Myths and truth about Stalingrad. Alexey Isaev

The German 14th Tank Corps, concentrating on the bridgehead of the left bank of the Don, went on the offensive on August 23. The enemy delivered his main blow to the 4th Panzer and 62nd Armies. South-Eastern Front, developing an offensive in the general direction of the Market. Having broken the resistance of the 98th division of I.F. Barinov and other troops who were preparing to launch a counterattack on the bridgehead, the enemy rushed from the Don to the Volga. In the path of his tanks were the marching regiments of the 87th division of Colonel A.I. Kazartsev. They had already been attacked by enemy bombers on a massive scale, and now up to a hundred tanks had descended on them. The battle began outside any defensive line, in open areas. The enemy cut Kazartsev's division in two. The rifle regiments and attached cadets suffered heavy losses. The troops of the shock group of the 6th German Army crossed the entire interfluve and by 16:00 on August 23 they reached the Volga near the northern outskirts of Stalingrad, in the area of ​​​​the villages of Latoshinka, Akatovka, and Rynok. Following the 16th Panzer Division of von Wittersheim's corps, the enemy's motorized troops also reached the Volga. Dozens of German tanks of the 14th Tank Corps appeared in the area of ​​the Tractor Plant, 1-1.5 km from the factory workshops. Following the tanks, the enemy threw two motorized and several infantry divisions into the resulting 8-kilometer corridor. The military situation was further complicated by the fact that formations and units of the 62nd Army, covering the northern outskirts of Stalingrad, continued to fight on the left bank of the Don several tens of kilometers from the city. They had to regroup in difficult combat conditions and occupy new defensive lines.

On August 23, the front commander created a strike group in the Samofalovka area (22 km east of Vertyachiy), which included the 35th, 27th Guards and 298th Rifle Divisions, the 28th Tank Corps and the 169th Tank Brigade. These troops, led by the deputy commander of the Stalingrad Front, Major General K. A. Kovalenko, were given the task of launching a counterattack in the southwestern direction and, in cooperation with the troops of the 62nd Army, defeat the formations of the enemy’s 14th Tank Corps, which had broken through to the Volga. When launching a counterattack, the troops had to close the breakthrough in the station area. Kotlubap, Bol. Rossoshka and restore the position on the right flank of the 62nd Army by reaching the river line. Don. At the same time, the commander of the 62nd Army was given the task of striking from the Mal area. Rossoshki to the north with units of the 87th Infantry Division and, in cooperation with the group of Major General Kovalenko, destroy the enemy group that had broken through.

Thus, having thrown 650 tanks into battle, the Soviet command decided to restore the front along the left bank of the Don. General Kovalenko's group, without waiting for the approach of the tank corps, went on the offensive at 18:00 on August 23, 5 hours after receiving the order. Two of its divisions, having encountered stubborn fire resistance, were unable to advance. The third division, together with the 169th Tank Brigade, commanded by Colonel A.P. Kodenets, defeated the enemy opposing them.

Comments:

A meeting was held before the attack on Kamensk
all commanders of the 135th tank brigade. On it is the “brigade commander” Filatov
in a slurred voice he set out a combat mission. He doesn't
could not pronounce the word "viaduct" after several unsuccessful
After trying, he was still able to pronounce “bivouac.” That's it
the ill-fated “bivouac” and the brigade’s tanks burned down. After passing
along the viaduct on the railway line, our tanks take turns,
one after another, came under fire from enemy anti-tank guns
and burned. Despite the reports of the commanders, Filatov
did not cancel his order, did not change the direction of the strike,
and he drove and drove the tanks under the daggering flank fire of the Germans.
After this beating, the 135th tank brigade. lost impact
and was taken to the rear.

Hero of the Soviet Union, commander of the 135th Tank Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Vasily Romanovich Filatov. Born in 1909 in Belgorod, he received the title of Hero for Khalkhin Gol. From the fall of 1941 - commander of a tank battalion in the 26th Tank Brigade, then deputy commander of this brigade and, finally, from August 1942 - commander of the 135th Tank Brigade. Rapid career growth during the war was quite natural for a front-line tanker; a gold star was an additional positive recommendation.
However, this growth abruptly ended in February 1943: Filatov was removed from his post and sent to the Ural Military District with a demotion - deputy commander of a training tank brigade, where he spent the next three years; It was there, beyond the Urals, that he met the end of the war. He returns from exile - without quotes - only a year later, but in subsequent years he does not hold command positions, working in the Central Office, and in the 60s, military official Filatov quietly retires with the rank of colonel. Obviously, what happened in the winter of 1942/43 forever remained a black spot on his record and, as a commander, there was no longer any trust in him.

In the memoirs of brigade veterans, which are used in a series of notes on the history of the 135th brigade by Konstantinovsky historian Igor Bredikhin, brigade commander Filatov is described derogatorily. From the passage given in the epigraph it clearly follows that Filatov’s drunken tyranny was the main and immediate reason for the defeat of the brigade and the loss of all its tanks. But how true is this?
On the pages of this magazine we will try to understand what happened near Kamensk on the frosty days of January 20-21, 1943, based on documents from the 135th Tank Brigade, the 23rd Tank Corps and the 3rd Guards Army, as well as the German 302- 1st and 304th Infantry, 7th Panzer Divisions, XXXXVIII Panzer Corps and Task Force Fretter-Picot.
And we will start with how the 135th brigade came to Kamensk.

On the march

The history of the 135th Tank Brigade begins in February 1942. For five months from February to mid-July, the brigade was formed on the territory of the Volga Military District, after which it departed for the Active Army, unloading on July 27 in the Rostov region and becoming part of the 51st Army of the Southwestern Front. Then for three months the brigade took part in defensive battles in the southern direction as part of the Southwestern, Stalingrad and Southeastern fronts. Then, in August, Major Filatov was appointed its commander. At the end of October 1942, it was withdrawn for completion to the Tatishchev camps near Saratov (Volga Military District) and included in the 23rd Tank Corps of Major General Tank Forces Efim Grigorievich Pushkin.

Commander of the 23rd Tank Corps, Major General of Tank Forces E.G. Pushkin

In addition to it, the 3rd and 39th tank brigades, also withdrawn to the Tatishchev camps for replenishment, and the 56th motorized rifle brigade, which was supposed to be part of the corps already in place, were subordinated to the corps control (initially the composition of the corps was somewhat different, but 56 In the last days before the corps was sent to the front, the 1st Tank Brigade was replaced by the 3rd Tank Brigade, and the 9th and 20th Motorized Rifle Brigades were sent to the front as separate ones even earlier).
On December 12, 1942, by order of Headquarters, the corps was ordered to be loaded into echelons and redeployed to Stalingrad, to the Don Front. However, as it soon turned out, the Don Front was only the starting point.

The concentration of the 23rd Tank Corps was difficult, somewhat reminiscent of the suffering and throwing of mechanized corps in the summer of 1941, and deserves a separate description. The corps was somehow unlucky in this sense: six months earlier, in July 1942, it already had to cover several hundred kilometers. From a memo from the Special Department of the NKVD of the Stalingrad Front to the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR: The continuous transfer of units of the 23rd Tank Corps from one line to another, their improper use in battle exhausted the material part, without achieving the goal. In 10 days, the corps units completed a march with a total complexity of up to 300 kilometers.(quoted from “The Stalingrad Epic: Materials of the NKVD of the USSR and military censorship from the Central Archive of the FSB of the Russian Federation”).

However, in December-January the corps managed to break its summer “record”. Having unloaded from the trains at the Kachalino station, the brigades first made a 50-kilometer march to the Vertyachiy and Peskovatka concentration areas. From there, by personal order of Colonel General A.M. Vasilevsky, the corps marched to the Lyapichev district during the day on December 22, then was sent on a night march to the Stalinsky district. In the new area, the corps took up defensive positions for three days in anticipation of a breakthrough from Paulus's 6th Army from Stalingrad, which never came. After which, for a week, the corps again made continuous marches, alternately coming under the command of the Don and Southwestern Fronts, the 5th Shock, 5th Tank and 3rd Guards armies. Wound on tracks for 10 days in total over 450 kilometers(including 28 hours at night), crossing the Don and Chir rivers (and the crossing of the Chir river allocated to the corps did not hold tanks, so the brigade personnel had to strengthen it during the day), with completely exhausted driver mechanics , On January 1-2, 1943, the corps arrived in the Bolshinka concentration area under the command of the 3rd Guards Army of Lieutenant General D.D. Lelyushenko (Southwestern Front).

The corps had to carry out all these marches without a company for supplying fuels and lubricants and without means of repair and evacuation of equipment, which were loaded with industry, but did not arrive in the concentration area. Without their own means of transportation, the supply of the corps on the march had to be completely transferred to the overloaded vehicles of the Don Front and the 5th Tank Army, which caused constant delays and downtime of tanks for a day or two. At the same time, the lack of tractors and constant shortages of fuel made it impossible to tow tanks to places convenient for repairs, forcing them to be repaired in the field, at the stop, which scattered the already extremely meager and insufficient repair funds of the brigades. Delays and downtime due to the lack of fuel delivery, coupled with the constant rush, disrupted routine maintenance and preparation for subsequent stages of the march, which further increased the number of equipment failures.

Lost tanks

In general, the not very high reliability of Soviet combat vehicles of that period, and the poor training of driver mechanics specifically of the 23rd Tank Corps, led to the fact that combat vehicles began to break down even before leaving for the Active Army: when loading into echelons they had to be left in the local reserve tank brigade had eight tanks that broke down on the way to the loading station (half of them from the 135th tank brigade). And during the further multi-hundred-kilometer march, the corps’ path to the front line turned out to be literally strewn with failed tanks, armored vehicles and vehicles: mostly engines jammed, gearboxes, air releases and starters failed, on some tanks the sloths burst due to frequent shifting of levers; finally, there were isolated cases of tanks being deliberately disabled by their own crews out of fear of going into battle.

In total, due to technical faults, 48 ​​tanks and 6 armored vehicles were abandoned along the way, and again half of the tanks belonged to the 135th brigade. The reasons for this dubious “leadership” of the 135th were the complete absence of evacuation means in the brigade (there was not a single tractor, there were no cables) and repairs (all repair shops arrived at the brigade separately, after how half the tanks were lost on the march), a complete lack of spare parts and poor training of driver mechanics.
As a result, having covered 485 km (almost half a thousand kilometers under its own power, in the cold, along steppe roads and ravines!), by the beginning of hostilities only 25 tanks remained in service in the brigade, i.e. less than half of what she left the formation area with! At the same time, medium T-34s failed much more often than light T-70s; if the former only a third of the original number remained, then the latter - almost three quarters. By order of the corps commander, the 338th tank battalion, which suffered particularly heavy losses on the march, handed over all remaining equipment to the second, 337th, battalion, and the personnel of the 338th, led by their commander, Major A.I. Mezentsev, went to collect and repair disabled corps tanks scattered along the route. Thus, the brigade had to conduct combat operations with only one combined tank (14 T-34 and 15 T-70) and motorized rifle and machine-gun battalions.

There were other problems as well. With wheeled transport, the situation was little better than with tanks: all the above-mentioned difficulties were superimposed on the initial shortage of equipment and the extreme elongation of supply routes: not only did the existing vehicles not cope with the delivery, which led to interruptions in the delivery of products and fuels, but also even more often they failed due to increased load. As a result, by the beginning of the fighting, less than 50% of the required transport was in service.
In addition, the brigade completely lacked electrolyte and acid for refilling batteries, there were no batteries and there was no traveling charging station - all this made it extremely difficult to maintain the operation of existing radio stations and electrical equipment in general. There was no antifreeze, which forced the engines of wheeled vehicles to be frequently warmed up; They came up with the idea of ​​pouring diesel fuel (gas oil) into the tank radiators, which solved the problem of the lack of antifreeze (and at the same time increased the amount of fuel carried by the tanks, which, to some extent, mitigated the problems with the lack of vehicles for transporting fuel), but the poured gas oil corroded the durites (hoses) and gaskets, which led to leaking cooling systems. Winter camouflage coats for reconnaissance and infantry were completely absent, there were not enough felt boots and short fur coats (on the very first day of the offensive in the cold of about -30° this led to frostbite), there was no gun oil and gun lard, which is why the weapons rusted and often failed in the cold .
The rush to staff and send the corps to the Active Army had its full impact.

Before the attack

Nevertheless, the first battles for the brigade turned out quite successfully for a number of reasons.
Firstly, the preparation for the offensive, which began on January 14, took a full 12 days, which made it possible to perfectly study the enemy’s defenses, accumulate - even taking into account supply difficulties - some supplies, conduct additional training with personnel, and check several times and double-check all the questions - in general, approach the matter calmly and seriously.
Secondly, the defense of the German 304th Infantry Division itself was very poorly prepared, especially in engineering and anti-tank terms: the artillery was only just concentrated towards the front line, the Germans did not have time to place mines in the offensive sector of the 135th Tank Brigade at all, and The infantry had only taken up defensive positions a few days after many days of foot marches across the snow-covered steppe.

Third, and perhaps most importantly: the defense of the 304th was stretched over a wide front, and it was opposed by the entire right wing of the 3rd Guards and the left flank of the 1st Guards armies, consisting of the 59th, 60th Guards and 266th rifle divisions, 90th and 94th rifle brigades and part of the forces of the 58th Guards Rifle Division, two tank corps - the 18th and 23rd - and several separate tank regiments. Even taking into account the severe shortage in Soviet formations, in terms of people and artillery barrels in the 304th Infantry sector, the Red Army outnumbered the Germans more than twice, and in tanks - absolutely, having about two hundred combat vehicles against nine serviceable tanks of the German 138th tank battalion.

One could have hoped for the traditionally high level of German training and the notorious Aryan spirit, but with them came embarrassment. The 304th Division, formed in 1940 as a territorial defense division, carried out garrison duty in Belgium for more than a year and a half. Although, shortly before being sent to the Eastern Front, it was hastily reorganized into a regular infantry division, incl. reinforced with artillery, but its personnel for the most part had no combat experience. Moreover, having arrived in the east, it was faced with the harsh Soviet winter, for which it was completely unprepared: as a result of the January battles, the division lost almost a thousand people sick and frostbite. Finally, according to the testimony of prisoners of war, part of the division’s personnel (in some units - up to 40%) were mobilized Poles who were not at all eager to die in 30-degree frosts for Hitler.
All this, of course, made it much easier for the 135th Brigade to complete its tasks.

First fights

The offensive began on the morning of January 14. Against the backdrop of disorganization and indecisiveness of the motorized rifle battalion, the brigade’s tanks acted energetically and effectively: in some places, stunned by their onslaught and lacking anti-tank weapons, the German infantry surrendered to the tanks without a fight at all. The corps' offensive developed successfully, the advance of the 3rd and 39th tank brigades of the corps was rapid (70 km by the end of the first day), although the 135th Tank Brigade and 56th Motorized Rifle Brigade were delayed behind, left by order of the army commander to assist the 266th SD and 94th Brigade in clearing centers of German resistance. The losses were small - on the first day there was only one T-34 and two T-70s, and on the second - one T-70.

However, already on the third day the lucky streak ended, and during the attack by the brigade of the village of Plotina, the low fighting qualities of the Soviet infantry, coupled with the inability of the commanders to keep in touch with neighbors and conduct reconnaissance, fully revealed themselves. While the accompanying infantry (its own motorized rifle battalion and the 56th Motorized Rifle Brigade) lay under fire, the tanks of the 337th battalion had to go forward and take the village on their own, which was done at the cost of the loss of four T-34s. The infantry, however, did not arrive, so the deputy brigade commander, Lieutenant Colonel N.M. Sekunda, fearing night German counterattacks, against which tanks without infantry in the village would be vulnerable, decided to withdraw to the field for the night and take up a perimeter defense there. Security and reconnaissance were not organized, so when the advanced units of the 59th Guards Rifle Division jumped out at the tanks at night, in the darkness both sides believed that they had met the enemy, and in the ensuing close combat, three T-34 tanks were knocked out by friendly fire.

But we will talk in detail about the events of January 20-21 and who opposed the 135th brigade in Staraya Stanitsa next time.

Formed by the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western direction in accordance with the directive of the Supreme High Command Headquarters dated April 17, 1942. The corps was formed in April - May 1942 in the Krasny Oskol region of the Voroshilovgrad region. In May 1942, he was transferred to the Kharkov direction as part of the troops of the Southwestern Front.

The 23rd Tank Corps almost shared the fate of the 21st, losing the 131st Tank and 23rd Motorized Rifle Brigades near Kharkov. And there is little left of the 6th and 130th tanks, which were originally part of it.

From June 20 to July 15, 1942, it was operationally subordinate to the 28th A, then to the reserve of the Southwestern Front.

On July 22, 1942, by Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 994124 dated July 22, 1942, the corps was included in the 4th TA.

On July 27, 1942, the corps as part of the Stalingrad Front was operationally subordinated to the 1st TA.

The Corps was formed for the second time on August 31, 1942, by order of the command of the Stalingrad and South-Eastern Front.

On October 28, 1942, the corps was withdrawn to the reserve of the Stalingrad front, and then withdrawn to the Shirokoe and Tatishchevo area for further recruitment, where it entered the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters.

By directive of NKO UV-2/883 of October 25, 1942, the management of the corps was transferred to a new staff No. 010/369.

On December 9, 1942, by Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 170699 dated December 8, 1942, the corps was included in the 5th Division. A .

On December 25, 1942, by Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 170714 dated December 25, 1942, the corps was transferred to the 5th Division. A .

December 31, 1942 corps as part of the troops of the Southwestern Front. On January 3, 1943, the corps was quickly subordinated to the 3rd Guards. A. On February 25, 1943, the corps was withdrawn from battle to the reserve of the Southwestern Front for replenishment in the city of Kupyansk. Since July 16, 1943, the corps has been under operational control of the 1st Guards. A. Since July 24, 1943, the corps has been in reserve on the Southwestern Front. Since August 8, 1943, the corps has been operationally subordinate to the 3rd Guards. A. On August 26, 1943, the corps was transferred to the reserve of the Southwestern Front. On September 4, 1943, the corps came under operational subordination to the 3rd Guards. A. On September 30, 1943, the corps was transferred to the reserve of the Southwestern Front and concentrated in the Grigoryevka, Chaplino area. And after replenishing the tank on October 10, 1943, it concentrated in the Blagoveshchenskoye area. On October 14, 18943, he captured the city of Zaporozhye.

On October 17, 1943, he was withdrawn from battle into the reserve of the 3rd Ukrainian Front and reassigned to the 4th Ukrainian Front. It was part of the 4th Ukrainian Front until October 30, 1943.

On October 30, 1943, the corps became subordinate to the 46th A of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. Since November 25, 1943, the corps as part of the 8th Guards. A.

From December 23, 1943, the corps, as part of the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, fought until March 18, 1944. Then it was withdrawn to the front reserve until March 30, 1944. Until April 24, 1944, it attacked again. From April 24 to June 4, 1944 he was in the reserve of the 3rd Ukrainian Front.

From August 21 to August 30, 1944, he was part of Gorshkov's KMG (7th Guards A).

In June 1945, the corps left the 2nd Ukrainian Front and entered the Lvov Military District.

In the active army:

• from 04/12/1942 to 10/28/1942
• from 12/31/1942 to 05/09/1945

The tactical sign of the 23rd Tank Corps was a white diamond, usually 400 mm high, with the letters of the Russian alphabet in the center. The letter "B" identified the 3rd Tank Brigade, the letter "G" identified the 39th, and the letter "D" identified the 135th Tank Brigade. In the lower right corner relative to the letter there was a small Arabic numeral indicating the battalion number. For example, “B1” is the 1st battalion of the 3rd Tank Brigade of the 23rd Tank Corps. In addition to the tactical designation of the unit, a personal identification number was applied to the tank in large numbers.