About the northwestern front. Western Front Western Front 1942 battle map

I specifically decided to wait until the annual parade dust around May 9 had settled down a bit. Below you can see several dozen pictures taken in May of this year in one of the bloodiest “squares” of the “Demyansk Cauldron”. I have been going there for many years now, and I try to communicate as much as possible with the few participants in the events there and eyewitnesses, fortunately there are still some. I didn’t write about my impressions; you can feel everything described there too intensely. But I will say one thing - now sometimes a kind of animal fear comes over there, especially when you try to imagine what exactly those who fought there experienced.

From January 7 to May 20, 1942, troops of the Northwestern Front (P.A. Kurochkin) conducted the Demyansk offensive operation. During it, by the end of February, Soviet troops separated the Old Russian and Demyansk enemy groups, and surrounded the latter, consisting of six divisions of the 16th Army. However, the liquidation of the encircled group was delayed, and by April 23 the enemy managed to connect with the encircled troops, forming the so-called Ramushevsky corridor 4 km wide. Further offensive actions of the Soviet troops with the aim of eliminating the Demyansk group were unsuccessful. The fight between the parties unfolded in the zone of the formed corridor, which by the end of April was expanded by the enemy to 6-8 km.

Map of military operations

Map of military operations

Not far from the neck of the corridor, truly tragic events unfolded in the winter of 1941-1942. Attempts to advance by the Red Army only on a small section of the front resulted in bloody losses: about 18,000 soldiers and officers and more than 80 tanks. Soldiers of the SS Division "Totenkopf" and the Danish SS Corps also fought against the Red Army. The Germans steadfastly defended themselves, turning the forests adjacent to populated areas into deeply echeloned fortified areas. Rubble, barbed wire and continuous minefields awaited the attackers in addition to cold, frost-free swamps, machine-gun and artillery fire.

There are a lot of these kinds of funnels filled with water in the forest. They often contain dead bodies dumped after a battle.

There are a lot of these kinds of funnels filled with water in the forest. They often contain dead bodies dumped after a battle.

Helmets scattered everywhere with the most intricate holes are collected in heaps and those that are not too rusty and disfigured are used to construct simple homemade monuments

Helmets scattered everywhere with the most intricate holes are collected in heaps and those that are not too rusty and disfigured are used to construct simple homemade monuments

The forest in our offensive zone is filled with rusty, mutilated iron. And, of course, people...

The forest in our offensive zone is filled with rusty, mutilated iron. And, of course, people...

British smoke mine

British smoke mine

German newspaper

German newspaper

Stars from the fraternal graves where their comrades were buried anonymously in 1941-1942

Stars from the fraternal graves where their comrades were buried anonymously in 1941-1942

About unknown soldiers

Several units of medallions for several hundred found Red Army soldiers are a common occurrence. As a rule, the dead lie very shallow, right under the turf. They do not have weapons with them or they were damaged in battle. It’s good if a person is lying in a helmet, there is a chance to find him with a metal detector. We found just such a “top” fighter.

Among his personal belongings, he had only two 20-kopeck coins, a bottle of cologne, and a spoon with the mark of the city of Kirov. The spoon was in a felt boot. There were no inscriptions or signs that could help identify the deceased...

Sailors in the "cauldron"

Sailors also fought in the Demyansk "cauldron". As part of naval rifle brigades. Naval rifle brigades began to be formed according to GKO Decree No. 810 dated 10/18/41 on the formation of 25 rifle brigades and Order of the USSR NKO No. 00110 dated 10/18/41 about the same (from number 61 to number 85). The basis was the recently accepted staff of cadet rifle brigades, which until the end of October had one rifle regiment. From the beginning of November, the brigades were transferred to the staff of a separate rifle brigade with three rifle battalions. The name “naval rifle brigades” was given by Order No. 0512 of December 27, 1941. They did not differ from ordinary rifle brigades in anything other than the presence of 20 to 80% of sailors in the l/s and the appointment of various numbers of dropout cadets from military schools and district courses. After the “October” brigades, according to GKO Resolution No. 935 of November 22, 1941, 116, 138, 142 separate infantry brigades were formed, also according to the staff of separate rifle brigades. In December 1941 - January 1942, 154 militia brigades were formed (according to a separate NPO Directive).

Formed on 01/02/42 in Moscow as a result of the renaming of the 166th Marine Brigade, which in turn was renamed on 12/28/41 from the 1st Moscow separate detachment of sailors withdrawn from the front to the capital. On January 19, the brigade was sent to the 3rd Shock Army of the Northwestern Front. Not a single brigade retained the word “cadet” in its name. The Omorsbr formation of 1942 also did not have “cadet” in its name. The expression “cadet naval brigades” appeared, it seems, by mixing disparate facts into one. During formation and in everyday life, the fighters of the Separate Marine Corps could call themselves the Marine Corps, and so could the command, but “naval rifle brigades” remain in history. As in the NPO Order.

The Order of Alexander Nevsky was awarded to commanders of the Red Army who showed personal bravery, courage and bravery in battles for the Motherland and who, through skillful command, ensured the successful actions of their units, for taking the initiative to choose the right moment for a sudden bold and successful attack on the enemy and inflicting a major defeat on him with small ones. losses for their troops.

The order was awarded to commanders of regiments, battalions, companies, and platoons. According to the Decree of the PVS of the USSR of November 10, 1942, the awarding of the order was extended to commanders of divisions and brigades.

The first award of the order took place according to the Decree of the USSR PVS of November 5, 1942. Badge No. 1 was received by the commander of the marine battalion of the 154th Marine Rifle Brigade, senior lieutenant (later - lieutenant colonel) I.N. Ruban. .

The sailors really fought bravely. Suddenly, boldly and courageously. In black pea coats, to the hoarse “Polunra!” they had thrown the Germans out of the small village and were preparing for the next attack. And the Germans were also preparing. Their reconnaissance, especially aerial reconnaissance, was excellent. Therefore, when the sailors fearlessly attacked again, the Germans met them with dagger fire from machine guns and self-propelled guns. They killed or wounded almost all of the attackers, and several dozen sailors were captured. Later, the Germans collected all the dead and dumped them in a sand quarry into a deep adit. And they fell asleep with an explosion. Demyansk search engines have been looking for this adit for many years. Found.

Every day a careful record of the found fighters is kept. In total, more than 300 Red Army soldiers were found during the entire spring watch

Every day a careful record of the found fighters is kept. In total, more than 300 Red Army soldiers were found during the entire spring watch

About monuments

The Demyansk detachment has a commander. The vast majority of monuments and burials in those places were created by his will and hands. His squad found and buried almost 9,000 dead soldiers - more than a DIVISION!

About beavers

This year's scourge was beavers. Beavers skillfully dammed a small river through which ours advanced in the fall and winter of 1941-1942.

Sharpened

Sharpened

Previously, you could jump over the river, but now you had to seriously overcome it by boat.

Previously, you could jump over the river, but now you had to seriously overcome it by boat.

About everyday life

Chapter two

The enemy in front of the Western Front in January 1942

General assessment of the enemy position at the beginning of January 1942

The 9th and 4th German armies, consisting of fourteen corps, several separate divisions and groups, as a result of the December defeat near Moscow, rolled back to the west under the attacks of the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts. During the retreat, the enemy fought stubborn defensive holding battles, launching counterattacks on a number of sectors of the front with the support of tanks and aircraft.

By the beginning of January, the Germans on their northern wing and in the center, with extraordinary efforts and fierce resistance, managed to stop the offensive of the Western Front troops and occupy an advantageous defensive line. This line ran along the western bank of the Lama, Ruza, Nara rivers to Bashkino (10 km southwest of Naro-Fominsk), inclusive, then went west of Borovsk and Maloyaroslavets to Detchino, descending to the south west of Kaluga.

On its southern wing, the enemy, under pressure from the 50th and 10th armies, retreated in the western and northwestern directions, waging stubborn battles on the intermittent broken line of Zubovo (30 km southeast of Yukhnov), Dolgaya (10 km south of Yukhnov), Yukhnov , Mosalsk, Meshchovsk, Sukhinichi, Maklaki (28 km southwest of Sukhinichi), Klintsy, Belev (legal).

When attacking Moscow, the German command, due to the successful development of the operation, did not provide for the possibility of a deep retreat. According to available data, although deep rear lines were outlined, they were not sufficiently prepared in advance, and at the disposal of the command of the central army group and the commanders of the 9th and 4th armies there were no free reserves that could occupy a new line of defense and take over rolling front.

The small cash reserves during the withdrawal process were used by the German command to restore the situation, but they could not save it. As a result, the enemy was unable to carry out a planned withdrawal and create strong strike groups using reserve units and formations.

Main operational directions and grouping of enemy forces in defense

The most important operational directions for the enemy in the zone of action of the Western Front in the first half of January were the following:

1. Volokolamsk-Gzhatsk direction (against the 1st, 20th and 16th armies) was the most serious and dangerous on the German left wing. Gzhatsk is a junction of routes going to Rzhev, Vyazma, Yukhnov; due to its military-geographical position, it covers the most convenient routes to Vyazma and further to Smolensk. Gzhatsk forms the apex of the triangle of the enemy’s defensive position, the base of which is Rzhev, Vyazma. The capture of the Gzhatsk defense center disrupted the German defensive system and made it possible to bypass the Vyazma resistance center from the north.

2. Mozhaiskoe the direction (against the 5th Army) was important for the enemy, since it led directly to Gzhatsk at the shortest distance.

3. Medynskoye the direction (against the 33rd and 43rd armies) led directly to Yukhnov and made it possible to deeply bypass the Vyazma resistance center from the southeast and south.

4. Yukhnovskoye direction (against the 49th and 50th armies) covered the shortest routes from the east and southeast to Roslavl and Vyazma; it was of great operational importance for the enemy.

5. Sukhinicheskoe the direction (against the 10th Army) was also of serious importance. Sukhinichi is a railway junction where the tracks coming from Smolensk, Roslavl and Bryansk converge, allowing for the transfer of troops and cargo.

In the second half of January, due to the development of the successful offensive of the Western Front troops, the most threatened operational directions for the enemy were:

1. Novoduginskoe(against the 20th Army) - as the shortest direction, which made it possible to cover the Gzhat resistance center from the north. The subsequent withdrawal of the 1st Army from the Western Front (the 1st Army was transferred to the Northwestern Front) undoubtedly influenced the development of the operation of the 20th Army, which alone, having taken over the sector of the 1st Army, was supposed to conduct further offensive on a 35-km front (instead of 20 km). By this time, the enemy had strengthened its defense by introducing new reserves and occupying advantageous positions.

2. Gzhatskoye the direction (against the 5th Army) led directly to Gzhatsk. However, in this direction, with the departure of the 16th Army to the southern sector of the Western Front, the 5th Army's zone of action increased to 50 km (instead of 20 km), which also influenced the course of the further offensive. The enemy, given the importance of this area, significantly strengthened its defense capability by introducing new reserves from deep in the rear.

3. Yukhnovo-Vyazemskoye direction (against the 33rd, 43rd, 49th and 50th armies) made it possible to deeply bypass the Vyazemsky fortified area from the southeast and south. The enemy attached great importance to retaining the Yukhnov resistance center and concentrated units of eight divisions in the Yukhnov area on a 75-km front.

4. Spas-Demenskoye direction (against the 10th Army and the group of General Belov), which threatened a deep detour of the enemy’s Yukhnovo-Vyazma grouping. In this direction, the enemy sought to retain the Sukhinichi stronghold; Subsequently, maneuvering reserve units assembled from different divisions and combined detachments, the Germans stubbornly held the line of defense they occupied, covering the Yukhnov-Roslavl highway.

5. Bryanskoe direction leading to an important junction of paths. In this direction, the enemy fought stubborn battles, trying to gain time, ensure the strengthening of the defensive line in front of the 61st Army and the supply of reserves from deep in the rear.

Typically, the German command distributed its forces in accordance with the importance of a particular operational area. During the December retreat in defensive battles, the bulk of enemy military formations were in the first line.

But by the beginning of January this was no longer observed: a significant number of military formations were withdrawn to the second line. At the same time, there was a slight increase in the total number of formations located in front of the Western Front. If at the beginning of January the 9th and 4th German armies numbered forty-three divisions in front of the Western Front, then by January 15 their number increased to forty-eight.

Depending on the situation, the enemy sought to maneuver along the front and from the depths to provide the most important of the threatened operational directions with the necessary forces.

The operational density of defense was expressed by the following data:

Thus, during January, despite the lengthening of the front line, the average operational density of the defense remained almost the same. The width of the defensive front per first-line division increased from an average of 13 to 18 km; Consequently, there was a decrease in the density of the enemy’s first line of defense. This is explained by two reasons: 1) the enemy on the right wing and in the center retreated to stronger defensive lines; 2) by the end of January the number of reserve divisions increased (from 8 to 15).

The tactical density of the enemy's defense on different sectors of the front was different. In attack directions, German divisions occupied denser areas.

By January 5, the maximum defense density in the Volokolamsk-Gzhatsk and Mozhaisk directions was: one division per 8 km; the minimum - in the Sukhinichi direction - one division for 33 km of the front.

On January 15, the maximum density of defense was in the Yukhnovsky direction: one division per 6 km; in Volokolamsko-Gzhatsky - one division per 8 km; the minimum tactical density is in the Spas-Demen direction - one division per 29 km of front.

By January 25, the maximum tactical density of defense moved to the Novoduginsk direction: one division per 5.8 km; there were no changes at Gzhatsk: one division per 8 km; in the Spas-Demen direction the density remained minimal, but even more sparse: one division per 38 km of front.

The weak strength of the defense front of the southern wing of the 4th German Army allowed the 50th and 10th armies and the group of General Belov to conduct a rapid offensive; there was no continuous front here, as was the case in the north in the 9th Army. The front line was broken and intermittent. During the struggle, the Germans were forced to send up individual units and combined detachments, tearing them out of different divisions and even special units.

The grouping of enemy forces at different stages of the defensive battle was different and depended on the situation at the front and on the importance of the operational direction. Appendix 1 (see at the end of the book) gives the combat schedule of German troops by period. It follows from it that by January 5, the largest enemy groupings were operating in the Volokolamsk-Gzhatsk (13 divisions) and Mozhaisk (10 divisions) directions. On January 15, the most intense were the Volokolamsk-Gzhatsk direction (13 divisions), Mozhaisk - against the 5th Army (7 divisions) and Yukhnovsk (6 divisions). By January 25, large enemy groups were concentrated in the Novoduginsk (9 divisions) and Gzhatsk (11 divisions) directions.

The enemy constantly sought to oppose the right wing and the adjacent part of the center of the Western Front with the largest forces, which made it possible to delay our advance.

This happened due to the fact that the Germans took into account the danger of the right wing of the Western Front overhanging their left wing, as well as the breakthrough that had taken place and the troops of the Kalinin Front entering their rear west of the Rzhev-Sychevka line. Under these conditions, the German command decided to stubbornly hold the area of ​​Rzhev, Gzhatsk, Vyazma, Sychevka.

As can be seen from the combat schedule, the bulk of the defending German troops of the first line were infantry divisions. On January 5, the first line consisted of 25 infantry divisions, on January 15 - 29 infantry divisions, on January 25 - 28 infantry divisions. The basis of the defense of tank divisions were predominantly motorized regiments. In more important operational directions (Volokolamsk-Gzhatsk, Mozhaisk, Sukhinichi) groups of tanks ranging from 15 to 30 were used.

Motorized divisions were used in defense as infantry formations. Army reserve divisions were concentrated at varying depths from the front line and, as a rule, were located in populated areas adapted for defense, as resistance nodes with bunkers, wire fences, ice ramparts, etc. (Gzhatsk, Mozhaisk, Vereya, Yukhnov, Zhizdra ) or as hastily fortified strongholds (Sereda, Porechye, Trinity, Kondrovo, Polotnyany Zavod, Sukhinichi, etc.).

Combat composition of troops and characteristics of enemy divisions

The combat composition of the 9th and 4th German armies on January 5 in operational directions was as follows:

The table shows that the enemy provided the two most threatened operational directions against a large group of armies of the right wing and part of the center of the Western Front (1st, 20th, 16th and 5th Armies) with the strongest grouping of its troops consisting of: 65,700 soldiers (48% of all forces), 463 field guns (47% of field divisional artillery) and 175 tanks (97% of all available tanks).

In the Yukhnovsky direction, the Germans, not having enough forces and means, fought on a broad front, grouping up to 25% of all their forces, except for tanks (3%).

By January 5, units of the 2nd Air Fleet, the 8th Aviation Corps, whose headquarters were located in Smolensk, were operating in front of the Western Front. Aviation combat strength: 270 bombers, 95 fighters, 35 reconnaissance aircraft, 400 aircraft in total.

Until the end of January, there were no sharp changes in the quantitative composition and location of the 8th Aviation Corps. The airfields were mainly located west of the Pogoreloe Gorodishche, Gzhatsk, Yukhnov line. The number of aircraft at the airfields ranged from 8 to 12. Aviation operations were carried out mainly in small groups with the task of covering their retreating troops. At the same time, fascist aviation bombed our units on the front line and conducted reconnaissance of rear targets.

* Only divisional artillery guns are taken into account.

The table shows that in the most threatened Gzhat direction, on a front of 50 km, the enemy concentrated more than a quarter of all infantry and artillery. Despite the increase in the total number of divisions from forty-three (January 5) to forty-nine (January 25), the number of men was reduced due to the losses that the Germans suffered in defensive battles and the subsequent retreat.

By January 25, the enemy had almost the same amount of available artillery and tanks in his troops as he had by January 5; this happened as a result of the transport of several new divisions from the rear and the partial restoration of artillery and tanks lost in battle.

The table also shows that, in comparison with the enemy’s combat strength on January 5, all operational directions, except Novoduginsk, had a small number of tanks by January 25. The operational importance of this direction, as the shortest for deep coverage of Gzhatsk from the north, was clear to the enemy, which is why it was provided by a stronger tank group.

The combat characteristics of the formations of the German army (operating in front of the Western Front), compiled from various sources for January 1942, can be reduced to the following.

Combat characteristics of tank divisions

Tank formations (2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 19 and 20th Panzer Divisions) operated on the Eastern Front from the beginning of the war, except for the 2nd and 5th Panzer Divisions, which were transferred to the Eastern Front in October 1941. During the fighting on the Eastern Front, all tank divisions suffered heavy losses and were repeatedly (two or three times) replenished with people and materiel. Losses in the material part of enemy tank divisions are characterized by the following data: on average, the regular composition of a tank division included from 150 to 200 tanks; with the start of the offensive on Moscow, most tank divisions were almost completely equipped with materiel; as a result of the October-December battles, the total number of tanks in all nine divisions in the first half of January was estimated at 250–300 vehicles. Some of them were at the front, some were sent to the rear for repairs. A brief combat characteristics of tank divisions for the first half of January 1942 is shown in the table.

Brief combat characteristics of enemy tank divisions for the first half of January 1942

These combat characteristics demonstrate:

1) large losses of tank divisions during the October-December battles near Moscow due to crushing blows by the troops of the Western Front;

2) a decline in the combat effectiveness of German tank formations, caused by combat failures and large losses in manpower and materiel.

3) the fact that the German command was forced to use the majority of the tank divisions that still retained combat capability in the defense as infantry units, scattering tanks in small groups in close cooperation with the infantry.

Combat characteristics of motorized divisions

Motorized divisions, despite large losses (from 60 to 70%) in manpower and artillery suffered in previous battles, largely retained their combat effectiveness. In the January battles in various sectors of the defense front of the 9th and 4th German armies, these divisions either occupied a defensive sector or were in reserve.

Combat characteristics of infantry divisions

The vast majority of infantry divisions (thirty-two out of thirty-eight) were transferred to the Eastern Front in late June, July and the first half of August 1941. Six divisions (35, 63, 208, 211, 213 and 216th Infantry Divisions) were transferred to the Eastern Front in December 1941 and early January 1942 from Belgium and France. Of the total, seven infantry divisions were personnel, the rest (thirty-one) were formed in the divisional districts of the Reichswehr for mobilization.

Due to large losses incurred during the war, all divisions changed their personnel several times, which could not but affect their condition. However, the predominant number of infantry divisions still retained their combat effectiveness by the beginning of January. Only individual divisions (52nd, 56th, 197th and 267th Infantry), which suffered heavy losses in previous battles (especially in December 1941), turned out to be incapable of combat.

In addition, the political and moral state and the decline in discipline were influenced by the harsh winter (frost reached 35°), lice, illness, lack of warm clothing, fatigue from war, not always normal food supply, etc. According to the testimony of prisoners, there were cases when the officers, in order not to arouse the discontent of the soldiers, were forced to cancel previously given orders. In individual divisions, in connection with the arrival of reinforcements, officers promised the soldiers that the units operating in the winter (56th Infantry Division, etc.) would be relieved and that the spring offensive would eliminate all difficulties. It must be said that such agitation in January 1942 still had an influence on some part of Hitler’s army. Along with this, in cases of open discontent among the soldiers (197th and 267th Infantry Divisions), severe repression was immediately applied.

Thus, the combat effectiveness of the enemy infantry divisions by the beginning of January was as follows:

It must be added that during the October and December battles of 1941, the disbandment of regiments due to heavy losses was increasingly observed. Individual divisions had two regiments instead of three, and regiments had two battalions.

General nature of enemy defense

The general principles of defense of the 9th and 4th German armies against the troops of the Western Front were basically consistent with the statutory provisions.

Due to winter conditions and the changed nature of hostilities, the formation of enemy defenses had some peculiarities.

When attacking Moscow, the German command outlined a number of defensive lines in its rear. In some places (for example, beyond the Ugra River), reconnaissance noted enemy trench work even before our counteroffensive. By the beginning of January 1942, in the immediate rear of the 9th and 4th German armies, the general contours of the defensive line along the line of Rzhev, Gzhatsk, Vyazma and further to Bryansk had already been determined. The German command tried, hiding behind strong rearguards with tanks, to hold back the pressure of our troops in order to gain a foothold with the main forces on the line of Lama, Ruza, Nara and further on the line of Maloyaroslavets, Sukhinichi, Belev. The defense in the northern sector was partly based in old trenches, ours and the Germans, built during the October battles on both banks of the Lama and Ruza rivers.

From the captured orders for enemy military formations (23rd Infantry Division) it is clear that the positions on Lama and to the south had to be defended to the last man. Hitler gave similar instructions in his order, demanding “to cling to every populated area, not to retreat a single step.”

The defensive line, to which the 9th and 4th German armies clung, on January 5th mainly ran along the western (and in some places along the eastern) banks of the Lama, Ruza and Nara. On its northern wing and in the center the enemy carried out a tough defense; on the southern wing - he conducted holding battles, sometimes turning into counterattacks.

The enemy's defense system during this period was built on the principle of organizing strongholds and resistance centers, the base of which in winter conditions was populated areas. The defensive position of each formation consisted of company strong points and battalion resistance centers with gaps between them. The latter were covered by a system of flanking cross machine-gun fire, fire from mortar batteries and machine gunners; in some places the gaps were filled with snow trenches and snow (watered) ramparts.

The interaction of enemy fire installations in the company strong point system was created by strong machine-gun, automatic and mortar fire in the main directions. A company stronghold generally had two or three platoon defensive areas, and, in turn, each platoon defensive area had two or three firing points. The most poorly protected place of the strong point was the rear.

The depth of a battalion resistance center is 1.5 km, a company strong point is 500–750 m. Enemy infantry divisions occupied 8–10 km in defense in important and dangerous directions; on less threatened ones - from 12 to 15 km. However, there were cases of occupying defenses with a front width of up to 20 km (98, 258, 31st and other infantry divisions). In such cases, such divisions were reinforced with artillery or infantry units from another formation. The above fire system was quite widely supplemented by field-type engineering fortifications.

Firing points were located in stone or wooden buildings adapted for defense, as well as in wood-earth snow points specially built for this purpose and in snow trenches. The vast majority of all enemy structures were light field buildings in design. The enemy widely used heating of dugouts located along the main communication routes. In these dugouts, the Germans with machine guns and machine guns sat until the moment of the attack; when the attack began, they ran out and took up positions in nearby trenches and firing points.

Enemy company strongholds were often located on high ground; the terrain in front of the front line was clearly visible and made it possible to organize good shelling. Firing points were sometimes located on the reverse slopes, at a distance of 150–200 m from the crest of the height, and there were often strong points with all-round fire. The enemy widely used several reserve positions for fire weapons; machine gunners, submachine gunners and individual guns, moving from one position to another, created the impression of a large number of forces on the defenders.

Large settlements and cities were equipped by the enemy as centers of resistance, and the defense system was built on close fire interaction between strongholds. The approaches to resistance centers and the gaps between strong points were covered by a system of barriers. The roads leading to the strong point and resistance center were mined. The Germans widely used mining in defense. Thus, in January, engineering units of the Western Front destroyed over 7,300 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines in different areas of the defensive line. Inside populated areas, mines were installed on streets, squares, public buildings, residential buildings and outbuildings. So, for example, when leaving Naro-Fominsk, the enemy mined a textile factory, the square in front of the Lenin monument, and the workers’ barracks area (100 min); in Medyn, ditches on Kirov Street, barricades and all exits from the city were mined (183 mines).

In the gaps between strong points, a poorly developed wire network, slingshots, inconspicuous obstacles made of smooth wire, wire fences on poles and other types of equipment were used.

The groves located in the depths of the defense turned into anti-tank defense areas (ATD), which were surrounded by a line of trenches and covered by anti-tank defense guns.

In tank-dangerous directions, an anti-tank ditch was sometimes torn off. The enemy often used “surprises” in various forms in defense.

When conducting a defensive battle, the enemy shifted the center of gravity to holding the tactical defense zone, using for these purposes the force of a pre-prepared fire system. With concentrated rifle and machine gun fire, artillery fire, mortars, and machine guns, he sought to destroy the advancing units even before they approached the front line. In the event of a breakthrough of the front line and the invasion of our attacking units into the depths of the defensive zone, the Germans carried out counterattacks with regimental and divisional reserves on the flanks of the tactical breakthrough, striking in the direction of the center of the breakthrough on the front line. When the situation was favorable and the attacking troops were weakened and disrupted, counterattacks were also used in front of the main line of defense. When the attacking units penetrated deeper into the defensive zone and there was a threat of breaking through the tactical zone (6–8 km), a counterattack was launched by corps and army reserves. Thus, the formations of the first line of defense, occupying the defensive zone, exerted the full and utmost strain of forces and means, and only when they were exhausted were deeper reserves brought into action. Behind the first defensive line, 8–10 km away, there was a second one. This defensive line was discontinuous and included individual strongholds or resistance centers, partly occupied by corps reserves.

The third line of defense of the 9th and 4th German armies was located 18–20 km from the front edge. It passed along the line Knyazhye Gory, Shakhovskaya, Sereda, Porechye, Mozhaisk, Vereya, Medyn, Kondrovo, Polotnyany Zavod, Yukhnov; In front of the front of the 50th and 10th armies, the enemy had an intermittent line of defense, fought defensive battles on a wide front and, apparently, did not have a pre-prepared and fortified line.

Settlements such as Shakhovskaya, Sereda, Porechye, Mozhaisk, Kondrovo, Polotnyany Zavod and others were turned into strongholds with snow trenches, light dugouts and bunkers dug between them. The gaps between the strong points (just as in the first line of defense) were covered with flanking fire of all types; in the main, most threatened directions against the 20th, 16th, 5th, 33rd and 49th armies, the enemy erected artificial ice ramparts in places. In the Medyn area, during the retreat, the Germans quite thoroughly destroyed the Maloyaroslavets and Medyn highway; Almost all the bridges were blown up and some were mined. The enemy placed quite a large number of barriers on parallel roads. Settlements east of Medyn (Aduevo, Ilyinskoye, Podsosino, etc.) were fortified as company strongholds. In a significant part of the forests, the enemy managed to block the passages, braid them with wire and mine them. This significantly hampered the actions of our advancing units and required a lot of time, effort and resources to overcome the obstacles.

On this line of defense were located the army reserves of the 9th and 4th German armies: the 106th and 85th infantry divisions, the remnants of the 10th Panzer Division (which was being completed), the 107th and 230th Infantry and the 20th tank division. The first rear main defensive line of the central army group ran along the line of Ostashkov (140 km northwest of Rzhev), Bely, Yartsevo, Yelnya, Bogdanovo, Zhukovo, Bryansk. Field-type fortifications were built on this rear line.

The general defense system in January included the defensive line of Rzhev, Gzhatsk, Vyazma, and Zanoznaya station (30 km north of Kirov). This line was strongly strengthened by a system of strongholds and resistance centers. In the Gzhatsk area in early January, the reserves of the central army group were concentrated - the 63rd and 255th infantry divisions, located 80–90 km from the front line.

As of January 15, the enemy's general defense system on his northern wing remained almost unchanged. In the center, German troops fought defensive battles on the line Vereya, Polotnyany Zavod, Yukhnov, on the southern wing - at the line Zanoznaya station, Olshanitsa, Zikeevo, Melekhova, Fedinskoye, Mtsensk.

By this time, the defense was already a more strengthened and developed system of strongholds and resistance centers.

The German command, having set itself the task of holding the triangle of Rzhev, Gzhatsk, Vyazma at all costs, feverishly erected field-type fortifications here and concentrated troops of the 3rd and 4th tank groups and separate infantry divisions (5th, 7th and 9th Army Corps). By mid-January, the enemy strengthened its resistance by increasing the number of first-line divisions, trying to delay the ever-increasing pressure of the armies of the Western Front.

By January 25, the overall defense system of the 9th and 4th German armies was an even more developed network of fortifications. The divisions of the first line fought stubborn defensive battles at the line Vasilyevskoye (12 km southeast of Pogoreloye Gorodishche), Tresely, Batyushkovo station, Azarovo, Vyazischa, Koshnyaki station, Pluskovo (25 km southwest of Kondrov), Yukhnov, Zimnitsy (6 km southwest east of Fomin), Podpisnaya station (7 km southwest of Kirov), Sukhinichi, Polyudovo (10 km northeast of Zikeev), Ktsyn, Ploskoe, south of Belev and further to Mtsensk.

On their northern wing and partly in the center, the Germans managed, relying on a more developed system of strongholds and resistance centers, to delay the further advance of the 20th, 5th and 33rd armies. This was also facilitated by the fact that the right wing of the Western Front allocated part of its forces to another direction. The total length of the defense line of the 9th and 4th German armies increased by almost 150 km compared to the beginning of January, but the enemy managed to bring up new reserve divisions, pull individual units from the front and create quite large reserves in the main, most threatened operational directions, especially strong in the Gzhat direction (four infantry, one motorized and one tank divisions).

The 197th Infantry Division, as having lost its combat capability, was withdrawn to the Gzhatsk area to be put in order. The remnants of the 52nd and 56th Infantry Divisions occupied secondary sectors and were incorporated into other divisions; The 267th Infantry Division was withdrawn to the Vyazma area for recruitment.

On their southern wing against the 10th and 61st armies, the Germans continued to conduct holding battles along a broad front. In the Sukhinichi area, the enemy’s Zhizdra group consisting of the 208th Infantry Division, the 35th Tank Regiment (4th Tank Division) and the 691st Column (up to an infantry battalion) fought stubborn battles, trying to break through to join the Sukhinichi garrison.

The operational structure of the German defense was:

1) a tactical defense zone with a total depth of 6 to 8 km (sometimes 10 km); it included divisional and corps reserves, the latter forming at the same time the second line of defense;

2) a strip of army reserves 18–20 km from the front line; this zone constituted the third line of defense and was a combination of strong points and resistance nodes in fire communication;

3) a strip of army group reserves 60–80 km from the front line, which was also strengthened by an intermittent system of strong points and engaged in military formations in the most important directions;

4) and finally, in the area of ​​the first rear defensive line (the area east of Smolensk), usually at the junction of a well-developed road network, at a distance of 150–200 km from the battle line, a front reserve was located.

However, it must be borne in mind that the Germans had few reserves, and essentially everything was based on the defense of the tactical zone.

Communication routes

By the beginning of January 1942, the enemy, through great effort, managed to convert part of the railways to the European gauge. In the zone of action of the 9th and 4th German armies, both tracks were changed on the Minsk-Smolensk-Vyazma line, one track was changed on the railway sections: 1) Vyazma-Mozhaisk, 2) Smolensk-Roslavl-Bryansk, 3) Bryansk-Orel .

However, to operate these lines, it was necessary to transfer not only rolling stock from Germany, but also railway workers. The delivered rolling stock, which was structurally very outdated and worn out, was very diverse: the locomotives serving the tracks were predominantly German, while the majority of the rolling stock was assembled from occupied European countries.

The capacity of the rebuilt roads is small: on double-track railways it did not exceed 20–25 pairs of trains per day, on single-track railways - about 15 pairs of trains. The reasons lie in the rather low technical condition of these roads, in the shortcomings of the bridges built, in the lack of interstation communications, traction equipment, power plants and water supply. In addition, frequent partisan raids had an effect, which is why in a number of areas train traffic was carried out for less than a day.

There were enough highways and dirt roads in the front line of the German armies.

The main rear routes were: 1) Mozhaisk-Gzhatsk-Vyazma-Smolensk, 2) Maloyaroslavets-Medyn-Yukhnov-Roslavl, 3) Orel-Bryansk-Roslavl-Smolensk.

The maneuver of troops along the front was ensured by the following routes: a) Rzhev-Zubtsov-Gzhatsk-Yukhnov-Sukhinichi-Zhizdra; b) Rzhev-Vyazma-Mosalsk-Meshchovsk-Lyudinovo; c) Sychevka-Dorogobuzh-Yelnya-Roslavl.

During the withdrawal of German troops, motor transport was largely used in the front line, despite the great difficulties of operating it in winter, the lack of fuel and the huge losses of trucks.

German command plan

The operational situation of the German troops in January was difficult. The German command tried by all means to restore order to the retreating troops and delay the advance of the Red Army troops. Hitler gave the following instructions in his order:

“To cling to every populated area, not to retreat a single step, to defend until the last bullet, until the last grenade, this is what the current moment requires of us.

Every settlement we occupy must be turned into a stronghold. Surrendering it to the enemy should not be allowed under any circumstances, even if it is bypassed by the enemy.

If, nevertheless, by order of the higher command we must abandon the point, it is necessary to burn everything to the ground and blow up the furnaces.”

To strengthen the 9th and 4th German armies, the following were transferred from France: in December - the 16th Infantry Division, in January - the 208th, 211th and 213th Infantry Divisions. These divisions had a shortage of officers, poorly trained contingents of soldiers and a shortage of weapons. In addition to the divisions transferred from the deep rear, front-line reserves (63rd and 255th infantry divisions) and individual units removed from other sectors were brought in. These reserves were used to restore the situation in operational areas threatened by the Germans. In addition, the remnants of individual divisions (52, 56, 197 and 267th) were hastily consolidated into regiments, the remnants of regiments into battalions and merged into more preserved formations.

The remaining materiel of the tank divisions was partially used at the front, and partially transferred to the rear for immediate restoration.

Along the way, groups of reservists were hastily sent up from the rear to staff the most battered divisions, but which still retained a certain combat effectiveness. During the battle, consolidated detachments and groups were created (groups of Chevalieri, Kuno, etc.).

At the beginning of January, the plan of the German command included the task at all costs to stop the further retreat of the exhausted and bloodless units of the 9th and 4th German armies, pressed by the Kalinin and Western fronts, to take a convenient defense and gain time to prepare the defensive line of Rzhev, Gzhatsk, Vyazma, Zanoznaya, Bryansk. The enemy made extensive use of individual pockets of resistance (Yukhnov, Sukhinichi) in the most important threatened directions and waged persistent holding battles on other sectors of the front.

The greatest concentration of retreating fascist troops was observed in the area of ​​Sychevka, Gzhatsk, Vyazma, as well as in the Yukhnov area.

Conclusions

1. The general position and condition of the German troops before the Western Front in January 1942 were unfavorable for them. Having suffered heavy losses, the enemy was no longer capable of active operations. The initiative for action was in the hands of the Red Army.

2. In the January battles, the enemy, taking into account the threat of enveloping both flanks, tried to hold on to a number of intermediate lines on his northern wing and in the center, withdrawing his main forces in a westerly direction, initially to the line of the Lama, Ruza, Nara rivers, and then to the Rzhev line , Gzhatsk and further south. On its southern wing, the enemy sought to prevent our units from reaching the Maloyaroslavets-Roslavl highway in order to ensure the withdrawal of their main forces.

It should be noted that, despite the difficult conditions of the struggle, the enemy, through enormous exertion of forces and means, maneuvering individual formations and units, by drawing up reserves from the deep rear, finally, at the cost of heavy losses in manpower and materiel, managed to restore the combat effectiveness of their troops and for quite a long period of time to secure the line along Lama, Ruza and further south.

Thus, the enemy gained about three weeks of time and brought the Rzhev, Gzhatsk, Yukhnov line into a stronger defensive state.

3. Due to the large losses suffered by the 9th and 4th German armies in December - January, and insufficient reinforcements, the German command was forced to resort to disbanding individual regiments and reducing some divisions to two-regiment, and regiments from three-battalion to two-battalion. However, the width of the troops' combat sectors remained almost unchanged, which could not but lead to a general weakening of the defense.

In addition, by the beginning of January, German divisions and regiments, in terms of organization and staffing, had long been no longer comparable to those full-blooded divisions that treacherously invaded the USSR in June 1941. The troops of the 9th and 4th German armies, instead of the required 300,000 soldiers, had about 142,000 soldiers in combat strength. The situation with the material part of the tank divisions and artillery was even worse: in eight tank divisions, instead of 1,350 tanks, already in the first half of January there were still only 262 tanks. Finally, the divisional artillery, instead of 1960 guns, consisted of 979 guns. This means that the 9th and 4th German armies suffered losses of 50 to 56% in infantry and artillery during previous battles. Tank divisions lost 61.5% of their tanks. At the end of January, as a result of difficult defensive battles for the enemy and a large number of frostbite, losses in manpower and materiel increased even more.

4. The political and moral state of the German troops before the Western Front in January was characterized by the following data;

a) the difficult operational situation created for the Germans at the front;

b) large losses suffered by German troops as a result of the withdrawal from Moscow;

c) severe winter with frosts reaching 30–35°; lack of supply of warm uniforms to the troops, lice infestation, exhaustion, fatigue, undermining faith in a quick German victory.

All this led to a decrease in the combat effectiveness of German troops.

WESTERN FRONT,

1) the operational-strategic unification of the Russian army in the western strategic direction during the 1st World War. Formed on August 4(17), 1915 as a result of the division of the North-Western Front into two - Northern and Western. The Western Front at various times included the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 10th armies. In August - October 1915, front troops fought heavy defensive battles for Vilna (now Vilnius), eliminating the breakthrough of the 1st and 6th cavalry corps of German troops in the area of ​​​​the city of Sventsyany. In the spring of 1916, troops of the Western Front carried out an offensive operation in the area of ​​​​Dvinsk and Lake Naroch. During the June offensive of 1917, the troops of the Western Front, having occupied the first position of German troops in the Vilna region, under the influence of the Bolsheviks [by October 1917 there were about 21.4 thousand members of the RSDLP (b) and over 27 thousand sympathizers in the front troops] refused to continue the offensive and returned into their trenches. On October 27 (November 9), 1917, the Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC) of the Western Regions and the Front was created on the Western Front. The Military Revolutionary Committee removed the front commander, Infantry General P. S. Baluev, loyal to the Provisional Government, and appointed Lieutenant Colonel V. V. Kamenshchikov in his place. The congress of representatives of the front troops on November 20 (Z.12), 1917 elected the Bolshevik A.F. Myasnikov as commander of the troops of the Western Front. At the beginning of December 1917, the demobilization of troops on the Western Front began. Despite this, in February 1918 his troops (about 250 thousand people) took part in repelling the offensive of German troops in the RSFSR. Since 29.3.1918, the Western section of the curtain detachments, formed by the RVSR to defend the demarcation line in the western direction from a possible invasion of German troops, was operatively subordinate to the command of the Western Front. Disbanded on April 18, 1918, about 15 thousand people from the front joined the ranks of the Red Army.

Commanders: Infantry General A. E. Evert (August 1915 - March 1917), Cavalry General V. I. Gurko (March - May 1917), Lieutenant General A. I. Denikin (May - June 1917), General Lieutenant P. N. Lomnovsky (June - August 1917), Infantry General P. S. Baluev (August - November 1917), Lieutenant Colonel V. V. Kamenshchikov (November 1917), A. F. Myasnikov (November 1917 - April 1918 ).

2) The operational-strategic unification of the Red Army in the western and northwestern strategic directions during the Civil War of 1917-1922 in Russia. Formed in accordance with the directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army I. I. Vatsetis on February 19, 1919 on the basis of the field control of the Northern Front. The Western Front at various times included the 3rd, 4th, 7th and 12th, 1st Cavalry, Western (1Z.3-9.6.1919 - Belarusian-Lithuanian, from 9.6.1919 - 16th) and Estonian armies, Mozyr Group of Forces, Army of Soviet Latvia (from 7.6.1919 - 15th Army) and the Dnieper Military Flotilla. The troops of the Western Front conducted military operations on a front stretching over 2 thousand km: against the armed formations of the White movement and Entente troops in the Murmansk direction; against Finnish troops - in the Petrozavodsk and Olonets directions and the Karelian Isthmus; against the troops of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian bourgeois governments, the White armies, German and Polish troops in the Baltic states and Belarus. Under pressure from superior enemy forces, the troops of the Western Front were forced to retreat from the Baltic states by July 1919. In the July Operation of 1920, troops of the Western Front defeated the main forces of the Polish North-Eastern Front. During the Warsaw operation of 1920, front troops reached Warsaw, but were defeated and were forced to withdraw from Poland. Troops of the Western Front participated in the suppression of the Kronstadt uprising of 1921.

8.4.1924 The Western Front was transformed into the Western Military District.

Commanders: D. N. Nadezhny (February - July 1919), V. M. Gittis (July 1919 - April 1920), M. N. Tukhachevsky (April 1920 - March 1921, January 1922 - March 1924), I. N. Zakharov (March - September 1921), A. I. Egorov (September 1921 - January 1922), A. I. Kork (March - April 1924), A. I. Cook (April 1924).

3) Operational-strategic unification of Soviet troops in the western strategic direction during the Great Patriotic War. Formed on June 22, 1941 on the basis of the Western Special Military District as part of the 3rd, 4th, 10th and 13th combined arms armies. Subsequently, the Western Front at various times included the 5, 11, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 39, 43, 49, 50, 61, 68th combined arms , 1st Shock, 10th and 11th Guards, 3rd and 4th Tank, and 1st Air Armies. Front troops in 1941 participated in the strategic defensive operation in Belarus, in the Battle of Smolensk 1941, in the Battle of Moscow 1941-42.

During the Rzhev operations of 1942-43, troops of the Western Front, together with troops of the Kalinin Front, liquidated the enemy bridgehead on the left bank of the Volga in the Rzhev region (July - August 1942) and the Rzhev-Vyazma ledge in the defense of German troops (March 1943). In July - August 1943, the troops of the left wing of the front during the Battle of Kursk 1943, together with the troops of the Bryansk and Central Fronts, participated in the Oryol strategic operation to eliminate the enemy’s Oryol group. At the same time, the main forces of the Western Front, taking advantage of the advantageous enveloping position, in August - September, together with the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, carried out the Smolensk operation 1943. At the end of 1943 - beginning of 1944, front troops, advancing in the Vitebsk and Orsha directions, reached the eastern regions of Belarus. 24.4.1944 The Western Front, based on the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command dated 12.4.1944, was renamed the 3rd Belorussian Front, and 2 of its armies were transferred to the 2nd Belorussian Front.

Commanders: Army General D. G. Pavlov (June 1941); Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko (June - July 1941); Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko (July - September 1941); Lieutenant General, from September 11, 1941 Colonel General I. S. Konev (September - October 1941 and August 1942 - February 1943); Army General G.K. Zhukov (October 1941 - August 1942); Colonel General, from August 27, 1943, Army General V. D. Sokolovsky (February 1943 - April 1944); Colonel General I. D. Chernyakhovsky (April 1944).

In German military-historical literature, the Western Front refers to the areas of combat operations of German troops in Western Europe against British, French and American troops in the 1st and 2nd World Wars.

Lit.: Military personnel of the Soviet state in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. (Reference and statistical materials). M., 1963; Directives of the High Command of the Red Army (1917-1920): Sat. documents. M., 1969; Directives of the command of the fronts of the Red Army (1917-1922): Sat. documents: In 4 vols. M., 1971-1978; Strokov A. A. Armed forces and military art in the First World War. M., 1974; History of the First World War. 1914-1918: In 2 vols. M., 1975; History of the Second World War. 1939-1945. M., 1975-1977. T. 4-8; Rostunov I.I. Russian Front of the First World War. M., 1976; Civil war in the USSR: In 2 vols. M., 1980-1986; Red Banner Belarusian Military District. 2nd ed. M., 1983; Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections: In 2 volumes, 13th ed. M., 2002; Fronts, fleets, armies, flotillas of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945: Directory. M., 200Z.

SOUTHWESTERN FRONT. MOSCOW. 1942

Abstract: Southwestern Front. Voronezh - Valuiki - Olkhovatka. Voronezh on the eve of the occupation and bombing. Rossosh. Uryupinsk. Stalingrad. Return to Moscow. The situation at the front. Eyewitness accounts. Meetings with Kokkinaki, Molokov. Pogosov's story about Arkhangelsk and caravans. Voronezh completed. Maikop has been delivered. Editorial life.

Notebook No. 20–05/19/42–08/19/42

8 WESTERN TANTRISM It must not be forgotten that MacGregor Mathers appeared twice at the trial to give evidence against Crowley. As in the first case, when he unsuccessfully tried to obtain a court injunction against the publication of the third issue