after midnight, the Georgian army suddenly opened fire on Tskhinvali with Grad multiple rocket launchers. Three hours later, Georgian troops moved forward.

Thus, the truce was violated by the Georgian side, and the Georgian army, already in the first hours of the offensive, managed to capture a number of settlements on the territory of South Ossetia (Mugut, Didmukha), as well as break into the outskirts of Tskhinvali. However, the South Ossetian militia units were able to inflict significant losses on the aggressor at the very beginning of the conflict and slow down the pace of the Georgian “blitzkrieg” with stubborn defense.

At this time, in Tskhinvali itself, as a result of the Georgian artillery attack, casualties appeared among the civilian population. The city was taken by surprise, but the residents bravely greeted the news of the Georgian invasion. Another tragic episode of the initial period of the war was the death of Russian peacekeepers from the fire of Georgian salvo launchers. This fact finally convinced the Russian leadership that there was no prospect of a peaceful resolution of the conflict. President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev announced the start of an operation to force the Georgian side to peace.

In the morning, Russian aviation began carrying out air strikes on Georgian troops, thereby sharply reducing the pace of their advance. Russian columns of the 58th Army, which formed the main reserve and main defense forces in the South Ossetian direction, moved through the Roki tunnel to help the peacekeepers and South Ossetian militia units.

During the day, Georgian troops managed to significantly push back the Russian-South Ossetian troops and surround the barracks of the Russian peacekeepers, but they failed to decisively turn the situation in their favor. In fact, by the evening of August 8, it became clear that the Georgian “blitzkrieg” had failed and it would not be possible to immediately capture Tskhinvali. However, a victorious mood reigned in the Georgian media; It was announced that the assault on Tskhinvali was successful.

Further development of the conflict (August 9-11)

By the morning of August 9, the fighting in Tskhinvali continued, but the Georgian troops no longer had a significant superiority. Having gotten bogged down in street fighting, they now sought to seize as much territory as possible so that during subsequent peace negotiations (which no one doubted on August 9) they would have at least some trump cards in their hands. However, militia units and Russian peacekeepers continued to stubbornly defend the city's neighborhoods.

At the same time, a group consisting of units of the 58th Russian Army arrived in Tskhinvali; in addition, the 76th Airborne Division was transferred to the scene of events. A battalion group was also created, separated from the 135th Motorized Rifle Regiment. The task of the group was to release Russian peacekeepers and establish contact with them.

However, due to the fact that the offensive impulse of the Georgian troops had not yet been exhausted, and the troops themselves had a sufficient amount of manpower and equipment, as a result of the oncoming battle, the Russian battalion group suffered significant losses and was withdrawn from the city by the end of the day. However, this counter-strike contributed to the speedy stop of the Georgian offensive and the transition of Georgian forces to defense.

Throughout the day on August 9, there were Russian airstrikes against Georgian troops, as well as mutual artillery shelling. A group of ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet entered the territorial waters of Georgia in order to carry out patrols and prevent aggressive actions by Georgia at sea. Moreover, the very next day, August 10, 2008, an attempt by the Georgian naval forces to penetrate the conflict zone was repelled.

On August 10, Russian troops launched a counteroffensive and began to oust Georgian forces from Tskhinvali, and Russian-Abkhaz forces began moving out of the regions bordering Georgia. Thus, on the third day of the conflict, the Georgian offensive completely fizzled out, and the front line began to move in the opposite direction. The result of the defensive battles was, first of all, a complete stop of the Georgian troops, their losses and complete disorganization. It was at this moment that the Georgian leadership began to panic, caused by the threat of complete military defeat. Saakashvili asked NATO countries to intervene in the conflict and “save Georgia from the clutches of the Russian aggressor.”

On August 11, Russian troops completed the liberation of the territories of South Ossetia captured by the aggressor and entered the territory of Georgia. Nevertheless, this event was covered in every possible way as the need to “force Georgia to peace.” On the same day, Russian troops occupied the city of Zugdidi in western Georgia without a fight, and the city of Gori was abandoned by Georgian troops.

Truce and end of the conflict

On August 12, Russian President D. Medvedev announced that there was no longer a danger to the civilian population of South Ossetia and Russian military personnel, which is why it makes sense to stop the operation to force the aggressor to peace. After this, through the mediation of the President of France and the President of the European Union, Nicolas Sarkozy, negotiations began between Russia and Georgia. The general meaning of the future peace agreement was based on the non-use of force to resolve disputed issues, the end of hostilities, the withdrawal of troops to the positions they occupied before the conflict, the access of humanitarian aid to the region, as well as the beginning of an international discussion of the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Georgian leadership agreed with all points of the agreement, except for the point on the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This paragraph has been reformulated.

Over the next days, the process of withdrawing Russian troops from Georgian territory continued. On August 16, the peace agreement was signed by the heads of the Russian Federation, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Georgia. Thus, although this conflict is called a five-day war (due to the fact that the phase of active hostilities lasted from August 8 to 12, 2008), it actually ended on August 16.

Results and consequences of the five-day war

The results of the August conflict in South Ossetia are interpreted differently by each side of the conflict. The Russian leadership announced the victory of Russian and South Ossetian troops, curbing the aggressor, inflicting a serious defeat on him and excluding new large-scale military conflicts in the near future. However, isolated battles and artillery attacks, ambushes and firefights continued until the end of 2008.

The Georgian leadership announced the victory of the Georgian troops, and Georgian President M. Saakashvili stated that one Georgian brigade, equipped with the latest American weapons, managed to defeat the entire 58th Army. However, if we objectively evaluate the results of the conflict, it should be noted: the statement of the Georgian leadership was made solely for propaganda purposes and had nothing to do with reality.

As for the losses suffered by the parties to the conflict, their estimates also differ. According to Russian data, the losses of the troops of Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in total amount to about 510 people killed and wounded, while the losses of Georgia are approximately 3000. The Georgian side claims that the losses of Georgian troops during the conflict amounted to about 410 killed and 1750 wounded, and the losses of Russian troops and their allies were approximately 1,500 killed and wounded. Thus, there was no such thing as “the defeat of an entire Russian army by a Georgian brigade.”

The objectively recognized result of the war in South Ossetia was the victory of Russia and its allies, as well as the heavy defeat of the Georgian army. At the same time, as a result of investigations conducted by the International Commission of the European Union, it was proved that it was Georgia that was the aggressor in the conflict, but at the same time it was pointed out that “Russia’s provocative behavior prompted Georgia to resolve the issue by force.” However, how this “provocative behavior” was linked to Russia’s refusal to accept South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as the non-recognition of the independence of the republics, the Commission was unable to answer.

The consequences of the five-day war were Russia's recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the beginning of confrontation between the Russian Federation and Georgia (diplomatic relations were severed between the states in September 2008). The United States, despite the Commission's conclusions about Georgia's responsibility for starting the war, accused Russia of aggressively seeking to expand its borders. Thus, the conflict in South Ossetia can be called a new era in relations between Russia and the Western world.

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Five-day war (8-12 August 2008)

The Russian special operation “to enforce peace in the area of responsibility of the peacekeepers,” which was carried out on the territory of Georgia and the unrecognized republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from August 8 to 12, 2008, went down in history under the name “Five-Day War.” This was the first military operation of the Russian Federation outside its own territory.

Further, the escalation only increased: one cannot fail to mention Russia’s role in the defeat of L. Chibirov in the 2001 presidential elections in South Ossetia, the accelerated passportization (issuance of Russian passports) of the population of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the introduction of troops and the construction of a military base in Java, and sabotage.

By 2006, the peace settlement was finally buried by the Russian Federation, even at the public level. “One cannot apply one set of rules to Kosovo and another to Abkhazia and South Ossetia,” the Russian President believed.

At the beginning of 2008, there was an increase in tension in the South Ossetian conflict zone, as well as in relations between Russia and Georgia. Russia is withdrawing from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, thereby removing the quota of flank restrictions on the deployment of offensive weapons in the North Caucasus Military District.

On March 6, 2008, it was announced that Russia had withdrawn from the ban on trade, economic and financial ties with Abkhazia; Moscow's decision was regarded by the Georgian Foreign Ministry as "encouraging separatism in the Abkhaz region and an open attempt to encroach on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia."

At the beginning of April 2008, the first units of the 7th Airborne Division of the Russian Armed Forces entered Abkhazia, positioned near the Georgian border.

On April 16, 2008, the Russian Foreign Ministry reported that Russian President V. Putin gave the government instructions on the basis of which Moscow will build special relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Starting from August 1, on the initiative of the Prime Minister of South Ossetia, Yuri Morozov, the residents of Tskhinvali were evacuated.

Since the beginning of August, the South Ossetian Ministry of Defense has reported about the concentration of Georgian troops near the border of the unrecognized republic.

In an interview with the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, an officer of the 135th motorized rifle regiment of the 58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District said: “On August 7, the command came to advance to Tskhinvali. They alerted us and set out on the march. We arrived, settled down, and already on August 8 there was a fire.” . The newspaper later clarified that the date in question was August 8. Some Russian media also claimed that on August 7, the dispatch of a number of units of the 58th Army to South Ossetia began; a month later, the Georgian side began to announce this, publishing its intelligence information in September 2008. The Georgian side published recordings of the conversation, which it claims belong to South Ossetian border guards.

A number of evidence published in the media indicate the presence on the territory of South Ossetia before the official entry of Russian troops, in addition to the peacekeepers, of other Russian military units. In particular, this is confirmed by the death of contract soldier of the 22nd separate GRU special forces brigade Evgeniy Parfenov on the first day of the conflict on August 8 in Tskhinvali.

Izvestia newspaper correspondent Yuri Snegirev stated that in June-July, military exercises of the 58th Army took place in North Ossetia, and after their completion, the equipment did not go into the pits, but remained in front of the entrance to the Roki tunnel (on Russian territory). Yuri Snegirev said: “After the tunnel there was no equipment. I saw this myself. This can be confirmed by my other colleagues, who, after the shelling of Tskhinvali on August 2, began visiting South Ossetia every day.” .

The Kozaev brothers (one of them is an employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of North Ossetia, the other is a hero of Abkhazia and South Ossetia) claimed that the President of South Ossetia E. Kokoity knew in advance about the upcoming military events and left Tskhinvali for Java in advance. However, according to Anatoly Barankevich, the President of South Ossetia left for Java only on August 8 at about two in the morning.

Points of view regarding responsibility for the start of the war

Georgia's position

According to the official version of the Georgian side, the start of hostilities was a reaction to South Ossetian provocations and the immediate threat of a Russian attack. Georgia allegedly had reliable information, obtained as a result of intercepting a telephone conversation, that on the morning of August 7, “the Russians had already passed through the Roki tunnel” and therefore invaded South Ossetia.

Russia's position

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that the reasons for the entry of Russian troops into the conflict zone were Georgia’s aggression against the territories of South Ossetia not under its control and the consequences of this aggression: a humanitarian catastrophe, the exodus of 30 thousand refugees from the region, the death of Russian peacekeepers and many residents of South Ossetia. Lavrov qualified the actions of the Georgian army against civilians as genocide. He noted that the majority of the population of South Ossetia are citizens of Russia, and that “not a single country in the world would remain indifferent to the murder of its citizens and expulsion of them from their homes.” According to Lavrov, “Russia’s military response to the Georgian attack on Russian citizens and soldiers of the peacekeeping contingent was completely proportionate.”

Position of the Tagliavini Commission

On September 30, 2009, the official text of the report of the International Independent Commission of Inquiry into the conflict in the South Caucasus was distributed. The Commission worked under the auspices of the EU. The group of experts was led by Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini.

According to the Russian side, an international investigation found Georgia responsible for the war in the Caucasus in August 2008. The text of the report stated that Georgia, using heavy artillery, launched an attack on Tskhinvali on the night of August 8, 2008 and, accordingly, started the war. However, this attack, as noted in the text, was the result of long-term provocations in the conflict zone. Russia, according to the report's authors, was also responsible for numerous violations of international law.

Progress of hostilities

August 7

In the morning, information appeared in the Georgian media that the South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity had left the capital and was preparing to lead large-scale military operations from Java, where detachments of volunteers from Russia had already arrived.

On the afternoon of August 7, 2008, Secretary of the South Ossetian Security Council Anatoly Barankevich stated: “Numerous Georgian military formations are heading to the border (of South Ossetia). The village of Khetagurovo has been shelled from 152-mm guns for two hours. The village is on fire. 27 Grad installations are concentrated in the Gori area. The activity of Georgian troops is observed along the entire border with South Ossetia “All this suggests that Georgia is beginning large-scale aggression against our republic.” .

In the afternoon, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili ordered the Georgian military to unilaterally cease fire. Then an appeal from the Georgian leader was shown on TV, in which he agreed to negotiations in any format and invited Russia to become the guarantor of the broadest possible autonomy for South Ossetia within Georgia. At the same time, Saakashvili offered an amnesty to all members of the armed forces of the unrecognized republic. An agreement was reached between Georgia and South Ossetia for both sides to stop shelling - pending negotiations, which were decided to be held on August 8 at the peacekeepers' headquarters in Tskhinvali.

The commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone, Marat Kulakhmetov, said that the parties ceased fire, however, according to the Georgian side, after Saakashvili’s statement, the fire on Georgian villages from South Ossetia sharply intensified. The Rustavi 2 television company reported about ten dead Georgian citizens.

The head of the analytical department of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Shota Utiashvili, reported that 10 people were killed and 50 were injured when Georgian villages were shelled in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict.

At 23.30 Georgian artillery opened heavy fire on Tskhinvali. The commander of the JPKF, Marat Kulakhmetov, announced the beginning of the war. The shelling began from the Georgian-controlled villages of Ergneti and Nikozi. The Georgian government stated that it was forced to abandon the previously announced unilateral moratorium on firing and return fire due to the ongoing shelling of Georgian villages by South Ossetian formations.

August 8

On the night of August 8 (about 00.15 Moscow time), Georgian troops subjected Tskhinvali to shelling from Grad rocket launchers, and at about 03.30 Moscow time they began an assault on the city using tanks. The locations of Russian peacekeepers were also attacked. According to the Georgian authorities, the capital of South Ossetia has been surrounded. Georgian media reported that the Znauri region of South Ossetia had come under the control of Georgian troops. News agencies reported that Georgian troops occupied six villages in South Ossetia - Mugut, Didmukha, Dmenisi, Okona, Akots and Kokhat.

At 00.30 Moscow time on August 8, the commander of operations of the Georgian Armed Forces, General Mamuka Kurashvili, announced on the Rustavi-2 TV channel that, due to the Ossetian side’s refusal to engage in dialogue to stabilize the situation in the conflict zone, the Georgian side "decided to restore constitutional order in the conflict zone". Mamuka Kurashvili called on Russian peacekeepers stationed in the conflict zone not to interfere in the situation.

At 4 a.m., Russia demanded an emergency convening of a meeting of the UN Security Council and alerted units of the 58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District. The alarm was also declared in Abkhazia.

At 02.00 Moscow time, due to the sharp aggravation of the situation in South Ossetia, an emergency meeting of the Security Council of Abkhazia was held in Sukhum. As a result, it was decided to move a number of units of the Abkhaz army to the borders of the weapons limitation zone in the Ochamchira region of the republic.

By noon, three battalion tactical groups from the 429th and 503rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division and the 135th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District entered South Ossetia through the Roki tunnel, which deployed into battle formations in Java and Gufta districts. Georgian planes tried to destroy a bridge near the village of Gufta in order to block the advance of Russian troops, but missed and hit residential buildings. Meanwhile, fighting took place all over Tskhinvali.

The 76th Pskov Airborne Division was transferred to the combat area.

In addition to the transfer of additional units to South Ossetia, Russia deployed airborne units and marines to Abkhazia.

Russian ships entered Georgian territorial waters and began combat patrols.

President of Abkhazia Sergei Bagapsh decided to forcibly oust the Georgian Armed Forces from the upper part of the Kodori Gorge. There is a concentration of troops in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. According to the plenipotentiary representative of the President of Abkhazia in the Gali region bordering Georgia, Ruslan Kishmaria, Georgia is introducing additional military contingent and armored vehicles into the security zone. Units of the Abkhaz army are stationed at the borders of the peacekeepers' zone of responsibility.

In South Ossetia, Russian troops reached the administrative border with Georgia along almost its entire length, continuing to push the few remaining combat-ready Georgian units to the south.

Evidence and findings of war crimes during the conflict

Russia and South Ossetia on the one hand, and Georgia on the other hand, accuse each other of crimes and ethnic cleansing. Journalists, human rights activists and others have also alleged war crimes during the conflict.

In November 2008, the human rights organization Amnesty International published a report according to which:

During the assault on Tskhinvali, the Georgian army carried out indiscriminate attacks, as a result of which dozens of South Ossetian civilians were killed and many were injured, as well as significant damage to infrastructure (public buildings, hospitals, schools);
The main destruction of Tskhinvali was caused by the Grad multiple launch rocket systems used by the Georgian army, the missiles of which have low accuracy.
During the conflict, Russian aviation carried out more than 75 air raids, most of which targeted positions of the Georgian army. Villages and towns were hit by airstrikes, with damage “limited to a few streets and individual houses in some villages.”
There is evidence that some Russian attacks on Georgian towns and roads have resulted in civilian injuries and deaths, with "perhaps no distinction being made between legitimate military targets and civilians." As the report writes, “if this is indeed the case, then such attacks qualify as indiscriminate attacks and constitute a violation of international humanitarian law.”
As the report states, “according to eyewitnesses, the disciplined behavior of Russian military personnel differed sharply from the actions of Ossetian fighters and militia groups, who were seen in looting and robberies.” Georgians interviewed by Amnesty International noted that Russian military personnel "generally behaved decently towards Georgian civilians and showed proper discipline."
South Ossetian units and paramilitary forces committed serious crimes against Georgians in South Ossetia and adjacent territories. Eyewitnesses reported unlawful killings, beatings, threats, arson and robbery carried out by armed groups on the South Ossetian side.

On January 23, 2009, the international human rights organization Human Rights Watch released the Up in Flames report, which concluded that Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian armed forces had committed numerous violations of humanitarian law, resulting in the death of civilians; the authors of the report call on Moscow and Tbilisi to investigate the crimes and punish the perpetrators. In the report, the Georgian side was accused of indiscriminate use of weapons during the shelling of Tskhinvali, neighboring villages and during the subsequent offensive, as well as beating detainees and looting. The South Ossetian side was accused of torture, murder, rape, robbery and ethnic cleansing. The Russian side was accused of robbery. HRW also stated that numerous accusations by the Russian side of the Georgian army of genocide and massacres were not confirmed during verification, and HRW did not receive answers to a request to the Investigative Committee under the Prosecutor's Office. According to the organization, individual facts of atrocities by the Georgian army, published in the Russian media, can be qualified as independent serious crimes, but not as an attempt at genocide.

Casualties during the conflict

South Ossetia

Official data

By the evening of August 8, preliminary data on casualties appeared: as the President of the Republic Eduard Kokoity stated in an interview with the Interfax news agency, over 1,400 people became victims of the attack by Georgian troops on South Ossetia. On the morning of August 9, the official representative of the South Ossetian government, Irina Gagloeva, reported 1,600 dead. On the evening of August 9, Russian Ambassador to Georgia Vyacheslav Kovalenko said that at least 2,000 residents of Tskhinvali (about 3% of the population of South Ossetia) had died. On August 16, the Minister of Internal Affairs of South Ossetia, Mikhail Mindzaev, said that the final death toll was still unclear, but it was already clear that more than 2,100 people had died. Final official data were reported on August 20; According to Irina Gagloeva, in total, South Ossetia lost 1,492 people killed during the conflict. On September 17, the Prosecutor General of South Ossetia, Taimuraz Khugaev, said in an interview that 1,694 died in the war, including 32 military personnel and an employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republic.

At the same time, the South Ossetian prosecutor's office reported on August 20 that “as a result of the armed aggression of the Georgian army,” the deaths of 69 residents of South Ossetia, including three children, were “established and documented.” According to prosecutors, this list will grow because it does not include those killed in rural areas. On July 3, 2009, the head of the Investigative Committee under the Russian Prosecutor's Office (SKP), A. Bastrykin, stated that 162 civilians became victims of the conflict and 255 were injured. However, according to him, this is not final data.

Unofficial data

On September 4, 2008, the Public Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes in South Ossetia and Assistance to the Affected Civilian Population published a list of those killed, indicating their full name, age, cause of death and place of burial. As of August 8, 2012, the number of deaths on this list is 365 people. This list is not final and is updated as accurate information is established about persons whose fate has not been reliably established, or there is hope that the people are alive.

On November 10, 2008, the American magazine Business Week reported that, according to estimates by the human rights organization Human Rights Watch (HRW), between 300 and 400 civilians in South Ossetia were killed as a result of the Georgian attack.

Russia

Official Russian data

On September 3, the chief military prosecutor of the Russian Federation, S. Fridinsky, published data according to which the losses of Russian military personnel amounted to 71 people killed and 340 wounded. The list of killed Russian military personnel by the Russian agency Regnum includes 72 people.

In February 2009, Deputy Minister of Defense General of the Army Nikolai Pankov stated that 64 servicemen were killed (according to the list of surnames), three were missing and 283 were injured. However, in August, Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin reported 48 dead and 162 wounded. The reasons for this discrepancy in numbers are unknown.

Data from the Georgian side

According to Georgian data, Russia significantly underestimated its losses. Thus, on August 12, Georgian President Saakashvili stated that the Georgian Armed Forces destroyed 400 Russian soldiers.

The Georgian news agency Medianews disseminated information about losses among Russian military personnel and equipment, many times higher than the losses voiced by both the Russian side and Georgian officials: “As a result of the fighting in the Tskhinvali region, the Russian 58th Army lost 1,789 soldiers, 105 tanks, 81 combat vehicles, 45 armored personnel carriers, 10 Grad devices and five Smerch devices.

Georgia

Official data

Ministry of Defense - 133 dead, 70 missing, 1,199 wounded;
Ministry of Internal Affairs - 13 dead, 209 wounded;
Civilians - 69 dead, 61 wounded.

On September 15, the data on losses was clarified: the deaths of 154 military personnel of the Ministry of Defense, 14 employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 188 civilians were reported; In addition, the bodies of 14 dead servicemen have not been found.

Georgia has officially published a list of killed civilians, indicating their first and last name, and locality. There are a total of 228 people on the list; opposite 62 names there is a sign that says “information is being verified.” A list of dead military and police officers has also been published: a total of 169 people. As new information becomes available, the lists are updated. This brings the total number of those killed according to official death tolls to 397, with 62 deaths not officially confirmed. Data on some of those killed cannot be double-checked due to the lack of opportunity for Georgian officials to work in the territory controlled by the de facto authorities of South Ossetia and the Russian military.

Russian data

Journalists from the Russian newspaper Kommersant, who were in Tbilisi on August 11, quoted an unnamed Georgian army officer, according to whom his unit delivered almost 200 killed Georgian soldiers and officers from South Ossetia to the hospital in Gori alone.

Some Russian sources accused Georgia of significantly understating the losses suffered. According to the assumptions of Russian military experts, expressed in the Vesti news program on the Rossiya TV channel on August 15, the losses of the Georgian army could amount to 1.5-2 thousand people killed and up to 4 thousand wounded. On September 15, an unnamed Russian intelligence source stated that Georgia had lost about 3,000 security personnel during the war. Unconfirmed by independent sources, these reports remain mere speculation.

Diplomatic settlement

On August 12 at 12.46 pm, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced that he had decided to complete the operation to force Georgia to peace.

After this, during the meeting of the EU Chairman, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, six principles for a peace settlement were agreed upon (the “Medvedev-Sarkozy Plan”):

Refusal to use force.
The final cessation of all hostilities.
Free access to humanitarian aid.
Return of the Georgian Armed Forces to their places of permanent deployment.
The withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to the line preceding the start of hostilities.
The beginning of an international discussion on the future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and ways to ensure their lasting security.

According to N. Sarkozy, “a six-point text cannot answer all questions. It does not completely solve the problem.”

On August 16, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a plan for the peaceful settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. Prior to this, the document was signed by the leaders of the unrecognized states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as the President of Georgia M. Saakashvili. The signing of this document by the parties to the conflict finally marked the end of hostilities.

Results

In the period from August 14 to August 16, 2008, the leaders of the states involved in hostilities signed a plan for the peaceful settlement of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict (the “Medvedev-Sarkozy Plan”). However, the confrontation between the parties to the conflict did not end with the ceasefire, but acquired a political and diplomatic character, largely moving into the sphere of international relations.

According to the OSCE, which was expressed on August 9, 2008 by Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, who chairs the OSCE, Russia has ceased to be a mediator in the South Ossetian settlement and instead has become one of the participants in the conflict.

The immediate consequence of the conflict was Georgia's secession from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). On August 12, Mikheil Saakashvili announced that Georgia was leaving the CIS; on August 14, this decision was approved by the Georgian parliament.

On August 26, 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced the signing of decrees “On recognition of the Republic of Abkhazia” and “On recognition of the Republic of South Ossetia”, according to which the Russian Federation recognizes both republics “as a sovereign and independent state”, and undertakes to establish with each of these, diplomatic relations and conclude an agreement of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance.

In which it recognized the territorial integrity of Georgia. On March 31, 2014, the Georgian Foreign Ministry reported that the state of Tuvalu had also canceled the decision to recognize the separatist republics.

Residents of Georgia and South Ossetia remember the victims of the “Five-Day War”

In South Ossetia and Georgia, mourning events are held annually in memory of the victims of the conflict. On August 7 and 8, 2017 in Georgia, the leaders of the opposition parties “United National Movement” and “European Georgia” laid wreaths at the graves of Georgian soldiers who died in combat in August 2008. In Tskhinvali, authorities and local residents took part in laying wreaths and flowers at the “Symbol of Sorrow” monument, and photographs of victims of the conflict were laid out on the steps of the republic’s parliament and candles were lit. Funeral rallies were also held in three South Ossetian villages.

International Criminal Court

For 10 years now, investigations into the conflict have been ongoing at the International Criminal Court (ICC). Both Georgia and the Russian Federation applied there.

On January 27, 2016, the ICC announced that it had authorized the prosecutor's office to begin an investigation into crimes that may have been committed during this conflict in and near the Tskhinvali region of Georgia from July 1 to October 10, 2008. The court concluded that there were “reasonable grounds to believe that crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC had been committed.”

The ICC field office in Georgia was opened in 2018.

According to human rights activists who gathered in The Hague on April 12, 2018, investigators of the International Criminal Court for ten years have not achieved results in the investigation of the armed conflict in South Ossetia; much evidence has been lost during this time. Victims of the conflict remain in dire straits and have no faith in justice as Russia and South Ossetia refuse to cooperate with the investigation, human rights activists said.

Notes:

Russian-Georgian war and features of national memory // Information and analytical portal “Caucasus Online”, August 27, 2013
Putin: Same rules regarding Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia // Rosbalt news agency, September 13, 2006
Russia has come out of the ban on trade, economic and financial ties with Abkhazia // “Echo of Moscow”, 03/06/2008.
More than 2.5 thousand people left the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone // Korrespondent.net, 04.08.2008.
There is no place for this president in South Ossetia // Kommersant, 12/04/2008.
The Dictionary of Modern Geographical Names edited by Academician Kotlyakov and the Big Encyclopedic Dictionary recommends using “Tskhinvali” as the main one (“Tskhinvali” or “Tskhinvali” - linguists do not agree // RIA Novosti, August 20, 2008)
This is not a conflict, this is a war // Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 08.08.2008.
NYT: Georgia has found facts that Russia “started first.” The West is not convinced, but understands // NEWSru, 09/16/2008.
A contract soldier from Kazan died in South Ossetia // Komsomolskaya Pravda, 08/12/2008.
My name is Snegirev. Yuri Snegirev // Izvestia, November 20, 2008.
South Ossetia does not extradite its citizens to Russia // Kommersant, 01.09.2008.
Media: Russian troops entered South Ossetia even before the start of hostilities // NEWSru 09/11/2008.
Why Russia's actions in Georgia were correct. - S. Lavrov // InoSMI (The Financial Times), 08/13/2008.
Georgia has begun large-scale aggression, Tskhinvali declares // RIA Novosti, 08/07/2008.
Five-day war // Kommersant Power, 08/18/2008.
Georgia launched a tank attack on the southern outskirts of Tskhinvali // Lenta.ru, 08.08.2008.
Georgia “made a decision to restore constitutional order” in South Ossetia // LIGA.news, 08.08.2008.
Georgia presents new evidence of the beginning of the war // Foreign Media (The New York Times), 09/16/2008.
The Russian army will "force Georgia to peace." - NEWSru.UA, 08/09/2008
Throw to Gori. Colonel A.L. Krasov // Official blog of the site "For the Fatherland", 01/22/2010.
The Black Sea Fleet is regrouping off the coast of Abkhazia // Lenta.ru, 08/09/2008.
Chronicle of the war in South Ossetia: day four. - Lenta.Ru, 08/11/2008
A state of complete combativeness // Kommersant, 01/24/2009.
Kokoity stated that more than 1,400 people died in the republic // Interfax, 08.08.2008.
1600 people were killed in Tskhinvali // Gazeta.ru, 08/09/2008.
Russian Ambassador to Georgia: at least two thousand people died in Tskhinvali // Interfax, 08/09/2008.
Ministry of Internal Affairs of South Ossetia: the death toll exceeds 2100 people // Gazeta.ru, 08/16/2008.
The losses of South Ossetia in the war with Georgia amounted to 1492 people // REGNUM, 08.20.2008.
Victims of Georgian aggression // Interfax, 08/17/2008.
List of dead citizens of South Ossetia on the website of the “Public Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes in South Ossetia and Assistance to the Affected Civilian Population” // Osetinfo.ru, 10/28/2008.
As of September 3, as a result of Georgian aggression, 71 Russian peacekeepers were killed and 340 were injured // Vedomosti, 09/03/2008.
List of peacekeepers killed in South Ossetia // REGNUM, 08/12/2008.
The conflict in South Ossetia has claimed the lives of 64 Russian soldiers. – Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation // Interfax, 02.21.2009.
The General Staff announced anti-Russian preparations for the Georgian army // Kommersant, 08/05/2009.
Georgia convinces itself of victory over Russia // Kommersant, 08/13/2008.
The 58th Army of the Russian Federation lost 1,789 soldiers during the events in the Tskhinvali region // Our Abkhazia, 09/08/2008.
Georgia claims 215 deaths as a result of military actions. Media: Russian peacekeepers are again in Poti // NEWSru, 08/19/2008.
Moscow counted almost 20 times more killed Georgian soldiers than Tbilisi // Polit.ru, 09/15/2008.
Official list of dead civilians in Georgia // Ministry of Health of Georgia.
Compilation of combat calculations // Kommersant, 08/11/2008.
About 3 thousand Georgian soldiers died in the war unleashed by Tbilisi // RIA Novosti, 09/15/2008.
Russia and France agreed on the principles of resolving the conflict in Georgia // Lenta.ru, 08/12/2008.
Sarkozy and Saakashvili approved six principles for resolving the conflict // Polit.ru, 08/13/2008.
Georgia accepted the settlement plan presented by Sarkozy // Korrespondent.net, 08/13/2008.
Kvirikashvili discussed the investigation of the 2008 war with the ICC prosecutor // NewsTbilisi.info, February 17, 2018
Georgia will provide the ICC with all the materials necessary for the investigation of the 2008 war // Information and analytical portal “Georgia Online”, February 18, 2017
The head of the Georgian government, during meetings in Munich, discussed the country’s defense capability and investment potential // Sputnik International News Agency, February 18, 2017

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