Former fortifications of the Finnish defensive line. Stalin's fourth blow

Main events of the Soviet-Finnish war 11/30/1939 - 3/13/1940:

The group of Soviet troops consisted of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies. The 7th Army advanced on the Karelian Isthmus, the 8th Army north of Lake Ladoga, the 9th Army in northern and central Karelia, and the 14th Army in Petsamo.

Soviet tank BT-5

Soviet tank T-28

The advance of the 7th Army on the Karelian Isthmus was opposed by the Army of the Isthmus (Kannaksen armeija) under the command of Hugo Esterman.

For the Soviet troops, these battles became the most difficult and bloody. The Soviet command had only “sketchy intelligence information about the concrete strips of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus.” As a result, the allocated forces to break through the “Mannerheim Line” turned out to be completely insufficient. The troops turned out to be completely unprepared to overcome the line of bunkers and bunkers. In particular, there was little large-caliber artillery needed to destroy bunkers. By December 12, units of the 7th Army were able to overcome only the line support zone and reach the front edge of the main defense line, but the planned breakthrough of the line on the move failed due to clearly insufficient forces and poor organization of the offensive. On December 12, the Finnish army carried out one of its most successful operations at Lake Tolvajärvi.

Until the end of December, attempts at a breakthrough continued, but were unsuccessful.

The 8th Army advanced 80 km. It was opposed by the IV Army Corps (IV armeija kunta), commanded by Juho Heiskanen.

Juho Heiskanen

Some of the Soviet troops were surrounded. After heavy fighting they had to retreat.

The advance of the 9th and 14th armies was opposed by the Northern Finland task force (Pohjois-Suomen Ryhm?) under the command of Major General Viljo Einar Tuompo. Its area of ​​responsibility was a 400-mile stretch of territory from Petsamo to Kuhmo. The 9th Army launched an offensive from White Sea Karelia. It penetrated the enemy defenses at 35-45 km, but was stopped. The 14th Army, attacking the Petsamo area, achieved the greatest success. Interacting with the Northern Fleet, the troops of the 14th Army were able to capture the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, and the city of Petsamo (now Pechenga). Thus, they closed Finland's access to the Barents Sea.

Front kitchen

Some researchers and memoirists try to explain Soviet failures also by the weather: severe frosts (up to -40°C) and deep snow up to 2 m. However, both meteorological observation data and other documents refute this: until December 20, 1939, On the Karelian Isthmus, temperatures ranged from +2 to -7°C. Then until the New Year the temperature did not drop below 23°C. Frosts of up to 40°C began in the second half of January, when there was a lull at the front. Moreover, these frosts hindered not only the attackers, but also the defenders, as Mannerheim also wrote about. There was also no deep snow before January 1940. Thus, operational reports of Soviet divisions dated December 15, 1939 indicate a depth of snow cover of 10-15 cm. Moreover, successful offensive operations in February took place in more severe weather conditions.

Destroyed Soviet T-26 tank

T-26

An unpleasant surprise was also the massive use of Molotov cocktails by the Finns against Soviet tanks, later nicknamed the “Molotov cocktail.” During the 3 months of the war, the Finnish industry produced over half a million bottles.

Molotov cocktail from the Winter War

During the war, Soviet troops were the first to use radar stations (RUS-1) in combat conditions to detect enemy aircraft.

Radar "RUS-1"

Mannerheim Line

The Mannerheim Line (Finnish: Mannerheim-linja) is a complex of defensive structures on the Finnish part of the Karelian Isthmus, created in 1920-1930 to deter a possible offensive attack from the USSR. The length of the line was about 135 km, the depth was about 90 km. Named after Marshal Karl Mannerheim, on whose orders plans for the defense of the Karelian Isthmus were developed back in 1918. On his initiative, the largest structures of the complex were created.

Name

The name “Mannerheim Line” appeared after the creation of the complex, at the beginning of the winter Soviet-Finnish War in December 1939, when Finnish troops began a stubborn defense. Shortly before this, in the fall, a group of foreign journalists arrived to get acquainted with the fortification work. At that time, much was written about the French Maginot Line and the German Siegfried Line. The son of Mannerheim's former adjutant Jorma Galen-Kallela, who accompanied the foreigners, came up with the name "Mannerheim Line". After the start of the Winter War, this name appeared in those newspapers whose representatives inspected the structures.

History of creation

Preparations for the construction of the line began immediately after Finland gained independence in 1918, and construction itself continued intermittently until the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish War in 1939.

The first line plan was developed by Lieutenant Colonel A. Rappe in 1918.

Work on the defense plan was continued by the German colonel Baron von Brandenstein. It was approved in August. In October 1918, the Finnish government allocated 300,000 marks for construction work. The work was carried out by German and Finnish sappers (one battalion) and Russian prisoners of war. With the departure of the German army, the work was significantly reduced and everything was reduced to the work of the Finnish combat engineer training battalion.

In October 1919, a new plan for the defensive line was developed. It was led by the Chief of the General Staff, Major General Oskar Enckel. The main design work was carried out by a member of the French military commission, Major J. Gros-Coissy.

According to this plan, in 1920 - 1924, 168 concrete and reinforced concrete structures were built, of which 114 were machine gun, 6 artillery and one mixed. Then there was a three-year break and the question of resuming work was raised only in 1927.

The new plan was developed by V. Karikoski. However, the work itself began only in 1930. They reached their greatest scale in 1932, when six double-embrasure bunkers were built under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Fabritius.

Fortifications

The main defensive line consisted of an elongated system of defense nodes, each of which included several wood-earth field fortifications (DZOT) and long-term stone-concrete structures, as well as anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. The defense nodes themselves were placed extremely unevenly on the main defensive line: the gaps between individual resistance nodes sometimes reached 6-8 km. Each defense node had its own index, which usually began with the first letters of the nearby settlement. If counting is carried out from the shore of the Gulf of Finland, then the node designations will follow in this order:

Bunker diagram:

“N” – Khumaljoki [now Ermilovo] “K” – Kolkkala [now Malyshevo] “N” – Nyayukki [no existence]
“Ko” — Kolmikeeyalya [no noun] “Well” — Hyulkeyalya [no noun] “Ka” — Karkhula [now Dyatlovo]
“Sk” - Summakylä [non-creature] "La" - Lyahde [non-creature] "A" - Eyuräpää (Leipäsuo)
"Mi" - Muolaankylä [now Gribnoye] "Ma" - Sikniemi [no existential] "Ma" - Mälkelä [now Zverevo]
"La" - Lauttaniemi [no noun] "No" - Noisniemi [now Mys] "Ki" - Kiviniemi [now Losevo]
"Sa" - Sakkola [now Gromovo] "Ke" - Kelya [now Portovoye] "Tai" - Taipale (now Solovyovo)

Dot SJ-5, covering the road to Vyborg. (2009)

Dot SK16

Thus, 18 defense nodes of varying degrees of power were built on the main defensive line. The fortification system also included a rear defensive line that covered the approach to Vyborg. It included 10 defense units:

"R" - Rempetti [now Key] "Nr" - Nyarya [now defunct] "Kai" - Kaipiala [non-existent]
“Nu” - Nuoraa [now Sokolinskoye] "Kak" - Kakkola [now Sokolinskoye] "Le" - Leviainen [no existential]
"A.-Sa" - Ala-Syainie [now Cherkasovo] "Y.-Sa" - Yulya-Syainie [now V.-Cherkasovo]
“Not” - Heinjoki [now Veshchevo] "Ly" - Lyyukylä [now Ozernoye]

Dot Ink5

The resistance center was defended by one or two rifle battalions, reinforced with artillery. Along the front the node occupied 3-4.5 kilometers and in depth 1.5-2 kilometers. It consisted of 4-6 strong points, each strong point had 3-5 long-term firing points, mainly machine gun and artillery, which made up the skeleton of the defense.

Each permanent structure was surrounded by trenches, which also filled the gaps between resistance nodes. The trenches in most cases consisted of a communication trench with forward machine gun nests and rifle cells for one to three riflemen.

The rifle cells were covered with armored shields with visors and embrasures for firing. This protected the shooter's head from shrapnel fire. The flanks of the line abutted the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. The shore of the Gulf of Finland was covered by large-caliber coastal batteries, and in the Taipale area on the shore of Lake Ladoga, reinforced concrete forts with eight 120-mm and 152-mm coastal guns were created.

The basis for the fortifications was the terrain: the entire territory of the Karelian Isthmus is covered by large forests, dozens of small and medium-sized lakes and streams. Lakes and rivers have swampy or rocky steep banks. In the forests there are rocky ridges and numerous large boulders everywhere. The Belgian general Badu wrote: “Nowhere in the world were natural conditions as favorable for the construction of fortified lines as in Karelia.”

Reinforced concrete structures of the “Mannerheim Line” are divided into buildings of the first generation (1920-1937) and second generation (1938-1939).

A group of Red Army soldiers inspects an armored cap at a Finnish bunker

The first generation bunkers were small, one-story, with one to three machine guns, and did not have shelters for the garrison or internal equipment. The thickness of the reinforced concrete walls reached 2 m, the horizontal coating - 1.75-2 m. Subsequently, these pillboxes were strengthened: the walls were thickened, armor plates were installed on the embrasures.

The Finnish press dubbed the second generation pillboxes “million-dollar” or million-dollar pillboxes, since the cost of each of them exceeded a million Finnish marks. A total of 7 such pillboxes were built. The initiator of their construction was Baron Mannerheim, who returned to politics in 1937, and obtained additional allocations from the country’s parliament. One of the most modern and heavily fortified bunkers were the Sj4 "Poppius", which had embrasures for flanking fire in the western casemate, and the Sj5 "Millionaire", with embrasures for flanking fire in both casemates. Both bunkers swept through the entire ravine with flanking fire, covering each other's front with machine guns. Flanking fire bunkers were called casemate “Le Bourget”, named after the French engineer who developed it, and became widespread already during the First World War. Some bunkers in the Hottinen area, for example Sk5, Sk6, were converted into flanking fire casemates, while the front embrasure was bricked up. The bunkers of the flanking fire were well camouflaged with stones and snow, which made them difficult to detect; in addition, it was almost impossible to penetrate the casemate with artillery from the front. “Million-dollar” pillboxes were large modern reinforced concrete structures with 4-6 embrasures, of which one or two were guns, mainly of flanking action. The usual armament of the pillboxes were Russian 76-mm guns of the 1900 model on Durlyakher casemate mountings and 37-mm Bofors anti-tank guns of the 1936 model on casemate installations. Less common were 76-mm mountain guns of the 1904 model on pedestal mounts.

The weaknesses of Finnish long-term structures are as follows: inferior quality of concrete in first-term buildings, oversaturation of concrete with flexible reinforcement, and lack of rigid reinforcement in first-term buildings.

The strengths of the pillboxes lay in the large number of fire embrasures that shot through the near and immediate approaches and flanking the approaches to neighboring reinforced concrete points, as well as in the tactically correct location of structures on the ground, in their careful camouflage, in the rich filling of gaps.

Destroyed bunker

Engineering barriers

The main types of anti-personnel obstacles were wire nets and mines. The Finns installed slingshots that were somewhat different from the Soviet slingshots or the Bruno spiral. These anti-personnel obstacles were complemented by anti-tank ones. The gouges were usually placed in four rows, two meters apart, in a checkerboard pattern. The rows of stones were sometimes reinforced with wire fences, and in other cases with ditches and scarps. Thus, anti-tank obstacles turned into anti-personnel obstacles at the same time. The most powerful obstacles were at height 65.5 at pillbox No. 006 and on Khotinen at pillboxes No. 45, 35 and 40, which were the main ones in the defense system of the Mezhdubolotny and Summsky resistance centers. At pillbox No. 006, the wire network reached 45 rows, of which the first 42 rows were on metal stakes 60 centimeters high, embedded in concrete. The gouges in this place had 12 rows of stones and were located in the middle of the wire. To blow up the hole, it was necessary to go through 18 rows of wire under three or four layers of fire and 100-150 meters from the front edge of the enemy’s defense. In some cases, the area between bunkers and pillboxes was occupied by residential buildings. They were usually located on the outskirts of a populated area and were made of granite, and the thickness of the walls reached 1 meter or more. If necessary, the Finns turned such houses into defensive fortifications. Finnish sappers managed to erect about 136 km of anti-tank obstacles and about 330 km of wire barriers along the main defense line. In practice, when in the first phase of the Soviet-Finnish Winter War the Red Army came close to the fortifications of the main defensive line and began to attempt to break through it, it turned out that the above principles, developed before the war based on the results of tests of anti-tank barriers for survivability using those then in service The Finnish army of several dozen outdated Renault light tanks turned out to be incompetent in the face of the power of the Soviet tank mass. In addition to the fact that the gouges moved from their place under the pressure of medium T-28 tanks, detachments of Soviet sappers often blew up the gouges with explosive charges, thereby creating passages for armored vehicles in them. But the most serious drawback, undoubtedly, was a good overview of the anti-tank lines from distant enemy artillery positions, especially in open and flat areas, such as, for example, in the area of ​​the defense center "Sj" (Summa-yarvi), where it was on 11.02. 1940 The main defensive line was broken through. As a result of repeated artillery shelling, the hollows were destroyed and there were more and more passages in them.

Between the granite anti-tank posts there were rows of barbed wire (2010) Rubble of stones, barbed wire and in the distance an SJ-5 pillbox covering the road to Vyborg (winter 1940).

Terijoki government

On December 1, 1939, a message was published in the Pravda newspaper stating that the so-called “People's Government” had been formed in Finland, headed by Otto Kuusinen. In historical literature, Kuusinen’s government is usually called “Terijoki”, since after the outbreak of the war it was located in the city of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk). This government was officially recognized by the USSR.

On December 2, negotiations took place in Moscow between the government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, headed by Otto Kuusinen, and the Soviet government, headed by V. M. Molotov, at which a Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Friendship was signed. Stalin, Voroshilov and Zhdanov also took part in the negotiations.

The main provisions of this agreement corresponded to the requirements that the USSR had previously presented to Finnish representatives (transfer of territories on the Karelian Isthmus, sale of a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, lease of Hanko). In exchange, the transfer of significant territories in Soviet Karelia and monetary compensation to Finland was provided. The USSR also pledged to support the Finnish People's Army with weapons, assistance in training specialists, etc. The agreement was concluded for a period of 25 years, and if one year before the expiration of the agreement, neither party declared its termination, it was automatically extended for another for 25 years. The agreement came into force from the moment it was signed by the parties, and ratification was planned “as soon as possible in the capital of Finland - the city of Helsinki.”

In the following days, Molotov met with official representatives of Sweden and the United States, at which recognition of the People's Government of Finland was announced.

It was announced that the previous government of Finland had fled and, therefore, was no longer governing the country. The USSR declared at the League of Nations that from now on it would negotiate only with the new government.

RECEPTION Comrade MOLOTOV OF THE SWEDISH ENVIRONMENT OF VINTER

Accepted Comrade Molotov on December 4, the Swedish envoy Mr. Winter announced the desire of the so-called “Finnish government” to begin new negotiations on an agreement with the Soviet Union. Comrade Molotov explained to Mr. Winter that the Soviet government did not recognize the so-called “Finnish government,” which had already left Helsinki and headed in an unknown direction, and therefore there could now be no question of any negotiations with this “government.” The Soviet government recognizes only the people's government of the Finnish Democratic Republic, has concluded an agreement of mutual assistance and friendship with it, and this is a reliable basis for the development of peaceful and favorable relations between the USSR and Finland.

V. Molotov signs an agreement between the USSR and the Terijoki government. Standing: A. Zhdanov, K. Voroshilov, I. Stalin, O. Kuusinen

The “People's Government” was formed in the USSR from Finnish communists. The leadership of the Soviet Union believed that using in propaganda the fact of the creation of a “people's government” and the conclusion of a mutual assistance agreement with it, indicating friendship and alliance with the USSR while maintaining the independence of Finland, would influence the Finnish population, increasing the disintegration in the army and in the rear.

Finnish People's Army

On November 11, 1939, the formation of the first corps of the “Finnish People's Army” (originally the 106th Mountain Rifle Division), called “Ingria”, began, which was staffed by Finns and Karelians who served in the troops of the Leningrad Military District.

By November 26, there were 13,405 people in the corps, and in February 1940 - 25 thousand military personnel who wore their national uniform (made of khaki cloth and similar to the Finnish uniform of the 1927 model; claims that it was a captured uniform of the Polish army , are erroneous - only part of the overcoats were used from it).

This “people’s” army was supposed to replace the occupation units of the Red Army in Finland and become the military support of the “people’s” government. “Finns” in confederate uniforms held a parade in Leningrad. Kuusinen announced that they would be given the honor of hoisting the red flag over the presidential palace in Helsinki. In the Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a draft instruction was prepared “Where to begin the political and organizational work of communists (note: the word “communists” is crossed out by Zhdanov) in areas liberated from white power,” which indicated practical measures to create Popular Front in occupied Finnish territory. In December 1939, this instruction was used in work with the population of Finnish Karelia, but the withdrawal of Soviet troops led to the curtailment of these activities.

Despite the fact that the Finnish People's Army was not supposed to participate in hostilities, from the end of December 1939, FNA units began to be widely used to carry out combat missions. Throughout January 1940, scouts from the 5th and 6th regiments of the 3rd SD FNA carried out special sabotage missions in the 8th Army sector: they destroyed ammunition depots in the rear of Finnish troops, blew up railway bridges, and mined roads. FNA units took part in the battles for Lunkulansaari and the capture of Vyborg.

When it became clear that the war was dragging on and the Finnish people did not support the new government, Kuusinen's government faded into the shadows and was no longer mentioned in the official press. When Soviet-Finnish consultations on concluding peace began in January, it was no longer mentioned. Since January 25, the government of the USSR recognizes the government in Helsinki as the legitimate government of Finland.

Leaflet for volunteers - Karelians and Finns citizens of the USSR

Foreign volunteers

Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, detachments and groups of volunteers from around the world began to arrive in Finland. The most significant number of volunteers came from Sweden, Denmark and Norway (Swedish Volunteer Corps), as well as Hungary. However, among the volunteers there were also citizens of many other countries, including England and the USA, as well as a small number of Russian White volunteers from the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS). The latter were used as officers of the “Russian People's Detachments”, formed by the Finns from among the captured Red Army soldiers. But since the work on forming such detachments was started late, already at the end of the war, before the end of hostilities only one of them (numbering 35-40 people) managed to take part in the hostilities.

Preparing for the offensive

The course of hostilities revealed serious gaps in the organization of command and control and supply of troops, poor preparedness of command staff, and the lack of specific skills among the troops necessary to wage war in winter in Finland. By the end of December it became clear that fruitless attempts to continue the offensive would lead nowhere. There was relative calm at the front. Throughout January and early February, troops were reinforced, material supplies were replenished, and units and formations were reorganized. Units of skiers were created, methods of overcoming mined areas and obstacles, methods of combating defensive structures were developed, and personnel were trained. To storm the “Mannerheim Line”, the North-Western Front was created under the command of Army Commander 1st Rank Timoshenko and member of the Leningrad Military Council Zhdanov.

Timoshenko Semyon Konstaetinovich Zhdanov Andrey Alexandrovich

The front included the 7th and 13th armies. In the border areas, a huge amount of work was carried out on the hasty construction and re-equipment of communication routes for uninterrupted supply of the active army. The total number of personnel was increased to 760.5 thousand people.

To destroy the fortifications on the Mannerheim Line, the first echelon divisions were assigned destruction artillery groups (AD) consisting of from one to six divisions in the main directions. In total, these groups had 14 divisions, which had 81 guns with calibers of 203, 234, 280 mm.

203 mm howitzer "B-4" mod. 1931

Karelian Isthmus. Combat map. December 1939 "Black Line" - Mannerheim Line

During this period, the Finnish side also continued to replenish troops and supply them with weapons coming from the allies. In total, during the war, 350 aircraft, 500 guns, more than 6 thousand machine guns, about 100 thousand rifles, 650 thousand hand grenades, 2.5 million shells and 160 million cartridges were delivered to Finland [source not specified 198 days]. About 11.5 thousand foreign volunteers, mostly from Scandinavian countries, fought on the Finnish side.

Finnish autonomous ski squads armed with machine guns

Finnish assault rifle M-31 “Suomi“:

TTD "Suomi" M-31 Lahti

At the same time, fighting continued in Karelia. The formations of the 8th and 9th armies, operating along roads in continuous forests, suffered heavy losses. If in some places the achieved lines were held, in others the troops retreated, in some places even to the border line. The Finns widely used guerrilla warfare tactics: small autonomous detachments of skiers armed with machine guns attacked troops moving along the roads, mainly in the dark, and after the attacks they went into the forest where bases were established. Snipers caused heavy losses. According to the strong opinion of the Red Army soldiers (however, refuted by many sources, including Finnish ones), the greatest danger was posed by “cuckoo” snipers who fired from the trees. The Red Army formations that broke through were constantly surrounded and forced their way back, often abandoning their equipment and weapons.

The Battle of Suomussalmi, in particular, the history of the 44th Division of the 9th Army, became widely known. From December 14, the division advanced from the Vazhenvara area along the road to Suomussalmi to help the 163rd Division surrounded by Finnish troops. The advance of the troops was completely unorganized. Parts of the division, greatly extended along the road, were repeatedly surrounded by Finns during January 3-7. As a result, on January 7, the division's advance was stopped, and its main forces were surrounded. The situation was not hopeless, since the division had a significant technical advantage over the Finns, but the division commander A.I. Vinogradov, regimental commissar Pakhomenko and chief of staff Volkov, instead of organizing defense and withdrawing troops from encirclement, fled themselves, abandoning the troops. At the same time, Vinogradov gave the order to leave the encirclement, abandoning the equipment, which led to the abandonment on the battlefield of 37 tanks, more than three hundred machine guns, several thousand rifles, up to 150 vehicles, all radio stations, the entire convoy and horse train. More than a thousand of the personnel who escaped the encirclement were wounded or frostbitten; some of the wounded were captured because they were not taken out when they fled. Vinogradov, Pakhomenko and Volkov were sentenced to death by a military tribunal and shot publicly in front of the division line.

On the Karelian Isthmus the front stabilized by December 26. Soviet troops began careful preparations for breaking through the main fortifications of the Mannerheim Line and conducted reconnaissance of the defense line. At this time, the Finns unsuccessfully tried to disrupt the preparations for a new offensive with counterattacks. So, on December 28, the Finns attacked the central units of the 7th Army, but were repulsed with heavy losses. On January 3, 1940, off the northern tip of the island of Gotland (Sweden), with 50 crew members, the Soviet submarine S-2 sank (probably hit a mine) under the command of Lieutenant Commander I. A. Sokolov. S-2 was the only RKKF ship lost by the USSR.

Crew of the submarine "S-2"

Based on the Directive of the Headquarters of the Main Military Council of the Red Army No. 01447 of January 30, 1940, the entire remaining Finnish population was subject to eviction from the territory occupied by Soviet troops. By the end of February, 2080 people were evicted from the areas of Finland occupied by the Red Army in the combat zone of the 8th, 9th, 15th armies, of which: men - 402, women - 583, children under 16 years old - 1095. All resettled Finnish citizens were placed in three villages of the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic: in the Intervillage of the Pryazhinsky district, in the village of Kovgora-Goymae of the Kondopozhsky district, in the village of Kintezma of the Kalevalsky district. They lived in barracks and were required to work in the forest at logging sites. They were allowed to return to Finland only in June 1940, after the end of the war.

February offensive of the Red Army

On February 1, 1940, the Red Army, having brought up reinforcements, resumed its offensive on the Karelian Isthmus across the entire width of the front of the 2nd Army Corps. The main blow was delivered in the direction of Summa. Artillery preparation also began. From that day on, every day for several days the troops of the North-Western Front under the command of S. Timoshenko rained down 12 thousand shells on the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line. The Finns answered rarely, but accurately. Therefore, Soviet artillerymen had to abandon the most effective direct fire and fire from closed positions and mainly across areas, since target reconnaissance and adjustment were poorly established. Five divisions of the 7th and 13th armies carried out a private offensive, but were unable to achieve success.

On February 6, the attack on the Summa strip began. In the following days, the offensive front expanded both to the west and to the east.

On February 9, the commander of the troops of the North-Western Front, Army Commander of the first rank S. Timoshenko, sent directive No. 04606 to the troops. According to it, on February 11, after powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the North-Western Front should go on the offensive.

On February 11, after ten days of artillery preparation, the general offensive of the Red Army began. The main forces were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. In this offensive, ships of the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Military Flotilla, created in October 1939, acted together with the ground units of the North-Western Front.

Since the attacks of Soviet troops on the Summa region were unsuccessful, the main attack was moved east, to the direction of Lyakhde. At this point, the defending side suffered huge losses from artillery bombardment and Soviet troops managed to break through the defense.

During three days of intense battles, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first line of defense of the “Mannerheim Line”, introduced tank formations into the breakthrough, which began to develop their success. By February 17, units of the Finnish army were withdrawn to the second line of defense, as there was a threat of encirclement.

On February 18, the Finns closed the Saimaa Canal with the Kivikoski dam and the next day the water began to rise in Kärstilänjärvi.

By February 21, the 7th Army reached the second defense line, and the 13th Army reached the main defense line north of Muolaa. By February 24, units of the 7th Army, interacting with coastal detachments of sailors of the Baltic Fleet, captured several coastal islands. On February 28, both armies of the Northwestern Front began an offensive in the zone from Lake Vuoksa to the Vyborg Bay. Seeing the impossibility of stopping the offensive, the Finnish troops retreated.

At the final stage of the operation, the 13th Army advanced in the direction of Antrea (modern Kamennogorsk), the 7th Army - towards Vyborg. The Finns put up fierce resistance, but were forced to retreat.

(To be continued)

Choose the correct answer

1. The defensive fortifications of the Karelian Isthmus were called:

1) “Maginot Line” 3) “Mannerheim Line”

2) “Eastern Wall” 4) “Siegfried Line”

2. Respect the timeline of World War II:

3. The governing body of the country during the war years, which concentrated all power in its hands:

1) Headquarters of the Supreme High Command

2) Council of People's Commissars

3) State Defense Committee

4) Evacuation advice

4. Stalingrad was defended by:

1) 62nd Army (commander V.I. Chuikov)

2) 64th Army (commander M. S. Shumilov)

3) 13th Guards Division A.I. Rodimtsev

4) all the above troops

5. The trial of the main Nazi criminals took place in:

1) Moscow 2) Berlin 3) Potsdam 4) Nuremberg

7. V. Solovyov-Sedoy, M. Blanter, N. Bogoslovsky,
K. Listov

What is extra in the series?

Conferences of the anti-Hitler coalition:

1) Moscow 3) Crimean

2) Genoese 4) Potsdam

9. Match:

1) genocide A) forced relocation of peoples

2) deportation B) removal of the population, material assets from localities,

under threat

3) evacuation B) extermination of certain population groups by race,

national and other motives

4) repatriation D) systematic persecution and extermination by the Nazis and their

collaborators in Germany and in the territories captured by it of a significant part of the Jewish population of Europe

5) Holocaust

10. Name the document:

“Both Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any violence, from any aggressive action and from any attack... The agreement is concluded for a period of ten years... Done in two originals in German and Russian in Moscow.”

What are we talking about?

One of the types of struggle of the masses for the freedom of their homeland, which is waged on territory occupied by the enemy; The fight involves the local population and units of regular troops operating behind enemy lines. Manifests itself in various forms: armed struggle, sabotage, sabotage, reconnaissance, exposure of enemy actions, propaganda and agitation,

Who are we talking about?

Since the 1920s in the Red Army. One of Stalin's nominees is a general (at forty-one - lieutenant general). In the battles near Kiev and Moscow he established himself as a capable commander. During the Great Patriotic War, he commanded the corps and army, and was deputy. commander of the Volkhov Front, commander of the 2nd Shock Army, which found itself surrounded near Leningrad in the spring of 1942. He was captured (according to other sources, he surrendered voluntarily). He headed the “Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia” and the “Russian Liberation Army”. By the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court in 1946 he was hanged

Second option

Choose the correct answer

1 . The non-aggression pact between Germany and the USSR was signed by:

1) A. Hitler, I. Stalin

2) V. Molotov, I. Ribbentrop

3) I. Stalin, I. Ribbentrop

4) M. Litvinov, I. Ribbentrop

2 . The divisions of the Soviet border districts in the summer of 1941 consisted of fighters:

1) 2.7 million 2) 3.5 million 3) 5 million 4) 5.5 million

3. Union of states that emerged during World War II
war in the fight against the fascist bloc:

1) Resistance movement

2) anti-Hitler coalition

3) League of Nations

4) anti-fascist movement

4. According to the plan to seize the Caucasus in 1942, the German command carried out:

1) encirclement of the main forces of the Red Army in the area
Rostov

2) capture of Grozny

3) mastery of the Maikop oil fields

4) all of the above

5. Event that happened later than others:

1) Atlantic Charter

2) Potsdam Conference

3) Tehran Conference

4) Yalta Conference

On what principle are the rows formed?

6 . Lenya Golikov, Marat Kazei, Valya Kotik, Zina Portnova

7. O. Berggolts, K. Simonov, A. Prokofiev, A. Surkov, A. Tvardovsky

8. What is extra in the row?

A radical turning point during the war:

1) battle for Moscow 3) crossing of the Dnieper

2) Battle of Stalingrad 4) Battle of Kursk

9 . Match:

1) genocide A) the leading role of any state in relation to

2) deportation to other countries

3) hegemony B) destruction of certain population groups by race

4) evacuation for national and other reasons

5) Holocaust B) systematic extermination by the Nazis and their collaborators

a significant part of the Jewish population of Europe

D) forced relocation of peoples

10 . In honor of what event was the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief issued?

“Today, August 5, at 24 o’clock, the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, will salute our valiant troops... with twelve artillery salvoes from 120 guns.”

11 . What are we talking about?

One of the largest battles in World War II, lasting 200 days. As a result of complete victory in this battle, one of the opposing sides seized the strategic initiative in the war.

12 . Who are we talking about?

During the Great Patriotic War - deputy. chief, chief of the General Staff, deputy. People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. He coordinated the actions of a number of fronts in strategic operations, especially where the most difficult situation developed. Having started the war as a major general, a year and a half later he became Marshal of the Soviet Union. Since June 1945 - commander of Soviet troops in the Far East. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, holder of two highest military orders - the Order of Victory. Author of the memoir “Life’s Work.”

Answers

1 option

1 - 3; 2 - 2; 3 - 3; 4 - 4; 5 - 4; 6 - blockade of Leningrad;

9 - 1-B, 2-A, 3-B, 4-no, 5-G;

11 - about the partisan movement; 12 - A. Vlasov

Option 2

1 - 2; 2 - 1; 3 - 2; 4 - 3; 5 - 2;

6 - young anti-fascist heroes (pioneers), Heroes of the Soviet Union;

7 - authors of famous poetic works during the war;

9 - 1-B, 2-B, 3-A, 4-no, 5-B;

11 - Battle of Stalingrad; 12 - A. M. Vasilevsky.

The material is taken from the manual by O.N. Zhuravlev. Tests on the history of Russia of the 20th century. Publishing house "Exam" Moscow, 2005

The Mannerheim Line and the Maginot Line, the Molotov Line and the Eastern Wall, the Stalin Line and the Siegfried Line, Soviet and Japanese fortified areas in the Far East, etc., etc. - in this book you will find comprehensive information about all the “Chinese walls of the 20th century” "and professional analysis of their effectiveness.

Why in 1939–1945? the “positional impasse” of the First World War was not repeated? Is it possible in principle to create an “insurmountable” line of defense? Are the colossal costs of building fortified areas justified? And how exactly did the assault groups manage to break through the most powerful defensive systems?

Mannerheim Line

Mannerheim Line

By the end of the 30s of the 20th century, the Finnish command, trying to protect their country from an attack from the Soviet Union, primarily on the Karelian Isthmus, created a powerful defense system there, which was commonly called the Mannerheim Line. This is not entirely true. Therefore, before talking about the Finnish defense, it is necessary to clearly understand what it was.

In military-historical works of the Soviet period, we constantly come across the term “Mannerheim Line” and we believe that it was precisely this line that resisted the advance of the Red Army in 1939 and 1940. It is indicated that the Mannerheim Line was a deeply echeloned zone of long-term fire fortifications with a total depth, together with the operational zone, of up to 100 kilometers. In the history of the Order of Lenin of the Leningrad Military District (M.: Voenizdat, 1988) on page 129 it is stated that “the Mannerheim line consisted of three main, forward and two intermediate stripes, as well as cut-off positions. On all three strips of this line, there were over 1000 bunkers and bunkers, of which 296 structures were long-term reinforced concrete... In total, on the main defense line there were about 200 reinforced concrete structures.” And in the book “Battles in Finland” (M.: OGIZ, 1941) it is indicated that during the offensive on the Karelian Isthmus, Soviet troops “captured 356 bunkers and 2425 bunkers.”

What did the Finns really have on the Karelian Isthmus?

The construction of the first defensive structures on the Karelian Isthmus began in the spring of 1920 on the initiative of Major General O. Enkel, who headed the General Staff of the Finnish Armed Forces the previous fall. She passed through Rempetti, Khumaljoki, Summa, lake. Muolaanyarvi, lake Eyuräpäanyärvi, part of the Vuoksi-Taipe water system (now Klyuchevoe, Emilovo, Soldatskoye, lake Glubokoe, lake Rakovoe, Vuoksa, Solovyevo) and consisted of 18 lined defense units, each of which included several long-term stone-concrete bunkers ) and wood-earth firing points (DZOT), covered from the front by anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. It should be noted that in Finnish scientific literature the term “Mannerheim Line” refers primarily to the main fortification position on the Karelian Isthmus during the Soviet-Finnish “Winter War” of 1939–1940. This position only partially coincided with the line of the main defensive line, on which long-term fire installations built before 1939 were located.

It all started with the fact that in connection with Finland’s intention to secede from the former Russian Empire after the events of 1917, K. Mannerheim, by his order dated May 7, 1918, seconded two of his representatives to the command of the Eastern Army (a group of white Finnish troops in the eastern part of the country) - Lieutenant Colonel A. Rappe and Major K. von Heine, who arrived to serve in the Finnish army from Sweden. They were instructed to draw up a preliminary plan for the construction of defensive structures on the Karelian Isthmus in accordance with the recommendations and instructions of the commander of the Eastern Army. When drawing up this plan, it was necessary to take into account that the proposed activities were to be carried out using available resources within the next two months. The finished plan was to be sent to Mannerheim's headquarters no later than May 25 of the same year with the conclusion of the commander of the Eastern Army.

These works were completed with a slight delay. Lieutenant Colonel A. Rappe dated this plan to June 1, 1918. In accordance with this plan, the construction of fortifications was to be carried out taking into account the need to create convenient starting positions for possible offensive actions by Finnish and White Guard troops in the direction of Petrograd. At the same time, A. Rappe, in his assessment of the situation, proceeded from the fact that the enemy would defend Petrograd, including through active offensive actions, and then his counterattacks could be directed deep into Finland or along the highway and railway track towards Kivennapa (now the village Pervomaiskoye) and Vyborg, or on the Rautu site (now the village of Sosnovo). But the Vyborg direction was considered the most likely.

To ensure the security of Finland in this operational direction, A. Rappe proposed building three defensive positions along the Finnish-Russian border. The first, or advanced, position was to be located directly at the border itself. The second, or main, position was planned from Fort Ino and further through the villages of Kivennapa and Lipola to the shore of Ladoga. The third, rear position was supposed to go along the line Muurila - Kuolemajärvi - Kaukjärvi - Perkjärvi - Valkjärvi - Rautu - Taipale.

In engineering terms, all three positions had to be well equipped with various structures. Thus, at the front line and at the main positions it was necessary to dig 25 kilometers of trenches and create obstacle courses with a total length of 100 kilometers. Such work would require a total of 195,000 man-days. The construction of the rear defensive position, which approximately coincided with the main defense line built in the 1920-1930s, which included a system of reinforced concrete firing points (pillboxes), was expected to spend approximately the same number of man-days. Taking into account the construction of roads and communication lines, the total number of man-days should have reached 400,000. However, the plan drawn up by A. Rappe remained unimplemented due to the resignation of General K. Mannerheim on May 29, 1918.

Nevertheless, the idea of ​​strengthening the borders of independent Finland continued to live. On September 16, 1918, the acting chief of the General Staff of the Finnish Army, German Colonel von Redern, proposed to the Committee on Military Affairs to begin fortification work on the Karelian Isthmus. The Finnish Senate made a corresponding decision on October 29 of the same year and decided to allocate funds in the amount of 300,000 marks for the construction of fortifications. Individual military units, primarily sapper companies, as well as up to 200 Soviet prisoners of war, were involved in the work. But this time too, the plan for fortifying the border was only partially implemented. In several areas, only wire fences and machine gun nests were built.

On September 16, 1919, Major General Oskar Enckel came to the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Finnish Armed Forces, who continued the work on strengthening the border on the Karelian Isthmus, begun by his predecessors. At the same time, he took into account the fact that in conditions of emergency mobilization, the military units stationed in Vyborg must most likely have time to complete deployment on the main defensive line before the aggressor reaches it. He believed that it would be very difficult to ensure the implementation of such a task in positions located near the border. Therefore, the western flank of the projected Enkel Line was moved away from the Soviet border.

Construction work according to Enckel's plan was carried out between 1920 and 1924. Initially, it was planned to build only the main defense line. But a year later, when construction was already underway, this initial project was supplemented by a plan for the construction of a second defense line that covered the exit to Vyborg.

In total, 168 defensive structures were erected according to Enkel's design, of which 114 were machine guns, 6 were gun casemates and one was a machine gun chamber. There were also 10 fire control posts, 27 personnel shelters and 10 small concrete infantry positions. In addition, another 16 structures were built outside the main and second defense lines to cover the most threatened areas.

The firing points, located in wooded and swampy areas, were equipped exclusively with machine guns. But in the area of ​​the wide open Vuoksa reaches, gun fire cover was considered more effective. Therefore, in 1922, Enkel approached the Ministry of Defense with a proposal to build five small coastal artillery forts equipped with 76-mm rapid-fire cannons of the 1900 model on the northern coast of Vuoksi-Suvanto. However, guns were installed in these forts only in December 1939.

The main defensive line consisted of an elongated system of 18 defense nodes, each of which included several wood-earth field fortifications (DZOT), long-term stone-concrete structures (DOT), as well as anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. The defense nodes themselves were placed extremely unevenly on the main defensive line: the gaps between individual resistance nodes sometimes reached 6–8 kilometers.

For ease of management, each defense node had its own index, which usually began with the first letters of the nearby settlement. If you count from the shore of the Gulf of Finland, then the designations of the nodes will follow in this order: “N” - Khumaljoki, now Ermilovo, “K” - Kolkkala, now Malyshevo, “N” - Nyukki, “Ko” - Kolmikeeyalya, “Nu” - Hylkeyala, "Ka" - Karhula, now Dyatlovo, "Sk" - Summayuola, "La" - Lyahde, "A" - Eyurapää, now Leipäsuo, "Mi" - Muolaankylä, now Gribnoye, "Ma" - Sikniemi, "Ma" - Mälkela, now Zverevo, "La" - Lauttaniemi, "No" - Noisniemi, now Mys, "Ki" - Kiviniemi, now Losevo, "Sa" - Sakkola, now Gromovo, "Ke" - Kelya, now Portovoye, "Tai" " - Taipale, now Solovyevo.

In addition, the Enkel Line fortification system also included a rear defensive line that covered the approaches to Vyborg. It included 10 defense nodes, which were located in the following order: “R” - Rempetti, now Klyuchevoye, “Nr” - Nyarya, “Kai” - Kaipiala, “Nu” - Nuoraa and “Kak” - Kakkola, now Sokolinskoye, “Le” - Leviainen, “A.-Sa” - Ala-Syainie and “Y.-Sa” - Yulya-Syainie, now V.-Cherkasovo, “Ne” - Heinjoki, now Veshchevo and “Ly” - Lyyukylä, now Ozernoe.

The defense units themselves were of varying power. Thus, defense center “N”, which was located northeast of the village of Khumaljoki, in addition to field fortifications, included four small one-story machine gun single-embrasure frontal fire bunkers that covered the railway and the coastal highway. Defense node “K” occupied the north-eastern part of the village of Kolkkala and included, in addition to field fortifications, anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers, seven small single-embrasure machine gun pillboxes of frontal fire, four concrete shelters and one command post. Defense node “N” was located within the northeastern tip of Lake Kuolemajärvi (now Lake Pionerskoye) near the village of Nyukki and included, in addition to field fortifications, anti-personnel and anti-tank barriers, three single-embrasure machine gun bunkers, one command post and two concrete infantry positions. The “Ko” defense center was located on the territory of the village of Kolmikesalä and included six single-embrasure frontal fire machine gun bunkers, three concrete shelters, one command post and two concrete infantry positions. The “Nu” defense center was located on the territory of the village of Hulkiya-la. The Ka defense center was located in the center of the village of Karhula and included five single-embrasure machine gun bunkers and two shelters.

The “Sk” defense unit was quite powerful, which was located on the territory of the village of Summakylä and included seven single-embrasure and two double-embrasure machine-gun pillboxes for frontal fire, one of which also combined the function of a small shelter. In the same defense center there were four more separate shelters.

The defense unit “La” was adjacent almost closely to the left flank of the fortified unit “Sk” and consisted of two single-embrasure machine-gun pillboxes for frontal fire, two shelters and four command posts. (Later the index "La" was replaced by "Sj"). Defense node “A” was located 2 kilometers southeast of the Eyryapää (Leipäsuo) railway station and consisted of five small single-embrasure machine-gun pillboxes with frontal fire, sweeping the area along the railroad bed. (Later the index “A” was replaced by “Le”.) The tenth defense unit, “Mi”, was located within the village of Muolaankylä and consisted of five single-embrasure machine gun bunkers, one artillery caponier equipped with a 75-mm Möller naval gun, five shelters and two command posts. The Ma defense center was located on Cape Sikniemi and consisted of three single-embrasure machine gun bunkers.

The twelfth defense center “Ma” occupied the south-eastern outskirts of the village of Myalkelya, stretching along the bank of the Salmenkayta River. It consisted of one single-embrasure machine-gun bunker, four shelters and three concrete infantry positions. According to available information, construction of an artillery caponier began in the same area in 1924. At Cape Lauttaniemi there was another defense center, which consisted of two single-embrasure machine gun bunkers and one artillery flanking fire caponier, designed for four guns. Like other artillery structures of this type, the caponier had a small barracks for the garrison, protected by thick concrete walls.

The fourteenth defense node “No” was located on the neighboring Cape Noisniemi and included one single-embrasure machine gun bunker and one artillery caponier for flanking fire. The defense center “Ki” was located in the center of the village of Kiviniemi on the northern bank of a turbulent channel. It included two machine-gun single-embrasure bunkers and one machine-gun-machine-gun-artillery caponier. The defense center “Sa” was located near the village of Sakkola on the shore of Lake Suvantojärvi (now Lake Sukhodolskoye). It consisted of two machine-gun single-embrasure bunkers and one artillery caponier. The defense center “Ke” was located on the territory of the village of Kelya and also consisted of two machine-gun single-embrasure bunkers and one artillery caponier. And finally, the eighteenth defense node, “Tai”, occupied the vast expanse of Cape Koukkuniemi, crossing the territories of the villages of Kirvesmäki, Terenttilä and Taipale. It included 10 single-embrasure machine-gun pillboxes for frontal fire, one artillery caponier and one shelter.

Thus, in total, 69 frontal fire machine-gun bunkers, one machine-gun-artillery bunker, 8 artillery caponiers, 25 concrete shelters, 9 concrete command posts and 7 concrete infantry positions were built on the main defense line.

At the rear defensive position of the Enkel line, within 10 defense nodes, 43 single-embrasure machine-gun bunkers, two shelters, three command posts and two concrete infantry positions were built.

In particular, defense node “R” was located near the village of Rempetti and included five machine-gun single-embrasure bunkers, two concrete shelters and one concrete command post. Defense node "Nr" occupied the northern shore of Lake Nyaryanjärvi (now Lake Zaychikhino) and included seven machine-gun single-embrasure frontal fire bunkers, as well as one concrete command post. The defense center "Kai" was located in the central part of the village of Kaipiala and included three single-embrasure bunkers, one command post and two concrete infantry positions. The “Nu” defense unit was located in the western part of the village of Nuoraa and included three single-embrasure frontal fire bunkers. The Kak defense unit was located in the village of Kakkola and included four single-embrasure frontal fire bunkers. The “Le” defense unit was located near the Leviainen farm and consisted of one single-embrasure bunker.

The “A.-Sa” defense unit, which was located in the village of Ala-Syainie and included nine single-embrasure bunkers, was quite powerful. The “Y.-Sa” defense unit, located in the village of Yulya-Syainie and including six single-embrasure bunkers, was somewhat weaker. Even weaker was the “Ne” defense unit, which was based on the village of Heinjoki and included three single-embrasure bunkers. And finally, in the village of Lyyukulya there was a defense center “Lu”, which included two single-embrasure bunkers.

Thus, the total number of all long-term structures built on the main and rear positions of the Enkel line by 1924, taking into account both bunkers for two and three machine guns outside the zone of these positions, amounted to 168 units.

At the same time, experts noted that the Enkel line was not without shortcomings, the reason for which lay not so much in the technical imperfections of the structures, but in the paucity of funds allocated for its construction. The initial progressive idea of ​​​​building a system of machine-gun oblique cross-fire bunkers had to be abandoned at the very beginning, since its implementation would require the construction of significantly more firing points than with the use of frontal fire bunkers with a firing sector angle of 90 degrees. Almost all concrete structures were characterized by low quality concrete, an almost complete absence of flexible steel reinforcement and a large volume of filler - sand, gravel and stones. The only metal part that was used in the ceilings of long-term defensive structures was an I-beam steel beam.

The overwhelming majority of the buildings on the Enkel line were of a single-tier type, that is, one-story. The exceptions were a two-story shelter located in the fortified unit “Ko” and a two-story gun caponier in Patoniemi (fortified unit “Tai”), in which the shelter for the garrison was located directly under the combat casemate. Some bunkers combined two rooms: a combat casemate and a shelter for 4–6 people, equipped with two-tier bunks.

The design of the embrasures of all machine gun bunkers assumed frontal fire and did not provide fire cover for adjacent long-term firing points. All structures were extremely vulnerable to direct fire into the embrasure area.

On February 26, 1932, the chief technical inspector, Colonel W. Sarlin, after several preliminary conversations with the experienced fortification specialist I. Fabritius, invited him to lead the construction of fortifications on a new section of the line. By this time, the Finnish military command had already made a specific decision on the construction of an additional, twenty-first defense node in the system of the main defensive zone, stretching from Lake Kuolemajärvi (now Lake Pionerskoye) to the shore of the Gulf of Finland east of Cape Kyurenniemi and including six one-story bunkers for 2-3 machine guns every. It was this site that received the abbreviation “Ink” from the name of the village of Inkilya located in the center of this stronghold.

Fortification work within this area was carried out by the sapper battalion. The first bunkers of the fortified node “Ink” (Ink-1 and Ink-2), located in its northern part, were erected in 1932. They were single-tiered and were intended to conduct flanking machine-gun fire, cutting off the advancing enemy infantry from the tanks. Unlike their predecessors, these structures had a number of innovations and advantages. In particular, these are side protective walls covering the embrasures from the front, the abundance of flexible reinforcement made of steel wire, and high quality concrete. The remaining bunkers (Ink-3, Ink-4, Ink-5 and Ink-7), built in 1933–1934, were also caponiers for flanking fire, but had embrasures protected by vertical armor plates 10–15 centimeters thick and 2x3 in size meters. They also had, in addition to combat casemates, underground shelters that could accommodate from 12 to 24 personnel. Each room had its own well, from which fresh drinking water could be replenished; sleeping places with two-tier bunks were also equipped there. In cold weather, the room was heated by stoves. In total, on the “Ink” site in the period from 1932 to 1934, the sapper battalion built six reinforced concrete machine gun bunkers. The last bunker, a two-level caponier, with three combat casemates and embrasures protected by armor plates, with an underground barracks for a platoon of soldiers located on the lower level in a 20-meter corridor, was built only in 1937.

In 1936, Lieutenant Colonel I. Fabritius was appointed to the post of head of the design and fortification department. From that time on, a fundamentally new stage of design work began on the line of defensive structures. The main attention was paid to the development of designs for two- and three-embrasure bunkers for flanking fire, well camouflaged and integrated into the terrain, reinforced with armor protection and equipped with armored domes. At the same time, Fabricius proceeded from the fact that the old single-embrasure pillboxes of frontal fire, located in the directions of the enemy’s likely main attacks, would not be able to withstand the onslaught of large masses of troops, reinforced with modern military equipment.

Construction of such structures began on August 26, 1936. First of all, efforts were focused on the modernization of old structures, which consisted mainly in the addition of new reinforced concrete combat casemates for flanking fire using high-strength materials. In some cases, old bunkers were simply reconstructed into shelters, and sometimes, in addition to them, completely new bunkers of the “million-dollar” type were erected.

Five of the twenty old fortified units were modernized: “Sk”, “La”, “Ma”, “Mi” and “A”. At the same time, the indices of some of them have changed. Thus, the fortified knot “La” turned into “Sj” (Summajärvi), and “A” into “Le” (Leipäsuo). Many long-term structures located in these fortified sites were radically reconstructed. Thus, in the fortified node “Sk”, five old frontal-type structures turned into modern bunkers of flanking fire, in addition to which three more new reinforced concrete fire structures appeared. Two “million-dollar” bunkers were added to the “Sj” and “Le” defense nodes. In 1939, new long-term firing points were built in the Mi and Ma fortifications. Between Lake Muolaanjärvi and the fortified node “Le” at the beginning of 1938, the twenty-second fortified node “Su” (Suurniemi) was erected, consisting of five bunkers, a shelter and a command post, as well as a system of field fortifications, anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers.

Beginning in 1937, the first bunkers of the so-called “million-dollar type” began to be built on the Karelian Isthmus. They received this name because of the large amounts of costs for their construction, often amounting to millions of Finnish marks of the time. On this basis, the bunker (“Sj-5”) even received the code name “Millionth”.

The first structures of this type had a design that provided for the presence, as a rule, of two or three combat casemates, connected by underground passages, which were usually used as a small barracks with a capacity for a platoon of soldiers, as well as service premises that supported, if necessary, autonomous combat and life support for the garrison in for a certain period of time under conditions of complete blockade. The combat embrasures of these fortresses were protected by 3–5 (on the Le-7 even seven) interconnected armor plates, each of which had a thickness of 60–70 mm. According to experts, such armor protection was supposed to withstand a direct hit from 6-inch artillery shells. The armor plates were foreign-made, most of them were purchased in the Czech Republic. The series of such bunkers included casemates “Ink-b”, machine-gun caponiers “Sk-ІО”, “Sk-2” (fortified building “Summakylä”), “Sj-4” (fortified building “Summajärvi”), “Le-6” and "Le-7" (fortified site "Leipyasuo").

Most bunkers of the last period of construction had one or more armored turrets built into the ceilings. The thickness of the armor of such towers reached 18 centimeters. Observation slits were cut in the upper part of the armored turret for all-round visibility of the area. A steel drum with a slot rotating inside the turret prevented accidental bullet or shrapnel hits inside the turret.

The “million-dollar” bunkers built in 1939, “Sk-11” (“Peltola”) and “Sj-5” (“Millionaire”), differed in their design only in that the combat casemates in them were made entirely of reinforced concrete without the use of armor protection . Their combat casemates, separated from each other by a distance of 30 to 40 meters, were connected to each other by an underground barracks corridor.

The Finns concentrated their main defense efforts on the central section, in the defile between Lake Muolaanyarvi-Eyurapyaanyarvi and the northern bank of the Samenkaita River (now the Bulatnaya River). Even under O. Enkel, this section was fortified with eight machine-gun semi-caponiers, one anti-fragmentation shelter and three concrete infantry positions. These old fortifications were distributed among three fortified units. In addition to them, in 1939, more modern reinforced concrete structures began to be built at the Mi and Ma nodes according to the designs of Belgian engineers. In addition, on October 9, 1939, the “Arajoki Work Site” was established, where, under the leadership of certified Finnish engineer A. Arajoki, the construction of 40 new one-story reinforced concrete caponiers began, of which only 23 had been erected by the beginning of the war.

Regarding the intensification of construction work, K. Mannerheim writes in his memoirs: “In the summer of 1939, a truly popular movement for the voluntary construction of defensive fortifications arose. Volunteers came in a steady stream from all over the country to the Karelian Isthmus, where representatives of all groups of the population worked side by side for four months, sacrificing their summer vacations in the name of defending the country. In addition, significant amounts of voluntary donations were collected to finance the work on the creation of fortifications... During the summer, mainly anti-tank obstacles were built in the most threatened areas - stone gouges, ditches and counter-scarps - which significantly increased the strength of defensive positions. Unfortunately, it later turned out that the installed stone blocks would have to be even higher in order to effectively block the terrain and impede the advance of enemy tanks.”

When preparing the operational defense, the Finns were well aware that they were unlikely to be able to repel a sudden offensive by the Red Army directly on the state border line. Therefore, in front of the main defense line, a support zone was prepared (forefield, operational barrier zone), the depth of which in the Kexholm direction reached 20–30 kilometers, in the Vyborg direction - 49–65 kilometers. The relatively shallow depth in the Kexholm direction was explained by the fact that in its rear, in front of the main defense line, there was a powerful water barrier - the Vuoksen-Virta River and Lake Suvantojärvi with a width of 800 to 2600 meters.

The support zone was equipped in rugged terrain with lines of strong points and intermediate positions, interconnected by fire, covered with anti-tank obstacles and barbed wire. As a result of this, all the roads leading to the front line of defense and the border roads were covered with strong points, intermediate positions and various barriers. In the Kexholm direction, there was one strong point for every 4–6 kilometers along its depth. In the Vyborg direction, where the road network was better developed, most of the strongholds, intermediate positions and fortified lines were located at the intersections of frontal and side roads. The total number of lines of strong points and intermediate positions ranged from six to eight. The Finns believed that such a placement of strong points for the assault on each of them would certainly require a change in artillery positions. All roads within the security zone were destroyed or mined at a density of up to 400 mines per kilometer, and they were blocked by solid rubble 400–500 meters wide.

Depending on the importance of the direction, the availability of roads and terrain conditions, strongholds and intermediate positions were defended by forces ranging from a platoon, reinforced with heavy machine guns and anti-tank guns, to a battalion, reinforced with artillery. Most of the strong points were supported by one or two batteries of 76 mm and sometimes 122 mm guns.

The strong points were designed for all-round defense and were located so as to prevent them from being bypassed. They usually consisted of one or two lines of rifle trenches, sometimes reinforced with rifle blockhouses. In the depths, behind the rifle trenches, there were machine gun nests, trenches for anti-tank guns and mortars, as well as observation posts. From the front, all strong points were covered by two, or less often by one, strip of wire obstacles such as a reinforced fence or a network with two or three rows of stakes.

The main defense efforts were concentrated within its main zone. However, by the end of autumn 1939, the main fortification work on this strip had not yet been completed. In a state of combat readiness there were (taking into account the unfinished Muolaanjärvi-Salmenkait fortification) 74 old single-embrasure machine-gun pillboxes for frontal fire, 48 new and modernized pillboxes that had from one to four machine-gun embrasures for flanking fire, 7 artillery pillboxes and one machine-gun-artillery caponier. In total, 130 long-term fire structures were located along a line about 140 kilometers long from the shore of the Gulf of Finland to Lake Ladoga. The western flank of the main defense line was 50 kilometers from the border, and the eastern flank - 16 kilometers.

In the early summer of 1939, work also began on the intermediate defensive position - line "V" by volunteers. However, by the autumn of the same year, in some areas of this position only anti-tank obstacles and rows of wire barriers had been erected.

In the fall of 1939, fortification work, which had been interrupted in 1924, was resumed on the rear defensive position - line “T”, which ran from Suomenvedenpohja Bay to Käkisalmi (now the city of Priozersk). According to the data given in the book “History of Fortification of Finland”, before the conclusion of the peace treaty of March 12, 1940, 7 bunkers and 74 bunkers were completely built on this section of the defensive line; 3 bunkers and 24 bunkers remained without finishing work; 182 bunkers and 131 bunkers. In addition, 11 kilometers of trenches were dug on this line, 131 kilometers of access roads were laid for the passage of heavy vehicles, and a number of wire and anti-tank obstacles were erected.

The Finns were well aware of the danger of the massive use of tanks to break through the defense. In this regard, “Instructions for the location and construction of anti-tank obstacles against medium 10-20-ton tanks” were developed, approved by the commander of the armed forces and the chief of the General Staff on May 23–24, 1939. They, in particular, indicated that every anti-tank barrier must be under surveillance and covered with fire weapons. Consequently, it should not be located closer than 150 meters, but no further than 200 meters from the front edge of the main defense line.

To strengthen anti-tank defense, it was prescribed to take advantage of the terrain. In particularly important areas, it was proposed to make the barriers multi-row. It was indicated that “wire barriers, shot through by flanking machine-gun fire, forming a fire covering network for the main defensive line, must be placed between it and the anti-tank barrier. In addition, wire fencing on low stakes can be placed inside and in front of the fence. Regarding machine-gun bunkers, the anti-tank barrier should be located so that the tank does not come closer than 500–600 meters to them, “in order to prevent targeted fire from the tank at vulnerable points of the bunker.” With regard to stone gouges, it was said that they should sit firmly in the ground, with a depth of 40–60 centimeters and an elevation of the three front rows above the ground by 80 centimeters, and the back row - about one meter. In addition, by the autumn of 1939, Finnish sappers managed to erect about 136 kilometers of anti-tank obstacles and about 330 kilometers of wire barriers along the main defense line.

True, K. Mannerheim himself characterizes the state of the defense lines somewhat differently. In particular, in his memoirs he writes: “In order to speed up very modest work to strengthen the Karelian Isthmus, I developed a new program, which at the beginning of July 1939 I handed over to the Minister of Defense. In it, we demanded the allocation of new funds to complete the construction of defensive fortifications on the line between the Gulf of Finland and the Vuoksi River, as well as for the construction of a second line located further, between the Vyborg Bay and the Vuoksi River. Continuation of this line in an eastern direction... And this issue was not fully considered, because the war began.”

Thus, the system of fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus (Mannerheim Line), according to the report of I.V. Tyulenev at the December meeting of the senior command staff of the Red Army, consisted of a support zone (“first forefield”) with a depth of 36 kilometers, a main defense line with a depth of 6 kilometers, a second forefield with a depth of 18 kilometers, a second defense line with a depth of up to 3 kilometers and the Vyborg fortified area with a depth of up to 3 kilometers. Its total length was 135 kilometers, and its depth reached 78 kilometers, of which 66 kilometers were well equipped in engineering terms. It consisted of 296 durable reinforced concrete and 897 granite structures. In front of the main defense line, by 1939, about 136 kilometers of anti-tank obstacles had been erected and 330 kilometers of wire barriers had been installed. Measures were also taken to create artificial flood zones in the area.

For more than two decades, the Finnish General Staff has been working on how troops should operate in the support zone. Thus, K. Mannerheim wrote in his memoirs: “For twenty years, the General Staff faced a nightmare with the question of how our covering troops could, in the event of war, hold the defense on the Karelian Isthmus while the main forces of the field army had time to take their positions. This fear was generated primarily by the fact that the Russians, due to the proximity of Leningrad, could unexpectedly concentrate large forces on the border, and, in addition, we expected that their aviation would greatly interfere with the mobilization and concentration of our army...

But the fortifications built on our territory could not serve as a factor equalizing the balance of forces. They were very modest in design and, with a few exceptions, were located only on the Karelian Isthmus. Along the defensive line, which was about 140 kilometers long, there were only 66 concrete pillboxes. 44 firing points were built in the twenties and were already outdated, many of them were poorly designed, and their placement left much to be desired. The remaining pillboxes were modern, but too weak for heavy artillery fire. The recently built barbed wire barriers and anti-tank obstacles did not fully meet their function...”

In accordance with the existing system of long-term defensive structures, the operational formation of the 7th Finnish Army on the Karelian Isthmus was in one echelon with the allocation of a significant part of the forces to the support zone. The main forces included six infantry divisions, and the covering troops included two separate infantry brigades, combined into a division subordinate directly to the army commander. The remaining two separate infantry, one cavalry brigade and separate infantry battalions, apparently, made up the combined arms reserve of the association. Depending on the nature of the terrain and composition, army corps defended stripes from 56 to 70 kilometers, divisions - from 10 to 25 kilometers. This is quite consistent with the memoirs of K. Mannerheim, who writes:

“The army consisted of six divisions located along the main line of defense running from the Gulf of Finland through lakes Kuolemajärvi and Muolaanjärvi to the Vuoksi River, further in the direction of Suvanto and to Lake Ladoga along the Taipalenjoki River. On a seventy-kilometer front from the Gulf of Finland to Vuoksi, four divisions of the 2nd Army Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Ehkvist, defended. The divisions' defense zones were 10–25 kilometers wide. On the eastern part of the Karelian Isthmus, in a continuous strip 56 kilometers long, two divisions of the 3rd Army Corps, commanded by Major General Heinrichs, held the defense.

Between the main position and the border there was a zone up to 50 kilometers deep, in which, in accordance with operational plans developed in peacetime, covering troops fought holding battles until the field army had time to reach the main position. The unification of the main part of the covering troops (1st and 2nd brigades) into a new division subordinate directly to the army commander also did not imply a passive position...” An oral order to create a cover group was given to the army commander on November 3, and a written order to this effect followed on November 11.

Troop training was of great importance for solving defense problems. Even before the creation of the final grouping of troops on the Karelian Isthmus, at the beginning of August 1939, exercises were conducted with formations of the Karelian Army in accordance with the plan for the upcoming defense. K. Mannerheim writes: “The exercises, preparations for which began in early spring, were carried out on the Karelian Isthmus in early August. In accordance with the disposition, the forces of the “yellows” /the enemy/ threw back the covering troops of the “whites” /Finnish troops/ to the east of Vyborg, where the advance of the “yellows” was stopped. When the concentration of the “white” forces northeast of Vyborg was completed, a general offensive followed on the right flank of the “yellows”.

True, a little lower he notes with bitterness: “The combat exercises ended with a parade of troops in Vyborg, at which very numerous forces taking part in the maneuvers were represented. The spectators were incredibly delighted with what they saw, but it was more difficult for a professional to share everyone’s admiration. The feeling of satisfaction caused by the completion of tasks by the troops during the exercises themselves, the good condition of the parade, despite the long marches and hot weather, was hampered by the awareness of how small the results were in the field of weapons. Military representatives of foreign countries were able to verify that Finland does not have a single anti-tank weapon. The armored vehicles that took part in the exercises were represented by several dozen tanks, some of which were outdated, and the new ones, despite the requirements of the Defense Council, were not armed. The air force was super modest. If we compared all this with the reserves of armored vehicles and aviation that our neighbor had abroad, then the shortcomings would look even more pronounced.”

A few months before the start of the Soviet-Finnish war, the Finnish army was put on full combat readiness, which K. Mannerheim also admits: “Finland, naturally, could not sit idly by when the war of the great powers began. On September 1 /1939/ I asked to be given the opportunity to again call up part of the reservists of the cover and naval defense forces, which had been demobilized in August. I was given such authority, and this event was carried out immediately. On my advice, the government at the end of September decided to increase readiness for defense in such a way that the officers and non-commissioned officers transferred to the reserve in 1938 in three stages underwent one-time training during the fall...

On October 6, the entire system of covering troops was mobilized, after which the military units were immediately redeployed to the border areas... I proposed on October 11 to conduct reservist exercises, to which the personnel were called up using summonses handed to each person personally. The covert exercises that began on October 14 corresponded to the general mobilization. The border areas were liberated, and part of the population of the cities located in the danger zone was transferred to other places...

Our troops were thoroughly familiar with the border zone, and their training almost dogmatically included training in conducting active holding battles on the isthmus. I, therefore, proceeded from the assumption that they would be able, in this first and perhaps last phase of a war of maneuver, to inflict a serious blow on the enemy, who, as we believed, was not accustomed to forested terrain. This would boost morale, which would undoubtedly be severely tested during a defensive battle. And the terrain on the Karelian Isthmus facilitated the conduct of holding battles. Long, narrow and not yet covered with ice lakes and swamps formed defiles along which enemy troops were forced to advance and in which it was convenient to launch flank attacks on them. The location of the main position increased the possibilities of such tactics, but, of course, the prerequisite was that the fighting in the forefield would be carried out by large forces and in close cooperation with the divisions on the main line of defense.

Thus, by the beginning of the offensive of the Soviet troops on the Karelian Isthmus, the Finnish command was able to prepare a powerful defense line there, well developed in engineering terms, select a type of defense appropriate to the conditions of the situation, develop an operation plan, in accordance with which to conduct military exercises and fully deploy a defensive group troops, including forces intended to operate in the support zone.

By November 1939, on the Karelian Isthmus, where the main attack was expected, the 7th Army (commander - Army Commander 2nd Rank V.F. Yakovlev) was deployed in advance from the Soviet side, consisting of the 19th and 50th Rifle Corps (9 rifle divisions, 3 tank brigades, 5 artillery regiments of the RGK). To support the ground forces from the air, the Air Force command of the Leningrad Military District had 28 aviation regiments, 7 separate aviation squadrons and 3 aviation spotter squads. In total, these units included 1,839 aircraft, including 484 bombers. 1633 aircraft were allocated directly to support the offensive of the 7th Army, that is, 88.7% of the total. Of these, there were 149 long-range bombers (DB-3), 536 medium bombers (SB), as well as 238 TB-3, R-5 and SSS aircraft capable of carrying from 400 to 500 kg of bombs. In total, the command of the 7th Army had 930 bombers to destroy Finnish long-term defensive structures. To cover these forces there were 665 I-15, I-16 and I-153 fighters.

To defend the Karelian Isthmus, the Finnish command deployed the Karelian Army in advance, consisting of 7 infantry divisions, 4 separate infantry, one cavalry brigade and several separate infantry battalions. The aviation group of the Leningrad Military District was opposed by the Finnish Air Force, which on September 1, 1939 had 388 aircraft of various types, including only 63 fighters capable of resisting Soviet bombers. Almost 200 aircraft were medium and light bombers, and 73 aircraft were trainers.

At that time, the Finnish Armed Forces, according to K. Mannerheim, were very weak. He points out their weaknesses:

“... - Almost insignificant anti-aircraft and anti-tank defense.

The air force currently at its disposal has only 50 percent of the number of aircraft required according to the staffing table; there is not a single aircraft in reserve. However, the staffing level is clearly insufficient if we take into account the vastness of our country.

Armored vehicles include three dozen obsolete tanks, purchased twenty years ago, after the First World War, and even used in it, and thirty modern light Vickers tanks, purchased a year ago, but still not armed.

Very weak artillery.

Of the 15 divisions, three still do not have weapons and equipment. The plan for replenishing /troops/ with ammunition has not yet been fulfilled.”

Thus, Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus were significantly inferior to Soviet troops, especially in terms of aviation. Even taking into account the fact that the Finns will send all their fighters against the aviation of the 7th Army, they will be outnumbered by Soviet fighters by more than 10 times. This means that Soviet aviation could easily seize air superiority and provide targeted bombing against the enemy’s long-term defensive structures.

The offensive of Soviet troops on the Karelian Isthmus began on November 30, 1939 and consisted of five successive stages.

At the first stage, in 12 days (November 30 - December 12, 1939), units of the 7th Army, with the support of aviation and navy, only crossed the Finnish support zone and reached the front edge of the main defense line on a front of 110 kilometers. The average rate of advance when overcoming the support zone was less than 4 kilometers per day. At the same time, the losses of the 7th Army troops were so significant that the Soviet command decided to take an operational pause. It lasted almost two months (December 13, 1939 - February 10, 1940). During this time, on the Karelian Isthmus, the Soviet command deployed an additional 13th Army (corps commander V.D. Grendal) consisting of four (49, 150, 142 and 4th) rifle divisions, one tank brigade, two artillery regiments of the RGK and two aviation regiments, Army Commander 2nd Rank K.A. was appointed commander of the 7th Army. Meretskov and a new offensive operation was prepared.

The breakthrough of the enemy's main line of defense and access to the second line of defense was carried out within 10 days (February 11–21, 1940). It was also associated with heavy losses. This was again followed by a six-day operational pause (February 22–27, 1940), during which the advancing troops were regrouped. And only then did the seven-day (February 28 - March 7, 1940) offensive of the troops of the 7th and 13th armies begin on a 60-kilometer front from Lake Vuoksi to the Vyborg Bay, which completed the breakthrough of the second line of Finnish defense.

Thus, it took Soviet troops 96 days to overcome the defense of the Karelian Army with a total depth of 90 kilometers. The average rate of advance was extremely low and amounted to less than one kilometer per day. The theory of a deep offensive operation, developed and adopted by the Red Army in the 30s, was not implemented in practice. At the same time, the losses of the Soviet troops advancing on the Karelian Isthmus were very significant. Thus, from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940, the 7th Army lost almost 18.5 thousand people killed, wounded and missing, the 13th Army - 20.7 thousand people. The losses of these associations in the wounded, frostbitten and sick amounted to 81.4 thousand and 68.5 thousand people, respectively.

Part of the reasons for the success of the Finnish defense were indicated by the commander of the 7th Army K.A. Meretskov in his report at a meeting of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the commanding staff to collect experience in combat operations against Finland, which took place from April 14 to April 17, 1940 in Moscow. He included among them:

The presence of a well-developed engineering support zone (forefield), which “in its depth, fortification development and the strength of automatic fire was, as it were, an independent defense zone.”

Good camouflage and high stability of the stone-earth defensive structures of the main line of defense, “the increased resistance of which against 152-mm and even 203-mm shells did not make it possible to immediately distinguish them from concrete ones.”

Insufficient reconnaissance of enemy defenses.

The unpreparedness of Soviet troops to fight enemy minefields.

Unpreparedness of sapper units to quickly restore bridges destroyed by the enemy.

Premature introduction of the main forces into battle, associated not with weakness, but with the delay of the vanguard.

Template, mechanical introduction of second echelons into battle by commanders while reducing the pace of the offensive without taking into account the situation, the possibility of maneuver (bypass, coverage).

Insufficient artillery preparation for the attack. The offensive was carried out in conditions of the continued survivability of long-term fire installations. It was not possible to destroy the concrete of the bunkers, as a result of which the infantry was cut off from the tanks.

Lack of experience in breaking through defenses filled with long-term defensive structures. Moreover, in the latter case, he, turning directly to I.V. Stalin, said:

“Our regulations are based on the experience of the maneuver period of the First World War and did not give any idea of ​​war in positional conditions in the presence of long-term structures. The World War in the West developed in positional conditions, and there is a wealth of experience in this direction, which received great development after the World War, but this experience has not completely reached us.

The Germans and French published their archives of the World War a long time ago, but when they will be published here is completely unknown, and this has led to a delay in studying the rich experience, especially in trench warfare. There is no systematic literature on the experience of the war in Spain and China. If we were in such a position that we could not study foreign literature and know how military affairs were developing abroad, then intelligence officers should have helped us in this regard, which they did not do. And only when the second imperialist war began did we establish that not only the Finns, but also the Western states have deep defense lines.

Despite the fact that we are late in studying the experience of the West, we still need to quickly have documents and materials that provide the experience of modern war. Now there is a war in Europe, we do not receive foreign newspapers and magazines and do not know what they write there. We only receive brief reports from our newspapers. This is it, comrade. Stalin, and prevents us from following the development of military affairs."

At the same time, neither K.A. Meretskov, nor any of the other military leaders present at this meeting, paid attention to the fact that the Finns, despite being limited in territory and time:

1. They found it possible to create a deep support zone (forefield) in front of their main defense line, within which they envisaged the conduct of maneuverable actions with limited forces using various tactics.

2. Already at the first signs of the threat of war, a group of covering troops was deployed near the state border.

3. We made a decision on the upcoming defensive operation.

4. Conducted the exercise in accordance with the decision made.

It is this, combined with the factors indicated

K.A. Meretskov, and became the reason for the successful conduct by the Finns of the first defensive operation with the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish war. K. Mannerheim later wrote: “We were able to transfer both the covering troops and the field army to the front on time and in excellent condition. We received enough time - 4-6 weeks - for combat training of troops, familiarizing them with the terrain, to continue the construction of field fortifications, preparation of destructive work, as well as for laying mines and organizing minefields."

At the same time, he believed that the army commander allocated insufficient forces to the support zone to solve the problem in the current situation. He writes: “Contrary to my instructions, the fighting began with too weak forces, which made it impossible to delay the enemy for a long time. Thus, we lost a brilliant opportunity to deliver even more sensitive blows to the advancing troops. This is all the more unfortunate since the enemy, as we expected, was moving in dense masses, avoiding forests that were mined in many places. Rows of Russian soldiers advanced under the cover of tanks along the roads we had destroyed and often got stuck in traffic jams. And then they became convenient targets for both infantry fire and artillery fire, but ours did not have sufficient forces to effectively use these opportunities... The passivity of the leadership of the initial battles forced me to intervene in the matter with an order, in accordance with which the covering troops operating in the Uudenkirkko and Kivennapa directions, two regiments were assigned, one for each direction.”

The low rate of advance of Soviet troops on the Karelian Isthmus allowed the Finnish command to improve its techniques during maneuver defense. Mannerheim writes: “In conversations about how to alleviate the situation, the idea was born to form special anti-tank units armed with bunches of grenades and mines. I gave the order to create such units in every company, battalion, regiment and division. And soon they received another simple but effective weapon - an incendiary bottle. Close battles against tanks in the winter war were the greatest manifestations of heroism, because in order to go to a tank with only a bunch of grenades and a Molotov cocktail in your hands, both art and courage are required.”

February 15, 1940 Soviet troops finally broke through the Mannerheim Line- a powerful complex of Finnish defensive structures, considered impregnable. This marked a turning point in the Winter War of 1939-1940 and in military history as such. Today we will remind you what this legendary Finnish defensive line was like and tell you about six most interesting facts, related to the “Mannerheim Line” - the history of its construction and operation.

Mannerheim Line or Enckel Line?

What is the Mannerheim Line?

Was the line truly impregnable?

In fact, the Mannerheim Line, despite its scale, had many significant shortcomings. Let's start with the fact that at the start of the war it was not completed, and there was still quite a lot of construction work left. In addition, most of the equipment of this defensive complex in 1939 was noticeably outdated, and there were not so many modern firing points. And there was no talk about great depth of defense.

Why did Soviet troops storm the Mannerheim Line for more than two months?

The reason for this is the lack of accurate data on the structure of the “Mannerheim Line”, as well as the lack of personal strength and weapons appropriate to the task. The Soviet army lacked large-caliber artillery to destroy enemy concrete firing points and lacked military experience in breaking through such barriers. And the command did not always behave competently.

What is a “Karelian sculptor”?

What is now the site of the Mannerheim Line?

First option

Choose the correct answer

1. The defensive fortifications of the Karelian Isthmus were called:

1. “Maginot Line” 3) “Mannerheim Line”
2. "Eastern Wall" 4) "Siegfried Line"

2. Respect the timeline of World War II:

1. September 1, 1939 – May 9, 1945
2. September 1, 1939 – September 2, 1945
3. June 22, 1941 – May 9, 1945
4. June 22, 1941 – September 2, 1945

3. The governing body of the country during the war, which concentrated all power in its hands:

1. Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
2. Council of People's Commissars
3. State Defense Committee
4. Evacuation advice

4. Stalingrad was defended by:

1. 62nd Army (commander V.I. Chuikov)
2. 64th Army (commander M. S. Shumilov)
3. 13th Guards Division A.I. Rodimtsev
4. all the above troops

5. The trial of the main Nazi criminals took place in:

1) Moscow 2) Berlin 3) Potsdam 4) Nuremberg

1. September 8, 1941, January 18, 1943, January 27, 1944
2. V. Solovyov-Sedoy, M. Blanter, N. Bogoslovsky,
   K. Listov
3. What is extra in the series?

Conferences of the anti-Hitler coalition:

1. Moscow 3) Crimean
2. Genoese 4) Potsdam

9. Match:

1. genocide A) forced relocation of peoples
2. deportation B) removal of the population, material assets from localities,

Threatened

3) evacuation B) extermination of certain population groups by race,

national and other motives

4) repatriation D) systematic persecution and extermination by the Nazis and their

collaborators in Germany and in the territories captured by it of a significant part of the Jewish population of Europe

5) Holocaust

10. Name the document:

“Both Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any violence, from any aggressive action and from any attack... The agreement is concluded for a period of ten years... Done in two originals in German and Russian in Moscow.”

11. What are we talking about?

One of the types of struggle of the masses for the freedom of their homeland, which is waged on territory occupied by the enemy; The local population and regular troops operating behind enemy lines take part in the struggle. Manifests itself in various forms: armed struggle, sabotage, sabotage, reconnaissance, exposure of enemy actions, propaganda and agitation,

12. Who are we talking about?

Since the 1920s in the Red Army. One of Stalin's nominees is a general (at forty-one - lieutenant general). In the battles near Kiev and Moscow he established himself as a capable commander. During the Great Patriotic War, he commanded the corps and army, and was deputy. commander of the Volkhov Front, commander of the 2nd Shock Army, which found itself surrounded in the spring of 1942Leningrad. He was captured (according to other sources, he surrendered voluntarily). He headed the “Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia” and the “Russian Liberation Army”. Hanged by the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court in 1946

Second option

Choose the correct answer

1 . The non-aggression pact between Germany and the USSR was signed by:

1. A. Hitler, I. Stalin
2. V. Molotov, I. Ribbentrop
3. I. Stalin, I. Ribbentrop
4. M. Litvinov, I. Ribbentrop

2 . The divisions of the Soviet border districts in the summer of 1941 consisted of fighters:

1) 2.7 million 2) 3.5 million 3) 5 million 4) 5.5 million

3. Union of states that emerged during World War II
war in the fight against the fascist bloc:

1. resistance movement
2. anti-Hitler coalition
3. League of Nations
4. anti-fascist movement

4. According to the plan to seize the Caucasus in 1942, the German command carried out:

1. encirclement of the main forces of the Red Army in the area
   Rostov

1. capture of Grozny
2. mastery of the Maikop oil fields
3. all of the above

5. Event that happened later than others:

1. Atlantic Charter
2. Potsdam Conference
3. Tehran Conference
4. Yalta Conference

On what principle are the rows formed?

6 . Lenya Golikov, Marat Kazei, Valya Kotik, Zina Portnova

7. O. Berggolts, K. Simonov, A. Prokofiev, A. Surkov, A. Tvardovsky

8. What is extra in the row?

A radical turning point during the war:

1. battle for Moscow 3) crossing of the Dnieper
2. Battle of Stalingrad 4) Battle of Kursk

9 . Match:

1. genocide A) the leading role of a state in relation to
2. deportation to other countries
3. hegemony B) destruction of certain population groups by race
4. evacuation for national and other reasons
5. Holocaust B) systematic extermination by the Nazis and their collaborators

A significant part of the Jewish population of Europe

D) forced relocation of peoples

10 . In honor of what event was the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief issued?

“Today, August 5, at 24 o’clock, the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, will salute our valiant troops... with twelve artillery salvoes from 120 guns.”

11 . What are we talking about?

One of the largest battles in World War II, lasting 200 days. As a result of complete victory in this battle, one of the warring sides seized the strategic initiative in the war.

12 . Who are we talking about?

During the Great Patriotic War - deputy. chief, chief of the General Staff, deputy. People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. He coordinated the actions of a number of fronts in strategic operations, especially where the most difficult situation developed. Having started the war as a major general, a year and a half later he became Marshal of the Soviet Union. Since June 1945 - commander of Soviet troops in the Far East. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, holder of two highest military orders - the Order of Victory. Author of the memoir “Life’s Work.”

Answers

1 option

1 - 3; 2 - 2; 3 - 3; 4 - 4; 5 - 4; 6 - blockade of Leningrad;

9 - 1-B, 2-A, 3-B, 4-no, 5-G;

11 - about the partisan movement; 12 - A. Vlasov

Option 2

1 - 2; 2 - 1; 3 - 2; 4 - 3; 5 - 2;

6 - young anti-fascist heroes (pioneers), Heroes of the Soviet Union;

7 - authors of famous poetic works during the war;

8 - 1, 3;

9 - 1-B, 2-B, 3-A, 4-no, 5-B;

11 - Battle of Sta Lingrad; 12 - A. M. Vasilevsky.

The material is taken from the manual by O.N. Zhuravlev. Tests on the history of Russia of the 20th century. Publishing house "Exam" Moscow, 2005