2. Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact The key element in this interpretation of the history of the war was the non-aggression treaty between Germany and the USSR and the secret protocols to this treaty, signed on August 23, 1939. Let me remind you of the background to the appearance of this document. In conditions of constant

Commemorative card in honor of the Munich Treaty
1. The USSR was the last country to conclude a Non-Aggression Pact with Nazi Germany, and the only one to conclude it in conditions when a European war had become inevitable.

2. From 1933 to early 1939, the USSR was the only country that consistently opposed the Hitler regime. At the same time, having an embassy in Berlin, the USSR was the only one in Europe that had practically no other relations other than formal ones with Germany.

3. The USSR did NOT train military personnel for Nazi Germany. The training of a small number of pilots and tank crews was carried out by the Germans themselves on the territory of the USSR; personnel were trained exclusively for the MOST democratic country of the then Europe - the so-called Weimar Republic. All contacts were stopped after Hitler came to power.

4. The USSR repeatedly advocated the creation of an Eastern European security system, but all attempts were torpedoed by the governments of Poland and Germany, met with opposition in London and were finally buried as a result of a special operation by German intelligence services, when the French Foreign Minister Barthou was killed - the only person in the West (in power ), who advocated the inclusion of the USSR in the European security system.

5. The USSR in its European policy proceeded from the thesis, which was later confirmed, that the war would have to be waged with a coalition of European states. Therefore, the task of Soviet diplomacy was, if not eliminating the possibility of creating such a coalition, then at least reducing its possible participants.

6. With regard to Poland, the USSR proceeded from the fact that it was the most likely military enemy (in Poland there was the same attitude towards the USSR), as well as from the likely existence of a secret Polish-German protocol to the non-aggression declaration of 1934, which dealt with eastern vector of Polish-German military expansion. Today's analysis suggests that the publication of the texts of this protocol in a French newspaper on the eve of the visit of French Minister Laval to the USSR and the upcoming Franco-Soviet agreement on joint military cooperation was precisely aimed at disrupting this signing, that is, it was an activity of German intelligence. However, at that time it was not obvious and the Soviet leadership correctly proceeded from the “black scenario”. Moreover, the rapprochement between Poland and Germany gave every reason for this.

7. After the Munich Pact, the USSR proceeded from the obvious truth that

A) guarantees from Western partners are worth nothing
B) The USSR is completely thrown out of European politics
C) the agreement on joint actions with France is, in general, de facto invalid.

9. From the beginning of 1939, the USSR was concerned about the beginning of a discussion in Europe on the topic of “Greater Ukraine,” that is, the creation of a Ukrainian state with the help of Germany, including at the expense of Soviet territories. Considering Munich, the USSR took this very seriously.

10. An anti-Comintern pact was concluded between Germany and Japan, implying any assistance from one of the parties if the other was subjected to aggression from the USSR.

11. Since the spring of 1939, the USSR has entered into a direct military conflict with Japan on the Khalkhin Gol River, and Japan accuses the USSR of aggression.

12. Through official and unofficial channels, the USSR receives information that the conflict with Japan occurred under the influence and direct pressure of Germany. Thus, the theoretical possibility of war with Germany increases many times over. Against the background of the strongest pro-German lobby in England and France, this encourages us to listen more carefully to the proposals of the German side.

13. Due to the inevitability of war in Europe (so far only Polish-German), England and France, realizing that they too will be drawn into the war, agree to negotiate with the USSR on possible counteraction to German aggression.

14. Against the backdrop of the conflict at Khalkhin Gol, where the Red Army demonstrates its problems (which would later manifest themselves in the Finnish War and in 1941), Moscow negotiations begin between England, France and the USSR. It immediately becomes clear that the delegations of France and England do not have high status and authority to sign any agreement. Moreover: it quickly becomes clear that England and France do not guarantee entry into the war if the USSR enters it. Under these conditions, a war on two fronts becomes a reality for the USSR. German proposals for non-aggression and willingness to compromise look more tempting.

15. The USSR defines the most important conditions for signing any agreement: complete oblivion of the theme of Greater Ukraine, complete renunciation of any type of expansion into the Baltic countries, renunciation of attempts to bring the countries of south-eastern Europe under German control, renunciation of the desire for the complete occupation of Poland and withdrawal on the actual borders of the USSR and the resumption of trade relations. Yes! The most important condition for signing the Pact was a trade agreement under which the USSR would receive high-tech equipment and machines necessary for DEFENSE production!

16. The plan for an attack on Poland was developed BEFORE the signing of the Pact with the USSR and regardless of the results of negotiations between Molotov and Ribbentrop. Thus, the Pact affects the relationship only between Germany and the USSR.

17. BEFORE the signing of the Pact, the USSR repeatedly appealed to the Polish government on its own; there were also appeals from England and France about cooperation with the USSR against Germany, but Warsaw categorically refused.

18. Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow began under the conditions of the Soviet offensive on Khalkhin Gol. The pact was signed AFTER news of victory was received. It is quite possible to assume that in the event of defeat, the USSR would lose interest both for Germany and for any other countries.

19. The signing of the Pact in Moscow practically destroyed the Anti-Comintern Pact. Since the German partners did not coordinate the signing of the Pact in the context of the Soviet-Japanese conflict with Tokyo and simply did not inform it, in Tokyo this was regarded as a direct betrayal. The pact gave the USSR the opportunity to enter into full-fledged hostilities with Japan. Tokyo's further policy towards the USSR was built taking into account precisely this circumstance. It is difficult to call it anything other than a brilliant success of Soviet diplomacy.

20. The provisions of the Pact implied ONLY the topic of non-aggression and guarantees. The provisions of the secret protocol contained ONLY the nuances of these guarantees. There was no talk of any Soviet expansion into Poland and the Baltic countries. The USSR did not undertake to attack Poland and incorporate part of it.

21. Until September 12, in the conditions of the military defeat of Poland, Hitler himself did not yet know what to do with this Poland.

22. Until September 12, the USSR did not intervene in the Polish-German war. No documents were presented that would indicate a pre-prepared decision on the invasion.

23. Germany repeatedly asked the USSR for early intervention in the conflict, but the USSR categorically refused until a certain point.

24. The decision to intervene in the conflict was made not on the basis of the Pact and the secret protocol thereto, but in connection with the following circumstances:

A) On September 12, at Hitler’s headquarters, a decision was made to liquidate the Polish state and actually revive the theme of Greater Ukraine. Judging by the reaction of the Soviet side, this decision became known in Moscow almost immediately, which indicates well-organized intelligence in the circle of the then leader of the Ukrainian Nazis (Bandera’s version) Yaroy.
B) The first foreign unit within the Wehrmacht, the Konovalets Ukrainian Legion, was advancing towards the territory designated by the secret protocol as the sphere of influence of the USSR.
C) the Wehrmacht has already overcome the boundary of demarcation of spheres of influence established by the secret protocol. Thus, the possibility arose of the Wehrmacht reaching the borders of the USSR. But for the sake of the impossibility of this, the USSR agreed to a Pact with Germany.
D) The complete military defeat of Poland was obvious.
D) It was also obvious that England and France did not want to directly intervene in the conflict, despite the existing capabilities and security guarantees given to Poland.
E) Japan agreed to end the conflict at Khalkhin Gol.

25. The decision on a military operation in Poland was made by Moscow no earlier than September 14. At this time, the Wehrmacht had already entered Eastern Galicia.

26. The military operation began only after the Japanese side signed an armistice agreement. The threat of a military conflict on two fronts was completely eliminated.

27. The incorporation of the Eastern Kres of Poland into the USSR occurred due to three main circumstances:

A) preventing, as stated in Molotov’s statement of September 17, any surprises and accidents. Like the proclamation of the OUN Great Ukraine. Here the topic needs to be developed. What was the danger of such an idea? The behavior of England and France towards Poland showed that in both countries there are quite powerful forces working to end the conflict with Germany. Yes, London and Paris declared war, but that was the end of it. There was no guarantee that the formally declared war would not develop into a truce, and then into a new Munich, when three countries would demand from the USSR concessions of Ukrainian territories and their annexation to “Great Ukraine” under German protectorate. This could not be allowed. The idea was killed at the sperm level.
B) Hitler was categorically against any existence of Poland in any form, even a reduced one. To maintain the validity of the Pact, this had to be taken into account.
C) In order not to multiply entities: under the conditions of incorporation, it was easier and more profitable to conduct defense construction on the distant approaches to the old borders of the USSR. Not to mention the elimination of the “fifth column”.

28. The new border between the USSR and Germany was drawn not in accordance with the Pact and the secret protocol, but in accordance with the Treaty of Friendship and Borders. By the way, this border only partially corresponded to the delimitation of spheres of influence specified in the protocol.

29. The history of the Baltic countries is even less connected with the Pact.

30. The significance of the new border was best appreciated by Churchill, who said that thereby a second front against Germany was opened. He was smart. No less clever was the American correspondent in the Wehrmacht in the summer of 1941 (yes, it was like that, the United States had not yet fought), who wrote in a report that the Russians responded to every step of Germany with a counter-step, pushing the danger away from their borders.

Opposition to German revanchism

“Kandelaki Mission” and Stalin’s first attempts to improve relations with Hitler

This search for contacts begins in 1934, when (after the “Night of the Long Knives”) Stalin began to realize that Hitler had come to power in earnest and for a long time. As a result, at the end of this year, Soviet emissary David Kandelaki is sent to Berlin as a trade representative, who is tasked with establishing political relations with Berlin. Before Kandelaki leaves, Stalin receives him twice (and the second time the conversation takes place in private), which indicates the importance that Stalin attached to this mission. While negotiating in Germany, Kandelaki persistently tried to transfer them from the economic to the political level - to Reich Minister G. Goering and Director of the Reichsbank J. Schacht. In 1936, the Soviet side offered Berlin the signing of a non-aggression pact (rejected on the grounds that there was no common border between the USSR and Germany). To demonstrate goodwill on the part of Moscow, the head of the Soviet intelligence network, Walter Krivitsky, was ordered to curtail the German station.

The so-called “Kandelaki mission,” which lasted until 1937, ended in failure: Hitler, for ideological and political reasons, considered it necessary to maintain ties with the USSR at a minimum level. However, in the same 1937, through Yezhov, through the NKVD, channels of communication were established with the highest spheres of the Reich.

The situation after Munich

At the same time (in October 1938), Hitler for the first time puts forward claims against Poland (demanding Danzig, extraterritorial roads and the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact), which later served as the reason for Germany’s attack on Poland.

"We're talking about roasted chestnuts"

Negotiations with Poland, however, did not lead to the result desired by Hitler; the situation worsened, and the threat of war again arose. Under these conditions, Stalin, speaking on March 10, 1939 at the XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), in a speech that in the West was called the “speech about roasted chestnuts,” accused the Anglo-French of provoking war and declared readiness for a “policy of peace” in relation to Germany, declaring the main objectives of Soviet policy:

1. Continue to pursue a policy of peace and strengthening business ties with all countries.

2. […] Do not allow war provocateurs, who are accustomed to raking in the heat with the hands of others, to drag our country into conflicts.

This hint was immediately accepted in Berlin. Subsequently, after the conclusion of the Pact, Molotov called it “the beginning of a turn” in Soviet-German relations.

Crisis of 1939

Spring-summer crisis of 1939

The further development of the situation in Europe looked as follows.

Soviet diplomacy in the context of the spring-summer crisis

Negotiations in the summer of 1939

Political negotiations with England and France

Trilateral political negotiations between the USSR, Great Britain and France, which began on April 10, were based on the Soviet project of June 2, which provided for the entry into force of the union in the following cases:

• In the event of an attack by one of the European powers (i.e. Germany) on the contracting party;
• in the event of German aggression against Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Romania, Poland, Latvia, Estonia or Finland (all of them were given guarantees of protection by the contracting parties),
• in the event that one of the parties is involved in a war due to the provision of assistance at the request of a third European country.

These conditions were accepted by London and Paris only partially. . The negotiations, which lasted until the end of July, rested mainly on the reluctance of England and France to accept the Soviet definition of the concept of “indirect aggression”, under which allied obligations came into force. In the Soviet version it was defined as follows:

The expression “indirect aggression” refers to an action by which any of the above states<страны, пограничные с СССР, а также Бельгия и Греция>agrees under the threat of force from another power or without such threat and which entails the use of the territory and forces of that state for aggression against it or against one of the contracting parties

This was regarded by the Anglo-French as a demand from the USSR to provide it with the opportunity to send its troops into neighboring countries at will and under any pretext. For their part, the “democracies” proposed a version of the treaty in which the presence of “indirect aggression” was established only after tripartite consultations; The USSR, for its part, accused England and France of unwillingness to commit themselves to military participation in the event of a possible war with Germany. In addition, the Soviet Union demanded that a military convention be concluded simultaneously with a political treaty, and England and France insisted that military negotiations follow a political agreement.

According to Churchill,

The obstacle to concluding such an agreement (with the USSR) was the horror that these same border states experienced of Soviet help in the form of Soviet armies that could pass through their territories to protect them from the Germans and, at the same time, include them in the Soviet-communist system. After all, they were the most vehement opponents of this system. Poland, Romania, Finland and the three Baltic states did not know what they feared more - German aggression or Russian salvation. It was the need to make such a terrible choice that paralyzed the politics of England and France.

Rapprochement between the USSR and Germany

At the end of July 1939, Hitler decided to rapprochement with the USSR. On July 26, Soviet charge d'affaires Astakhov is invited to a restaurant to “test” him in an informal setting. On the German side, there was an official from the Foreign Ministry, Schnurre, who was still conducting economic negotiations. The results of the conversation satisfied both parties. Astakhov reports in a telegram:

Germany is ready to talk and come to an agreement with us [the USSR] on all issues of interest to both sides, giving all the security guarantees that we would like to receive from it. Even with regard to the Baltic states and Poland, it would be as easy to reach an agreement as it would be with regard to Ukraine (which Germany abandoned).

According to these authors, “all its points were aimed not at how to promote the success of the negotiations (their goal was not even stated), but at how to disrupt them, then placing responsibility for the failure on the Western delegations that sent them.” This is also confirmed by the fact that on August 11, that is, on the eve of the start of negotiations, the Politburo decided to “enter into an official discussion of the issues raised by the Germans, about which to notify Berlin.” . Chargé d'Affaires of the USSR in Germany Astakhov wrote to Molotov on August 8, 1939:

...But, essentially, the Germans are, of course, not interested in these questions. Judging by the hints that I hear and the trends that reach me, they would not be averse, having tested our discretion and readiness to negotiate on these issues, to involve us in conversations of a more far-reaching order, reviewing all territorial and political problems that could arise between us and them. In this regard, the phrase about the absence of contradictions “all along the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea” can be understood as a desire to agree on all issues related to the countries located in this zone. The Germans want to give us the impression that they would be ready to declare their disinterest (at least politically) in the fate of the Baltic states (except Lithuania), Bessarabia, Russian Poland (with changes in favor of the Germans) and dissociate themselves from the aspiration to Ukraine. For this, they would like to have confirmation from us of our disinterest in the fate of Danzig, as well as former German Poland (perhaps with an addition to the Warta or even the Vistula line) and (by way of discussion) Galicia. Conversations of this kind, in the minds of the Germans, are obviously conceivable only on the basis of the absence of an Anglo-French-Soviet military-political agreement.

...The list of objects indicated in your letter of August 8 interests us. Conversations about them require preparation and some transitional steps from the trade and credit agreement to other issues. We prefer to negotiate on these issues in Moscow. Molotov.

According to other researchers, the text does not provide grounds for such interpretations

Voroshilov posed a number of specific questions to the Anglo-French, to which they could not give clear answers, since they were forbidden to disclose secret military information (due to the fact that, in the absence of a binding political agreement, it could be transferred to Berlin). The USSR also presented a deployment plan, according to which up to 136 divisions were supposed to operate, but representatives of England and France did not provide such plans

A day later it came to the question of allowing the Red Army through the territory of Poland, along the Vilna and Galician corridors - without which, in the opinion of the Soviet side, possible German aggression could not be repelled. . This turned out to be a “dead point” at which the negotiations froze. The Poles flatly refused to let the Red Army pass through their territory, despite pressure from France. There is a well-known aphoristic expression said by Beck to the French ambassador: “With the Germans we risk losing our freedom, and with the Russians our soul.”

There is no doubt that the USSR wants to conclude a military pact and does not want us to turn this pact into an empty piece of paper that has no specific meaning. […] The failure of the negotiations is inevitable if Poland does not change its position.

American journalist William Shirer states:

Despite the widespread opinion at that time not only in Moscow, but also in Western capitals, that England and France did nothing to persuade Poland to allow Soviet troops to pass through its territory for protection against the Germans, it follows from recently published documents that this is not so. England and France have advanced far in this matter, but not far enough. It is also clear from these documents that the Poles showed incomprehensible stupidity.

Simultaneously with the Moscow negotiations, the British government was negotiating in London with German representatives to conclude an agreement that would recognize special German interests in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe; In addition, England was ready to allow Germany to exploit the “colonial-African zone.” The negotiations ended in failure due to Germany's actual refusal to consider British proposals, due to the depth of mutual contradictions.

According to the official Soviet version, it was after this that the Soviet government stopped trusting its partners in the Moscow negotiations and agreed to consider Germany's proposal to conclude a German-Soviet non-aggression pact.

Politics of Eastern Europe

The governments of Eastern European countries treated the USSR with deep mistrust. In March 1939, after Germany captured the Klaipeda region of Lithuania, the USSR took diplomatic steps towards rapprochement with Latvia and Estonia, but they were greeted coldly. . In May, despite worsening relations with Germany, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Poland did not want to commit itself to any agreements with the USSR.

The American historian W. Shirer characterizes the pre-war policy of Poland as “suicidal.” Shirer notes that Poland, since 1934, had steadily supported Germany to the detriment of the Versailles system. At the same time, there was an acute territorial dispute between Poland and Germany over the Danzig Corridor, which divided German territory into two parts. Relations between Poland and Russia have been cool since the Polish-Soviet War, in which Poland attacked Russia, weakened by the civil war, and moved its border east of the Curzon Line at the expense of Soviet territory. (As a result of this, about 6 million ethnic Belarusians and Ukrainians ended up in Poland). After Piłsudski's death, Polish policy was shaped by veterans of the Soviet-Polish War, such as Beck and Rydz-Śmigły, who were committed to confrontation with the USSR. Thus, according to Shirer, Poland had a border that was “unacceptable” to either Germany or the USSR, without being strong enough to be able to quarrel with both neighbors at the same time.

The Baltic countries, as Estonian historian Dr. Magnus Ilmjärv notes, did not trust the USSR both for historical reasons and because of the difference in regimes; The Soviet-British-French negotiations that began in the summer of 1939 aroused their fears that, upon entering these countries, the Red Army would establish a Bolshevik regime there and ultimately refuse to leave. In addition, the Baltic countries, after the Munich experience, did not believe that Great Britain and France would actually fulfill their obligations to protect them in the event of German aggression.

As a result, the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Finland declared that any guarantee given without their request would be considered an act of aggression, after which they rushed to conclude non-aggression pacts with Germany (June 7). At the same time, Germany not only promised not to attack the Baltic countries, but also guaranteed assistance in the event of Soviet aggression. This gave the Baltic governments a sense of security, which soon turned out to be false. High-ranking German military officials (Halder and Canaris) visited the Baltic countries and negotiated military cooperation there. According to the German envoy in Tallinn, the chief of staff of the Estonian army, Reck, told him that Estonia could assist Germany in establishing control over the Baltic Sea, including in mining the Gulf of Finland against Soviet warships.

Non-aggression pact

Signing the contract

Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow at noon on August 23 and immediately reported to the Kremlin. The meeting, which lasted three hours, ended favorably for the Germans. When the discussion of the draft treaty began, Stalin said: “This treaty requires additional agreements, about which we will not publish anything anywhere.” This meant a secret protocol on the division of spheres of mutual interests. According to Ribbentrop, Stalin “made it clear that if he does not receive half of Poland and the Baltic countries without Lithuania with the port of Libau, then I can immediately fly back” (As Ribbentrop’s telegram to Hitler shows, it was about two Latvian ports - Liepaja and Ventspils) .). That same evening both documents were signed. Negotiations continued until the morning. The meeting ended with a banquet, which opened with a toast from Stalin: “I know how much the German people love the Fuhrer. That’s why I want to drink to his health.”

Contents and legal characteristics of the agreement

Left: division of areas of interest in Eastern Europe under the additional protocol.
Right: actual territorial changes by 1941.
The territories ceded and ceded to the USSR are depicted in orange, the territories ceded to the Reich in blue, the territories occupied by Germany (Government General of Warsaw and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia) in purple.

Assessments of the legal side of the contract are contradictory. According to some opinions, the Non-Aggression Treaty itself (without a protocol) does not contain anything unusual and is a typical non-aggression treaty, examples of which are frequent in contemporary European history (for example, a similar pact between Germany and Poland). In addition, the delimitation of spheres of interest, in itself, does not imply a mandatory change in the status of states classified as someone’s sphere of interest.
Other authors, analyzing the agreement, point to the following features that make it possible to characterize it as a conscious encouragement of the aggressor:

1. The treaty did not contain a clause that would cancel its validity if one of the parties committed aggression (in international practice this clause was optional, but in Soviet treaties of this kind it was certainly present until then).
2. Article II of the treaty provided for the observance of neutrality in the event that one of the parties became not the target of an attack, but “the object of military action by a third power” (that is, the USSR guaranteed Germany neutrality in both defensive and aggressive actions).
3. Article III declared forms of political interaction in the form of consultations.
4. Article IV declared the refusal of both sides to participate in a grouping of powers directly or indirectly directed against the other side. At the same time, it did not contain the usual clause in such cases that this agreement does not cancel the validity of previously concluded agreements. Thus, this treaty canceled all agreements previously concluded by the USSR with Germany's opponents, and concluded a promise not to support them in any form. From this they conclude that Articles III and IV unilaterally tied the USSR to the German bloc to the detriment of relations with Germany’s opponents (Although from a legal point of view such a clause is unthinkable, since an agreement concluded between the two parties cannot in any way change or cancel any other an agreement concluded by one of the parties to this agreement with a third party - without such a third party itself becoming a party to the agreement being concluded).

These authors also point out that the Treaty is closely related to the secret protocol and cannot be assessed separately from it, as well as outside the specific pre-war situation of those days. The secret protocol to the agreement included Latvia, Estonia and Finland in the sphere of interests of the USSR in the Baltic states, and Lithuania in Germany; in Poland, the division took place along the Narew-Vistula-San line, Vilnius passed from Poland to Lithuania. At the same time, the very question of whether it was desirable from the point of view of the interests of the contracting parties to preserve the Polish state was left to “the course of further political development,” but in any case had to be resolved “in the manner of friendly mutual consent.” In addition, the USSR emphasized its interest in Bessarabia, and Germany did not object to the interests of the USSR in Bessarabia. The additional protocol is assessed by these authors as legally unlawful, since it concerned third countries

Japan's reaction to the signing of the treaty

On August 25, 1939, Japanese Foreign Minister Arita protested to the German Ambassador in Tokyo Otto about the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact. The protest noted that this treaty in its spirit contradicted the Anti-Comintern Agreement. On August 28, 1939, the Japanese government, led by Kiichiro Hiranuma, who was a supporter of the joint Japanese-German war against the USSR, resigned.

Versions about the reasons for signing the agreement

Version about the USSR's desire to avoid war with Germany

This version is adhered to by Soviet and modern Russian historiography.

The treaty was signed after the failure of Moscow negotiations held in the spring-summer of 1939 between representatives of the USSR, England and France in order to conclude a tripartite treaty of mutual assistance (a draft treaty was presented by the Soviet government on June 2) and a military convention providing for specific military measures to ensure collective security in Europe.

During the negotiations, it was revealed that England and France were unwilling to give specific military commitments and develop real military plans to counter possible German aggression. Moreover, in parallel with the Moscow negotiations, the British government held negotiations in London with German representatives on the delimitation of spheres of influence. And this further strengthened the fears of the Soviet government that its Western partners were seeking to direct Hitler’s aggression to the east, the aggression that had already led to the Munich Agreement and the division of Czechoslovakia. As a result of the failure of the Moscow negotiations, the USSR lost hope of creating a military coalition with the Western powers and found itself in a hostile environment, when in the West its potential opponents were both the countries of the “cordon sanitaire” and Germany, and in the East militaristic Japan acted as the aggressor. Under these conditions, the USSR was forced to agree to Germany’s proposals to begin negotiations on concluding a non-aggression treaty.

Thus, Soviet historiography considered the signing of a non-aggression pact with Germany the only way to avoid war with Germany and other countries of the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1939, when the USSR, in its opinion, was actually isolated, without allies

Version about Stalin's expansionist motives

As a number of researchers believe, the agreement became a manifestation of the expansionist aspirations of Stalin, who sought to pit Germany against the “Western democracies” and take the position of the “third rejoicing”, and after their mutual weakening, to Sovietize Western Europe. S.Z. Sluch, who believes that Stalin saw Germany primarily as a “natural ally” in the fight against the capitalist world, characterizes the agreement as follows: “Essentially, continental Europe, even before the outbreak of the Second World War, was divided between two dictators who represented on the international stage models of largely similar behavior - political gangsterism of a new type, differing only in the scale and degree of hypocrisy.” .

Version of Stalin's imperial motives

This point of view explains Stalin's actions solely by pragmatic-imperial considerations. According to it, Stalin for some time chose between Germany and the “democracies”, but, faced with the latter’s dishonesty, he chose to stay away from the war and take advantage of the benefits of “friendship” with Germany, first of all by establishing the political interests of the USSR in Eastern Europe. This opinion was already expressed by Winston Churchill immediately after the signing of the Treaty.

According to Geoffrey Roberts, a professor of history at the University of Ireland, the policy of the USSR was to achieve, on the basis of an agreement with Germany, a limited sphere of influence that would guarantee the country's primary security needs, mainly to keep the country from being drawn into war and limit German expansion to the east. .

It should also be noted that many historians believe that England and France, contrary to the version of Soviet historiography, did not have as their goal the direction of German aggression in the east of Europe.

Version of Stalin's preparation for an attack on Germany

This version is supported by the concentration of Soviet troops near the borders of Germany in 1941 and the training of the Red Army in offensive war tactics.

Possible motives for Stalin's actions

Calculations to provoke war

According to a number of researchers, Stalin was never a sincere adherent of the course of collective security officially proclaimed (and sincerely defended) by Litvinov.

It is significant that collective security is not mentioned a word in the “Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks),” edited and partially written by Stalin himself. Moreover, in this work, written in the city, it was argued that “the second imperialist war has in fact already begun” - thus, the ongoing political events were qualified by Stalin as a war between imperialist states. Deputy People's Commissar of the NKID V. Potemkin outlined the official concept of the “second imperialist war” and its prospects in the magazine “Bolshevik”:

A. A. Zhdanov, outlining the theses of Stalin’s future “speech on roasted chestnuts” at the Leningrad Party Conference on March 3, 1939, made the following summary: Moscow’s task is “to accumulate our forces for the time when we deal with Hitler and Mussolini, and at the same time, of course, , and with Chamberlain"

From this, a number of researchers conclude that Stalin considered the undermining of the imperialist system during the proposed war to be his political goal. As S.Z. Sluch believes, Stalin “saw in the acutely confrontational development of the international situation additional opportunities for realizing his own imperial ambitions, identified with the interests of the country’s security, and sought to force the capitalist world to “make room a little and retreat”

In 1935, Stalin wrote to Kaganovich in a coded telegram:

The stronger the fight between them will be<капиталистическими странами>, the better for the USSR. We can sell bread to both so they can fight.<...>It is beneficial for us that their fight lasts as long as possible, but without a quick victory for one over the other

Almost the same thoughts were expressed by Stalin immediately after the outbreak of World War II to Georgiy Dimitrov:

The war is going on between two groups of capitalist countries (poor and rich in terms of colonies, raw materials, etc.) for the redivision of the world, for domination over the world! We wouldn't mind them having a good fight and weakening each other. It would not be bad if the position of the richest capitalist countries (especially England) was shaken by the hands of Germany. Hitler, without understanding this and without wanting to, is shaking and undermining the capitalist system.<...>We can maneuver, push one side against the other in order to better tear ourselves apart.<...>What harm would happen if, as a result of the defeat of Poland, we extended the socialist system to new territories and populations?

In this regard, some historians believe that Stalin was actually guided by the “rules of the game” that he formulated in his “speech about roasted chestnuts” in relation to England and France:

Formally, the policy of non-intervention could be characterized in this way: “let each country defend itself from aggressors as it wants and as best it can, our business is our side, we will trade with both the aggressors and their victims.” In reality, however, the policy of non-intervention means condoning aggression, unleashing a war, and therefore turning it into a world war. In the policy of non-intervention there is a desire, a desire not to interfere with aggressors from doing their dirty deed.<...>let all the participants in the war get bogged down deep in the mire of war, encourage them in this quietly, let them weaken and exhaust each other, and then, when they are weakened enough, appear on the stage with fresh forces - act, of course, “in the interests of peace” and dictate weakened war participants their own conditions. And cheap and cute!

“State tasks of the USSR” as understood by Stalin

A number of researchers believe that Stalin, when putting forward his proposals for a joint struggle with Hitler, was not at all as disinterested as official Moscow imagined. In this they rely on a number of statements that directly or indirectly go back to Stalin himself. In the city, the newspaper Pravda defined the behavior of the USSR before the signing of the pact as follows: “The USSR sought to implement its state tasks within the western borders of our country and strengthen peace, and Anglo-French diplomacy - to ignore these tasks of the USSR, to organize war and involving the Soviet Union in it."

They also point to Stalin’s words to Georgiy Dimitrov (September 7), from which it is clear that Stalin expected to receive “payment” for an alliance with democracies:

We preferred an agreement with the so-called democratic countries, and therefore negotiated. But the British and French wanted to have us as farm laborers, and not pay anything! We, of course, would not go to work as farm laborers, much less without receiving anything.

Opinions of contemporaries

Our enemies also counted on the fact that Russia would become our enemy after the conquest of Poland. The enemies did not take into account my determination. Our enemies are like little worms. I saw them in Munich. I was convinced that Stalin would never accept the British proposal. Only reckless optimists could think that Stalin was so stupid that he did not recognize their true goal. Russia is not interested in preserving Poland... Litvinov's resignation was the decisive factor. After that, I instantly realized that Moscow’s attitude towards the Western powers had changed. I took steps aimed at changing relations with Russia. In connection with the economic agreement, political negotiations began. Eventually an offer was made from the Russians to sign a non-aggression pact. Four days ago I took a special step that led to Russia yesterday announcing its readiness to sign the pact. Personal contact was established with Stalin. The day after tomorrow Ribbentrop will conclude an agreement. Now Poland finds itself in the position I wanted to see it in... The beginning has been made of the destruction of England's hegemony. Now that I have made the necessary diplomatic preparations, the path is clear for the soldiers.

It may be asked: how could it happen that the Soviet Government agreed to conclude a non-aggression pact with such treacherous people and monsters as Hitler and Ribbentrop? Was there a mistake made here by the Soviet Government? Of course not! A non-aggression pact is a peace pact between two states. This is exactly the kind of pact Germany offered us in 1939. Could the Soviet Government refuse such a proposal? I think that not a single peace-loving state can refuse a peace agreement with a neighboring power, if at the head of this power are even such monsters and cannibals as Hitler and Ribbentrop. And this, of course, is subject to one indispensable condition - if the peace agreement does not affect either directly or indirectly the territorial integrity, independence and honor of the peace-loving state. As you know, the non-aggression pact between Germany and the USSR is just such a pact.

As for the agreement with Russia, I fully approve of it<...>rapprochement between Germany and Russia is necessary to prevent their democracies from encircling them

7. William Shirer, American historian, correspondent in Germany

France, together with Germany and England, unanimously excluded Russia from participating in the meeting in Munich. Within months, Western democracies had to pay the price. On October 3, four days after the Munich meeting, Werner von Tippelskirch, adviser to the German embassy in Moscow, reported to Berlin on the consequences of Munich for the politics of the Soviet Union.<…>

In London and Paris they bitterly lamented Stalin's double game. For many years, the Soviet despot shouted about “fascist beasts,” calling on all peace-loving states to unite to stop Nazi aggression. Now he himself became her accomplice. The Kremlin could argue, which, in fact, they did: the Soviet Union did what England and France did a year ago in Munich - at the expense of a small state, they bought themselves a peaceful respite necessary for rearmament in order to resist Germany. If Chamberlain acted honestly and nobly, appeasing Hitler and giving him Czechoslovakia in 1938, then why did Stalin behave dishonestly and ignoblely, appeasing Hitler a year later with Poland, which still refused Soviet help?

About Stalin's secret cynical deal with Hitler<по разделу Восточной Европы>(...)knew only in Berlin and Moscow. True, everyone soon learned about it from the steps that Russia took and which even then amazed the whole world. (...)

In 1948, in response to the publication of the aforementioned collection of the US State Department “Nazi-Soviet relations”, the Sovinformburo published the book “Falsifiers of History”, which makes counter-accusations against Western countries and, in turn, contains allegations about the financing of Germany by British and American financial circles in the 1930s years Unlike the publication of the US State Department, which was, in fact, a collection of archival documents, the Soviet publication was an author's text; it did not contain a single document in full and several in minor excerpts. The existence of a secret protocol was denied by Molotov until his death, which he repeatedly spoke about in conversations with the writer Chuev.

The issue of the pact and especially the protocols was raised in the USSR during perestroika primarily due to pressure from Poland (see Katyn Question). To study the issue, a special commission was created headed by the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Alexander Yakovlev. On December 24, 1989, the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, having heard the commission's conclusions reported by Yakovlev, adopted a resolution in which it condemned the protocol (noting the absence of originals, but recognizing its authenticity, based on graphological, phototechnical and lexical examination of copies, and the correspondence of subsequent events to them). At the same time, for the first time in the USSR, the text of secret protocols was published (based on German microfilm - “Questions of History”, No. 6, 1989).

The original protocol was actually kept in the Presidential Archive (now the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Special folder, package No. 34), but was hidden by Mikhail Gorbachev (who knew about its existence since 1987), and Gorbachev, according to his property manager V. Boldin, hinted to Boldin on the desirability of destroying this document. After the archive was declassified, the document was “found” on October 30, 1992 by the Deputy Head of the Main Political Directorate, Colonel General D.A. Volkogonov and published in newspapers. Scientific publication took place in the journal “New and Contemporary History”, No. 1 for 1993.

See also

• Soviet-German cooperation in the period before World War II

Notes

1. S.Z. Case. Stalin and Hitler, 1933-1941. Calculations and miscalculations of the Kremlin, Domestic History, 2005, No. 1 pp. 100-101.
2. TSB "World War II"
3. Anthony C. Sutton. Wall Street and the rise of Hitler. New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1975
4. S.Z. Case. Stalin and Hitler, 1933-1941. Calculations and miscalculations of the Kremlin, Domestic History, 2005, No. 1 p. 101 ff.
5. S.Z. Case. Germany and the USSR in 1918-1939: motives and consequences of foreign policy decisions // USSR and Germany during the years of war and peace (1941-1945) M., 1995
6. A. M. Nekrich. June 22, 1941
7. D. G. Najafov. The Soviet-German Pact of 1939 and its historical consequences. // Questions of History, No. 12, 2006, p. 7

On August 24, 1939, the Soviet newspaper Pravda published an editorial about the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact. A large photograph on the front page showed Molotov, Stalin, Ribbentrop, Deputy State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry Gaus and their legal advisers and translators. Under the photo from the meeting in the Kremlin the following was written: “On August 23, at 3:30 a.m., V.M.’s first conversation took place. Molotov with the German Foreign Minister, Mr. von Ribbentrop. The conversation took place in the presence of Comrade Stalin and the German Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg and lasted three hours. After a break in the negotiations at ten o’clock in the evening, the conversation was resumed and ended with the signing of a non-aggression pact, the text of which is given below.”

For the world community, the signing of the treaty, which became known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, came as a bolt from the blue, because until now the Soviet Union had acted as a resolute opponent of Nazi expansion. However, the signing was not such an unexpected event, because on August 21 it was preceded by a message about the conclusion of a trade agreement between the USSR and the Third Reich. There is an opinion that it was this pact that provoked the outbreak of World War II. But it would not be harmful to recall what preceded its signing.

The non-aggression pact itself was not as shameful as the secret protocol in which the two countries divided spheres of influence in Eastern Europe, the existence of which the Soviet Union stubbornly denied until glasnost under Gorbachev. The protocol guaranteed that the northern border of Lithuania would be “in the event of territorial and political changes” the border of the Soviet-German zone of interests in the Baltic states, and the Narva-Vistula-San line would become a temporary demarcation line. Also, subsequently, the USSR and Germany had to decide whether to maintain the Polish state at all and within what borders.

But for the sake of objectivity, it should be said that the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was preceded by trilateral British-French-Soviet military negotiations on cooperation in Europe in the face of German aggression against Poland. True, these negotiations ended in nothing. The two main Western democratic regimes were not particularly eager to sign a mutually beneficial and effective treaty. When the Soviet government invited them to send military delegations to Moscow, their members prepared for departure for 11 days, then sailed for six days to Leningrad on a slow steamer designed to transport passengers and goods, and arrived in Moscow only on August 11.

Context

Why did Putin justify the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact?

"Top-secret" protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was a disaster for Stalin

Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact: no history - just politics

A member of the Soviet military delegation, Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Marshal Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov, presented three options for joint actions by the armed forces of the USSR, Great Britain and France against the aggressor.

The Soviet government pledged to send 120 rifle and 16 cavalry divisions, 5 thousand heavy guns and howitzers, 9 - 10 thousand tanks and 5 - 5.5 thousand bombers and fighters to fight the aggressor in Europe.

In the event of an attack on Great Britain and France, the USSR had to provide 70% of the armed forces with which Great Britain and France would confront the main enemy, that is, Germany. In this case, Poland was expected to participate in the war on a large scale, which was supposed to concentrate 40-50 divisions on its western borders.

In the event of an attack by the aggressor on Poland and Romania, both of these countries had to throw all their forces to the front, and the USSR - the same amount of resources as Great Britain and France would have put forward directly against Germany. Marshal Shaposhnikov emphasized that the USSR, for obvious reasons, can take part in the war only if the country of the Gallic rooster and the United Kingdom agree with Poland and Romania, or perhaps with Lithuania and Romania, on the passage of Soviet troops, because otherwise the Red Army will not be able to reach the line of contact with the enemy and take part in the war, which is not without logic.

If Admiral Drax still had a lot of time, then General Doumenc in a telegram dated August 17 to Paris stated: “The Russians are firmly determined not to remain on the sidelines as observers and clearly want to assume certain obligations…. There is no doubt that the USSR wants to conclude a military pact and does not want us to turn this pact into an empty piece of paper that has no specific meaning. Marshal Voroshilov assured me that we will resolve all issues of mutual assistance, interaction, etc., as soon as what the Russians call the “cardinal issue”—their access to Polish territory—is satisfactorily resolved.”

On the same day, the desperate Dumenk even sent one of his assistants, capital Beafre, to Warsaw to the Inspector General of the Polish Armed Forces, Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly, but all in vain. The extremely anti-Soviet and anti-Russian marshal repeated what he said to the French ambassador: “Perhaps with the Germans we risk losing our freedom, and with the Russians our soul.”

Only on August 23, after the announcement of Ribbentrop’s arrival in Moscow, the Polish government expressed consent, but not to the passage of Soviet troops, but to the fact that it would consider the issue of Soviet military assistance - albeit with some reservations. On the same day, with literally hours ticking, Polish Foreign Minister Josef Beck said: “The Polish government agrees that General Dumenk make the following statement: “We are now confident that in the event of joint action against German aggression, cooperation between Poland and the Soviet A union, the technical terms of which still need to be negotiated, is not excluded (or possible)."

France, and especially Great Britain, were not interested in signing a specific agreement with the Soviet Union, and, on the contrary, the USSR, for obvious reasons, did not want to allow itself to be drawn into a war with Germany, especially when the Red Army was simultaneously fighting fierce battles in the Far East near the Mongolian Khalkhin - Goal with the Japanese. Poland’s reluctance to allow the Red Army into its territory also played a fatal role, which, however, from the point of view of the Poles, was justified by historical reasons. They still vividly remembered the bloody war with Soviet Russia in 1918-1921, when their capital Warsaw was saved by the “miracle on the Vistula” - the defeat of the Red Army in August 1920.

Nazi Germany was again victorious in the diplomatic arena. Nine days after the pact was signed, Germany began World War II by attacking Poland. But the Soviet Union did not sit idly by, and on September 17 struck the desperately defending Polish army in the back, and the Poles still cannot forgive the Russians for this. The fourth partition of Poland followed - the worst of all, considering the number of lives lost and material damage. The Soviet Union occupied even more territory than Nazi Germany.

The price the USSR paid for this was small: according to official Russian data, the number of dead and missing was 1,475 (Polish data is much higher). The deployment of Soviet units in the Baltics followed. But then the icy shower began. When the Red Army attacked Finland on November 30, 1939, beginning the Winter War, it faced fierce resistance from the bravely defending Finns. According to official data, the territory that the USSR “snatched” from the country of a thousand lakes cost 126,875 dead and missing Soviet soldiers.

In the summer of 1940, the USSR occupied and annexed the Baltic states, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. At the same time, there was not a word about the last two regions in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The Soviet Union “liberated” them along the way.

In 2009, the Warsaw Institute of National Remembrance stated that the number of victims as a result of the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland reached 150 thousand people. Many others (mostly Polish émigré journalists) say that the losses were much greater. Soviet terror in 1940-1941 cost Estonia 3,173 prisoners and 5,978 exiles, of whom 6,000 died. 2 thousand people were executed and killed. During the first Soviet occupation in the same period in Lithuania, 5,665 people were sent to prison, 10,187 were sent into exile, and 9 thousand of them died. The number of executed and killed was 2,500 people. In Latvia, 5,625 prisoners and 9,546 exiles became victims of repression, of which 5 thousand died, and 2 thousand were executed and killed. In the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (formerly Bessarabia), a thousand people were executed and killed, 15 thousand were arrested, and seven thousand of them died. 32 thousand were sent into exile, and 12 thousand of them did not survive it.

This bitter experience is the reason for the great and still persisting fear of the Russian neighbor and undisguised Russophobia - especially in Poland and the Baltic states. The words of the Republican candidate for US President Donald Trump that the United States would not fight over Estonia do not add to their confidence in their own security and peace of mind.