On April 8, 70 years ago, the Crimean strategic offensive operation began. It went down in history as one of the most important offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. Its goal was the liberation of the Crimean Peninsula, an important strategic bridgehead in the Black Sea theater of military operations, by defeating the 17th German Army of Colonel General E. Eneke, who was holding Crimea.

On April 8, 70 years ago, the Crimean strategic offensive operation began. It went down in history as one of the most important offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. Its goal was the liberation of the Crimean Peninsula, an important strategic bridgehead in the Black Sea theater of military operations, by defeating the 17th German Army of Colonel General E. Eneke, who was holding Crimea.

As a result of the Melitopol (September 26 - November 5, 1943) and (October 31 - November 11, 1943) Soviet troops broke through the fortifications of the Turkish Wall on the Perekop Isthmus, captured bridgeheads on the southern bank of the Sivash and on the Kerch Peninsula, but liberated Crimea immediately It didn’t work - there wasn’t enough strength. A large group of German troops continued to remain on the peninsula, relying on deeply echeloned defensive positions. On the Perekop Isthmus and against the bridgehead on Sivash, the defense consisted of three, and on the Kerch Peninsula - of four lines.

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) considered Crimea as a strategically important area, and its liberation as the most important opportunity to return the main base of the Black Sea Fleet - Sevastopol, which would significantly improve the conditions for basing ships and conducting combat operations at sea. In addition, Crimea covered the Balkan strategic flank of German troops and their important sea communications running along the Black Sea straits to the western coast of the Black Sea. Therefore, the German leadership also attached great military and political importance to keeping Crimea in their hands, which, in their opinion, was one of the factors in maintaining the support of Turkey and its allies in the Balkans. In this regard, the command of the 17th Army was obliged to hold the peninsula to the last. Despite this, the German command developed a detailed plan in the event of its retreat, called Operation Adler.

At the beginning of 1944, the German army was reinforced by two divisions: at the end of January 1944, the 73rd infantry division was delivered to the peninsula by sea, and at the beginning of March - the 111th infantry division. By April, the army had 12 divisions: 5 German and 7 Romanian, 2 brigades of assault guns, various reinforcement units and numbered more than 195 thousand people, about 3,600 guns and mortars, 215 tanks and assault guns. It was supported by 148 aircraft.

The Soviet leadership entrusted the task of defeating the enemy's Crimean group and liberating Crimea to the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front (commanding army general), which included the 2nd Guards and 51st armies, the 19th tank corps, the 16th and 78th nd fortified areas, air support was provided by aviation of the 8th Air Army and the Black Sea Fleet Air Force; Separate Primorsky Army (commanded by Army General), whose operations were supported by aviation of the 4th Air Army; Black Sea Fleet (commander admiral), whose forces supported the offensive on the coastal flanks and disrupted the enemy's sea communications; Azov military flotilla (commanded by rear admiral), which supported the offensive of the troops of the Separate Primorsky Army.

The balance of forces and means of the parties at the beginning
Crimean strategic offensive operation

In total, the Soviet strike force consisted of about 470 thousand people, 5982 guns and mortars, 559 tanks and self-propelled guns (SPG), 1250 aircraft, including the Black Sea Fleet aviation. By April 1944, the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov military flotilla included a battleship, four cruisers, six destroyers, two patrol ships, eight basic minesweepers, 47 torpedo and 80 patrol boats, 34 armored boats, 29 submarines, three gunboats and other auxiliary vessels. In addition, the troops were supported by Crimean partisan detachments. Created in January 1944, the Crimean partisan forces, numbering almost 4 thousand people, were united into three formations: Southern, Northern and Eastern. Thus, the forces of the USSR significantly exceeded the enemy forces.

The actions of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front and the Separate Primorsky Army were coordinated by representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Marshal and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Marshal.

Preparations for the Crimean offensive operation began in February 1944. On February 6, Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky and the Military Council of the 4th Ukrainian Front presented their considerations to the Supreme Command Headquarters regarding the conduct of the Crimean operation, which was supposed to begin on February 18-19.

However, the start date of the operation was subsequently postponed several times. So, on February 18, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, in accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Command Headquarters, ordered Army General F.I. Tolbukhin, the Crimean operation will begin after the entire coast of the Dnieper up to and including Kherson is liberated from the enemy. Despite this, the Headquarters in its further instructions demanded that the operation begin no later than March 1, regardless of the progress of the operation to liberate the Right Bank Dnieper from the enemy. A.M. Vasilevsky reported to Headquarters that, given the weather conditions, the Crimean operation could only begin between March 15 and 20. The Headquarters agreed with the target date, but on March 16 the front received new instructions that the Crimean operation “begin after the troops of the left wing of the 3rd Ukrainian Front captured the area of ​​​​the city of Nikolaev and advanced them to Odessa.” However, the front, due to poor meteorological conditions, was able to begin the operation only on April 8, 1944.

The entire operation of the 4th Ukrainian Front was planned to a depth of up to 170 km, lasting 10-12 days with an average daily rate of advance of 12-15 km. The rate of advance of the 19th Tank Corps was determined to be 30-35 km per day.

The idea of ​​the Crimean operation was to deliver a simultaneous strike in the general direction of Simferopol and Sevastopol, with the forces of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front from the north - from Perekop and Sivash, and the Separate Primorsky Army from the east - from the Kerch Peninsula, to dismember and destroy the enemy group , preventing her evacuation from Crimea. The main blow was planned to be delivered from a bridgehead on the southern bank of Sivash. If successful, the main group of the front went to the rear of the enemy’s Perekop positions, and the capture of Dzhankoy opened up freedom of action towards Simferopol and the Kerch Peninsula to the rear of the enemy group located there. An auxiliary attack was carried out on the Perekop Isthmus. The separate Primorsky Army was supposed to break through the enemy’s defenses north of Kerch, deliver the main blow to Simferopol, Sevastopol, and with part of its forces along the southern coast of the Crimean Peninsula.

On April 8, 1944, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front went on the offensive. Five days earlier, heavy artillery destroyed a significant part of the enemy's long-term structures. On the evening of April 7, reconnaissance in force was carried out, confirming previous information about the grouping of Wehrmacht troops in the area of ​​Perekop and Sivash. On the day the operation began, at 8:00 am, artillery and aviation preparation began in the zone of the 4th Ukrainian Front for a total duration of 2.5 hours. Immediately after its end, the front troops went on the offensive, striking with the forces of the 51st Army of Lieutenant General from a bridgehead on the southern bank of Sivash. After two days of fierce fighting, thanks to the courage of Soviet soldiers, the enemy’s defenses were broken through. The 51st Army reached the flank of the German Perekop group, and the 2nd Guards Army of the Lieutenant General liberated Armyansk. On the morning of April 11, the 19th Tank Corps of the Lieutenant General captured Dzhankoy on the move and successfully advanced to Simferopol. Fearing the threat of encirclement, the enemy abandoned the fortifications on the Perekop Isthmus and began to retreat from the Kerch Peninsula.

The troops of the Separate Primorsky Army, having launched an offensive on the night of April 11, captured the fortified city of Kerch in the morning - a fortified center of enemy resistance on the eastern coast of Crimea. The pursuit of enemy troops retreating to Sevastopol began in all directions. The 2nd Guards Army developed an offensive along the western coast towards Yevpatoria. The 51st Army, using the success of the 19th Tank Corps, rushed across the steppes to Simferopol. A separate Primorsky army advanced through Karasubazar (Belogorsk) and Feodosia to Sevastopol. As a result, Yevpatoria, Simferopol and Feodosia were liberated on April 13, and Bakhchisarai, Alushta, and Yalta on April 14-15.

German troops continued to retreat. Aviation of the 8th and 4th Air Armies carried out massive attacks on retreating enemy troops and communications centers. The forces of the Black Sea Fleet sank its ships and transports with evacuated troops. The enemy lost 8,100 soldiers and officers from attacks on sea convoys and single ships.

Crimean partisans and underground fighters fought courageously. Crimean partisan formations received tasks to destroy enemy rear lines, nodes and communication lines, destroy railways, set up blockages and ambushes on mountain roads, disrupt the work of the Yalta port and thereby prevent the withdrawal of German-Romanian troops to it and other loading points for evacuation to Romania . The partisans were also entrusted with the task of preventing the enemy from destroying cities, industrial and transport enterprises.

On April 15-16, Soviet troops reached Sevastopol and began preparations for the assault on the city. In accordance with the decision of the commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front, approved by the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, the main blow was planned to be delivered from the Balaklava area by formations and units of the left flank of the 51st and the center of the Primorsky Army, which became part of the 4th Ukrainian Front on April 18. They had to break through the enemy’s defenses in the area of ​​Sapun Mountain and the heights northeast of the settlement of Karan with the task of cutting it off from the bays located west of Sevastopol. According to the front command, the defeat of the enemy on Sapun Mountain, despite the difficulty of its assault, should have allowed the stability of the German defense to be quickly disrupted. The auxiliary strike was planned in the zone of the 2nd Guards Army and, in order to divert the enemy’s attention, was planned two days before the main strike. The army had to break through the enemy’s defenses in the area southeast of Belbek with the forces of the 13th Guards and 55th Rifle Corps and develop an offensive on the Mekenzi Mountains and the eastern shore of the Northern Bay in order to press the German group to the sea and destroy it.

On April 19 and 23, front troops made two attempts to break through the main defensive line of the Sevastopol fortified region, but they ended in failure. A new regrouping and training of troops was required, as well as the supply of ammunition and fuel. On May 5, the assault on the city’s fortifications began - the 2nd Guards Army went on the offensive, which forced the enemy to transfer troops to Sevastopol from other directions.

On May 7 at 10:30, with massive support from all front aviation, Soviet troops began a general assault on the Sevastopol fortified area. The troops of the front's main strike group broke through the enemy defenses along a 9-kilometer stretch and captured Sapun Mountain during fierce battles. On May 9, front troops from the north, east and southeast broke into Sevastopol and liberated the city. The remnants of the German 17th Army, pursued by the 19th Tank Corps, retreated to Cape Khersones, where they were completely defeated. At the cape, 21 thousand enemy soldiers and officers were captured, and a large amount of equipment and weapons were captured.

Combat report from the headquarters of the 4th Ukrainian Front on the capture of the city and sea fortress of Sevastopol

Soviet tanks on Frunze Street (now Nakhimov Avenue)
during the days of the city's liberation from German invaders. May 1944

The Crimean offensive operation is over. If in 1941-1942. While it took German troops 250 days to capture heroically defended Sevastopol, in 1944 Soviet troops only needed 35 days to break through powerful fortifications in Crimea and clear almost the entire peninsula of the enemy.

Already by May 15, 1944, the headquarters of the 4th Ukrainian Front began to receive reports about military parades held in military units and formations dedicated to the final defeat of the group of German troops in Crimea.

Combat reports from the headquarters of the Primorsky Army to the headquarters of the 4th Ukrainian Front on the conduct of military parades in military units and formations.

Fireworks in liberated Sevastopol. May 1944 Photo by E. Khaldei

The objectives of the operation were achieved. Soviet troops broke through the deeply echeloned defenses on the Perekop Isthmus, the Kerch Peninsula, in the Sevastopol region and defeated the 17th Field Army of the Wehrmacht. Its losses on land alone amounted to 100 thousand people, including over 61,580 people captured. During the Crimean operation, Soviet troops and naval forces lost 17,754 people killed and 67,065 people wounded.

The victory in Crimea returned an important economic region to the country. In general, a territory covering an area of ​​about 26 thousand square meters was liberated. km. During the years of occupation, the Nazi invaders caused enormous damage to Crimea: more than 300 industrial enterprises were put out of action, livestock was almost completely exterminated, cities and resorts were severely destroyed - Sevastopol, Kerch, Feodosia and Yevpatoria were especially affected. Thus, at the time of liberation, 3 thousand inhabitants remained in Sevastopol out of 109 thousand people in the city on the eve of the war. Only 6% of the housing stock in the city survived.

Considering the progress and assessing the results of the Crimean operation, it is clear that its successful completion was predetermined by the skillful choice by the Soviet command of the directions of the main attacks, the good organization of interaction between strike groupings of troops, aviation and naval forces, the decisive dismemberment and defeat of the main enemy forces (Sivash direction), and the capture of key defensive positions in a short time (storming of Sevastopol). Mobile groups (advanced detachments) of armies were skillfully used to develop the offensive. They quickly penetrated into the operational depth of the enemy's defense, preventing his retreating troops from gaining a foothold on intermediate lines and in defense areas, which ensured a high rate of attack.

For heroism and skillful actions, 160 formations and units were given the honorary names of Evpatoria, Kerch, Perekop, Sevastopol, Sivash, Simferopol, Feodosia and Yalta. 56 formations, units and ships were awarded orders. 238 soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, thousands of participants in the battles for Crimea were awarded orders and medals.

As a result of the Crimean operation, the last large enemy bridgehead that threatened the rear of the fronts operating in Right Bank Ukraine was eliminated. Within five days, the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, Sevastopol, was liberated and favorable conditions were created for a further offensive in the Balkans.

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* The Great Patriotic War is not classified. Book of losses. Latest reference publication / G.F. Krivosheev, V.M. Andronikov, P.D. Burikov, V.V. Gurkin. - M.: Veche, 2010. P. 143.

Anna Tsepkalova,
Research Institute employee
military history of the Military Academy of the General Staff
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,
Candidate of Historical Sciences

The liberation of Crimea in 1944 is often called “Stalin’s Third Strike,” which is not entirely true. Firstly, as the Crimean historian V.E. explained in his work “Stalin’s Third Strike - Myth and Reality”. Polyakov, the very concept of “Stalin’s blows” is a post-war invention, the impetus for which was the speech of I.V. Stalin in 1944, where he mentioned ten crushing blows. And also one of the first post-war films, “The Third Strike,” which talked about the liberation of Crimea. As a result, the Soviet press came up with “Stalinist strikes.”

In any case, the “third strike” includes not only the liberation of Crimea, but also the liberation of Odessa. So the Crimean offensive operation of 1944 is only an integral part of the so-called. "blow".

Although many different works (mostly creative, not historical) are devoted to the topic of the liberation of Crimea, little is known reliably about the losses.

Red Army forces in the Crimean operation

The offensive in Crimea was planned to be carried out from Perekop and the Kerch Peninsula.

From the north, the 4th Ukrainian Front was supposed to enter Crimea under the command of Army General F.I. Tolbukhin. The front consists of two combined arms (51st and 2nd Guards) and 8th Air Armies, 19th Tank Corps. A total of 18 rifle divisions, a tank corps, a separate tank brigade, a separate tank and self-propelled artillery regiments, a flamethrower tank battalion, 2 artillery divisions and 4 engineering brigades, separate units.

The front's tank fleet was extremely varied: there were already outgoing Soviet KVs and T-60s, as well as various American and British vehicles. In total there were 337 tanks and self-propelled guns. Of these, the 51st Army was supported by 82, and the 2nd Guards - by 43 tanks and self-propelled guns. The front had powerful artillery, including 203 mm howitzers and 280 mm mortars.

The Separate Primorsky Army under the command of Army General A.I. Eremenko was advancing from the east. The army consists of 12 rifle and mountain rifle divisions, 2 naval rifle brigades, a tank brigade, 4 separate tank and self-propelled artillery regiments, and separate units. From the air, Eremenko’s troops were supported by the 4th Air Army. The army's tank fleet was also varied and consisted of 204-211 tanks and self-propelled guns.

The 8th Air Army had 600 serviceable aircraft (out of 750), the 4th Army had 561 aircraft (out of 580), and the Black Sea Fleet aviation could provide up to 300 aircraft. The total number of aircraft was 1,456 aircraft, including 683 fighters and 382 attack aircraft.

The strength of the Primorsky Army is indicated at the beginning of the operation as 92,367 people, the 2nd Guards Army - 72,230 people, the 51st Army - 93,300 people. There were 20,681 people in front-line units. Soviet troops, after huge losses in previous operations, still had a significant shortage of strength. In the divisions, according to the data given in A. Isaev’s book “The Battle for Crimea,” there were only 6,500-7,000 people each. In the companies of the divisions of the 2nd Shock Army, according to report No. 1195/sh dated April 16, there were 70-75 people each.

Who defended in Crimea?

In Soviet times, it was customary to inflate the number of German troops in every possible way. However, it should be recognized that in the Crimean operation a significant advantage was on the side of the Red Army.

The 17th German Army was in Crimea. It consisted of only five German infantry divisions. Of these, two were in the north, two on the Kerch Peninsula, and one on the coast (later transferred to Perekop). In addition, there were seven Romanian divisions: cavalry and mountain on the Kerch Peninsula, infantry and cavalry in the northern part, and three guarded the coast from possible landings. There were 77 assault guns, comprising two corresponding divisions. Romanian troops had two tank companies, which included up to two dozen Czech tanks that had zero combat value.

But the 17th Army had 583 anti-tank guns (of which 98 were 75 mm caliber), 30 Marder self-propelled guns, 485 Panzerschreck grenade launchers and 9645 disposable Panzerfausts. The anti-tank defense consisted of guns from the 9th Anti-Aircraft Division, which had 134 88-mm anti-aircraft guns.

The combat effectiveness of the Romanian troops was extremely low, both in moral terms and in terms of training and weapons. The German units experienced a significant shortage of personnel and weapons. At the same time, there was a significant number of various freelance and auxiliary formations. For example, the 50th Infantry Division defending Perekop had a total of 19 battalions, including two “Caucasian” battalions and one Slovak battalion. The division's regiments were reinforced with 20 mm and 88 mm anti-aircraft guns.

German aviation in Crimea consisted of 48 fighters and 88 attack aircraft.

The total number of personnel of the Crimean group on April 1 was 230,000 people. Of these, about 65,000 are soldiers of Romanian units. More than half of them were in all kinds of rear services, law enforcement, and civilian personnel, and they should not be considered as a fighting force. However, after huge losses (the 73rd and 98th infantry divisions that fled from the Kerch Peninsula lost 79% and 43% of their personnel, respectively), the German command threw rear troops and everyone they could into the positions.

How much did the victory cost?

According to official data, the losses of the Red Army during the Crimean offensive operation amounted to 84,819 people, including irrevocable losses - 17,754 people. If we assume that at the beginning of the operation there were 278,578 people, then 30% of the personnel dropped out.

But it is worth noting that the victory was complete; the 17th Army suffered huge losses. A. Polishchuk, in his work “Payback for the Bustard Hunt,” provides data that differs from the official Soviet ones, but is also very impressive.

During the fighting, 38,854 Germans and 24,674 Romanians died or went missing - a total of 63,528 people. 97,875 people were evacuated - 63,499 Germans and 34,376 Romanians, this number includes about 10,000 people who were on transports sunk by Soviet aircraft. On May 12–13, 21 thousand soldiers and officers were captured at Cape Chersonese. It should be remembered that the German reports concern only military personnel, and, as stated above, there were many different people in Crimea, including civilians. Therefore, it is not surprising that Soviet and German data can differ greatly.

After the evacuation from Crimea, the number of personnel of the 17th Army was 9,741 people, of which 2,680 were rear personnel.

It was for this victory that tens of thousands of Soviet soldiers in Crimea paid with their lives and health in 1944.

Battle of Crimea 1941–1944 [From defeat to triumph] Runov Valentin Aleksandrovich

Liberation of Crimea

Liberation of Crimea

The troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front (commander - Army General F.I. Tolbukhin) during the Melitopol operation on October 30, 1943 occupied Genichesk and reached the coast of Sivash, crossed the bay and captured a bridgehead on its southern shore. And on November 1, having overcome the fortifications of the Turkish Wall, they broke into the Perekop Isthmus. The 19th Tank Corps, under the command of Lieutenant General of Tank Forces I.D. Vasilyev, managed to fight its way through the fortifications on the Turkish Wall and reach Armyansk. Using the separation of the tankers from the cavalry and infantry, the German command managed to close the gap in its defense and temporarily block the tank corps. But by November 5, the main forces of the 51st Army of Lieutenant General Ya. G. Kreizer also overcame Perekop and joined forces with the tankers fighting in the encirclement. The fighting in this direction gradually ceased. Thus, by November 1943, Soviet troops reached the lower reaches of the Dnieper, captured a bridgehead in Crimea on the southern bank of the Sivash and the approaches to the Crimean isthmuses.

The entry of Soviet troops to the immediate approaches to the Crimean Peninsula put on the agenda the task of liberating it from the Nazi invaders. Back in early February 1944, when Soviet troops were fighting for the Nikopol bridgehead, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky presented to the Supreme High Command Headquarters ideas developed jointly with the command of the 4th Ukrainian Front for organizing an offensive operation to liberate Crimea. They believed that such an operation could begin on February 18–19. However, the Supreme High Command decided to carry it out after the lower reaches of the Dnieper to Kherson were cleared of the enemy and the 4th Ukrainian Front was freed from solving other problems.

In connection with the defeat of the Nikopol enemy group on February 17, Headquarters ordered the start of an offensive in Crimea no later than March 1, regardless of the progress of the operation to liberate the right bank of the Dnieper. However, due to inclement weather and storms in the Sea of ​​Azov, which delayed the regrouping of front troops and their crossing of the Sivash, the operation had to be postponed. Therefore, the Supreme Command Headquarters decided to begin active actions to liberate Crimea after the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front captured the Nikolaev region and access to Odessa.

The Supreme High Command headquarters planned joint participation in the operation to liberate Crimea by the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, the Separate Primorsky Army, the Black Sea Fleet, the Azov Military Flotilla and the Crimean partisans.

During the Kerch-Eltigen landing operation, carried out from November 1 to November 11, 1943, although the troops of the North Caucasus Front did not achieve the planned result, they created an operational bridgehead north of Kerch. After its completion, the North Caucasus Front was liquidated, and the 56th Army located on the bridgehead was transformed into the Separate Primorsky Army. Its troops were supposed to attack the enemy from the east.

The Soviet Black Sea Fleet, deprived of the possibility of basing in the ports of the Crimean Peninsula, experienced great difficulties in conducting operations at sea. Therefore, the Supreme Command Headquarters, taking into account the importance of the actions of Soviet warships in the Black Sea, at the beginning of the operation to liberate the Crimean Peninsula, issued a special directive outlining the tasks of the Black Sea Fleet. The main task was to disrupt enemy communications in the Black Sea by submarines, bomber aircraft, mine-torpedo aircraft, attack aircraft and torpedo boats. At the same time, the operational zone of the Black Sea Fleet must constantly expand and consolidate. The fleet had to protect its sea communications from enemy influence, primarily by providing reliable anti-submarine defense. For the future, it was ordered to prepare large surface ships for naval operations, and fleet forces to be redeployed to Sevastopol.

Operations to liberate Crimea

In conditions when the Soviet Army cleared the entire Northern Tavria from the invaders, the enemy’s Crimean group threatened the Soviet troops operating in Right Bank Ukraine and pinned down significant forces of the 4th Ukrainian Front. The loss of Crimea, in the opinion of Hitler’s command, would mean a sharp decline in Germany’s prestige in the countries of South-Eastern Europe and Turkey, which were sources of valuable and critically scarce strategic materials. Crimea covered the Balkan strategic flank of Nazi Germany and important sea communications leading through the Black Sea straits to the ports of the western coast of the Black Sea, as well as up the Danube.

Therefore, despite the loss of Right Bank Ukraine, the 17th Army under the command of Colonel General E. Eneke was entrusted with the task of holding Crimea until the last opportunity. To achieve this, the army was increased by two divisions at the beginning of 1944. By April, it consisted of 12 divisions - 5 German and 7 Romanian, two brigades of assault guns, various reinforcement units and numbered more than 195 thousand people, about 3,600 guns and mortars, 250 tanks and assault guns. It was supported by 148 aircraft based at Crimean airfields and aviation from airfields in Romania.

Artillerymen cross Sivash

The main forces of the 17th Army, the 49th German mountain rifle and the 3rd Romanian cavalry corps (four German - 50, 111, 336, 10th, one Romanian - 19th division and 279th assault gun brigade) , defended themselves in the northern part of Crimea. The 5th Army Corps (73rd, 98th German Infantry Divisions, 191st Assault Gun Brigade), 6th Cavalry and 3rd Mountain Rifle Divisions of the Romanian Army operated on the Kerch Peninsula. The southern and western coasts were covered by the 1st Mountain Rifle Corps (three Romanian divisions).

The enemy took all measures to create a strong defense, especially in the most important directions where he expected the advance of Soviet troops.

On the Perekop Isthmus, three defense lines were equipped to a depth of 35 km: the first line, the Ishun positions and the line along the Chatarlyk River. In front of the bridgeheads of the Soviet troops on the southern bank of the Sivash, the enemy equipped two or three strips in narrow inter-lake defiles. On the Kerch Peninsula, four defensive lines were built along its entire 70-km depth. In operational depth, defense was being prepared at the line of Saki, Sarabuz, Karasubazar, Belogorsk, Stary Krym, Feodosia.

Soviet troops occupied the following position.

On the Perekop Isthmus, on the 14-km front, the 2nd Guards Army was deployed, which included 8 rifle divisions. The bridgehead on the southern bank of the Sivash was occupied by the 51st Army, which had 10 rifle divisions. The front commander's reserve included the 19th Tank Corps (four tank and one motorized rifle brigade), which located its main forces on the Sivash bridgehead. To the left of the 51st Army, the 78th fortified area was defended to Genichesk.

Commander of the 63rd Rifle Corps, Major General (later Marshal of the Soviet Union) P.K. Koshevoy

Commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front, Army General (later Marshal of the Soviet Union) F. I. Tolbukhin

To support the troops on the bridgehead, the engineering troops of the 51st Army built two crossings across the Sivash: a bridge on frame supports with a length of 1865 m and a load capacity of 16 tons, two earthen dams 600–700 m long and a pontoon bridge between them 1350 m long. In February - March In 1944, the bridge and dams were strengthened, their carrying capacity increased to 30 tons, which made it possible to ensure the crossing of T-34 tanks and heavy artillery. The crossing of the tanks of the 19th Tank Corps was extremely difficult. It was held from March 13 to 25. Several tanks were transported from the corps at night, which were carefully camouflaged and hidden from enemy observation in the shortest possible time. The German command failed to detect the crossing and concentration of the tank corps, which subsequently played a role.

Commander of the 51st Army, Lieutenant General Ya. G. Kreizer at the OP near Sevastopol

The Separate Primorsky Army was concentrated on the Kerch Peninsula (commander - Army General A.I. Eremenko).

Black Sea Fleet (commander - admiral

F. S. Oktyabrsky) was based at the ports of the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, the Azov military flotilla (commander - Rear Admiral S. G. Gorshkov) - at the ports of the Taman Peninsula.

A group of Soviet partisans, numbering 4.5 thousand people, operated on the Crimean Peninsula.

The Separate Primorsky Army is receiving reinforcements. Kerch region. Spring 1944

In the second half of 1943, general dissatisfaction with the occupation regime began to increasingly manifest itself on the peninsula; more and more Crimean Tatars began to desire the return of the previous government. This dissatisfaction was expressed primarily in the fact that they began to support her “long arm” on the peninsula - the partisans. As Soviet troops approached the peninsula, partisan attacks on the occupiers began to intensify. The Soviet command began to provide them with increasing assistance. Constant communication with the population was established. Residents of many villages took refuge in the forests, hundreds of them joined partisan detachments. Crimean Tatars made up approximately a sixth of the number of these units.

In total, by January 1944, Soviet partisans in the amount of about 4 thousand people were operating on the Crimean Peninsula. But these were not scattered partisan groups and separate detachments. In January–February 1944, 7 partisan brigades were formed. These brigades were united into three formations: Southern, Northern and Eastern. There were two brigades in the South and East, and three in the North.

Soviet artillery fires at enemy fortifications in Crimea. 4th Ukrainian Front. 1944

The largest in composition was the Southern Unit (commander - M. A. Makedonsky, commissioner - M. V. Selimov). This unit operated in the mountainous and forested area of ​​the southern part of Crimea and numbered more than 2,200 people. In the mountainous and forested area southwest of Karasubazar, the Northern Unit (commander - P.R. Yampolsky, commissar - N.D. Lugovoy) operated with a strength of 860 people. To the south and southwest of Old Crimea there was an area of ​​operation of the Eastern Union (commander - V.S. Kuznetsov, commissar - R.Sh. Mustafaev) in the amount of 680 people.

The partisans controlled large areas of the mountainous and wooded terrain of the south of Crimea, which gave them the opportunity to strike at units of German-Romanian troops moving along the roads leading from the southern coast to the northern and eastern regions of the peninsula.

Underground organizations of Soviet patriots operated in various cities of Crimea - Yevpatoria, Sevastopol, Yalta.

The activities of the partisans were controlled by the Crimean headquarters of the partisan movement, which had reliable communication with formations and detachments by radio, as well as with the help of aircraft of the 2nd Aviation Transport Regiment of the 1st Aviation Transport Division, located in the 4th Air Army. The Po-2 and P-5 aircraft of the 9th Separate Aviation Regiment of the Civil Air Fleet were most widely used for communication and supply of partisans.

The partisan formations, operationally subordinate to the command of the Separate Primorsky Army, for the period of the offensive operation received orders to strike the rear units of the invaders, destroy nodes and communication lines, preventing the systematic withdrawal of enemy troops, destroying individual sections of railways, setting up ambushes and creating blockages in mountainous areas. roads, preventing the enemy from destroying cities, industrial enterprises and railways. The main task of the Southern Connection was control over the Yalta port and disruption of its work.

By the beginning of the operation, the 4th Ukrainian Front and the Separate Primorsky Army had 470 thousand people, 5982 guns and mortars, 559 tanks and self-propelled guns. The 4th and 8th Air Armies had 1,250 aircraft. Comparing the forces of the parties, it is clear that the Soviet command was able to achieve a serious superiority over the enemy (2.4 times in personnel, 1.6 times in artillery, 2.6 times in tanks, 8.4 times in aircraft ).

Crossing the Sivash. 51st Army. 1944

The general idea of ​​defeating the enemy in Crimea was to carry out simultaneous attacks by troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front from the north, from Perekop and Sivash, and the Separate Primorsky Army from the east, from a bridgehead in the Kerch region, with the assistance of the Black Sea Fleet, DD aviation formations and partisans , in the general direction of Simferopol, Sevastopol, dismember and destroy the enemy group, preventing its evacuation from Crimea.

Soldiers of the 16th Rifle Corps are fighting in Kerch. Separate Primorsky Army April 11, 1944

The main role in defeating the enemy in Crimea was assigned to the 4th Ukrainian Front, whose troops were supposed to break through enemy defenses in the northern part of the Crimean Peninsula, defeat the troops of the German group and develop a rapid offensive on Sevastopol in order to prevent the enemy from organizing a strong defense in the area of ​​​​this city .

The Separate Primorsky Army was entrusted with the task of breaking through the enemy’s defenses on the Kerch Peninsula and developing success in Simferopol and Sevastopol. The army was supposed to go on the offensive a few days later than the 4th Ukrainian Front, when a threat was created to the rear of the enemy’s Kerch group.

The Black Sea Fleet was entrusted with the task of blockading Crimea, disrupting the enemy's sea communications, assisting ground forces on the coastal flanks and being ready for tactical landings. The fleet was also involved in assisting the ground forces with its aviation, and in the coastal zone with naval artillery fire. Brigades of torpedo boats from Anapa and Skadovsk were supposed to destroy enemy ships on the near approaches to Sevastopol and directly in the ports; a submarine brigade - on distant approaches and aviation - along the entire length of enemy communications. The Azov military flotilla, operationally subordinate to the commander of the Separate Primorsky Army, provided all transportation through the Kerch Strait.

Aviation support in the 4th Ukrainian Front was assigned to the 8th Air Army (commander - Lieutenant General of Aviation T.T. Khryukin) and the aviation group of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force. The Air Army was supposed to support the offensive of the troops of the 51st Army and the 19th Tank Corps, the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet - the 2nd Guards Army. The troops of the Separate Primorsky Army were to be supported by aircraft of the 4th Air Army (commander - Major General of Aviation N. F. Naumenko).

In the Crimean operation, the Air Force was tasked with conducting aerial reconnaissance, striking enemy ships and transports in communications and ports, and supporting the combat operations of the 19th Tank Corps while developing success in the depths of the enemy’s defense. During the air offensive, enemy ground force groups, strongholds, and artillery were to be hit.

Soldiers of the 16th Rifle Corps attack an enemy stronghold on the territory of a metallurgical plant in Kerch. Separate Primorsky Army April 11, 1944

Crimean partisans received the task of smashing the rear of the invaders, destroying their nodes and communication lines, disrupting control, preventing the organized withdrawal of fascist troops, disrupting the work of the Yalta port, and also preventing the enemy from destroying cities, industrial and transport enterprises.

The coordination of the actions of all forces and means involved in the operation was carried out by the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky. The representative of the Headquarters in the Separate Primorsky Army was Marshal of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov. General F. Ya. Falaleev was appointed representative for aviation.

In accordance with the plan of the operation, the commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front, Army General F.I. Tolbukhin, decided to break through the enemy’s defenses in two directions - on the Perekop Isthmus with the forces of the 2nd Guards Army and on the southern bank of Sivash with the forces of the 51st Army. The front delivered the main blow in the 51st Army zone, where, firstly, the enemy considered the delivery of the main blow to be unlikely; secondly, the attack from the bridgehead would lead to the rear of the enemy fortifications on the Perekop Isthmus; thirdly, a strike in this direction made it possible to quickly capture Dzhankoy, which opened up freedom of action towards Simferopol and the Kerch Peninsula.

The operational formation of the front was single-echelon. The mobile group consisted of the 19th Tank Corps, which was supposed to enter the breakthrough in the 51st Army zone from the fourth day of the operation, after breaking through the enemy’s tactical and operational defenses. Developing success in the general direction of Dzhankoy, Simferopol on the fourth day after entering the breakthrough, the corps was supposed to capture Simferopol. Having moved part of its forces to Seitler, Karasubazar, the corps was supposed to protect the left flank of the front from a possible attack by the enemy group from the Kerch Peninsula.

The entire operation of the 4th Ukrainian Front was planned at a depth of up to 170 km, lasting 10–12 days. The average daily rate of advance was planned for the rifle troops to be 12–15 km, and for the 19th Tank Corps – up to 30–35 km.

The commander of the 2nd Guards Army, General Zakharov G.F., based his decision on the idea of ​​​​cutting the enemy group defending in Perekop positions into two parts, and then by developing an offensive in the south-eastern and south-western directions, press these groups to Sivash and Perekop Bay , where to destroy them. It was planned to land troops on boats as part of a reinforced rifle battalion in the rear of the enemy defending in Perekop positions.

The commander of the 51st Army, General D. G. Kreiser, decided to break through the enemy’s defenses, delivering the main blow with two rifle corps on Tarkhan and auxiliary attacks by the 63rd Rifle Corps on Tomashevka and Pasurman 2; subsequently develop success with the 10th Rifle Corps on Ishun, in the rear of the Ishun positions, and with the 1st Guards Rifle Corps on Voinka (10 km south of Tarkhan) and on Novo-Alexandrovka. The forces of one rifle division were planned to develop an offensive from Pasurman 2nd to Taganash.

In the 2nd Guards Army, it was planned to break through the main defense line to a depth of 20 km in the first two days, then, developing the offensive, in the next two days, break through the second and army lines to a depth of 10–18 km.

Machine gunners before attacking enemy positions in Perekop. 4th Ukrainian Front. April 8, 1944

In both armies, to increase efforts and develop success, the corps built battle formations in two or three echelons, and the first echelon divisions had the same formation.

Almost 100% of all forces and assets were concentrated in breakthrough areas, creating densities of 3 to 9 rifle battalions, from 117 to 285 guns and mortars, 12–28 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of breakthrough area. At such densities, rifle corps outnumbered the enemy by 1.8–9 times in rifle battalions, by 3.7–6.8 times in guns and mortars, and by 1.4–2.6 times in tanks and self-propelled guns.

The commander of the Separate Maritime Army decided to launch two strikes. One blow, the main one, was planned to be delivered by the adjacent flanks of two rifle corps, breaking through the defenses north and south of the strong stronghold of Bulganak and developing an offensive in the direction of Kerch-Vladislavovka. The second strike with the forces of one rifle corps was planned on the left flank, along the Black Sea coast, and with the joint efforts of the two groups, defeat the enemy and liberate the Kerch Peninsula. After this, the main forces of the army should attack Simferopol, and the rest of the forces should continue the offensive along the coast, cutting off the enemy’s escape route to the sea coast.

The offensive zones of rifle formations were narrow: 2.2–5 km for rifle corps, 1–3 km for rifle divisions. There were also areas where formations could break through: 2–3 km of rifle corps and 1–1.5 km of rifle divisions.

During the preparation of the operation, the command and political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations carried out extensive educational and propaganda work with personnel. In this work, much attention was paid to the heroic past associated with the struggle for Crimea during the Civil War, with the defense of Perekop and Sevastopol in the first period of the Great Patriotic War. Examples were given from the experience of the battles of the troops of the Southern Front under the command of M.V. Frunze in 1920, and the heroic defense of Sevastopol in 1941–1942 was recalled. Participants in the assault on Perekop, heroic Sevastopol residents who defended the city at the beginning of the war, were invited for such conversations. Rallies of personnel, party and Komsomol meetings were held.

The transition of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front to the offensive was preceded by a period of destruction of long-term enemy structures on the Perekop Isthmus. Heavy artillery fired at them for two days. The use of 203 mm guns here convinced the enemy command that the main attack of the Soviet troops would come from the Perekop area. General E. Eneke wrote in his memoirs: “The longer time dragged on, the more clearly the grandiose preparatory measures of the Russians for the offensive near Perekop and somewhat less at the Sivash bridgehead emerged.”

On April 7 at 19.30, reconnaissance in force was carried out throughout the entire front line, as a result of which it was possible to clarify the enemy’s fire system, and in the zone of the 267th Infantry Division (63rd Rifle Corps) - to capture a section of its first trench, where three rifle battalions advanced from composition of the main forces of the first echelon regiments.

On April 8 at 10.30, after 2.5 hours of artillery and aviation preparation, the troops of the 2nd Guards and 51st armies simultaneously went on the offensive. During the artillery preparation, carried out with a number of false fire transfers, part of the enemy's fire weapons were destroyed or suppressed. In the 2nd Guards Army, when a false transfer of fire was carried out, 1,500 soldiers with scarecrows rushed forward along the previously dug “whiskers”. The enemy, deceived by this false attack, took up their positions in the first trench and was immediately covered by artillery fire.

On the Perekop Isthmus, during the first day, the enemy was driven out of the first two trenches of the main defense line; units of the 3rd Guards and 126th Rifle Divisions captured Armyansk. In the center of the Perekop Isthmus, the enemy’s defenses were broken through to a depth of 3 km. By the end of the second day of the operation, the troops of the 2nd Guards Army had completely broken through the enemy's first defensive line. The enemy began, under the cover of rearguards, a gradual withdrawal of troops to the Ishun positions. The success of the offensive by the troops of the 2nd Guards Army was facilitated by the decisive actions of the troops of the 51st Army on its left flank, as well as the landing behind enemy lines as part of a reinforced rifle battalion from the 387th Rifle Division.

Representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army A. M. Vasilevsky (second from right) and commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front F. I. Tolbukhin (third from right) monitor the progress of hostilities on the approaches to Sevastopol. May 7, 1944

This landing was prepared in the 1271st Infantry Regiment as part of the 2nd Infantry Battalion under the command of Captain F.D. Dibrov, reinforced by personnel with combat experience from other units. The battalion had more than 500 personnel, two 45-mm cannons, six 82-mm mortars, 45 machine guns, rifles, and machine guns. The fighters had fragmentation and anti-tank grenades. They were transported on boats by designated sappers. At midnight on April 9, the boats set sail from the piers, and at 5 a.m. the battalion in full force landed on shore at the designated location. Having landed, the battalion began striking the enemy. A battery of six-barreled mortars was captured, three tanks were knocked out, and damage was caused to manpower. Having discovered the retreat of the enemy infantry, the battalion commander began pursuit and defeated a large group of the enemy. At the end of the day, the battalion linked up with the advancing units of the 3rd Guards Rifle Division. For their courage, all soldiers and officers were awarded orders and medals. The battalion commander, Captain Dibrov, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Mortars support infantrymen storming Sapun Mountain. 4th Ukrainian Front May 8, 1944

In the 51st Army zone, the enemy put up strong resistance. The main strike group of the army, consisting of the 10th and 1st Guards Rifle Corps, advancing in the Tarkhan direction, during the first day of the operation, due to insufficient suppression of the enemy’s defense by artillery fire, was able to capture only its first trench.

The greatest success on April 8 was achieved by units of the 63rd Rifle Corps, advancing on Karanki and Pasurman 2nd, where the enemy was knocked out of all three trenches of the first line and the advance was more than 2 km.

The results of the first day of the offensive made it possible to identify the places of the most stubborn enemy resistance. The front commander immediately gave instructions to reinforce the troops in the Karankino direction, which had previously been considered auxiliary. To develop the success, it was decided to introduce into the battle the second echelon (417th Rifle Division) of the 63rd Rifle Corps and the 32nd Guards Tank Brigade from the 1st Guards Corps.

In addition, two self-propelled artillery regiments were transferred here. To assist units in this direction, part of the forces of the 346th Infantry Division was supposed to cross Lake Aigul and go to the flank of the defending enemy troops. The main forces of the 8th Air Army were aimed at the same direction and almost four artillery brigades were transferred. The density of guns and mortars increased by one and a half times.

The transfer of the main efforts to the Karankino-Tomashevsky direction, where the less stable units of the 10th Romanian Infantry Division were defending, allowed the troops of the 51st Army to build on their success on April 9. The divisions of the 63rd Rifle Corps (commander - Major General P.K. Koshevoy), overcoming the resistance of the Romanians, repelling the counterattacks of their infantry, supported by assault guns, advanced from 4 to 7 km. This was helped by the actions of the 1164th Infantry Regiment of the 346th Infantry Division, which forded Lake Aigul and struck the enemy’s flank, and the timely introduction into battle of the second echelon division of the corps, reinforced by the 32nd Guards Tank Brigade. The main line of enemy defense was broken through, and the troops of the 63rd Corps reached its second line.

As a result of intense fighting by the troops of the 2nd Guards and 51st armies, a maneuver to shift efforts to the direction of the designated success, on April 10, a turning point was outlined in the course of hostilities in the northern part of Crimea. The troops of the 2nd Guards Army reached the approaches to the Ishun positions. To quickly capture these positions, the army commander

ordered the divisions of the 13th Guards and 54th Rifle Corps to form mobile forward detachments consisting of rifle battalions and anti-tank fighter regiments on vehicles. But the composition of these advanced detachments turned out to be weak, and they did not fulfill their task. By the end of April 10, the army troops were detained in front of the Ishun positions and began to prepare for their breakthrough.

On the same day, the 10th Rifle Corps, advancing on Karpova Balka (11 km southeast of Armyansk), broke through the main enemy defense line and linked up in the area of ​​Karpova Balka with the left flank units of the 2nd Guards Army.

On the morning of April 11, the troops of the 63rd Rifle Corps went on the offensive. In the resulting breakthrough in the direction of Karanka, a mobile front group consisting of the 19th Tank Corps, two regiments of the 279th Infantry Division (mounted on vehicles) and the 21st Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade was brought into battle. Infantry vehicles in the amount of 120 units were allocated from the front rear.

The mobile group, and above all the 19th Tank Corps, defeated the opposing enemy troops and launched a rapid offensive. This forced the enemy command to begin a hasty withdrawal of units of the 19th Romanian Infantry Division holding positions on the Chongar Peninsula.

This retreat soon turned into a stampede.

Already at 11 o'clock on April 11, the forward detachment of the 19th Tank Corps (202nd Tank Brigade of Colonel M. G. Feshchenko, 867th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment of Major A. G. Svidersky) and the 52nd Motorcycle Regiment of Major A. A . Nedilko reached the northern outskirts of Dzhankoy. Fighting ensued to capture the city. The enemy, with the strength of up to an infantry regiment with artillery, supported by the fire of an armored train, offered stubborn resistance. The battle dragged on. But then the 26th motorized rifle brigade under Lieutenant Colonel A.P. Khrapovitsky reached the southwestern outskirts and struck the southern outskirts of the city. The pilots of the 6th Guards Bomber Air Division carried out their air strikes. This predetermined the end of enemy resistance. Having suffered heavy losses, abandoning artillery, warehouses with ammunition, food, the remnants of the Dzhankoy garrison began a hasty retreat to the south. Almost simultaneously, the 79th Tank Brigade destroyed the enemy airfield in the Veseloye area (15 km southwest of Dzhankoy), and the 101st Brigade captured the railway bridge 8 km southwest of Dzhankoy.

With the capture of Dzhankoy, the enemy’s defenses in the northern part of the Crimean Peninsula finally collapsed. In the steppe expanses of Crimea, the enemy was not able to hold Soviet troops. The German command still had hopes of stopping the advance of Soviet troops at the Evpatoria-Saki-Sarabuz-Karasubazar-Feodosiya line. But the enemy did not have the opportunity to implement this decision.

The success of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front in the northern part of Crimea and access to the Dzhankoy area threatened the encirclement of the enemy group on the Kerch Peninsula. The enemy command was forced to make a decision to withdraw troops from the Kerch Peninsula to the Akmonai positions. The removal of military property and the destruction of the remaining part began. The enemy artillery intensified its activity.

Intelligence of the Separate Primorsky Army discovered enemy preparations for withdrawal. In this regard, the army commander decided to launch a general offensive on the night of April 11. It was supposed to begin on the evening of April 10 with an attack by the enemy with the forces of the advanced battalions, and the advanced detachments and mobile groups at this time were preparing to pursue the enemy. The 4th Air Army received an order to intensify reconnaissance of the enemy.

At 22:00 on April 10, the forward battalions, after a fire raid, attacked the front line of the enemy’s defense. At 4 o'clock in the morning on April 11, following the advanced battalions, the advanced detachments and mobile groups of divisions, corps and the army entered the battle.

In the zone of the 11th Guards Corps (commander - Major General S.E. Rozhdestvensky), by 4 o'clock in the morning on April 11, they captured the entire first enemy defense position. Then, with the support of artillery fire, a mobile group of the corps was brought into battle, which overcame the resistance of the covering units and began pursuing the retreating enemy.

Events in the offensive zone of the 3rd Mountain Rifle Corps (commander - Major General N.A. Shvarev) developed in a similar way.

The 16th Rifle Corps, operating on the left flank of the army (commanded by Major General K.I. Provalov), liberated the city of Kerch by 6 a.m. on April 11. The 318th Mountain Rifle Division under Major General V.F. Gladkov, which distinguished itself as part of the Eltigen landing in 1943, took part in the liberation of Kerch.

The captured commander of the 9th Cavalry Regiment of the 6th Romanian Cavalry Division testified: “My regiment occupied the defense south of the city of Kerch. When the Russians broke through the German defenses and reached the Kerch-Feodosia highway, the threat of encirclement loomed over the regiment. The Germans ran away headlong, and I gave the order to retreat to the Turkish Wall line. Before we had time to take up defense in a new place, Russian tanks appeared on the left flank. Seeing that the Germans had fled, the Romanian soldiers began to surrender in entire squadrons... The 9th Cavalry Regiment was completely destroyed, not a single soldier left the Kerch Peninsula. All the equipment of the regiment and the artillery attached to it were captured by the Russians.”

In the liberated cities and villages of Crimea, the restoration of normal life began. So, Kerch again became Soviet at 4 a.m. on April 11. On the first day after liberation, there were only about three dozen residents in the city. Gradually, people began to return to the city from the liberated regions of Crimea. Families hiding in the quarries were taken out. The city authorities were faced with difficult problems of resettling returning people, restoring destroyed houses, water supply, and the electrical network. And by the end of the month the post office and telegraph were operational. Then an ever-increasing number of the population began to receive bread from the restored bakery, and a canteen and fish shop opened their doors. Water supply has improved. We received our first electricity in April. The Kerch shipyard was cleared of mines, the surviving equipment began to be transported there, and 80 workers were recruited.

Meeting of sailors with Crimean partisans in Yalta. May 1944

We began to restore the iron ore plant, the coking plant, and the Kerch-Feodosia railway. Enterprises serving the needs of the population began to operate: shoemakers, carpenters, tinsmiths, saddlers, sewing workshops, and a bathhouse began to operate. Fishing and fish processing enterprises are being restored. The shipyard began work on lifting and repairing ships. Three hospitals and consultations began to function in the city.

The whole country provided assistance to the heroic city. Cars with timber, cement, food, and repair materials went from different areas to Kerch. The command of the Black Sea Fleet donated a ship to the city, from which the restoration of the fishery began.

Starting from April 11, the pursuit of retreating enemy troops began throughout Crimea. The enemy rearguards tried to cover the withdrawal of troops and the evacuation of military equipment. The enemy sought to break away from the Soviet troops, retreat to Sevastopol and organize a defense there. However, Soviet troops quickly moved forward, trying to reach the flanks behind the enemy rearguards and prevent the enemy from accomplishing their plans.

The 2nd Guards Army, having completed the breakthrough of the Ishun positions, began pursuing the enemy with strong forward detachments, placing infantry on vehicles and reinforcing it with tanks and artillery. Having reached the second line of enemy defense on the Chatarlyk River, the army troops began to prepare for its breakthrough. But there was no need to break through it, since as a result of the successful actions of the troops of the 51st Army, a threat was created for the entire Perekop enemy group, and on the night of April 12 it was forced to begin withdrawing across the Chatarlyk River. Mobile detachments of the right-flank corps, having crossed Chatarlyk and fought more than 100 km, captured the city and port of Yevpatoria on the morning of April 13. Units of the 3rd Guards Rifle Division liberated the city of Saki on the morning of April 13. On April 14, the cities of Ak-Mosque and Karaja were liberated. The entire western part of Crimea was cleared of the enemy, and the 13th Guards Rifle Corps, which liberated this area, was withdrawn to reserve.

Enemy small arms captured by Soviet troops during the Crimean operation. May 1944

The main forces of the 2nd Guards Army (54th and 55th Rifle Corps) continued to develop their offensive in the general direction of Sevastopol. They immediately crossed the Alma and Kacha rivers and on April 15 reached the Belbek River, where they met stubborn enemy resistance on the approaches to Sevastopol.

Enemy armored vehicles captured by Soviet troops during the Crimean operation. May 1944

In the 51st Army zone, the enemy was pursued by a front mobile group. The pursuit took place along the railway and the Dzhankoy–Simferopol–Bakhchisarai highway. To the left, two more advanced detachments were pursuing the enemy. One advanced on Zuya, the second - through Seitler to Karasubazar. Both of these detachments had the task of cutting the Feodosia-Simferopol road and blocking the enemy’s escape route from the Kerch Peninsula.

By the end of April 12, the front mobile group was reaching the approaches to Simferopol. The first advance detachment in the Zuya area defeated a large enemy column and, having captured Zuya, organized a perimeter defense, preventing the movement of enemy troops to the west. The second advanced detachment captured Seytler that day.

Enemy artillery captured by Soviet troops during the Crimean operation. May 1944

The main forces of the 19th Tank Corps on the morning of April 13 approached Simferopol. Having burst into the city, the tankers, together with the partisans of the 1st brigade (commander - F.I. Fedorenko) of the Northern Unit (17th detachment under the command of F.Z. Gorban and the 19th detachment under the command of Ya. M. Sakovich) by 16 Hours later, the city was completely liberated from the occupiers. In honor of the liberation of Simferopol from the fascist invaders, an artillery salute was given in Moscow.

After capturing Simferopol, the mobile group continued to pursue the retreating enemy. On the morning of April 14, two tank brigades of the 19th Tank Corps, together with partisans of the 6th Brigade of the Southern Unit (commander - M.F. Samoilenko), after a short battle, liberated the city of Bakhchisaray. The 26th motorized rifle brigade from Simferopol was sent through the mountains to Alushta to assist the troops of the Separate Primorsky Army in capturing the southern coast of Crimea. The 202nd Tank Brigade from Simferopol was sent to the city of Kacha, which it captured by 18:00, defeating the enemy garrison and joining forces with the troops of the 2nd Guards Army.

"Pravda" in liberated Sevastopol. May 1944

Units of the 19th Tank Corps advanced detachments reached the Belbek River east of Mekenzia, where the enemy put up stubborn resistance. The troops of the 51st Army soon arrived here.

It should be noted that during the pursuit, the troops of the 51st Army and the 19th Tank Corps were actively exposed to enemy aircraft, which caused losses in personnel and equipment and slowed down the pace of the offensive. The actions of Soviet aviation were hampered by limited fuel supplies.

A separate Primorsky Army pursued the enemy with advanced detachments. In the middle of the day on April 12, they approached the Ak-Monay positions and tried to break through them on the move. The attempt failed. It was necessary to quickly transfer rifle units, bring up artillery and launch a concentrated air strike. After strong artillery preparation, a powerful air bombing strike, and an attack by infantry and tanks, the enemy’s last fortified position was broken through. Having broken through the Ak-Monai positions in stubborn 8-hour battles, the troops

The separate Primorsky Army rushed to Feodosia, which was liberated on April 13. The Kerch Peninsula was completely liberated from the invaders. In honor of this victory, an artillery salute was fired again in Moscow.

After the liberation of the Kerch Peninsula, the troops of the Separate Primorsky Army began to develop an offensive with the main forces in the general direction of Old Crimea, Karasubazar, and with part of the forces - along the coast along the Primorskoye Highway to Yalta, Sevastopol. On April 13, its troops liberated Old Crimea and, together with the troops of the 51st Army, with the assistance of partisans (5th partisan brigade of the Northern Union under the command of F. S. Solovey), on April 13 they liberated Karasubazar. In this area there was a connection between the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front - the 51st Army and the Separate Primorsky Army.

Developing an offensive along the Primorskoye Highway, part of the troops of the Separate Primorsky Army occupied Sudak on April 14, Alushta and Yalta on April 15, Simeiz on April 16, and by the end of the 17th they reached fortified enemy positions near Sevastopol. The troops fought more than 250 km in 6 days. During the liberation of Yalta, partisans of the 7th brigade of the Southern Unit under the command of L.A. Vikman acted together with the troops.

By order of the Supreme Command Headquarters, on April 18, the Separate Primorsky Army was transferred to the 4th Ukrainian Front and renamed the Primorsky Army. Lieutenant General K. S. Melnik became the command of the army.

As a result of the pursuit of the retreating enemy, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front and the Separate Primorsky Army, with the assistance of ships and aviation of the Black Sea Fleet, advanced to the approaches to Sevastopol. Attempts by the German command to delay the advance of Soviet troops at intermediate lines in the central part of Crimea were a complete failure.

Hitler's command, having been defeated in a defensive battle, decided to evacuate its troops and rear personnel from the peninsula. In the current situation, there could be no talk of a systematic evacuation of the troops of the 17th Army without organizing a strong defense of Sevastopol. With a strong defense on the approaches to the city and in the city itself, during defensive battles it sought to pin down significant forces of the Soviet troops, inflict losses on them and ensure the evacuation of the remnants of its troops by sea.

To defend the city, the enemy prepared three defensive lines, each of which consisted of two or three trenches, cut-off positions and a large number of structures made of earth and stones. The first, most powerful, defensive line was established 7–10 km from the city and ran along heights 76, 9; 192.0; 256.2; and Mount Sugarloaf, the eastern slopes of Sapun Mountain and nameless heights west of Balaklava. Three to six kilometers from the city there was a second line and a third on the outskirts of Sevastopol. Of particular importance for holding the first line was Sapun Mountain, which was turned by the enemy into a powerful node of resistance.

The enemy group near Sevastopol consisted of eight divisions of the 49th and 5th Army Corps of the 17th Army. Their total number was more than 72 thousand soldiers and officers, 3414 guns and mortars, 50 tanks and assault guns. 70% of the forces and means were located on the first defensive line, which ensured the presence of up to 2,000 people and 65 guns and mortars along 1 km of the front in areas where the main efforts were concentrated. Having decided to hold Sevastopol, the German command strengthened its group in this area, transporting about 6 thousand German soldiers and officers by air.

Thus, the enemy had a large group on the approaches to Sevastopol, which relied on natural lines that were very advantageous for defense and well-equipped engineering positions.

Moreover, the continuous retreat of the Nazi troops forced Hitler to change the commander of the 17th Army. At the beginning of May, General E. Eneke was replaced by the commander of the 5th Army Corps, Colonel General K. Almendinger. On May 3, the new commander demanded in his order: “... that everyone defend in the full sense of the word, that no one retreat, that they hold every trench, every crater, every trench... The 17th Army in Sevastopol is supported by powerful air and naval forces. The Fuhrer will give us enough ammunition, aircraft, weapons and reinforcements. Germany expects us to do our duty."

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Guerrilla and underground movement on the territory of Crimea (brief outline) In the fall of 1941, the Resistance movement unfolded on the territory of Crimea, which became a response to the terror of the occupiers. On October 23, by decision of the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Central Headquarters was formed

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Part two Oktyabrsky and Mehlis. From Crimea to the Caucasus

From the author's book

Occupation of Crimea With the end of the “Battle of the Sea of ​​Azov”, a regrouping of forces took place on the southern flank of the Eastern Front. Apparently, the High Command of the German Army realized that one army cannot simultaneously conduct two operations - one in the direction of Rostov and

April 8, 1944 began The Crimean strategic offensive operation, which ended on May 12 with the complete liberation of the peninsula from the Nazi occupiers. “Blessed places! Now they are ours forever!” – Konstantin Paustovsky wrote then.

Fireworks in liberated Sevastopol. May 1944

The liberation of Crimea from the Nazis became one of the most heroic pages in its already rich history. After all, the Nazis expected to stay on the peninsula forever. And many invaders succeeded. True, not at all as they dreamed, but in the damp Crimean soil...

"German Gibraltar"

To Crimea Adolf Gitler and his entourage have been closely watched since pre-war times. Head of the German Labor Front Robert Ley dreamed of turning the peninsula into “one huge German resort.” The Fuhrer himself was eager to make Crimea a “German Gibraltar” in order to control the Black Sea from there. Planning to populate the peninsula with Germans, Hitler and the Reich Minister for the Eastern Occupied Territories Alfred Rosenberg They planned to clear Crimea of ​​Jews and Russians after the war and rename it Gotenland.

Rosenberg proposed uniting Crimea with the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions and creating the general district of Tavria. This Nazi ideologist himself flew to the peninsula. Having visited the battle site, he wrote in his diary: “Sevastopol: complete ruins. Only the witnesses of the ancient Greek past – the columns and the museum – remained standing, unharmed by our aviation and artillery.” A native of Revel (now Tallinn), who lived in Russia for up to 25 years, Rosenberg understood better than other Nazi bosses what a treasure Crimea was, how much it meant for the Russians.

The feelings of Soviet people about the loss of Sevastopol and Crimea were reflected in one of the articles in Literaturnaya Gazeta:

“Crimea was for us the image of a victor – for the first time in the history of mankind, victorious! - happiness. He always reminded us with new freshness of the joyful meaningfulness of every minute of our daily work; he was our annual meeting with the main, best thing that was in us - with our goal, with our dream. So this is what the enemy wanted to take away from us forever - the very image of our happiness!”

The worst thing is that the enemy wanted to deprive Soviet citizens not only of hope for a happy life, but also of the very right to life. While clearing “living space” for themselves, the Nazis and their accomplices did not stand on ceremony with the indigenous population of the peninsula.

The future of any nation is its children. The attitude of “true Aryans” towards Crimean boys and girls leaves no ground for illusions. “During the liberation of Kerch, the following brutal crime was revealed,” writes the historian Nina Petrova. – The local German commandant’s office ordered the parents to send their children to school. Obeying the order of the German SS cavalry brigade, 245 children with textbooks and notebooks in their hands went to their classes. No one returned home. What happened to them became known after the liberation of the city, when 245 corpses of these children were found 8 km from it in a deep ditch. They were not shot, they were buried alive by the occupiers. There are documents and photographs relating to this heinous crime."

Also, on November 2, 1943, a one-year-old child and 35 other residents of the “Crimean Khatyn” - the village of Friedental (now Kurortnoye, Belogorsk district) were burned alive. On the territory of the former state farm "Red" (now the village of Mirnoye, Simferopol region), the occupiers created a concentration camp where thousands of prisoners of war, partisans and civilians were tortured. The list of crimes committed by the Germans, Romanians and their accomplices in Crimea during the war is endless...

Crimean bridgeheads

Crimea not only symbolized a happy Soviet life - it had great military-political and strategic significance. Later in his memoirs, Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Vasilevsky stated:

“By owning it, the Nazis could keep the entire Black Sea coast under constant threat and put pressure on the policies of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. Crimea also served the Nazis as a springboard for the invasion of the territory of the Soviet Caucasus and stabilization of the southern wing of the entire front.”

After the defeat of the Wehrmacht at the Kursk Bulge, it became clear that the liberation of the entire territory of the Soviet Union was a matter of time. On November 1, 1943, troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front under the command of General Fedora Tolbukhin made an attempt to break into Crimea from the north.

The Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Vasilevsky, coordinated the operation to liberate Crimea

19th Tank Corps Lieutenant General Ivan Vasilyeva made his way through the enemy fortifications at Perekop. And although the desperately defending Germans managed to temporarily block the tankers, the 51st Army of Lieutenant General Yakov Kreiser soon connected with them. Thus arose an important bridgehead, which was destined to play a prominent role during the operation to liberate the peninsula.

The commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front during the Crimean offensive operation, Fyodor Tolbukhin, was awarded the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union on September 12, 1944

“CRIMEA WAS FOR US AN IMAGE OF A WINNER – FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE HISTORY OF HUMANITY, A WINNER! - HAPPINESS. This is what the enemy wanted to take away from us forever - the very image of our happiness!

Our valiant fighters created two more bridgeheads - northeast of Kerch and on the southern bank of Sivash. The collective farmer was the first to lead scouts and advanced units through the Rotten Sea Vasily Kondratievich Zaulichny. For this feat he was awarded the Order of the Red Star. Another guide through Sivash was a 68-year-old Ivan Ivanovich Olenchuk. 23 years earlier - in early November 1920 - along the same route, he led units of the Red Army to the rear of the White Guard troops Peter Wrangel. Ivan Ivanovich did not disappoint this time either.

Walking through the Rotten Sea was very difficult. Yakov Kreizer recalled that if “a fighter with light weapons crossed Sivash in 2–3 hours, then a 76-mm gun was transferred by boat by a group of soldiers in 5–6 hours.”

Soviet troops in liberated Sevastopol. May 1944

The Red Army soldiers who held the bridgeheads in the winter of 1943–1944 fought both the enemy and nature. Sergey Biryuzov, at that time Lieutenant General, Chief of Staff of the 4th Ukrainian Front, testified in his memoirs:

“Our bridgehead beyond Sivash was very uncomfortable. There are salt marshes all around, not a hill, not a bush - everything is in full view of the enemy and under his fire. However, the Sivash bridgehead was not much different from two other important bridgeheads on the approaches to Crimea - Perekop and Kerch.”

Despite all the problems, preparations for the operation to liberate Crimea were in full swing. Creating the crossings required truly titanic efforts. Marshal Vasilevsky, who, as a representative of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, coordinated the actions of all forces involved in the operation, later recalled:

“Storms, enemy air raids and artillery shelling destroyed bridges. By the beginning of the operation, two crossings had been created - a bridge on frame supports 1865 m long and two earthen dams 600–700 m long and a pontoon bridge between them 1350 m long. The carrying capacity of these crossings, through the efforts of the front engineering troops, was increased to 30 tons, which ensured the crossing of tanks T-34 and heavy artillery. For the purpose of camouflage, a false bridge was built a kilometer from these crossings.”

The Germans did not sit idly by either. Thus, in the Perekop area, on a narrow section of the isthmus - up to 14 km long, up to 35 km deep - the enemy created three powerful defensive lines. The main defense line, 4–6 km deep, had three defensive positions with full-profile trenches, pillboxes and bunkers. The center of defense was Armyansk, on the streets of which barricades were erected. In total, in the Perekop area the enemy concentrated up to 20 thousand soldiers and officers, 325 guns and mortars, up to 50 tanks and assault guns.

HITLER WANTED TO MAKE CRIMEA A "GERMAN GIBRALTAR" to control the Black Sea from there

The idea of ​​the Crimean offensive operation was to carry out simultaneous attacks by troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front from Perekop and Sivash and the Separate Primorsky Army of General Andrei Eremenko from a bridgehead in the Kerch region in the general direction of Simferopol and Sevastopol - with the assistance of long-range aviation, the Black Sea Fleet, Azov military flotilla and partisans - to dismember and destroy the enemy group, preventing its evacuation from the peninsula.

The most important task of the Black Sea Fleet under the command of Admiral Philip Oktyabrsky was to disrupt the enemy’s sea communications with Crimea. In addition, in the coastal zone, the fleet was supposed to help the Red Army soldiers with its aviation and naval artillery fire.

The command of the 4th Ukrainian Front, having an idea of ​​the strength of the enemy defense in the Perekop area, decided to deliver the main blow from Sivash, where the main tank formations were concentrated for this purpose. It was assumed that, having broken through to the enemy's rear, they would launch an offensive deep into the peninsula.

“The Northern Front cannot be held”

Our grandfathers and great-grandfathers were eager to fight, eager to drive the Germans and Romanians out of Crimea. However, the sea was stormy, and the rains made the roads completely insurmountable. Due to muddy roads and bad weather conditions, the start of the operation was postponed more than once.

Finally, on the morning of April 8, 1944, after powerful artillery preparation, Soviet troops went on the offensive. They immediately met stubborn enemy resistance. Sergei Biryuzov recalled:

“In some places the guards had to use a trick, placing effigies dressed in tunics and helmets from behind their shelters, creating the appearance of starting an attack. The visual imitation was accompanied by sound - a powerful “hurray!” thundered. And the Nazis took this bait. Apparently, after our two-hour artillery preparation, their nerves were tense to such an extent that they were unable to distinguish stuffed animals from living people. The Nazis crawled out of their dugouts and “fox holes”, hastily took up places in the trenches, and at that moment they were again covered by our artillery.”

Sevastopol was liberated from the Nazi invaders exactly one year before the Great Victory - May 9, 1944

However, not only the Nazis encountered unpleasant surprises at the beginning of the battle. Deep in the enemy defenses, Soviet tanks ran into minefields, where several combat vehicles were blown up on the move.

Meanwhile, the Red Army continued to increase pressure. April 10 in the diary of an officer of the operations department of the headquarters of the 17th German army, captain Hans Ruprecht Hansel there was an entry:

“The northern front cannot be held. The 50th Infantry Division, having suffered heavy losses, barely managed to retreat to a reserve line of defense. But a strong Russian tank group is now advancing through the gap in the Romanian defense sector, posing a threat to our rear. We are working feverishly to prepare for the deployment of troops on the Gneisenau defensive line. I was ordered to fly to the 5th Corps to the Kerch Peninsula to deliver there the order to retreat to Sevastopol.”

Reich Minister of Eastern Occupied Territories Alfred Rosenberg planned to populate Crimea with Germans and rename it Gotenland

Breaking into enemy defenses, soldiers and officers of the Red Army showed massive heroism. On the award list of the squad commander of the machine gun company of the 262nd Guards Rifle Regiment, Guard Senior Sergeant Alexandra Korobchuk It was noted that on April 12, in a battle near the village of Ishun, Krasnoperekopsk region, he “with grenades in his hands, dragging the soldiers with him, was among the first to break into the enemy trenches, where he destroyed 7 Nazis with grenades.” After the release of the grenades, the machine gunner boldly moved forward and covered the bunker embrasure with his body.

"We all–children of one mother, the Motherland!

On April 13, Evpatoria, Feodosia and Simferopol were liberated. Preparing to retreat, the Nazis mined the most important buildings in Simferopol, intending to blow them up along with Soviet soldiers. The Crimean underground did not allow the crime to take place. Sergei Biryuzov wrote in his memoirs:

“We entered the city when it was still shrouded in gunpowder smoke; the battle was ending on the southern and eastern outskirts. Some houses and even neighborhoods were destroyed, but on the whole Simferopol remained intact. Thanks to the rapid advance of our troops, the enemy was unable to carry out his black plans to destroy all residential buildings, cultural institutions, parks and squares there. The city was beautiful like spring in its green decoration and blossoms.”

Soviet pilots fought heroically in Crimea

The day before the liberation of Yevpatoria, near the village of Ashaga-Dzhamin (now Heroiskoe) in the Saki region, nine reconnaissance officers of the 3rd Guards Motorized Engineering and 91st Separate Motorcycle Battalions fought an unequal battle for about two hours: the commander of the guard group, Sgt. Nikolay Poddubny, his deputy guard junior sergeant Magomed-Zagid Abdulmanapov, privates Pyotr Veligin, Ivan Timoshenko, Mikhail Zadorozhny, Grigory Zakharchenko, Vasily Ershov, Pyotr Ivanov And Alexander Simonenko. They repelled several enemy attacks. When the cartridges ran out, the wounded and bleeding scouts fought the enemy hand-to-hand.

The Germans tied the captured Red Army soldiers with barbed wire and, seeking the necessary information, began to brutally torture them. They were beaten with rifle butts, stabbed with bayonets, their bones were crushed, and their eyes were gouged out. But they didn’t get anything from them. And then the German officer turned to 19-year-old Avar Abdulmanapov:

“Well, they are Russians, and who are you? Why are you silent? What do you have to lose? You are a stranger to them. Everyone should think about their own life. Where are you from?" To the enemy’s question, Magomed-Zagid answered directly: “It’s known where. We are all children of one mother, the Motherland!” – and spat in the officer’s face.

After torture, the Red Army heroes were shot near the village. On May 16, 1944, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, all nine intelligence officers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

One of them, a 24-year-old machine gunner Vasily Ershov, miraculously survived. Local residents who discovered the hero saw 10 gunshot and 7 bayonet wounds on his body. Ershov's jaw was reduced to mush. The native of the Sandovsky district of the Tver region remained a disabled person of the 1st group for the rest of his life. After the war, Vasily Alexandrovich came to the battlefield, and the village residents greeted him as the person closest to them.

Hitler's dreams were not destined to come true: Soviet soldiers cleared Crimea of ​​occupiers

Soviet pilots also fought heroically. On April 22, the 134th Guards Bomber Aviation Regiment received an order to strike an airfield where there were more than fifty enemy aircraft. The Germans met the attackers with strong defensive fire from anti-aircraft batteries. One shell hit the plane of the air regiment commander, Major. Viktor Katkov.

General Grigory Chuchev, then commander of the 6th Guards Bomber Aviation Division, recalled:

“The commander energetically put the burning plane into a dive. During the dive, the flames of fire were torn from the wing of the aircraft. Diving, the pilot took aim and dropped bombs on enemy planes stationed on the border of the airfield. When exiting the dive into level flight, the plane caught fire again. Only after completing the task, Major Katkov left the battle formation, turned the plane in the direction of his territory and began to land. The flames were already approaching the cockpit of the pilot and navigator.

A few minutes later a fire broke out in the cabin. The pilot landed on the fuselage on rough terrain. The plane crawled some distance on uneven ground and stopped. The pilot's canopy was jammed and could not be reset, as a result of which the pilot and navigator could not get out of the cockpit. The flames spread throughout the plane.

An explosion was about to happen. Without hesitating for a second, gunner-radio operator Senior Sergeant D.I. The lonely man left his cabin, risking his life, ran up to the burning cabin and, using his heroic strength, broke the plexiglass of the cabin canopy with his feet. First, he helped the regiment commander get out, then he pulled the burnt navigator out of the burning plane and took him to a safe place. A few seconds later the plane exploded.”

“Now they are forever ours!”

The worse the situation at the front became for the enemy, the more ferocious the Germans, Romanians and their accomplices behaved on Crimean soil. They tried to take everything they had stolen during the occupation from the peninsula. And the worst thing was that the enemies were killing civilians, including children and the elderly.

“Right at the entrance to the house of doctor Fedotov, who died during the days of occupation, the Germans shot his 64-year-old wife Elena Sergeevna and Marina Ivanovna Chizhova, who lived with her. Across the street, near a small house, there is a puddle of blood. Here, a 14-year-old boy, Rustem Kadyrov, died from a bullet from a Nazi scoundrel. We also saw bloody traces of the crimes of German monsters on Severnaya and Armenian streets, and here almost all the houses are empty - the Germans destroyed all their inhabitants. On April 12, 1944, the Germans shot and bayoneted 584 people in Old Crimea!”

Meanwhile, Hitler did not give up the hope of defending Crimea until the last minute. The possessed Fuhrer ignored the demands of the Romanian dictator Jonah Antonescu withdraw Romanian troops from Crimea. And the doubt of the commander of the 17th German Army, Colonel General Erwin Gustav Jenecke the fact that Sevastopol could be held cost him his position. The general who replaced Jenecke Karl Allmendinger in an order dated May 3, 1944, he brought the following to the attention of his subordinates:

“I received orders to defend every inch of the Sevastopol bridgehead. You understand its meaning. No name in Russia is pronounced with more reverence than Sevastopol. Monuments of past wars stand here...

Due to the fact that Sevastopol has such historical significance, Stalin wants to regain this city and port. Therefore, we are given the opportunity to bleed the superior forces of the Reds on this front. I demand that everyone defend themselves in the full sense of the word; so that no one retreats and holds every trench, every crater and every trench.”

And our soldiers had to take these trenches and trenches. The multi-tiered fortifications of Sapun Mountain with 63 pillboxes and bunkers looked especially formidable. They were stormed by troops of the 63rd Rifle Corps of Major General Peter Koshevoy and the 11th Guards Rifle Corps, Major General Seraphim Rozhdestvensky.

After the war, Pyotr Koshevoy wrote about those days:

“The battle took on an intense character throughout the entire offensive zone of the corps. There was no rapid advance of troops anywhere.<…>In the clouds of dust and fumes from the explosions of shells and mines, our soldiers and the enemy constantly fought hand-to-hand.<…>Three times the trenches changed hands. Everything was burning all around, but the enemy stubbornly did not leave the first position.”

Poster of the Leningrad association of artists “Combat Pencil”. 1944

On the approaches to Sevastopol, a feat Alexandra Matrosova repeated the lieutenant Mikhail Dzigunsky, sergeants Fedor Skoryatin And Stepan Pogodaev, private Alexander Udodov(he was seriously wounded, but survived). All four, like 122 other liberators of Crimea, were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. And the commander of an air squadron who escaped from captivity to the partisans Vladimir Lavrinenkov received a second Gold Star medal.

Exactly one year before the Great Victory, on May 9, 1944, Sevastopol was liberated. As a sign of victory, a vest and cap were placed on the stem of the Count's Pier arch. Three days later, the Crimean peninsula was completely cleared of invaders.

Summing up the Crimean strategic offensive operation, the historian Mikhail Myagkov stated:

“The total losses of German and Romanian troops far exceeded the losses of the Red Army. If we lost 13 thousand killed and 54 thousand wounded in this operation, then the Germans and Romanians lost 60 thousand people as prisoners alone. And the total losses exceeded 140 thousand soldiers and officers. It was an outstanding operation in a series of decisive blows by the Red Army in 1944. It was carried out by commanders and ordinary soldiers who went through the bitter school of 1941–1942. Now the Red Army was lowering the punishing sword of retribution on the head of the hated enemy who was ravaging the Crimean land.”

The dream of the Soviet people came true: the land of Crimea became free again. “Blessed places! Now they are ours forever!” - the writer rejoiced Konstantin Paustovsky, expressing the sentiments of all our people in an essay published in Izvestia.

Soon, artists from the front-line branch of the Maly Theater arrived in Sevastopol. On the local stage, they played in performances based on the plays of the great Russian playwright Alexander Ostrovsky, “Guilty Without Guilt” and “In a Lively Place.” And a few days later, the residents of Sevastopol saw the film “Two Fighters,” which was directed by an outstanding Soviet director a year earlier Leonid Lukov.

Life on the peninsula quickly returned to normal. Already at the beginning of February 1945, Crimea became the venue for a conference of heads of state of the anti-Hitler coalition. Joseph Stalin received the US President in Yalta Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the Prime Minister of Great Britain Winston Churchill…

Oleg Nazarov, Doctor of Historical Sciences

In 1903, the French writer L. Boussenard, the author of famous adventure novels, argued: “The masters of the Crimea will always be the rulers of the Black Sea.” 40 years later, representatives of the military command of the USSR and Germany agreed with his opinion. The Crimean offensive operation of 1944 was designed to provide the Soviet fleet with unambiguous dominance in the local waters and finally turn the tide of the war in favor of the anti-Hitler coalition.

Preliminary schedule

The situation that developed in Crimea at the beginning of 1944 was somewhat reminiscent of the situation in which he found himself. The forces of the aggressive bloc were blocked from land as a result of the successful USSR carrying out two landing operations - Melitopol and Kerch-Etilgen at the end of 1943. But they had reliable fortification systems and were numerous, about 200 thousand people in total:

• 17th Army,
• several mountain rifle and cavalry corps and divisions,
• 215 tanks,
• more than 3,500 pieces of artillery.

True, almost half of the personnel represented Romanian units, and Romanian leader Antonescu protested against their use in Taurida and even demanded evacuation. The Odessa operation put an end to these demands - it became simply impossible to withdraw the Romanians from Crimea.

Disposition of forces before the start of the Crimean operation

Some German soldiers also suggested that Hitler leave Crimea. But he resisted, saying that then Romania, Bulgaria, etc. would inevitably fall away from Germany. In this he was absolutely right.

The Union troops were in a much better position than in 1920. By the beginning of the year, they already had bridgeheads in the Kerch region and on the southern shore of the Rotten Sea, and also crossed the. Naval power was important - the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov flotilla operated from the sea coast.

They all had a significant advantage over the enemy in the number of soldiers who had the appropriate attitude - during the year the Red Army won significant victories. The Union sought to return Crimea as an ideal base for the Black Sea Flotilla - then it would really be possible to control the Black Sea region. Ideology also played a role - the Nazis should have “remembered” the 255 days of the Second Sevastopol Defense.

Strategic plans

The leadership of the operation was entrusted to experienced commanders. The main force was to be the 4th Ukrainian Front (under the command of General F.I. Tolbukhin) and the Primorsky Army (with General A.I. Eremenko). Troops, guardsmen and a tank corps also took part. General management and control from the headquarters was carried out by marshals K.E. Voroshilov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

Initially, the start of the operation was planned for mid-February. But then it was postponed several times - both for tactical and natural reasons. First, it was decided to finally gain a foothold on the right bank of the Dnieper region (the Odessa operation can also be considered a part of this idea). Then a storm and prolonged heavy rains interfered, preventing the crossing of troops.

The balance of power of Nazi Germany

The last option for launching the offensive was a new date - April 8. By this time, Odessa was almost over: the “pearl by the sea” was taken by the Red Army on the 9th, therefore, enemy units were completely blocked in Crimea.

Wide grip

The beginning of the operation also resembled the actions of M.V. Frunze in 1920. After a powerful artillery barrage, on 8.04 the Fourth Ukrainian Front went on the offensive simultaneously from the Sivash bridgehead and on Perekop. On the 11th, the coastal army attacked and took the city on the same day.

In a week (from April 8 to April 16), our troops also liberated Armyansk and Evpatoria and Simferopol, and Dzhankoy, Belogorsk, and Sudak, and reached Sevastopol. The last city on the list required three assaults. Attempts made on April 19 and 23 did not produce tangible results, bringing only minor success. The greatest difficulty was the capture, from where the Germans were firing artillery.

The final assault was scheduled for May 5. By this time, the USSR could already afford to regroup its troops, since a significant part of the combat missions in Crimea had already been resolved. The 2nd Guards Army went to the forefront of the attack - such detachments did not retreat. But still, the final liberation of the “pride of Russian sailors” took 4 days. The remnants of the Nazis retreated to the Chersonesus region. They were promised evacuation, but the attack aircraft of the Land of the Soviets thwarted all plans - instead of saving the Nazis, the Black Sea became the grave for 42 thousand of them.

The Crimean partisans made a huge contribution to the success of the offensive. They cut communication channels and lines of communication, obtained intelligence information, and prevented the destruction of enterprises and infrastructure. One of the formations liberated the city of Old Crimea; the partisan scouts did not give it up, although the Nazis, when attempting a counteroffensive, captured one city block and killed everyone they found there - almost 600 people. On May 12, 1944, the Crimean operation ended with the unconditional victory of the Soviet troops.

Further, to the west!

The results of the operation were impressive. In general, the aggressor's losses in Crimea are estimated at 140,000 irretrievable losses (killed and captured). Despite the fierce resistance of the enemy, the losses of the Red Army were noticeably smaller - about 40 thousand killed and less than 70 thousand wounded. The entire operation took 35 days. At one time, one resisted the enemy for more than 250 days.

Hitler was not mistaken - Germany’s authority among the allies fell sharply after the defeat in Crimea. And the Red Army, on the contrary, once again proved its strength. Now safe rear areas and a reliable base for the fleet opened up opportunities for further advancement - to the Balkans, beyond the Danube, to the west. Symbolically, the day of liberation of Sevastopol is celebrated on May 9! So convincingly the Crimean operation predicted the Great Victory over fascism and Nazism!