The emergence of new industries Peter 1. Consequences of economic development

Peter the Great inherited from the Moscow state poorly developed rudiments of industry, planted and supported by the government, and poorly developed trade associated with the poor structure of the state economy. Were inherited from the Moscow state and its tasks - to conquer access to the sea and return the state to its natural borders. Peter quickly began to solve these problems, starting a war with Sweden and deciding to wage it in a new way and with new means. A new regular army is emerging and a fleet is being built. All this, of course, required huge financial costs. The Moscow state, as state needs increased, covered them with new taxes. Peter, too, did not shy away from this old technique, but next to it he put one innovation that Muscovite Rus' did not know: Peter cared not only about taking from the people everything that could be taken, but also thought about the payer themselves - the people, about where he can get funds to pay heavy taxes.

Peter saw the path to raising the people's well-being in the development of trade and industry. At the same time, the desire to reduce the cost of maintaining the army and navy naturally suggested the idea that it would be cheaper to produce everything that was needed to equip and arm the army and navy. And since there were no factories and factories that could fulfill this task, the idea arose that they needed to be built. These thoughts were not new and have been known since the time of Tsar Michael, but only a man with an iron will and indestructible energy, like Tsar Peter, could implement it.

During the Great Embassy, ​​the tsar studied all aspects of European life, including technology. Abroad, Peter learned the basics of economic thought of that time - mercantilism. Mercantilism based its economic teaching on two principles: first, every nation, in order not to become poor, must produce everything it needs itself, without turning to the help of other people's labor, the labor of other peoples; secondly, in order to get rich, every nation must export manufactured products from its country as much as possible and import foreign products as little as possible.

Realizing that Russia is not only not inferior, but also superior to other countries in the abundance of natural resources, Peter decided that the state should take upon itself the development of industry and trade of the country. "Our Russian state,- said Peter, - “Before other lands, it is abundant and blessed to have the necessary metals and minerals, which until now have been searched for without any diligence.”.

Thus, having realized the importance of trade and industry and having adopted the ideas of mercantilism in the West, Peter began to reform these areas, forcing his subjects to do so, even if by force.

During the reign of Peter I, two stages can be traced in Russia’s industrial policy:

• · 1700-1717 - the main founder of manufactories - the treasury;
• · Since 1717, private individuals began to found manufactories. At the same time, the owners of manufactories were exempted from government service.

On first stage, priority was given to the production of products for military needs. On second stage, industry began to produce products for the population.

By decree of 1722, urban artisans were united into workshops, but unlike Western Europe, they were organized by the state, and not by the artisans themselves, to produce products needed by the army and navy. "

A higher form of industrial production was manufacture. As a result of the transformations of Peter I in the first quarter of the 18th century. There was a sharp leap in the development of the manufacturing industry. Compared to the end of the 17th century. the number of manufactories increased approximately fivefold and in 1725 amounted to 205 enterprises.

Particularly great successes were achieved in the metallurgical industry, which was necessitated by the need to arm the army and build a navy. Along with factories in the old regions (Tula, Kashira, Kaluga), factories arose in Karelia, and then in the Urals. It was during this period that the widespread development of iron and copper ores in the Urals began, which soon became the main metallurgical base of the country. Pig iron smelting reached 815 thousand poods per year, according to this indicator Rorcia took third place in the world, second only to England and Sweden. Large copper production was organized. In second place were textile manufactories, which were developed in the center of the country. Tanneries also operated here, providing products primarily to the army.

Under Peter the Great, new industries arose in Russia: shipbuilding, silk spinning, glass and earthenware, and paper production.

The state played a major role in the development of large-scale industry. It built factories, helped private entrepreneurs, and provided manufactories with labor.

The manufactories used both free and forced labor of peasants who worked in the patrimonial enterprises of their landowners, as well as assigned peasants from the state and palace villages. By a decree of 1721, merchants were allowed to purchase serfs for their factories, which later became known as sessional. Thus, in the first quarter of the 18th century. There was a leap in the development of large-scale production and in the use of civilian labor. This can be considered the second stage in the initial period of the genesis of capitalist relations in Russian industry (the first stage is the 17th century).

Thus, under Peter, the foundation of Russian industry was laid. Many new industries entered the circulation of people's labor, that is, the sources of people's well-being increased quantitatively and qualitatively improved. This improvement was achieved through a terrible effort of the people's forces, but only thanks to this effort the country was able to endure the burden of a continuously lasting twenty years of war. In the future, the intensive development of national wealth that began under Peter led to the enrichment and economic development of Russia.

Domestic trade under Peter also picked up significantly, but, in general, continued to have the same caravan-fair character. But this side of the economic life of Russia was stirred up by Peter and brought out of the peace of inertia and lack of enterprise that characterized it in the 17th century and earlier. The spread of commercial knowledge, the emergence of factories and factories, communication with foreigners - all this gave a new meaning and direction to Russian trade, forcing it to revive within and, thereby, becoming an increasingly active participant in world trade, assimilating its principles and rules.

During the period of the Tatar-Mongol yoke, many artisans were forcibly sent from Russia to Asia, which significantly worsened the state of crafts in the country. The former craft disappeared almost everywhere, but the need for handicraft products remained, so the necessary things had to be made by peasants. As a result, they began to develop peasant crafts. Peasant artisans made products not only for personal use, but also for sale. This led to the fact that crafts began to gradually occupy the vacated market niche of crafts. After the defeat of the Horde, the city craft could have been revived, but its niche was already occupied: era of specialization of trades, not crafts.

The specialization of crafts in Russia began in the 16th century. and reached its peak in the 17th century. The first large fishing (industrial) enterprises (manufactories) were state-owned (state-owned). Artillery guns were cast at the state-owned Cannon Yard in Moscow. For example, master Chokhov worked there, who cast the Tsar Cannon. Small arms and bladed weapons were manufactured in the armory and in the Tula Armory Settlement. Construction production and construction itself were state sectors of the economy. Large construction works were carried out under the order and under the supervision of the “Order of Stone Affairs”.

Initially, Peter I adhered to the use of hired labor in the manufactory, because this was the case in Western Europe. And while there were few manufactories, there were enough “hunters” to work for them. These were mainly people from the urban lower classes. With the increase in the number of manufactories, there were no longer enough such people, so they began to send “wine girls and women”, prisoners of war, soldiers, and later serfs.

The turning point was the issuance of a decree in 1721 on the permission “for the multiplication of factories to buy those factories of the village without prohibition.” According to this decree, it was possible to buy serfs in order to turn them into serf workers. This decree applied mainly to merchants: the nobles already had the right to buy serfs and use their labor. But after the publication of the decree, the rights of merchants were equal to those of the nobility, and this, according to the authorities, should not have been allowed, so the rights of merchant-manufacturers were limited. Serfs and the manufacture itself became not the property of the merchant, but only his conditional possession - session. Legally, the state was considered the owner of such a manufacture. Serf workers were attached not to the owner, but to the manufactory, and he had no right to sell them or use this labor outside the manufactory. In addition, all laws that were related to state-owned manufactories automatically applied to possessions. The state established the volume of production, output standards, and wages for the latter.

So, under Peter I, life began "serf manufacture" - the original form of Russian industry using serf labor.

In total, at that time there were four types of manufactories: state-owned; sessional; patrimonies, which belonged to the nobles with the right of full ownership, and merchants. Only the first three types used serf labor. “State peasants” were “assigned” to state-owned and possessional manufactories. “Assigned peasants” should not be identified with serf workers. The “assigned” remained peasants, but state taxes were replaced for them by equal-sized work in auxiliary work in manufactories: they cut down forests, burned coal, and transported goods on their horses. After serving this duty, the peasants returned to their native villages.

Manufactories of the fourth type were called merchant manufactories not only because they belonged to merchants. The latter could own possessional manufactories, and merchant manufactories could be the property of both peasants and nobles. It was customary to call manufactories with hired workers "merchant". True, most of the hired workers in such manufactories consisted of serfs, but these were not the serfs of the manufacturer, but landowner peasants released on quitrent. That is why, in relation to the manufacturer, they were hired.

Serf manufacture was not a purely feudal enterprise. Its owner spent capital on production, which was divided into fixed and circulating capital. The money was spent on construction, equipment repairs, raw materials and materials, and wages to employees. The manufacturer received benefit not in the form of feudal rent, but in the form of profit, i.e. the difference between revenue from sales of products and production costs. The factory worker received payment for his work.

Thus, already in serf manufacturing, the relationship between worker and owner was fundamentally capitalist, but was clothed in a feudal-serf form. The serf worker did not voluntarily, but forcibly sold his labor and could not change his owner on his own initiative. If there was an excess of workers at one enterprise, there might not be enough of them at another. The capitalist entrepreneur was at the same time a landowner; he owned not only the enterprise, but also the land and workers. It is no coincidence that Russian economists wrote: in Russia, fixed (“real estate”) capital could include not only the enterprise itself, but also land and serfs.

From the moment of its inception, serf manufacture turned into large-scale commodity production using serf labor. Serfdom became the instrument that made it possible to adapt capitalist manufacturing to the feudal system. As a result of its development, the merging of manufacturers with feudal lords took place. Manufacturers received noble titles, for example, the heirs of the merchant-gunsmith Demidov became princes, the heirs of the peasants Stroganovs became barons.

Manufacturing production in the 18th century. brought Russia among the leading countries in industrial development. Industrial achievements were reflected in exports. If in the 17th century. Russia exported mainly raw materials and agricultural products; already in 1726, 52% of exports were manufactured products: mainly metal and canvas, as the metallurgical and textile industries were successfully developing.

A powerful impetus for the development of metallurgy and the construction of mining plants in the Urals was the war with Sweden. To make weapons, a lot of metal was required, and Russia had previously imported it from Sweden. There was a period when cannons were cast from church bells. By the end of the reign of Peter I, Russia not only ceased to depend on the import of metal, but also began to export it to England. Up to 80% of the metal produced in the country was exported.

Textile production achieved significant success at that time. Only under Peter I, about 30 textile factories were built. True, Peter did not wait for the fulfillment of the goal he set - “not to buy a uniform from overseas,” but under him Russia was already providing Europe with canvas - the “engine” of ships of that time.

In addition to the metallurgical and textile industries, gunpowder, shipbuilding, glass and paper production developed. At the same time, the production of clothing and footwear, furniture and agricultural implements and many other consumer goods still remained at the handicraft level.

The rapid development of Russian manufacturing production was explained by its serf roots. The serf manufacture had relatively low costs for labor, raw materials and fuel. The owner of a metallurgical enterprise in England had to buy ore and coal from the owner of the land - the landlord, and the costs of raw materials and fuel of the Ural factory were reduced only to the costs of their procurement. Russian metal sold in London turned out to be cheaper than English metal, so England imposed duties on it, almost doubling the price.

The first feature of the process of development of manufactories in Russia was the emergence of serf enterprises, the second was the power of the state over industry. Under Peter, not only state-owned, but also private manufactories were built on the initiative of the state, often using coercive measures. Peter explained: “Our people will not enter into anything themselves unless they are forced.” And he told the authorities that “one should have control, like a mother over a child, until perfection comes.” Klyuchevsky called this “the state-run greenhouse education of industry.” The state provided loans for the construction of factories. Usually the loan was repaid with finished products delivered to the treasury.

The question arises: was it worth creating manufactories through state coercive measures? Wouldn’t it be easier to let industry develop naturally, in accordance with economic laws, as happened in Western Europe? Apparently it was worth it, since Russia was faced with the task of “catching up and eliminating the economic gap.” It was necessary to immediately create a manufacturing industry, since waiting for it to arise in an evolutionary way meant consolidating the gap that had arisen from Europe. In addition, in the West there was a free burghers, which gave birth to entrepreneurs, but in Russia peasant industries were shackled by serfdom, and therefore were deprived of the opportunity to show such initiative. But state entrepreneurship already existed in the country at that time, and serfdom provided the conditions for the forced “introduction” of manufactures.

In Western Europe, progressive transformations occurred gradually, along with economic development. Improvement of production and market development required certain legal guarantees for the entrepreneur, as well as proactive, interested workers. Therefore, economic progress was accompanied by the expansion of individual rights and freedoms, secured by law.

In Russia, progressive reforms were carried out from above and were accompanied by the suppression of society. Peter I carried out his reforms in order to strengthen the Russian state, eliminate the country's economic lag, i.e. These reforms were based not on the interests of society, but on the interests of the state in conditions of competition with other countries. Such despotism caused economic stagnation and slowed down development. After some time, the need for new reforms arose. Development proceeded impulsively, in cycles, and this cyclicality was a fundamental feature of Russia's economic development.

During the reign of Peter I, taxes increased 3 times, and the population decreased by more than 20%. A unique situation arose in industry: as a result of Peter’s reforms, the bulk of the manufactories were state-owned and possessional, which formally also belonged to the state. The overwhelming majority of manufactured goods was placed at the disposal of the state, and therefore prices for them were not determined by the market, i.e. were not market, but “mandatory”, as they were determined by state decrees.

During this period, the state managed not only state and possessional, but also all other manufactories. It gave state “orders” to enterprises, even if the products were not intended for the treasury. If a manufacturer failed to cope with the state’s production tasks (orders), the state took this enterprise away from him and transferred it to another “factory owner”.

State regulation could not replace market relations. It made competition impossible, and thereby the improvement of production. The entrepreneur was interested in receiving a profitable government order, a monopoly on the production of certain products, and a high list price for his products; receive land from the state, as well as various kinds of privileges. In this situation, there was no need to improve production; it was enough to have connections in the government and be able to bribe officials. This led to the emergence of manufactories that were listed only on paper. First of all, administrative regulation was related to state-owned enterprises. By the end of Peter's reign they had fallen into such disrepair that they had to be urgently transferred to private ownership.

After the death of Peter I, manufacturing production began to stagnate. It began to revive only under Catherine II. The Empress issued a number of decrees limiting the role of the state in managing these industries; in particular, it was forbidden to buy serfs to work in factories. Conditions were created for the emergence of a commercial and industrial population, the so-called “middle layer.” During the reign of Catherine II, the number of manufactories increased from 980 to 3200; Exports also increased – from 13 to 57 million rubles.

• Already in that period, mining manufactories were usually called factories.

The sage avoids all extremes.

Lao Tzu

The Russian economy in the 17th century lagged significantly behind European countries. Therefore, the economic policy of Peter 1 was aimed at creating conditions for the economic development of the country in the present and future. Separately, it should be noted that the main direction of economic development of that era was the development, first of all, of the military industry. This is important to understand, since the entire reign of Peter 1 took place during a period of wars, the main one of which was the Northern War.

The economy of the era of Peter should be considered from the point of view of the following components:

State of the economy at the beginning of the era

The Russian economy before Peter 1 came to power had a huge number of problems. Suffice it to say that the country, which has a huge amount of natural resources, did not have the necessary material to supply even the needs of the army. For example, metal for cannons and artillery was purchased in Sweden. The industry was in a declining state. There were only 25 manufactories throughout Russia. For comparison, more than 100 manufactories operated in England during the same period. As for agriculture and trade, the old rules applied here and these industries practically did not develop.

Features of economic development

Peter's great embassy to Europe revealed to the tsar the problems that existed in the Russian economy. These problems worsened with the outbreak of the Northern War, when Sweden stopped supplying iron (metal). As a result, Peter I was forced to melt church bells into cannons, for which the church almost called him the Antichrist.

The economic development of Russia during the reign of Peter 1 was aimed primarily at the development of the army and navy. It was around these two components that the development of industry and other objects took place. It is important to note that since 1715, individual entrepreneurship began to be encouraged in Russia. Moreover, some of the manufactories and factories were transferred into private hands.

The basic principles of the economic policy of Peter 1 developed in two directions:

• Protectionism. This is support for domestic producers and encouragement of exporting goods abroad.
• Mercantilism. The predominance of export of goods over import. In economic terms, exports prevail over imports. This is done to concentrate funds within the country.

Industrial development

By the beginning of the reign of Peter I, there were only 25 manufactories in Russia. This is extremely small. The country could not provide itself with even the most necessary things. That is why the beginning of the Northern War was so sad for Russia, since the lack of supplies of the same iron from Sweden made it impossible to wage war.

The main directions of the economic policy of Peter 1 were distributed in 3 main areas: the metallurgical industry, the mining industry, and shipbuilding. In total, by the end of Peter’s reign, there were already 200 manufactories operating in Russia. The best indicator that the economic management system worked is the fact that before Peter came to power, Russia was one of the largest importers of iron, and after Peter 1, Russia took 3rd place in the world in iron production and became an exporting country.

Under Peter the Great, the first industrial centers in the country began to form. Or rather, there were such industrial centers, but their significance was insignificant. It was under Peter that the formation and rise of industry took place in the Urals and Donbass. The downside of industrial growth is the attraction of private capital and difficult conditions for workers. During this period, assigned and possessional peasants appeared.

Possession peasants appeared by decree of Peter 1 in 1721. They became the property of the manufactory and were obliged to work there all their lives. Possession peasants replaced the assigned peasants, who were recruited from among urban peasants and assigned to a specific factory.

Historical background

The problem of the peasants, expressed in the creation of the possession peasantry, was associated with the lack of qualified labor in Russia.

The development of industry in the Peter the Great era was distinguished by the following features:

• Rapid development of the metallurgical industry.
• Active participation of the state in economic life. The state acted as the customer for all industrial facilities.
• Involvement of forced labor. Since 1721, factories have been allowed to buy peasants.
• Lack of competition. As a result, large entrepreneurs lacked the desire to develop their industry, which is why there was a long stagnation in Russia.

In the development of industry, Peter had 2 problems: the weak efficiency of public administration, as well as the lack of interests of large entrepreneurs for development. It was all decided simply - the tsar began to transfer, including large enterprises, to private owners for management. Suffice it to say that by the end of the 17th century the famous Demidov family controlled 1/3 of all Russian iron.

The figure shows a map of the economic development of Russia under Peter I, as well as the development of industry in the European part of the country.

Agriculture

Let's consider what changes occurred in Russian agriculture during the reign of Peter the Great. The Russian economy under Peter I in the field of agriculture developed along an extensive path. The extensive path, in contrast to the intensive one, did not imply an improvement in working conditions, but an expansion of opportunities. Therefore, under Peter, active development of new arable lands began. Lands were developed most quickly in the Volga region, the Urals, and Siberia. At the same time, Russia continued to remain an agricultural country. Approximately 90% of the population lived in villages and was engaged in agriculture.

The orientation of the country's economy towards the army and navy was also reflected in the agriculture of Russia in the 17th century. In particular, it was precisely because of this direction of the country’s development that sheep and horse breeding began to develop. Sheep were needed to supply the fleet, and horses to form cavalry.

It was during the Peter the Great era that new tools began to be used in agriculture: a scythe and a rake. These tools were purchased from abroad and imposed on the local economy. Since 1715, which year Peter I issued a Decree to expand the sowing of tobacco and hemp.

As a result, an agricultural system was created in which Russia could feed itself, and for the first time in history it began to sell grain abroad.

Trade

The economic policy of Peter I in the field of trade generally corresponds to the overall development of the country. Trade also developed along a protectionist path of development.

Before the era of Peter the Great, all major trade was conducted through the port in Astrakhan. But Peter the Great, who loved St. Petersburg terribly, by his own decree forbade trade through Astrakhan (the Decree was signed in 1713), and demanded a complete transfer of trade to St. Petersburg. This did not bring much effect for Russia, but it was an important factor in strengthening the position of St. Petersburg as a city and the capital of the Empire. Suffice it to say that Astrakhan, as a result of these changes, reduced its trade turnover by about 15 times, and the city gradually began to lose its rich status. Simultaneously with the development of the port in St. Petersburg, ports in Riga, Vyborg, Narva and Revel were actively developing. At the same time, St. Petersburg accounted for approximately 2/3 of foreign trade turnover.

Support for domestic production was achieved through the introduction of high customs duties. So, if a product was produced in Russia, then its customs duty was 75%. If the imported goods were not produced in Russia, then their duty varied from 20% to 30%. At the same time, payment of the duty was made exclusively in foreign currency at a rate favorable to Russia. This was necessary to receive foreign capital and be able to purchase the necessary equipment. Already in 1726, the volume of exports from Russia was 2 times higher than the volume of imports.

The main countries with which Russia traded in those days were England and Holland.

In many ways, the development of trade was facilitated by the development of transport. In particular, 2 large canals were built:

• Vyshnevolotsky Canal (1709). This canal connected the Tvertsa River (a tributary of the Volga) with the Msta River. From there, through Lake Ilmen, a path opened to the Baltic Sea.
• Ladoga Obvodny Canal (1718). I was going around Lake Ladoga. This detour was necessary because the lake was turbulent and ships could not move across it.

Finance development

Peter 1 had one strange thing - he loved taxes very much and in every possible way encouraged people who came up with new taxes. It was during this era that taxes were introduced on almost everything: on stoves, on salt, on government forms and even on beards. In those days they even joked that there were no taxes only on air, but such taxes would soon appear. Increasing taxes and their expansion led to popular unrest. For example, the Astrakhan uprising and the uprising of Kondraty Bulavin are the main major discontents of the popular masses of that era, but there were also dozens of small uprisings.

In 1718, the tsar carried out his famous reform, introducing a poll tax in the country. If earlier taxes were paid from the yard, now from every male soul.

Also, one of the main initiatives was the implementation of financial reform of 1700-1704. The main attention in this reform was paid to the minting of new coins, equating the amount of silver in the ruble with silver. The very weight of the Russian ruble was equal to the Dutch guilder.

As a result of financial changes, the growth of revenues to the treasury increased by approximately 3 times. This was a great help for the development of the state, but made it almost impossible to live in the country. Suffice it to say that during Peter’s era the population of Russia decreased by 25%, taking into account all the new territories that this tsar conquered.

Consequences of economic development

The main results of the economic development of Russia in the first quarter of the 18th century, during the reign of Peter 1, which can be considered the main ones:

• Increase in the number of manufactories by 7 times.
• Expansion of production volume within the country.
• Russia has taken 3rd place in the world in metal smelting.
• New tools began to be used in agriculture, which later proved their effectiveness.
• The founding of St. Petersburg and the conquest of the Baltic states expanded trade and economic ties with European countries.
• St. Petersburg became the main trade and financial center of Russia.
• Due to the government paying attention to trade, the importance of the merchants increased. It was during this period that they established themselves as a strong and influential class.

If we consider these points, a positive reaction to the economic reforms of Peter 1 naturally suggests itself, but here it is important to understand at what cost all this was achieved. The tax burden on the population increased greatly, which automatically caused the impoverishment of most peasant farms. In addition, the need to develop the economy at a rapid pace actually contributed to the strengthening of serfdom.

New and old in Peter's economy

Let's consider a table that presents the main aspects of the economic development of Russia during the reign of Peter 1, indicating which aspects existed before Peter and which appeared under him.

Regarding the growth in the number of entrepreneurs, it should be noted that Peter 1 actively contributed to this. In particular, he allowed any person, regardless of his origin, to conduct research into the location of minerals and establish his own factories at the location.

The great reform of Peter the Great, which brought Russia “from non-existence into existence,” is, according to the historian Solovyov, a great feat, a huge, comprehensive revolution, accompanied by major world-historical consequences and which laid new foundations in all aspects of the internal life of the people. Peter “took from Old Rus' forces, supreme power, law, estates, and from the West he borrowed technical means for the organization of the army, navy, state and national economy, government institutions” and still carried out a “radical revolution”, or “rather a shock; it was a revolution not in its goals and results, but only in its methods and in the impression it made on its contemporaries.”

To impressionable foreigners, “Russia seemed like one factory; Everywhere hitherto hidden treasures were extracted from the bowels of the earth; the sound of hammer and ax could be heard everywhere; Scientists and craftsmen of all ranks flowed there from everywhere with books, tools, machines, and during all this work the monarch himself was visible as a master and guide. But even foreigners, who looked with distrust at Peter’s industrial efforts, admitted that with many failed enterprises, some industries not only satisfied domestic demand, but also supplied foreign markets, for example, with iron and canvas.”

However, how prepared was the soil into which these new seeds were thrown? Korsak first raised this question in his remarkable book “On the Forms of Industry” and came to a negative conclusion. “The most important condition for the development of the factory industry in the country,” he says, “is the preparation of a significant part of the population for the role of skilled and cheap workers... Russia in the era of Peter was in a position that was far from favorable for the introduction of a factory or manufacturing method of production. Peter, meanwhile, wanted to transfer manufacturing activity in its full and complete scope to Russian unprepared soil. He immediately wanted to introduce almost all the industries that existed in the West at that time. At the same time, it was necessary to train workers, establish factories, and open sales for their products. The means that Peter chose to carry out his plans consisted for the most part in those measures and that regulation that were the product of mercantilism in the West.”

Korsak finds that “the most direct and natural transition to the factory and manufacturing form of production should consist in the corresponding organization of those local and most widespread crafts, the products of which previously had a fairly wide market... Instead of simple rural artisans who have hitherto worked for selling in their free time on their own, to be done by factory workers, it would be much better to make them themselves factory entrepreneurs - and instead of building factories at the expense of the treasury and then giving them to merchants and landowners, wouldn’t it be better to give them to entire localities that were engaged in the same trade with the help of simple household tools... The new form of industry was decisively opposed to all folk habits and forms of life.”

This idea - that Peter directed the development of our industry along the wrong path, gave it an artificial character by planting large-scale production - was then repeated many times. A clear exponent of it, although in a slightly modified form, is P. N. Milyukov. He touches on this issue already in his “State Economy in Russia in the First Quarter of the 18th Century.” “The necessity of goals,” we read here, “which Peter’s contemporaries doubted, would now be late and useless to doubt; Regarding the timeliness of their implementation, there can, unfortunately, be two answers, depending on whether we consider them in relation to the internal or external situation of Russia. In relation to the external situation of Russia, the timeliness of setting these goals is already proven by their successful achievement... In relation to the internal situation, the answer to the question must be negative. New foreign policy tasks fell on the Russian population at a moment when it did not yet have sufficient means to carry them out. The political growth of the state again outpaced its economic development... At the cost of ruining the country, Russia was elevated to the rank of a European power.”

Pointing out that in the West “the domestic form of industry little by little turned into purely capitalist forms,” in another work the same author contrasts Russia with the West, where “manufacture and factory did not have time to develop organically, from home production, under the influence of the growth of domestic needs of the population,” and “was created for the first time by the government, which was guided both by its own needs (for example, in cloth for the army), and by theoretical considerations about the need to develop national industry... The ancient Russian handicraftsmen were forgotten and the new form of production was transferred from The West is ready. In a country without capital, without workers, without entrepreneurs and without buyers, this form could be maintained only by artificial means and took root only thanks to prolonged and intense patronage. The workers were given freely to the manufacturers in the form of serfs assigned to the factories (the so-called possession peasants). Buyers were obligated, since factories received a monopoly on production, and homogeneous foreign products were subject to heavy import duties.” And the result was still weak. When verified in 1730, many manufacturers turned out to be “fake”, and in 1744, “due to the non-reproduction of factories and the poor workmanship of the goods made in those factories,” 44 factories were closed; Many businesses closed on their own.

M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky resolutely opposed these views. He proceeds from the fact that “Peter undoubtedly succeeded in causing large-scale production among us” - this is confirmed by the number and size of the factories that arose under Peter; he does not mention their further fate, or the “fake” factories. Returning, therefore, to the old view given above about the enormous significance of Peter’s activity in the field of creating our industry, Tugan-Baranovsky, however, unlike the indicated direction, does not limit himself to stating a fact, but tries to show that “the random personal views of Peter and his successors" did not at all play a decisive role in the history of our industry. He tries to establish that although in “pre-Petrine Rus' there was no industrial capitalism, commercial capitalism was developed... the concentration of commercial capital observed in pre-Petrine Rus' was caused not by government measures, but by the natural evolution of trade, the advantages of large trade over small trade.” The fact is that “nothing could be more erroneous than the idea of ​​Muscovite Rus' as an exclusively agricultural state, with almost no trade. On the contrary, all foreigners who came to Moscow in the 17th century were amazed by the development of trade in this city and, in general, by the Russians’ penchant for trade.” Moreover, by this time commercial capital had managed to penetrate into industry. “Already in the 17th century, the artisan was in the hands of the merchant who owned the market,” “the merchant was a necessary intermediary between the producer (in the vast majority of cases, a village artisan) and the consumer.”

This trading capital, according to M.I. Tugan-Baranovsky, - and was the basis on which large-scale production was based in the era of Peter.” But “the merchant by no means showed any inclination to become an independent entrepreneur and turn his artisan supplier into a hired worker working in the owner’s workshop.” The change occurred only due to the fact that a new factor appeared on the scene - the state. The latter needed a whole range of weapons, uniforms, etc., and the largest factories and factories - weapons, cannon, foundries, cloth, sail-linen, stationery factories - supplied their products exclusively or mainly to the treasury. “So,” he concludes, “although without the measures taken by Peter, large-scale production had no chance of developing in the Russia of that time, these measures were successful only because the Russian economic soil was prepared for new forms of industry.” And Peter’s industrial policy was not at all accidental, it was dictated by economic necessity. The industrial production of Russia on the Western European model was as necessary as the reorganization of its army in a European manner. In order to successfully wage a war, not only trained soldiers were required, but also cannons, cannonballs, gunpowder, weapons, soldiers' cloth, linen, etc. Finally, if “large-scale production arose in Russia under the direct influence of the government,” then this is not at all characteristic of Russian industry, for there is not a single country in the world, in the West or in the East - no matter where capitalism developed without the active support of the government. Thus, there is no need to talk about the “artificiality” of Russian capitalism.

In order to answer this question posed in our literature, it is necessary first of all to understand, at least in general terms, how the development of industry took place during this era in Western Europe. After all, in essence, the problem is posed in this way: was the soil for the creation of industry prepared in the same way as in other states, or, unlike them, the entire industrial reform was built on sand, did not have a solid foundation in the form of the necessary capital and labor, in the form of demand from the population for industrial products. Only with such a comparison will it become clear how artificial was the direction that Peter gave to Russian economic life.

First of all, it must be borne in mind that in the countries of Western Europe, everywhere and everywhere - whether we take England, Holland, France or Austria, Prussia and other German states, or, finally, the Scandinavian Peninsula, Spain and Portugal - is created in the XVII-XVIII centuries. industry in the form of handicraft production, partly - to a much lesser extent - and centralized manufactories, and in all countries the initiative comes from the government: it takes all possible measures to encourage and facilitate its creation and development. Peter the Great did not invent anything new in this regard; he applied on Russian soil what Cromwell and Colbert, the Prussian kings, the Dutch states had already done before him, and what was practiced after him by Frederick the Great and Maria Theresa. Everywhere and everywhere the state “put pressure on the population, forced it to come out of its usual inert and apathetic state, tried to pull out the cart of the national economy stuck in the mud.” A touching picture is presented by Colbert’s attempts to “push his especially immobile contemporaries,” to somewhat speed up their progress through privileges and cash benefits, immigration of foreigners and a number of other measures. “He was the first entrepreneur among his nation,” we read about the Swedish king Gustav Vasa, “he was able to extract wealth from the depths of Sweden, and use it in the interests of the treasury, and show the merchants a new path not only with trade agreements and protective duties, but also with his own widely supplied by maritime trade."

In the West, the needs of the state, or more precisely, military needs, have always been in the foreground. Epoch XVII-XVIII centuries. is a period of almost continuous wars in the West, wars between England and France, England and the Netherlands, England and Spain, France and the Netherlands, the wars of Louis XIV, Frederick the Great. To wage wars, vast armies and navies were needed, which were created in this era and for the maintenance of which numerous and varied industries were needed. The army needed cloth and canvas for uniforms, canvas was needed for tents and sails, leather was needed for shoes, saddles, harnesses and all kinds of other devices. No less great was the need for weapons - guns, cannons, shells, bladed weapons, and for all these weapons it was necessary to mine iron and copper ore and process the ore into iron and steel. Finally, for the fleet, in addition to making sails, it was necessary to build shipbuilding, produce ropes, and anchors. All these needs of a military nature explain the special attention that Western governments pay to the wool, linen and leather industries, mining, metallurgical production and shipbuilding, partly creating their own government enterprises, partly encouraging the activities of private individuals and companies.

Along with this, they also had in mind the needs of another kind - the needs of the sovereign, the court and the court aristocracy for luxury goods, clothing and linen of the highest quality, in particular silk and lace, glass and porcelain dishes, wallpaper, carpets, soap and perfumes. goods, tobacco products, valuable furniture and mirrors and much more. Hence we find enterprises of two kinds. On the one hand, mining and metallurgical, cannon and rifle factories, cloth production, linen, leather, sailing, shipbuilding, and on the other hand, silk, lace, mirror, glass, porcelain, wallpaper, tobacco, soap and, again, cloth enterprises and linen, which only produce thin linen, woolen fabrics for the court and aristocracy.

Many of these industries, such as wool, linen, blacksmithing and weapons, leather, already existed and developed quite independently on the initiative of buyer-traders, who gave orders mainly to the rural population, often supplied them with raw materials, and then sold the finished products in cities and markets, they supplied it to the treasury, for the court, for the army. But now, with the growth of the army and navy and the increase in the number of wars, this production turned out to be completely insufficient. Suppliers were not able to supply the armies with cloth, shoes, and weapons in the quantities needed and with the speed required by the war. It was necessary to create mass production and, moreover, rapid production.

There were no other goods in the country at all. It was necessary to transplant foreign industries and attract foreigners who would plant new industries and teach them to the native population. Only in this way was the production of silk, velvet, braids, glass, mirrors, porcelain, watches, ribbons, lace, wallpaper, soap, as well as new varieties of woolen, linen, and semi-paper fabrics created everywhere.

But how to create and develop all these industries? This required labor and capital. Obtaining the necessary labor was not easy. There were a great many idle and begging people everywhere, but they were often unsuitable for work, and they often avoided it, preferring to wander and feed on alms. The state everywhere and everywhere enters into the fight against this evil, trying to reduce the number of beggars and vagabonds and at the same time use them, supply them with the newly created industry. Workhouses, reformatory institutions for beggars, vagrants, prostitutes, shelters for homeless and beggar children and orphans are established, and in these institutions a variety of industrial work is carried out. Or the inmates of these institutions and orphans are given to entrepreneurs for use in industry.

No less difficult was the question of the necessary capital. It is naive, of course, to argue that in Western Europe capitalism was less prepared than in our country, because guild craft dominated there, as Struve asserted. In fact, the workshops in the 17th century. no longer consisted of only artisans. There were organizations that retained the guild form, but consisted of only artisans working for the merchant. Sometimes the companies of the latter took the form of a workshop, or buyers, along with artisans, were part of the same workshop. But what is even more important is the fact that in various Western European states there was significant capital created by overseas trade, thanks to which gold and silver flowed from the colonies in huge quantities. This capital was available in abundance in England and the Netherlands, and it could perfectly be used for new industry. The low level of interest, the dizzying speculation on the stock exchange at the beginning of the 18th century, the desire to place money in government loans - all this indicated that capital was available in abundant quantities in the country. All it took was a push from the government in the form of customs protectionism and encouragement of immigration of foreigners, and countries such as England and the Netherlands soon became industrial states that satisfied their own needs with products produced at home, without the need for foreign imports. There was absolutely no need for financial assistance from the state here. There were no government enterprises (with a few rare exceptions, such as arsenals), nor the provision of government loans to individuals or companies.

The situation in France was somewhat more difficult. Although there were a significant number of capitalists there who made their fortunes through trade with the colonies and on stock exchange transactions, especially through farming of all kinds, this capital was not as willing to go into commercial and industrial enterprises as in England and the Netherlands. Tax farmers preferred to invest their fortune in the land and this way make their way into the nobility. Colbert was therefore forced, not only to attract foreign craftsmen, to issue exclusive privileges for the right to produce certain goods, to grant new enterprises the title of royal manufacture, etc., but also to supply new enterprises with the capital they needed, to issue interest-free loans, non-repayable benefits, awards to craftsmen, etc., and often it was necessary to simply establish state-owned enterprises, since there were no private individuals. Likewise, when establishing overseas trading companies, the treasury, the king and members of the royal family took on the majority of the shares.

The situation was even worse in countries such as Prussia, Baden, Bavaria, and Austria. They did not take any part in overseas trade, did not have colonies, and therefore the flow of gold and silver that came from there to Europe passed by them. In general, they traded second-hand, receiving overseas goods from the Netherlands, France, and England. These states suffered from a lack of capital. But it was difficult for them to create their own industry due to foreign competition, because foreign goods were produced cheaper and better. For all these reasons, the industrial policy of these countries took on a somewhat different character than that of England and the Netherlands. First of all, we find here a large number of state-owned enterprises. Mining factories, foundries and smelters, porcelain factories and many others are established by the treasury. Sometimes the treasury tries to transfer them to private individuals, in other cases, on the contrary, enterprises founded by the latter, stopped and ready to close, pass into the hands of the state, which tries to somehow save them. On the other hand, private enterprises cannot arise without loans and benefits from the treasury. And in the future, they each time turn to the treasury for help, because they are not able to continue the business with their own funds. Hence the continuous and large allocations from the treasury for the development of industry. For that relatively small production, which by the beginning of the 17th century. existed and which mainly relied on the handicraft labor of the villagers, there was enough capital. But with the expansion of production for the needs of the army and with the emergence of new industries transferred from other countries, this capital was already too little, and the help of the treasury was needed. At the same time, it was necessary to take various kinds of coercive measures, forcing local traders to purchase products from new enterprises, forcing entrepreneurs to continue production, even if it was unprofitable, etc.

As we see, in these countries the new industry was partly of an artificial nature. It was not always caused by existing needs; the production of luxury goods often exceeded the demand for them, and the capital necessary for this was not available, just as there were often no working hands. Coercive measures practiced against entrepreneurs, traders, consumers, and workers best confirm this position. And accordingly, the results were not always brilliant. While English and Dutch industry developed very successfully, many enterprises created in France by Colbert did not move, others began to close after his death, as soon as their increased support ceased. Of the industries created by Frederick the Great, many developed only temporarily, and later almost completely disappeared: so the entire silk industry, which he brought to life with such difficulty and with such large sacrifices for the treasury, began to cease to exist by the end of his reign. In Silesia, he brought into life many different enterprises: merchants and nobles, monasteries and Jews - everyone was forced to establish enterprises. And in the periodic data reported to the king about the number of establishments and workers employed in them, the figures were constantly growing. But in fact, they noted only an increase, but not a decrease, and did not indicate a large number of enterprises that closed very quickly.

And yet no one will argue that all this industrial policy was fruitless. If many things failed, various measures turned out to be ineffective, the state often artificially created new branches of production, yet certain successes were achieved, and along with the numerous enterprises that died, there were also those that developed successfully, or in the place of some that closed, others arose. In any case, a beginning had been made and everything was prepared for the factory industry of the 19th century, for the era of machines and engines.

From this point of view we must consider the activities of Peter the Great. There is no doubt that we had commercial capital before Peter and a handicraft industry in the 17th century. was built on him and could not exist without him. Foreigners visiting Russia were amazed by the commercial enterprise of the Russians, their love of trade; all of them, down to the most important ones, led by the “first merchant king,” are engaged in trade. “Everyone here, from the highest to the lowest, is only thinking about how to make money here or there on something.” Foreigners were amazed at the abundance of Moscow shops and rows with all kinds of goods, which made Moscow superior to the largest shopping centers. Moreover, contemporary Pyotr Pososhkov, as M.N. points out. Pokrovsky, “the point is already being outlined where commercial capitalism turns into industrial capitalism”; “Without merchants,” we read from Pososhkov, “not only great, but also small kingdoms cannot stand; The merchants and the army are comrades: the army fights, and the merchants help.” Only, adds M.N. Pokrovsky, Pososhkov’s parallel could be reversed: “in Peter’s policy, the role of the soul fell on the share of the merchants, and the army was the body, the material force that “prepared the needs of merchant capital.”

But, of course, the mere fact of the existence of trading capital in the Moscow state “is not enough to recognize Peter’s factory as a product of this particular capital. It is necessary to first establish what exact reasons prompted the representatives of merchant capital to move to the organization of large-scale industry, whether these reasons lay in the conditions of the economic process itself,” and then it is necessary to find out whether “the forces of merchant capital were sufficient for the task of creating large-scale production.” It is impossible to give an affirmative answer to these questions not only for Russia, but, as we have seen, for many Western European states. By itself, commercial capital was too weak and too inert to create a new industry - the matter could not do without the help of the state and without its encouragement.

Our industrial activity has previously developed under the influence of the needs of the treasury. For government needs, artisans were called, as we saw in the 17th century, from provincial cities to Moscow. In Tula in 1625 there were 33 forges, of which 17 were state-owned. From 1628 to 1677, the number of state-owned artisans in Tula tripled. Those foreign masters whom we talked about in the previous chapter were called to the sovereign's service, and this, as we saw, was not just a phrase. Either they cast cannons, produced gunpowder, found ore, made saltpeter for the army, or they worked for palace needs, as gold and silversmiths, manufacturers of glass vessels, silk materials, and paper. In most cases, the enterprises they started were state-owned, established at the expense of the sovereign and the master, and received a salary from him, and only in a few cases do we find private establishments (Marselis and Akema ironworks, Coet glass). True, we also mentioned such foreigners, about whom it is said “he feeds from the city, from the foreigner with his work,” in particular, “he sews clothes for foreigners,” but these were, apparently, small artisans who worked in the new foreign (New German ) settlement on the “service Germans” living there, i.e. military people (among the 204 homeowners of the settlement we find 142 officers in 1665) and other foreigners. These artisans must be distinguished from those foreigners who were supposed to establish new industries in the country or expand existing ones.

Peter initially followed the same proven path - he created state-owned enterprises, again keeping in mind the needs of the treasury, which intensified along with the reform of the army, which received the appearance and structure of a European regular army. If we add to this that Peter was the first to create a fleet in Russia, then it becomes clear that the industry that existed at that time could not meet the needs of the state.

Hence the numerous decrees on the establishment of the Petrozavodsk, Sestroretsk and Okhten metallurgical and weapons factories, on the establishment of a saltpeter plant in Kazan, later in the Kyiv province, in Great Russian and Little Russian cities, on the creation of linen enterprises and calling craftsmen from abroad for this purpose.

However, very soon he changes his policy in the sense that he is trying to achieve the same goal - the development of industry for government needs - with the help of private entrepreneurs. Therefore, state-owned enterprises are transferred to private individuals. The realization that it is impossible for the treasury to run industrial enterprises appears much earlier. In 1633, foreigners were called in and entrusted with the production, because the state-owned one failed - “they taught in our state in Moscow to make drawn and drawn gold and silver and gimp... and copper work and that work learned to be expensive and profits for our royal majesty in this there wasn't enough to do." However, these were only isolated cases. As a general rule, everything was done at the expense of the state, and, apparently, before Peter it was impossible to do otherwise. Only now - although with great difficulty - hunters and private industrialists were found. Thus, in 1711, it was ordered that “the linen factories and the purchased yards in the new German settlement, which were in charge of the embassy order, with the foreign masters called to that business according to their contracts, and the Russian people who had learned that business, should be given to the merchant people who trade in Moscow: Andrey Turka, Stepan Tsynbalytsikov and others.” The following year, it was ordered that cloth factories be given to private individuals, so that in five years the treasury could be content with Russian-made cloth: “The cloth factory should not be multiplied in one place, but so that in five years you will not have to buy an overseas uniform... but having started it, give trading people, gathering a company.”

The regulations of the Manufacture College of 1723 already established a general instruction concerning industry: “State-owned factories, already established, and those that will be established, should be transferred to private individuals.” Accordingly, the Kazan cloth factory, founded in 1714, ten years later was transferred to the Kazan resident of the living room, Miklyaev, and his companions. At this time, there were 40 mills, 587 craftsmen and workers in this enterprise, and there were still 673 halves of cloth worth 9,287 rubles. In 1729, the St. Petersburg residents Maslov, Solodovnikov and the “foreign papermaker” themselves asked to transfer the state-owned paper mill to them.

In these cases, companies are formed from individuals called the “owners” of the enterprise. The prevailing view was that trading companies or societies should be “established, so that the common wealth would have a stronger effect on privileges. And such companies must, it seems, be made up of all kinds of people, i.e. from townspeople, merchants and nobles, since they produce it in many states with great benefit.”

Not only in the manufacturing industry, but also in mining, the government began to transfer factories into the hands of private entrepreneurs “to prevent unnecessary losses in the maintenance of state-owned factories.” And here companies of owners appear, receiving state-owned enterprises “for their own business” under certain conditions.

Along with this kind of enterprises, which, after “bringing them into good condition,” were given over to the maintenance of “particular people,” private ones also appeared, directly established by individuals, but with all kinds of incentives from the government, for this business “at first, not without great labor, and above all, it cannot be done without loss.” “Since we are diligently trying to spread in our states and benefit the common good and the belongings of our subjects, merchants and all kinds of artists and handicrafts, with which all other well-established states prosper and grow rich,” then Shafirov and Tolstoy were ordered (in 1717) “to work apply in order to establish in our state a factory or art of all kinds of fabrics and brocades,” and since it is “impossible to start it and bring it into good condition without any dependencies and a long time,” then the mentioned persons are given all kinds of benefits, such as: freedom from all taxes, the right to duty-free sale of their products for 50 years, in those cities where they “deem to open those factories, for the first time ready-made courtyards without money,” and especially the exclusive right to organize such enterprises in Russia.

Homogeneous advantages are also given to a number of other entrepreneurs, such as, for example, in 1718 the merchant Pavel Vestov had the right to the exclusive establishment of sugar factories in Moscow for 10 years, in 1719 the stolnik Afanasy Savelov and the merchant sons Tomilin were given privileges to establish turpentine, rosin and harpius factories factories, according to which they are granted the exclusive right to trade in the said items in Russia and the right to sell the remainder duty-free abroad. The company for the production of drawing and flattening gold and silver was even allowed to “select without money both the silver and the tools of the one who will produce this skill in addition to their company.”

As we see, Peter is not limited to creating industry for the needs of the army, but is also trying to establish the production of various types of luxury goods consumed at court and by high circles in order to save Russia from the need to import these products from abroad and preserve hard cash in the country. He patronizes the production of silk, velvet and brocade - we mentioned Shafirov's silk enterprise, encourages the production of sugar - we cited the privilege of the sugar factory Vestov. He creates glass, stationery, and tobacco factories. Under Peter, several glass factories were established, including the still existing Imperial Glass Factory in St. Petersburg.

Having visited Shewhart's paper factory in Dresden in 1712, Peter then hired several craftsmen and sent them to Moscow to set up a paper mill. The German Playfair set up such an enterprise in Moscow that same year. At the same time, among the young people sent abroad for training was a certain Korotky, who was ordered to study paper production in Holland. Upon his return, he was ordered to build a paper mill in Moscow on a Dutch model, and students were given to teach papermaking. When the capital was transferred to St. Petersburg, Peter set up a paper mill here (Dudorovskaya), and in 1718 the prices of paper sold by the Admiralty from this mill were established - “and publish decrees about this with the beating of drums and display sheets in decent places in order to His Royal Majesty’s decree was in charge of the purchase of that paper.” Soon they began building another paper mill, but there was a shortage of raw materials. Therefore, in 1720, it was prescribed that people of all ranks who had worn out linens, “bring such rags and declare them in the office of the police chief, for which, by definition, they will be paid money from E.V.’s office”...

Under Peter, people were no longer threatened with a whip and tearing of the nostrils for the consumption of tobacco, but they tried to use tobacco for fiscal purposes. In 1716, Peter wrote to a certain Solovyov in Amsterdam: “We have plenty of tobacco in the Cherkassy cities, but they don’t know how to build for such a manira as they are transported from Holland for consumption for sale in the Ostsee, and for this purpose we can hire a place in Holland for our service for three years as an apprentice or a good worker... and make sure that he is a sober, hardworking and not an old person, namely, no more than forty years old, and having hired such a person, come here.” The addition is also typical: “Do this secretly as much as possible, so that those who trade in this and receive wealth do not find out, for if they find out, they will recapture the hirers.” The emigration of craftsmen was prohibited everywhere. The master was discharged, and the tobacco enterprise was established the same year; in 1717 Menshikov reported that “the tobacco master made a fair trial of our tobacco.”

As we see, all these were industries planted with the help of foreigners in all Western countries and were part of the iron inventory of mercantilism. We tried to create many of them already under Alexei Mikhailovich, but then the success was only short-term. However, all the benefits and advantages that Peter endowed industrialists with for this purpose were not enough. Quite often the most important thing was missing - capital to establish an enterprise and run it. The treasury supplied entrepreneurs with this capital to a large extent; from her they often received free of charge not only buildings, but also materials and tools, and also received sums of money. So, for example, Shchegolin and his comrades in 1720 received the buildings and tools of a cloth mill along with artisans and, in addition, money of 30 thousand rubles. in an interest-free loan, the same amount of 30 thousand was also given to Dokuchaev for the establishment of a cloth enterprise in the same 1720, in 1744 Dokuchaev received another 30 thousand. Amounts of 5 thousand were given in the 20s to the tanner Ritter, a cloth maker Voronin, Isaev, Pavlov for a tannery, Ivan Tames, 3 thousand - to Volkov for setting up a Kolomyanka enterprise, Korotkov - for a paper workshop.

As for the amounts invested by the entrepreneurs themselves, they are not large. Thus, the capital contributed to the manufactory established by Count Apraksin was about 90 thousand, but of this Apraksin himself contributed 10 thousand and then another 10 thousand, the rest of the amount was contributed by Shafirov, Tolstoy and various invited merchants. But they also received a loan from the treasury in the amount of 451/2 thousand rubles. In Menshikov’s company, the capital was only 211/2 thousand, and he himself owned only 10 thousand, three participants invested 3 thousand, one 2 thousand and one 400 rubles. - the amounts are small. In the enterprise founded by Tames, Miklyaev alone placed 12 thousand, six participants, including Tames, from 41/2 to 3 thousand each, one 2100 rubles, one 1600 rubles, four 1300 each, one 1050 and two 650 and 250 rub.

Based on this, Lanpo-Danilevsky comes to the conclusion that “most of the shares invested in enterprises by company owners were not large in size, although they were converted into rubles of contemporary value. However, he adds, even such capitalists were relatively few in number, and even they felt the need for government subsidies.” In the regulations of the Manufacture College, such monetary assistance is established as a general rule - if necessary, the college can, with the knowledge of the Senate, lend money to all manufacturers for a certain period of time without interest.

Complaints about a lack of capital and shutdowns of enterprises due to lack of working capital perhaps most clearly express the fact that the capital necessary to create industry was not enough. However, since, as we have seen, in Austria, Prussia, and to a large extent in France, entrepreneurs could not do without financial assistance from the treasury, it is hardly surprising that such difficulties arose in our country.

The silk enterprise of Count Apraksin declared, for example, in 1720 that he did not have the capital required for production, and there was no silk, and the company explained the latter circumstance by the lack of “art in the merchant class.” In particular, this kind of phenomenon was discovered when the Manufactory Collegium instructed assessor Mezheninov to inspect the factories. It turned out that some of them ceased their activities “for lack of capital.” This was the case with the enterprises: sailing enterprises of Simonov, linen enterprises of Kuznetsov, Vorokhbin in Korokhov, Greek Artin in Nezhin. The paper enterprises of the Maslenikovs and Titichkin and the cloth enterprise of Golikov and his comrades suffered the same fate. In the latter, “cloth and carcass are not made because two of the owners of that factory have died, and two, due to the scarcity of money for that factory, do not give money to that factory, and they alone have nothing to support that factory.”

Along with the lack of capital, an obstacle to the development of industry in our country, as in Prussia and Austria, was a lack of market. Despite the fact that the import of some goods was prohibited (for example, various types of woolen fabrics), and others were subject (according to the tariff of 1724) with a high duty of 50-75% (for example, silk fabrics, linen and many products made from it), nevertheless, foreign goods were preferred to Russian goods due to their higher quality and lower price. In 1727, merchants complained about this low quality of Russian products, which “are no good compared to overseas products and are very inferior.” This applied to needles, stockings, cloth, linen, and silk materials. All of them are “the lowest”, “lower than overseas”, velvets “will not work against overseas, but are sold at a price higher from factories than overseas”. In the same way, “vitriol, black turpentine, strong vodka, white mourners, paint, cormorant, vohra” are not suitable and “overseas prices are twice as expensive.”

From the decree of 1740 we learn that “uniform cloth, which is made in Russian factories and used for shelves, is very thin and fragile to wear,” and in 1741 the commission was ordered “about the bad cloth made in Russian factories until now, which is why is happening, thoroughly investigate and fine the wine manufacturers without fail.”

As a result, in Voronin’s penal enterprise in 1726, “the stanzas were reduced by 10, and this was done so that the penitentiary had been made and had a large number, but they were not accepted anywhere,” in the Moscow hosiery enterprise, “people were called up, and none of those stockings were I didn’t buy it and the sale of those stockings from the military chancellery was published and sheets were displayed, and no one came to those public to buy those stockings”, which is why the enterprise “remained inactive and stood until 1722.” The truchman-powdered factory was in the same situation, from which in 1722 “103 poods were sent to Stockholm for sale, but nothing was used for sale there and was brought back and the truchman was ordered to be sold at home, but only nothing was on sale.” And in other cases we find significant inventory unsold. For example, in Evreinov’s silk enterprise, 40 thousand worth of brocade was produced in six years, of which only half, 18 thousand, was sold; in Gusyatnikov's hat factory and Chirkin's wax factory, almost all of the goods produced remained unsold.

Finally, great difficulties arose in supplying industry with the labor force it needed, “especially at the beginning of the 18th century, when craftsmen had to be sent from abroad, and workers had to be found, not without difficulty, among the free people, who were still little inclined to a settled way of life and were not accustomed to hard and constant work." When setting up the silk enterprise of Count Apraksin in 1717, a “pattern designer” (draftsman) de Bournoville was hired in France, who in turn was tasked with hiring foreign craftsmen and purchasing materials abroad, and since he “made many promises to company owners” regarding establishing “the manufactory and soon bringing it into good condition,” then “the company people... hoping to get benefit from him,” handed him “a directorate over all the artisans.” In fact, Bournoville hired abroad “artisans of little skill and, moreover, recruited all sorts of indecent men and women for this work... besides, they transported their idle junk on hired and postal carts,” which he, as well as the purchase of raw materials, “at a great price”, “caused losses to the company.” And then “instead of fruit and action in Moscow at the former manufactories, Bournoville, near the city, walked around the city in a train and only outraged the artisans” and - worst of all - did not teach the Russians his skills “he ordered the French to teach Russian students”). As a result, the enterprise stood still for a long time, and then they began to make metatarians “self-taught.” Since it turned out that “if he’s in that business, then it’s impossible to expect anything good,” the company “saw his lewdness... ordered, having given him a salary in Moscow, which was due, although he didn’t deserve it, to let him go here , and here they gave him a passport for travel to his fatherland.”

This is how the matter with the foreigner ended sadly, while their own subjects were a people “wild, unlearned and completely incomprehensible to the manufacturing business,” as entrepreneurs declared in 1727; Often the enterprises had fugitive workers and there were “idle camps due to the lack of working people who come to that factory with passports after the summer business season” - so work was impossible in the summer.

As a result, Peter had to resort to the same measures as in the West - supplying enterprises with forced labor. As in the West, workers were recruited from runaways, vagabonds, beggars, and criminals. In 1717, Tomilin’s needle company was ordered to hire “from the poor and minors who walk the streets and beg,” Milyutin’s enterprise recruited “wretched people,” and from the decree of 1736 it is clear that due to the lack of workers, “soldiers” were hired children." By decree of 1719 it was ordered “to increase the linen factory of fine linens (Andrei Turki and his comrades) to send to them for yarn flax women and girls who will be in Moscow from Prikaz, also from other provinces on business for their guilt... And for the guard to those women, so that they don’t run away, give them a company of retired soldiers, as many people as you like.” Two years later, this measure was made general: women who were found guilty of certain crimes and misdemeanors were left at the discretion of the Berg and Manufactory Collegium, which were supposed to send them to company factories for several years or even for life.

But since these unfree elements were not enough, it was necessary to use the labor of fugitive peasants, and Peter in 1722 forbade returning them to their rightful owners, “whoever they were... since the interests of the factories announce that then their factories will be shut down.” And a year earlier, in 1721, a well-known decree followed, which was of great importance, for it granted “an important right, on an equal basis with the nobles, to both the gentry and the merchant people to buy village factories without restrictions, with the permission of the berg and the manufacturing board, only under such conditions, so that those villages would always be inseparable from those factories.” And to this is added: “In order for both the nobility and the merchants of those villages, especially without factories, not to sell or mortgage to anyone and not to attach any inventions to anyone... And if anyone starts factories just for the sake of small ones, so that those who have buy villages and such fictitious people should not be allowed to make that purchase at all and... be fined by confiscation of all movable and immovable property.” Peter, apparently, himself was aware of the consequences such a measure could lead to; he is afraid that merchants will buy and sell peasants without factories or set up small factories just for show, in order to have a reason to buy peasants. And yet, circumstances force him to decide to create this special type of serfdom.

From this, however, it does not at all follow that “the relations of labor to capital in our large-scale production took completely different forms than in the West” and “instead of the capitalist industry developing at that time in the West, we had large-scale production based in forced labor." As we have already mentioned, forced labor of vagabonds and beggars, criminals and orphans was widely used in Western Europe, and there, for example, in Austria, the use of the labor of serfs is found. And if we do not find purchases of villages for manufactories there, then there were still workers attached to them who could not leave the enterprise, sometimes even being sold along with it. The difference is only in degree, but by no means fundamental.

And to this we must add that Peter also applied coercive measures in relation to industrialists - and for them, the establishment of enterprises and their management was the same state duty as for workers and peasants working for them. Both of them, as under the first Romanovs, did “the sovereign’s business.” Hence the requirement “having started a cloth factory for merchants, gathering a company; if they do not want to, even if they are in captivity,” as we read in the decree of 1712. And a year earlier, when transferring the linen factories to Andrei Turke and his company: “And if they multiply this factory with their zeal and make a profit in it, and for that they will His great sovereign will receive mercy; but if they do not increase and through negligence they diminish, and for that they and those who will be with them as comrades will be fined 1000 rubles. per person." Russian people were “forced to build companies” and were strictly monitored for their “decent maintenance.” Thus, in 1718, “director Ivan Tames was ordered to produce linen manufactory in Moscow in a company kosht, in which company workers were appointed, some at their request, and others by personal decree.”

And in this regard, Peter was not the only one: half a century later, Frederick the Great threatened industrialists with military billeting and other drastic measures if they reduced production and released workers or refused to give work to the people sent to them by order of the king, and through such coercion he achieved his goal. All this was part of the educational system of mercantilism. “Our people,” Peter motivates his policy, “are like children, for the sake of ignorance, who will never learn the alphabet, when they are not forced by the master, who at first seem annoyed, but when they learn, they then thank you.” And he finds that “obviously, of all the current affairs, not everything was done involuntarily and thanksgiving is already heard for much, from which the fruit has already come.” In the regulations of the Manufactory College of the latter, it is prescribed that for persons who wish to “start manufactories and factories, first look at their belongings and dignity and then not only make a quick decision, but also all sorts of ways to show how best to deal with that manufactory and for the good.” and bring a non-loss state.” And in the following year, 1724, regarding the establishment of a company for trading with Spain, we read: “Everyone knows that our people will not do anything if they are not forced, for this reason the Commerce Board for this news should have a directorate over this and management to be like a mother over a child in everything until it comes to perfection.”

While reforming the Russian economy, Peter I made a lot of efforts to develop Russian industry. As in other areas of life, Peter saw this work as a state duty, and therefore considered himself entitled to impose it on the population and demand its implementation. To stimulate industrial production, interest-free loans are issued, installment payments are provided, duty-free or at a reduced tariff import of necessary materials from abroad is allowed. High duties are imposed on imported goods to eliminate competition. Peter I was especially concerned about the development of the mining industry in Russia and the establishment of a large factory industry, and in this area he achieved the greatest success. On the shore of Lake Onega, an iron foundry and ironworks were built, which became the foundation of the city of Petrozavodsk. But mining developed especially widely and successfully in the Urals, rich in ore deposits. In the 18th century the government could already arm the army and navy with weapons from Russian

material and Russian manufacture, and iron and copper were even exported abroad.

19. The era of palace coups in the 18th century: causes, content, consequences for Russia.

The culprit of the instability of the supreme power in the 18th century in Russia was precisely Peter I, who in 1722 issued the “Charter on the Succession to the Throne.” This legal act secured the right of the autocrat to appoint any successor at his discretion. After the death of the emperor, diplomat and associate of Peter I Andrei Ivanovich Osterman entered into an alliance with the most influential person of the Peter I era - A. D. Menshikov with the aim of enthroning Empress Catherine. Although, there were other contenders, in particular, the son of Tsarevich Alexei - Peter (the future Peter II). As a result of the coup organized by Menshikov with the support of the guard, it was Catherine I who came to power.

After the death of Catherine I in 1727, the question of power arose again. This time it was Alexei’s son, Peter II, who was declared emperor. A month and a half after Catherine’s death, the “Charter on the Succession to the Throne” was withdrawn by Decree of the Supreme Privy Council.

After the death of Peter II, the question of succession to the throne arose again. The Golitsyn family, rivaling the Dolgorukys, nominated Anna Ioannovna of Courland, the niece of Peter I, as heir. Anna Ioannovna received the crown at the cost of signing the Conditions limiting her power in favor of the Supreme Privy Council. In Russia, instead of an absolute monarchy, a limited monarchy was established. On November 25, 1741, another palace coup took place, and it was initiated by Elizaveta Petrovna, the youngest daughter of Peter I

The coup of June 28, 1762 in Russian and Soviet historical literature has always been interpreted unambiguously - smart, decisive, patriotic Catherine overthrows her insignificant husband, a traitor to Russian interests, Peter III.

20. The policy of “enlightened absolutism” of Catherine II: content, features, contradictions

So, enlightened absolutism is the policy of European monarchs and Catherine II, based on attempts to implement the theoretical ideas of Western enlighteners. The basis of the rule of monarchs was concern for the welfare of their subjects in accordance with the laws emanating from the monarch.

The aggravation of class antagonism between the peasant masses and the nobility pushed Catherine II to choose the path of enlightened absolutism, which she pursued taking into account the preservation of serfdom, autocracy and the privileged position of the nobility.

In the first 5 years of her reign, Catherine II made several trips around Russia. This allowed her to find out how her subjects lived. The country was changing before our eyes - by the mid-1780s. The generation of Catherine’s era has already grown up, for which the concept of “society” or “the good of humanity” was not at all an empty phrase. Over the course of several years, a network of educational institutions was created in Russia, among which stood out 25 public schools, which were later turned into gymnasiums. For their opening in the capital, by order of Catherine II, teachers were trained and textbooks were printed. For the first time, a system of classes and lessons was introduced, which still exists today. During the last years of her reign, Catherine was concerned with one problem - how to protect Russia from the harmful, as she believed, influence of the French Revolution. In essence, the entire reign of Catherine II became a reign exclusively for the benefit of the nobility. A foreigner who came to St. Petersburg and lived there for five months realized that the words about the people's welfare, written and spoken so many times by Catherine II, remain only words. This is the main feature of enlightened absolutism in Russia. Usual hypocrisy.