On September 1, 1939, Germany began the war against Poland. This day is considered the beginning of World War II. Polish troops were quickly defeated, the government fled the capital. On September 17, 1939, Soviet troops entered the eastern regions of the Polish state. The USSR included the lands of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. The area of the city of Vilna (Vilnius), captured at one time by Poland from Lithuania, was transferred by the USSR to the Lithuanian Republic.
It turned out that a short blow to Poland from first the German army and then the Red Army was enough for nothing to remain of this ugly brainchild of the Treaty of Versailles.
On September 28, 1939, immediately after the completion of military operations in Poland, Ribbentrop and Molotov signed a friendship and border treaty in Moscow and new secret protocols, which clarified the spheres of interest of the two countries (in exchange for a number of regions of Eastern Poland, Germany “ceded” USSR Lithuania).
It was not Germany that attacked France and England, but France and England that attacked Germany, taking responsibility for the current war.
Soviet-Finnish War (November 1939 - March 1940).
The Soviet-Finnish border ran only 32 km from Leningrad, which created the danger of the city being quickly captured in the event of war. The USSR invited Finland to transfer to it a small part of the Karelian Isthmus and a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland. In exchange, the Finns were offered large territories of the USSR, including the city of Petrozavodsk. Finland's refusal to sign a mutual assistance treaty with the USSR (according to which it was planned to create Soviet military bases on Finnish territory) was declared an act indicating the hostility of the intentions of the Finnish leadership.
In response to this, the USSR announced denunciation non-aggression treaty with Finland. On November 30, the Red Army began military operations against Finnish troops. However, the Finns put up vigorous resistance. Soviet troops suffered huge losses and were stuck in deep waters for a long time. echeloned the fortification system of the so-called Mannerheim Line on the Karelian Isthmus. The start of the USSR's war against Finland was perceived in the world as an act of aggression. The Soviet Union, recognized as an aggressor state, was expelled from the League of Nations.
Western powers provided economic and military assistance to Finland. It was even planned to land troops of Western countries on its territory to fight the Red Army. Meanwhile, in February 1940, the Red Army, taking into account the lessons of the first offensive, undertook a new, more successful advance at the front, breaking through the Mannerheim Line. Finland sued for peace. In March, a peace treaty was signed in Moscow. As a result, all territorial claims of the USSR to Finland were satisfied. The Finnish military campaign led to serious losses in the Red Army: according to incomplete data, the number of killed, missing, or died from wounds and disease exceeded 131 thousand people. The war not only led to the international isolation of the USSR, but also seriously undermined the prestige of the Red Army. Hitler considered that she was unable to conduct effective combat operations in a modern war. But conclusions from the war were also drawn in Moscow. K.E. Voroshilov was removed from the post of People's Commissar of Defense, and his place was taken by S.K. Tymoshenko. Measures were taken to strengthen the country's defense.
From the act of receiving the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR S.K. Timoshenko from K.E.Voroshilova
The main shortcomings in troop training are:
1) Low training of middle command personnel... and especially poor training of junior command staff...
4) Extremely poor training of military branches in interaction on the battlefield... artillery does not know how to support tanks; aviation does not know how to interact with ground troops...
USSR and Baltic states.
Immediately after the defeat of Poland, the USSR achieved the conclusion of mutual assistance agreements with the Baltic countries - Estonia (September 28), Latvia (October 5) and Lithuania (October 10). The agreements provided for the creation of Soviet naval and air bases on the territory of these countries and the deployment of significant Red Army forces on them. The presence of Soviet troops was used by the USSR to subjugate these former parts of the Russian Empire.
In mid-June 1940, the Soviet government, in the form of an ultimatum, demanded the formation of new governments in the Baltic countries with the participation of communists. Faced with the threat of establishing complete military control, the governments of the Baltic countries agreed to the demands of the USSR. The “people's governments” that emerged in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania soon turned to the Soviet Union with a request for their countries to join the USSR as union republics.
At the end of June 1940, the USSR presented an ultimatum to Romania demanding the immediate transfer to its control of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, captured by Romania in 1918. Romania, after consultations with Germany, was forced to agree. On part of these territories the Moldavian SSR was formed as part of the USSR, more details.
As a result, in less than a year, the western border of the USSR was pushed west by 200-600 km.
Thus, the agreements between the USSR and Germany on the division of spheres of interest were implemented by the fall of 1940. Hitler by this time had managed to conquer France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Norway. Both Stalin and Hitler had no doubt that a military clash between Germany and the USSR was inevitable. In the summer of 1940, on Hitler's instructions, a plan for war against the USSR (Plan Barbarossa) was developed. At the same time, both sides sought to delay the war until they were fully ready for it.
In November 1940, Molotov arrived in Berlin for negotiations with Hitler, having received instructions from Stalin to agree to continue Soviet-German cooperation provided that Bulgaria and the Black Sea Straits were included in the sphere of interests of the USSR. Hitler invited the Soviet Union to join the Tripartite Pact (Germany, Italy, Japan) and promised to expand Soviet spheres of interest to the south at the expense of Iran. The agreement never materialized. In December 1940, Hitler signed the Barbarossa plan, scheduling an attack on the USSR for May 1941. However, in the spring of 1941, German troops took part in military operations in the Balkans (Yugoslavia and Greece were captured). Therefore, the date of the attack on the Soviet Union was moved to June 22.
Through active efforts and the most complex diplomatic combinations, the leadership of the USSR managed to delay the country's entry into the world war for almost two years. However, he failed to fully use this time to prepare to repel aggression.
The implementation of the policy of “appeasement” began with the destruction of the sovereign and independent state of Czechoslovakia on the geographical map of Europe. On September 30, 1938, at the request of Nazi Germany, the leaders of England and France agreed to transfer the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia to Germany. Together with Hitler and Mussolini, Chamberlain and Daladier signed this decision. In accordance with the signed agreement, England, France, Germany and Italy guaranteed new borders for Czechoslovakia, subject to its renunciation of treaties with the USSR and France, as well as the settlement of issues regarding the Polish and Hungarian minorities. Czechoslovakia, whose fate was being decided at this conference, and the USSR, which had a mutual assistance agreement with Czechoslovakia, were not invited.
The day after the signing of the Munich Agreement, Polish troops invaded Czechoslovakia and, according to W. Churchill, Poland “... with the greed of a hyena, took part in the robbery and destruction of the Czechoslovak state,” seizing the Tishin region from it. Hungarian troops occupied Transcarpathian Ukraine in Czechoslovakia.
The conditions under which England and France agreed to sacrifice Czechoslovakia also became known. These were promises by Germany not to attack these Western countries, which were formalized in the Anglo-German Declaration and a similar Franco-German Declaration, which were considered as non-aggression pacts.
Before leaving Munich, Chamberlain met with Hitler and said: “You have enough aircraft to attack the USSR, especially since there is no longer the danger of basing Soviet aircraft on Czechoslovak airfields.” This was a kind of blessing for Hitler in his policy directed against the USSR.
The reprisal against a sovereign country, the betrayal of their Czech friends and allies by England and France had the gravest consequences for Czechoslovakia and the fate of Europe. Munich destroyed the USSR-France-Czechoslovakia treaty system to prevent German aggression in Europe and in its place created conditions for the “canalization” of territorial aspirations to the east, towards the USSR.
In conversations with F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill already during the war, J. Stalin said that if there had not been Munich, there would have been no non-aggression pact with Germany.
Only six months passed after the signing of the Munich agreements, and on March 13, 1939, the “independence” of Slovakia was proclaimed, which immediately turned to Germany with a request to recognize it as an independent state and station German troops on its territory.
The final point in the fate of Czechoslovakia was set on March 15, when German troops entered Prague and the next day the remnants of the once independent state were included in the German Empire under the name “Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.” On March 16, the “guarantor” of Czechoslovakia’s independence, Chamberlain, stated that due to the collapse of Czechoslovakia, the guarantees of the post-Munich borders had lost their force.
If England and France continued to condone Hitler’s aggression, then the USSR, understanding the danger of the emerging international situation, put forward a proposal on March 18, 1939 to convene a conference of six states in Bucharest: the USSR, England, France, Poland, Romania and Turkey to create a “peace front” "against German aggression. Chamberlain rejected the Soviet initiative on the grounds that it was “premature.”
Given the lack of opposition from Western states, Hitler decided to continue his aggressive policy in an eastern direction.
On March 21, Germany demanded that Poland, in an ultimatum, transfer Danzig and the extraterritorial strip through the Polish corridor to the Reich to connect Germany with East Prussia.
On March 22, under the threat of an air attack, the Lithuanian government was forced to sign an agreement with Germany on the transfer of Klaipeda and the surrounding area to Germany. On March 23, Hitler triumphantly arrived in Klaipeda (Memel) on board the battleship Deutschland and greeted the residents of the “liberated” city.
In April, under pressure from public opinion and the parliamentary opposition led by W. Churchill, Chamberlain was forced to begin Anglo-French-Soviet political negotiations to discuss the international situation emerging in Europe.
On April 17, on the first day of negotiations, the USSR made specific proposals to counter Hitler’s expansion, the essence of which boiled down to the following:
The USSR, England and France enter into an agreement for 5-10 years on mutual assistance, including military assistance;
The USSR, England and France provide assistance, including military assistance, to the states of Eastern Europe located between the Baltic and Black Seas and bordering the USSR.
Only three weeks later did London formulate its answer. The USSR was required to unilaterally assume obligations in the event of involvement of England and France in hostilities. No obligations of England and France were envisaged towards the USSR. On May 14, the Soviet government stated that this position of Western countries does not contribute to the creation of a united front of resistance to Hitler's aggression. Nevertheless, the Soviet government proposed holding Anglo-French-Soviet military negotiations in Moscow. On June 23, England and France accepted the Soviet proposal to send their military delegations to Moscow.
The possible rapprochement of England and France with the USSR caused serious concern in Berlin. On July 26, the Soviet Ambassador to Germany Astakhov was offered a program of Soviet-German cooperation in three areas:
Economic sphere - concluding credit and trade agreements;
Respectful political relations in the field of press, science and culture;
Restoring good political relations, including the conclusion of a new agreement that takes into account the vital interests of both sides.
On July 29, the Soviet government gave Germany a completely neutral answer: “Any improvement in political relations between the two countries, of course, would be welcomed.”
On August 12, Anglo-French-Soviet military negotiations began in Moscow. Composition of the delegations: from the USSR - People's Commissar of Defense K. Voroshilov, Chief of the General Staff B. Shaposhnikov, People's Commissar of the Navy N. Kuznetsov, Air Force Commander A. Laktionov, from England - Commandant of Portsmouth Admiral Drake, from France - General Dumenk.
At the beginning of the meeting, K. Voroshilov presented to the heads of the Western delegations his powers to negotiate and sign a military treaty and asked his Western colleagues to present their powers. The delegations of England and France did not have such powers from the governments of their countries.
During the first day of meetings, the Soviet delegation proposed three possible options for joint actions by the armed forces of the USSR, England and France.
The first option is when a bloc of aggressors attacks England and France. In this case, the USSR will field 70% of the armed forces that England and France will send against Germany.
The second option is when aggression is directed against Poland and Romania. In this case, the USSR will field 100% of the armed forces that England and France will field directly against Germany. At the same time, England and France agree with Poland, Romania and Lithuania on the passage of Soviet troops and their actions against Germany.
The third option is when the aggressor, using the territories of Finland, Estonia and Latvia, directs its aggression against the USSR. In this case, England and France must immediately go to war with the aggressor. Poland, bound by treaties with England and France, must oppose Germany and allow Soviet troops through the Vilna corridor and Galicia for military operations against Germany.
K. Voroshilov posed the main question at the negotiations on August 14: will Soviet troops be allowed to pass through Vilna and Polish Galicia for combat contact with the Wehrmacht? If this is not accomplished, the Germans will quickly occupy Poland and reach the USSR border. “We ask for a direct answer to these questions... Without a clear, direct answer to them, it is useless to continue these military negotiations,” he said.
General Dumenk telegraphed to Paris: “The USSR wants the conclusion of a military pact... It does not want to sign a simple piece of paper...”.
Considering the brewing military conflict in Europe, one cannot ignore or fail to evaluate the policy of Poland and its role in the emerging explosive situation. Back on May 11, 1939, on behalf of the Polish government, the Polish Ambassador in Moscow made a statement to V. Molotov, which was a response to the proposal of the Soviet government: “Poland does not consider it possible to conclude a mutual assistance pact with the USSR...”.
On August 18, when less than two weeks remained before the attack on Poland, the ambassadors of England and France in Warsaw asked Polish Foreign Minister Beck to give an answer regarding the passage of Soviet troops and joint military operations. Beck told the ambassadors that Soviet troops “have no military value” and that he “didn’t want to hear about it anymore.” The Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces, Field Marshal E. Rydz-Smigly, in a conversation with the French ambassador, said with military candor: “Poland has always considered Russia, no matter who rules there, as its enemy number one. And if the German remains our enemy, he is still a European and a man of order, while the Russians for the Poles are a barbaric, Asian, destructive and corrupting force, any contact with which will turn into evil, and any compromise will result in suicide.”
In two weeks, the Poles will meet German Europeans on the battlefield, who will establish German “order” in Poland.
While the British and French representatives created the appearance of negotiations, the Soviet government received reliable information about the actual attitude of the British government towards the Moscow negotiations. Thus, on August 3, when the British delegation was still packing its bags, the Soviet government learned that in government circles “the power of the Red Army is regarded low and that England’s war against Germany can be easily won.” Therefore, there is no particular need for England to conclude an agreement with the USSR and negotiations with it should be delayed until November and then interrupted. The secret instruction of the Foreign Ministry to the British delegation at the negotiations in Moscow also became known. Clause 15 reads: “The British Government does not wish to undertake detailed obligations that could tie its hands under any circumstances. Therefore, an attempt should be made to limit the military agreement to as general terms as possible.”
On August 21, due to the lack of a response from their governments, Admiral Drake asked to announce a break in the work of the delegations until they received answers about the passage of Soviet troops. There was no response from the British government. Therefore, the Soviet delegation stated that it regretted the lack of response and believed that responsibility for the prolongation of the negotiations and their interruption fell on the British and French sides.
During the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations in Moscow, London made attempts to come to an agreement with Germany on all the most important international issues. Goering was supposed to conduct negotiations with Chamberlain, and on August 23, a Lockheed A-12 plane from the British special services had already arrived at one of the German airfields for the “eminent guest.” However, in connection with the USSR's agreement to receive Ribbentrop in Moscow, Hitler canceled Goering's agreed visit to London.
The Soviet government's knowledge of Anglo-German behind-the-scenes negotiations was one of the most important factors in deciding to sign a non-aggression pact with Germany. Stalin was not as afraid of aggression from Germany as he was of a conspiracy between Germany and England and a new Munich at the expense of Poland.
The Moscow Anglo-French-Soviet military negotiations in Moscow forced Hitler to intensify his eastern policy. He demanded that Ribbentrop take measures to probe the USSR's position on the possibility of concluding a non-aggression pact. Ribbentrop first made such a proposal to Astakhov on August 3. But the Soviet government rejected it, awaiting the arrival of the Anglo-French delegation and the results of the negotiations. Following Hitler’s instructions, Ribbentrop again, through Astakhov and the German Ambassador to the USSR, Schulenburg, returned to this issue, declaring that England was trying to push the USSR into a war with Germany.
On August 14, when the Soviet delegation in negotiations with Western countries came to the conclusion that they were reaching a dead end, a telegram was sent from Ribbentrop to V. Molotov, which stated that he was ready to go to Moscow to meet with Stalin and solve all problems in space between the Baltic and Black Seas. On August 16, V. Molotov responded to Ribbentrop about the possibility of concluding a non-aggression pact, and Ribbentrop announced his readiness to arrive in Moscow any day after August 18 to sign a non-aggression pact and guarantees to the Baltic republics.
In this regard, we note the lack of results in the negotiations with the Anglo-French delegation, including their reluctance to guarantee the independence of the Baltic countries in the face of possible German aggression.
The negotiation process with Germany was entering the home stretch. On August 19, Germany signed an economic agreement beneficial for the USSR as one of the conditions for the normalization of German-Soviet relations, and the Soviet government agreed to Ribbentrop’s visit to Moscow on August 26-27. But Hitler personally intervened in the negotiation process. On August 21, he sent a telegram to Stalin saying that a crisis could break out in relations between Germany and Poland every day, in which the USSR would be involved. “Therefore,” Hitler concluded, “I once again propose that you receive my Foreign Minister on Tuesday, August 22, or at the latest on Wednesday, August 23.”
After K. Voroshilov's report to I. Stalin about the lack of response from Western governments in the negotiations, Stalin informed Hitler of his agreement to receive Ribbentrop in Moscow on August 22. At the same time, the Soviet government was forced to take into account the available information about the upcoming German attack on Poland on August 26 with the subsequent advance of German troops into the Baltic republics, which already posed a direct threat to the security of the USSR.
Thus, the Soviet government had an alternative: sign the non-aggression pact proposed by Germany and thereby exclude possible cooperation between Germany and England and France against the USSR, or remain in conditions of complete international isolation before Germany attacked Poland, its inevitable defeat, and the entry of German troops into the western USSR border.
Having weighed the position of Western countries and the fierce fighting at Khalkhin Gol, the Soviet government, in the interests of the security of its country, was forced to agree to Ribbentrop’s arrival and the signing of a non-aggression pact. These documents are more often called the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
A military-political assessment of the pact today, when many events that occurred after its signing are known, shows that it provided the USSR with a number of serious political and military advantages, which played an important role in the first unfavorable months of the Great Patriotic War for the Red Army.
Firstly, thanks to the pact, the Red Army was able to advance the front line of defense of the vital political and economic centers of the USSR hundreds of kilometers to the west. Germany was forced to renounce its claims to the Baltic republics, Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Bessarabia and agree to the inclusion of Finland in the sphere of interests of the USSR.
Secondly, the pact allowed us to gain almost two years to prepare the country to repel German aggression in 1941.
Thirdly, the threat of a Japanese attack was eliminated.
Fourthly, Western countries failed to create an Anglo-Franco-German alliance directed against the USSR.
Fifthly, the pact allowed the USSR to restore the historical territory of the Russian Empire and placed the USSR among the great world powers.
The assessment of the pact by political and military leaders and contemporaries of those years is of undoubted interest.
I. Stalin: “If we had not come out to meet the Germans in 1939, they would have occupied all of Poland up to the border. We could not defend Poland because it did not want to deal with us.”
W. Churchill: “In favor of the Soviets, it can be said that it was vitally necessary for the Soviet Union to push the starting positions of the German armies as far west as possible in order to gather forces from all corners of their huge country. If their policy was coldly calculating, then it was in that moment is highly realistic."
Hitler: “Indeed, the Reich government, having concluded a non-aggression pact with Russia, significantly changed its policy towards the USSR: Moreover, it pacified Poland, which means, at the cost of German blood, it contributed to the Soviet Union achieving the greatest foreign policy success for the entire period of its existence.” .
G. Zhukov: “The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Soviet government proceeded from the fact that the pact did not save the USSR from the threat of fascist aggression, but made it possible to use time in the interests of strengthening our defense, and prevented the creation of a united anti-Soviet front.”
The Chief of the German General Staff, Halder, upon learning of the signing of the pact, said: “A day of shame for the German political leadership.”
The head of German military intelligence and counterintelligence, Admiral Canaris: “The Reich has embraced the citadel of communism, forever quarreled with all of Europe, and for this he will be an appendage of the vast Asian Russia, and Hitler will be the satrap of the Kremlin tsar.”
Not all politicians and historians agree with the positive assessment of the pact. Moreover, the attitude towards the pact became a kind of watershed between supporters of strengthening the national security of the Soviet Union on the basis of active foreign policy actions, as was the case in 1939, and supporters of the Western line aimed at weakening the Soviet Union. The Western movement is initiated and receives political and financial support from Western politicians, influential anti-Russian circles, Western media and finds support from some leading domestic political figures, historians, and the media.
On June 2, 1989, the First Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union instructed A. Yakovlev's commission to give "a political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty of August 23, 1939." At the second congress, A. Yakovlev submitted for approval the report of the commission, which was approved by the congress in the following wording: “Item 5. The congress states that the protocols signed with Germany in 1939-1941, both in the method of their preparation and in content, are a departure from the Leninist principles of Soviet foreign policy. The delimitation of the “spheres of interest” of the USSR and Germany and other actions undertaken in them were, from a legal point of view, in conflict with the sovereignty and independence of third countries.” The resolution was adopted unanimously.
If we leave moral assessments aside and take a legal point of view, it should be emphasized that, according to international law, it is possible to recognize an international treaty as illegal or invalid only if the treaty was the result of violence against the state that signed it. As is known, nothing like this happened with the participants in the pact between Germany and the USSR. In addition, the text of the pact did not contain any demands for territorial or political changes addressed to third countries, as was the case in the Munich agreements of 1938.
As we see, criticism of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, begun by the “architects of perestroika” M. Gorbachev and A. Yakovlev, served as the beginning of a revision of the history of the USSR in order to highlight international events of the past in accordance with anti-Soviet historiography under the dictation of Western politicians and ideologists. The first step towards the collapse of the Soviet Union was the justification for the withdrawal of the Baltic republics, which, in accordance with the pact, were “occupied by the USSR.” Not only the results of the diplomatic victory of the USSR in August 1939 were presented, but also the results of Russian history over the past three hundred years.
Critics of the pact argue that it was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that pushed Germany to attack Poland and thereby triggered World War II. There is an opinion that without the signing of a pact between Germany and the USSR, World War II might not have started.
Such statements do not correspond to historical facts. Back on April 3, 1939, Hitler ordered the German command to prepare a plan for the military defeat of Poland. On April 11, the plan was prepared under the code name "Weiss" and reported to Hitler. On April 28, Germany broke the non-aggression pact with Poland and the German General Staff began the final stage of developing operational documents. On June 15, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, General Brauchitsch, signed a directive to attack Poland, and on June 22, Hitler approved the Weiss plan.
On August 22, Hitler gave his last orders to the leadership of the Armed Forces: “First of all,” he said, “Poland will be defeated. The goal is the destruction of manpower... If war even breaks out in the West, we will first of all deal with the defeat of Poland.” Hitler gave these orders at a time when Ribbentrop had not yet arrived in Moscow.
By August 26, the first date for the attack on Poland, all German military preparations were completed, and whether the pact was signed or not, the attack on Poland was predetermined and the Wehrmacht did not need Soviet help to defeat the Polish Armed Forces.
The war with Poland began on September 1, 1939 with massive air strikes and attacks by ground forces.
Foreign and some domestic historians consider September 1 to be the day the Second World War began. If you follow the facts, and not political and ideological predilections, the German-Polish war began on September 1. On September 3, England and France declared war on Germany, but other than a formal declaration of war, no specific actions were taken in accordance with the political and military agreements with Poland. While German troops were wreaking death and destruction in embattled Poland, England and France were fighting a "no war" war, a "strange war" as it came to be known in history, and were careful to avoid any military action against Germany.
Not a single shot was fired on the German-French border, not a single French or English aircraft took off to support the Polish Air Force in Polish airspace or carry out air strikes on military targets on German territory, not a single English or French ship came to assistance to the Polish Navy. France and England stood idle during the weeks when the German war machine destroyed Polish troops and civilians. Poland was thrown by its allies under the tracks of German tanks.
The Soviet government closely monitored the development of the German-Polish military conflict and the approaching complete defeat of the Polish troops and Polish statehood. At the same time, the leadership of the USSR could not help but take into account the historical fact that the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus were not Polish territories, but were torn away from Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Belarus in 1920 as a result of the Soviet-Polish war, which was unsuccessful for Soviet Russia, and were forcibly annexed to Poland, ethnically alien to them.
Thus, 8 million Ukrainians and 3 million Belarusians could have been under German occupation. In addition, by September 15, the military defeat of Poland and the ability of the German army to quickly complete the occupation of all Polish territory and reach the approaches to Kyiv and Minsk did not raise any doubts.
Having information that the Polish government had lost control of the country and left Polish territory, the Soviet government on September 17, 1939 ordered the High Command of the Red Army to cross the Soviet-Polish border and take under protection the lives and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. In that military-political situation, the Red Army entered Poland not on the side of Germany as its ally, but as an independent third force, acting in the interests of the security of the USSR from possible attacks from the West and the protection of the population of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus from German occupation.
According to the “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation” concluded in Moscow on September 28, 1939, the demarcation between the USSR and Germany took place approximately along the so-called “Curzon Line,” defined by the Entente in 1919 as the eastern border of Poland. Former British Prime Minister during the First World War, Lloyd George, wrote in the fall of 1939 that the USSR occupied “...territories that are not Polish and which were taken by force by Poland after the First World War... It would be an act of criminal madness put the Russian advance on the same level as the German advance."
After the destruction of Poland, the Western powers still hoped that the next victim of Hitler's aggression would be the USSR and continued to adhere to the strategy of a “strange war,” as if giving Hitler the “green light” to move to the east and guaranteeing peace in the west. The intensity of the fighting on the Western Front, more precisely, on the western border of Germany, since there was no front, can be judged by German data on losses for almost 8 months: 196 people killed and 356 people wounded. This is, at best, a local border conflict, but nothing like World War II. The “Strange War” confirmed the correctness of the Soviet government’s assessment of the position of England and France - they did not want to fight Germany, but still wanted to involve it in a war with the USSR.
The “Phantom War” ended on April 9, 1940, with the German attack on Denmark and Norway, and it was on this date that World War II began. Let us just note that in this case the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact did not play any role and all the accusations against the USSR that the USSR was to blame for the outbreak of World War II together with Germany are untenable and have one goal - to justify Munich, the policy of “appeasement” and remove the blame from Western countries for supporting the aggressive policy of Nazi Germany, which ultimately led to World War II, and to use the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact to discredit the foreign policy of the USSR in the ongoing anti-Soviet campaign.
To confirm this interpretation of international events of 1939-1940. In the West and in Russia, books are published in large print runs, articles by historians and political figures are published, and serial films are released on television. There is an information war for the minds and hearts of people in a new international situation, characterized by the US struggle for world domination; there is an information attack on our country to prevent the revival of a strong Russia.
The words of the poem “Hearts” by the poet Vasily Fedorov, written by him almost 60 years ago, involuntarily come to mind, but these lines still sound modern today:
Having experienced everything,
We know ourselves
What on days of psychic attacks
Hearts not occupied by us
Without hesitation, our enemy will occupy
He will occupy himself, settling all the same scores,
He will occupy, he will sit down,
Raze us:
Hearts!
Yes, these are heights,
Which cannot be given away.
So the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact did not provide for cooperation between Germany and the USSR in defeating Poland, the pact was not the cause of the “freak war” between Germany, England and France, the pact had nothing to do with the German attack on Denmark and Norway and, therefore, was not cause of World War II. These are the facts of history that refute the accusations against the USSR that are repeated year after year in the anti-Soviet, anti-Russian campaign against the USSR for starting World War II together with Germany.
Abstract on the history of Russia
In 1937 the capitalist world was engulfed in a new economic crisis, which exacerbated all his contradictions.
The main force of the imperialist reaction was the aggressive military side of Germany, Italy and Japan, which launched active preparations for war. The goal of these states was a new redistribution of the world.
To stop the impending war, The Soviet Union proposed creating a collective security system. However, the USSR initiative was not supported. The governments of England, France and the USA, contrary to the fundamental interests of the peoples, made a deal with the aggressors. The behavior of the leading capitalist powers predetermined the further tragic course of events. In 1938, Austria became a victim of fascist aggression. The governments of England, France and the USA did not take any measures to curb the aggressor. Austria was occupied by German troops and incorporated into the German Empire. Germany and Italy openly intervened in the Spanish Civil War, helping to overthrow the legitimate government of the Spanish Republic in March 1939 and establish a fascist dictatorship in the country.
In 1938, Germany demanded that Czechoslovakia transfer to it the Sudetenland, populated mainly by Germans. In September 1938 in Munich, at a meeting of the heads of government of Germany, Italy, France and England, it was decided to tear away the region demanded by Germany from Czechoslovakia.
The head of the British government signed a declaration of mutual non-aggression with Hitler in Munich. Two months later, in December 1938, the French government signed a similar declaration.
In October 1938, the Sudetenland was annexed to Germany. In March 1939, all of Czechoslovakia was captured by Germany. The USSR was the only state that did not recognize this seizure. When the threat of occupation loomed over Czechoslovakia, the USSR government declared its readiness to provide it with military support if it asked for help. However, the bourgeois government of Czechoslovakia, betraying national interests, refused the offered assistance.
In March 1939, Germany separated the port of Klaipeda and the adjacent territory from Lithuania. Impunity for Germany's aggressive actions encouraged fascist Italy, which captured Albania in April 1939.
A threatening situation was also developing on the eastern borders of our country. In the summer of 1938, the Japanese military provoked an armed conflict on the Far Eastern state border of the USSR in the area of Lake Khasan. As a result of fierce battles, the Red Army defeated and drove back the aggressors. In May 1939, militaristic Japan attacked the Mongolian People's Republic in the area of the Khalkhin Gol River, hoping to turn the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic into a springboard for further aggression against the USSR. In accordance with the treaty of friendship and mutual assistance between the USSR and the MPR, Soviet troops acted together with Mongolian soldiers against the Japanese aggressors. After four months of stubborn fighting, the Japanese troops were completely defeated.
In the spring of 1939, at the initiative of the Soviet government, negotiations began between the USSR, England and France on concluding a trilateral mutual assistance pact. The negotiations, which continued until July 1939, ended inconclusively due to the position taken by the Western powers. The governments of England and France also opposed the conclusion of a trilateral agreement on military cooperation directed against Nazi Germany. They sent delegations that were not endowed with the necessary powers to negotiate in Moscow.
At the same time, in the summer of 1939, secret negotiations began between England and Germany on concluding a bilateral agreement on military, economic and political issues.
By August 1939, the stubborn reluctance of the Western powers to take effective measures to curb fascist aggression and their desire to reach an agreement with Germany became obvious.
Under these conditions, the Soviet leadership was forced to agree to Germany’s proposal and sign non-aggression pact. On August 23, 1939, such an agreement was concluded for a period of 10 years. It was signed by the USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov and the German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. The agreement was accompanied by a secret protocol that delimited the spheres of influence of the USSR and Germany in Eastern Europe. According to it, Poland became the German “sphere of interests”, with the exception of the eastern regions, and the Baltic states, Eastern Poland, Finland, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina (part of Romania) became the “sphere of interests” of the USSR, i.e. The USSR actually returned those lost in 1917-1920. territory of the former Russian Empire. The conclusion of the Soviet-German Pact led to the cessation of all diplomatic contacts between England, France and the USSR.
By concluding an agreement with Germany, the Soviet Union destroyed the plans to create a united anti-Soviet front of the imperialist states and thwarted the plans of the instigators of the Munich policy, who sought to accelerate a military clash between the USSR and Germany. As a result of the agreements between the Soviet Union and Germany, the country, due to the territorial increments of 1939-1940, strengthened its strategic position, economic and mobilization capabilities, and won two years of “respite” from the war. The agreements between the USSR and Germany also had negative consequences: the USSR turned into a raw material base for the Reich and supplied its future enemy with strategic resources; ideological work in the country and the army became disoriented; the anti-fascist activities of the Comintern were paralyzed; England and France considered the USSR as a partner of Germany and only after June 22, 1941, began to break down the wall of alienation between future allies in the anti-Hitler coalition.
Introduction
In the early morning of June 22, 1941, German troops invaded the USSR along the entire western border from the Baltic to the Carpathians. Thousands of German guns opened hurricane fire on previously scouted targets. German aviation bombed railway junctions, airfields, naval bases and peacefully sleeping cities. The invasion of the territory of the USSR by enemy troops became a turning point in the life of the entire Soviet people. In one day, all the plans and hopes of tens of millions of people collapsed. A war began, unprecedented in history, far superior to the previous one, “German” or “imperialist”, as it was popularly called, in its lethal force, in the number of equipment involved: tanks, guns, airplanes; by the number of victims: killed, wounded, maimed not only among those fighting on the fronts, but also among the civilian population.
The main task was to save the Fatherland from enslavement, preserve its independence and territorial integrity. Before this, all internal problems receded into the background. In the first hours of the war, when the situation was still unclear, Stalin flatly refused to go on the radio with a message about the German invasion. At noon on June 22, a statement by the Soviet government was made by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov. The statement expressed firm confidence in victory over the treacherous aggressor: “Our cause is just, the enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours." The war that began from the first days received the name of the Great Patriotic War.
Foreign policy situation on the eve of the war. Relations between the USSR and the West
In September 1938, Hitler began to implement his plans for world domination. First, he decided to unite all the lands inhabited by the Germans in one state. In March 1938, German troops occupied Austria. Taking advantage of the passivity of the world community and the support of the German people, who pinned their hopes on Hitler for the revival of the country, the Fuhrer moved on. He demanded that Czechoslovakia hand over the Sudetenland, which was populated predominantly by Germans, to Germany. Both Poland and Hungary put forward territorial claims against Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia could not resist Germany alone, but was ready to fight in alliance with the French and British. However, the meeting in Munich on September 29-30, 1938 between British Prime Minister Chamberlain and French Prime Minister Daladier with Hitler and Mussolini ended in the shameful capitulation of the democratic powers. Czechoslovakia was ordered to give Germany the most important industrially and militarily Sudetenland, Poland - the Cieszyn region, and Hungary - part of the Slovak lands. As a result of this, Czechoslovakia lost 20% of its territory and most of its industry.
The British and French governments hoped that the Munich Agreement would satisfy Hitler and prevent war. In reality, the policy of appeasement only encouraged the aggressor: Germany first annexed the Sudetenland, and in March 1939 occupied all of Czechoslovakia. With the weapons captured here, Hitler could equip up to 40 of his divisions. The German army quickly grew and strengthened. The balance of power in Europe was rapidly changing in favor of the fascist states. In April 1939, Italy captured Albania. In Spain, the civil war ended with the victory of Franco's fascist regime. Advancing further, Hitler forced the Lithuanian government to return to Germany the city of Memel (Klaipeda), annexed by Lithuania in 1919.
On March 21, 1939, Germany presented Poland with a demand for the transfer of Gdansk (Danzig), inhabited by the Germans, surrounded by Polish lands and having the status of a free city guaranteed by the League of Nations. Hitler wanted to occupy the city and build a road to it through Polish territory. The Polish government, given what happened to Czechoslovakia, refused. England and France declared that they would guarantee the independence of Poland, that is, they would fight for it. They were forced to speed up their military programs, agree on mutual assistance, and provide guarantees to some European countries against possible aggression.
In the mid-1930s, realizing the danger of fascism, Soviet leaders tried to improve relations with Western democracies and create a system of collective security in Europe. In 1934, the USSR joined the League of Nations, and in 1935, mutual assistance agreements were concluded with France and Czechoslovakia. However, a military convention with France was not signed, and military assistance to Czechoslovakia, which was offered by the USSR, was rejected, because it was conditioned by the provision of such assistance to Czechoslovakia by France. In 1935, the Seventh Congress of the Comintern called for the formation of a popular front of communists and social democrats. However, after the Munich Agreement, the USSR found itself in political isolation. Relations with Japan have become strained. In the summer of 1938, Japanese troops invaded the Soviet Far East in the area of Lake Khasan, and in May 1939 - into the territory of Mongolia.
In a difficult situation, the Bolshevik leadership began to maneuver, which resulted in dramatic changes in the foreign policy of the USSR. On March 10, 1939, at the XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin harshly criticized the policies of England and France and stated that the USSR was not going to “pull chestnuts out of the fire” for “warmongers,” meaning these states (and not fascist Germany) ). However, in order to calm public opinion in the West and put pressure on Germany, the Soviet government on April 17, 1939 proposed that England and France conclude a Tripartite Pact of mutual assistance in case of aggression. Hitler took a similar step in order to prevent a bloc of Western powers with Russia: he invited them to conclude a “Pact of Four” between England, France, Germany and Italy. The USSR began negotiations with England and France, but only as a smoke screen in order to bargain more with Hitler.
On May 3, 1939, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M.M. Litvinov, who was a supporter of an alliance with Western democrats and a Jew by nationality, was replaced by V.M. Molotov. This was a clear symptom of a change in the emphasis of the USSR's foreign policy, which was fully appreciated by Hitler. Soviet-German contacts immediately intensified. On May 30, the German leadership made it clear that it was ready to improve relations with the USSR. The USSR continued negotiations with England and France. But there was no mutual trust between the parties: after Munich, Stalin did not believe in the readiness of the British and French to resist, they also did not trust the USSR, they were playing for time, they wanted to pit the Germans and Russians against each other. On the initiative of the USSR, on August 12, 1939, negotiations began in Moscow with the military missions of England and France. And here difficulties emerged in the negotiations, especially in terms of taking on military obligations and readiness to send troops against the aggressor. In addition, Poland refused to allow Soviet troops through its territory.
Hitler, on the contrary, expressed a clear readiness to reach an agreement with the USSR, because at that time he needed such a partner. Germany was not yet ready for a big war with the USSR, and Hitler chose the Western option. Back on March 8, 1939, at a secret meeting with the Fuhrer, a strategy was outlined that included the capture of Poland before the fall, and in 1940-1941. - France, then England. The ultimate goal was the unification of Europe and the establishment of fascist domination on the American continent. Therefore, Hitler was interested in a temporary alliance with the USSR.
Stalin made the decision to begin negotiations with Germany at the end of July 1939. However, he did not interrupt contacts with Western countries. Thanks to the efforts of Soviet intelligence, he knew about the plans of Nazi Germany to attack Poland and start a war with England and France; he believed that an agreement with Hitler would delay the USSR’s entry into the war, expand Soviet borders and the sphere of influence of socialism, and carry out a world revolution with the help of military forces. political power of the USSR.
On August 23, 1939, after three hours of negotiations in Moscow, the so-called “Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact” was signed. The negotiations took place in deep secrecy, and therefore the announcement of the signing of a non-aggression pact produced the impression of a bomb exploding throughout the world. The parties also signed a more important document - secret protocols on the division of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe (the existence of the protocols was denied by the Soviet leadership until 1989, their existence was confirmed under Gorbachev by the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR). Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Eastern Poland and Bessarabia were included in the sphere of influence of the USSR. It was a secret, shameful conspiracy with the fascist aggressor to divide Eastern Europe. With the signing of these documents, Soviet foreign policy changed radically, the Stalinist leadership turned into an ally of Germany in the division of Europe. The situation in Europe as a whole changed in favor of Nazi Germany. The USSR helped her remove the last obstacle to an attack on Poland and the start of the Second World War.
The step taken by the Stalinist regime towards rapprochement with Nazi Germany in the desire to delay the start of the war and expand the sphere of its domination was logical for it, but unpromising and disastrous for the country. Retribution for him was inevitable, but it did not follow immediately.
Foreign policy of the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………...3
1. International situation by 1939…………………………………..6
2. Negotiations between the USSR and England and France……………………………...…6
3. “Munich Agreement” of 1938 and the position of the USSR……………….…………..7
4. Rapprochement between the USSR and Germany. Soviet-German Pact of 1939........12
5. Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940. ……………………………..19
6. Relations between the USSR and Sweden……………………………..……………….22
7. The reaction of the USSR to the German-Polish war of 1939…………………….23
8. Accession of the Baltic states to the USSR……………………………………..25
9. Annexation of Bessarabia to the USSR………………………………………………………28
10. Improving Soviet-Turkish relations……………………………..29
11. Relations between the USSR and Japan……………………………………………...30
12. Conclusion of an economic agreement between the USSR and Germany....31
13. Increasing tension in Soviet-German relations in 1940……………………………………………………………………………….32
14. Soviet-German negotiations in the fall - winter of 1940-1941.....32
15. USSR and Germany before the attack…………………………………...33
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………35
Bibliography……………………………………………………………..38
Applications…………………………………………………………………………………...39
I . Introduction
The foreign policy activities of the USSR in the pre-war years were built not only on the basis of internal tasks, but also depending on the state and development of international relations.
The current situation in Europe left no doubt that Hitler's Germany, strengthened as a result of its conquests, would try to attack the Soviet socialist state. Under these conditions, the foreign policy of the USSR faced the most important tasks: to prolong peace for our country as much as possible, to prevent the spread of war and fascist aggression. It was also necessary to create favorable international conditions in the event of a German attack on the USSR. This meant seeking preconditions that could, on the one hand, ensure the creation of an anti-fascist coalition, and on the other, deprive Germany of its possible allies in the anti-Soviet war.
Despite all the differences in approaches to tactics in foreign policy, the general trend of international development in the early 30s. was correctly defined by the Soviet leadership: the aggravation of the international situation, the growing forces of revanchism and war, the movement of the world towards a new war. What was the country's foreign policy practice like under these conditions? There is active activity aimed at combating fascist aggression, creating a system of collective security in Europe, and developing international relations based on a policy of peaceful coexistence. The implementation of this line of foreign policy was the establishment in 1933-1935. diplomatic relations of the USSR with Spain, Uruguay, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Albania, Belgium, Luxembourg and Colombia, which for more than 25 years did not recognize our country. A special place in the international events of these years is occupied by the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the USA in November 1933. All this testified to the strengthening of the international authority of the USSR and created more favorable conditions for intensifying its foreign policy activities.
In 1934, the USSR joined the League of Nations. As a result of negotiations between French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M.M. Litvinov, a draft Eastern Pact was developed, according to which the USSR, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Finland form a collective security system. However, the Eastern Pact as a system of collective security was not implemented due to the opposition of England and the right-wing reactionary circles of France.
In March 1936, a treaty was concluded with the Mongolian People's Republic, and in August 1937, a non-aggression treaty was concluded between the USSR and China.
A serious factor that complicated the international situation in these years was the signing of the Munich Agreement of 1938 between Germany, Italy, France and England, according to which Czechoslovakia lost its independence.
In the current conditions, Soviet diplomacy sought, on the one hand, to implement a plan for collective security in Europe, to prevent the creation of a broad united anti-Soviet front, to exercise maximum caution and not succumb to enemy provocations, and on the other, to take all necessary measures to strengthen the country’s defense.
The policies of countries before the outbreak of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War are one of the most controversial and controversial issues in the history of the CC century, and despite the large number of studies and publications on this topic, it still remains the subject of heated debate. This is the reason for the high relevance of this study.
Purpose This work is an analysis of the foreign policy of the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, which determines the formulation of the following tasks :
1. Give a general description of the international situation by 1939;
2. Analyze the relations of the USSR with the key players in the foreign policy arena of that period - England, France, the USA, Germany and Japan.
3. Consider how the relations between the USSR and small countries developed during the same period (Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Sweden, the Baltic countries, Finland, Romania, Turkey).
Subject of research is the nature of the foreign policy activities of the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War.
Chronological framework The works cover the period from 1935, which is associated with the beginning of the aggravation of the political situation in Europe, to June 22, 1941, when the Great Patriotic War began.
Theoretical and methodological basis The research was based on the basic scientific principles of historicism, objectivity and dialectics, as well as special methods of historical science, such as the problem-chronological, logical method and the method of problem analysis of documents.
Sources.
One of the main sources of materials for the work was the monograph by G.L. Rozanov "Stalin-Hitler. Documentary sketch of Soviet-German relations 1939-1941", published in 1991.
His area of focus is diplomatic relations between Moscow and Berlin. The researcher constantly emphasizes the insincerity of the German side, playing a double game with the USSR and Western democracies, which was especially evident during 1939. He explains the Soviet agreement to conclude a non-aggression pact by the hopelessness of the situation when Great Britain and France practically sabotaged negotiations on military cooperation with Moscow. The author tries not to indicate the facts of Soviet-German cooperation and pays little attention to Molotov’s visit to Berlin. In his opinion, the main goal of the German leadership was to misinform the Kremlin about Germany’s future plans. As a result, the Soviet leadership incorrectly determined the timing of a possible war with Germany, and the country was not ready for fascist aggression in June 1941.
M. I. Semiryaga gives us a completely different view of the nature of Soviet-German relations in his work “Secrets of Stalin’s Diplomacy,” which was published in 1992.
He believes that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was characterized by a desire to expand the socialist base. Therefore, Stalin was interested in Soviet-German rapprochement. The desire for this was allegedly clearly manifested in his speech at the XVIII Party Congress in March 1939. Cooperation between Moscow and Berlin in the political, economic and military fields was fruitful for both sides until their interests collided in southeastern Europe. To the question of why the fascist attack on the USSR was unexpected for the Kremlin, Semiryaga does not give a definite answer, and in general, he chose not to pay much attention to this problem.
Also in the work were used collections of documents and materials (USSR - Germany, 1939-1941. Document and materials on Soviet-German relations; documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War. 1937-1939) and materials from periodicals (Dongarov A.S. .. Baltic States. Fifty years ago, L.I. Gintsberg, Soviet-German Pact: concept and its implementation), shedding light on the controversial issues of the historical period under consideration.
Work structure determined by goals and objectives. It consists of an introduction, a main part represented by 15 paragraphs, a conclusion, a list of references and applications. The total volume of work is 41 pages.
II. Main part
At the end of 1938, the inevitability of a new war in Europe became completely obvious. Italy's attack on Ethiopia in 1935, German-Italian intervention against Republican Spain and their assistance to the Francoists in 1936-1938, the Anschluss of Austria in 1938, the aggressive policy of Japan - an ally of Germany and Italy - in the Far East, the Munich Agreement of 1938 - all these acts of aggression indicated the imminence of a new large-scale armed conflict. In this situation, most European countries, trying to protect themselves, are playing a “double game”, trying to simultaneously conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany and create a “security system” together with the USSR.
The Soviet Union was no exception in this situation either. It must be said that he had the prerequisites for rapprochement with both England and France, and with Germany. The first include, firstly, the participation of the USSR in various peace pacts and conventions of the 20s - 30s along with England, France and the USA, the Soviet-French and Soviet-Czechoslovak treaties on mutual assistance (1935); secondly, the aggressive policy of the Triple Alliance countries towards the Union. Germany and Japan concluded Anti-Comintern pact in 1936, in addition, Japan waged military operations against the USSR (which began in the summer of 1938, they continued until the autumn of 1939; fierce battles took place in August 1938 in Eastern Siberia in the area of Lake Khasan, and then in Mongolia, where several months of ground and air battles in the Khalkhin Gol area ended in victory for the Soviet troops; a truce was concluded on September 15, 1939). On the other hand, December 6, 1938 France and Germany signed in Paris Non-aggression pact; in 1938, the Munich Agreement and the division of Czechoslovakia took place without the participation of the USSR; all this could be regarded as an attempt by Western countries to direct German aggression against the Soviet Union. Ultimately, this led to the fact that the USSR, like other states, pursued a dual policy.
In the spring of 1939, the USSR negotiated European guarantees and the creation of a security system with France and Great Britain. The latter tried in every possible way to delay the negotiations in order to clarify Germany’s intentions and at the same time prevent the Soviet-German rapprochement. The USSR agreed to join the declaration of "unconditional guarantees" provided by France and Great Britain to Poland, but Poland rejected the possibility of any agreement that would allow the presence of Soviet troops on its territory. April 17, 1939 The Soviet Union proposed that England and France conclude a tripartite agreement, the military guarantees of which would apply to the entire Eastern Europe from Romania to the Baltic states, but Western countries still avoided resolving this issue. On June 29, Pravda published an article sharply criticizing the policies of the British and French governments; two days later they agreed to include the Baltic countries in the scope of the guarantees, subject to similar guarantees in relation to Switzerland, Holland and Luxembourg. However, the negotiations failed again: the states mentioned in the treaty did not want such “guarantees.” The British and French agreed to discuss the military aspects of the upcoming agreement with the USSR, and for this they sent their representatives to Moscow. But the delegates who arrived on August 11 did not have sufficient authority to negotiate on such important issues, and on August 21, the Soviet side postponed the negotiations to a later date.
The project never became a real agreement, since neither party showed interest, often putting forward obviously unacceptable conditions. In general, the head of the French government, E. Daladier, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, J. Bonnet, were supporters of compromise with Germany.
3. “Munich Agreement” of 1938 and the position of the USSR
Prerequisites for the signing of the Munich Agreement of 1938 The policy of pandering to the aggressor on the part of London and Paris instilled in Hitler and his like-minded people the confidence that from now on Nazi Germany was allowed everything. The liquidation of the Czechoslovak state became for the Third Reich just another point in its plans to conquer “living space.” “My firm decision is the destruction of Czechoslovakia by military attack in the near future,” Hitler said in the directive on the Thrun plan (capture of Czechoslovakia), signed by him on May 30, 1938.
His “firmness” was well founded. As early as 1937, Lord Halifax assured Hitler that the British ruling circles showed full understanding of Germany's "legitimate" territorial claims in relation to Danzig, Austria and Czechoslovakia. He only expressed the wish that possible changes in this part of Europe "would be brought about through peaceful evolution" in order to "avoid methods that could cause further upheavals, which neither the Fuhrer nor other countries wanted." This passive position of the Western powers completely suited the Nazis, and they began to prepare for the seizure of Czechoslovakia. On April 24, 1938, the fascist party of the Sudeten Germans of K. Henlein, on the instructions of Hitler, put forward a demand for the government of Czechoslovakia to grant autonomy to the Sudetenland. A meeting of the prime ministers and foreign ministers of England and France, held in London the same month, recommended that Czechoslovakia agree to the demand.
However, both London and Paris were concerned about the position of the Soviet Union, which, having concluded agreements with Czechoslovakia and France on joint defensive actions against the forces of aggression in 1935, declared its readiness to help Czechoslovakia with the emergence of the Sudetenland crisis. Similar statements were made subsequently: May 25, June 25, August 22, 1938.
Western politicians, trying to rid themselves of the war in Europe at any cost, hastened to come to Hitler’s aid under the guise of organizing “mediation” between Germany and Czechoslovakia. According to the British historian F. Bell, “in England they hoped to satisfy German claims through negotiations and at the same time not allow any cooperation with the USSR. Such a course, based on the ideological confrontation and mistrust accumulated over twenty years, gave rise to a firm determination to keep the USSR in isolation."
Meeting in Berchtesgaden. At a meeting in Berchtesgaden (Germany) on September 15, 1938, British Prime Minister N. Chamberlain agreed with Hitler's claims to transfer to Germany part of the Czechoslovak territory, where the Germans made up more than half of the population. Chamberlain assured the head of the Third Reich that after discussing this issue in the governments of England and France, he would ensure that the leadership of Czechoslovakia accepted these demands.
Just two days later, the British cabinet approved the “principle of self-determination,” which is how the separation of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia was called. This was followed by Anglo-French consultations, which resulted in a joint ultimatum: Czechoslovakia was ordered to satisfy German claims “in the interests of European peace.” Hungary and Poland hastened to make territorial demands on Prague.
Czechoslovakia resolutely opposed attacks on the territorial integrity of the country. The government of Czechoslovakia, not wanting to complicate relations with the Western powers, was forced to resort to maneuvering tactics. President E. Benes assured his people that “capitulation is excluded.” At the plenum of the Council of the League of Nations, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M.M. Litvinov officially confirmed the readiness of the Soviet Union to fulfill, together with France, its obligations towards Czechoslovakia. He stressed the need to hold a meeting of the European great powers and all interested states “to develop a collective demarche.”
Despite this, on September 21 Beneš announced that Czechoslovakia accepted the Anglo-French demands. This news caused a wave of mass protests and strikes in the country. A new government was quickly created, headed by General Y. Syrov. Under pressure from the popular masses, a general mobilization was announced. However, the new government continued the capitulatory line and only pretended that it intended to defend the republic. At the height of the mobilization, on September 27, the Soviet government once again stated that the USSR was ready to immediately provide assistance to Czechoslovakia if its government asked for it. However, this did not happen. England and France continued to put pressure on Czechoslovakia, seeking concessions from it to Germany. As a result, Czechoslovakia accepted the conditions imposed on it.
On September 29-30, the heads of government of Germany, Italy, England and France gathered in Munich for a special conference regarding the territorial claims of the Third Reich to Czechoslovakia, but without representatives of the Czechoslovak Republic. They concluded an agreement that obligated the Czechoslovak government to transfer the most industrially developed part of the country - the Sudetenland - to Germany. This act dramatically changed the situation in Europe.
The agreement imposed on Czechoslovakia provided for, within a strictly limited period - from October 1 to October 10, 1938 - the transfer to Germany of the Sudetenland and the regions bordering with Austria with all the structures and fortifications located in these territories in complete safety, agricultural and industrial enterprises with reserves of raw materials, and communication routes , communication means, etc. In addition, Czechoslovakia was required to satisfy the territorial claims of Hungary and Poland within three months. The parties to the agreement “guaranteed” the new borders of Czechoslovakia against unprovoked aggression. As a result, Germany tore away from Czechoslovakia approximately 20% of its territory, where a quarter of the country’s population lived and half of the industry was located. Thus, without firing a single shot, one of the most industrially developed countries in Europe, betrayed by both its own rulers and Western allies, submitted to the fascists.
Czechoslovakia was not the last place in Hitler’s plans for preparing for a big war. During the interwar period, Czechoslovakia was a country with developed industry and intensive agriculture, and was a major arms manufacturer. Its share in the sale of weapons and military equipment on the world market was 40%. In addition, with the capture of Czechoslovakia, Germany acquired an advantageous strategic position, first for an attack on Poland, and then for aggression in the East.
Czechoslovakia had significant capabilities to repel the aggressor. In that same fateful September, its army had 2 million soldiers and officers, 45 divisions, 1,582 aircraft, 469 tanks. During the same period, the Wehrmacht had 47 divisions (2.2 million people), had 2,500 aircraft and 720 tanks.
There was no surprise factor: mobilization was carried out in Czechoslovakia. The country had a defensive line equipped with the latest technology, not inferior to the Maginot Line and occupied by troops. First-class Czechoslovakian aviation could, in a matter of minutes, subject German chemical plants located near the border to devastating bombing, thereby inflicting serious damage on the enemy. According to the German General Staff, in the event of hostilities, the Czechoslovak army was capable of disabling up to 60% of the Wehrmacht units. It is no coincidence that Hitler later said: “What we learned about the military power of Czechoslovakia after Munich horrified us - we exposed ourselves to great danger. The Czech generals prepared a serious plan.” The danger was indeed great, because, having pulled together large forces to the borders of Czechoslovakia, the German command left in the west and south of Germany only a thin curtain of 12 divisions, 1 on the other side of the Franco-German border stood against them 40 French divisions, which, if France had remained faithful to its allied obligations, they could have inflicted a serious defeat on the enemy. At the same time, in the western regions of the USSR, in order to assist Czechoslovakia, 30 rifle and 10 cavalry divisions, as well as formations of tank troops and over 500 aircraft, were put on full combat readiness.
Reasons for the isolation of the USSR in resolving the Czechoslovak issue. Czechoslovakia did not want to take advantage of USSR help without the participation of France. Experts from the Western powers, who were listened to in Prague, argued that the Red Army, decapitated by repression, was not able to conduct active offensive operations. According to Colonel Firebrace, the British military attache in Moscow, in April 1938, the Red Army itself "has suffered a severe blow and cannot be considered capable of undertaking an offensive war." German propaganda played an important role in this statement. The West was sensitive to German propaganda, which declared Czechoslovakia to be the "unsinkable aircraft carrier" of the Soviets, who were seeking to use this country with its strong Communist Party to strengthen communist influence in Europe. The fear of the spread of Bolshevism forced the ruling circles of Western democracies, including in Czechoslovakia itself, to fear unilateral assistance from the USSR. The appearance of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia did not allow the USSR to count on outside support and put Soviet formations in the event of their arrival in Czechoslovakia (due to the lack of a common border) in a very difficult position. Soviet troops had to pass through the territories of Poland or Romania, and this required their permission. Poland flatly refused. Negotiations were held with the Romanian authorities (between Litvinov and the head of the Romanian Foreign Ministry Komen). But, despite Romania’s verbally expressed readiness to make some concessions (to “turn a blind eye” to the flight of Soviet aviation at an altitude of more than 3 thousand m, to allow a 100,000-strong contingent of Soviet troops to pass along one railway within 6 days), they were arranged like this conditions that made Soviet assistance impossible.
This was understood both in Czechoslovakia and in the USSR. In any case, as a result of negotiations between the military delegation of the Czechoslovak Republic and the command of the Red Army in early September 1938, its members came away with the impression that the USSR had no serious intentions in providing assistance to their country without the participation of France.
Only the unity of the USSR, France and England could prevent a catastrophe. However, even the very possibility of presenting a united front with the USSR terrified the governments of England and France. Recalling the days of Munich, former Prime Minister Daladier said in 1963 that at that time “ideological problems often overshadowed strategic imperatives.”
The consequences of Stalin's arbitrariness, such as the extermination or removal of experienced personnel of the Soviet diplomatic corps, could not but affect the negotiation process. During 1937-1938 All deputy people's commissars for foreign affairs were repressed (except for V.P. Potemkin), many plenipotentiary representatives, and other senior officials (in 10 countries, the posts of plenipotentiary representatives were vacant, of the 8 departments of the NKID, only one had a head). The arrests and executions of diplomats, their replacement with random people, sometimes even without experience in this field, deprived the country of valuable personnel. All these factors sharply reduced the capabilities of the USSR's foreign policy. International isolation, which had already begun at the end of 1936, grew more and more. It became especially obvious in 1938, during the signing of the Munich Agreement by England, France, Germany and Italy.
Results of the Munich Agreement. The leaders of England and France portrayed the Munich Agreement as "a step towards peace." “My friends!” exclaimed N. Chamberlain upon his return from Munich, addressing the Londoners who filled the street in front of his residence, “...an honorable peace is coming to Downing Street from Germany. I believe that we will live in peace.” »
In fact, everything was different. It was during the days of Munich that Hitler and Mussolini, at an informal meeting, agreed to “act shoulder to shoulder against Great Britain.” In October 1938, the head of the German Foreign Ministry J. Ribbentrop told B. Mussolini and Italian Foreign Minister G. Ciano: “The Czech crisis showed our strength! We have superiority in initiative, so we will be masters of the situation. We cannot be attacked. From a military point of view, the situation is excellent: already in September 1939 we will be able to wage war with the great democracies."
Munich significantly strengthened Germany's position, breaking the connecting link between the far from perfect security systems that still existed in Western and Eastern Europe. The idea of collective security was dealt a mortal blow: the path to aggression on a pan-European scale was opened. Munich allowed Hitler to revise his “schedule of aggression.” If in 1937 he spoke about the war “no later than 1943,” now these dates were moved to 1939. The agreement in Munich was not a hasty improvisation, it was a continuation of the political line outlined by the Locarno Treaty of 1925, which guaranteed the western borders of Germany, but left it a path to the east, as well as the “Pact of Four” of 1933. On this basis, England and France hoped to maintain the status quo that suited them, and in the event that they could not avert the threat from themselves, they hoped to direct it to the east.
The second stage in the implementation of the secret protocol was the war with Finland.
The position of the USSR regarding Finland. The agreement of September 28 between the USSR and Germany opened a period of stable Soviet-German cooperation. Now Stalin could afford to begin resolving territorial issues with Finland, which was also part of the “sphere of interests” of the USSR.
The Soviet proposal to conclude an agreement with Finland, similar to the agreements between the USSR and the Baltic republics, was rejected by the Finnish side, which believed that this contradicted the neutrality of Finland. Then the Soviet government proposed to move the border on the Karelian Isthmus several tens of kilometers north to the line Lipola (Upper) - Koivisto (Primorsk), transfer to the USSR several islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the territory of the Rybachy Peninsula and the Sredny Peninsula in the Barents Sea in exchange for twice the territory in Soviet Karelia. It was also proposed to lease the Hanko Peninsula to the USSR for the construction of a naval base there. The latter could play an important role in covering the sea approaches to Leningrad.
The Finnish side, however, did not want to give up Hanko, but was ready to make other concessions. This created a real opportunity to achieve progress in the negotiations. Moreover, the head of the Finnish delegation, Paasikivi, stood for reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union. A number of other Finnish political figures shared the same assessments. However, at the insistence of E. Erkko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland, Minister of Finance V. Tanner, who was included in the delegation, fulfilling the instructions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, sought to toughen Finland’s position.
Soviet proposals were rejected. The USSR's desire to strengthen the existing Soviet-Finnish non-aggression treaty with additional guarantees did not find support either. Not finding a common language, both sides began to lean toward resolving the problem by military means, although many possible alternatives to a political solution to the problem had not yet been exhausted.
Progress of hostilities. On November 9, Erkko instructed the Finnish delegation to stop negotiations, saying that it had “more important things to do.” On November 13, negotiations were interrupted. Relations between both countries deteriorated every day. A campaign of mutual accusations began in the media. The troops of both states were intensively moving towards the border, and although at the end of November Finland proposed to continue negotiations, Stalin had already made a choice in favor of a military solution to the issue. This decision was largely facilitated by the Stalinist leadership’s incorrect assessment of the current situation. Moscow believed that the war with Finland would be easy and short in time. It was also assumed that the Western powers, preoccupied with the problems arising in connection with the war against Germany, would not intervene in the Soviet-Finnish conflict. On November 30, troops of the Leningrad Military District crossed the border. The Soviet-Finnish war began.
On December 1, in the city of Terijoki (Zelenogorsk), a pro-Soviet government of the Democratic Republic of Finland was created, headed by the famous figure of the Finnish Communist Party and the Comintern O. Kuusinen. The USSR recognized this government as legitimate and on December 2 concluded an agreement with it on mutual assistance and friendship. This allowed Molotov, in response to a request from the League of Nations to find out whether the USSR had denounced the non-aggression pact with Finland, to declare that “the Soviet Union is not at war with Finland.” The League of Nations expelled the USSR from its membership on December 14. However, the people of Finland rejected Kuusinen's government, which soon disappeared from the political scene.
In the early days, Soviet troops had some success. However, as they advanced, the enemy increased resistance, developing active sabotage and partisan activity in the immediate rear of the Red Army, and creating strong resistance centers on the flanks. The supply of Soviet units and formations was disrupted: kilometer-long traffic jams of military equipment appeared on the few roads. The tanks got stuck in the snow and stopped in front of numerous obstacles. Some formations (for example, the 44th Rifle Division) were surrounded, and the personnel, abandoning a significant part of their equipment, made their way in small groups to the Soviet border.
Only after a month of fierce fighting was it finally clarified where the Mannerheim Line lay. It became obvious that to complete the campaign, special training was required, the formation of ski units, improved command and control and the establishment of interaction between the branches of the armed forces and branches of the military.
At the beginning of January 1940, an order was given to switch to defense and a reorganization of the troops was carried out. The Leningrad Military District turned into the North-Western Front, led by 1st Rank Army Commander S.K. Tymoshenko. Instead of an army offensive operation, a front-line operation was now planned, mainly through the efforts of the 7th and 13th armies. The troops and headquarters began to carefully prepare decisive operations to break through the enemy’s defense line.
During the short respite, Soviet troops carried out thorough preparations, taking into account the mistakes of past battles. On February 3, the command of the North-Western Front adopted an operation plan, according to which the troops were to break through the fortified zone with a simultaneous attack by the inner flanks of the 7th and 13th armies and defeat the enemy defense forces in the area of Lake Vuoksi to Karkhul. In the future - destroy the entire enemy group on the Karelian Isthmus, preventing it from retreating to the west, and reach the Kexholm line, st. Antrea, Vyborg.
On February 11, 1940, front troops went on the offensive. The final stage of the Soviet-Finnish war began. A struggle of unprecedented ferocity unfolded along the entire front. Overcoming numerous defensive structures, the Red Army stubbornly bit into the Finnish defenses.
“The Russians,” wrote the commander-in-chief of the Finnish army K. Mannerheim, “this time learned to organize the interaction of troops... Artillery fire paved the way for the infantry. It was controlled with great precision from balloons and combat vehicles. Since the Russians did not skimp on either infantry or on tanks, the scale of their losses was terrifying." On February 17, fearing the entry of Soviet troops into the rear of the Karelian Army, the Finnish command began to withdraw its units. The ensuing snowstorm, which lasted for several days, delayed the advance of the attackers and gave the enemy the opportunity to occupy the second line of defense in an organized manner.
At the end of February, after a short respite and massive artillery preparation, the Red Army launched a general offensive. The enemy, putting up stubborn resistance, began to retreat along the entire 60-kilometer front. March 4 70th Infantry Division Brigade Commander M.P. Kirponosa, on the ice of the Vyborg Bay, suddenly for the Finns bypassed the Vyborg fortified area. The Finnish leadership was forced to begin peace negotiations. On March 12, 1940, a peace treaty was concluded between the USSR and Finland, according to which hostilities ceased along the entire front from 12 o'clock on March 13.
The Soviet Union improved its strategic position in the northwest and north, and created the prerequisites for ensuring the security of Leningrad and the Murmansk railway. The Karelian Isthmus and some other territories went to the USSR, and the Hanko Peninsula was leased to the Soviet Union. The losses of Soviet troops were: killed and died from wounds and illnesses during the evacuation stages and in hospitals - 87,506, missing - 39,369 people. More than 5 thousand people were captured. The Finns lost about 23 thousand killed, more than 43 thousand wounded, and 1,100 prisoners. During the fighting, many shortcomings of the Red Army in organization, tactics, weapons, and command and control were revealed. This contributed to strengthening the opinion in the West about the weakness of the Red Army.
The forceful methods used by the Soviet leadership turned out to be not the best way to resolve the problem of resolving the northwestern borders. During the war unleashed by the Soviet Union, Germany refrained from openly helping Finland, but secretly allowed the transit of weapons supplies to the Finns from Hungary and Italy through its territory, and the Germans themselves supplied their weapons to Sweden in exchange for Swedish weapons sold to Finland.
The Soviet-Finnish War led to a sharp decline in the international prestige of the USSR and worsened its relations with other countries, primarily with England and France, which provided assistance to Finland. The USSR was expelled from the League of Nations. The West was already making plans to strike the northern communications and ports of the Soviet Union, and its oil regions in the south. Only peace with Finland improved the situation somewhat. Trade negotiations with England soon resumed; relations with France remained tense.
At the same time, the war with Finland, which showed the weakness of the Red Army, strengthened Hitler in his opinion that the Soviet Union could be defeated in a short-lived campaign in the near future.
Under these conditions, the USSR is trying to prevent the spread of German expansion in Europe and deprive it of possible allies.
In April 1940, in connection with the fascist aggression against Denmark and Norway, Sweden faced the threat of a direct attack from German troops reaching its borders in the most important strategic directions. The Soviet government took measures to protect Sweden's national independence. On April 13, 1940, it told the German Ambassador Schulenburg that the USSR was “definitely interested in maintaining Sweden’s neutrality” and “expresses the wish that Swedish neutrality should not be violated,” which was taken as a serious warning in Berlin. On 16 April, Schulenburg transmitted his government's response, which stated that military operations in northern Europe would not be extended to Sweden, and Germany would certainly respect its neutrality unless Sweden assisted the Western powers. Swedish Foreign Minister Gunther, in a conversation with Soviet Ambassador A. M. Kollontai, “excitedly thanked” the Soviet Union and assured that Sweden would remain neutral. On May 9, 1940, the Swedish Prime Minister also expressed his “deepest gratitude” to the Soviet government, adding that “friendship with the Soviet Union is the main pillar of Sweden.” The Soviet action in defense of Sweden saved it from occupation by German troops at the time of their invasion of other Scandinavian countries. On October 27, 1940, the USSR government ordered to re-assure the Swedish government that “unconditional recognition and respect for the full independence of Sweden represents the unchanged position of the Soviet government.”
7. The reaction of the USSR to the German-Polish war of 1939
Since the beginning of the war, the foreign policy of the Soviet leadership was determined by the events that unfolded in Europe. The desire to gain time to strengthen the defense capability of one’s country, to improve the strategic position, to push the forward lines of defense as far as possible to the west, to find allies whose territories could be used in the event that the USSR was drawn into the war - all this became paramount in the actions of the Soviet Union. manuals. The rapidly changing military situation itself dictated quick and pragmatic decisions. The determining factor here was the relationship between the USSR and Germany.
As evidenced by the texts of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, the secret additional protocol and recordings of conversations during negotiations in Moscow on August 23-24, 1939, the leadership of the USSR at the time of signing the secret protocol did not yet have a clear course for its foreign policy in Eastern Europe. At that time, Soviet leaders still had a very vague idea of what forms Soviet-German relations would take in the future. It is known that when discussing the draft treaty drawn up in Berlin with Ribbentrop, Stalin crossed out the preamble proposed by the German side, which spoke about the establishment of friendly Soviet-German relations.
“Don’t you think that we should take more into account public opinion in our countries? For years we have been throwing mud at each other. And now suddenly everything should be forgotten, as if it never existed? Such things do not pass so quickly,” he said at the same time. Ribbentrop, in a memorandum to Hitler dated June 24, 1940, regarding the negotiations in Moscow in August 1939, points to the clear uncertainty of German-Russian relations42. In fact, this indicates a lack of prospects for the future, about the USSR’s distrust of Germany in the atmosphere of haste in which the agreement was concluded.
The uncertainty in relations did not disappear even after the German attack on Poland. With the outbreak of the war, Stalin based his plans and actions not so much on the set of agreements related to the pact of August 23, but on the real development of events. The most important factors that had a direct influence on the subsequent decisions of the Soviet leadership were the lightning defeat of the Polish army, which stunned all of Europe, and the “strange war” in the West instead of the supposed active actions of the warring parties.
But the main thing was different - the strongest army in the world - the Wehrmacht - entered the arena. The blitzkrieg strategy clearly demonstrated its advantages. Poland was completely defeated in a few weeks, and German troops inexorably moved east and crossed the demarcation line established by the secret protocol of August 23. At the same time, England and France, having declared war on Germany, did nothing. Undoubtedly, Moscow was worried about whether the Germans would fulfill the agreements and why Poland’s Western allies were inactive.
The correspondence with the German Foreign Ministry in the first half of September was filled with clarification of Berlin's position.
Immediately after England and France entered the war, Ribbentrop persistently suggested that the USSR send its troops to Poland. This decision was not an easy one for the Soviet leadership. On the one hand, the creation of a forward defensive line in Eastern Poland was a desirable goal from a military-strategic point of view. In addition, the fear remained that if this territory was not occupied by the Red Army, the Germans would come there; Moreover, failure to comply with Ribbentrop's demands could lead to complications with Germany. On the other hand, there were no guarantees that England and France would not declare war on the USSR if the Red Army crossed the Soviet-Polish border. Moscow was afraid of falling into the trap of another “Munich”, since, having declared war on the Reich, the Western powers did not provide any concrete assistance to Poland. This suggested the possibility of a new deal at the expense of the USSR. By September 17, two factors were clearly defined: the achievement of an armistice with Japan on September 15 and the loss of control of the country by the Polish government, i.e. there was a pretext to protect the Ukrainian and Belarusian population of Poland from “chaos”.
Even after this, Stalin’s confidence in his new partner did not increase. On September 17, in a conversation with the German Ambassador to Moscow F. Schulenburg, he expressed “certain doubts as to whether the German High Command will adhere to the Moscow agreement at the appropriate time and whether it will return to the line that was determined in Moscow (Pissa, Narev, Vistula, San )". Despite the Germans' assurance that the agreements would be implemented, Stalin's concern about the course of events, his doubts about Hitler's true intentions, and uncertainty about the exact adherence by the German side to the agreements reached in Moscow did not disappear. If Poland capitulates and retains some kind of statehood, where is the guarantee that this state on the Soviet western borders will not become a German puppet hostile to the Soviet Union. Will the Soviet government be able to create a friendly pro-Soviet regime in this truncated Poland? “The destruction of this state in the current conditions,” Stalin told Dimitrov in their conversation on September 7, describing Poland as a fascist country, “would mean one less bourgeois fascist state! What bad would it be if, as a result of the defeat of Poland, we spread the socialist system to new territories and population? Only on September 19 did Molotov make it clear to Schulenburg that “the original intention, which was nurtured by the Soviet government and Stalin personally, to allow the existence of a remnant of Poland, has now given way to the intention to divide Poland...”.
8. Accession of the Baltic states to the USSR
According to the secret protocol of August 23, Latvia and Estonia moved into the “sphere of interests” of the USSR. However, Lithuania remained in the “sphere of interests” of Germany, and in the event of German troops entering there, the Wehrmacht group created there would have the opportunity (under changed circumstances) to launch a deep flank attack on Soviet troops entering the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus.
Soon the possibility of the Wehrmacht troops entering Lithuania took on very real shape. On September 20, Hitler decided to soon turn Lithuania into a German protectorate, and on the 25th he signed Directive No. 4 on the concentration of troops in East Prussia. They were ordered to be ready for the invasion of Lithuania. On the same day, Stalin, in a conversation with Schulenburg, stated that “in the final settlement of the Polish question, it is necessary to avoid everything that in the future could cause friction between Germany and the Soviet Union.” He proposed that from the areas located east of the demarcation line, the entire Lublin Voivodeship and part of the Warsaw Voivodeship up to the Bug should move into the “sphere of interests” of Germany, and for this the German side could abandon Lithuania. This was reflected in the already mentioned Treaty on Friendship and Borders, which distributed the “spheres of interest” of the USSR and Germany in a new way. On the territory of Poland, the border ran along the Curzon line, i.e. ethnic Polish areas found themselves in the sphere of German interests. This indicates that in Stalin’s policy, strategic interests prevailed over territorial ones. After all, by ceding part of the territory inhabited by the Poles, he saved himself from the inevitable struggle of the Polish people for the liberation of the country and made the immediate rear, where the Ukrainian and Belarusian populations lived, more reliable. In addition, the new outline of the border shortened the line of contact between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, which, if this line became a front, was also of strategic importance. The inclusion of Lithuania in the “sphere of interests” of the USSR removed the threat of a Wehrmacht flank attack from the north against the Red Army grouping in Western Belarus and placed the so-called Vilna Corridor, the shortest route to East Prussia, in the hands of the Soviet military command. The treaty made German-Soviet relations more certain. Moscow received freedom of action in the Baltic states.
The situation at the end of September dictated very specific forms of policy towards the Baltic states to the Soviet leadership. Military considerations again came to the fore, requiring the deployment of Soviet troops and naval bases there in order to secure the region from possible German expansion and at the same time create a strategic forward defensive line. In the context of the outbreak of war, this development of events led to the division of Poland and the conclusion of mutual assistance agreements between the USSR and the Baltic republics in September-October 1939. In accordance with them, the USSR and the Baltic countries pledged to provide each other with all kinds of assistance, including military assistance. It was planned to create Soviet military and naval bases on the territory of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia and station small contingents of the Red Army and Navy on them (25 thousand people each in Latvia and Estonia and 20 thousand people in Lithuania).
The spring and summer of 1940 radically changed the international situation. Now the Wehrmacht convincingly demonstrated its power on the fields of Western Europe. In 5 days Holland was conquered, in 19 days - Belgium, British troops, abandoning all military equipment in Flanders, rolled back across the English Channel, France was in agony. The Soviet leadership had to foresee such a turn of events: after the end of hostilities in the west, it was quite possible for German troops to be transferred to the east to attack the USSR and simultaneously seize the Baltic states.
In this regard, the Soviet government considered it necessary to take urgent measures to strengthen its influence in the Baltic states, as well as to increase the combat capabilities of the Soviet troops stationed in them. They included an increase in the Red Army grouping there, as well as the creation of pro-Soviet governments in these republics instead of regimes that were increasingly gravitating toward Germany. The USSR government sent notes to the leadership of Lithuania (June 14), Latvia and Estonia (June 16), where it indicated that it considered it absolutely necessary and urgent to form in them such governments that could ensure the “fair implementation” of mutual assistance treaties with the USSR , and also demanded consent to increase the number of Soviet troops. These notes were dictated by the fact that, due to the strengthening of the influence and authority of the victorious Reich in the Baltic republics, the possibility of promoting the German economy (and therefore influence) to the east was created. Moreover, after the surrender of France on June 22, 1940, small European countries urgently reoriented towards Germany. Now the Kremlin no longer has the confidence of last year that Hitler intends to adhere to the secret agreements. At the same time, the few Soviet garrisons in the Baltic states and the far from high combat capabilities of the armies of the Baltic states did not provide a reliable barrier in the event of Nazi aggression.
The Soviet notes were drawn up in a crude ultimatum form: “so that a pro-Soviet government is immediately formed...”, “so that immediate security is provided...” At the same time, this also indicated that, in an effort to improve their strategic position on the western borders, where in First of all, hostilities could unfold in the event of German aggression; the Soviet leadership was aware that this act of itss would be met extremely negatively in Berlin.
In the face of an increased threat of war, the entry of Soviet troops into the Baltic republics in the summer of 1940 was dictated primarily by strategic interests. It is known that the Baltic region with its flat terrain has long been the gateway through which Western conquerors invaded Russia. A powerful group of the Red Army was created in this region. Ice-free ports ensured the operations of the Baltic Fleet all year round. In case of war, he had the opportunity to conduct cruising operations, organize submarine raids, mine the waters off the coast of East Prussia and Pomerania, and block the delivery of iron ore from Sweden to Germany. From airfields located in the Baltic states, Soviet aircraft could reach German territory. It was from here that the first air strikes on Berlin were launched in August 1941.
The motives for the USSR's actions were clear to many foreign politicians. Thus, the German envoy in Riga von Kotze wrote: “The incoming troops are so numerous that... it is impossible to imagine that such an extensive occupation was necessary only to subjugate Latvia. I think that the idea of Germany and the available capabilities, and that the Russian plans are defensive in nature." His colleague in Kaunas, E. Zechlin, reported to Berlin: “It is absolutely obvious that such an impressive show of force cannot be carried out solely for the purpose of occupying Lithuania. Taking into account the entire political situation, it becomes clear that the Soviet Union sent such a huge number of troops here out of distrust of Germany for purely defensive purposes." The head of the British Foreign Ministry, E. Halifax, shared a similar opinion. In those days, he noted that “the concentration of Soviet troops in the Baltic states is a defensive measure.”
Indeed, by mid-July, according to Soviet intelligence, 48 Wehrmacht divisions were concentrated in East Prussia and Poland, and additional mobilization was announced in the eastern regions of Germany. Other events were also carried out that indicated the activation of German troops on the eastern borders of Germany.
The introduction of additional formations of the Red Army and the replacement of governments in the Baltic countries by the majority of foreign states were met as understandable measures dictated by the security interests of the USSR, as evidenced by the recognition of the new governments by many countries. The inclusion of the Baltic republics into the USSR in the West was regarded as annexation, as a manifestation of the “imperial ambitions of a communist totalitarian state,” as a desire to “multiply the number of Soviet republics.” The reaction was immediate: the relations of the Soviet Union with England and the USA worsened, i.e. with those countries that were potential allies of the USSR, and precisely at the moment when the contradictions between Moscow and Berlin were becoming more and more clear and the situation itself demanded the full strengthening of relations with the Western powers.
9. Annexation of Bessarabia to the USSR
In 1940, the issue of strengthening the southwestern borders of the USSR came up on the agenda. The Soviet government demanded that Romania immediately resolve the Bessarabian issue. In a conversation with the German Ambassador Schulenburg on June 23, Molotov said that if Romania “does not agree to a peaceful resolution of the Bessarabian issue, then the Soviet Union will resolve it by armed force. The Soviet Union has waited a long time and patiently for a solution to this issue, but now it is impossible to wait any longer.” . He further emphasized that the USSR government considers this issue extremely urgent. The basis for such a conversation was the secret protocol of August 23, 1939, according to which Bessarabia was included in the “sphere of interests” of the USSR. The urgency of the issue was dictated by the fact that since the spring of 1940, Romania, which had previously gravitated towards England and France, connected itself more and more closely with the Third Reich. The Romanian government turned to Berlin for help in building fortifications on the Soviet-Romanian border along the Dnieper. It demonstratively mobilized more than 1 million reservists, increased military spending, and strengthened the grouping of its troops in Bessarabia. The haste with which Romania was subjugated to the Third Reich gave good reason to believe that the Germans would try to turn Romanian territory, and with it Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, into a springboard for an attack on the USSR. All this was perceived with concern in Moscow.
On June 26, the Soviet government handed over a note to the Romanian representative, which proposed “to begin, together with Romania, to immediately resolve the issue of returning Bessarabia to the Soviet Union.”
Since the Romanian government took an evasive position, on June 27, another note followed with a demand to withdraw Romanian troops from “the territory of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina within four days, starting at 14:00 Moscow time on June 28.” The issue of Northern Bukovina caused concern in Berlin. This territory was never part of Russia and was not specified in the protocol of August 23, 1939. The Romanian government’s attempt to appeal to Berlin for intercession was unsuccessful. Germany could not object due to the too vague wording in that paragraph of the secret protocol that concerned South-Eastern Europe. It said that “the Soviet side emphasizes the USSR’s interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterest in these territories.” Thus, the “sphere of interests” of the USSR was not strictly limited to Bessarabia alone, since it was a question of Germany’s disinterest “in these territories.” When now, in 1940, the question arose about the entry of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina into the USSR, Ribbentrop explained to Hitler: “In view of the then uncertainty of German-Russian relations... I... chose a general wording for the protocol...”. Ribbentrop advised Romania to concede, adding one word in the oral conversation - “for now.”
On June 28, the Red Army entered Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Romanian political parties and organizations in these territories were immediately dissolved, and bodies of Soviet power were created everywhere. On August 2, the Moldavian SSR was formed, which included most of Bessarabia and the Moldavian Autonomous Republic, which had existed on the left bank of the Dniester since 1924. Northern Bukovina and southern regions of Bessarabia became part of Ukraine.
As in the case of the Baltic states, the examples of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina clearly show that it was the interests of strategy that were a priority in determining Soviet policy towards the new Western lands. Thus, from the territory of Bessarabia, Soviet aviation could threaten the oil fields of Romania, which at that time was the main supplier of oil to Germany. And Northern Bukovina, which had never before belonged to Russia, was needed because a rolling railway of strategic importance passed through its territory, from Odessa, through Chisinau, Chernivtsi (Chernivtsi) to Lviv. The European gauge that it had made it possible to use rolling stock for movement on the railways of Europe. Molotov spoke to Schulenburg about the importance of this highway for the USSR on June 26, 1940. By the way, the question of its use arose not for the first time. He stood up back in 1938 during the Czechoslovak crisis, when it came to the possibility of transferring Soviet troops to Czechoslovakia. Obviously, Stalin knew well the price of the Chernivtsi-Lviv road. This is not surprising: in 1920 he was a member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front, which then carried out the Lvov operation.
Immediately before the attack by the Reich troops, the Soviet Union managed, using the contradictions between Germany, Turkey and Japan, to achieve the neutrality of the latter two countries in the impending war.
In March 1941, German-Turkish contradictions almost led to an armed conflict between these two states. The German ambassador in Madrid, Hassel, wrote in his diary on March 2, 1941, that Ribbentrop insisted on a direct attack on Turkey. Knowing Germany's intentions, the Soviet government issued a statement saying that if Turkey were attacked, it could count on the USSR's full understanding and neutrality. In response to this, the Turkish government stated that “if the USSR found itself in a similar situation, it could count on Turkey’s full understanding and neutrality.” This exchange of statements had serious political significance: it actually confirmed the neutrality agreement, which, as is known, the Soviet government proposed to do back in September 1939, and emphasized its value in the current international situation. These statements forced Germany to abandon its planned steps towards Turkey. Although the Turkish government systematically violated neutrality, this exchange of statements and the significant warming of relations between the two countries was of great importance for both the USSR and Turkey.
Let's see how relations between the USSR and militaristic Japan developed on the eve of the Second World War.
Japan, in which in the 30s. A fascist regime was established and had long been nurturing expansionist plans for the Far Eastern territories of the USSR. After the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact, she had a real opportunity, in alliance with the strongest power in the world, to implement these plans.
In the summer of 1938, Japan invaded the territory of the Soviet Union in the area of Lake Khasan, hoping to capture Vladivostok. However, the USSR had enough forces to fight this country and units of the Red Army under the leadership of Blucher quickly defeated the aggressors.
In May 1939, Japan attacked Mongolia in the area of the Khalkhin Gol River, trying to gain a springboard for an attack on the USSR. According to the agreements in force between the Soviet Union and Mongolia, units of the Red Army under the leadership of Zhukov were introduced into this country to protect its sovereignty, and Japan was defeated in difficult battles.
After the signing of the Soviet-German treaties, Japan did not dare to continue its aggression against the USSR.
Thus, thanks to the successes of the Red Army in the fight against the Japanese aggressors, one of the possible opponents was taken out of combat readiness even before the start of the Great Patriotic War, and the Soviet Union managed to avoid a war on two fronts and successfully restrain Japanese aggression throughout the entire period.
The alliance between Germany and Japan posed a threat to the USSR of war on two fronts. However, in the last months before the German invasion of the Soviet Union, in an atmosphere of aggravation of Japanese-German contradictions, the Japanese government began to be inclined to conclude a non-aggression pact with the USSR; the German government tried to prevent him from doing this. On March 27, 1941, during the stay of Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin, Ribbentrop assured him that the war against the USSR would end in an easy and quick victory. Matsuoka, declaring that “Japan has always been a loyal ally who will devote herself entirely to the common cause,” however, limited himself to only a promise to take military action against the possessions of the United States and England in the Pacific Ocean. The conclusion of the treaty was also prevented by the United States; Thus, Senator Vanderberg stated that “if Japan and the Soviet Union conclude a non-aggression pact, the United States will immediately impose an embargo on the export of American goods to Japan.” On the way back from Berlin to Tokyo, Matsuoka stopped in Moscow, giving consent on behalf of his government to the conclusion of a Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty. The Japanese government viewed this treaty as a means of allowing them to choose the most convenient moment to attack the USSR, believing that the Soviet Union, relying on the treaty, would withdraw its troops from the Far East, which would create favorable conditions for an attack. The USSR knew about these expectations of Japan, but in any case the agreement made it possible to avoid simultaneous attacks by Germany and Japan; further developments would depend on the course of military operations between Germany and the USSR. Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty was signed on April 13, 1941; his conclusion was received extremely unkindly both in Germany and in the United States. Ribbentrop instructed the German ambassador in Tokyo to demand an explanation from the Japanese government. Japan responded that it would remain true to its obligations under the treaties of alliance with Germany.
On February 11, 1940, an agreement was concluded between the USSR and Germany business agreement, which provided for the export of raw materials from the Soviet Union to Germany, compensated by the supply of industrial products to the USSR. For 16 months, until the German attack, the Union supplied the Reich with agricultural products, oil and mineral raw materials totaling about 1 billion German marks. Such assistance, provided under the conditions of the economic blockade declared by Great Britain against Germany, was of paramount importance for the latter. Despite the fact that reciprocal deliveries were disrupted and delayed in every possible way, the USSR impeccably fulfilled all the terms of the agreement, and the Soviet press and propaganda throughout 1940 continued to present Germany as a “great peace-loving power.” According to historians, the reasons for this behavior of the Union lie in the complete surprise of the lightning victories Germany won in 1940. For the USSR, which was counting on a long war in the west, such a quick capitulation of the European powers, demonstrating the enormous power of the Wehrmacht, was a shock; at the same time, these victories freed up a significant contingent of German troops, which could henceforth be used in other places. All this forced the leadership of the USSR to take any measures that could help avoid aggression against itself.
13. Increasing tension in Soviet-German relations in 1940
However, some time after the annexation of the Baltic states and Romania by the Union, Germany, which had previously remained silent, provided foreign policy guarantees to Romania, signed a series of economic agreements with it and sent a very significant military mission there to prepare the Romanian army for war against the USSR. In September, German troops were also sent to Finland. Germany also acted as an arbiter in the settlement of the dispute between Romania and Hungary over Transylvania, and after satisfying its claims, Hungary joined the fascist coalition. Trying to influence the Hungarians, the USSR government decided to solemnly hand over to them the banners of the revolution of 1848-1849, stored in Soviet museums, thus recalling the long history of the national liberation struggle of Hungary against German expansion.
In an effort to counter the spread of German influence in southern Europe, the USSR directed its efforts to revive Pan-Slavism and intensify political and economic relations with Yugoslavia. Back in May 1940, a Soviet-Yugoslav treaty on trade and navigation was signed, and on June 25 of the same year, diplomatic relations were established. On April 5, 1941, three hours before Germany attacked Yugoslavia, a Soviet-Yugoslav treaty of friendship and non-aggression was signed in Moscow.
14.Soviet-German negotiations in the fall - winter of 1940-1941
Despite the partial cooling of relations between the USSR and Germany caused by the change in the situation in the Balkans, in the fall the Reich made several more attempts designed to improve Soviet-German relations. Soon after signing September 27, 1940 Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan Ribbentrop approached Stalin with a proposal to send Molotov to Berlin so that Hitler could personally present to him his views on relations between the two countries and on the “long-term policy of the four great powers” to delimit their spheres of interest on a larger scale.
During Molotov's visit to Berlin on November 12–14, very intense negotiations were held, which, however, did not lead to the USSR joining the Tripartite Pact. During these negotiations, the Soviet government declared that German expansion in Romania, Bulgaria and other Balkan countries posed a serious threat to the security interests of the USSR. German leaders in response to this proposed that the USSR “agree on the delimitation of spheres of influence,” demanding that the Soviet Union recognize Europe and Africa as a zone of domination of Germany and Italy, and East Asia as a zone of dominion of Japan, limiting its international policy only to the area “south of the state.” territory of the Soviet Union towards the Indian Ocean." For its part, the German government agreed to recognize the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union; however, the USSR government rejected the proposal. At the same time, the Soviet Union twice invited the Bulgarian government to sign a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance, but they remained unanswered. During Hitler’s meeting with the Bulgarian Tsar, which took place during the days of negotiations, the latter said: “Don’t forget that there, in the Balkans, you have a faithful friend, don’t leave him.” Diplomatic representatives of the United States and England in Sofia also recommended that the Bulgarian government reject the Soviet proposals.
On November 25, the Soviet government presented the German Ambassador Schulenburg with a memorandum outlining the conditions for the USSR's entry into the Triple Alliance:
The territories located south of Batumi and Baku and south towards the Persian Gulf should be considered as the sphere of Soviet interests;
German troops must be withdrawn from Finland;
Bulgaria, having signed a mutual assistance treaty with the USSR, comes under its protectorate;
There is a Soviet military base on Turkish territory in the Straits area;
Japan renounces its claims to Sakhalin Island.
This memorandum was used by Germany to influence those countries whose interests were affected by it, and above all Bulgaria, which in March joined the Three-Power Pact. On March 3, 1941, the USSR government told Bulgaria that it could not share its opinion on the correctness of its position on this issue, since “this position, regardless of the wishes of the Bulgarian government, does not lead to the strengthening of peace, but to the expansion of the sphere of war and the involvement Bulgaria into it."
The demands of the Soviet Union regarding entry into the Triple Alliance remained unanswered. On Hitler's instructions, the Wehrmacht General Staff began developing a war plan against the USSR from the end of July 1940, and at the end of August the transfer of military units to the east began. On December 5, Hitler made the final decision to start a war with the Soviet Union, confirmed on December 18 by Directive 21, which set the start of the Barbarossa Plan for May 15, 1941.
On January 17, 1941, the USSR government again appealed to Germany through its ambassador in Moscow, stating that the Soviet Union considered the territories in the eastern Balkans to be its security zone and could not remain indifferent to events in this area. The same applies to Finland. Soviet-German relations deteriorated further following the German invasion of Yugoslavia on April 5, 1941, hours after the signing of the Soviet-Yugoslav Friendship Treaty. The USSR did not react in any way to this aggression, as well as to the attack on Greece. These military actions forced Hitler on April 30 to postpone the date of the attack on the USSR to June 22, 1941.
Despite the alarming course of events, the USSR, right up to the attack itself, behaved as if nothing had happened, probably hoping that if it did not “provoke” Germany, the attack would be avoided. Soviet supplies to Germany increased significantly after the renewal of the 1940 economic agreements on January 11, 1941. Germany continued to be viewed as a “great friendly power,” and no measures were taken to strengthen defenses on the western borders.
On June 14, TASS published a message saying that statements disseminated by foreign, especially English, press about an approaching war between the USSR and Germany have no basis, since not only the USSR, but also Germany are steadily observing the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty , and that, “in the opinion of Soviet circles, rumors about Germany’s intention to break the pact and launch an attack on the USSR are devoid of any basis...”. The German government did not react to the TASS report and did not publish it in its country. Based on this and other facts, the Soviet government, late in the evening of June 21, through the German ambassador in Moscow, drew the attention of the German government to the seriousness of the situation, proposing to discuss the state of Soviet-German relations. This proposal was immediately sent by Schulenburg to Berlin. It hit the German capital at a time when there were no longer hours, but minutes left before the fascist attack.
Conclusion
Today, even such an obvious question as to who was the true initiator of the war sometimes causes controversy. There is a provocative version of the publicist V. Suvorov (whom it is difficult to call a historian due to the weak reliability of the facts he cites) that the attack was prepared not by Germany, but by the Soviet Union, and the question of who would attack first was a matter of time; Germany was just ahead of the USSR.
According to another version, the true initiator of the war was not Germany, but Western countries, which simply used the military power of the Reich to destroy Bolshevism. The assessment of the foreign policy of the USSR in the pre-war years also cannot be unambiguous. On the one hand, such acts as the conclusion of a secret protocol of the non-aggression pact, the annexation of the Baltic states and aggression against Finland contradict universal human values.
On the other hand, in an atmosphere of general “double game” and similar behavior on the part of not only Germany, but also England and France, these actions look completely justified and truly vital for the Soviet Union. Finally, the question of whether this war could have been prevented cannot be given the only possible answer. There is a point of view that claims that if the USSR and England and France had joined forces and acted as a united front against Germany in the fall of 1939, the war would have ended quickly and without the huge losses that had to be suffered. But, in my opinion, such a unification at that moment was simply impossible. The distrust of Western countries towards the USSR overpowered the fear of fascist aggression; in addition, there was a point of view that if the West and the Union joined forces, Germany would be quickly defeated, which, in turn, would lead to the strengthening of the USSR and the Bolshevization of Europe; then the Soviet Union could become the aggressor in a possible war. On the other hand, a collision between the USSR and Germany would weaken both aggressors, which, of course, was beneficial to England and France.
Finally, after the purges of the Soviet army in the thirties, many Western politicians did not view the USSR as a strong militarily ally. The USSR, for its part, may not have sought to conclude an alliance with Western countries (not least because of ideological views), largely using negotiations with them as a tool to influence Germany. Ultimately, the general “double game” and the reluctance to be the first to turn on the aggression of the Reich, in my opinion, led to the resounding successes of Germany, the “strange war”, the disunity of the actions of the allies already during the Great Patriotic War, which, undoubtedly, significantly delayed victory.
To summarize the above, it is necessary to note the main results of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the pre-war decade. As a result of the USSR’s actions in the external arena, it achieved the following positive results:
The non-aggression pact, for all its negative features, somewhat delayed the Soviet Union's entry into the war;
The relative safety of Leningrad, Murmansk, and the Baltic Fleet bases was ensured; the borders were removed from Minsk, Kyiv and some other centers;
It was possible to split the capitalist camp and avoid the unification of the major powers in the fight against the USSR, as well as disorient the allies under the “Anti-Comintern Pact” and avoid a war on two fronts.
However, the foreign policy of the USSR during this period also had many negative consequences and, in general, the task of preventing war and creating a system of collective security was not completed.
What assessment of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union can be given based on the above?
As you know, the Congress of People's Deputies formed a commission for the political and legal assessment of the non-aggression treaty concluded by the USSR and Germany on August 23, 1939, which was headed by Politburo member, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee A.N. Yakovlev. This commission was called upon to assess the legality of concluding the treaties of 1939 and the results of the USSR’s foreign policy before the Great Patriotic War as a whole. The commission made the following conclusions, which can, in our opinion, be considered the most correct and compromise for the current state of Soviet historical science.
In contrast to the previously prevailing official point of view, the Congress commission, based on a thorough analysis of documents of that time and the testimony of still living eyewitnesses, came to the unequivocal conclusion that the pact of August 23, 1939, the treaty of friendship and border of 28 September 1939 and other acts and agreements with Germany, in which the foreign policy aspirations of the Stalinist leadership were expressed, are in deep contradiction with the Leninist principles of international relations and legal norms, did not reflect the will of the Soviet people, and the people are not responsible for the secret criminal transactions of their leadership, and all secret foreign policy contradicts the ideas of peace and security proclaimed by the USSR in the external arena. In addition, the “policy of small wars,” in which the Soviet Union also became involved, cannot but cause condemnation from the world community and subsequent generations. Despite the fact that in the pre-war years the Soviet Union took significant steps to prevent the threat of war, Stalin’s internal policy of genocide towards its own people was reflected in the imperialist inclinations manifested in the implementation of the foreign policy of the USSR, which brought down all the peaceful initiatives of our state to zero result.
Soviet foreign policy in the pre-war period was contradictory. This inconsistency is explained by the uniqueness of the international situation of that time and the peculiarities of the bureaucratic system of party and state leadership that developed in the USSR, which neglected moral criteria and criteria of international law in its activities, including foreign policy.
IV. Bibliography:
1. The Great Patriotic War. Questions and answers. M., 1990. Wert N.; "History of the Soviet State"; Progress – Academy; M. 1994.
2. Gintsberg L.I. Soviet-German Pact: concept and its implementation // Domestic History 1996. No. 3.
3. Gorokhov V.N. History of international relations 1918-1939: lecture course. M., 2004
4. Dayton L. The Second World War: mistakes, mistakes, losses. M., 2000.
5. Dongarov A.S.. Baltic states. Fifty years ago. "Arguments and facts". 1989, N 36.
6. Documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War. 1937-1939. in 2t M., 1981
7. History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. edited by Pospelova P. N.
8. 1939 Lessons of History"; monograph; edited by Rzheshevsky; "Thought", M., 1990.
9. World wars of the 20th century: in 4 books. Prince Z. World War II. Historical sketch. "VI..2002.
10. Unfamous war; prof. M. I. Semiryaga; magazine "Ogonyok"; 1989.
11. Pokhlebkin V.V. Foreign policy of Rus', Russia and the USSR for 1000 years in names, dates, facts. Vol. 1. M.: International relations, 1992.
12. Rozanov G.L. Stalin-Hitler. Documentary sketch of Soviet-German relations 1939-1941. M..1991.
13. Semiryaga M.I. Secrets of Stalin’s diplomacy. M, 1992.
14. Sogrin V. Political history of modern Russia. M., 1994.
15. Message from the Commission of the Congress of People's Deputies. "Is it true". 1989, N 230.
16. Sokolov B.Yu. The price of victory in the Great Patriotic War: the unknown about the known. M., 1991.
17. USSR - Germany, 1939-1941. Doc and mat. about Soviet-German relations in 2 volumes. Vilnius, 1989
18. The harsh drama of the people. Scientists and publicists about the nature of Stalinism. M., 1989.
19. Utkin A.I. World War II. M., 2002. Reader on the history of international relations. M., 1963.
20. Reader on the history of Russia. In 4 volumes. M., 1994.
21. Yakovlev A.N. “Events of 1939 - a view from a half-century distance.” "Is it true". 1989, N 230.
V . Applications
I . Illustrations
Fig. 1. Demonstration in Tallinn dedicated to Estonia’s entry into the USSR.
Figure 2. Signing of an agreement between the Soviet Union and Finland. March 1940.
Fig 3. Parade of the Red Army in Chisinau in the summer of 1940 after the annexation of Bessarabia to the USSR.
II . Excerpts from documents
1. German-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Border between the USSR and Germany of September 28, 1939.
1. The Government of the USSR and the German Government, after the collapse of the former Polish state, consider it exclusively their task to restore peace and order in this territory and provide the people living there with a peaceful existence consistent with their national characteristics. To this end they agreed as follows:
Article 1
The Government of the USSR and the German Government establish a line as the boundary between mutual state interests on the territory of the former Polish state, which is marked on the attached map and will be described in more detail in the additional protocol.
Article 2
Both parties recognize the boundary of mutual state interests established in Article 1 as final and eliminate any interference by third powers in this decision.
Article 3
The necessary state reorganization in the territory west of the line indicated in the article is carried out by the German Government, in the territory east of this line - by the Government of the USSR.
Article 4
The Government of the USSR and the German Government consider the above restructuring as a reliable foundation for the further development of friendly relations between their peoples.
Article 5
This treaty is subject to ratification. The exchange of instruments of ratification should take place as soon as possible in Berlin.
The agreement comes into force from the moment of its signing. Compiled in two originals, in German and Russian.
2. Secret additional protocol to the Soviet-German treaty of September 28, 1939
The undersigned authorized representatives state the agreement of the German Government and the Government of the USSR as follows:
The secret additional protocol signed on August 23, 1939 is amended in paragraph 1 in such a way that the territory of the Lithuanian state is included in the sphere of interests of the USSR, since on the other hand the Lublin Voivodeship and parts of the Warsaw Voivodeship are included in the sphere of interests of Germany (see map to the one signed today Treaty of Friendship and Border between the USSR and Germany). As soon as the Government of the USSR takes special measures on Lithuanian territory to protect its interests, then, in order to draw the border naturally and simply, the present German-Lithuanian border is corrected so that the Lithuanian territory, which lies southwest of the line indicated on the map, goes to Germany.
By authority of the Government of the USSR
V. Molotov
For the German Government
I. von Ribbentrop
3. INTERVIEW OF K. E. VOROSHILOV TO THE IZVESTIA NEWSPAPER
An Izvestia employee turned to the head of the Soviet military mission, K. E. Voroshilov, with a number of questions, to which K. E. Voroshilov gave the following answers.
Question. How did the negotiations with the military missions of England and France end?
Answer. Due to the revelation of serious disagreements, the negotiations were interrupted. Military missions left Moscow back.
Question. Is it possible to know what these differences are?
Answer. The Soviet military mission believed that the USSR, which does not have a common border with the aggressor, can provide assistance to France, England, and Poland only if its troops pass through Polish territory, because there are no other ways for Soviet troops to come into contact with the aggressor’s troops . Just as the British and American troops in the last world war could not have taken part in military cooperation with the armed forces of France if they had not been able to operate on French territory, so the Soviet armed forces could not have taken part in military cooperation with the armed forces France and England, if they are not allowed into Poland.
Despite the obvious correctness of this position, the French and British military missions did not agree with this position of the Soviet mission, and the Polish government openly declared that it did not need and would not accept military assistance from the USSR.
This circumstance made military cooperation between the USSR and these countries impossible.
This is the basis of the disagreement. This is where the negotiations broke down.
Question. Was there any talk during the negotiations about helping Poland with raw materials and military materials?
Answer. No, it wasn't said. Assistance with raw materials and military materials is a matter of trade, and in order to provide Poland with raw materials and military materials, the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact, much less a military convention, is not at all required. The United States and other countries do not have any mutual assistance pacts or military conventions with Japan, but they have been selling raw materials and military materials to the Japanese for two years, despite the fact that Japan is at war with China. During the negotiations, it was not about assistance with raw materials and military materials, but about assistance with troops.
Question. A diplomatic observer for the Daily Herald newspaper writes that the military missions of England and France allegedly asked the Soviet mission whether the USSR should supply Poland with aircraft, ammunition and keep the Red Army ready on the border, and the Soviet military mission allegedly responded to this with the proposal: “ immediately after the start of the war, occupy Vilna and Nowogrudek in the northeast, as well as the Lvov, Tarnopol and Stanislav voivodeships in the southeast, so that from these areas the Red Army could provide military assistance to the Poles if necessary.”
What do you think of this statement by the Daily Herald diplomatic columnist? Is it true?
Answer. This statement is false from beginning to end, its author is a blatant liar, and the newspaper that published this false statement of its diplomatic observer is a slanderous newspaper.
Question. Reuters radio reported: “Voroshilov today told the heads of the British and French military missions that in view of the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty between the USSR and Germany, the Soviet government considers further negotiations with England and France pointless.”
Is this Reuters statement true?
Answer. No, that's not true. Military negotiations with England and France were interrupted not because the USSR concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany, but on the contrary, the USSR concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany as a result, among other things, of the fact that military negotiations with France and England reached a dead end due to insurmountable differences.
2. Unfamous war; prof. M. I. Semiryaga; Ogonyok magazine; 1989.
