Japanese foreign policy on the eve of the Second World War. Japanese aggression in Northeast China (Manchuria)

Japan, being among the countries that won the First World War, made huge gains at the expense of the losing countries in the Far East and the Pacific. The success, which was achieved without much effort, fueled the expansionist sentiments of the ruling elite and the samurai spirit of the military. Tokyo dreamed of new conquests, of establishing Japanese domination throughout the Far East.

Japan's aggressive aspirations led to the aggravation of Anglo-Japanese contradictions. British imperialism penetrated the Far East at a time when Japan was not yet a serious competitor for it. England owned such important military and economic strongholds in the East as Hong Kong, Singapore, etc. Large English trading and industrial companies operated in China. But by the beginning of the 30s. Japanese imperialists began to expand their influence. Japan had larger forces in the Far East than the British Empire, whose possessions and armed forces were scattered across all continents.

The governments of the USA and England were most satisfied with the reorientation of Japanese aggression from China to the USSR. English conservative circles believe, the Soviet plenipotentiary in England wrote on this issue in 1933, that the Japanese seizure of Manchuria could lead to war between the USSR and Japan, and this, in their opinion, would be “a real blessing of history.” Having taken the path of aggression in 1931, the Japanese captured Northeast China (Manchuria). They formed the puppet state of Manchukuo there. Along with plans to continue aggressive actions in China, the Japanese turned their attention to the Soviet Far East and the Mongolian People's Republic. Japan has repeatedly rejected Soviet proposals to conclude a non-aggression pact.

On July 7, 1937, Japanese militarists opened extensive military operations against China. Japanese aggression created a mortal threat to the Chinese people. At the same time, Japanese conquests in the Far East undermined the positions of the US and British imperialists. China filed another complaint to the League of Nations. Soviet diplomacy energetically demanded that action be taken against Japan. However, this organization, as usual, did not take any countermeasures. By decision of the League of Nations, on November 3, 1937, a conference of powers interested in Far Eastern affairs opened in Brussels. Representatives of the USSR, USA, England, China, France and a number of other states took part in it. The Soviet delegation proposed collective measures to prevent the use of force in international relations. The Anglo-Americans rejected this path, suggested by life itself. As a result, the conference was limited to the adoption of a declaration appealing to the prudence of Japan. But American and British diplomats in Brussels persistently convinced the Soviet delegation that the USSR must act alone against Japan. Many years later, US Secretary of State C. Hell admitted in his memoirs that these proposals were based on the desire to obtain the same opportunity that Theodore Roosevelt had in 1904 to “put an end to the Russo-Japanese War.” There is hardly any need to moralize about this: the governments of the USA and Great Britain religiously followed the policy of “balance of power”.

On August 21, 1937, a non-aggression pact was concluded between the USSR and China. In 1938 - 1939 The USSR provided China with three loans totaling $250 million. There was a continuous flow of weapons, military materials, and fuel from the Soviet Union through Northwest China. Columns of tanks moved under their own power and planes were ferryed. Soviet pilots not only defended the skies over Chinese cities, but also struck deep behind enemy lines. As a result of bomb attacks by Soviet volunteer aviation, the Japanese command was forced to move the bases of its bomber aircraft 500 - 600 km from the front line, while previously they were at a distance of 50 km. Soviet pilots bombed Japanese warships on the Yangtze and destroyed Taipei on the island of Taiwan. At the beginning of 1941, when China was in especially dire need of aviation, bombers and fighters arrived from the USSR and took part in the battles until the start of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union.

Although the Japanese conquests infringed on their imperialist interests in China, Washington and London believed that through the hands of Japanese militarists it was possible to achieve the cherished goals of international reaction - to strangle the national liberation movement of the Chinese people, as well as to cause a war between Japan and the USSR. Due to the poverty of the country's natural resources, Japan's military-industrial potential was extremely limited. Japan's factories producing weapons and war materials were critically dependent on imported raw materials, which were supplied from the USA and England. In 1937, Japan received 54% of the necessary military materials from the United States, in 1938 - 58%, another 17% came from Great Britain. 50% of Japanese military transport to China was carried by foreign freight, mainly English. Even the Chiang Kai-shek ambassador to the United States in 1940 was forced to publicly admit that 54 out of every 100 Chinese civilian deaths were killed by American weapons!

Japanese aggression in the Far East was being prepared along all lines: political, economic, ideological. In the late 20s and early 30s, there were no major disagreements in the ruling circles of Japan regarding the stages of implementation of the extensive aggressive program. It was assumed that at the first stage Northeast China would be captured relatively easily. The following stages included military campaigns from this bridgehead against the Mongolian People's Republic, the USSR and all of China.

The alliance of monopolies with the military was strengthened and the influence of military-fascist circles was significantly strengthened, the army and navy were being rearmed, and their numbers were increasing. Since the late 1920s, militaristic circles in Japan, together with the leading monopolies, have been developing a plan for new large government subsidies for the military industry, and especially for those sectors that should be used first in the event of war. In 1929 - 1930 the government took active measures to expand investment in the military industry and raise its technical level. By 1930, 100 thousand people were employed at the arsenal factories subordinate to the military department.

Military production became the main one for many monopolies. More than 2 thousand factories and plants carried out orders from the military and naval ministries. The Yavat steel mills supplied 62.3 percent of steel and rolled products for war production. In September 1931, Mitsubishi aircraft factories began serial production of heavy bombers for the first time. The aluminum industry, created in the early 30s and which served as the basis for Japanese aircraft manufacturing, produced 19 thousand tons of aluminum ingots in 1933 (281).

By the beginning of the 1930s, a state apparatus was created in Japan to mobilize the military industry and supply military materials in conditions of air raids, the actions of which were tested at the end of 1930 in exercises in the cities of Kyoto, Osaka and Kobe. The budgets of the army and navy grew, and military spending in general increased.

Table 6. Budget expenditures of Japan in 1931 - 1934 (282)

In Japan, there was no transfer of state power to the fascist party and the creation of a dictatorship replacing the previous state apparatus, but gradually and systematically the dominant role was assigned to the most reactionary and aggressive elements. By 1933, there were several hundred reactionary organizations in Japan, of which more than 80 were large (283).

In the early 30s, the ruling classes concentrated their political forces to create a “government of a strong hand,” that is, to strengthen the existing apparatus of the monarchy, its fascisation, and the concentration of power in the hands of the most reactionary representatives of the military.

To further strengthen their position in the state apparatus, the military took advantage of the social disappointment and unrest of broad sections of the petty bourgeoisie, and their loss of confidence in parliamentary parties. The ferment intensified due to the global economic crisis, which extremely aggravated class contradictions within the country. Among the petty and middle bourgeoisie, the opinion grew that the military was the only force capable of leading Japan out of the crisis. The military clique, especially the chauvinistically minded “young officers,” actively opposed the government’s “negative” foreign policy, advocating war with China, and later the Soviet Union.

To achieve these goals, the military used its influence on former military personnel. Under her direct leadership was the “Imperial Union of Reservists”, as well as some paramilitary sports societies, numbering over 7 million people.

The most prominent representatives of Japanese militarism hatched plans to establish a fascist regime in Japan, for which they maintained close ties with financial magnates, the “Society of State Fundamentals,” which united up to 200 pro-fascist figures from the ruling circles of Japan.

The fascist “young officers” in the struggle for power took the path of conspiracies, murders and putschs. One of its leaders, General Araki, demanding radical changes in Japanese state policy, made it clear that the military was ready to become the ideological inspirer of the movement for an aggressive course, to direct it towards the implementation of the plans of Japanese imperialism.

Printed materials glorifying war, conquest, murder, and death were widely distributed throughout the country. The fascist scribblers hammered into the head of every Japanese that a man is only “meat of the great herd of war,” and a woman is a submissive slave, the prey of a warrior. Singing the Pathos of an easy death, they called on the Japanese to die for the emperor without hesitation.

These ideas were especially diligently propagated among military personnel, who had long been prepared for campaigns of conquest in neighboring countries.

In the 20s and early 30s, the army was reorganized and equipped with the latest models of small arms and artillery weapons.

According to the Japanese ruling circles, in 1931 a favorable domestic and international situation was created for the implementation of aggressive plans. The deep and prolonged economic crisis that has engulfed the capitalist world has also hit Japan hard. The industrial crisis coincided with the agricultural crisis. Industrial production in the country fell sharply, the army of unemployed and semi-unemployed people reached almost 3 million people. Workers' wages dropped significantly. In 1931, foreign trade compared to 1929 decreased by 47 percent in exports and by 55 percent in imports (284). Prices for certain important industrial goods and basic agricultural products - rice and raw silk - fell by more than half.

The American market has become difficult to access for Japanese goods. The price of silk fell to one-quarter of its previous level, reducing the value of Japanese exports to the United States by more than 40 percent. In June 1930, the United States raised customs duties on Japanese goods by an average of 23 percent.

Economic turmoil has increased discontent among Japan's workers. The number of strikes in the city and conflicts between peasants and landowners in the countryside increased. In government and military circles, the country saw a way out of the current situation in conquering new markets, sources of raw materials and areas of capital investment. Right-wing elements intensified their activities. An alliance of military “critics” of foreign policy and fascist organizations emerged, using the discontent of the masses for their own political purposes. The militarists needed mass support, and the fascists needed justification for their demagogic slogans, which could be achieved with the help of a military clique that advocated “national renewal.” External expansion was widely advertised as a means of solving internal contradictions.

The aggressors chose Northeast China as their first target for attack. It accounted for 93 percent of oil production, 79 percent of iron smelting, 55 percent of gold production, 41 percent of railroad lines, 37 percent of iron ore reserves, 23 percent of electricity generation, and 37 percent of China's foreign trade turnover (285). The imperialists in Tokyo definitely counted on world imperialism’s “understanding” of the seizure of Northeast China, thanks to which Japan found itself in direct border contact with the USSR.

Widespread anti-Soviet propaganda unfolded in Japan under the slogan of protecting Manchuria “from the Bolshevik threat.” In July 1931, the press published a speech by General Koiso at a meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers, in which he stated that “the implementation of the five-year plan (in the USSR. - Ed.) poses a serious threat to Japan... In view of this, the Mongol-Manchu problem requires a quick and effective solution.”

Such speeches had a dual purpose: to prepare the country's public opinion and to assure the Western powers that the spearhead of aggression was directed against the USSR.

At the same time, Japanese diplomacy, trying to ensure surprise of the attack, entered into negotiations with the Kuomintang government to resolve differences. Negotiations began in London on dividing China into spheres of influence. There was an impression of improvement in US-Japanese relations. Two days before the Japanese arrived in Manchuria, Japanese Ambassador Debuzi paid a visit to US Secretary of State Stimson in connection with his upcoming vacation. The interlocutors found that the moment chosen for the ambassador’s rest was very successful, since in the near future nothing could affect the friendly relations established between their countries.

In connection with preparations for war in the first half of 1931, Japanese General Harada visited Europe to study the situation. On the way back, he stopped in Moscow, where he met with Ambassador Hirota and military attaché Kasahara. The ambassador asked Harada to tell the chief of the general staff that Japan “carried out a decisive policy against Soviet Russia and was ready at any moment to start a war with the aim of capturing Eastern Siberia” (286). On March 29, 1931, Kasahara wrote to the General Staff that Japan should advance at least to Lake Baikal, consider the Far Eastern provinces that Yuna would capture as part of its own empire, and establish military settlements there for many years to come.

In March, Colonel Suzuki was sent to Northeast China and Korea to study the possibility of using this area as a springboard for an attack on the Soviet Union. “Military operations in Primorye,” Suzuki wrote in a report to the General Staff, “mainly involve the landing of the main forces of the army on the coast east of Vladivostok, and the units operating in North Korea coordinate their operations with the main forces in order to conduct independent actions in isolation from main forces" (287).

The Japanese militarists understood that it was risky to start a war against the USSR only on their own. Therefore, Japanese diplomacy made every effort to create an aggressive anti-Soviet bloc of capitalist states. Military attaches accredited in Berlin, Warsaw, Ankara, London, Paris, and Rome were especially active in this regard.

Preparations for aggression were accompanied by increased repression against fighters for peace and democracy. In 1929, 4,942 people were arrested, in 1930 - 6,124, in 1931 - 10,422, in 1932 - 13,938 people (288). In the fall of 1932, the police arrested all members of the Communist Party conference and carried out mass arrests of communists in the country.

But the Japanese Communist Party continued to live and fight. It explained to the working people the meaning and nature of Japanese capital's transition to the offensive, revealed the reasons for the explosion of national chauvinism, and called for international solidarity. Fulfilling their class duty, the Japanese communists warned the people about the impending aggression.

Japanese industry was quickly transferred to a war footing, new branches of military production were developed, and mass production of weapons and ammunition was established. Priority was given to aircraft and tank construction. New naval shipyards were built. At the same time, a complex of auxiliary branches of chemistry and metallurgy of non-ferrous, light and rare metals was created.

A detailed plan for the capture of Manchuria was developed at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army in the summer of 1931. They did not look for a pretext for aggression for long - on September 18, 1931, not far from Mukden on the South Manchurian Railway, Japanese agents committed sabotage. The minor damage caused by the explosion served as the “ground” for the occupation of all of Southern Manchuria by Japanese troops. Within three months, Manchuria found itself in the hands of the aggressor. But this was the result not so much of the high combat effectiveness of the samurai army as of the lack of serious resistance from the Chinese troops.

As soon as the Japanese attack began, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed the ruler of Northeast China, Zhang Hsue-liang: “Avoid widening the incident, resolutely avoid resistance” (289). Zhang Xue-liang ordered his troops stationed at Mukden to leave their weapons in the barracks and not to use them or respond to fire in any other way (290). Chiang Kai-shek considered the Communist Party and the Red Army of China to be the main enemy and, in order to deal with them, was ready to collude with Japan. Hence his policy: not to provide armed resistance to the Japanese, not to drag the Chinese people into the anti-Japanese struggle, not to weaken his army, and to try to completely shift the elimination of aggression to the League of Nations.

That is why the Chinese government sent a letter to the Secretary General of the League of Nations. The Chinese representative asked to immediately convene the Council of the League and take measures to preserve peace between nations. In this letter, Chiang Kai-shek's government did not even qualify Japan's attack on China as an act of aggression, although Japan violated the Nine Power Treaty, the Briand-Kellogg Pact (291) and the Charter of the League of Nations.

When discussing the letter from the Chinese government, the participants at the League Council meeting showed that they were unwilling to take any effective measures against Japan. Explaining this, the British representative Lord Cecil stated: “Japan has always been one of the pillars of the League of Nations” (292). He offered to resolve the conflict on the spot.

The Council of the League of Nations decided to send telegrams to the Japanese and Chinese governments with a proposal to refrain from further hostile actions and find an opportunity to withdraw their troops. Thus, the League resorted to a method that was subsequently repeatedly used by the imperialists: the aggressor and his victim received the same warnings. This decision of the League of Nations was not directed against Japan. Secretary General of the League of Nations E. Drummond, in a conversation with the Japanese delegate, noted the “courage” of the Japanese troops, and addressed the Chinese government with a warning that the effectiveness of the actions of the Council of the League of Nations depended on the ability of the Chinese government to restrain the anti-Japanese movement and maintain calm (293).

On the very first day of consideration of the Japanese-Chinese “conflict”, the Council of the League of Nations sent a letter to the US government. “The position of the United States is of decisive importance to the members of the League” (294), Wilson, who at that time served as the American envoy in Geneva, wrote in his memoirs.

The American government, through Secretary of State Stimson, made it clear that the United States would not take part in the investigation of the Mukden incident. Among his advisors, Stimson denounced the League of Nations as "trying to transfer the burden" to the United States and stressed the need to avoid anything that might displease Japan.

Stimson telegraphed to Geneva that the United States would not participate in the discussion of the “Japanese-Chinese dispute” at the League of Nations forum, and instructed Wilson in every possible way to oppose the creation of a mediation commission and to promote “that Japan and China reach an agreement between themselves through direct negotiations” ( 295) Deputy Secretary of State Castle's statement was more definite. He believed that the best way out of this situation “would be to establish complete Japanese control” over Northeast China. Naturally, people in Tokyo were very grateful for such “understanding.” Stimson soon wrote in his diary: “The Japanese are very pleased with the courtesy I showed them in resisting too harsh treatment of them...” (296) The entire capitalist world approved of Stimson’s “tactful” diplomacy. Only the victim of aggression and the Soviet Union protested.

In the second half of October, at a special government meeting, the US President formulated his views on the issue of Japanese military operations in Manchuria, which he then outlined in a lengthy memorandum. “Suppose,” Hoover wrote, “Japan plucks up courage and declares: “We can no longer tolerate these treaties. We must point out that China has failed to ensure the proper order within the country, which is provided for by the treaties. A significant part of China's territory is under the influence of Chinese communists collaborating with Russia. The government of Manchuria is in the hands of a military adventurer who does not recognize the Chinese government, and China is taking no measures to force it to submit. Anarchy reigns in this territory, which is completely unacceptable. The very existence of our people depends on the expansion of the export of our manufactured goods to China and on the guarantee of supplies of raw materials from that country. Today our economy is almost paralyzed due to the unrest in China. Moreover, with Bolshevik Russia in the north and the possibility of Bolshevik China appearing on our flank, our independence would be in jeopardy. Either the countries that signed the Nine Power Pact must unite with us and restore order in China, or we must do it ourselves as an act of self-preservation. If you do not join us, we will consider ourselves free from our obligations, since the situation has now completely changed.”

America, of course, would not accept such a proposal, but it would not be able to raise serious objections to this step of the Japanese" (297).

Thus, the US President essentially viewed Japan's military actions in Manchuria as "restoring order" in China. He was primarily concerned about the national liberation movement of the Chinese people and the influence of the Soviet Union in the Far East. Therefore, the conclusion of the memorandum stated that the United States would not undertake either military or economic sanctions against Japan (298).

Washington believed that Japanese military actions in Manchuria would force Chiang Kai-shek to focus even more on the United States and would lead to a worsening of Japanese-Soviet relations, and perhaps even to a clash between Japan and the USSR. It was important for the American government to direct Japanese expansion north rather than south.

England's position was determined to a large extent by the fact that it had small economic interests in Manchuria. Therefore, London believed that Japanese military operations in the northeastern provinces of China would create a military threat to the Soviet Union and divert Chiang Kai-shek’s attention from areas in which British economic interests were concentrated. In addition, the Nanjing government will be forced to turn to England for help and support. It was also taken into account that Japan could be used, if necessary, to suppress the national liberation movement in China. France's interests were to divert Japan's attention away from Indochina.

To discuss the issue of Japan's invasion of Manchuria, the Council of the League of Nations met again in mid-October 1931.

Stimson cabled the American Consul in Geneva, Gilbert, to leave his seat at the Council table and be present in the Council chamber only as an observer, as he had been before (299). His participation in the work of the Council of the League of Nations came down to the fact that the United States joined in another ineffective sending of reminders to Japan and China about their violation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact. The Japanese were recommended to withdraw troops from the occupied territory by November 16, 1931. In vain did some members of the League persuade Washington to take part in the discussion of the issue. The American capital did not want to counteract Japanese aggression.

On November 16, the Council of the League of Nations once again met in Paris to consider the situation in Manchuria. Stimson spoke by telephone to the American Ambassador to England, Dawes: “We do not want you or anyone else to attend meetings of the League Council, but we want them to come to you and discuss with you, and you with them, the issues that interest you.” USA" (300) .

On the eve of the opening of the League Council session, Simon and the Japanese Ambassador in London Matsudaira came to a consensus on the situation in Northeast China. At the same time, Dawes negotiated with Matsudaira, during which it was agreed that “the League should abandon setting a specific time limit for the evacuation of Japanese troops” and seek to end “hostilities through an armistice.” After this, the American ambassador agreed on this position with the British Foreign Minister Simon. Then Dawes, arriving in Paris, hastened to secure Briand's consent (301). Consequently, the main issues were resolved even before the opening of the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.

At the same time, the reactionary press of England and France launched a broad anti-Soviet campaign. The English newspaper The Times wrote on November 14 that “from a political and economic point of view, Japan’s actions have significant justification.” The next day, Japanese aggression was justified by the Observer. The French newspaper Tan stated on November 21: “Japan, a civilized nation, our faithful ally in war, represents and defends in the East peace of social order and peace against savage anarchy...” On the same day, another French newspaper, Oror, frankly wrote that Japan “is a good gendarme in China,” and “Maten” expressed regret that Japanese actions “are unfolding only in Manchuria.”

There were also direct calls for war against the USSR in the press. “The Soviet state,” wrote the Liberte newspaper, “is vulnerable in Siberia. And if Europe understands its duty to civilization, then the endless steppes of Siberia may soon become a battlefield in which Bolshevism will perish.”

The policy of encouraging the aggressor was especially clearly manifested in the fact that, to the sound of soothing speeches by diplomats at the League of Nations, American businessmen in the fall of 1931 and 1932 provided Japan with military supplies worth $181 million (302), and the French Minister of War allowed arms dealers to secretly send gunpowder to Germany to make ammunition ordered by Japan (303).

The obvious connivance of the USA, England and France encouraged the Japanese imperialists. Their troops launched an offensive to the north. In November they captured Qiqihar and reached the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER). In Japan itself, the anti-Soviet campaign intensified.

On December 10, 1931, the Council of the League of Nations made a decision that completely satisfied the aggressor: to form a commission headed by the Englishman Lord Lytton to investigate the “Manchurian incident.” This meant that the League of Nations finally decided not to counteract Japanese aggression, but to conduct reconnaissance of Japan's further intentions.

The working class of the northeastern provinces of China was the first to oppose the aggressors. On September 19, Mukden workers took an active part in street fighting against Japanese troops. From the first days of the Japanese attack on Manchuria, the Communist Party of China countered the treacherous policy of the Kuomintang reaction with an effective program of active struggle against the aggressor. On September 22, 1931, the CPC Central Committee issued an appeal calling for organizing a mass struggle against the armed invasion of Japan. Chinese patriots, led by the Communist Party, called on the government to start a war to expel the Japanese militarists.

Mass strikes and demonstrations of workers took place in Shanghai, Wuhan, Nanjing, Beiping, and Hong Kong. On September 23, 1931, a rally was held in Nanjing, attended by about 100 thousand people. Those gathered demanded that the government declare war on the Japanese invaders. On September 26 in Shanghai, participants in a mass rally called for the development of an anti-imperialist, anti-Japanese war, and for the unification of all the forces of the Chinese people for this purpose.

The Communist Party began work on organizing anti-Japanese detachments and creating a northeastern people's revolutionary army, and providing assistance to volunteer units. In the occupied territory, partisan detachments arose, consisting of workers of the South Manchurian Railway, miners from Benxi and Fushun, and metallurgists from Mukden and Anynan. Already in November 1931, a two-thousand-strong partisan detachment attacked the Japanese garrison of Fushun. The partisans carried out a number of attacks on the interventionists in the industrial areas of Northeast China.

The movement reached even greater scope in December 1931. More than 50 thousand representatives from various organizations in China arrived in Nanjing. All of them demanded that Chiang Kai-shek's government take military action against Japan. On December 2, demonstrations took place in Nanjing and Fuzhou, and on December 5 in Beiping. On December 6, the Kuomintang government declared martial law in the capital. Despite this, on December 28, a demonstration of 60 thousand students took place in Nanjing, arriving from Shanghai, Peiping, Wuhan, Qingdao and other cities. The demonstrators resisted the police.

Chinese patriots began to widely use the economic form of struggle against the invaders: they boycotted Japanese goods everywhere. Wide sections of the Chinese population took part in the boycott, including part of the national bourgeoisie, which was interested in ousting Japanese goods and replacing them with Chinese ones.

The anti-Japanese protests of the working people of China met with the support and sympathy of the Soviet people, faithful to the principles of class solidarity and proletarian internationalism. The Pravda newspaper wrote on September 25, 1931: “There is only one force capable of putting an end to the imperialists’ violence against the working people of China - this is the victory of the workers’ and peasants’ revolution in China under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. The workers and peasants of China have been waging an armed struggle against the imperialists and the Kuomintang for several years now, not without success. Now that Japanese imperialism is trying to deal with the Chinese people, workers all over the world are rising up to defend the Chinese revolution. The working people of the USSR are following the struggle in China with the greatest attention, their sympathy is on the side of the Chinese people.” The Soviet people understood that the capture of northeast China marked the beginning of Japan's active penetration of the continent, that Japan, carrying out its program of annexations, was creating a hotbed of world war.

The occupation of Manchuria was a violation of the Russian-Japanese Portsmouth Treaty of 1905. The advance of Japanese troops to the north, directly to the borders of the USSR, threatened the security of our country.

Consistently pursuing a peaceful foreign policy, the Soviet government in December 1931 invited Japan to conclude a non-aggression pact. After a year of delays, the Tokyo government announced that the moment was not yet ripe for concluding a non-aggression pact.

The highest military-political leadership of Japan, having taken the path of aggression against China and preparations for war against the USSR, USA and Great Britain, in every possible way increased the power of the armed forces. The number of personnel increased, weapons, the organizational structure of the troops, operational-tactical training were improved, and the ideological indoctrination of military personnel intensified. Japan created bridgeheads in Manchuria and Korea to attack the Soviet Union and naval bases to conduct military operations against the United States of America and England.

In 1930 - 1935 Japan's armed forces increased from 250 thousand to 400 thousand people, including the navy - from 75 thousand to 100 thousand people (304). The Kwantung Army grew especially quickly. Its numbers more than doubled from January to August 1932, and the number of guns, tanks, armored vehicles, and aircraft tripled.

The commander-in-chief of the Japanese armed forces was Emperor Hirehito, to whom were subordinate the ministers of war and navy, the chiefs of the general staffs of the army and navy, and the inspector general of military training (305). As advisory bodies to the emperor, there was a supreme military council, a council of field marshals and admirals, and a council of the emperor's associates (jusin). During the war, it was planned to create an imperial headquarters, consisting of sections of the army and navy and a council of national resources (306).

The ground forces were subordinate to the Minister of War and the Chief of the Army General Staff. Associations, formations and units of the army were included in the internal districts (Northern, Western, Eastern and Central), groups of forces (Kwantung, Korean and Formosan) and expeditionary forces in China.

The highest unit of ground forces was the field army, which included one to four divisions, one or more infantry brigades, armored tanks, artillery and other units. The highest formation was a two-brigade infantry division, which included four infantry, artillery, cavalry regiments, an armored detachment and other units and subunits with a total number of 26 thousand people. The staffing number of officers was designed to accommodate the deployment of each brigade into a division. The army also had other types of infantry divisions, which numbered 9 thousand people (in the metropolis), 14 - 17 thousand (in Northern China), 21 thousand (in the Kwantung Army) (307).

In 1930, the ground forces had 720 tanks, 600 aircraft, 1184 guns, 5450 heavy and light machine guns (308). For 1931 - 1935 The firepower of the ground forces has increased significantly. They received 574 tanks, 1070 aircraft, 1651 guns, more than 10 thousand machine guns (309).

The Japanese Navy, led by the Minister of the Navy and the Chief of the Naval General Staff, included the combined fleet created in May 1933 (1st, 2nd and 3rd fleets and a training detachment) and eight naval bases with " security squadrons" (310). The 1st Fleet (Yokosuka base) had the most powerful battleships, new cruisers, destroyers and submarines. The 2nd Fleet (Sasebo base) contained modern warships - cruisers, destroyers and submarines. The 3rd Fleet, operating in Chinese waters, consisted of ships of outdated types. In 1931 - 1935 The Japanese navy was replenished with 46 new warships, mostly cruisers and destroyers, with a total displacement of 134,536 tons (311). Naval aviation in September 1931 had 472 base and 329 ship-based aircraft (312). In total, the navy in 1935 consisted of 9 battleships, 5 aircraft carriers, 2 air transports, 12 heavy and 22 light cruisers, 7 obsolete cruisers built between 1899 and 1902, 110 destroyers and 63 submarines (313). In 1932 - 1935 The navy received 1,980 new base and ship aircraft, replacing obsolete aircraft.

The preparation of the armed forces for the expansion of aggression was based on the experience of intervention against Soviet Russia, military operations in Manchuria and Northern China; Military theoretical views common in European countries and the United States were also taken into account.

Due to the fact that the theaters of military operations in which the Japanese command planned to conduct operations had a wide variety of terrain, vegetation, water basins and climatic conditions, in the operational and tactical training of the army, much attention was paid to practicing the actions of formations, units and subunits in night conditions , in the mountains, with crossing water barriers, in the forest, populated areas, in the desert, in winter. The main type of combat operations was considered to be offensive. When training troops to conduct offensive combat, the issues of interaction between all branches of the military, as well as the organization of joint actions of the army and navy, were especially carefully worked out. Since December 1933, the Kwantung Army began intensive preparation of units and formations for an attack on the USSR (314).

The main focus of the Japanese naval forces was on preparing for military operations against the US and British fleets in the Pacific Ocean and in the South Seas (315). In the summer and autumn, the fleet conducted large maneuvers, which began with a long joint voyage and ended with a “battle.” Variants of action were tested to disrupt the sea communications of a potential enemy and ensure their communications between the Japanese islands and the Chinese coast. The aircraft carrier fleet and basic naval aviation were involved in the maneuvers.

The capture of Manchuria and the program of further conquests were used to strengthen chauvinistic propaganda in the country. The popularity and authority of military circles grew. A film promoting Japan's special role in Asia was shown throughout the country. A political map of the world appeared on the screen, with Japan and Manchukuo in its center, and adjacent to this “center of the new order” were Siberia, China, India and the countries of the South Seas. The image was accompanied by the words of Minister of War Araki: “The day will come when we will force the whole world to respect our national values... Compatriots! Look at the situation in Asia. Will it remain the same forever? Our highest mission is to create a paradise in Asia. I appeal to you with an ardent appeal to rush forward in a single impulse.” Following this, the inscription appeared on the screen for a long time: “The light comes from the East” (316). Propaganda of this kind swept Japan.

The ideological preparation of the Japanese army was a combination of activities of the ruling circles, command, reactionary organizations, and a special propaganda apparatus aimed at instilling in the personnel Tennoist (317), chauvinistic-militarist and anti-communist views.

Military personnel were instilled with boundless devotion to the emperor and unquestioning submission to those in higher positions. Dying for the emperor was considered a manifestation of the highest patriotism. “The cardinal moments in the education of the army,” wrote General Araki, “are the training and tempering of the warrior’s spirit, so that he, without hesitating for a moment, is ready to give his life for the prosperity of the imperial house...” (318) By consciously instilling in the personnel the desire to go to their death, the command extolled the heroism of three demolition soldiers who died during an operation in China near Jiangwan (319). A monument was erected to them in the center of Tokyo. The Japanese military was instilled with caste, professional “ethics”, expressed in the samurai traditions of “Bushido”. Their basic principle is “renunciation... of all the blessings of earthly life and of life itself in the name of the idea of ​​a great empire, the pinnacle of which is faith in the emperor and his divine origin” (320). The idea of ​​“kodo” (“imperial path”) was also instilled in the personnel. Widespread propaganda of the principle of Hakko Ichi U introduced the idea of ​​​​creating a colonial empire under Japanese rule. In the army, it was daily promoted that military service was a special honor, and a military man was the best person: “There is no flower more beautiful than a cherry and no man better than a military man.”

Political institutions, such as parliament, as well as the press, radio, cinema, theater, educational institutions, and religion were mobilized to indoctrinate the population, especially young people. Class selection into the armed forces was facilitated by a territorial recruitment system. As a rule, the regiment was stationed in the area where it was recruited. According to the military-political leadership of Japan, this helped to establish a close connection between the command of units, local authorities and reactionary organizations to strengthen the ideological influence on military personnel, as well as to weed out conscripts whose stay in the army was considered undesirable. The average officer corps of the army was 30 percent represented by the sons of large and small landowners, kulaks, 30 - 35 percent - from the large and middle bourgeoisie, bureaucrats and intelligentsia, 35 - 40 percent - from the petty bourgeois environment and other elements. Non-commissioned officers were recruited mainly from the kulaks, small bankrupt merchants, urban philistines and intelligentsia. The rank and file was replenished mainly from peasants. As a rule, younger brothers who did not enjoy the right of inheritance and had no means of subsistence were drafted into the army. Out of 500 thousand conscripts, only about 100 thousand people became active (321). At the same time, the politically unreliable and physically weak were eliminated.

Responsibility for the ideological indoctrination of military personnel was assigned to commanders of all levels, who, in the process of educating personnel, had to demonstrate knowledge of politics, the fundamentals of pedagogy and psychology of soldiers (322). The command severely punished officers for omissions in political education. For example, in 1932, on the Shanghai front, the entire rebel company of the 24th Brigade was shot: soldiers for mutiny, and officers for failing to prevent the soldiers’ uprising and cope with it.

The indoctrination system of the Japanese armed forces succeeded in perverting the minds of military personnel to such an extent that they perceived Japan's aggressive actions as a sacred and patriotic cause worth any sacrifice.

The course towards aggression and war found concrete embodiment in the military-strategic plans against China (“Hei”) and against the USSR (“Otsu”) (323), developed by the General Staff of the Japanese Army in the late 20s and early 30s. The General Staff of the Fleet drew up plans for an attack on the colonial possessions of Great Britain, France and the USA.

In December 1933, General Tojo, a very influential politician, called the Soviet Union Japan's first enemy. He stated that to fulfill the great mission of the “Yamato race” (Japanese. - Ed.) it is necessary to unite the country together and develop the armed forces; when resorting to diplomacy, remember that “diplomacy, if it is not supported by force, can never achieve results” (324).

In 1933, after the capture of Manchuria and part of the territory of Northern China, the army general staff clarified and detailed the Otsu plan: of the 30 divisions that were supposed to be formed, 24 were allocated for military operations against the Soviet Union. In the very first days of the war, an invasion of the territory of the USSR was planned. After the successful completion of operations developing to the east, it was planned to strike in a northern direction with the aim of capturing the area of ​​​​Lake Baikal. The new operational-strategic plan for 1934 differed from the previous one in that it provided for the start of the offensive even before the arrival of additional contingents of Japanese troops in Manchuria. It took into account the likelihood of conducting military operations simultaneously against the Soviet Union and China (325).

Even before the occupation of Manchuria, the army general staff planned military operations against China: the capture of Beiping and Tianjin, Shanghai and the surrounding areas (326). To unleash aggression against the United States and Great Britain, the Japanese command considered it necessary to seize a bridgehead in South China, terminate the Washington Agreement on the Limitation of Naval Arms and strengthen bases in the Pacific Ocean, primarily in the Mariana and Caroline Islands. Planning to expand aggression, the Japanese government decided to enter into a military alliance with Germany (327).

The USSR government, closely monitoring the actions of the Far Eastern aggressor, sought opportunities to organize a collective resistance to Japan. The Chinese government could play a big role in this.

The solidarity of the Soviet people with the Chinese people, who fought against Japanese aggression, and the readiness of the USSR to provide assistance to the victims of this aggression found a response among Chinese patriots.

After the capture of the northeastern provinces of China, the command of the Japanese army chose Shanghai, the largest industrial center and the key to the Yangtze River valley, as the next target of attack. The commander of the Japanese Expeditionary Force, Yoshizawa, told foreign correspondents on January 26, 1932 that he would “occupy Shanghai within three hours without firing a shot.” Three days later, the Japanese invaded the city, but unexpectedly encountered courageous resistance. The heroic defense of Shanghai began. The people's militia and workers inspired the soldiers of the Chinese 19th Army located in the city. The defenders of Shanghai managed in a selfless fight to stop the enemy, whose invasion was supported by 3 aircraft carriers, 11 cruisers and 36 destroyers.

The Japanese attempt to seize Shanghai caused extreme anxiety in the camp of the imperialists of other countries and exacerbated their contradictions. The further spread of Japanese aggression affected the interests of the Western powers, since 40 percent of China's trade passed through Shanghai. It was clear that by capturing this city, Japan would occupy a dominant position in Central China. The new Japanese offensive, the English researcher noted, caused a negative reaction from public opinion in England, and also created the preconditions for Anglo-American cooperation in the Far East (328). US President Hoover sent troops and warships to Shanghai for joint action with the British. Commandants of military bases in the Philippines and Hawaii were ordered to reinforce these American outposts.

Meanwhile, Japan continued to strengthen its position in China in every possible way. In order to disguise the aggression, the Japanese government carefully developed and implemented a specific form of colonial regime in Manchuria. The system of colonial domination was hidden behind a local national banner: on March 9, 1932, Japan proclaimed the creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo, headed by Pu Yi, the last Chinese emperor from the Manchu dynasty. Soon after the formation of Manchukuo, the Japanese governors announced its constitution. 14 years later, Pu Yi gave the following testimony: “On paper, in order to deceive the people and the whole world, they (the Japanese. - Ed.) represented Manchuria as an independent state. But in reality, Manchukuo was ruled by the Kwantung Army" (329).

At the end of February, through the mediation of the commander of the British fleet in the Far East, Admiral Kelly, Japanese-Chinese negotiations began on a cessation of hostilities. In the face of growing popular resistance, the Kuomintang government hastened to conclude a truce with the Japanese command on May 5, 1932. Chiang Kai-shek's reluctance to repel the invaders was again revealed.

With the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese troops, a new stage in the national liberation movement of the Chinese people began. Revolutionary forces led by the Communist Party intensified their armed struggle. On April 14, 1932, the Provisional Central Government of the liberated areas of China addressed the people of the country with a manifesto in which it officially declared war on Japan. The party called on the broad masses, under the leadership of this government, to unite in the national revolutionary struggle.

In response to this call, the patriotic sections of the population of Northeast China, led by the Communists, headed for organizing armed resistance to the Japanese aggressors. Together with them, the Koreans who emigrated to Northeast China also embarked on the path of armed struggle. The armed struggle of the Koreans was led by the communists, who saw in it an opportunity to rid their enslaved homeland from the yoke of Japanese militarism.

The partisan movement of Koreans living in Northeast China acquired its widest scope within Jiangdao (330). It was here, in Antu County, that the first partisan detachment was created under the leadership of Kim Il Sung (Kim Song Ju). The partisan movement of two neighboring peoples against a common enemy began to merge into a single stream. As it expanded, large partisan formations began to form in Manchuria. In 1934, an independent unit of Korean partisans was created - the Korean People's Revolutionary Army (KPRA).

The partisan armies began to increase their attacks on the occupiers, and primarily on police institutions, puppet military formations, and even regular troops of the Japanese Kwantung Army. In the fight against the invaders, they accumulated combat experience and improved organizational forms. By the end of 1935, there were already seven partisan armies operating in Northeast China, including the KPRA. The partisan armies did not have a single governing body and acted separately. Only in 1937 was a unified command of the partisan armies created, headed by the Chinese communist Yang Ching-yu.

The new stage of the national liberation movement of the Chinese people is characterized by the gradual formation of a united anti-imperialist struggle front, which took shape under the direct influence of the Comintern with the leading role of the Communist Party of China. In June 1932, the political commission of the ECCI noted that in China there was a tendency to merge the struggle of the masses of the liberated areas with the labor movement on Kuomintang territory. This merger is the key to the victorious development of the anti-imperialist struggle.

The first country to take the path of a forcible revision of the Versailles-Washington system was Japan.

For many years, the Japanese ruling circles had been hatching extensive aggressive plans and were actively preparing for their implementation. These plans were outlined with the utmost frankness in the sensational “Tanaka Memorandum” submitted to the Japanese Emperor in 1927. The author of this memorandum, who was then the Japanese Prime Minister, demanded the seizure of Northeast China (Manchuria) and Mongolia, war with the Soviet Union and the seizure of the Soviet Far East and Siberia, the establishment of Japanese domination over all of China, and then over Southeast Asia and India.

The Japanese imperialists took the first step towards implementing this program in 1931-1932, capturing Northeast China.

By the autumn of 1931, a favorable situation had developed for Japan both in China and in the international arena.

In 1930-1931 Chiang Kai-shek launched three campaigns against the Chinese Red Army and revolutionary bases in Guangdong, Hunan, Jiangxi and some other provinces. All these campaigns were repulsed by the Red Army. However, Chiang Kai-shek did not give up the idea of ​​destroying the revolutionary bases and was preparing for a new, fourth campaign.

International situation 1930-1931 was characterized by aggravation of relations between the USSR and capitalist countries. Under these conditions, one could count on the fact that the Western powers would not oppose Japanese aggression in Northern China, which was clearly aimed against the USSR.

On September 18, 1931, Japanese troops located in the South Manchurian Railway zone began to occupy Northeast China. As a pretext for this occupation, the Japanese authorities used the false report that the Chinese had carried out an explosion on the South Manchurian Road.

The Chinese ruling circles did not offer any resistance to the Japanese invaders. In February 1932, Japanese troops completed the occupation of the entire Northeast of China. On March 1, 1932, Japanese authorities officially announced the creation of a new “state” on the occupied territory, the so-called Manchukuo. The last Chinese emperor, Pu Yi, who was overthrown in 1912, was placed at the head of this puppet “state.”

The Japanese imperialists turned Northeast China into a springboard for seizing other Chinese territories and preparing an attack on the Soviet Union. The first center of a new world war was created in the Far East.

Despite the fact that the seizure of part of China by Japan was a flagrant violation of the Washington Agreements of 1922 and directly affected the economic and political interests of the United States and England in this country, the Western powers did not provide any resistance to Japanese aggression. The expectation that Japan would “destroy communism” in China and, most importantly, start a war with the Soviet Union, outweighed all other considerations among the ruling circles of the United States and England. The League of Nations, whose charter guaranteed its members territorial integrity, also did not take any measures in defense of China.

In October 1931, the Council of the League of Nations considered the Chinese government's complaint about Japanese aggression. The majority of Council members supported the resolution obliging Japan to withdraw its troops from China within three weeks. Japan voted against this resolution and thus disrupted the adoption of a decision on the issue under discussion (since decisions of the Council of the League of Nations could only be taken unanimously).

In December 1931, the Council of the League of Nations appointed a commission, chaired by the Englishman Lytton, to survey the Sino-Japanese conflict on the ground and make recommendations to the League of Nations.

In January 1932, US Secretary of State Stimson sent a note to the governments of Japan and China in which he stated that the US government did not recognize the situation created by Japan's unilateral actions. The Stimson Doctrine did not provide for any effective measures to protect China's territorial integrity.

In fact, both the League of Nations and the US government refrained from providing any assistance to China and thereby gave the Japanese military a free hand for further acts of aggression.

The discussion of the Sino-Japanese conflict in the League of Nations became the beginning of the notorious “policy of non-intervention.”

Japan made an attempt to capture Shanghai in January 1932. However, the Japanese military met a decisive rebuff from the workers of Shanghai and units of the 19th Kuomintang Army, who, contrary to the orders of Chiang Kai-shek, entered into an armed struggle against the invaders. For two months, the workers of Shanghai and units of the 19th Army defended the city. Eventually Japan was forced to withdraw its troops from Shanghai.

In October 1932, the Lytton Commission presented its report to the League of Nations. The conclusions and recommendations of this report were very ambiguous. The Lytton Commission recommended restoring Chinese sovereignty over the Northeast, but at the same time recognized Japan's special rights and interests in that part of China. At the end of February 1933, the Assembly of the League of Nations approved the report of the Lytton Commission.

Despite the fact that this resolution actually recognized Japanese dominance in Northeast China, it caused violent indignation among the Japanese military. On March 27, 1933, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations. At the same time, she began to occupy a number of provinces in Northern China.

Japan's aggressive actions in China and Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations meant the beginning of the collapse of the Versailles-Washington system of the post-war structure of the capitalist world.

The aggressive actions of Japan and the policy of non-resistance to them on the part of the Western powers emboldened all the forces of revenge and war in Europe and especially in Germany.

Japan's capture of Northeast China strained Soviet-Japanese relations. The Manchurian puppet authorities and the Japanese military began organizing new provocations on the Chinese Eastern Railway and along the Soviet Far Eastern borders. The Soviet government, seeking to strengthen peace in the Far East, turned to Japan at the end of 1931 with a proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact. However, Japan rejected this proposal.

The Soviet Union did not recognize Japan's seizure of Northeast China. In December 1932, diplomatic relations between the USSR and China, broken in 1929 due to the fault of the Kuomintang government, were restored.

In the early 1930s. Japan's internal development became a factor in destabilizing the Washington system. The transformation of the statehood and political structure of Japan as a result of the global economic crisis led to the formation of a fascist ideology of Japanese national exclusivity in difficult conditions. It is called militaristic because representatives of the armed forces were the most receptive to these ideas. The ruling circles saw a way out of the crisis in external expansion, a war aimed at gaining regional and world hegemony. First of all, for this it was necessary to conquer Manchuria: “Manchuria is the first line of national defense of Japan.” To do this, it had a well-trained Kwantung Army, and its location was the leased territory of Guangdong (Kwantung in Japanese).

On the night of September 18–19, 1931, Japanese troops invaded Manchuria near Mukden and, with the support of naval aviation, launched an attack on Chinese garrisons and cities in northeastern China. The ruler of Manchuria, Zhang Xueliang, who had an army of 100,000 against a Japanese army of 14,000, was unable to resist. After a few months, the occupation of Northern Manchuria was completed. In the Far East, as a result of Japanese aggression in China, a dangerous hotbed of war.

The powers participating in the China Treaty took a cautious position, for a long time considering what was happening as a local incident that did not pursue far-reaching political goals.

US President Henry Hoover in October 1931 recognized Japan's right to “restore order in China.” However, the growing conflict forced the United States to announce Japan's expansion and for the first time to cooperate closely with the League of Nations. On January 7, 1932, Secretary of State J. Stimson addressed Japan and China with identical notes (the Stimson Doctrine), where he formulated the US position regarding the capture of Japan: non-recognition of any actions that violate the sovereignty and integrity of China, and the principle of “open doors”; any agreements legalizing the annexation of Manchuria. But many state parties to the China Treaty avoided a collective demarche.

China has relied exclusively on political and diplomatic methods of countering aggression. Counting on the support of Western states, he appealed to the Council of the League of Nations with a complaint against Japan, demanding the restoration of the status quo and compensation for the damage caused.

Japan tried in every possible way to avoid a collision with the USSR. For its part, the Soviet Union officially declared its neutrality and non-intervention in the conflict. At the height of the conflict, the USSR raised the question of concluding a Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact. The USSR correlated this conflict with the course of the civil war in China and sought to use it against the Kuomintang. The diplomatic maneuvers of the USSR and Japan created a multi-valued political situation in which the Western powers found themselves divided. Meanwhile, Japan's attitude towards the actions of the Kwantung Army was determined. The amazing ease of military success predetermined the outcome of the struggle between moderate and fascist elements in the Japanese leadership. In December 1931, the government of R. Wakatsuki-K. Shidehara resigned, and a new pro-militarist cabinet, K. Inukai, came to power.

The Lytton Commission and Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations

In September-December 1931, the Council of the League of Nations, repeatedly discussing the Manchurian question, condemned Japan and decided to create a commission to study the situation on the ground. It consisted of authoritative representatives of the USA, Britain, France, Germany and Italy, led by the English Lord Victor Lytton (Lytton Commission).

In the face of inaction by the international community, Japan attempted to capture Shanghai in January 1932, but a decisive demonstration by the American and British fleets forced it to retreat (Shanghai Incident ) . To consolidate the annexation of Manchuria, the Japanese created a puppet state on March 1, 1932 - Manchukuo. The former Emperor of China, Pu Yi, who was overthrown by the Xinghai Revolution of 1911, was put in charge. The city of Changchun became the capital. The state was completely controlled by the Kwantung Army. The 1932 military alliance between Japan and Manchukuo provided for the right of Japan to maintain its troops on its territory.

On March 11, 1932, the League Council, at the proposal of the US government, adopted a resolution on non-recognition of Japanese conquests. The Lytton Commission, which visited the USA, Japan, China, and Manchukuo, presented a detailed report in October 1932 containing facts about Japan’s aggression, its violation of the League Charter, the Nine-Power Treaty, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Pointing out that the region was an integral part of China, Lytton proposed defining a new status for Manchuria as an autonomous unit of China. At the extraordinary session of the Assembly of the League of Nations (December 1932), half-hearted decisions were made on the report. Having recognized Japan as an aggressor, the League of Nations avoided introducing economic and military sanctions against Japan.

Condemnation of Japanese aggression by the world community was largely devalued by the ineffectiveness of international legal coercion. At the same time, the difference in the positions of the powers towards aggression again emerged. The United States focused its diplomatic efforts on enshrining the "open door" principle in China, making it clear that the United States did not intend to interfere with Japan's "legitimate treaty rights" in Manchuria. British Foreign Minister J. Simon stated that his government does not intend to take any steps against Japan. The Soviet government declared that from the very beginning of the Sino-Japanese conflict it had stood on the path of strict neutrality, and reported that it did not find it possible to accede to the resolutions of the League of Nations.

Japan strongly rejected the conclusions of the Lytton Commission and the League of Nations resolution. On March 27, 1933, Japan announced its withdrawal from the League of Nations. This completed a radical turn in its foreign policy towards a course towards a revision of the Versailles-Washington system.

Power politics in the Far East and Pacific region

Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations and the inaction of the great powers forced China to agree to an armistice with Japan on May 31, 1933 in Tanggu. In accordance with it, Japan received a number of military and political privileges in the occupied areas. The entire vast area south of the Great Wall was turned into a “demilitarized” zone, where Chinese troops were denied access. Thus, the Chiang Kai-shek government’s refusal to abandon Manchuria and the areas south of it occupied by Japan was recorded.

The peculiarity of Japan's Manchurian policy was that instead of traditional colonialism in the form of the export of mineral and other resources, priority was given to the development of heavy industry and infrastructure in the region through large investments of Japanese capital. As a result, in the 30s. Manchuria has become one of the most dynamically developing regions in the world. By 1937, the Kwantung Army stationed in Manchuria had noticeably surpassed in combat power the armed forces stationed on the Japanese Islands. The mainland military-economic base for expansion was basically created. Thus, Japan was able to seize the political initiative in the Far East. At the new stage, Tokyo considered it necessary to consolidate the achieved result by directing efforts to the development of Manchuria and further penetration into China.

In the Pacific, Japan, as a result of its actively pursued foreign policy, expanded its territorial possessions and influence and moved significantly closer to Southeast Asia, New Zealand and Australia. The communications of the United States and England were put at risk, especially the US naval bases of strategic importance - the Philippines and Hawaii (Sandwich Islands), located near Japan.

Japanese aggression in the Pacific and the consolidation of the fascist bloc

The attack of Hitler's Germany on the USSR caused a heated debate in Tokyo regarding the future course of Japanese foreign policy. Among the Japanese ruling circles there were many supporters of an immediate attack on the Soviet Union. There were, however, those who considered it necessary to use the current situation to continue aggression in the southern direction, postponing the war against the USSR for a while.

At the beginning of July 1941, after numerous meetings of leading political and military figures in Tokyo, a document was adopted that defined the military-strategic concept of the rulers of Japan in connection with the outbreak of the Soviet-German war. This document stated: “Although our attitude towards the Soviet-German war is based on the spirit of the “Axis” of the three powers, we will not interfere in it for the present time and will maintain an independent position, while secretly completing military preparations against the Soviet Union... If The German-Soviet war will develop in a direction favorable to the empire; by resorting to armed force, it will resolve the northern problem and ensure stability in the situation in the North.”

The Nazis, for their part, despite confidence in their “lightning victory” over the Soviet armed forces, showed great interest in quickly drawing Japan into the war against the Soviet Union. To this end, they began to take various steps: information about the “tremendous successes” of German troops was widely disseminated in Tokyo, the idea of ​​the “imminent collapse” of the Soviet state was instilled, and all sorts of fakes were published about the “massive” transfer of Soviet troops from Siberia to the Soviet-German front etc. On July 10, 1941, Ribbentrop gave instructions to the German Ambassador in Tokyo Ott: “I ask you to continue to make efforts to achieve the earliest possible participation of Japan in the war against Russia... Use all the means at your disposal, because, The sooner this participation in the war takes place, the better. As before, the goal must naturally be for Germany and Japan to meet on the Trans-Siberian Railway before the onset of winter.”

Under the influence of pressure from the Nazis, Tokyo intensified the development of various options for attacking the USSR. However, the courageous resistance that the Soviet armed forces offered to Hitler’s armies thwarted the plans of the Japanese militarists. The Nazis’ assurances that by the fall of 1941 the “Russian campaign” would essentially end did not come true. Time passed, but a fundamental change on the Soviet-German front in favor of the Wehrmacht did not come. Under these conditions, Tokyo decided to postpone the attack on the USSR until a more favorable time.

Having made this decision, the Japanese rulers accelerated the implementation of their plans in the southern direction: the seizure of new territories in the region of South Asia and the Pacific Ocean. To this end, the Japanese government conducted active negotiations with Washington, trying to achieve concessions from the Western powers - the USA and England - through diplomatic means. The demands that the Japanese representatives had to achieve at these negotiations were formulated in September 1941 as follows: “The United States and England should not interfere with or interfere with the imperial measures to resolve the Chinese incident”;

“America and England should not take actions that could pose a threat to the defense of the empire”; "America and England must cooperate with Japan in providing it with the necessary resources."

The United States, however, was not going to give up its position in China and the Pacific and cede cheap sources of raw materials and vast markets to its Japanese imperialist competitor without a fight. And although the positions of the negotiators on the issue of joint “defense against communism” were quite close, it was impossible to reconcile differences on fundamental problems. Negotiations between Japan and the USA became futile, and war became increasingly inevitable.

This conclusion was reached in the fall of 1941 in Tokyo:

On November 5, the decision was made to open military operations against the United States in early December. Military preparations for an attack on the United States were feverishly completed, and on November 26, at 6 a.m., the Japanese fleet left the base on the Kuril Islands in battle order and headed for Hawaii, despite the fact that formally Japanese-American negotiations in Washington were still ongoing. Theoretically, the Japanese squadron could have been recalled back at any time, but in practice it was no longer possible to avert war.

Having lost all hope of being able to achieve its aggressive goals in the south through diplomatic negotiations and heading for war with the United States, Japanese diplomacy decided to consolidate a military-political alliance with other participants in the fascist bloc. For its part, Hitler’s Germany, which jealously followed the Japanese-American negotiations, fearing that they could lead to an undesirable agreement between Japan and the United States, was itself interested in tying Japan more tightly to the fascist chariot. That is why Japan’s agreement to renew the “anti-Comintern Pact” for the next five years, with the help of which Tokyo hoped to attract Germany to the war against the United States, was greeted with satisfaction in Berlin. In response to this decision of the Japanese government, the German ambassador in Tokyo stated at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Germany “will not abandon Japan in the event of a conflict with the United States.”

The mutual interest of the main participants of the fascist bloc in strengthening their military-political cooperation led to the fact that on November 25, 1941, the “Anti-Comintern Pact” was renewed in a solemn atmosphere in Berlin. Although the terms of this pact did not contain specific obligations of a military and political nature, but only a commitment to fight against the Communist International, which, as the secret annex explained, meant the Soviet Union, the renewal of the “anti-Comintern Pact” was supposed to cement the bloc of aggressors. Representatives of Germany, Italy, Japan, Romania, Hungary, Finland, Manchukuo and other fascist satellites took part in the signing ceremony of the document on the renewal of the pact.

Not limiting itself to this, Japanese diplomacy, on the eve of the war with the United States, began to seek clear commitments from its main allies - Germany and Italy - about their participation in such a war. In early December, Japan invited Germany and Italy to sign an agreement not to conclude a separate peace.

While the text of the treaty was being agreed upon in Berlin, the Japanese squadron approached the Hawaiian Islands, and on December 7, Japanese armed forces attacked Pearl Harbor, landed in Malaya, and bombed the American naval base on Midway Island and other British and American possessions. The war between Japan, on the one hand, and the USA and England, on the other, became a reality.

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese representatives in Washington came to the next meeting with US Secretary of State Hull to continue Japanese-American negotiations and, as if nothing had happened, handed him a response to the latest American proposals. After reviewing the Japanese response, Hull, aware of Japanese aggression, said, “In all my fifty years of government service, I have never seen a document full of such disgusting lies and perversions,” and showed the Japanese representatives the door.

On December 11, 1941, Germany and Italy declared war on the United States. In a corresponding statement, the Hitler government claimed that the United States “violated” neutrality and proceeded to actions that practically created a state of war between Germany and the United States. On the same day, a new tripartite treaty was signed between Germany, Italy and Japan, complementing the tripartite pact of 1940. The treaty stated that its participants would wage war against the United States and England with all the means at their disposal, together until victory; not to conclude a separate truce or peace without full and mutual consent; cooperate closely in “establishing a just new order in the spirit of the tripartite pact” after the victorious end of the war.

Shortly thereafter, on January 18, 1942, a military agreement was concluded in Berlin, which was supposed to “ensure the effective cooperation of the three powers with a view to the earliest possible destruction of the enemy’s military force.” The military agreement provided for the division of zones of operations between Germany, Italy and Japan. The conclusion of a tripartite treaty of December 11, 1941 and a military agreement of January 18, 1942 completed the political and legal formalization of the bloc of fascist aggressors. The participants in this bloc did not hide the fact that their ultimate goal was to conquer and enslave the entire world.

In the post-war period, the events that led to the formation of two military-political alliances were repeatedly subjected to critical analysis. It was argued, in particular, that if not for Hitler’s hasty declaration of war on the United States on December 11, 1941, the final balance of power during the war could have been completely different. This conclusion is reached, for example, by the American author J. Grigg, who believes that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor did not yet predetermine the US entry into the war against Germany. On the contrary, in his opinion, this attack required the concentration of all US efforts on repelling Japanese aggression and pursuing a more correct neutral line towards Germany. Therefore, Hitler's declaration of war on the United States, which did not directly follow from Germany's obligations under the Tripartite Pact of 1940 and prompted the entry of the United States into the anti-Hitler coalition, was, as Grigg argues, “probably the most fatal decision of the entire war.”

This interpretation of the genesis of the formation of two military-political alliances during the Second World War does not stand up to criticism. Of course, one or another of Hitler’s voluntaristic decisions had a certain, sometimes significant, influence on the course of events. However, the participation of Germany, Italy, and Japan in the fascist bloc, their joint aggression with the aim of establishing a “new order” and redividing the political map of the world was determined by deeper reasons - the interests of the ruling monopoly elite of these states, which sought to eliminate the consequences of the Versailles Peace and establish their world domination. Had Hitler, and then Mussolini, not declared war on the United States on December 11, 1941, a military clash between Germany and its satellites and the United States, for the above reasons, would still have been inevitable.

CHAPTER FOUR IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN Dramatic experiences of the expedition members. The raft was towed out to sea. The wind is getting stronger. Fighting the waves. Along the Humboldt Current. The plane didn't find us. Logs absorb water. The tree protects the ropes. Flying fish for breakfast. At Thorstein's