3rd Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht

3.Panzer-Division

3rd Panzer Division was formed on October 15, 1935 in Berlin and Wünsdorf (Military Region III). In March 1939, the 3rd Panzer Division took part in the capture of Czechoslovakia. In September 1939, the division took part in the Polish campaign. Since May 1940, the division fought in the Netherlands and France. From July 1940 she was in Germany, from May 1941 - in Poland.

Since June 1941, the division fought on the Eastern Front. From July 1944 she was in Hungary. From January 1945, the 3rd Panzer Division fought in Hungary, then in Austria. The remnants of the division surrendered at the end of April 1945 in the area of ​​Steyr in Austria.

Insignia of the 3rd Panzer Division
1939-1940

The first identification mark of the 3rd Panzer Division was a stylized drawing of the Brandenburg Gate, not far from which the headquarters of the division, which was formed mostly in Berlin, was located. This symbol was later used by the 20th Panzer Division.

1940-1945
An alternative sign based on the runic symbol "Ir" (Yr, Eur, Eihwaz).

A sign of the elm or yew, sacred trees among the Germanic tribes, from which bows were made.
Insignia of the 3rd Armored Division during Operation Citadel

summer 1943
Additional identification mark of the 3rd Panzer Division - bear

- symbol of Berlin.
Additional identification mark of the 3rd Panzer Division -

coat of arms of Berlin on the heraldic shield.
Medium tank Pz Kpfw III J


2nd tank of the 2nd platoon of the 1st company of the 6th tank regiment

Rice. J. Rosado. The division's nickname is.

1939: Berlin Bear Division September-November – Pomerania, Poland ( XIX

1940: MK 4th A Gr.A “North”), December – Lower Rhine (reserve 6th A Gr.A “B”).

1941: January-April – Germany, III Military District (XLVI MC 11th A Gr.A “C”), from April 7 – Germany, III Military District (XXIV MC 11th A Gr.A “C”), May- June - Germany, III Military District (2 TGr), June-December - Minsk, Smolensk, Kyiv, Bryansk, Tula (XXIV MK 2nd TGr Gr.A "Center"), from December 25 - Kharkov (LV ak 6- y A Gr.A “South”).

1942: from January 5 - Kursk (XLVIII shopping mall 2nd A Gr.A "Center"), March-May - Kharkov (6th A Gr.A "South"), June - Kharkov (XL shopping mall 6th A Gr.A " South"), July-December - North Caucasus (XL tk 1st TA Gr.A "A").

1943: January - North Caucasus (XL tk 1st TA Gr.A "A"), February - Rostov, Stalino (4th TA Gr.A "Don"), March - r. Mius (III TK 1st TA Gr.A “A”), April-June - r. Mius (reserve of the 1st TA Gr.A "South"), July - Belgorod (III TC of the 4th TA Gr.A "South"), August - Kharkov (group "Kempf" Gr.A "South"), September -October – Dnieper River, Kiev (III TK 8th A Gr.A “South”), November – Dnepr River, Kiev (XXIV TK 4th TA Gr.A “South”), December – Cherkasy (III TK 8th A Gr.A “South”).

1944: January-February – Cherkasy (XXXXVIII TK 8th A Gr.A “South”), March – Uman (LII TK 6th A Gr.A “A”), April – Bug (XXXX AK 6th A Gr. A "Southern Ukraine"), May - Dniester, Chisinau (XXXX ac 6th A Gr.A "Southern Ukraine"), June-July - Dniester, Chisinau (reserve 6th A Gr.A "Southern Ukraine"), August – Vistula, Baranov (XXXXVIII TK 4th TA Gr.A “Northern Ukraine”), September-December – Narev (reserve 2nd A Gr.A “Center”).

1945: January – Hungary (LXXII ak 6th A Gr.A “South”), February-March – Hungary (III tk 6th A Gr.A “South”), April – Styria (Central Austria; IV tk SS 6- y A Gr.A “South”), May – Steyer, Enns (Styria - Central Austria; IV TK SS 6th A Gr.A “Austria”).

Organization of the 3rd Panzer Division on 1 August 1939 (Poland)

5th Panzer Regiment "Wünsdorf"(Wünsdorf)
Tank Battalion I (three light tank companies)

(Neuruppin)
Tank Battalion I (three light tank companies)
Tank Battalion II (three light tank companies)

Reinforced training tank battalion (two light companies and a company of medium tanks)

3rd Infantry Regiment
Rifle Battalion I
Rifle Battalion II

3rd Motorcycle Battalion

75th Artillery Regiment
headquarters
motorized communications platoon
motorized meteorological department

Motorized Artillery Division II

39th Anti-Tank Division
headquarters
motorized communications platoon
1st motorized anti-tank battery
2nd motorized anti-tank battery
3rd motorized anti-tank battery
4th Heavy Motorized Machine Gun Company

3rd Motorized Reconnaissance Battalion
headquarters
motorized communications platoon
1st armored vehicle platoon
2nd armored vehicle platoon
motorcycle company
heavy motorized company

1st Engineer Company
2nd Engineer Company
3rd Engineer Company
motorized bridge

self-propelled communications company
self-propelled radio company
self-propelled communications supply column

Organization of the 3rd Panzer Division in 1940 (France)

3rd Tank Brigade "Berlin"

5th Panzer Regiment "Wünsdorf"(until 1.1941)

6th Tank Regiment "Neuruppen"
Tank Battalion I (headquarters company, two light companies and a company of medium tanks)
Tank Battalion II (headquarters company, two light companies and a company of medium tanks)

3rd Infantry Brigade "Eberswalde"

3rd Infantry Regiment

3rd Motorcycle Battalion

75th Artillery Regiment
39th Anti-Tank Division
3rd Motorized Reconnaissance Battalion

39th self-propelled communications battalion
39th Divisional Supply Detachment

In August 1940 The division included the 394th Infantry Regiment.

In January 1941 The 3rd Tank Division sent the following units to Africa to form the 5th Light Division: the headquarters of the 3rd Tank Brigade, the 5th Tank Regiment, the 3rd Motorized Reconnaissance Battalion, the 39th Anti-Tank Division, the 1st Division 75- th artillery regiment. In return, the division received in February and March 1941 the 2nd Division of the 49th Artillery Regiment, the 543rd Anti-Tank Division and the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion.

Organization of the 3rd Panzer Division in 1941:

6th Tank Regiment
Tank Battalion I (headquarters company, two light companies and a company of medium tanks)
Tank Battalion II (headquarters company, two light companies and a company of medium tanks)
Tank Battalion III (headquarters company, two light companies and a company of medium tanks)

3rd Infantry Brigade "Eberswalde"

3rd Infantry Regiment
Rifle Battalion I
Rifle Battalion II

394th Infantry Regiment
Rifle Battalion I
Rifle Battalion II

3rd Motorcycle Battalion

75th Artillery Regiment
artillery division I
artillery division II

543rd Anti-Tank Battalion
1st Reconnaissance Battalion
39th self-propelled engineer battalion
39th self-propelled communications battalion
39th Divisional Supply Detachment

Organization of the 3rd Panzer Division in the summer of 1943:

Headquarters
divisional headquarters
83rd motorized topographical squad

6th Tank Regiment
regimental headquarters
headquarters battery
Tank Battalion I
tank battalion II

3rd Panzergrenadier Regiment
regimental headquarters

self-propelled panzergrenadier battalion I (on half-track armored personnel carriers)

394th Panzergrenadier Regiment
regimental headquarters
motorized regimental headquarters company
Motorized Panzergrenadier Battalion I
Motorized Panzergrenadier Battalion II
motorized infantry gun battery
self-propelled anti-aircraft battery

75th self-propelled artillery regiment
regimental headquarters and headquarters battery
Motorized Artillery Division I
Motorized Artillery Division II
Motorized Artillery Division III
motorized observation battery

543rd Anti-Tank Battalion
headquarters and headquarters battery
motorized anti-tank battery
self-propelled anti-tank battery

3rd Self-Propelled Reconnaissance Battalion
headquarters
1st armored vehicle company
2nd Motorcycle Company
3rd Motorcycle Company
4th self-propelled reconnaissance company (on half-track armored personnel carriers)
5th heavy self-propelled reconnaissance company (on half-track armored personnel carriers)
light motorized reconnaissance supply column

314th Army Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion
headquarters and motorized headquarters battery
1st heavy motorized anti-aircraft battery
2nd heavy motorized anti-aircraft battery
3rd light anti-aircraft battery
4th self-propelled anti-aircraft battery
light motorized anti-aircraft supply column

39th self-propelled engineer battalion
headquarters
1st self-propelled engineer company (on half-track armored personnel carriers)
2nd motorized sapper company
3rd motorized sapper company
bridge column
light motorized engineer supply column

83rd Field Replacement Battalion(4 companies)

39th Divisional Supply Detachment

Combat operations of the 3rd Panzer Division

In March 1939., after the occupation of the Sudetenland, the 3rd Panzer Division participated in the capture of the remaining Czechoslovakia. At 8.20 am on March 13, 1939, separate units reached the Czech capital.

Two days later, tanks from the 3rd Panzer Division led a German parade in Prague.

Polish company

During the Polish campaign, the division was part of General Guderian's XIX Motorized Corps and advanced from Pomerania. The XIX Corps, in the vanguard of which was the 3rd Panzer Division, crossed the Polish corridor and cut off Poland from the Baltic Sea.

On September 18, 1939, the 3rd Panzer Division established contact in the Brest-Litovsk area with the XXII Motorized Corps, advancing from the south. The second German tank ring has closed. The last units of the Polish army stopped resistance on October 6. 5th Tank Regiment (two tank battalions of three light tank companies each) – 160 tanks (

Pz IV – 9, Pz III – 3, Pz II – 77, Pz I – 63, Pz Bef – 8). 6th Tank Regiment (two tank battalions of three light tank companies each) – 158 tanks (

Pz IV - 9, Pz III - 3, Pz II - 79, Pz I - 59, Pz Bef - 8). Training tank battalion (two light companies and a company of medium tanks) – 73 tanks

(Pz IV - 14, Pz III - 37, Pz II - 20, Pz Bef - 2).

After a successful campaign in Poland, the division was transferred to the Western Front. In terms of defeating France, the division was supposed to operate as part of Army Group B. She entered Belgium and the Netherlands as part of a force luring French troops into the Netherlands. In the second phase of the campaign, as the German army turned south to occupy France, the 3rd Panzer Division advanced west of Paris.

The division had serious combat clashes with the French 3rd Mechanized Division. In total, the division's tankers reported 87 enemy tanks destroyed.

5th Tank Regiment – ​​130 tanks (Pz IV – 16, Pz III – 29, Pz II – 55, Pz I – 22, Pz Bef – 8).

6th Tank Regiment – ​​136 tanks

(Pz IV – 16, Pz III – 29, Pz II – 60, Pz I – 23, Pz Bef – 8).

In January 1941, the division was recalled to Germany for rest and reorganization.

The 5th Tank Regiment was withdrawn from the 3rd Tank Division to form the 5th Light African Division, which became part of the newly formed Afrika Korps.

In March 1941, when the reorganization of tank forces was carried out, the 6th Tank Regiment received the III Battalion, which was transferred from the disbanded 28th Tank Regiment of the 18th Tank Division, where the II Battalion was. The battalion was armed with underwater (“diving”) tanks created from medium tanks Pz III and Pz IV for Operation Sea Lion (invasion of England).

Eastern front After rest and recovery, in May 1941 the division was redeployed to Poland and became part of General Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group of Army Group Center.

The 6th Tank Regiment consisted of three battalions of three companies and was armed with 203 tanks

Pz IV – 20, Pz III – 110, Pz II – 58, Pz Bef – 15).

June - September 1941

From June 22, 1941, as part of the 2nd Panzer Group, part of Army Group Center, the 3rd Panzer Division advanced in the first echelon. As part of the group, the division took part in all the main battles in the central direction: Minsk - Smolensk (Battle of Bialystok-Minsk, Battle of Smolensk 1941) - and by September there were about 50 tanks left in it.

After the end of the Battle of Smolensk, the 2nd Tank Group was deployed to the south, where it took part in the encirclement of the forces of the Southwestern Front near Kiev.

October - December 1941

In March 1942, the 3rd Panzer Division was transferred from Army Group Center to the Kharkov region to the 6th Army of Army Group South. After the victory at Kharkov, the division was transferred to the 1st Tank Army, which was part of the newly formed Army Group A, for the attack on the Caucasus.

The 6th Tank Regiment (three battalions of three companies) was armed with 164 tanks ( Pz IV – 33, Pz III – 106, Pz II – 25).

1943

At the beginning of 1943, under the threat of encirclement, Army Group A began to retreat, and the 3rd Panzer Division was transferred to the new Army Group Don and transferred to Rostov.

In May 1943, the III Battalion of the 6th Tank Regiment was disbanded. By August, the 1st Battalion received Pz Kpfw V Panther tanks.

After retreating from Kursk during the autumn of 1943, the 3rd Panzer Division was in the Kirovograd region in December, where it fell into a “cauldron”, from which it emerged with the help of a relief group with the participation of the Grossdeutschland division.

6th Tank Regiment (one tank battalion – II: headquarters and four tank companies) – 90 tanks (Pz IV – 23, Pz III – 59, Pz II – 7, Pz Bef - 1).

Pz IV "Grislybär" on the Eastern Front in September 1943

1944

Throughout the year, the 3rd Panzer Division retreated first as part of Army Group South through Ukraine, fighting at Cherkassy, ​​Uman and the Bug. Then the 3rd Panzer Division withdrew to Poland and, as part of Army Group Center, fought on the Narew in the fall of 1944.

In December 1944, the division was replenished.

1945

In January 1945, the 3rd Panzer Division was transferred to Hungary, where it fought until April, then retreated to Austria. The remnants of the division surrendered at the end of April 1945 in the area of ​​Steyr in Austria to American troops.

Division commanders:

The first commander was Major General, then Lieutenant General Ernst Feßmann October 15, 1935 - September 30, 1937

Lieutenant General Leo Freiherr Geyer von Schweppenburg ( Leo Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg) October 12, 1937 – September 27, 1939

Major General Horst Stumpff September 27, 1939 - December 14, 1939

Lieutenant General Leo Freiherr Geyer von Schweppenburg December 15, 1939 – February 14, 1940

Lieutenant General Friedrich Kühn September 1940 - October 3, 1940

Lieutenant General Horst Stumpff October 4, 1940 - November 14, 1940

Lieutenant General Walter Model November 15, 1940 - October 21, 1941

General of Tank Forces Hermann Breith October 22, 1941 - September 1, 1942

Colonel Kurt Freiherr von Liebenstein (Kurt Freiherr von Liebenstein) September 1 – October 24, 1942

Lieutenant General Franz Westhoven October 25, 1942 - October 20, 1943

Lieutenant General Fritz Bayerlein ( Fritz Bayerlein ) October 20, 1943 – January 4, 1944

Colonel Rudolf Lang ( Rudolf Lang ) January 5, 1944 – May 24, 1944

Lieutenant General Wilhelm Philips ( Wilhelm Philipps ) May 25, 1944 – January 20, 1945

Major General Wilhelm Soth ( Wilhelm S ö th ) January 20, 1945 – April 19, 1945

There was one point on the entire Soviet-German front where events unfolded according to the worst-case scenario. This was the Brest Fortress. At 24.00 on June 21, the commander and chief of staff of the 4th Army, A.A. Korobkov and L.M. Sandalov, and somewhat later the rest of the army command officers, were summoned by order of the district chief of staff to army headquarters. The district headquarters did not give any specific orders, other than “everyone to be ready.” Korobkov, under his own responsibility, ordered that sealed “red packets” with instructions on the procedure for combat alert, developed according to the cover plan, be sent to all formations and individual units.

What followed was a delay that became fatal. At approximately 2 a.m. on June 22, wire communication between the army headquarters and the district and troops stopped. Communication was restored only at 3.30. Signalmen discovered a break in the wires in Zaprudy and Zhabinka. In the neighboring 10th Army, everything was exactly the same: at midnight the commander was called to the headquarters, awaiting further orders at the HF apparatus. Order from D.G. Pavlova followed between 2.00 and 2.30 and was received on time by the headquarters of the 10th Army. The commander of the district, which was becoming the Western Front, ordered units to be raised according to the “red package,” warning that detailed encryption would follow later. Strictly speaking, the Kremlin’s hesitation regarding the form in which to raise troops was smoothed out in the process of transferring Directive No. 1 to the districts. The units were actually simply alerted and had to act according to cover plans. But in the 4th Army everything went differently from its neighbors...

After communication was restored at 3.30, the army commander received an order, transmitted in clear text by telegraph (BODO), from the commander of the Western Special Military District to put the troops on combat readiness. The 4th Army, which was in a worse position relative to its neighbors, with its units locked in the mousetrap of the Brest Fortress, received the order an hour later. Pavlov demanded, first of all, to silently withdraw the 42nd Infantry Division from the Brest Fortress “in batches” and bring the 14th Mechanized Corps to combat readiness; aviation was allowed to be relocated to field airfields. But there was no time left for all this. Before 3.45, Korobkov personally gave two orders by telephone: to the chief of staff of the 42nd Infantry Division to alert the division and move it out of the fortress to the assembly area; the commander of the 14th mechanized corps to bring the corps into combat readiness.

Naturally, they did not have time to withdraw units of the 42nd Infantry Division from the fortress before the start of hostilities. It took three hours to withdraw troops from the fortress. Moreover, the withdrawal did not have time to begin. Barely the chief of staff of the 42nd division, Major V.L. Shcherbakov gathered the unit commanders to convey the relevant orders to them, when salvos of artillery from the XII Corps thundered from the other side of the border. The connection, which worked steadily after the fatal hour-long break, was now used to convey only bad news. At 4.15 - 4.20 Shcherbakov already reported to the headquarters of the 4th Army that the enemy had begun artillery shelling of Brest. The staff officers who knew the fortress well understood perfectly well what this meant: the mousetrap had slammed shut. The order to put the divisions of the 14th Mechanized Corps on combat readiness, issued at 3.30, was also not given to the units before the start of artillery preparation.

The situation was somewhat smoothed out by the fact that before the war, ten of the eighteen battalions of the 6th and 42nd rifle divisions were withdrawn from the fortress for exercises. At the time of the start of German artillery preparation, the following units and subunits were located in the citadel of the Brest Fortress: the 84th Infantry Regiment without two battalions, the 125th Infantry Regiment without one battalion and an engineer company, the 333rd Infantry Regiment without one battalion and an engineer company, 131 1st artillery regiment, 75th separate reconnaissance battalion, 98th separate anti-tank battalion, headquarters battery, 37th separate communications battalion, 31st automobile battalion and rear units of the 6th rifle division, 44th rifle regiment minus two battalions (in a fort 2 km south of the fortress), the 455th rifle regiment without one battalion and a sapper company (one battalion remaining in the fortress was located in a fort 4 km northwest of Brest), the 158th automobile battalion and rear units of the 42nd rifle division. The fortress also housed the headquarters of the 33rd district engineer regiment with regimental units, half of the district (i.e. subordinate to the district) military hospital on Gospitalny Island and a border outpost on Pogranichny Island.

What made the first hours of the war on the Eastern Front unusual was the ringing silence, if this term can be applied to the sounds of battle. However, to an experienced ear it was just silence. German troops in most areas of the offensive were met only by small arms fire. If in the future the terrifying roar of Soviet artillery and the lingering howl of “Stalin’s organs” would become an invariable companion to battles on the Soviet-German front, then the first day of the war was unusually quiet in this regard.

The German 4th Army reported: “The border fortifications are mostly unoccupied. The actions of artillery are extremely weak, as well as the actions of bomber aircraft." The refrain in the reports for June 22 were the phrases “small amount of artillery”, “weak artillery and aviation operations.” The surprised Germans tried to draw conclusions about the reasons for what was happening. The VII Army Corps War Log noted: “The almost non-combatable enemy artillery demonstrates that the enemy divisions have greater width and depth of formation.” The reasons, meanwhile, were quite obvious - the advance of the Red Army in deployment. This is what led to the “great width and depth of the structure.” Directly at the border there were only separate units of covering army divisions and sappers building fortifications of the Molotov Line. In the first hours of the war, at best, the divisional artillery of the rifle divisions approaching the border managed to enter the battle. The heavy artillery of the corps artillery regiments and artillery regiments of the RGK had not yet had time to say its weighty word.

Even von Bock noted the silence of the Soviet artillery on June 22 in his diary: “It is surprising that no significant work of their artillery is noticeable anywhere. Heavy artillery fire is conducted only in the northwest of Grodno, where the VIII Army Corps is advancing.”

On the contrary, artillery of all calibers thundered from the German side. For the bombing of the Brest Fortress, the Germans prepared one of the most powerful weapons of its time - the 600-mm self-propelled mortar "Karl". By June 1941, Germany had two Karl batteries, united into the 833rd Heavy Artillery Battalion. It was decided to use the “Carls” to storm Soviet border fortifications. The first battery (two guns) with 60 shells was sent to the 17th Army of Army Group South, and the second battery with 36 shells was sent to the 4th Army of Army Group Center. The guns were delivered by rail to the Terespol station two days before the start of Barbarossa. The unloading of the monsters was covered from observation from the Soviet side of the border with special camouflage masks. On the night of June 21-22, they were moved to firing positions. On June 22, mortar No. 4 fired three shells, mortar No. 3 fired four. After this, problems arose with shells getting stuck in the barrel, and the next shots of giant mortars were fired on June 23. Subsequently, during an inspection of the citadel of the Brest Fortress, traces of Charles’s hits were discovered.” The funnels reached a diameter of 15 m at a depth of 5 m in fairly dense soil. The explosion of the Karl shell raised a column of smoke and dust 170 meters high and, according to the Germans, had a “great psychological effect.” "Carls" made it possible to break through strong walls and ceilings up to 2 meters thick, against which 210-mm shells were ineffective. In addition to exotic super-heavy guns, the German troops storming the fortress had an abundance of conventional weapons at their disposal: 150 mm and 210 mm caliber guns, as well as Nebelwerfer rocket launchers, including 280 mm caliber. The latter, due to its high firepower, was called by German soldiers Stuka zu fuss, “Stuka” (dive bomber on foot).

In a brief combat report on the actions of the 6th Infantry Division, the first terrible enemy blow was described as follows:

“At 4 o’clock in the morning on June 22, hurricane fire was opened on the barracks, on the exits from the barracks in the central part of the fortress, on the bridges and entrance gates and on the houses of the commanding staff. This raid caused confusion and panic among the Red Army personnel. The command staff, who were attacked in their apartments, were partially destroyed. The surviving commanders could not penetrate the barracks due to the strong barrage placed on the bridge in the central part of the fortress and at the entrance gate. As a result, Red Army soldiers and junior commanders, without control from mid-level commanders, dressed and undressed, in groups and alone, left the fortress, crossing the bypass canal, the Mukhavets River and the rampart of the fortress under artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire. It was not possible to take into account the losses, since scattered units of the 6th Division mixed with scattered units of the 42nd Division, and many could not get to the assembly point, because at about 6 o’clock artillery fire was already concentrated on it.”

Shells rained down not only on the barracks. All exits from the bastion ring of the fortress were under such strong artillery, mortar, and later machine-gun fire that the 98th separate anti-tank division was almost completely destroyed when trying to break out of the fortress. As a result, the soldiers and commanders of the 6th and 42nd rifle divisions remained in the fortress not because they had the task of defending the fortress (according to the plan, one battalion was allocated for this), but because they could not leave it.

Everything that was outside the strong casemates of the fortress was swept away by fire. The artillery located in the open parks of the fortress was mostly destroyed. Next to the guns at the hitching posts stood the horses of the artillery and mortar units and subunits of the divisions. The unfortunate animals were already killed by shrapnel in the first hours of the war. The vehicles of units of both divisions, parked in the combined open vehicle parks, immediately burst into flames.

Further events in the Brest Fortress are quite well known, and therefore I will not dwell on them. From the point of view of our narrative, the following fact is interesting: the German 45th Infantry Division of the XII Corps was stuck in the battles for the fortress for a long time and therefore did not participate in the encirclement battle near Volkovysk.

The fate of Army Group Center's offensive plan largely depended on the speed and effectiveness of the actions of the two tank groups. Leaving the Brest Fortress to be torn to pieces by the infantry, the 2nd Tank Group reached positions north and south of Brest. Guderian recalled: “On the fateful day of June 22, 1941, at 2:10 a.m. In the morning I went to the group’s command post and climbed to the observation tower south of Bogukala (15 km northwest of Brest). I arrived there at 3:10 when it was dark. At 3:15 a.m. Our artillery preparation began. At 3:40 a.m. - the first raid of our dive bombers. At 4:15 a.m. The forward units of the 17th and 18th tank divisions began crossing the Bug. At 4:45 a.m. The first tanks of the 18th Panzer Division crossed the river. During the crossing, vehicles that had already been tested during the preparation of the Sea Lion plan were used. The tactical and technical data of these vehicles allowed them to overcome water boundaries up to 4 m deep.”

Then, in the early morning of June 22, Heinz Guderian hardly really considered the coming day fatal. Any later described premonitions were disingenuous. German military leaders were confident in their strength and abilities. There were great victories behind them. Moreover, the first hours of the “campaign to the East” did not yet inspire fear. On the contrary, at first the success even exceeded our wildest expectations.

Submarine tanks, of course, gave the invasion forces a significant advantage. They took full advantage of the moment of surprise. A division of “diving” tanks already at 8.15 on June 22 breaks through to an important crossing over the Lesna River east of the Bug and captures it intact. About another crossing through Lesna, aerial reconnaissance reports: “Destroyed!” However, the “divers” at 9.45 refuted this report, capturing the crossing intact. Unlike the Soviet special amphibious tanks T-37 and even T-40, German tanks for a similar purpose were conversions of linear vehicles. Therefore, they had all the combat capabilities of conventional “triples” and “fours,” including the ability to fully engage in combat with tanks. This was needed very quickly: Soviet tanks appeared on the path of the advanced detachments of the 18th Panzer Division. They fought their way to the town of Pelishchi. As stated in the combat log of the XXXXVII Corps, along the way they “destroyed several enemy tank detachments numbering up to 40 tanks.” This was the forward detachment of the Soviet 30th Tank Division S.I. Bogdanov. The bulk of the formation advanced to the general assembly point of the divisions of Oborin’s corps in Zhabinka, so the first tank battle was more of a test of the forces of the parties. However, an interim report from Army Group Center indicated that the 18th Panzer Division had “repelled a strong Russian tank attack.”

Just like in other directions, the beginning of the offensive of Guderian’s group formations south of Brest took place in “artillery silence.” The 3rd Panzer Division of the XXIV Motorized Corps also had diving tanks. However, its commander, Walter Model, the future field marshal, did not rely on technology. He obtained permission from Guderian to capture the bridge even before the first shots were fired. Model formed a group of sappers and infantry, which had to cross the bridge even before the start of artillery preparation. The expectation of surprise in the attack was completely justified. Already at 3.11 the headquarters of the 2nd Panzer Group was informed that the bridge had been captured. The combat log of the 3rd Panzer Division stated: “Kleemann’s group reports that the impression of the enemy is “zero.” Only a single artillery shot in the area of ​​the Koden Bridge.” She is echoed by the magazine of the neighboring 4th Panzer Division: “Little Russian artillery, no Russian aviation.” Resistance to the offensive was provided only 3–4 km east of the Bug.

Historical events are often pushed forward by a chain of accidents and actions, the real effect of which their participants do not know or even imagine. Moreover, a momentary assessment of events may be directly opposite to their actual effect. Heinz Guderian's negative experience in the assault on the Brest Fortress in September 1939 forced him to plan a double enveloping maneuver. Instead of a rapid breakthrough along the highway, his two motorized corps were forced to make their way through difficult terrain in all respects north and south of Brest.

Having started cheerfully on the morning of June 22 “for health,” the 2nd Tank Group quickly began to break down into “for peace.” To the north of Brest, by noon, crossings across the Bug had been built, but the access roads to them became a bottleneck. The paths leading from the paved roads to the crossing points passed through a swampy lowland. Under the tracks and wheels of dozens of vehicles, they rapidly deteriorated. The tractors of the 17th Panzer Division were forced to pull out and pull stuck trucks to the crossing along a road that allowed movement in only one direction. In the evening, at the crossing of the same division, a bridge breaks under a tank, which immediately stops the crossing for five hours. The “diving” tanks that have rushed forward into Soviet territory are left without refueling or replenishing ammunition. The combat log of the XXXXVII Corps stated: “By the late evening of June 22, only a small part of both divisions had crossed the Bug.” One can imagine how annoyed Guderian was, having spent the entire first half of the day in Lemelsen’s building. The commander of Army Group Center also went there. The struggle with the terrain at the crossings took place before his eyes.

The situation in the XXIV Motorized Corps south of Brest was no better, and in some ways even worse. From Guderian's memories a false and overly benign picture of the first day of the war may emerge. He writes: “The surprise attack on the enemy was achieved along the entire front of the tank group. West of Brest-Litovsk (Brest), the 24th Tank Corps captured all the bridges across the Bug, which turned out to be in full working order.” What conclusion can be drawn from this phrase? The answer is obvious - after the capture of the bridges, the corps' connections moved forward non-stop. However, it is not. The captured bridges were sufficient for motorized infantry to cross, as well as light artillery. For tanks it was still necessary to build 16-ton bridges. As Guderian used to say in another of his works, “victory follows the trail of tanks.” Therefore, the entire morning of June 22 was spent building bridges for them. Despite the fact that hostilities began at 3.15 am on June 22, the crossing of tanks across the newly built bridge of the 4th Panzer Division does not begin until 10.30. It stretches into the middle and second half of the day for the same reason as in the XXXXVII Corps - bad roads on the shore on the approaches to the crossings. In some places on sandy roads, cars had to be towed one by one.

However, even after the tanks managed to be transported across the Bug with great difficulty, victory was in no hurry to follow in the footsteps of the “troikas” and “fours” of the XXIV Corps. Attempts by Model's 3rd Panzer Division to follow the original offensive plan failed. They had to be abandoned due to the impassability of the roads designated in the plan. Swamps and overflowing streams stood in the way of tanks and vehicles. We had to look for other routes. The division began advancing towards Brest, accompanied by constant clashes with scattered Soviet units, including tanks of the ill-fated 22nd Panzer Division. The 4th Army did not have large forces here, but the terrain was favorable for the defense of even small detachments. Then the 3rd Panzer went around Brest from the south and reached the Warsaw Highway east of the city. Thus, Model found himself on a route assigned to the neighboring 4th Panzer Division. The latter was locked for a long time by the center of resistance of Soviet troops in the first half of the day. Despite all the orders and prohibitions, in war the principle “who gets up first, gets the slippers” often applies. Model reached the highway earlier, and corps commander Geyer von Schweppenburg was forced to authorize a change in the plan of attack. As a result, two large tank formations moved in single file along the same road. One could have expected that Model's division, which had jumped out onto the highway, would begin to advance non-stop.

However, the 3rd Panzer Division's troubles did not end there. At 16.50 aerial reconnaissance reported that the bridge over Mukhavets near Bulkovo (southeast of Zhabinka) was on fire. The unit's combat log noted that this bridge "is of enormous importance for the division." It was already getting dark when the head of a giant steel snake from two divisions reached Mukhavets. By that time, only smoking firebrands remained from the wooden bridge. Bridge Park is late, stuck somewhere in the endless traffic jams behind. Further progress had to be stopped. Only “diving” tanks cross Mukhavets in the late evening, around 10 p.m. They moved towards Kobrin, but it was more of a force reconnaissance than an offensive.

Colonel Horst Zobel, who commanded a tank platoon in the Model division in 1941, recalled with annoyance: “We covered only 18 kilometers, while we should have covered 80 kilometers!” In the combat log of the 3rd Panzer Division, there even appears a phrase breathing with envy: “The tank divisions moving north of Brest are rapidly advancing, not encountering the obstacles that fall to the lot of the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions.” However, it must be said that Guderian himself seemed to be unenthusiastic about the prospects of an offensive south of Brest - he spent the whole day in the XXXXVII Corps, and did not even look at the XXIV. Despite all their efforts, the infantry divisions of the XII Army Corps could not develop a pace of attack comparable to that of the mechanized units. Guderian himself did not comment on the modest results of the offensive of his tank group on the first day of the war. Moreover, in his memoirs, he, willingly or unwillingly, attributed the success of the next day to his troops. Summarizing the results of the first day of fighting, he casually noted: “At Pruzhany, the 18th Panzer Division entered into its first battles with enemy tanks.” In reality (according to corps reports), this first tank battle took place near the town of Pelishche, far west of Pruzhany. Moreover, in a late-night report from Army Group Center about the results of the day's battles, Poddubno is indicated as an achievement of the 18th Panzer Division, which is also not Pruzhany at all, but noticeably to the west. In a word, “fast Heinz” on June 22 was not at all as fast as usual. Von Bock was frank in his diary: “We are moving forward; The most successful in this sense was the Hotha tank group, which in the evening came under the direct command of the army group. Things are not going so smoothly for Guderian's Panzer Group. The problems at the crossings near Brest are the same as those faced by Lemelsen’s corps - they make it difficult to deliver fuel.” The 2nd Panzer Group debuted without resounding success, and the deployment of large Soviet reserves against it could quickly turn Guderian into an outsider. Everything depended on what move his opponent would make.

The location of Soviet units in the Vilnius-Kaunas direction on the morning of June 22 was typical for border armies. Of the four rifle divisions of the 11th Army, there was one regiment each on the border, and two battalions from the fifth rifle division. This screen was opposed by five army corps of the German 16th and 9th armies, as well as two motorized corps of the 3rd Panzer Group. The Soviet rifle regiments stationed on the border were attacked by at least two infantry divisions each. In this regard, the general “dumbness” of Soviet artillery in the zone of the 3rd Panzer Group was, perhaps, most pronounced. The group’s report on the results of the battles stated: “On all sectors of the front, the enemy offered weak resistance, and enemy artillery actions were not noted anywhere.”

The offensive technique of German tank groups in the first days of the war with the USSR resembled the principle of operation of a tunneling shield. When laying tunnels, the blade ring of the shield is pressed into the ground, and then a cylinder of soil limited by the ring is selected. German tank groups advanced with two motorized corps on the flanks of their formation and an army corps in the center. Tank formations made their way into the depths of the defense, and the infantry advancing in the center crushed the enemy caught between two deep wedges. This construction made it possible to rationally use the road network and increased resistance to counterattacks - the outer flanks of the motorized corps were separated by a decent distance. Cutting through the “tunneling shield” with flank attacks was a non-trivial task.

In the limited space in the Baltic states, the “tunneling shield” formation was not used, and all other tank groups (3, 2 and 1) were built this way. The outer flanks of the 3rd Panzer Group were formed by the XXXIX and LVII Motorized Corps, and the center was the infantry of the V Army Corps. On the northern flank, the junction with Army Group North was provided by the VI Army Corps. The spearhead of the XXXIX Motorized Corps was aimed at crossing the Neman at Alytus, and the 12th Panzer Division of the LVII Corps was moving towards crossing the same river at Merkine. An important advantage of the Hoth tank group was the absence of water barriers right on the border. The tank groups of Guderian and Kleist needed to cross the Bug, but there was no such obstacle on the way of 3 TGr.

The absence of the need to cross the water barrier already in the first hours of hostilities made the advance of Hoth's tanks and infantry especially rapid. The border fortifications were taken on the move. Concern was caused only by aerial reconnaissance reports about small groups of Soviet troops retreating to the Neman.

The task of the tank divisions becomes to make a quick breakthrough to the river before it becomes a stable line of defense.

The first to break through to the Neman was the 7th Panzer Division of the XXXIX Corps. At about one o'clock in the afternoon on June 22, it entered the western part of Alytus and captured both bridges across the Neman intact. Even in the document that is not conducive to emotions, the combat log of the 3rd Panzer Group, regarding the capture of the bridges, it is said: “No one counted on this.” Later, the Germans wrote that an order was found on a captured Soviet sapper officer ordering the bridges to be blown up at 19.00 on June 22. This allowed them to start arguing that “not a single Soviet military commander made an independent decision to destroy crossings and bridges.” However, let's put ourselves in the shoes of this officer. Molotov’s speech was literally just heard on the radio. The first impression is shock. Deciding to blow up a bridge quite far from the border a few hours after the start of the war was not so easy. We still had to get used to deep enemy breakthroughs. In addition, Soviet units retreating from the border departed through the bridges. Blowing up bridges in their faces would be a bad idea. Two hours after the successful breakthrough to Alytus, luck smiles on the neighboring LVII Corps: motorcyclists seize the crossing in Merkina. All plans carefully developed at Hoth's headquarters for the construction of crossings to replace those blown up are put aside with relief. It might seem that the war with the USSR would become another blitzkrieg.

It must be said that the Soviet version of the battle near Alytus differs significantly from the picture of the rapid capture of bridges painted by the Germans. So, according to an article by Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor M.V. Yezhov’s “Tank battle of the first day of the war”, the Germans were met with fire on the approaches to Alytus: “...by order of the command of the 11th Army, the 5th Panzer Division moved to the western bank of the Neman to defend the bridgehead positions...” Accordingly, the bridges, according to this version , were taken in battle, with intensive air support: “... the enemies rained bombs and artillery fire on the positions occupied by Soviet tankers on the western bank of the Neman. They suffered heavy losses. Enemy tanks managed to break through the bridge to the eastern bank of the Neman south of Alytus. But they were immediately counterattacked by units of the 5th Panzer Division, which crushed the German tanks and burst into the city.” This scenario did not really fit with the subsequent advance of the Germans further towards Minsk. Therefore, Comrade Yezhov was again forced to throw the long-suffering Luftwaffe into battle: “The outcome of the battle was decided by enemy aircraft, which continuously attacked our tank units. Lacking air cover, they suffered heavy losses and by the end of the day were forced to retreat again to the eastern bank of the Neman.” Thus, the German Air Force becomes a miracle weapon, scattering Red Army tank formations with hundreds of tanks. Refusal to admit the obvious, the loss of the crossing under a sudden attack, gives rise to the need for additional explanations. All these explanations begin to sound especially unconvincing against the backdrop of the fifty T-34 tanks that the 5th Tank Division had at the beginning of the war. People ask themselves: “Okay, senseless counterattacks, but is it the Germans themselves who are in trouble?! Stop and shoot them on the spot!” On the move, another explanation for the general failure appears - the lack of armor-piercing shells in the T-34. This whole hastily constructed building collapses when trying to figure out where the Luftwaffe got such inhuman efficiency? Then, based on such omissions and exaggerations, conspiracy theories flourish.

Chief of Staff of the 3rd Mechanized Corps P.A. Rotmistrov, to whom Yezhov refers in his article, does not build any intricate cause-and-effect relationships for failure. In his memoirs there is not a word about the battles on the outskirts of Alytus, on the western bank of the Neman. In “Steel Guard” Rotmistrov writes the following: “Division commander Colonel F.F. Fedorov managed to advance to the bridge at Alytus only the artillery of the 5th motorized rifle regiment, a separate anti-aircraft artillery division and the 2nd battalion of the 9th tank regiment. The artillerymen and tank crews, having brought the enemy tanks within 200–300 meters, opened direct fire. In 30–40 minutes of battle, they knocked out 16 enemy vehicles and temporarily detained a tank column of the Nazi 39th Motorized Corps.” In this version, there is no longer a contradiction with the documents of the 3rd TGr. The listed units of Colonel Fedorov's division advance to the bridge after its capture and delay the development of the offensive from the bridgehead on the eastern bank, knocking out a number of enemy tanks. Despite all the complaints against Rotmistrov as a memoirist in general, here he gives no reason to doubt his words.

If the Soviet 5th Panzer Division had managed to reach the bridges at Alytus earlier, crossing the Neman would have become a difficult task for the advanced formations of the 3rd Panzer Group. They would have had to wade through a certain number of different-sized tanks, and it was unlikely that she would have won the yellow jersey of the leader. However, Soviet tanks approached the bridges already when they were occupied by the Germans. Therefore, for the Soviet troops, the battle developed according to the scenario of “attack on the bridgehead”, and not “defense of the bridgehead position”. In the afternoon of June 22, tankers of the division F.F. Fedorov launched a series of attacks on enemy bridgeheads, but all of them were ineffective. Attacking T-34s were, of course, much more vulnerable than those occupying static positions, i.e. the answer to the question “What happened to 50 T-34s?” acquires a simpler and more obvious answer.

On the other hand, the Germans' attempts to break out of the bridgeheads were also initially unsuccessful. The installation from above was appropriate; the command of the tank group planned “to advance as far east of the Neman as possible on the first day.” However, Soviet tankers took advantageous positions on the reverse slopes of the heights on the approaches to Alytus. As 7th Panzer Division tanker Horst Orlov recalled, an attempt to advance east from the southern bridgehead immediately led to the loss of six tanks. They became victims of a Soviet tank ambush. Hoth continued to demand that all his corps “move further east, without waiting for the lagging divisions. On the evening of June 22 - offensive to the last opportunity." The XXXIX Corps was ordered to break through to Vilnius before the end of the day. But there was no talk yet of any breakthrough from the two successfully captured crossings. The situation has reached a state of stable equilibrium. The Soviet side could not eliminate the bridgeheads, the Germans could not “open” them. It was especially humiliating that the neighboring LVII Motorized Corps advanced further from the Neman to the east, reaching Varena late in the evening, having completed the task of the day.

In the evening, tanks of the 20th Panzer Division approached Alytus. They were sent to the northern bridgehead. At the same time, the approaching tank units transferred part of their ammunition to the tankers of Mainteufel’s division - as a result of a heavy daytime battle, they shot most of the ammunition. The approach of reinforcements changed the balance of forces. It was decided to take advantage of this, and immediately. The Germans' capture of two bridgeheads on the Neman at once gave them a certain freedom to choose the direction of the main attack. At about 21.00 on June 22, the northern bridgehead was “opened.” The Soviet 5th Tank Division was under threat of attack on its flank and rear. The idea of ​​eliminating the German bridgehead on the Neman had to be abandoned. The battered units of Fedorov's division began to retreat from Alytus to the northeast. However, the Germans no longer had time to take advantage of the opened opportunities for further advancement to the east. With the onset of darkness, the fighting ceases.

An evening report from the 3rd Panzer Group assessed the battle of Alytus as "the largest tank battle of the war" for the 7th Panzer Division. This means, obviously, not the war with the USSR, but the Second World War, which began on September 1, 1939. The losses of the Soviet 5th Tank Division in the battle report to the headquarters of Army Group Center were estimated at 70 tanks, in the ZhBD 3- th TGr - 80 tanks. Accordingly, its own losses before the 3rd TGr reported amounted to 11 tanks, including 4 “heavy” ones (apparently, we are talking about Pz.IV). It is not entirely clear what losses are meant. Most likely - irrevocable. Accordingly, the total losses should be at least two to three times greater. According to Soviet data, out of 24 T-28 tanks that participated in the battle, 16 were lost, out of 44 T-34 - 27, out of 45 BT-7 - 30. A total of 73 vehicles, which is quite consistent with German data.

It cannot be said that Goth was completely satisfied with the results of the day. The point was not even that it was not possible to immediately break through from the bridgeheads at Alytus to the east. At the end of the day, the combat log of the 3rd TGr recorded the following: “One can doubt whether it was even necessary and advisable to introduce infantry divisions into battle in view of the enemy’s actual position that has now become clear.” Due to some overestimation by German intelligence of the Red Army forces opposing the 3rd TGr, its formation as a “tunneling shield” was not optimal from the point of view of the situation.

Hoth's motorized corps on June 22 were squeezed between the army corps and deeply echeloned in depth. The undeniable advantage of this situation was peace of mind behind the rear, where scattered Soviet units still remained. Otherwise, the narrowing of the hull stripes contained a lot of disadvantages. It slowed down the advance of the group, and also deprived the vanguards that encountered enemy resistance of the support of artillery that was far behind. In addition, the strict division of offensive zones excluded legitimate tank targets from the control of motorized corps. Thus, the slow advance of the VI AK to Prienay (it reached the river only on June 23) led to the explosion of the only bridge across the Neman there. If a tank division had reached Prienay, the bridge would have been captured already in the first hours of the war, when the Red Army was still in the stupor of transition from a state of peace to a state of war. The best option for the 3rd TGr would be a breakthrough on a wide front to the Neman with motorized corps, with a quick capture of all crossings. We have to admit once again that what we are facing is far from a “perfect storm.”

If only “professional armies” represented by tank groups had invaded the territory of the USSR, then the Red Army would have been able to cope with them. However, in addition to the motorized corps, the viscous mass of German infantry from the field armies crossed the border. They began the “march to the East” at the same time as the tank groups - at 3.15 Berlin time on June 22.

The offensive zone of the 3rd Panzer Group was directly adjacent to the zone of the VIII Army Corps of the German 9th Army. This corps, aimed at the city of Grodno, had one important advantage from the very beginning. Unlike its neighbor, the XX Corps, it was mostly located in the protrusion of the border on the southern bank of the Augustow Canal. The left flank 256th Infantry Division of the XX Corps pulled out the same winning ticket. Three German divisions did not need to cross the canal under fire and waste time building a bridge (we already know what this entails from the example of Guderian’s group). At the same time, Grodno was literally a stone's throw away. The report of the headquarters of the VIII Corps, written following the battles, said: “Long-range flat fire from the corps artillery produced a successful wake-up call in the Grodno barracks.” A powerful artillery fist was generally an important advantage of the VIII Corps: it was assigned 14 divisions of heavy and super-heavy artillery, as well as a regiment of rocket launchers. These included: a battalion of 150 mm guns, four battalions of 210 mm howitzers, a battalion of 240 mm guns and two battalions of 305 mm guns. The VIII and neighboring XX Corps were the only formations on the Eastern Front on 22 June 1941 with 12-inch (305 mm) artillery.

While long-range guns were setting up a “wake-up” in the Grodno barracks, 240-mm and 305-mm shells fell on the border fortifications. Thanks to the terrifying force of fire, the border fortifications were quickly overcome, and already at 5.15 the 8th Infantry Division reported their breakthrough. On the way of the VIII Corps, only isolated pockets of resistance remained in the bunkers of the Grodno fortified area.

The commander of the 28th Infantry Division of the VIII Corps, in a report on the battles in the Sopotskino area, wrote: “In the fortification area from Sopotskino and north ... we are talking primarily about the enemy, who firmly decided to hold out at any cost and did so. The offensive according to the basic principles currently in force did not give success here... Only with the help of powerful demolition means could one destroy one bunker after another... The division’s means were not enough to capture numerous structures.” The report described Soviet defense tactics as follows: “The garrisons took cover when attacking into the lower floors. It was impossible to capture them there... As soon as the assault groups rolled back, the enemy came to life again and occupied the embrasures, as far as they were still unharmed.” The resistance of individual bunkers here continued for several days, when the front line rolled far away from the border.

The 256th Division, advancing to the right of the VIII Corps, also encountered stubbornly defended bunkers of the Grodno UR. The division’s combat log noted: “In the zone of the 476th brigade, which advances to the right of the 481st brigade through Krasne and Lipsk, things are also going well at first, but in the Krasne area the regiment finds itself drawn into serious battles for bunkers, and in the area Lipska faces powerful enemy resistance." However, while some battalions got involved in battles for the bunkers, others successfully overcame the fortifications, and as a result, the formation as a whole successfully moved forward.

Under a hail of blows, the integrity of the Soviet defense in the Grodno direction was violated. Two divisions from the VIII Corps and one from the XX Corps broke through to the Augustow-Grodno highway and quickly advanced towards Grodno. Another division of the VIII Corps was advancing towards the Neman. The 56th Infantry Division of the 3rd Army, occupying the defensive on a wide front, could not withstand the blow of the mass of German infantry, supported by a powerful artillery fist. The strength of the enemy's artillery, it must be said, was noted by the Soviet side. In the next report of the 3rd Army to the headquarters of the Western Front, the following words were heard: “The enemy is using massive artillery fire in cooperation with aviation.”

The collapse of the defense of the 56th Infantry Division under enemy pressure forced V.I. Kuznetsov to take urgent measures to restore the integrity of the army’s defense front. The only mobile reserve in his hands was the 11th Mechanized Corps of Major General D.K. Mostovenko. On the first day of the war, from the moment the German planes raided Volkovysk at 4.00, there was no communication with the headquarters of the 3rd Army and the district headquarters, and parts of the corps moved independently to the Grodno area according to the cover plan. This promotion was fully consistent with the command’s idea of ​​using the mechanized corps to support the front of the rifle units. The support, however, was not of the best quality. As Mostovenko later wrote, due to a lack of equipment and weapons, approximately 50% of the formations’ personnel were taken on the campaign. The rest were sent to the rear.

Of the three formations of the 11th Mechanized Corps, only two could actually participate in the battle on June 22: the 29th and 33rd tank divisions. Due to the lack of vehicles, the 204th Motorized Division was able to move only its headquarters and one motorized infantry battalion to Grodno from its permanent location in Volkovysk. The shortage of vehicles also affected the actions of Mostovenko's tank divisions. The infantry moving on foot lagged behind the tanks. Nevertheless, two Soviet tank divisions went on the attack with the task of “destroying the advancing enemy.” However, “two divisions” is a strong word. It would be more correct to call them “battle groups” or “detachments” of two divisions.

On the first day of the fighting near Grodno, the fate of all three KV tanks in Mostovenko’s corps was decided. One capsized and sank in the swamp. The second was immobilized by hits to the chassis. This was most likely the first KV tank that the Germans encountered in battle. Oddly enough, there were no reports of this collision with the new Soviet armored vehicles. At least none have been discovered yet. The third KV of the 11th mechanized corps was faulty and remained in the workshops; it was later blown up during the retreat. If the first tank battle of the Great Patriotic War took place near Alytus, then near Grodno the German infantry felt the taste of the meeting with T-34 machine guns. They made an impression on the enemy. According to Mostovenko, “enemy tanks that tried to attack our tanks were knocked out, and the remaining ones held on to the defending infantry.” We are obviously talking about the Sturmgeschütz battalion, which supported the advance of the VIII Corps.

However, even without the Sturmgeschutz, the infantrymen had the means to fight Soviet tanks, including the T-34. In total, according to German data, on June 22, 180 Soviet tanks were destroyed in battles on the outskirts of Grodno, of which only the 8th Infantry Division reported 80 units. Later, the latter's request was adjusted upward - up to 115 tanks. The advanced units of the 256th Infantry Division, which advanced to Novy Dvor, were also attacked by Soviet tanks. The Germans reported 8 tanks that they had knocked out in positions in Novy Dvor. If we accept the German request as a base one, we are talking about knocking out at least half of the vehicles from the 384 tanks of the 11th mechanized corps.

Interestingly, both sides subsequently regarded their actions as more or less successful. Mostovenko wrote in his report: “The pr-k, attacked by tank divisions, suspended the offensive and went on the defensive, using populated areas and rivers.” In turn, the VIII Corps report on Soviet tank attacks said the following: “They tried to crush the advancing wedge of the VIII Corps, introducing more and more attacking echelons (a total of more than 500 tanks in 13–14 echelons). After the loss of more than 120 tanks, the attacks were stopped."

In this case, the truth lies in the middle. A counterattack by the 11th Mechanized Corps of the 3rd Army managed to avoid an immediate German breakthrough to Grodno along the highway. The combat log of the German 8th Division states this directly and unambiguously: “The advance has been stopped, the commander of the 84th Infantry Division is forced to abandon his intention to take Grodno with a quick blow.” About the nature of the resistance of the Soviet troops, in the evening report of the 1s (intelligence) department of the 9th Army on June 23, the following words were said: “The Russians fight to the last, preferring death to captivity (order of the political commissars). Large losses of personnel, few prisoners."

However, only two Soviet tank divisions could not completely eliminate the crisis that arose on the morning of June 22. North of Grodno, along the northern bank of the Augustow Canal, the 161st Infantry Division of the VIII Corps reached the Neman. Already at noon, one regiment was transported across the river, and by evening a bridge was built. The threat of bypassing Grodno from the north was taken very seriously. Later, during interrogation, Pavlov spoke about a conversation that took place on the evening of June 22 with the commander of the 3rd Army. Pavlov recalled: “When I asked what the situation was on his right flank, Kuznetsov replied that the situation there, in his opinion, was catastrophic, since scattered units in the Kose region (north of Grodno) were having difficulty holding back the enemy’s onslaught, and the rifle regiment located between Kose and Druskeniki, was crushed by a blow from the rear of very large mechanized units, but that he is now collecting everything he has at hand and throwing it into the Kose area.”

"Kose" (Hoza) is a town north of Grodno on the highway to Druskeninkai. The “large mechanized units” are most likely the left flank units of the LVII Corps of the 3rd Panzer Group. Kuznetsov’s anxiety can be understood; this was a detour of the flank of his army by enemy mechanized formations. Therefore, he directly told Pavlov that “we will have to leave Grodno.” The city of Grodno itself was a fairly strong position. The path of the enemy attacking the city from the west was blocked by the Neman River, which encircles the city.

The German researcher of the Bialystok “cauldron” Heydorn writes:

“Even early in the morning of June 23, the 8th Infantry Division believed that there would be a bloody crossing of the Neman and the capture of Grodno in battle. The last additions were made to the attack order at 07.15. The greater the surprise and relief when the reconnaissance battalion of the 8th Infantry Division reported that it had managed to occupy the bridge south of Grodno at 08.50. The banks of the Neman and Grodno were cleared by the enemy.

During the morning hours the division crossed the Neman on a bridge south of Grodno. While the 84th Infantry Division remained to cover the division's flank south of Grodno and in the city itself, the main part of the division, with a reconnaissance battalion in the vanguard, began to move north of the Neman in the direction of the southeast, to Skidel, with the reconnaissance battalion of the 8th Infantry Division encountered strong enemy resistance only at 19.00 on the banks of the Kotra (24 km southeast of Grodno, 4 km west of Skidel).”

Front commander Pavlov, in his order sent to the 3rd Army shortly after midnight on June 22, clearly and unambiguously set the task: “You must firmly hold Grodno by all means.”

In a word, Kuznetsov’s decision to leave Grodno was, to say the least, controversial, although understandable. It significantly worsened the conditions in which the 3rd Army had to fight in the following days. In addition, stocks of ammunition were concentrated in Grodno, some of which had to be distributed to the troops, and some of which had to be blown up. As a result, already on June 24, Kuznetsov reported to the front headquarters: “An extremely difficult situation with ammunition has arisen in the units.” In turn, in the evening report of the 1c (reconnaissance) department of the 9th Army the following words were heard: “Large trophies of weapons, ammunition and food were captured in Grodno.”

During the period of preparation for the invasion, a discussion arose among the commanders of the 2nd Air Fleet regarding the most appropriate time to strike the airfields. Lieutenant Colonel Paul Deitchmann, chief of staff of the II Air Corps, believed that it was inappropriate to fly over the border at the same time as the start of artillery preparation. Taking into account the need to attack targets deep in the Soviet defense, this gave approximately a 40-minute interval to bring the airfields to combat readiness. The Soviet command could lift the planes into the air, and the attacking German bombers could reach the empty airfields, carefully reconnoitered by Rovel’s team. Flying over the border used to deprive ground forces of surprise. The same thoughts worried other commanders of air units of the 2nd Air Fleet. As a result, the commander of the 51st Fighter Squadron Mölders and the commander of the VIII Air Corps Richthoffen turned to the fleet commander Kesselring with a proposal, the essence of which could be characterized by the phrase: “We will sneak up on airfields at high altitude, like aerial reconnaissance aircraft.” The planes assigned for the strike had to gain maximum altitude above the territory occupied by German troops, and then cross the border in the dark over swampy and forested areas, with muffled engines. This proposal was accepted by Kesselring.

The main target of the German pilots, who flew over the border in the dark, was the airfields of the 9th mixed air division. However, it cannot be said that the strike plan simultaneously with the artillery barrage completely worked. Commander of the 129th Fighter Regiment, Captain Yu.M. Berkal, having heard the artillery cannonade, immediately (at his own peril and risk) declared a combat alert. Fighters took off from the Tarnovo airfield. In total, during the day they carried out 74 sorties to cover the airfield. Soviet pilots announced the destruction of 2 Me-109 fighters. One aircraft was lost in an air battle, another did not return from a combat mission. 27 MiG-3s and 11 I-153s were lost on the ground.

In the neighboring 124th Fighter Aviation Regiment, Major I.P. Polunin also sounded the alarm on time. The deputy regiment commander, Captain H.A., took to the air. Kruglov and ml. Lieutenant D.V. Kokorev. The latter managed to intercept and shoot down with a ramming blow a twin-engine, two-keel vehicle, identified as Do-217. In reality it was an Me-110 fighter. He was destined to become the first aircraft lost by the Germans on the Eastern Front. The first German attack on the Wysokie Mazowieckie airfield did not achieve its goal. However, the secret of success on June 22 was not the first strike on the “sleeping airfield,” but the conveyor of subsequent strikes one after another. The Germans carried out about 70 sorties per day at the airfield of the 124th Regiment, alternating attacks by Me-110 and He-111. Sooner or later there came a time when all the planes found themselves grounded, refueling or reloading weapons. As a result, the Germans managed to shoot down and destroy 30 Soviet aircraft.

Subjective factors also played a role. The commander of the 9th Air Division, General Chernykh, was confused and did not take any measures to withdraw the regiments from the attack. More precisely, he did not have his own unattacked airfields, and Chernykh was unable or did not have time to coordinate and organize a maneuver further to the east. As a result, the newest aircraft were finished off almost without interference in the second and subsequent strikes. In just one day, the division lost 347 aircraft out of 409 available.

A more favorable balance of forces for the Germans in the central sector of the Soviet-German front allowed them to attack almost all the airfields of the three air divisions subordinate to the armies and even reach the Bobruisk airfield of the 13th Bomber Air Division. Moreover, even airfields not occupied by aircraft were attacked. This dense exposure meant that the regiments of the 9th, 10th and 11th Air Divisions were subjected to systematic air attacks throughout the day.

At the Leishche airfield, where the 127th Fighter Aviation Regiment of the 11th Air Division was based, a combat alert was announced at 3:25 a.m. on June 22. Already at 3:30 a.m., a duty flight of three aircraft took off. By telephone from the VNOS post they reported that German bombers, accompanied by fighters, had crossed the border. The remaining aircraft of the duty squadron were immediately scrambled. During the day of June 22, the 127th Regiment did not limit itself to covering its airfield. The regiment's fighters fought over Grodno, Lida, and Augustow. Some pilots made 8-9 sorties, which was actually at the limit of human capabilities. 10 of their own aircraft were lost in air battles, and the pilots announced the destruction of 11 enemy aircraft. Among the requests of the 127th regiment, FV-198 aircraft appear several times. Oddly enough, these losses are confirmed by the enemy. Only two FV-189 reconnaissance aircraft, “frames”, were lost in the Grodno area. One of them was completely lost, the crew died.

If the airfields where the fighters were based could still stand up for themselves, then the airfields of the bombers, in the absence of airfield maneuver, turned out to be an easy and rewarding target. In the 16th Bomber Regiment of the same 11th Air Division, German bombing raids disabled 23 SBs and 37 Pe-2s.

The move forward of the fighter aviation airfields of the Western Special Military District led to the fact that by the middle of the day on June 22, 1941, not even tanks, but German infantrymen, accompanied by Sturmgeschüts, approached one of the airfields. This was the Novy Dvor airfield of the 122nd IAP of the 11th Air Division. Shortly before the start of hostilities, the roar of engines on German territory could be heard. But these were not tanks. Most likely, these were artillery tractors - on the other side of the border, numerous artillery of the VIII Army Corps was moving into position. Having broken through the defenses on the border with the help of this artillery, the German infantry rushed forward and reached the Soviet airfield by noon.

In the combat log of the 256th Infantry Division it was described as follows: “The 481st Infantry Division, after the capture of Selko, continuously advances in the direction of Novy Dvor. At 12.30 he goes to the airfield, located approximately 4 km north of Novy Dvor, and with the fire of heavy machine guns, together with the battery of assault guns subordinate to him, destroys 38 aircraft on the ground preparing for takeoff, after which he sets fire to numerous hangars, which also contain aircraft.” .

Most likely, for our pilots the quick breakthrough of the Germans to the airfield came as a big surprise and the loss of aircraft actually amounted to dozens of aircraft. By the beginning of the war, 59 I-16 fighters were based at the Novy Dvor airfield. They were able to survive the morning raid on the “sleeping airfield”. By order of the deputy commander captain V.M. The Wuhanev regiment managed to take off before the enemy bombers appeared. Losses on the ground were minor. The commander of the 11th Air Division, Colonel P.I., who flew in his I-16 to the Novy Dvor airfield. Ganichev, assessing the situation, ordered the regiment to relocate to Lida. It is unknown how many vehicles managed to carry out this order and fly to other airfields - to Lida and Lesishche. At 24.00 on June 23, only 2 I-16s remained in service at the Leishche airfield from the 122nd Air Regiment. It is quite possible that the regiment nevertheless lost most of its “donkeys” in Novy Dvor under the fire of machine guns and cannons of the Sturmgeschutz.

The basing system of the 10th Mixed Air Division was located in the operational zone of Mölders' 51st Fighter Squadron. Its Messerschmitts were actively involved in attacks on Soviet aircraft lined up at airfields. The Kuplin and Pruzhany airfields of the 33rd Fighter Aviation Regiment were attacked three times. At 4.10 am there was one Xe-111 aircraft, at 5.30 – 15 Xe-111 aircraft. However, a series of assault attacks by Me-109 fighters at 8.40-9.50 put an end to it. As a result, as stated in the report of the Western Front Air Force headquarters, “the materiel of the 33rd IAP, consisting of 44 aircraft, was completely destroyed on the ground.”

74th attack air regiment of the 10th air division, based at the Mal airfield. The factories were also completely destroyed. As indicated in the operational report of the air division dated 14.45 on June 22, “the equipment from the assault attacks and bombing was withdrawn to 100%.” The trophy of the Germans, who soon entered this airfield, was 8 damaged new Il-2 attack aircraft. Soon these machines will become the main attack aircraft of the Red Army Air Force. The second strike regiment of the 10th Air Division - the 39th High-Speed ​​Bomber - survived four attacks, resulting in the loss of 43 SBs and 5 Pe-2s.

The Imenin airfield, where the 123rd Fighter Aviation Regiment was located, was subject to five raids by the middle of the day on June 22. The main blow was dealt by a series of almost continuous attacks in the period from 13.55 to 14.42 by forces of 9 Xe-111s and 12 Me-110s. 18 aircraft were rescued from the attack. Also at the airfield, 8 Yak-1s remained undamaged. This gives us a figure of 53 aircraft of the 123rd regiment disabled. The regiment commander, Major B.N., died. Surin. It should be said that before its defeat, the regiment actively covered Kobrin. The claims of the IV group of the 51st fighter squadron (IV/JG51) list 11 I-153 and DI-6 shot down on the morning of June 22 in the Kobrin area. So not all the aircraft of the 123rd Regiment were lost on the ground.

The actions of Mölders' squadron as attack aircraft were very effective. In total, on the day of June 22, the 51st Fighter Squadron destroyed 129 Soviet aircraft on the ground. Some fighter units destroyed more aircraft on the ground than in the air. Thus, the II Group of the squadron (II/JG51) announced the destruction of 63 vehicles at airfields, and only 28 in air battles.

Already from the first hours of the war, the imperfection of the organizational structure of the Red Army Air Force began to manifest itself. The 9th, 10th and 11th air divisions were formally subordinated to the armies. In the hands of the commander of the Air Force of the Western Front, I.I. Kopets only had the 12th, 13th Bomber Air Divisions, the 3rd Long-Range Aviation Corps and the 43rd Fighter Air Division. The latter's fighters were based in the Orsha region and could not participate in battles on the border. So Kopec could only throw SB and DB-3 into battle, and without fighter cover.

From the middle of the day on June 22, General Kopec actively used the bomber aircraft of the 12th and 13th Air Divisions, as well as the 3rd Long-Range Bomber Corps. Retaliatory strikes were aimed at known enemy airfields, Bug crossings and columns of mechanized units.

One of the targets of the Soviet bombers was the Biała Podlaska airfield, where dive bombers from the 77th squadron (StG77) were based. Air bombs exploded on the airfield - six twin-engine planes with red stars on their wings slowly floated in the sky above the airfield. The Messerschmitt attack followed immediately. The detachment commander, Captain G. Pabst, wrote in his diary:

“The first one opened fire on the move, thin strips of tracks stretched between the two cars. The huge bird falls awkwardly on its side, its silver fuselage sparkling in the sun, after which it rushes vertically to the ground, accompanying its fall with the intensifying, insane howl of its engines. A huge pillar of fire rose up - the end had come for the Russians! Soon the second bomber bursts into flames and explodes as it hits the ground. Fragments of blades flew into the air. The next car set on fire seems to encounter an invisible obstacle and roll over its nose. Then another bomber dies, and another. The last SB of the group falls directly on a village near the airfield, after which a fire rages there for an hour. Six columns of smoke rose at the horizon - all six bombers were shot down!

This picture was typical for June 22 - the lists of victories of groups of German fighter squadrons for this day mainly included bombers. Attempts to counter the Germans with bombers not covered by fighters led to heavy losses. The 13th Air Division lost 64 bombers (mostly SB) during the day in air battles and from ground fire.

The result of the day for the Western Front Air Force was the loss of 738 aircraft, of which 528 aircraft were lost on the ground. Losses in the air were distributed as follows: 133 were shot down by enemy fighters and 18 by anti-aircraft guns, and 53 did not return from a combat mission. These data fit well with German claims for Soviet aircraft shot down on the first day of the war. Single-engine fighters of the 2nd Air Fleet alone claimed to have destroyed 180 Red Star aircraft of all types in air battles. Taking into account the fact that part of the forces of the VIII Air Corps operated over the territory of the Baltic District, the application can be considered quite close to reality.

At the end of the day, the commander of the Western Front Air Force I.I. Kopets personally flew over many airfields of the air divisions entrusted to him in a fighter. Seeing with his own eyes the broken and charred skeletons of fighters, the ranks of bombers chipped after losses in the air, after landing at 18.00 on June 22, he shot himself. It is likely that if he had not done this, he, along with the commander of the ZapOVO Pavlov, could have ended up in the dock. Instead of Kopets, this fate befell one of his former subordinates. The commander of the 9th Air Division, Major General C.A. The blacks were accused of criminal inaction, arrested, tried and soon shot.

On the second day of the war, the intensity of the fighting over the airfields decreased somewhat. However, the Germans continued to attack some of them. On the night of June 22-23, the 127th Regiment moved to Lida airfield. However, in the conditions of changing the airfield, serious organizational and technical difficulties arose, which led to a sad ending. The documents of the 127th Regiment say the following about this: “Due to the fact that the refueling of our aircraft was not ensured, they could not take off and were disabled during the attack.” As a result, at 24.00 on June 23, only 2 I-16s and 10 I-153s remained at the Leishche airfield in the 122nd and 127th air regiments. The air division of Colonel Ganichev, who died on June 22, practically ceased to exist.

According to the data given in the report of the Western Front Air Force headquarters, on June 23, 125 aircraft were lost, including 63 aircraft at airfields.

The Western Front command needed to assess the enemy's actions and plans and develop countermeasures accordingly. Comrade Pavlov, unfortunately, did not have the same data on the actions of Army Group Center that von Bock had and that we have today. He looked at the enemy through the prism of intelligence data. What did he see? The conclusions of intelligence report No. 1 of the Western Front headquarters dated 14.00 on June 22 stated: “The enemy’s main desire is to capture Grodno.” In the following intelligence report No. 2 of 16.15 on June 22, this thesis was supported by an additional argument: “The main efforts of the enemy air forces are directed towards Grodno, Lida.”

The evening (20.00) intelligence report from the headquarters of the Western Front for June 22 read: “At dawn on June 22, 1941, German troops consisting of up to 30–32 infantry divisions, 4–5 tank divisions, two motorized divisions, 4–5 aviation regiments, an airborne division , 40 artillery regiments went on the offensive against the Western Front." From a formal point of view, the scouts were not much mistaken. Only four tank divisions of the 2nd Panzer Group actually crossed the Soviet-German border within the front demarcation lines. The 3rd Panzer Group broke through into the zone of the neighboring North-Western Front. This was especially noted in the intelligence report; the enemy forces on the other side of the demarcation line, near the neighbors, were estimated at two tank and two motorized divisions.

A completely different picture appears before us if we look at the distribution of these enemy forces in various directions. The intelligence report stated that two tank and two motorized divisions were operating in the Grodno direction. In reality, there were no mechanized German formations near Grodno, only infantry. Thus, 2–3 tank divisions remained for the remaining directions. Another tank division was “discovered” by front reconnaissance on the southern front of the Bialystok ledge. In reality, there were no tanks here, just infantry. At best, a reinforced self-propelled gun "Sturmgeschutz". The bottom line is that 1–2 tank divisions remain in the Brest direction. There is a significant underestimation of the enemy on the left wing of the Western Front.

On the one hand, the shortsightedness of intelligence is explained by its weaknesses. Aviation on the Western Front suffered heavy losses, and therefore it was difficult to clarify the situation by aerial reconnaissance. It seems that our pilots were unable to closely examine the areas west of the Bug in the Brest region. There remained such an objective criterion as the depth of the enemy’s penetration and the use of tanks in battle. The penetration in the Brest direction on June 22 was not yet deep. Due to problems with crossings near Lemelsen's corps, large masses of tanks also did not appear on the horizon. It is not surprising that Pavlov immediately focused on what seemed to be a more dangerous direction - Grodno. The junction with the Northwestern Front was fraught with the same danger.

The last straw was the opinion of the top leadership of the Red Army. The grains of Directive No. 3, which arrived from Moscow at ten o’clock in the evening of the first day of the war, fell onto the soil, abundantly manured by reports of breakthroughs near Grodno. In it, Pavlov’s troops were given the following task:

“The armies of the Western Front, holding back the enemy in the Warsaw direction, launch a powerful counterattack with the forces of at least two mechanized corps and front aviation on the flank and rear of the enemy’s Suwalki group, destroy it together with the North-Western Front and, by the end of June 24, capture the Suwalki area.”

On the Southwestern Front, by the evening of June 22, the situation was more or less dealt with and Directive No. 3 was actually ignored. On the Western Front, on the contrary, it fully corresponded to the ideas of Pavlov and his staff about the actions and goals of the enemy. Moreover, soon after receiving the directive, Marshal Kulik and Marshal Shaposhnikov arrived at front headquarters. Kulik immediately went to the 10th Army for the 6th Mechanized Corps.

Twenty minutes before midnight on June 22, a conversation took place between Pavlov and Boldin. The front commander ordered his deputy: “Organize a strike group consisting of Khatskelevich’s corps plus the 36th Cavalry Division, Mostovenko’s units and strike in the general direction of Bialystok, Lipsk, south of Grodno with the task of destroying the enemy on the left bank of the river. Neman and prevent its units from entering the Volkovysk region."

As we see, Pavlov was waiting for an attack on Volkovysk, that is, an enemy attack to the rear of the front to a relatively shallow depth. Oddly enough, this decision of Pavlov played into the hands of Guderian. Brest was not included among the directions in which it was planned to use the reserves of the Western Front. This saved the “fast Heinz” wards from an early meeting with the T-34 and KV tanks of the 6th mechanized corps of Khatskilevich. Of course, Guderian did not take any deliberate action for this. He didn’t cut the bridge under his division’s tank. You can call it whatever you want - luck, luck, favor of the gods. Before the war, the 6th Mechanized Corps was stationed in the center of the Bialystok ledge. This position made it possible to extend it, if necessary, to any point on the perimeter of the ledge. Covering the highway from Brest to Baranovichi was a completely logical decision. But that did not happen. The commander of the 2nd Panzer Group received a “green light” in the direction of Baranovichi and even Minsk.

At the same time, one should not think that the Brest direction was left to the mercy of fate by Pavlov. However, in accordance with the enemy’s assessment, the front commander began to reinforce the 4th Army with infantry. In principle, this even corresponded to “home preparation” in the form of a cover plan. It said: “The 47th rifle corps, consisting of the 55th, 121st and 155th rifle divisions, which from M-3 to M-10 is concentrated in area of ​​Pruzhany, Zaprudy, Bereza-Kartuska, Bluden and before receiving a combat mission prepares a defensive line on the front of Murava, Pruzhany, the Dnieper-Bug Canal to Gorodets.” It was this section of the cover plan that began to be implemented.

Pavlov was also forced to be puzzled by the position of the 10th Army. It was attacked on a wide front by infantry with the crossing of the Bug. Holding positions on the border was no longer possible. Therefore, Pavlov ordered the commander of Army 10, General Golubev, to withdraw troops to the eastern bank of the river on the night of June 23. Narew and organize a strong defense at this line. Reliance on the water barrier made it possible to ensure at least some stability of the defense.

The first days and even hours of a battle are of great importance for its further development. Decisions made at this time are already difficult to adjust. At this point, we can confidently admit that targeting Boldin’s group at the Grodno area was a serious mistake by the Soviet command. First of all, it was an intelligence miscalculation. Interestingly, in the report on the combat activities of the Western Front Air Force for 1941, it was written without the slightest doubt: “... aerial reconnaissance in the very first days of the war promptly revealed the Suwalki group of enemy motorized mechanized troops and its further advance in the direction of Grodno and further to the east.” I would like to draw your attention to the “enemy’s motorized mechanized troops,” i.e., the most dangerous from the point of view of possible encirclement. In reality, infantry formations of the German 9th Army were advancing in this direction. They also posed a significant threat to the 3rd Army, but the level of danger was significantly lower. Parrying infantry actions did not necessarily require the use of the most powerful mobile formation of the Western Front - the 6th Mechanized Corps. However, it was he who advanced to meet the German infantry regiments walking along the dusty roads.

Launched on the evening of June 22, the counterattack flywheel with a large mass of tanks could no longer be stopped. A group of two corps moved to their starting positions for a counterattack. I.V. Boldin recalled:

“The commander of the 6th mechanized corps, Major General M.G., arrived at the command post. Khatskilevich. That's what I need! I set him the task - with the onset of darkness, surrender to the units of the 10th Army the occupied line of defense along the eastern bank of the Narev and by morning concentrate in the forest ten kilometers north-eastern Bialystok. The 29th mechanized division is to be transferred from Slonim to Sokolka at night and placed in defense at the Kuznitsa-Sokolka line in order to cover the deployment of the main forces of the 6th mechanized corps and the 36th cavalry division. Then, at dawn, launch a counterattack in the direction of Bialystok, Grodno and, interacting with the 11th mechanized corps, which had already entered the battle south of Grodno, defeat the enemy group advancing on Krynki.”

In reality, the troops of the 10th Army completely failed to “surrender” the defense line along the Narev. Very significant forces of the 6th Mechanized Corps were left there. However, in general, Boldin’s memories in this case are consistent with the documents. The commander of the 7th Tank Division, Borzilov, in his report on the results of the battles, wrote the following: “New information has arrived: the enemy tank division has broken through between Grodno and Sokulka. At 14.00 23.6 the division received a new mission - to move in the direction of Sokulka - Kuznitsa, to destroy the broken TD with access to the assembly area south of Grodno (approximately 140 km). Carrying out the task, the division in the first half of the day 24.6 concentrated on the line for attack south of Sokolka and old Dubovoe.” By the time it received a new mission, the 7th Panzer Division had already come under air attack. According to Borzilov’s report, the air bombing in the first half of the day on June 23 cost his division 63 tanks, “broken and dispersed by enemy aircraft,” and “all the rear of the regiments were destroyed.”

Borzilov also noted with annoyance that upon arrival at the scene, “reconnaissance established that there was no enemy tank division, but there were small groups of tanks interacting with infantry and cavalry.” In this case we are obviously talking about the Sturmgeschütz. How can one not recall the boastful statement of the headquarters of the Polar Fleet Air Force: “Aerial reconnaissance in the very first days of the war promptly revealed the Suwalki group of enemy motorized mechanized troops.”

Who was actually part of the mysterious “Suwalki group”? Units of the German XX Corps of the 9th Army advanced to the direction of the counterattack planned by the front command on June 23. The corps commander, General Materna, at that time assessed the situation very optimistically. Thus, during his stay at the headquarters of the 162nd Infantry Division in the morning of June 24, he casually said: “We can assume that the enemy is no longer capable of resistance, and it is enough to bring up artillery and quickly attack to force him to quickly retreat.”

However, one should not imagine the German infantry as harmless herbivores. Infantry units did not have the mobility of tanks, but they had a heavy hand. The task of the XX Army Corps was by no means an abstract occupation of the territory abandoned by the retreating Soviet troops. The corps moved forward with a ledge to the right with far-reaching goals. First, the left flank 256th Infantry Division was supposed to capture the crossing of the Neman at Lunna. Secondly, parts of the corps were supposed to create a barrage line with a front to the southwest, blocking the Soviet troops’ escape routes from the Bialystok ledge to the northeast. At the same time, with such a maneuver, Materna’s corps covered the flank of the neighboring VIII Corps, freeing its hands to break through to the rear of the Western Front.

The task for June 24 for the formations of the XX Corps was the exit of the 162nd Infantry Division to the Sidra area, and the 256th Infantry Division to the Indura area. Thus, the German infantry entered the area south of Grodno, narrowing the corridor for the retreat of the formations of the 3rd and 10th armies stationed on the border.

Until the Boldin group entered the area designated for the counterattack, the area south and southwest of Grodno remained under the jurisdiction of Kuznetsov’s 3rd Army formations. To be precise, the 11th mechanized corps of General Mostovenko operated here, supporting the crumbling defense of the rifle units. By order of Kuznetsov, the 11th Mechanized Corps was to withdraw to the Svisloch River on June 23. This decision was a direct consequence of the surrender of Grodno. Everything would have been fine, but Army Commander-3 gave the order for the withdrawal of the 29th Tank Division defending near Grodno over the head of Corps Commander-11 Mostovenko. As a result, she began to retreat, exposing the flanks of her neighbors. Mostovenko learned about the withdrawal from his technical assistant, Lieutenant Colonel Bozhko, who accidentally came across the columns of a tank regiment withdrawing from its positions. The corps commander stopped the retreat and ordered a return to their original positions. The 29th Panzer Division recaptured its previous position, losing 25 tanks.

In essence, at this time the 11th Mechanized Corps held positions from which it was possible to launch a counterattack by Boldin’s group. However, the abandonment of Grodno significantly complicated the situation. The German infantry slowly but surely pushed back Mostovenko's corps. At 2.00 am on June 24, units of the German 256th Infantry Division occupied Kuznitsa. The history of the regiment of this division notes that it was possible to “capture the Lososna crossings unharmed.” During the night, quite large forces accumulate in the village - 5.5 infantry battalions, artillery of all types, two divisions of Sturmgeschutz. At 7.00 am the Germans began to advance further south, towards Indura. However, Soviet tanks suddenly came out from the villages south of Kuznitsa to meet them. They came from nowhere under the cover of darkness and were not detected by intelligence. The German units attacked from different sides had to forget about their own offensive plans for some time.

The tanks seen by the German infantrymen were the first heralds of the arrival of Boldin's group. Compared to the composition planned by Pavlov on the evening of June 22, it was significantly weakened. The motorized rifle regiment of the 7th Tank Division and a significant part of the 4th Tank Division were removed from it. They were used to defend the Narew line west and southwest of Bialystok. The commander of the 4th Tank Division, Potaturchev, during interrogation in German captivity, later reported the following: “The rifle regiment with an artillery battalion received an order to defend the crossings across the Narev on the section Strable (railway bridge on the Bialystok - Belsk road) - Ploski (Bialystok - Belsk road). The division was thus divided into two parts." In the diagram that Potaturchev drew in captivity, at the turn of the Narev there is not even one division, but the entire artillery regiment of the division. Also, the commander of the 4th Panzer Division told the Germans who interrogated him that he was personally against splitting the division.

The actual composition of Boldin’s group, due to the lack of documents from the Soviet side, is difficult to establish. However, according to German intelligence, it was as follows:

29th Motorized Division;

7th Tank Division without motorized rifle regiment;

6th Cavalry Division;

36th Cavalry Division;

Possibly the 8th Tank Regiment of the 4th Tank Division. Thus, 3–4 tank regiments of the 6th mechanized corps and tank units of the 6th cavalry corps were concentrated in the hands of Boldin for a counterattack. The number of infantry, on the contrary, was very small - two motorized rifle regiments (29th Motorized Division) and cavalry regiments of the 6th Cavalry Corps. There was also little artillery. According to German estimates, at best, 3 heavy and 2 light artillery regiments of two divisions each took part in the battle.

The advancement of parts of Boldin's group did not go unnoticed. The command of the VIII Corps on June 24 was already planning to send its divisions further east, in pursuit with open flanks. However, aerial reconnaissance reported the approach of strong tank forces from Indura in the direction of Grodno and the accumulation of tanks in the Indura area. This forced us to temporarily postpone offensive plans and leave one regiment of the 8th Infantry Division near Grodno. It was further reinforced by a battalion of 150 mm howitzers. A division of 88-mm anti-aircraft guns installed south of Grodno became a serious help for the German infantry.

Meanwhile, the Soviet side was also preparing for the upcoming battles. Boldin prudently pushed forward the 29th Motorized Division to hold the initial positions for the counterattack. This was generally a standard solution for commanders of mechanized units in 1941. The 11th Mechanized Corps was withdrawing under enemy pressure, and this measure turned out to be not at all superfluous. If the situation had gotten out of control, the Germans could have managed to occupy the Sokolka road junction and seriously worsen the already not brilliant situation before the counterattack.

Units of Bikzhanov’s 29th Division reached the designated area on a broad front. This led to a collision with both formations of the XX Corps at once. One Soviet detachment in the morning hours of June 24 reached the village of Sidra, 17 km north of Sokolka. There he was met by a regiment of the 162nd Infantry Division. After a short battle, already at 11.00 (German time), a detachment of Bikzhanov’s division was thrown back. Having lost 7 tanks, he, however, was able to gain a foothold 3 km south of Sidra. Events developed more dramatically in the zone of action of the second detachment of the 29th motorized division. It was he who, in the early morning of June 24, encountered the advancing combat group of the 256th Infantry Division in the Kuznitsa area. Despite repeated counterattacks, the advance detachment was unable to completely stop the advance of the German infantry. By the evening of June 24, the front here rolled back about 5 km. According to German intelligence, the 47th Tank Regiment of the 29th Motorized Division took part in these battles. He was armed only with BT tanks, and he could not deliver a serious blow. Nevertheless, the units expelled by Boldin managed to slow down the pace of the German offensive.

The arrival of fresh forces allowed Mostovenko's 11th Mechanized Corps to feel more confident on the afternoon of June 24th. He took part in the attacks on Kuznitsa, in the area of ​​which the main forces of the 256th Infantry Division gradually gathered. Until the evening of June 24, the 11th Mechanized Corps carried out more than a dozen tank attacks. They were aimed mainly at Kuznitsa, but part of the forces of Mostovenko’s corps attacked the bridgehead of the German 8th Infantry Division south of Grodno. As German researcher of the Bialystok “cauldron” Heydorn writes: “German Stukas and artillery fire controlled by spotter aircraft, as well as direct fire, thwarted all these attacks.” In view of the threat of encirclement from Grodno and being subject to pressure from the front, Mostovenko was forced to give the order to withdraw from his positions.

By that time, according to Mostovenko’s report, about 60 tanks remained in the 29th Tank Division, including 10 T-34s. The shock capabilities of the corps in heavy battles on June 22–24 decreased significantly. There was no longer any talk of his participation in the counterattack together with Boldin’s group.

Nevertheless, the Germans highly appreciated the actions of Mostovenko’s corps and the advanced detachments of Boldin’s group. Already in the interim report of Army Group Center for June 24 (submitted at 19.45) the following words were heard:

“Strong enemy counterattack using tanks against Kuznitsa and Grodno from the south and southeast. There are heavy battles here (dive bombers attacked the attacking enemy tanks; an order was given to transfer here the 129th anti-tank division, one anti-aircraft battery of the VIII AK, as well as the 129th infantry division to the XX AK zone).”

The final report of the army group for the day stated that “XX AK and 8th Infantry VIII AK temporarily went on the defensive.”

When the battles with Soviet tanks were already in full swing, intelligence began to report the approach of more and more tank units. The report of the intelligence department of the XX Corps stated:

“Around 12.00 our reconnaissance officer reports a large concentration of enemy tanks (more than 200 tanks) in the Odelsk-Indura-Novosil area.”

The 256th Infantry Division's war log reported many such reports:

“Reconnaissance aircraft report throughout the day about large concentrations of the enemy, primarily tanks, in the area of ​​Indura, Dubova-Staraya, Odelsk, as well as columns of tanks and motorized artillery on the Bialystok-Sokolka-Kuznica highway.”

One can only imagine how Mattern dimmed when he learned that hundreds of Soviet tanks were approaching the positions of his corps. However, he had two full-blooded formations in the first line, the 162nd and 256th infantry divisions. I would like to emphasize: on Boldin’s path it was not a flank barrier, but a German strike group that had gone on the defensive.

Soon the tanks approaching from the south entered the battle. Actually, the offensive of Boldin’s group began precisely on the evening of June 24. According to German data, the first strike occurred only at 19.00 Berlin time. It is not entirely clear why the offensive began so late. Perhaps Boldin wanted to minimize the effect of German aviation. It is possible that the units were simply delayed on the march, and the command insisted on an immediate transition to the offensive. This version is supported by reports from German aerial reconnaissance, which reported the approach of mechanized columns on the afternoon of June 24. If they had arrived ahead of time and just waited in the wings, they would hardly have been noticed.

In his memoirs, Boldin presents the events very vaguely, confusing their dating. This, by the way, applies not only to the counterattack near Grodno; all his memoirs are just as blurry. However, Boldin mentions that Marshal Kulik came to the command post of his group. It is known that Kulik was in the 3rd Army on June 24. Perhaps he arrived at Boldin in the evening of the same day and, under his pressure, the tank units went on the offensive. There were literally a few hours left before darkness fell.

The first attack, which, according to German data, began at 19.00 on June 24, was aimed at the village of Sidru, which was occupied by the main forces of the 162nd Infantry Division. As the German researcher Heydorn writes, “this very vigorously launched offensive led to panic in Sidra.” The commander of the XX Corps, General Materna, was forced to decide to abandon his position and retreat several kilometers to the north. The commander of the 7th Tank Division, Borzilov, estimated the losses of his formation in this first full-fledged battle at 18 tanks, “burned out and stuck in the swamps.”

Already in the dark, at 1.00 am, an attack followed on the Dabrovo road junction. Apparently, this blow was carried out by units of the 36th Cavalry Division. The blow fell on the weak link of the German front. Dabrova was located at the junction between the 129th and 162nd infantry divisions. It was occupied by only one company. The situation quickly took such a threatening turn for the Germans that the command was forced to strengthen the defense by sending infantry and artillery units to Dabrova. Only early in the morning of June 25 did the Germans manage to regain a strong foothold in this road junction.

The morning report of Army Group Center (submitted at 7.10 on June 25) already named specific Soviet formations participating in the counterattack. Both tank divisions of Khatskilevich's mechanized corps were identified. The source of information is also interesting: “According to the testimony of a captured, seriously wounded major, the 7th Tank Division together with the 4th Tank Division (both from Bialystok) belong to the 6th Tank Corps.” The name of this major could not be established, but by the evening of the same day he also reported about the third division of the 6th Mechanized Corps participating in the battles - the 29th Motorized. Moreover, the prisoner gave fairly accurate information about its structure, telling the Germans the numbers of the tank and motorized rifle regiments of Bikzhanov’s division. Also in the morning report it was stated that during the battles south of Grodno, units of the XX Corps knocked out 67 Soviet tanks. Most likely, we are talking about the results of the previous day, i.e. June 24.

Early in the morning of June 25, the offensive of Boldin’s group was resumed. The attacks followed with artillery support, with the main attack directed between Sidra and Makovlany (3 km south-southwest of Sidra), to the rear of the units in Kuznitsa. Fierce fighting in this area lasted throughout the first half of the day, but even tactical success could not be achieved. The best achievement was a deep tank breakthrough near the village of Poganitsy, 5 km south of Sidra at about 10.00 on June 25.

At the same time, the positions of the neighboring 256th Infantry Division near Kuznica were attacked. The history of the regiment of this formation records: “As expected, all the Russian forces driven into the Bialystok cauldron tried to break through in the north-eastern and eastern directions. For this purpose, the road through Sokolka, Kuznitsa, and Grodno seemed especially convenient. On this road, during June 24 and 25, heavy attacks by enemy tanks had to be repelled (Lieutenant Pelican alone with his battery of self-propelled guns “Sturmgeschutz” disabled 36 tanks).” Interestingly, the Germans interpreted the Soviet counterattack as an attempt to break out of the encirclement.

It is unknown whether Boldin wanted to avoid air strikes with the evening attack, but at least it took place without systematic Luftwaffe influence. On the morning and afternoon of June 25, this was more than compensated for by a barrage of airstrikes. The Stukas of the VIII Air Corps fell upon the advancing Soviet units. The attacks were eventually stopped around 12:00. Parts of Boldin's group retreated in a southwestern direction. The commander of the 11th Mechanized Corps, Mostovenko, who observed the counterattack from the side, later wrote in his report on the results of the battles: “The offensive of the 6th Mk was not successful. 4th TD advanced to Kuzhnitsa and began to retreat."

The question may arise: why didn’t the KV and T-34 overthrow the German infantry? Firstly, there was a lot of it, and it was not a weak flank barrier, but a strike force with strong artillery. Secondly, the Soviet attack was carried out with weak support from motorized rifles, and German anti-tank crews could shoot at the tanks at point-blank range. Also, the invulnerability of new Soviet tanks is somewhat exaggerated. The commander of the 4th Tank Division, Potaturchev, during interrogation in captivity, said: “Light German anti-tank guns were ineffective against heavy Russian tanks (50–68 tons), they fought successfully against other tanks, including the T-34.” These are the words of a person who personally participated in the events described. The commander of the 7th Tank Division Borzilov later wrote in one of his reports on the battles in Belarus: “Personally overcame four anti-tank areas with KV and T-34 vehicles.” The driver's hatch cover was knocked out in one car, and the TPD apple was knocked out in the other.” . German aviation only completed what the infantry had already achieved.

The situation, I must say, was quite typical. In the same way, the German V Air Corps near Berestechko on the Southwestern Front forced the 12th Panzer Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps to retreat. At the same time, in Ukraine the Germans did not have the most effective dive bombers against ground targets. They were near Grodno. Of course, even the Yu-87 could not hit tanks effectively enough. But they could hit infantry and artillery. Without them, advancing forward with tanks alone was impossible. This scenario was repeated more than once during the war: near Stalingrad in September 1942, near Kursk in July 1943 (in the offensive phase of the operation). Repelling the attack near Grodno was only the first example of such actions.

The most offensive thing in the whole story with the counterattack of the 3rd Army and the Boldin group near Grodno is that there was a decent-sized “window” in the formation of the German troops. The VIII Corps report on the results of the battles said: “The gap gaping at Lososny between the 256th Division and the right wing of the 84th Infantry Regiment was of particular concern to the corps command, especially since there, at the Caroline airfield, the corps short-range reconnaissance squadron. If the Russians had launched an attack in the northwestern direction, they would not have encountered any resistance here.”

This gap could be detected by careful reconnaissance of the enemy. Its use brought any of the attacking Soviet tank formations, even the relatively weak divisions of the 11th Mechanized Corps, directly to the rear of the XX Army Corps. Moreover, it led directly to the corps headquarters in Novy Dvor. There is no doubt that such a blow, supplemented by attacks from the front, would force the Germans to falter and retreat. Near Dubno on the Southwestern Front, albeit by accident, the Soviet 34th Tank Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps managed to wedge itself into the gap between the advancing German battle groups. Unfortunately, this did not happen near Grodno.

The 11th Mechanized Corps actually did not participate in the counterattack on June 25th. Lieutenant General Boldin subjugated the 33rd Tank Division. The other two divisions of Mostovenko's corps solved purely defensive tasks. In particular, they had to repel the Germans’ attempt to cross the Neman from east to west, threatening the flank of the Soviet strike force near Grodno. Mostovenko confirms data about intensive German air strikes on the afternoon of June 25. He later wrote about this in his report: “A particularly intensified bombing was carried out on this day by aviation, and the rear areas that had survived from the previous days were destroyed. Not a single car could appear in the open without being destroyed. The location of the units was also subjected to continuous bombing and air strikes.”

In addition to air attacks, the reason for the withdrawal of parts of Boldin’s group from the battle was that they had already been conducting offensive operations for a long time, since the evening of June 24. Moreover, they went into battle from the march. It took time to refuel and maintain the cars. The commander of the 7th Tank Division, Borzilov, wrote in his report: “The division’s units were running out of fuel and lubricants; there was no way to refuel due to the lack of containers and main warehouses, although we managed to get one refueling from the burnt warehouses Kuznitsa and Krinki meter (in general They extracted fuel and lubricants as best they could).”

Nevertheless, Khatskilevich’s mechanized corps could continue the attacks several hours later. However, already at 15.40 on June 25, 1941, an order came from the headquarters of the Western Front to withdraw the 6th Mechanized Corps from the battle and concentrate in the Slonim area. This was due to the successes of Guderian's tank group. The history of this order will be told a little later. According to Borzilov’s report, the order reached units of the 6th Mechanized Corps “by the end of the day” on June 25.

One way or another, the counterattack of Boldin’s group can be considered completed at noon on June 25. What were its results? The German researcher of the Bialystok “cauldron” Heydorn wrote:

“Without a doubt, the Soviet attacks on June 24 and 25 south and southeast of Grodno ended in heavy tactical defeat. Despite the use of a large number of tanks, the Russians were unable to defeat the units of the German XX AK located in not very favorable positions.

On the contrary, heavy tank losses were suffered. According to XX AK, the number of destroyed Soviet tanks was as follows:

256th Infantry Division - 87;

162nd Infantry Division - 56;

2nd company of the 4th anti-aircraft artillery regiment - 21;

VIII Air Corps - 43;

Of course, two hundred tanks out of a thousand were not a fatal blow for the 6th Mechanized Corps. Even if we add to them 63 “broken and dispersed by enemy aircraft” vehicles from the 7th Tank Division. Also, an unknown number of vehicles broke down on marches and were used in the defense of the front along the Narew. However, by June 26, Khatskilevich’s mechanized corps still retained its combat capability and, as we will see later, was still able to prove itself.

At the same time, it would certainly be a mistake to evaluate the Boldin group’s counterattack negatively. The same Heydorn writes: “At the operational level, however, the Soviet attacks were successful. The German XX AK was so seriously constrained that only on June 27 was it able to go on the offensive again. Thus, he lost 3.5 days." You can’t argue with this thesis: the tasks assigned by the command of the XX Corps by the time Boldin’s group left Grodno were not completed. In fact, the counterattack of the 6th Mechanized Corps prevented the rapid closing of the encirclement of Soviet troops in the Volkovysk area by the German infantry. Given the quantitative superiority of the two German field armies over the opposing 3rd and 10th armies, this in itself was an achievement. Let me remind you that the counterattack fell not on the German flank barrier, but on the XX Army Corps, which had offensive missions.

The withdrawal of units of the 6th Mechanized Corps from Kuznitsa and Sidra began already on the night of June 25-26. Borzilov writes with annoyance in his report that, “according to preliminary data, 4 TD of the 6th Corps retreated across the river on the night [from] 25 to 26.6. Svisloch, thanks to which the flank of the 36th cavalry was opened. divisions". According to Borzilov, the withdrawal was not organized enough. The 128th motorized rifle regiment of the 29th motorized division and the 36th cavalry division retreated randomly, in panic. Order was restored closer to Volkovysk.

The final report of Army Group Center for June 26 stated: “Strong enemy attacks against the XX and VIII Army Corps ceased, only local attacks and battles with scattered enemy units were noted.”

In connection with the counterattack of Boldin’s group, it is also necessary to mention the battles on the Narew, in which units of the 4th and 7th tank divisions of the 6th mechanized corps took part. Due to the advance in deployment, the troops of the Western Front were numerically inferior to the enemy not only in the directions of the main German attacks, but also in the center of the “cannes” planned by the German command. As a result, they had to use units of the 6th Mechanized Corps to contain the onslaught of German infantry on the front of the 10th Army. The line of the Narew River became the mainstay of defense in this area.

According to German intelligence, the following Soviet units and formations operated on the Narev and at the mouth of the Orlanka:

86th Infantry Division;

Large units of the 113th Infantry Division;

25th Tank Division of the 13th Mechanized Corps;

Large units of the 4th Tank Division of the 6th Mechanized Corps;

Corps and army artillery.

We did not have to wait long for enemy attacks at the Narev line. The VII Army Corps approached it from the southwest, moving in the direction of Grodek - Bialystok. According to the order of the corps headquarters dated 20.30 on June 23, its tasks for June 24 were:

“2) VII AK advances to the Narew on June 24, tries to capture the bridges over the Narew with a quick strike and prepares to cross the river;

3) 268, 7 and 23 divisions begin moving towards the Narev in the same order at 04.00 on June 24. Advance formations should be sent forward in advance.”

On June 24, the bridgeheads on the other side of the Orlanka and Narev were successfully captured. Already in the evening, counterattacks were launched on the bridgeheads of the 23rd division, but all of them were repelled. The next day an offensive was planned from the captured bridgeheads.

However, these plans were soon disrupted by the actions of the Soviet units taking up defensive positions on the front to the west. Accompanied by powerful artillery fire, infantry and tank attacks fell on the bridgeheads of the 7th (especially in the first half of the day) and 23rd (here mainly in the afternoon) infantry divisions. The Germans were able to maintain and even somewhat expand the bridgeheads, but neither the 7th nor the 23rd divisions had to think about continuing the offensive. Thus, the Bialystok-Sokulka road was preserved for maneuvering Boldin’s group. Soon the group needed her to be taken to the Volkovysk area.

The combat log of the VII Corps directly indicates “authorship” regarding the effective counterattacks on the bridgeheads: “Despite repeated counterattacks by the 4th and 7th TD, by 18.00 the Pavly-Ryboly-Khodory line in front of Ukhovo was reached.”

This happened, let me remind you, at the same time as the counterattack near Grodno. It ended with him. On the night of June 26, the retreat began along the entire course of the Narev. A new stage of the battle for Belarus began.

TsAMO RF, f. 208, op. 2589, d. 91, l. 102.

TsAMO RF, f. 208, op. 2511, d. 83, l. 65.

Heydorn V.-D. Or. cit. S.235-236

TsAMO RF, f. 38, op. 11353, no. 5, l. 53.

TsAMO RF, f. 500, op. 12462, d. 547, l. 115.

The 3rd Tank Group consisted of two tank corps: the 39th (7th and 20th tank divisions, 14th and 20th motorized divisions) and the 57th (12th and 19th tank divisions, 18th motorized division). The tank divisions were armed with 942 tanks, mainly Czech Pz-38(t). Three of the four divisions (12 TD, 19 TD and 20 TD) were formed in the fall of 1940 on the basis of infantry divisions.

In addition to these divisions, the Group also included: the 101st battalion of flamethrower tanks, the 643rd anti-tank fighter division (armed with Czech 47-mm anti-tank missiles on a Pz-I tracked wedge chassis), the 51st Nebelwerfer rocket mortar regiment, six separate artillery divisions (150 mm and 210 mm guns), sapper, reconnaissance, anti-aircraft units.

In the first days of the war, at the stage of breaking through the border fortifications (the German command assumed that they would have to be broken through with fierce fighting), two army (infantry) corps were quickly subordinated to the 3rd TGR: the 5th (5th and 35th infantry divisions ) and 6th (6th and 26th Infantry Divisions)

NARA, T 313, R 225, f.f.0052 -0073

electronic copies of the document were provided by John Calvin (http://www.wwii-photos-maps.com/germandivisions/6panzerdivision/)

21.06.41

0:00

39th and 57th tanks * The corps took over their sectors (of the front) and replaced the guards of the infantry divisions on the border.

*for the terms used, see http://www.site/new_k-voprosu-o-terminah

11:15

Meeting to discuss the combat mission with the commander and chief of staff with the commander of the 8th Air Corps (General Baron von Richthofen). It is envisaged: 2 groups of dive bombers attack Kalvaria, then destroy the networks ( Leitungsnetzes), attacks on airfields and headquarters (Operation “Great Awakening”).

The second combat mission will be announced at 05:00.

The commander asks to suppress the approach of enemy forces from the Vilnius direction to the Neman River.

General von Richthofen requests that messages from reconnaissance detachments be transmitted primarily to the 8th Air Corps. The corresponding order from the commander was transmitted to the commander of the air forces.

16:00

The operations department is ready to work at the new checkpoint " Hü nersdorff" For redeployment and deployment orders, see appendix.

18:00

The commander of the 39th Panzer Corps reports that a German motorcyclist - a liaison officer of the 51st Mortar Regiment (Nebelwerfer rocket launchers) - crossed the border 5 km north of Punsk and was captured.

20:20

The 57th Army Corps reports that two SS brigades have stopped in the area Lyck - Treuburg and block the advance of the 19th Panzer Division. The command of the 9th Army gives the order to clear the road. Army patrols were deployed to withdraw SS units to the north.

General information about the enemy: the map of the command of the ground forces with the position of the enemy indicated indicates the presence of enemy divisions between the border and the river. Neman in the areas of the 3rd and 4th Tank Groups. No enemy or prepared defense was found east of the Neman. Consequently, enemy defense can be expected near the border on the discovered fortifications behind the line of lakes Kapčiamestis - Lazdijai - Kalvaria. Recent observations on the border indicate isolated blasting and trench work along the entire front line.

The operational departments of the headquarters of the 39th and 57th Tank Corps arrived at the forward command posts during the day. The advance of the Tank Group proceeded according to plan. The need to continue the march also during the daytime, which arose due to the paucity of roads and the shortness of nights, did not interfere with maintaining secrecy. The clear separation of combat vehicles and the transport following them showed particular effectiveness. All the equipment necessary for combat operations, which included numerous pontoon-bridge brigades, arrived on time at the prescribed sites along bad roads. The clear separation of the movement lanes of the tank and infantry corps, which the Group command always demanded, brought good results even during the attack.

The divisions stood under the cover of artillery, heavy guns and anti-aircraft guns, perfectly camouflaged and ready to attack. The task of the Tank Group was to rush ahead of the left flank of Army Group Center through the Neman, Vilnius and further south, initially to the Molodechno-Lake Naroch line.

Combat composition of the 3rd Tank Group (including the 5th and 6th Army Corps) on 22.6 - see Appendix Volume 5.

22.06.41

02:00

The divisions took their starting positions.

03:05

After a peaceful night and the occupation of the starting positions at 2:00, all four corps of the Tank Group went on the offensive. Tank corps on the front line are accompanied on foot by riflemen and infantry.

The air force bombs Kalvaria and Alytus. When repelling an attack, there is no fire from anti-aircraft guns - only machine-gun fire, and in Alytus there is insignificant fighter defense of the airfields. Apparently, the surprise was a success.

Border field positions are being occupied quickly.

03:30

Akmeniai.

03:35

7th Panzer Division - Zovada, 20th Panzer Division reaches the lake Rykociece.

03:45

The 12th Panzer Division occupies Pazapsiai.

04:00

The 6th Army Corps reports: the border heights 1500 m east of the border are in our hands.

04:10

The 6th Army Corps captured enemy field fortifications on the border. The offensive reveals a significantly weaker enemy presence near the border, especially artillery, than previously assumed.

05:00

The 30th Motorcycle Battalion and the 20th Reconnaissance Battalion took up positions in their vehicles, and the tanks of the 39th Tank Corps moved forward.

Around 6:00

The tanks approached Kalvaria, which by 8:00, having encountered weak enemy resistance, was taken by the 20th Panzer Division. The 7th Panzer Division approached Rudeniakiai(south of Kalvaria).

5:45

The 6th Army Corps moves forward in battle formation with a retreat to the rear on the left flank until it encounters enemy resistance.

06:15

The 30th Infantry Regiment (18th Motorized Division) reaches Kapčiamestis and, encountering only minor resistance, advances to Leipalingis.

It is still impossible to clearly determine the position of the enemy. Only the 5th Army Corps in some areas encountered desperate enemy resistance. The 5th Division broke into Lazdiyai at dawn and destroyed the enemy in the bunker (line of bunkers) positions.

08:00

An air attack on the city of Simnas by the 8th Air Corps was planned for this hour, until the 39th Tank Corps broke through there.

09.30

After the attack, the 8th Air Corps requested the Neman as a rear boundary line for bombing. The airspace was almost completely conquered on the first day of the offensive.

09:25

The advance detachment of the 35th Infantry Division reached the crossing Kirsna under Kirsna Didzioje, while the 34th and 111th Infantry Regiments fought their way through the bunker positions on either side of Rudamina.

09:15

The 18th Motorized Infantry Division takes place in the lake defile near Kulance towards Leipalangis, encountering light artillery fire from the Leipalangis area. The 12th Tank Division and the 109th Infantry Regiment are located near Weisiai, motorized rifles are under Kuveliai, tanks sent via Slavantai.

Around 09:00

The right flank division (6th) of the 6th Army Corps reached Sleine, the reconnaissance battalion is sent to Liudvinavas. The 26th Division crossed the Kalvaria-Vistutis road.

Until now, the 3rd Panzer Group has no clarity about the presence of enemy forces, located, according to reports received before 22.06, near the border - whether they managed to retreat in time before the attack began or were so stunned that only minor resistance could still be established and departure to the Neman. However, there is no need to do anything yet, which means moving on to the Neman.

09:40

From aviation reports it follows that the Russians are retreating to the river. Neman in small groups. In this regard, it is important that our forces quickly approach the Neman before the Russians can organize resistance there. The 57th Tank Corps, whose advance had been slowed by obstacles and poor terrain conditions, was ordered by telephone to turn around completely and march on the Neman.

10:40

The 7th Panzer Division passes Simnas, while to its north the 20th Panzer Division occupies the lake defile between Simnas and the lake Zuvintai, from where the division's tank regiment should move to Udriya (12 km northwest of Alytus - M.S) .

The initial goal of the first day of the offensive: to reach the river on a broad front. Neman and try to force the river, the 7th Panzer Division was the first to reach, which at 13:10

broke into the western part of Alytus and occupied both bridges across the river. Neman, remaining undamaged. Nobody expected this(underlined by me - M.S.).

14:00

The pilots also report that the Merkine bridge remains intact. By noon, the impression was that the enemy's resistance, after the first effect of surprise, had somewhat strengthened, but did not have a unified organization. Small detachments retreat to the river. Neman. Captured prisoners - from the 8th (there was no Soviet division with this number in the offensive zone of the 3rd TGr - M.S.), 23rd and 128th motorized divisions.

Until 16:00

The following milestone has been achieved: Bardziunai (13 km southwest of Merkine), western outskirts of Seiriyai, southern outskirts Metelisez (8 km southwest of Simnas), eastern part of Alytus, Marijampol (excl.)

15:00

The task of the Tank Group: on the first day, move as far east as possible across the Neman. Take advantage of the effect of surprise. The target for the 57th Tank Corps was Orany, and for the 39th Tank Corps - Vilnius.

17:15

The 30th motorcycle battalion of the 57th Tank Corps has reached the bridge over the Neman at Merkine and is starting to cross. Thus, there is no need for countless plans to build bridges for the crossing of both tank corps. The faster the divisions will be able to occupy the terrain ahead in an eastern direction.

18:15

The 56th Infantry Regiment from the 5th Army Corps also reached the river on foot. Neman - brilliant work of the infantry, which in such a short time, despite collisions with the enemy, poor terrain conditions and hot weather covered a distance of more than 40 km (emphasis mine - M.S.). The regiment commander, Colonel Thum, was presented for the award in a report to the Wehrmacht High Command.

19:00

The 6th Army Corps reached the site Szeszupa near Liudvinavas (8 km south of Marijampol - M.S.) and until the evening he fought on the left flank with a desperately resisting enemy located in separate bunkers. At the same time, motorized advance detachments were sent to Prienai and Nibriai, but were unable to get to the river. Neman on the first day. Significant losses (see specific numbers below - M.S.) in both divisions of the corps.

The progress of the offensive was again significantly facilitated by the division of the tank and infantry corps into separate combat zones, thus the difficulties during the movement were not aggravated by their mixing with each other.

Doubts may arise about the advisability and necessity of introducing infantry divisions after the actual position of the enemy was established, but on the other hand, the infantry divisions successfully attacked the enemy’s border fortifications, which undoubtedly pinned down his forces. The 5th Army Corps, attacking enemy bunkers near Lazdiyai with particular vigor, defeated large enemy forces and, thanks to the excellent pace of advance on the march, was able to cross the river on the first day. Neman on its site. The benefit of bringing the 5th and 6th Army Corps into battle was also evident in the fact that they, at least in their combat zones, cleared the territory in the rear of the mobile formations from scattered enemy units and snipers.

The negative points are as follows:

1) Due to the long approach of the 6th Army Corps to Prienai, the enemy managed to destroy the only bridge there. The capture of this bridge by a tank division could further speed up the crossing of the Neman for the entire tank group.

2) Due to the fact that many roads west and east of Njemen were given to the 5th and 6th Army Corps, the 3rd Panzer Group could not advance towards Vilnius with sufficient deployment, using all bridges and roads, but was forced line up your divisions one after another, to too great a depth. This slowed down and complicated the advance of the Group, and also, when the enemy repulsed, deprived the forward troops of artillery support, stuck far behind(emphasis mine - M.S.)

From 19:15

The corps were given tasks for the evening of June 22 and the morning of June 23:

Move forward to the east without waiting for the second echelon division. Continue the evening offensive on June 22 as long as possible.

57th Tank Corps - via Orany to Eišiškės

39th Army Corps - via Olkieniki and Butrimonis to Vilnius

5th Army Corps - across the Neman between Krikstoniai And Nemunaitis,

The 6th Army Corps captures the bridge in the Prienai area and moves to the eastern bank of the river. Neman

20:00

Units of the 18th Motorized Division, transferred to the command of the 9th Army (see entry dated June 19), again enter the 57th Army Corps, since, judging by the position of the army after the first day of the offensive, the use of units of the 18th a motorized division no longer seems necessary.

The successes of the neighbors are summarized in the order for Group No. 2 dated 06/22/41.

Where the enemy took the fight, he stood to the death, stubbornly and bravely. There was no information from any area about defectors or those who surrendered. Therefore, the struggle was harder than in Poland and during the Western campaign.

The bridgehead occupied in the Alytus area by the 7th Panzer Division was again attacked by enemy tanks (5th Panzer Division) in the afternoon, so the 7th Panzer Division decided to repeat the attack from 21:00 and expand the bridgehead. A fierce tank battle took place, in which the enemy lost 70 tanks (last phrase crossed out - approx. per.). At the Alytus airfield, 20 aircraft on the ground were destroyed.

The 7th Panzer Division won the heaviest tank battle since the beginning of the war; 80 enemy tanks were knocked out. The first decisive attempt by the Russians to stop the German advance was defeated. The significantly weakened Russian 5th Tank Division retreated to the northeast (the division commander retreated to the southeast and on the morning of June 24 was already in the region of Molodechno, 170 km from Alytus - M.S.) and lost most of its tank forces in the coming days. Apart from this failed attempt, the Russian actions consisted mainly of waging a small war without setting tactical objectives and operational goals. The Red Army, apparently, in training preferred the forms of conducting internal political struggle, civil war and revolution to the requirements of military operations at the front. Its leadership these days has admitted its own incompetence.

It was decided to abandon the continuation of the movement of divisions the night after the battle.

23:00

The advanced units of the 57th Army Corps reached Orana that evening, crossing the bridge over the Neman at Merkine. Thus, on the first day of the war the group reached the Orana line, the bridgehead Krikstonuai, bridgeheads at both bridges in Alytus, Liudvinavas, Marijampol (excl.).

Location of the checkpoint on the evening of June 22:

3rd Tank Group: forest camp " Hü nersdorff» by the road Szipliszki - Smolsny, 2 km east of Slinokiemie,

57th Tank Corps: Jonauka(west of Merkine),

5th Army Corps: Lazdijai

39th Army Corps: not yet deployed,

6th Army Corps: Liudvinavas.

Weather: sunny, warm.

General impression:

Managed to stun the enemy. The initially slight resistance intensifies in some places. Only a small participation of enemy artillery in the battle; the enemy fought in disparate groups (probably no more than a regiment), without a single leadership. Some field fortifications were not even occupied or were very weak. Stubborn opposition between individual bunkers. Some small units moved forward without ammunition, presumably for training . In general, it seems that in front of the river. In Neman the enemy forces were not as large as previously estimated (3-4 divisions). The surviving enemy units everywhere retreated to the east, in general and in particular stunned by their own counterattack and, apparently, by this time not yet in the mood to start a war.

As in Poland, as a result of our air attacks, the enemy was driven into the forests, from where he successfully waged a small war against the rear units and columns. This may also explain the surprisingly small number of active enemy forces at the very beginning. Define, how many of them hid in the forests, and how much equipment they left there (emphasis mine - M.S.), is not yet possible.

Problem for 23.6:

Capture of the Vilnius road junction by the 39th Tank Corps and continuation of the offensive towards Mihalishki (60 km northeast of Vilnius - M.S.). The 57th Tank Corps covers the advance of the 39th Tank Corps from an enemy attack from the south (from the direction of Lida) and advances on Oshmyany (50 km southeast of Vilnius - M.S.) with the aim of cutting off the roads from Vilnius to Minsk.

Before the start of the offensive, the important question was whether the 3rd Tank Group should fight its way through Vilnius or bypass it from the south in order to avoid wasting time fighting for the city. Poor road network across Puszeza Rudnicka, as well as the great importance of Vilnius as a transport hub, led to the decision to send the left flank (39th) corps to Vilnius. On June 22, there was no reason to abandon this decision, moreover, the 3rd Tank Group certainly wanted to maintain the decision to push further to the Western Dvina and not turn [to the south] too early (tentatively towards Minsk). This was also facilitated by the prevailing impression of the enemy, who was not as strong as expected, and did not defend himself, but retreated to the east.

It was expected that Vilnius would be quickly reached - simultaneously with or before the retreating enemy, so that from there, in accordance with the order, the attack to the east could be continued. It was necessary to use the effect of surprise for the longest throw to the east in order to prevent organized enemy resistance on the Viliya, Berezina and Western Dvina rivers. Corresponding combat order No. 1 for the 9th Army (see appendix).

23.6.41

The night passed peacefully.

05:00

The 5th Army Corps builds a bridge across the Neman in order to transfer as many strong units as possible to the eastern bank on June 23.

06:00

The 109th Infantry Regiment returns to the 5th Army Corps and is assigned to the Corps Reserve.

07:00

The goal of the 57th Tank Corps is to first reach the Lida-Vilnius road. Under Slavantai the columns were fired upon by scattered Russian forces.

19th Panzer Division (second echelon of the 57th Tank Corps - M.S.) will be pulled up with the location of the division head at Berzhniki (settlement on the territory of the “Suwalki ledge” several kilometers west of the border - M.S.).

09:00

The 7th Panzer Division of the 39th Panzer Corps goes on the offensive against Olkienki, "Pilsudski Tract" (Warsaw-Vilnius highway, built during the 2nd Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth - M.S.) from the Alytus bridgehead, against which single shooting still going on (in the writings of some Soviet historians it turned into a repeated counterattack by the 5th TD - M.S.). After liberating the bridge at Alytus and securing fuel, the 20th Panzer Division should also move towards Butrimonys. The 20th Motorized Infantry Division is still located west of the Neman and must move in echelon on the left flank behind the 20th Panzer Division.

10:00

The Group Commander considers it important to reach the Western Dvina before the enemy. It is necessary to ensure that there is no concentration of enemy forces anywhere. If the tank corps finds itself far ahead, and the infantry lags behind, it is impossible to allow any empty territory between them, in which lateral movements of the enemy are possible.

So far no concentration of enemy forces has been discovered.

11:00

The 6th Army Corps reports a better rate of advance today.

11:30

The 6th Infantry Division faces weak enemy forces along the edges of the woods west of Prienai. Both regiments of the 26th Infantry Division will reach the site by noon. Szeszupa.

11:30

The 12th Panzer Division reaches Eišiškės without clashes with the enemy (55 km east of Merkine - M.S.).

12:30

The commander of the 9th Army, Colonel General Strauss, arrives at the forward command post of the Panzer Group and outlines his view of the situation: According to observations, the Russians are retreating in all sectors today. A large convoy has been detected moving from the northeast towards Minsk, perhaps the Russians want to concentrate there again. It is reported that in the zone between the 4th and 9th Armies there are about eight enemy divisions, which, judging by the events of the first day, will not be able to get out of there.

Until 12:00, a road is provided as a line of action for bombers Lida - Pilna.

Judging by single pockets of enemy resistance in the zone of the 39th and 6th Corps in the first half of the day on June 23, as well as by air reconnaissance reports, it can be established that the enemy is retreating mainly along the Kaunas, Vilnius, Mihalishki highway. It is obvious that he does not want to take the fight on the eastern bank of the river. Neman.

Interaction with the 8th Air Corps was especially close and active, and its support for the tank group in all positions was invaluable.

The population warmly welcomed the troops.

12:40

7th Panzer Division under Olkienki again encounters separate enemy tanks (most likely, units of the destroyed 5th Panzer Division - M.S.) and after a short battle continues to march east to the “Pilsudski Route” in order to move along this road to Vilnius.

14:40

A message arrives that Grodno is in the hands of the Germans (message from the command of the 9th Army)

16:00

Construction of a temporary bridge by the 5th Army Corps in Erikstoniai.

16:30

The Chief of Operations of the General Staff requests from Army Group Center a decision on the further movement of the 3rd Tank Group: to remain in the north-eastern direction, or an order will follow to turn to Minsk.

The concentration of the enemy near the border, assumed by the main command of the ground forces, has not yet been discovered by the 3rd TGr, so it is doubtful what the number of the enemy will be near Minsk. Perhaps it would be wiser to wedge into the enemy’s battle formation, retreating to the Dnieper and Western Dvina, and thereby achieve even more effective coverage of the enemy forces near Minsk.

The Chief of Operations of the Army Group does not share the opinion of the command of the 3rd Tank Group about the enemy's position, since in the southern sector of the front of Army Group Center and at Army Group South the enemy took the battle on the border. Only with neighbors to the north (i.e. in the offensive zone of the 4th TGr on Siauliai - M.S.) a picture similar to the 3rd TGr is observed.

By 17:00 the situation is as follows:

The 12th Panzer Division of the 57th Army Corps has reached Orana and is moving towards Oshmyany.

7th Panzer Division of the 39th Army Corps 14 km southwest of Vilnius (as of 16:30)

The 20th Panzer Division reached Onushkis (status at 14:30),

Head of the 14th Motorized Division (second echelon of the 39th Tank Corps - M.S.) reached Simnas before 17:00.

Large units of the 5th Army Corps crossed the Neman.

The 6th Army Corps is located near Prienai.

16:30

The 7th Panzer Division is fighting the enemy southwest of Vilnius. It will no longer be possible to enter the city this evening.

In the evening, the advance detachment of the 6th Army Corps also reaches the eastern bank of the river. Neman. The bridge at Prienai was nevertheless blown up.

In the 6th Army Corps before approaching the river. Neman killed 10 officers and about 100 privates, this suggests that the number of the enemy there and its defense capability were underestimated (underlined by me - M.S.). There are about 200 prisoners.

From this point on, the infantry divisions of the 5th and 6th Army Corps, following behind the motorized formations, began to pose a serious problem for tank routes. As has been previously reported many times, some of their units went onto roads reserved for the movement of tank units, which further complicated the movement of equipment.

The second problem in the use of roads designated for the movement of tank units was created by ground aviation services (2nd Air Fleet, 8th Air Corps). They were sent behind the 19th Panzer Division of the 57th Panzer Corps in two marching echelons (a total of about 3,000 vehicles) and were supposed to follow through Merkine. After the pace of march of the advanced divisions of the 57th Tank Corps decreased, they had to stop. The requirement of the 8th Air Corps to bypass the 19th Panzer Division was rejected by the command of the Tank Group. It was taken into account that the support of the air corps would be temporarily stopped, but given the reduced combat effectiveness of enemy aviation, the advancement of the 19th Panzer Division was of greater importance. Pushing forward air units would further slow down the overall movement. The 57th Panzer Corps could not stop the 19th Panzer Division on the western bank of the Neman, but, as the Panzer Group repeatedly demanded, transfer it across the river and close or deploy it in the east.

In general, variable enemy resistance is observed; battles with isolated enemy units are observed even in the rear of tank corps. Throughout the entire sector, the enemy turned out to be clearly stronger than thought at the beginning of hostilities. Its equipment, weapons and ammunition supply are very different. The number of prisoners is growing; the exact number cannot yet be determined.

Any infantry attack and any other type of battle - defense, holding battle, retreat - the Russians carried out using more or less numbers of tanks and the massive use of manpower. Both of these always led to their defeat. When the enemy used artillery, attention was often paid to the economical use of ammunition. The captured equipment made a good impression (emphasis mine - M.S.). The Russian high command did not show itself at all in the first days.

Lower command levels were inflexible, sketchy and unable to quickly make decisions in a given situation. For example, orders were found that, despite being aware of the advance of German troops in the first half of the day, in the evening ordered us to occupy defensive lines, which we were supposed to reach in the afternoon. None of the junior commanders made the decision to destroy the bridge. Only one captured sapper officer carried out the order to blow up the Alytus bridge at 19:00. Methodical preparation did not help to seize the initiative in a situation of surprise attack.

Each fighter [of the Red Army] individually was more tenacious than the individual soldier of the World War, probably due to the influence of Bolshevik ideology, but also due to the instigation of their political commissars (who themselves prudently removed their insignia and donned the uniform of privates); During the 20 years of Soviet power, he lost his sense of the value of human life and is filled with disdain for life.

22:00

In order to maximally speed up the rush to the northeast behind the retreating enemy, the commander issues an order for both tank corps on the night from 23.6 to 24.6 to carry out a non-stop transfer of all combat units, except for the 14th motorized division, across the river. Neman to the east.

23:00

An order from Army Group Center is received by telephone, instructing the 3rd Tank Group to continue moving towards Minsk, and in the north, on a wide front, to push back large enemy defensive units to the upper reaches of the Western Dvina in the area of ​​Vitebsk and Polotsk (for subsequent radiograms and telegrams, see application). This means a change in the previously planned course of both motorized corps. The task of capturing the crossings across the river by the Tank Group. Viliya remains in the Vilnius region and north of it, as well as near Mikhalishki, with the goal of ensuring movement along these bridges to advance to the Western Dvina and to provide cover from the northern direction.

When discussing the Barbarossa offensive plan, the command of Army Group Center and the 3rd TG had different points of view regarding the continuation of the operation after crossing the Neman. The 3rd Tank Group intended to immediately break through to the Western Dvina, without getting involved in secondary tasks. The intention of the Army Group command - with the help of the 2nd and 3rd Tank Groups to create conditions for the destruction of the enemy between Bialystok and Minsk - in the opinion of the 3rd Tank Group could most likely be realized when reaching the Dvina, where it would be possible to prevent the withdrawal and renewal of resistance enemy than with the narrowly set goal of a breakthrough to Minsk.

Upon reaching Vilnius on June 24, the command of Army Group Center ordered to reach the high ground in the Minsk region to encircle the enemy retreating in front of the 4th and 9th Armies and link up with units of the 2nd Tank Group. The command of the 3rd Tank Group, continuing to hold the opinion that enemy units had retreated to the east and needed to be pursued all the way to the Western Dvina, tried to convey their point of view to the GA command through the liaison officer of the GA command. The GA command did not change its order on the maneuver with the task for the 3rd TGr to occupy heights in the Minsk area.

24:00

In the order for the 3rd Tank Group, the tasks for June 24 are outlined as follows: Changing the direction of advance and breaking through in a northern direction to Minsk, primarily in order to seize the passage between Volozhin and Molodechno. In the future, together with the 2nd Tank Group, prevent the enemy, who is located near Bialystok, from escaping [from the encirclement ring] through Minsk. The 57th Panzer advances through Holszany to the heights in the Volozhin region. 39th Tank Corps - through Smorgon to the lake defile in the area and south of Molodechno.

CP location:

3rd Panzer Group - like 22.6.,

57th Tank Corps - Okla, 2 km north of Eišiškės

5th Army Corps - Seiriyai

39th Tank Corps - Vazgirdonia, 12 km north of Orana

6th Army Corps - Vartai, 11 km southwest of Prienai

Weather: sunny and warm.

24:00

On June 23, from 24:00, the 5th and 6th Army Corps again came under the command of the 9th Army, and the 3rd Tank Group came under the direct command of Army Group Center.

Translated by Dina Duchenko

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