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GOVOROV Leonid Alexandrovich

SPEAKING Leonid Aleksandrovich, Soviet military leader, commander. Marshal of the Soviet Union (1944). Hero of the Soviet Union (01/27/1945).

Born into a peasant family. After graduating from the Yelabuga Real School in 1916, he entered the Polytechnic Institute in Petrograd, in December of the same year he was drafted into the army and sent to the Konstantinovsky Artillery School, which he graduated in 1917. Then he served in Tomsk as a junior officer in a separate mortar battery, second lieutenant. In March 1918, after demobilization from the old army, he worked in the city of Elabuga. In October 1918, when the city was captured by the White Guards, he was mobilized into the army of Admiral A.V. Kolchak, commanded an artillery battery in the 8th Kama Rifle Division. In November 1919 L.A. Govorov, with part of the soldiers of his battery, went to Tomsk, where, as part of a combat workers’ squad, he participated in the uprising against the White Guard troops. In January 1920 he joined the Red Army and fought on the Eastern and Southern fronts. Commander of a separate light artillery battalion of the 51st Rifle Division, who distinguished himself in battles with Wrangel tanks on the Kakhovka bridgehead, then assistant chief of artillery of the same division.

After the Civil War, he continued to serve in the 51st Perekop Rifle Division. In 1926 he graduated from artillery advanced courses, and in 1930 - Higher Academic Courses. Since May 1931 L.A. Govorov is the chief of artillery of the Rybnitsa fortified region. In 1933 he graduated from the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze and in July 1934 was appointed chief of artillery of the rifle corps. From February to October 1936 Govorov was the head of the 1st branch of the artillery department of the Kyiv Military District. In 1938, he graduated from the Academy of the General Staff and is engaged in teaching activities: senior lecturer, associate professor of the department of artillery tactics of the Military Academy named after. F.E. Dzerzhinsky. During the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. served as chief of staff of artillery of the 7th Army. Participated in the preparation and implementation of artillery support during the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line. Since March 1940 L.A. Govorov is the Deputy Inspector General of Artillery of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army. In May 1941 he was appointed head of the Military Academy. F.E. Dzerzhinsky.

At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, Major General of Artillery L.A. Govorov is the chief of artillery in the Western direction. In August 1941, he was awarded the rank of lieutenant general. He successively holds the positions of chief of artillery of the Reserve Front, deputy commander of the troops of the Mozhaisk line of defense, and chief of artillery of the Western Front. Since October 1941, L.A. Govorov commanded the 5th Army, which in early December 1941, in cooperation with the 16th and 33rd armies, launched counterattacks on the enemy in the Istra and Zvenigorod directions, then launched a counteroffensive and liberated the city of Mozhaisk in January 1941. Subsequently, the 5th Army held a defensive line in the central sector of the Western Front east of the city of Gzhatsk.

In April - June 1942 L.A. Govorov commanded the Leningrad Group of Forces of the Leningrad Front, and from June 3, 1942 and almost until the end of the war - the Leningrad Front. In January 1943, L.A. Govorov was awarded the rank of Colonel General. Until the end of 1942, the front troops under his command conducted a defense that was distinguished by exceptional tenacity and activity. From January 12 to January 30, 1943, troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, in cooperation with the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, broke the blockade of Leningrad.

In the summer and autumn of 1943 L.A. Govorov successfully commanded the front troops in defensive battles, as a result of which, in cooperation with the Volkhov Front, all enemy attempts to reach the coast of Lake Ladoga and restore the blockade of Leningrad were thwarted. In November 1943, he was awarded the rank of army general.

Later L.A. Govorov participated in the planning, preparation and conduct, in cooperation with the troops of the Volkhov, 2nd Baltic Fronts and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, of the Leningrad-Novgorod offensive operation. Thanks to the skillful leadership of L.A. Govorov, the troops of the Leningrad Front, during the Krasnoselsko-Ropshinsky operation, pushed back the troops of Army Group North 60-100 km from Leningrad and reached the Luga River, then, together with the troops of the Volkhov Front, captured the Luga fortified zone, first reached the Narva River, capturing a bridgehead on its West Bank, and then to the Pskov-Ostrovsky fortified area, where they went on the defensive.

In June 1944, Army General Govorov prepared and carried out, with the support of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, the Ladoga and Onega military flotillas, the Vyborg offensive operation, which ended in the defeat of the Finnish task force “Karelian Isthmus”. In June 1944, he was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union. In September - November 1944, troops of the Leningrad Front, together with troops of the 3rd, 2nd and 1st Baltic, 3rd Belorussian Fronts and part of the forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, participated in the Baltic strategic offensive operation. Under the command of L.A. Govorov, in a short time, the 2nd Shock Army was secretly regrouped and the Moonsund landing operation was carried out. Since October 1944 L.A. Govorov simultaneously coordinated the actions of the 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts.

After the war, L.A. Govorov commanded the troops of the Leningrad Military District from July 1945, from April 1946 he was the chief inspector of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces and concurrently the head of the Directorate of Higher Educational Institutions, from January 1947 the chief inspector of the Armed Forces of the USSR, from October 1947 the Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief Inspector of the Armed Forces, since July 1948, Commander of the country's Air Defense Forces and Chief Inspector of the Armed Forces. Since March 1950, commander of the country's Air Defense Forces, Deputy Minister of War of the USSR, since 1952, Deputy War Minister of the USSR for combat training, since April 1953, chief inspector of the USSR Ministry of Defense, from May 1954 to April 1955, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces The country's air defense is the Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. He was buried on Red Square near the Kremlin wall.

Awarded the highest Soviet military order "Victory".

Awarded: 5 Orders of Lenin, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov 1st class, Order of Kutuzov 1st class, Red Star, “Order of the Republic” of the Tuvan Arat Republic, medals, as well as foreign orders: USA - “Legion Honor" 1st degree; France: Legion of Honor 2nd Art. and the Military Cross.

Ivan Govorov was born on January 2, 1899 in the village of Zinovevo, Tver region. Before serving in the army, he was a turner's apprentice and a turner at the Putilov plant in St. Petersburg. In August 1915, he was arrested for participating in a general strike and was kept in the Kresty prison until February 1916, then worked as an electrician at the Thread Factory.

In October 1917, he joined the workers' squad and participated with it in the capture of the Nikolaevsky station, the disarmament of the cadet school and the storming of the Winter Palace. After the October Revolution of 1917, he was assigned to the Volyn battalion, then from November he was a separate commander in the Yuryevo-Putilov detachment. As part of it, he took part in battles in Finland near the city of Vyborg and the village of Rauta.

In March 1918, Govorov was transferred as a Red Army soldier to the 2nd Hussar Squadron to guard Smolny. In June, with a group of Red Guards, he left for the city of Rybinsk and in July, with a detachment, he participated in the suppression of the Yaroslavl rebellion, then he was appointed to the newly formed Yaroslavl regiment as a sergeant major in cavalry reconnaissance and participated in battles on the Arkhangelsk front. Then the regiment was transferred to the city of St. Petersburg and renamed the 3rd Estland. The commander of mounted reconnaissance fought with him from Narva to Vizimborg. After the retreat from Estonia, the regiment fought in the area of ​​the village of Pechera, the city of Gdov, and Lake Peipsi. Near the village of Pechera he was wounded and evacuated to the hospital. Since 1918, member of the CPSU (b).

Upon recovery in March 1919, he left for the Eastern Front in the 3rd Army, where, upon arrival in the city of Perm, Govorov was enrolled as a cadet in command courses at army headquarters. After completing his training in July, he was appointed commander of a food transport platoon of the 1st Brigade, 30th Infantry Division, and since September served as a platoon commander and political instructor in the cavalry squadron of that division. Between Tomsk and Mariinsk he was captured with a half-squadron, but after 8 days he was released by the approaching units of the 1st brigade. Then he fought with her from Shadrinsk to Lake Baikal.

In 1920 he was transferred to the Cheka units and served as a political commissar in the 33rd separate battalion of the Siberian Cheka. From July 1920 to January 1921, he studied at the party school at the political department of the 5th Army in the city of Irkutsk, then was appointed military commissar of the 1st separate battalion of the 1st Siberian Border Regiment of the OGPU of the Siberian Cheka. Since May 1921, he also held the position of commissioner and head of human intelligence at the headquarters of the 9th border battalion of the Cheka troops, and from July he was a political instructor of a company in the 207th separate border battalion of the Siberian Cheka. As part of these units, he took part in battles against the armed detachments of Shubin, Baron R.F. Ungern von Sternberg.

In April 1922, he was transferred to the city of Rostov-on-Don to the 6th separate cavalry division, and from there to the 2nd cavalry regiment of the OGPU, where he served as political instructor of the company and squadron. In 1923, Govorov was appointed head of the training commandant's office of the 47th separate Kuban-Black Sea division of the OGPU. From August of the same year he studied at the Tiflis border school of the OGPU, after which in May 1924 he was sent as an inspector of political work of the border guard units of the Armenian-Nakhichevan region to the city of Erivan. With the reorganization of the ChON into border detachments from July 1925, he served as an instructor of party political work in the 39th border detachment of the OGPU troops in the city of Gyumri, Armenia.

He attended the Higher Advanced Courses for Senior Commanders in the city of St. Petersburg from April 1926 to May 1927. Then he was appointed assistant chief of the maneuver group of the 46th border detachment of the OGPU troops. From June 1928, he continued to serve as an instructor in the 47th border detachment of the OGPU troops of the Central Asian District in the city of Kerki, and from August he commanded a division in the Surkhan-Darya separate border commandant's office of the OGPU in the city of Termez. As part of a maneuver group, he participated in the liquidation of the Utambek and Ibrahim-bek gangs in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

In 1929, as the commander of an operational detachment of the OGPU, he fought with the Basmachi in the Northern Karakum Desert. In May 1930, he was appointed commander of the 62nd separate cavalry division of the OGPU troops in the city of Turkul, and from July 1932 he commanded a large maneuver group at the 68th border detachment. Participated with her in eliminating gangs in the areas of Kushka, Kerki, and Merv.

He was sent to study at the Higher Border School of the NKVD in Moscow in January 1934. After graduation in May 1935, he was appointed commander of the 22nd cavalry regiment of the NKVD troops in the city of Kirovabad. At the same time, he studied at the correspondence department of the Military Academy of the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze.

By order of the NKVD of February 28, 1937, he was awarded the badge “Honorary Worker of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD” for the fight against Basmachism. In December 1939, Colonel Govorov was appointed head of the 43rd Geok-Tapinsky border detachment of the NKVD troops, then in August 1940 he was transferred to the Directorate of Border Troops of the Black Sea District as assistant chief for logistics in the city of Simferopol.

Since 1941, he served as deputy chief of the NKVD border troops of the Moldavian district for supply. By decree of the PVS of the USSR dated March 1, 1941, he was awarded the medal “For Military Merit.” With the outbreak of war, Colonel Govorov in June 1941 was appointed to the post of commander of the 952nd Infantry Regiment of the 268th Infantry Division, which was being formed in the Moscow Military District in the city of Zagorsk. At the beginning of August, the division left for Estonia and, as part of the 8th Army of the Northern Front, fought in the Rakvere areas, then retreated to Oranienbaum. In August he was wounded in the arm. Then Colonel Govorov on the Leningrad Front commanded the 107th Infantry Regiment of the 85th Infantry Division of the 55th Army and the 7th Infantry Regiment of the 20th Infantry Division of the NKVD troops in the 23rd Army.

While studying at the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze was there from May to October 1942, then appointed deputy commander of the 387th Infantry Division, which was in the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters in the city of Michurinsk. Since mid-December, the deputy commander and acting commander of this division as part of the 2nd Guards Army of the Stalingrad Front participated in the Kotelnikovsky operation, in defensive battles in the area of ​​​​the Kren state farm, to prevent the release of the blockade of the German group surrounded near Stalingrad.

In November 1942, he was wounded in both legs and shell-shocked. On December 25, the division went on the offensive and in January participated in the North Caucasus and Rostov offensive operations. On April 9 of the following year, the colonel took command of the 271st Infantry Division. On May 13, she joined the 28th Army and in July participated in the Mius offensive operation. By order of the Supreme High Command dated September 8, 1943, the division was given the honorary name “Gorlovskaya”.

Major General Govorov was appointed commander of the 120th Infantry Gatchina Red Banner Division, which was in the reserve of Headquarters in November 1944. In December, it was redeployed to Poland east of the Sandomierz bridgehead and from January 1945, as part of the 21st Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front, it participated in the Vistula-Oder, Sandomierz-Silesian, Lower Silesian and Upper Silesian offensive operations, in crossing the Vistula and Oder rivers, and in capturing the cities of Vladovice, Żarki, Kozeglovy, Sebezh, Oppeln.

Since mid-March, its units fought to encircle and destroy the enemy Oppeln group. On March 23, the division captured the city of Neisse and entered the area north of Tsobten, where it went on the defensive. At the beginning of May 1945, it entered the territory of Czechoslovakia in the area northeast of Lskov and participated in the Prague offensive operation.

During the war, division commander Govorov was mentioned four times in commendations in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Since June 1945, the Major General commanded the 34th Guards Rifle Enakievo Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Division in Austria. The following year, he was seconded to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and appointed head of the district military supply department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Moldavian Republic. Discharged due to illness on September 25, 1947.

The biography of Leonid Aleksandrovich Govorov is similar to the biographies of many of his peers who dedicated their lives to service in the Soviet Armed Forces, although, like any person, it has its own characteristics, its own sharp turns.

L. A. Govorov was born on February 22, 1897 in the village of Butyrki, Vyatka province - in a region that, even in previously backward Russia, stood out for its poverty and was considered one of the remote bearish corners. His father, like many other poor people, left his native land for a long time in search of income. In his youth, he had a chance to work as a barge-maker, then he sailed as a sailor, and in his mature years, since he still managed to master reading and writing, he got a job as a clerk at a real school in the city of Elabuga. Leonid Govorov and his three brothers spent their childhood there.

The Govorovs' father made every effort to ensure that his sons studied. In 1916, Leonid graduated from a real school. He even entered the Polytechnic Institute in the capital. But in December of the same year he was drafted into the tsarist army and sent to the Konstantinovsky Artillery School. Here, in Petrograd, before the eyes of cadet Govorov, the events of the February bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia unfolded. October 1917 found him already in Siberia. With the rank of second lieutenant, he served in Tomsk in a mortar battery.

This service was short-lived. The proletarian revolution set one of its most important and priority tasks as the demolition of the entire previous state machine, which served as an instrument of enslavement and oppression of the working people. The decree of the Soviet government, signed by V.I. Lenin, also abolished the old army as one of the main levers of the former power of the exploiters. In March 1918, Second Lieutenant L.A. Govorov was demobilized. He returned to his native Yelabuga and went to work in a cooperative, helping his parents.

And the flames of civil war were already blazing in the country. In October 1918, Elabuga was captured by the White Guards. The so-called Constituent Assembly, which provided cover for the counter-revolutionaries, shouted about the creation of a “people's army.” Where can I get soldiers for her? To achieve this, the local population was forcibly mobilized. Officers, of course, were the first to be mobilized. So the former second lieutenant artilleryman returned to military service. At first he was sent as a junior officer to a battery that was in formation. But then... Then, together with this battery, Govorov was included in the Eighth Division of the Second Ufa Corps and forced to participate in Kolchak’s campaign against Soviet power. This marked a sharp turn in his biography, which left an imprint on his future life for a very long time.

This was a turning point in the life of the twenty-two-year-old young man, who until now, generally speaking, had not come into close contact with the turbulent political events of that time. Not everyone was able to determine the right path in such conditions, especially if a person, against his will and desire, had already found himself on the other side of the barricades. However, Govorov managed to make the final choice without hesitation.

“Having realized the falsity of the “democratic” slogans of the Constituent Assembly...,” he wrote in his autobiography about this period of his life, “and after Kolchak’s coup, having seen with his own eyes where the reaction was leading, he began to look for opportunities to change the situation.”

Leaving Kolchak’s army was not so easy. Nevertheless, in October 1919, Govorov fled along with part of the soldiers of his battery. Hiding, he reached Tomsk. And in December he already participated in the uprising against the whites, being part of a working combat squad.

Soon, Red Army troops entered Tomsk, and Leonid Govorov voluntarily and forever joined its ranks.

Military fate for a whole decade connected Govorov with the division, which was later known under the glorious name of Perekopskaya - a name that it was awarded for military distinction in the fight against Wrangel on the Southern Front. He began his service there, forming an artillery division by order of army headquarters and becoming its commander.

Twice in 1920 - near Kakhovka and during the assault on Perekop - he was wounded. The Workers' and Peasants' Government recognized the courage and heroism of the young Red commander, shown in the battles for Soviet power, with the Order of the Red Banner.

Unlike many of his comrades, participants in the civil war, Leonid Aleksandrovich remained non-party for a long time, although in his affairs he had long been with the party. Being a scrupulous person by nature and demanding, first of all, of himself, he probably believed that he still had to earn the high title of communist. Although everything went well in his service, his participation in the Chelyabinsk and Ufa operations on the side of the Whites in 1919 was still not an ordinary episode that could be easily forgotten. If we add to this individual character traits, then, perhaps, it will be possible to understand the reasons for the isolation and severity mentioned by everyone who came into close contact with Govorov in life and work. But he only looked like that on the outside. It seems that this was very correctly noted by Army General S. M. Shtemenko, who described L. A. Govorov in the following words in his memoirs:

“Talkative, dry, even somewhat gloomy in appearance, Govorov made an impression at the first meeting that was not very favorable for himself. But everyone who served under Leonid Alexandrovich knew perfectly well that under this external severity hid a broad and kind Russian soul.”

In the Perekop Rifle Division, L. A. Govorov rose from the commander of an artillery division to the chief of artillery, and for five years he commanded an artillery regiment that was part of it. He proved himself to be an excellent specialist, a strong-willed, energetic commander, an honest and modest comrade. It was for this that he was respected by his colleagues, senior superiors, subordinates and everyone he encountered in his line of work. The workers of Odessa, then Chernigov, where the division was stationed, placed their trust in Leonid Aleksandrovich, sending him as their deputy to the city councils. He was also elected as a member of the executive committee of Odessa.

The documents stored in the personal file of L. A. Govorov sparingly and accurately characterize his business and political qualities. Here are some excerpts from them.

“For the position of assistant commander of the light artillery regiment of the Fifty-first Infantry Division for combat unit,” the performance appraisal says the following:

“He showed himself to be a very capable commander in all respects. Has a strong will, energy, initiative. His technical training as an artilleryman is impeccable. He is disciplined and knows how to maintain discipline in his regiment. The general educational preparation is excellent."

1925-1926.

“As commander of an artillery regiment”:

“He pays full attention to the theoretical course he is taking and masters it well. Tactically, he is well prepared and knows how to understand any situation. Tends to make decisions independently without fear of responsibility. He can conduct political work independently... His character is even, calm, and serious. Most inclined to combat artillery work. For a senior general commander he will be a reliable employee and a valuable assistant.”

1931-1932.

“As chief of artillery for a fortified area”:

“...showed excellent practical and theoretical knowledge of artillery and general tactics. He knows fireworks and precision shooting methods very well... He is demanding of his subordinates, but at the same time sensitive and attentive. Good organizer. Non-partisan, but well-developed politically, active in Marxist-Leninist self-training. He was a model in social work.”

1934-1935.

“As chief of artillery of the Fifteenth Rifle Corps”:

“He works a lot to improve the combat training of the artillery units of the corps, which made it possible to have the artillery of the corps well trained... a competent artilleryman, knows all types of troops well... quickly navigates, quickly makes decisions... Subject to nomination to the position of chief of the district artillery.”

There is hardly any need to comment on these lines of official performance appraisals. It remains only to emphasize that Leonid Aleksandrovich combined all these years of intense combat service with persistent study. He has behind him years of study at advanced training courses for command personnel, academic courses, and at the operational department of the M. V. Frunze Academy. In 1933, he completed the full course of this academy in absentia, in addition, he studied German and passed the exam to become a military translator.

The very listing of all these biographical data allows us, on the one hand, to imagine his extraordinary efficiency, determination and talent; and on the other hand, we see how carefully the Soviet government, the Communist Party, and the people raised and educated a capable commander. Govorov quickly developed into a major specialist in military affairs, combining practical experience of military service with the theoretical knowledge of a scientist.

In 1936, brigade commander L.A. Govorov became a student at the Academy of the General Staff. Unfortunately, he was not able to fully complete the course of study. Six months before graduation, in 1938, Govorov was appointed teacher of tactics at the Dzerzhinsky Artillery Academy.

Now he taught others, but even during this period he continued to persistently increase the level of personal knowledge, working on his dissertation. In 1939, his first scientific work was published, devoted to the topic of attack and breakthrough of a fortified area.

Soon after the start of his teaching career, Govorov was temporarily appointed head of the tactics department and, as the academy command noted, “he coped well with this matter.” In 1940, as a valuable specialist who studied the problem of overcoming fortified areas by troops and had deep knowledge of artillery tactics, Leonid Aleksandrovich took an active part in the Soviet-Finnish war. At the front, he did a lot of work preparing units and organizing a breakthrough of the fortified area by the troops of the Seventh Army, for which he was awarded the Order of the Red Star by the government and, out of turn, was awarded the military rank of division commander.

In the same year, during recertification, he was awarded the rank of major general of artillery and entrusted with the post of inspector general of artillery of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army.

In May 1941, Major General of Artillery L. A. Govorov was promoted to the post of head of the Artillery Academy named after F. E. Dzerzhinsky. Less than three weeks after this, the Great Patriotic War began.

Exactly a month after the Nazi invaders invaded their native Soviet land, Leonid Aleksandrovich Govorov was appointed chief of artillery in the western strategic direction. Less than a month later, he served as artillery chief in the Reserve Front. It was precisely the commotion near Smolensk, where our troops, in the difficult summer campaign of 1941, for the first time thoroughly battered the enemy’s strike forces, as a result of which Hitler’s command gave the order to Army Group Center to go on the defensive.

In October 1941, when the enemy began his first attack on Moscow, with the goal of capturing the Soviet capital, events unfolded so rapidly that even usually very punctual personnel workers did not have time to monitor the movements and appointments of officials. This is also noticeable from the official profile of L. A. Govorov, stored in his personal file. It says that from August to November 1941, General Govorov was the chief of artillery of the Reserve Front.

However, by November 1941, the Reserve Front itself, which was mentioned above, no longer existed.

Let us recall, at least very briefly, how the events of that time developed. At the beginning of October 1941, a serious threat loomed over the capital of our Motherland and the entire country. With the help of the Third and Fourth Tank Groups and field armies, with powerful air support, the enemy broke through the front line. His tank and motorized divisions rushed to Gzhatsk, Mozhaisk, and Moscow. A significant part of our troops from the Western and Reserve Fronts found themselves surrounded in the Vyazma region. Continuing to fight heroically, they attracted large enemy forces to themselves, thereby winning precious time to prepare a new line of defense on the approaches to Moscow. This line was supposed to be the Mozhaisk defense line, which was being built at that time. By the time the front broke through, there were almost no troops on it. By order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, cadet units from military schools, individual tank and artillery units, as well as rifle divisions located on the approach to Moscow were urgently moved there from Moscow, Tula, Serpukhov and other cities. These troops soon became part of the Fifth Army formed by order of Headquarters. At the same time, the Reserve Front was abolished, and its troops were transferred to the reorganized Western Front. It is clear that there is an obvious gap in L.A. Govorov’s service profile - after all, he could not remain in a non-existent front at such a hot time. Moreover, we are not talking about a middle or senior commander, but about a senior commander.

Having come to this conclusion, I tried to erase this “blank spot” in the military biography of the Soviet commander, whose life and activities I began to study as an employee of the Military Historical Journal. I had to turn again to archival documents from the fall of 1941.

Now, when it was necessary to get an answer only to this specific question, it was possible to find the necessary documents relatively quickly. It is useful to reproduce them now so that future researchers are not left with any ambiguities.

The first of them is marked “To the commander of the troops of the Moscow Military District (Moscow Military District. - Author’s note). Copy: Commander of the Western and Reserve Fronts. Major General Govorov. Head of the Personnel Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army. October 9, 1941. 01 hour 00 minutes.” reads:

“The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command appoints:

1) Commander of the Moscow Military District troops, Lieutenant General P. A. Artemyev, commander of the troops of the Mozhaisk line of defense, retaining his post as commander of the Moscow Military District troops.

2) Major General Govorov L.A. - Deputy Commander of the Mozhaisk Defense Line.

3) Chief of Staff of the Mozhaisk Defense Line - Major General Kudryashev A.I.

4) All troops of the Mozhaisk defense line through the commander Comrade. Artemyev should be subordinated directly to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

Stalin, Shaposhnikov."

A day later, a new directive from Headquarters followed, according to which the command of the Mozhaisk defensive line was renamed the command of the Moscow Reserve Front. The same directive ordered the formation of the Fifth Army in the Moscow Reserve Front by October 11, the commander of which was appointed commander of the First Guards Corps, Major General D. D. Lelyushenko.

On the evening of October 12, another document of interest to us was signed and sent to the troops. It says:

“For better unification of actions in the western direction, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. From 11 p.m. 50 min. On October 12, 1941, the Western Front merged with the Moscow Reserve Front.

2. Subordinate all military units and institutions of the Moscow Reserve Front to the front commander.

3. Lieutenant General Artemyev is appointed deputy commander of the Western Front.

Major General Govorov was appointed chief of artillery on the Western Front.

Major General Camera is appointed deputy chief of artillery of the Western Front.

Headquarters of the Supreme High Command I. Stalin, B. Shaposhnikov.”

So, even from these individual documents we see, on the one hand, how in the tense atmosphere of the menacing October days of 1941, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, taking emergency measures to recreate the Western Front, persistently searched for an expedient organizational form of command and control of the troops that were hastily occupying the Mozhaisk line of defense, to block the enemy's path to Moscow. On the other hand, everything is falling into place in the track record of L. A. Govorov. True, Leonid Aleksandrovich practically did not have time to assume the post of chief of artillery on the Western Front this time either.

In connection with the injury of the commander of the Fifth Army, General D. D. Lelyushenko, the Military Council of the Western Front petitioned the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to appoint General L. A. Govorov to this post. It was in connection with the leadership of the Fifth Army that his name forever entered the military chronicle of the Battle of Moscow.

But here a new question inevitably arises. What was the reason for the promotion to the post of commander of a combined arms army operating in such a responsible direction of a general whose military specialty is an artilleryman?

The most accurate answer could have been given by the one on whose initiative this appointment took place, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, who at the beginning of the second ten days of October 1941, by decision of the State Defense Committee, was placed at the head of the troops of the Western Front. Taking advantage of the opportunity, I turned to G.K. Zhukov with this question in the days when the entire Soviet country was preparing to solemnly celebrate the 20th anniversary of our great victory in the battle of Moscow. Georgy Konstantinovich answered exhaustively:

“To put it briefly, we proceeded from two most important circumstances. Firstly, during the battles near Yelnya, General Govorov, being the chief of artillery of the Reserve Front (Army General G.K. Zhukov at that time was the commander of the Reserve Front troops. - Author's note), established himself not only as an excellent knowledge of his business a specialist, but also as a strong-willed, energetic commander with a deep understanding of operational issues; secondly, in our defense near Moscow, the main burden of the fight against numerous enemy tanks fell primarily on the artillery, and therefore, Govorov’s special knowledge and experience acquired special value. Subsequent events showed that the choice made was very successful.”

The events of that terrible time were indeed the most severe test of all the human traits of the new army commander, his life experience, organizational skills, will and versatile special military knowledge. On October 16, 1941, at the command post in Mozhaisk, General Govorov signed his first combat order to the entrusted troops as commander-5. Its essence was to prevent the enemy from breaking through to the east along the Mozhaisk Highway. The main military events in the army's defense zone have been taking place for several days now on the famous Borodino field. From the very dawn of October 16, groups of German tanks began to advance to the front line of defense of units of the Thirty-second Infantry Division, commanded by Peak Regiment V.I. Polosukhin.

It was in the defense zone of this division, which arrived from Siberia in the Mozhaisk region on October 12, that the Borodino field found itself. In the same places near Moscow, where almost 130 years earlier the Battle of Borodino took place, in which the Russian soldier gained the glory of being invincible, a mortal battle with the enemy was again taking place.

The defensive structures of the Patriotic War of 1812, the Shevardinsky redoubt, Bagration's flushes, granite monuments on this field of eternal glory of Russian weapons - everything here reminded of the immortal feat in the name of the Motherland. It seemed that Soviet soldiers stood here - Siberians and Far Easterners, Muscovites volunteers, tankmen of three very few tank brigades, cadets of the Moscow Military-Political School named after V.I. Lenin in the face of history, and it was she herself who told them: do not disgrace the glory of your ancestors , increase their military valor with new exploits, fight to the death defending the capital.

And they stood. Starting from ordinary soldiers, commanders and political workers and ending with the commander of the army, everyone gave all their strength, not even sparing their lives, in order to delay the enemy’s advance and thwart his plan. The Nazis repeated attacks over and over again, regardless of losses. Our troops also suffered irreparable losses. It was on October 16, when attacking enemy units broke through to the army observation post, that General D. D. Lelyushenko, who was there, was wounded, who was replaced as army commander by L. A. Govorov. At the same time, the remarkable combat commander of the Twentieth Tank Brigade, Colonel T. S. Orlenko, died the death of a hero.

Despite persistent attempts, the enemy was unable to reach the Mozhaisk area on October 16. However, soberly assessing the situation, L. A. Govorov understood that the general situation remained difficult. Our forces in the Mozhaisk direction were very few. Colonel Polosukhin's division had to be strengthened. But with what? The army commander actually had no reserves at his disposal: two artillery batteries and a company of T-26 tanks - this was negligible in order to fend off the ever-increasing threat of a breakthrough.

The next day, enemy troops launched new fierce attacks along the entire front. The situation in the sector of the Thirty-second Infantry Division became critical. The enemy sought to dismember its defenses and destroy the troops piece by piece. One of the battalions, together with cadets of the Moscow Military-Political School, still held Yudinki and Fomino, but was cut off from the rest of the division’s forces and fought surrounded. Fascist tanks and motorized infantry broke through to Psarevo, and separate groups of tanks and infantry went to the Kukarinsky forest, to the division command post. Its commander, Colonel Polosukhin, did not even ask the army commander for reinforcements, knowing that he had no reserves. However, General Govorov, realizing that the battle on the Borodino field had entered a critical phase, himself sent a rifle battalion and a Katyusha division to Polosukhin’s disposal, essentially exposing another area for this. With these forces the gap in our defense was covered. Having encountered increased resistance, the Nazis stopped their attacks in the evening.

Thus another day was won. In total, the enemy lost five whole days in the battles near Borodino, in the Mozhaisk direction, before he was able to capture Mozhaisk at the cost of heavy losses. Another division was placed at the disposal of Army Commander-5. Initially, Govorov was given the task of using the forces of this division, together with a tank brigade, to counterattack the enemy in the Mozhaisk area and recapture the city. However, in direct wire negotiations with the head of the operational department of the Western Front, G.K. Malandin, on October 19, General Govorov was able to show the inexpediency and unreality of the fight for the return of Mozhaisk with such weak forces. He considered it necessary, saving his troops and avoiding encirclement, to retreat to a new defensive line in order to meet the enemy there in an organized manner, forcing him to prepare again and then conduct costly attacks. The front command agreed with his decision.

In the extremely difficult situation of that time, Leonid Aleksandrovich proved himself to be a decisive, firm and proactive leader, and managed to ensure clear control of the troops. Timely using the few technical reserves at his disposal, deploying artillery weapons to tank-dangerous directions and skillfully organizing their actions, the army commander did not allow the enemy to break through the defenses in any of the sectors of his army.

During the October defensive battles, having received a directive from the Military Council of the Western Front on the need to create maneuverable detachments to fight enemy tanks, Govorov immediately understood the significance of this event for increasing the stability of our defense. The enemy managed to overcome it using their multiple superiority in tanks. The best measure to combat them is to strengthen all tank-threat areas. But there are no appropriate forces and means for this. And if so, then it is necessary to create, from what is available, maneuverable mobile units that could be quickly transferred to threatened areas.

The professional artilleryman Govorov was able to most clearly and energetically implement the right idea. He signed an order that ordered the organization in each rifle regiment of “separate anti-tank exclusively maneuverable detachments consisting of a commander and 15 soldiers, of which one crew of anti-tank rifles and a squad of sappers.” Each division has, respectively, two such detachments, which include a platoon of sappers with anti-tank mines and a mobile mortar detachment in vehicles. “Specially allocate commanders to lead these detachments,” the order said. Finally, three divisional-type mobile detachments were created at army headquarters. The army commander entrusted their direct leadership to the chief of artillery of the army, thereby again and again emphasizing the role he assigned to these detachments. The army commander consistently and unswervingly demanded that his orders be carried out. According to the report of the front command, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief also drew attention to their effectiveness and, in general, to the skillful organization of artillery operations in the Fifth Army zone. As a result, J.V. Stalin once ordered G.K. Zhukov to go to the army of K.K. Rokossovsky, in which the most difficult situation arose, and to take with him L.A. Govorov as an expert artilleryman to provide assistance and transfer experience. But this happened later, during the repulsion of the November offensive of fascist German troops on Moscow.

In the meantime, by the end of October 1941, the troops of the army commanded by L.A. Govorov were occupying defenses at a distance of approximately 80 kilometers from the capital, covering the direction along the Mozhaisk highway and the Minsk highway. The merits of General L.A. Govorov in repelling the October offensive of fascist German troops on Moscow were awarded a high government award - the Order of Lenin.

The army commander, using the ensuing two-week pause in the first half of November, took care of creating a deep and strong defense. According to his decision, the troops took up an operational formation in two echelons. Despite the fact that in the army zone the density of guns and mortars was less than 7 guns per kilometer of front, up to 18 anti-tank strong points were created from army assets. By order of the front command, anti-tank areas were also created in such points as Zvenigorod, Kubinka, Akulovo, etc. The commander and headquarters, the party-political apparatus of the army took all measures to best prepare the troops to repel the November “general” offensive of Hitler’s troops on Soviet capital.

As is known, in November the fascist German command concentrated its powerful tank and motorized groups northwest and southwest of Moscow to attack the Soviet capital. Therefore, the Nazis did not show much activity against the armies of the center of the Western Front. Although here they retained the initiative. By the end of November, in the defense zone of the Fifth Army, the enemy managed to approach Zvenigorod.

And on December 1, he went on the offensive in the Naro-Fominsk direction, the goal of which was to break through the defense and defeat the troops of the Thirty-third Army, bring mobile troops onto the Minsk-Moscow highway to the rear of the Fifth Army, and develop an attack on Moscow along the highway. In this way, the enemy command intended not only to assist the advancement of its flank groups, but also hoped to dismember the entire central section of the Western Front with a sudden attack, disrupt its operational formation, defeat our troops and capture Moscow. For the Nazis, of course, it was no secret that in the sector they had chosen for the offensive, the Soviet troops were weakened, since heavy defensive battles in the Istra and Volokolamsk directions forced the front command to transfer forces there from unattacked sectors of the central armies.

By coincidence, the enemy made this last attempt to break through to Moscow, now in the central sector of the Western Front, precisely at the moment when the commander of his troops, Army General G.K. Zhukov, and Army Commander-5, Artillery Lieutenant General L.A. Govorov, on the orders of I.V. Stalin, were forced to leave their command posts to travel to the Sixteenth Army of Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky. We have already spoken above about the role that was assigned to Govorov on this trip. He himself accepted the assignment without enthusiasm: it was not in his nature to act as a mentor, teaching his colleagues, and even at such an inappropriate time for traveling.

That is why, as G.K. Zhukov recalls, Leonid Aleksandrovich, despite all his scrupulousness regarding the orders of his superiors, in this case tried to challenge this order:

“He quite reasonably tried to prove that he saw no need for such a trip: the Sixteenth Army has its own artillery chief, Artillery Major General V.I. Kazakov, and the commander himself knows what and how to do, why should he, Govorov, At such a hot time, abandon your army. In order to avoid further debate on this issue, I had to explain to the general that this was the order of I.V. Stalin.”

Of course, if Stalin had known that the Nazi command would strike on December 1 in the center of the front, he himself probably would not have insisted on this trip. But one way or another, the enemy’s offensive in the Naro-Fominsk direction took place in the absence of Zhukov and Govorov, which undoubtedly further aggravated the nervousness in our headquarters. Both generals, having learned about the events that had taken place during their absence, hastily returned to the command posts of their subordinate troops.

The situation, which was reported to Govorov upon his arrival at the command post, looked difficult.

In the very first hours of the offensive, the fascist German command threw up to a hundred tanks into battle. The enemy infantry widened the gap, into which tanks and motorized units rushed. In six hours of battle, the enemy penetrated 10 kilometers into our defenses and approached Akulovo. There was a danger of his breaking through onto the Minsk-Moscow highway. As German tanks advanced from south to north along the Naro-Fominsk-Kubinka highway, the threat of fascist German troops reaching the rear of the left flank, and then the entire Fifth Army, grew more and more.

The extreme tension of the situation that day was emphasized by the fact that even members of the army headquarters were forced to take part in repelling a tank attack near the village of Akulovo. One rifle regiment from the Thirty-second Rifle Division of Colonel Polosukhin and his artillery and anti-tank reserve were urgently transferred here. Enemy tanks did not get further than the Akulovo line that day. Having lost up to an infantry battalion and two dozen tanks in battle, they turned to Golovenki and further in the direction of Petrovskoye to reach the Minsk-Moscow highway by a roundabout route.

In the second half of the next day, the Nazis again attacked units of the Fifth Army in the Akulovo area. But again they were repulsed with heavy losses (suffice it to say that in two days of battle, units of the Thirty-second Infantry Division burned and knocked out 23 and captured 11 tanks, destroyed up to a regiment of infantry and shot down 5 enemy aircraft). Army commander L.A. Govorov, having arrived in the Akulovo area, now personally supervised the actions of his subordinate troops.

The fighting from December 1 to December 3, 1941 in this area was extremely fierce. The enemy understood well that if this attempt to break through to Moscow failed, then he would no longer have the strength for a further offensive. The bleak prospect of meeting the harsh Russian winter near the walls of the Soviet capital spurred on German soldiers and. Individual settlements changed hands several times. Soviet troops responded to the Nazi attack with a counter attack, delivering quick and decisive blows to the flank and rear. The fighting continued day and night.

The enemy delivered the main blow in the zone of the Thirty-third Army of General M. G. Efremov. The Nazis managed to break through to Aprelevka here... The battle continued until December 4. By the end of this day, the troops of General Efremov, who carried out a counterattack, reached the Paru River and completely restored their previous position.

General Govorov and other members of the Military Council of the Fifth Army, assessing the progress of the military operation in a brief written report, noted with satisfaction the increased skill of commanders of all levels and troops, expressed in the fact that the infantry in most cases learned to fully use artillery fire, the tanks clearly carried out various combat missions both together with infantry and independently, night attacks for our units have become normal. Usually stingy with praise, Govorov this time gave the highest assessment in his mouth to the actions of the artillery: “The artillery, especially the rocket artillery, worked excellently.” And in conclusion, the report formulated a general conclusion, soberly assessing the main results in the actions of both sides:

“The enemy skillfully used the junctions, throwing his main forces into them and against the unstable 222nd Infantry Division. Elimination of the breakthrough and destruction of the enemy were achieved thanks to the steadfastness of units of the Thirty-second, Fiftieth, Eighty-second rifle divisions and the skillful actions of maneuver groups.”

Characterizing the military art of our military leaders, including L.A. Govorov, we only have to add that in the battles of December 1-4, interaction was clearly organized on the adjacent flanks of the Fifth and Thirty-third armies, the commanders and staffs of which firmly and prudently led the troops. Through their concerted efforts, the enemy's last attempt to attack Moscow was eliminated.

On December 5-6, 1941, a counteroffensive by Soviet troops began near Moscow, which marked the complete failure of the plans of the Nazi invaders to capture the capital of our Motherland. In this counteroffensive, and then in the general winter offensive of the Soviet Army, the formations led by L.A. Govorov were able to solve the combat missions assigned to them. The second Order of Lenin, which adorned the chest of Army Commander 5, was high recognition of his military services in the defense of Moscow. And in November 1941, by resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, Leonid Aleksandrovich was awarded the military rank of lieutenant general of artillery.

The period of leadership of the troops of the Fifth Army was the first very responsible and serious test of his qualities as a military leader. An artilleryman by military specialty, he took command of a large combined arms formation during the menacing days of the October battles in the Moscow strategic direction, in an unusually difficult combat situation. And, despite this, he managed to prove himself from the best side, although at first, of course, the lack of relevant experience affected him. The combat description of Commander-5, signed on January 28, 1942 by the commander of the Western Front, Army General G.K. Zhukov, and a member of the Military Council of the Front Ts, F. Khokhlov, said:

“Lieutenant General Comrade. Govorov has commanded the Fifth Army since October 18, 1941. Conducted successful defensive operations in Mozhaisk and Zvenigorod. Conducts offensive operations well to defeat the enemy's Mozhaisk-Gzhatsk group.

Well prepared in operational and tactical terms. The main disadvantage of Comrade. Govorov is a certain dispersion along the entire front and a lack of skill in gathering a fist for a strike action... Comrade. Govorov is a strong-willed, demanding, energetic, brave and organized commander of the troops.”

Since the spring of 1942, the Soviet Supreme High Command entrusted Leonid Aleksandrovich with a new responsible assignment: in April he was appointed commander of a group of troops of the Leningrad Front, and in August he took command of the troops of the entire front. From that time on, the name of L. A. Govorov forever entered into the glorious defense of Leningrad.

In the summer of 1942, decisive battles for the fate of our Motherland took place in the south of the country. Fascist hordes rushed to the Volga and the Caucasus. New incredibly difficult trials befell our people and their Armed Forces.

It was now, when a grandiose battle ensued on the Don and Volga, in which the future of the Soviet state was being decided, that Leonid Aleksandrovich addressed the party organization with a statement. And precisely because it was submitted at a difficult time for the Fatherland, this statement sounded like an oath:

“...I ask you to accept me into the ranks of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), outside of which I cannot imagine myself in the decisive days of severe danger for my Motherland.”

It seems that this fact from Govorov’s biography is very important for understanding his appearance as a person and citizen.

Recommendations were given to Govorov by the chief of artillery of the Leningrad Front, G. F. Odintsov, who knew him from his time as a tactics teacher at the artillery academy, a member of the Military Council of the Fifth Army, P. F. Ivanov, and the deputy chief of staff of the Leningrad Front, A. V. Gvozdkov. The party organization, having examined the application, accepted him as a candidate member of the party. However, the Central Committee of the party decided to admit L. A. Govorov as an exception to the party membership without undergoing candidate experience.

The communist general plunged headlong into his work. Having taken command of the troops of the Leningrad Front and relying on the constant support of the Military Council, he took all measures to solve the dual task - to alleviate the situation of blockaded Leningrad and at the same time pin down the enemy here, prevent his attempts at a new assault and at the same time not give him the opportunity to transfer his forces to the south .

Everyone heard about Leningrad and Leningraders at that time. And everyone wanted to do everything possible and impossible to alleviate their lot. Govorov, due to his position, knew more about the city than others. Yet he was shocked by what he saw and learned when he arrived there.

Here he sits, having returned from another trip to the troops, in his office in Smolny - a stern, outwardly dry, unfriendly man, with a short-cropped mustache on a tired, somewhat puffy face. He listens attentively to A.A. Kuznetsov, a member of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, who heads the city’s defensive construction commission, about how work is going on laying a gas pipeline to besieged Leningrad along the bottom of Lake Ladoga. In a conversation, Kuznetsov suddenly remembers how, quite recently, it was necessary to take sappers from the front to the city so that they would tear off mass graves at the Piskarevskoye cemetery with explosives. Those who died of exhaustion were buried in them: the population of Leningrad, although they did not go on attacks, suffered huge losses every day from starvation.

Govorov’s gray eyes gaze intently at his interlocutor. The commander continues to listen carefully. And only the raised nodules on his cheekbones and the nervous rubbing of his hands betray his excitement.

“We must, Alexey Alexandrovich, take all measures to accurately fulfill the construction schedule,” he says dully.

Everything related to the laying of a gas pipeline constantly occupies the commander and members of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front. Gasoline is the bread and butter of internal combustion engines. He is needed both to continue life in the city and for the upcoming offensive that will break the chains of the blockade. However, when will there be an offensive, the commander thinks, but for now he is obliged to do something immediately to make life easier for the people of Leningrad. They overcame the incredibly difficult winter of the siege, fought continuously and survived to continue the fight until complete victory over the enemy. Since his arrival here, rations have been increased for the population. The officers and generals of his headquarters discussed the first run of the city tram, which consisted of just one trailer, as a big event. With the same excitement they talked about the opening of a bathhouse with a hairdresser. Leningraders continue to work hard, tirelessly forging weapons for the front. Few hours and minutes free from work are devoted to vegetable gardens: even on the Champ de Mars and in the Summer Garden, plots were now set aside for them. Yes, of course, with the arrival of spring, life in besieged Leningrad became a little easier. The immediate threat of its capture by the enemy had disappeared. But it remains blocked, the enemy continues to methodically fire at it with large-caliber guns, causing death and destruction...

Lost in thought, Govorov again remembered the proposal to organize a systematic counter-battery fight against the Nazi siege artillery. It immediately attracted the commander's attention.

In the language of specialists, this is called moving to preemptive offensive tactics of counter-battery warfare. To put it more clearly, this is a duel, a real artillery duel. Our artillerymen impose it on the enemy’s artillery and thereby divert enemy fire from the city.

Govorov had already discussed the counter-battery plan in detail with his deputy for artillery, General G.F. Odintsov, and approved it. At the urgent requests of the front commander, the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army began to supply Leningrad with large-caliber shells. Now it is already possible to fire to destroy enemy siege batteries, which caused the greatest damage to the city. General Govorov also demanded more active participation of aviators in the fight against enemy siege artillery. In this regard, he set a task for the head of the defensive construction department - to make special shelters for protection in order to increase the safety of our gun crews during enemy shelling. Engineers quickly designed original types of shelters for heavy long-range guns and personnel.

The commander asks Kuznetsov what the Leningrad workers have done to implement the engineers’ proposals. Kuznetsov gives a certificate from which it is clear how much armored steel, beams, and rails were required for this, which the front city gave to its defenders. And he gave them not only the necessary materials. Thousands of Leningrad girls and women worked selflessly to help quickly build shelters.

Having listened to the member of the Military Council with satisfaction, Govorov tells him to go and rest.

“You don’t understand: is it too late now or is it still very early?” Apparently, it’s the white nights’ fault that we once again don’t notice how one day replaces another,” the commander jokes rather gloomily.

Kuznetsov left. And Govorov sat down at the table again, pulling a map with the operational situation towards him.

The commander of the front troops scrupulously studied the enemy and over time knew the location of his units along the entire blockade ring down to the battalion. He constantly dealt with issues of organizing engineering structures. And again, I looked at them not only from the point of view of current tasks, but taking into account the future. The head of the engineering department of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General B.V. Bychevsky, recalls, for example, how he once reported to Govorov a conceptual scheme for the development of a trench system in divisional defense zones. Having examined her carefully, Leonid Aleksandrovich fidgeted with his elbows and wrung his seemingly frozen fingers.

- Not everything has been thought out. You are more concerned about tough defense... The trench network must be gradually developed not only in the depths, but also forward, towards the enemy.

And when General Bychevsky directly asked the commander about the prospects of going on the offensive, he looked at him sideways and grumbled:

- It’s too early for you to know about this. You still have enough to do for defense... But take into account what I said...

The commander was able to instantly assess the situation and took control of a wide range of issues related to the combat activities of all branches of the military, the training of personnel, and the work of logistics and supply. His approach to people always had the air of a strict teacher. He knew how to listen to anyone without interrupting, but did not tolerate verbosity. The instructions he gave were very succinct, requiring the performers to be able to “use their brains” on their own.

Govorov’s high personal organization, recalls B.V. Bychevsky, was quickly felt by the entire headquarters. If subordinates ask the commander to see them for a report, he will immediately set a time and call exactly, minute by minute.

Leonid Aleksandrovich’s taciturnity and dryness were initially perceived as emphasized rather than natural character traits, but then they got used to his gloomy appearance. A. A. Zhdanov, A. A. Kuznetsov, T. F. Shtykov and other party leaders treated this strict person, but not isolated from the team, with sincere respect.

By order of Govorov, front troops began to conduct active operations in many sectors of the defense, which were called local battles in operational reports, but had not only a short-range, but also a long-range focus: on the one hand, they pinned down and exhausted the enemy, on the other, they raised spirit and confidence our troops, laid the foundations for future offensive battles. As a result of a number of activities carried out by the front command and headquarters in the summer and autumn of 1942, seven divisions were withdrawn from the first echelon of defense. But this was not done at the expense of weakening the defense. By withdrawing units and formations from the front line, the front commander took care of restoring the combat effectiveness of individual machine-gun and artillery battalions, which at the beginning of the war defended fortified areas and were then dispersed among rifle divisions. At the same time, by his order, the fortified areas themselves were restored. The entire city defensive circuit was considered from an engineering standpoint as a gigantic fortified area. In the south and southwest, the role of strong forts was played by the Oranienbaum bypass, Kronstadt and Pulkovo Heights, in the north by the reinforced concrete belt of the Karelian fortified region, in the east by the Neva fortified position. Leningrad itself was the heart of this fortress, the main bastion - political and strategic, an arsenal city in all respects.

Govorov did not cancel, but, on the contrary, supported everything valuable that was done in order to increase the stability and survivability of the city’s defense, although the immediate threat of its capture by the enemy had passed. He approved the principle of organizing defense within the city itself into sectors. Each of them had its own permanent military garrison of army, navy, border units and working combat groups, which were formed at enterprises territorially included in this sector and united into battalions. The army battalion structure was also introduced in local air defense units.

In the first line troops, the defense was improved taking into account the accumulated experience, and the personal experience of Leonid Aleksandrovich himself, gained in the battle for Moscow, played a significant role. He was still very demanding about the creation of special anti-tank areas, the organization of maneuver groups and barrage detachments, etc., etc.

The troops of the Leningrad Front most carefully improved their defenses and increased their survivability. However, this was by no means a sign of continuing to sit in one place for a long time. On the contrary, as we have already seen, it was thanks to all this that the commander, without waiting for Headquarters to send him troops to reinforce him (he understood very well that in conditions when the Battle of Stalingrad was in full swing, Headquarters was accumulating reserves to defeat the enemy at the decisive point) , brought a number of connections from the leading edge. Together with one division that had previously been in the front reserve, they formed an attack force that began to prepare for the upcoming offensive battles.

Enough has already been written about everything related to the preparation for the offensive, about breaking the blockade of Leningrad in January 1943, about the final defeat of the enemy at the walls of the hero city in January 1944, as well as about the subsequent major offensive operations of the Leningrad Front, which he led. in detail both in special military-historical works and in memoirs, in particular in the memoirs of B.V. Bychevsky “City-Front”, to which reference has already been made above. We would therefore like to dwell in more detail on the characteristics of some of the features inherent in the style of work of Leonid Aleksandrovich Govorov as a front commander, and give examples that are little known to a wide circle of readers.

Let us stipulate that the author received this opportunity thanks to the help kindly provided to him by the now deceased General of the Army M. M. Popov, former chief of staff of the Leningrad Front, and Marshal of Artillery G. F. Odintsov, former commander of the artillery of the same front. Both of them, working together with Leonid Aleksandrovich in direct contact, communicating with him continuously throughout many days of the war in a variety of situations, witnessed facts that are not in any of the archival documents and which, undoubtedly, are very valuable for deeper get to know the image of the Soviet commander.

Not only the similarity of the biographies, but also much of what characterizes Govorov’s style of work has already been or will be said in stories about other outstanding military leaders. Such similarity is natural, because common features must inevitably be inherent in them, since they all represent the Soviet school of military art. But with all this, each of them has his own individual style.

“The main thing that caught the eye of the person who first encountered Govorov was the extremely meticulous, literally filigree work in preparing the operation,” - this is how Markian Mikhailovich Popov conveyed to me his strongest impression of the front commander. Regardless of him, Georgy Fedorovich Odintsov says on this matter: “Extremely hardworking, punctual to the point of pedantry, he personally developed all the necessary calculations in preparation for discussing any, even private, operation.”

Does this mean that the front commander sought to replace the collective work of the front headquarters, commanders and their staffs, various special departments and services? No, Govorov did not replace anyone. On the contrary, he strictly demanded the same thorough preparation for the performance of any combat mission from all his assistants and subordinates.

As a rule, it began with the most detailed study of the enemy, from his front line and inclusive of operational reserves. Reconnaissance was given the task of revealing down to the smallest detail the defense system, the outline of the enemy's defensive structures and the location of firing points. The front commander spared neither effort nor money for continuous reconnaissance searches, systematic aerial photography, radio interception, etc. He himself regularly went to the troops to personally study the enemy’s defenses, for meetings and conversations with commanders, primarily with reconnaissance officers of formations and units. From division commanders, Govorov sought to ensure that they could make a forecast regarding the behavior of enemy reserves in their tactical depth, and from corps commanders and army commanders - a specific calculation and prediction of possible maneuver by operational reserves.

The front commander and commanders of all levels carefully studied the terrain, determining the possibilities of using military branches and observation conditions for both sides. At the same time, calculations and study of the densities of artillery and mortars needed to break through the defense were carried out; in accordance with this, the width of the breakthrough area was outlined, a group of troops was created, and tasks were determined for the entire depth of the operation.

Before hearing the decisions of the army commanders, Govorov took over one of the armies, and instructed the chief of staff and operational management to make decisions for the remaining army commanders. These solutions were then discussed in detail while other possible options were explored.

B. Bychevsky’s memoirs about Govorov emphasize that soon after he assumed the post of commander of the troops of the Leningrad Front, “... it seemed to each of the employees of the front headquarters that the new commander attached special importance to his area of ​​​​work.” This is a very significant detail, testifying to the great organizational talent of the commander: he skillfully and purposefully directed the efforts of all staff specialists to achieve a common goal, and each of them constantly felt his attention and control.

Such a method of work, when the front commander himself delved into all the details and calculations of the upcoming operation, certainly required a huge expenditure of energy and would have been impossible without his wide erudition and versatile military training. But he had an indisputable advantage - when discussing any plan, Leonid Aleksandrovich had his own opinion, based on a deep study of this issue.

But since this was so, weren’t subsequent discussions and meetings reduced to a mere formality, when the already established point of view of the senior boss is expressed out loud only to be unconditionally accepted, and the opinions of others are, at best, condescendingly listened to? This happens quite often in life. Leonid Aleksandrovich’s closest associates and assistants answer this question in the negative.

“Before calling the staff of the headquarters,” said General G.F. Odintsov, “the commander already had his own thoughts on the issue being brought up for discussion. However, after listening to others, he changed his own point of view if better proposals were made. And he did it without any ambition.” “Leonid Aleksandrovich Govorov submitted his preliminary decision,” recalled General M. M. Popov, “to a narrow circle of command for discussion. The following were usually involved: a member of the Military Council, the chief of staff, the head of the operational department, and the commanders of the artillery and air army. Having outlined his decision, Govorov listened very carefully to the suggestions and comments of those present. He accepted some of them, rejected others, but each time he explained in detail the reasons for his disagreement.” While listening to the decisions of the army commanders, Govorov also did not always approve them without comments and amendments. But even in this case, “his comments or disagreements were completely justified.”

We have thus revealed another important feature of Govorov’s military leadership style. Needless to say, the ability to listen to all the suggestions of subordinates and combine this with an explanation of what exactly is the advantage of one of them or the disadvantage of another - this method of work, among other things, was also a good school for everyone who communicated with Leonid Alexandrovich and worked under his leadership.

When preparing troops for offensive operations, General Govorov demanded that formation commanders carefully study the terrain at the front line and in the immediate depths of the enemy’s defenses, select at least approximately identical terrain in their rear and train troops on it. The attack conditions in different areas are completely different: some will have to storm heights, others will have to ford a river at the beginning of the attack, others will have to get closer to the enemy hiding on the edge of the forest, or storm a pillbox in an open area. All this must be taken into account by the commander when preparing his troops. And Govorov not only demanded that the necessary training be provided in units and units, but he himself very often attended such training.

The training of formation and headquarters commanders, as a rule, was carried out on terrain models created on the ground at the appropriate scale, with an accurate reproduction of the topography, as well as defensive structures and the initial position of their troops. The front commander personally checked the degree of readiness of army commanders, army headquarters, corps, division, and in other cases regimental and even battalion commanders to carry out the combat mission. He especially strictly ensured that the combined arms commanders thoroughly knew the capabilities of all forces and means interacting with them.

The efforts that were expended each time to prepare for an offensive were more than justified during the operations. In war, as we know, it does not often happen that planning and the course of an operation coincide. In the operations led by Govorov, such coincidences were no exception. The first and most difficult of them is breaking the blockade of Leningrad. It seemed fundamentally impossible to cross a river 600-700 meters wide on ice, and then climb its steep, icy bank, in which the enemy had built a system of powerful long-term firing points in advance.

The width of the crossing of the Neva is as much as 13 kilometers, from Nevskaya Dubrovka to its sources. Formations and units of the Volkhov Front are breaking through enemy defenses towards the troops commanded by General L.A. Govorov. Their meeting is scheduled in the Sinyavino area. On November 29, 1942, Leonid Aleksandrovich first formulated this combat mission to break the siege of Leningrad to the leadership of the front, emphasizing that a month was given to prepare the operation.

Needless to say, all this time was filled to the limit with various preparatory events, staff games, demonstration exercises, etc.

The commander set very difficult tasks for the departments and directorates of the front headquarters. Engineers, for example, had to solve many difficult problems in connection with the upcoming crossing of the Neva. Light tanks will go on the offensive along with the first echelon of our infantry. No later than the second day of the operation, it is planned to introduce a second echelon into the battle to build up the strike. Its battle formations will already include medium and heavy tanks. But how can tanks cross the river on ice, if it is known that its thickness is not sufficient to support the weight of even a medium tank? What needs to be provided in case the enemy blows up the ice before or during our attack, creating an obstacle to the movement of not only tanks, but also infantry? How to ensure passage through minefields and obstacles on the enemy shore?

The front commander carefully and scrupulously examined the essence of each of these and many other issues, forced experts to express all the arguments for and against this or that option, doubted with them and looked for some new solution... And only after being thoroughly convinced of the acceptability of a proposal, approved it definitively. In this case, the decision was consistently and purposefully implemented.

For example, the head of the Engineering Department, at his next report to the commander, offers to teach the soldiers in the rifle units themselves how to overcome minefields. Then the infantry will not have to lie under enemy fire on the ice of the Neva during the attack, waiting for the sappers to clear the way. In this case, it is impossible to count on sappers: there are too few of them left in the ranks, and on the other hand, the density of the enemy’s minefields is too high.

Govorov silently listens to the general. And then asks about the very essence of this idea:

- Do you want to destroy the infantry?

And then he puts forward, as if as a counter-argument:

— But the headquarters of the Red Army engineering troops is doing something opposite: forming special assault engineering and sapper brigades.

However, General Bychevsky is not inclined to see this as something contradictory. On the contrary, powerful engineering units should, in theory, ensure that their infantry quickly overcome various engineering obstacles during an attack. However, the Leningrad Front will not have such units at the start of the operation. The solution, therefore, is to teach the infantrymen themselves how to overcome minefields.

The arguments of the head of the Front Engineering Directorate are convincing. Nevertheless, the commander continues to ask about what has been done in terms of preparation for the implementation of this proposal, about the simulated minefield created in one of the engineering battalions - an exact copy of the one scouted from the enemy - for special training of troops. Then he asks to show him a diagram of the barrier line built by the Nazis on the opposite bank of the Neva.

Day after day, our observers and intelligence officers collected and accumulated information about what was happening on the enemy side. And now before the eyes of the commander of the front troops there is a diagram on which conventional symbols show barbed wire barriers - spirals, and in them there are tension "surprises" - mines. Then there is a six-meter strip of tensioned anti-tank mines. Then - slingshots made of poles with barbed wire wrapped around them and anti-tank minefields.

The commander examines the diagram, and a picture of a future attack appears in his mind’s eye... It will take a full seven minutes for a soldier to run across the ice of the Neva to the opposite bank under enemy fire, then he will need to climb the six-meter steep bank of the river to the top. And then he will meet all this. And fire, fire from the enemy, who targeted every point.

“Okay, prepare a demonstrative teaching,” Govorov sums it all up thoughtfully. “I’ll come and have a look myself and then we’ll decide how to proceed.” This is a serious matter.

A week later, the entire senior and senior command staff of the Sixty-seventh Army of General M.P. Dukhanov, which will cross the Neva, and the Military Council of the front are present at a demonstration exercise. It's going well. The soldiers of one of the companies, trained to overcome minefields on the move, acted with dexterity and swiftness. They threw live grenades to detonate mines, and pulled away tension mines with grapples and hooks on ropes. According to the conclusion of the controllers, only four soldiers from the entire company were “blown up”. Those present were clearly convinced of the effectiveness of special training.

Now the commander of the front troops approves the proposals of the head of the Engineering Department. And General N.P. Simonyak, the commander of the rifle division that will go in the leading echelon of the attackers, is the first to express his desire to begin training his soldiers. Others did not want to leave him behind either.

Meanwhile, General Govorov is already resolving issues with the artillerymen. To destroy long-term firing points, he ordered more than 200 guns with calibers ranging from 45 mm to 203 mm inclusive to be placed on direct fire. Each fire crew received the task of destroying two firing points - the main one and the reserve one.

A day before the start of the offensive, Govorov told the front artillery commander, General Odintsov:

“If you ensure that the first echelon gets caught on the other side, consider that the artillery has completed ninety percent of its tasks.”

It was incredibly difficult to do this: after all, even two or three surviving enemy firing points are enough for our infantry to lie like bones on the ice of the river. Actually, in some areas of the offensive this happened, although in general the artillery coped with the task. The front commander quickly decided to commit the division, which failed to cross the Neva, into battle in a neighboring sector where the enemy’s defenses had been breached. On January 12, a breakthrough across the river was made, and on January 18, the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts united. On January 15, 1943, L. A. Govorov received his first rank of combined arms commander - colonel general, and less than two weeks later - the military commander's Order of Suvorov, 1st degree.

While solving many important and urgent current affairs, Leonid Aleksandrovich never lost sight of the prospects. On the table in his office in Smolny there were always maps laid out, covering the territory far to the west of Leningrad. Using them, he studied the operational directions where the troops of the Leningrad Front were to launch offensive operations. The city was still under blockade, but the commander’s thoughts, ahead of events, were already rushing into the future. A thick student notebook bound in black oilcloth was always seen on the same table by everyone who entered the commander’s office. There he wrote down what was related to current affairs, and he also trusted her with his thoughts about long-term operational plans, which for the time being no one should have known about. The notebook contained a lot of his thoughts, sketches, plans for future operations. They were born gradually, as he studied the situation more and more deeply, accumulated specific data about the enemy and his troops, about the terrain, the system of defensive structures, etc., etc. This is probably why his plans were original and deep, and every detail so carefully thought out and weighed. In the offensive operation of the troops of the Leningrad Front in January 1944, L. A. Govorov, by that time already an army general, seemingly violated the basic principle of breaking through the fortified defense. He decided to carry it out not in the weakest, but in the strongest area. And he explained this decision with the following circumstances: it will be easier to break through the defense in the weakest sector, but then the troops will get bogged down in swampy terrain and it will not be possible to develop a breakthrough; the enemy will use the time given to him to organize defense on a new line; breaking through a strong defense prepared in advance by the enemy on the Krasnoye Selo line is incomparably more difficult, but the capture of Krasnoye Selo opens the way to Gatchina and makes it possible to develop an attack on the rear of the two enemy armies.

This is how this operation was planned and prepared, and this is how it took place. There are probably very few examples in military history where troops that were under siege for a long time were able to inflict such a decisive defeat on the besieging enemy. At the same time, of course, it should be borne in mind that they interacted with two fronts operating from outside the blockade. The second Order of Suvorov, 1st degree, recognized the military leadership merits of L. A. Govorov in this operation.

Let us now take the June 1944 offensive operation of the troops of the Leningrad Front on the Karelian Isthmus. The enemy's defense system here was more than 100 kilometers deep and was full of all types of fortifications. L.A. Govorov was well acquainted with the nature of the fortifications on the Mannerheim Line from the Soviet-Finnish war. But now the enemy was also building a second powerful defense line with a number of strong resistance units on it. The enemy expected to sit behind the walls of pillboxes and casemates.

Considering the upcoming nature of the actions of the advancing formations to break through the heavily fortified defense, Army General Govorov made a significant change in the operational formation of the front forces: instead of the second echelon, a strong front reserve of ten rifle divisions, several tank and self-propelled artillery units was created.

As Chief Marshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov recalls, when on June 6, 1944 he arrived at the command post of the commander of the Leningrad Front troops to direct the actions of our aviation in the upcoming operation, and Govorov began to acquaint him with the plan of action of the troops, Novikov immediately drew attention on this feature in the operational formation of the front.

- Did you notice? — Govorov smiled contentedly. “That’s the whole point, Alexander Alexandrovich.” Look,” and the pencil in his hand ran across the map. — You know from your own experience what the terrain is like here. You are a participant in the Soviet-Finnish war. In such terrain, it is impossible to carry out complex maneuvers and deep strikes with large masses of mechanized formations. You can only break through the defenses head-on, and the tanks have nowhere to turn around. There is no operational space in the usual sense of the word for the advancing troops here. You will have to operate mainly along the roads, and they are blocked by powerful resistance units. That's why we abandoned the usual two-echelon construction.

There was one more feature in the plan for the upcoming operation: the Twenty-third Army of General A.I. Cherepanov did not receive an independent breakthrough area. Its divisions on the left flank were replaced by units of the Twenty-First Army of General D.N. Gusev. This was done in order to bring the formations of the Twenty-third Army into a breakthrough through the gap made by its left neighbor. This order of attack made it possible to reduce losses when breaking enemy defenses in the northeastern part of the isthmus.

The plan of the operation as a whole provided the necessary penetrating power of the first strike, made it possible to continuously and systematically increase pressure on the enemy, and maintain superiority in people and means when breaking through subsequent defensive lines. The plan was original, and Headquarters approved it.

Our offensive began on the morning of June 10, 1944. It was preceded a day earlier by the preliminary destruction of long-term fortifications by artillery fire and massive air strikes. In the afternoon it became known that the enemy was retreating to the second line of defense. The blow took the Finnish command by surprise, and it did not have time to bring its operational reserves to the breakthrough site. On the first day of the offensive, the enemy's defenses were broken through on a 20-kilometer front. The rifle corps of General N.P. Simonyak achieved the greatest success.

During the operation, L.A. Govorov was, as always, at an observation post, which was located close to the advancing units in the direction of the main attack. From here he closely monitored the actions of the troops, primarily the timely introduction of second echelons and reserves into the battle, and directed the actions of artillery and aviation. At critical moments of the battle, he acted with his characteristic determination and courage, and without hesitation took upon himself full responsibility.

Markian Mikhailovich Popov spoke about a characteristic episode in this sense that occurred on June 14, 1944 during the assault by the troops of the Leningrad Front on the second line of Finnish defense on the Karelian Isthmus. By the way, military historians do not report about it, since the events of that day were determined by orders given by telephone or in personal communication with subordinates, and therefore nothing is said about them in archival documents.

The second line of Finnish defense was located 25-40 kilometers from the first and was, as already mentioned, a new Mannerheim line. Considering that this powerful line of defense consists of reinforced concrete and armored structures, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, although it envisaged capturing it on the move, at the same time indicated to the front commander the need to prepare a forceful breakthrough if it was not possible to overcome this line on the move.

The first assault, which began on the morning of June 14, was unsuccessful for us. The troops that rose together to attack were soon forced to lie down in front of the enemy's barbed wire barriers, fired upon by heavy machine-gun and mortar fire. The front commander had every reason to abandon a second attack and begin preparing a breakthrough. Moreover, he even had to do this, because a repeated attack in case of failure would mean a violation of the instructions of Headquarters. However, carefully following the course of events and subtly feeling the pulse of the battle, Govorov came to the conclusion that the enemy’s fire was rather poorly organized, and our advancing troops were most likely stopped by some “fear of concrete.” Leonid Aleksandrovich also knew well that the enemy did not have special troops to defend the second zone and intended to defend it with those forces that would withdraw from the first. But only disorganized and very battered units withdrew from there. Consequently, by refusing to repeat the attack and taking a break for several days to organize a breakthrough, we would allow the enemy to bring troops here from the rear and significantly strengthen our defenses, which would greatly complicate our further actions and lead to unnecessary casualties.

The commander decided, after a break of several hours, to repeat the attack with the involvement of all artillery and bomber aircraft. The corresponding orders and explanations were immediately given to the army commander and corps commanders. The party-political apparatus of the units used the pause to explain to the soldiers the meaning of the task received and the current situation.

Since the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was not yet at Headquarters, the front commander had to take the decision made on his personal responsibility, and he did so without hesitation (later his decision was approved). The repeated attack was a complete success. The second line of defense, on which Mannerheim had placed so much hope, was broken through first in a narrow area, and then turned out to be completely breached. Our troops quickly moved forward. Four days after this, Leonid Aleksandrovich was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Led by Marshal Govorov, the troops of the Leningrad Front in the fall of 1944 carried out very successful operations to liberate Estonia and the islands of the Moonsund archipelago. Remaining the commander of the troops of this front until the end of the Patriotic War, Leonid Aleksandrovich, from October 1, simultaneously coordinated the actions of the Second and Third Baltic Fronts, being a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. In January 1945, for military services to the Motherland shown during the Great Patriotic War, L. A. Govorov became a holder of the Golden Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union, and in May of the same year he was awarded the Order of Victory.

The war has died down. The victorious Soviet people returned to peaceful creative work, transforming the appearance of their native land. But his armed defenders are still vigilantly standing at their combat post. Marshal of the Soviet Union Leonid Aleksandrovich Govorov remained in combat formation with them until the end of his life. In the post-war period, the Communist Party and the Soviet government entrusted him with a number of responsible areas of work in the Armed Forces of the USSR. He was the chief inspector of the Ground Forces, from July 1948 to July 1952 and from May 1954 until the day of his death, on March 19, 1955, he headed the country's Air Defense Forces, being at the same time the Deputy Minister of Defense.

The country's air defense troops took shape organizationally as an independent branch of the USSR Armed Forces in the post-war period. It was in 1948 that for the first time a provision appeared in Soviet military regulations that the country's Air Defense Forces, along with the Ground Forces, Air Force and Navy, were a branch of the Armed Forces.

This situation fully arose from the experience of the Great Patriotic War, as well as from the conditions of post-war development. The fact is that in the West, the desire of the military leaders of the armies of capitalist states to transform their air force into the main means of solving the problems of a future war, which aggressive imperialist circles were intensively beginning to prepare, was becoming more and more clearly evident. Aviation and unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with nuclear weapons, in their opinion, were supposed to destroy and destroy political and economic centers, airfields, communications routes and other important objects with sudden attacks in order to paralyze the entire country, bring chaos and panic and ultimately decide the outcome of the war in your favor.

It is quite natural that under these conditions the role and importance of the country's air defense increased immeasurably. These issues become the focus of attention of the Communist Party and the Soviet government. The country's air defense troops were withdrawn from the subordination of the artillery commander of the Soviet Army and turned into an independent branch of the Armed Forces. The high honor of commanding these troops was entrusted to Marshal of the Soviet Union L. A. Govorov.

Leonid Aleksandrovich, as always, plunged headlong into the assigned work. He had to resolve many issues related to improving the weapons of air defense troops. During that period, the re-equipment of the country's air defense fighter aircraft from piston to jet aircraft began. More advanced weapons and military equipment were also supplied to ground formations and air defense units. Anti-aircraft artillery guns were improved, remote control of guns of all calibers was developed, anti-aircraft artillery systems were created, and work was intensively carried out on the creation of anti-aircraft guided missiles. Completely new weapons were developed based on the latest achievements of science and technology.

In May 1954, after a new reorganization of the troops and the entire air defense system, which aimed at centralizing its control, Marshal of the Soviet Union L. A. Govorov became the first commander-in-chief of the country's Air Defense Forces.

It’s not for nothing that our people call air defense soldiers “air border guards.” 60 thousand kilometers of air borders are entrusted to their protection, beyond which stretch the vast fields and forests of our Motherland, cities and villages where millions of Soviet people live and work. Leonid Aleksandrovich tirelessly taught the soldiers, sergeants, and generals subordinate to him to always be on alert so that any enemy aircraft and every enemy missile would be immediately destroyed if they appeared in Soviet airspace. He saw the highest duty of a Soviet soldier in selfless service to the Fatherland at his assigned post. And he himself always carried out his combat watch with honor, until the last beat of his heart he was a soldier, a communist, a faithful son of the great Soviet people.
Colonel A. Kiselev

Govorov Leonid Alexandrovich
10(22).02.1897–19.03.1955

Years of life: 10(22).02.1897-19.03.1955

He was Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Born in the village of Butyrki, near Vyatka, in the family of a peasant, who later became an employee in Yelabuga. He studied at the Petrograd Polytechnic Institute. L. Govorov in 1916 became a cadet at the Konstantinovsky Artillery School. He began his combat career in 1918 as an officer in the army of Admiral Kolchak. In 1919, he was accepted as a volunteer into the Red Army, took part in battles on the Southern and Eastern fronts, exercised command of an artillery division, and was wounded twice - near Kakhovka and Perekop. In 1933 he graduated from the Military Academy. Frunze, after which the General Staff Academy in 1938. He took part in the war with Finland of 1939-1940. During the Great Patriotic War, General L.A. Govorov led the 5th Army, which defended the approaches to Moscow. By order of I.V. Stalin, in the spring of 1942, he went to besieged Leningrad, where he led the front. He acted under the pseudonyms Leonidov, Leonov, Gavrilov. On January 18, 1943, he broke through the blockade of Leningrad - the operation was called “Iskra”, carrying out a counter attack near Shlisselburg. A year later, Govorov managed to deliver another blow, which destroyed the German Northern Wall, thereby lifting the complete blockade of Leningrad.

The German army, led by Field Marshal von Küchler, suffered irreparable losses. In the early summer of 1944, troops of the Leningrad Front carried out the Vyborg operation, thereby breaking through the “Mannerheim Line” and taking control of the city of Vyborg. Govorov was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union on June 18, 1944, and in the fall of 1944 Govorov managed to liberate Estonia, thereby breaking the enemy’s Panther defenses.

While occupying the position of commander of the Leningrad Front, Govorov also represented Headquarters in the Baltic states. He was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In May 1945, the entire German army group “Courland” surrendered to troops led by Govorov.

In Moscow, fireworks were given 14 times in honor of victories led by Govorov. In the post-war period, Govorov was the first Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Union's air defense. This great commander died in 1955 at the age of 59. He was buried in Moscow on Red Square near the Kremlin wall.

Marshal L.A. Govorov had:

Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union (01/27/1945), 5 Orders of Lenin,

Order of Victory (05/31/1945),

3 Orders of the Red Banner,

2 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree,

Order of Kutuzov 1st degree,

Order of the Red Star - a total of 13 orders and 7 medals,

Tuvan "Order of the Republic",

3 foreign orders.

V.A. Egorshin, “Field Marshals and Marshals.” M., 2000

Govorov Leonid Alexandrovich

Born February 10 (February 22), 1897 in the village. Butyrki today is in the Bogorodsky district of the Kirov region, in a peasant family, Russian by nationality. In 1916 he graduated from 7 classes of a real school, after which he studied at the Polytechnic Institute for a year, then 7 months at the Artillery School in Petrograd. In 1926 he graduated from the Artillery Advanced Courses for Command Staff, in 1930 he graduated from the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze, and in 1933 he completed his studies at the correspondence course at the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze, in the same year he graduated from the operational department of the Military Academy. M. V. Frunze, in 1938 - Military Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army.

He began his military career at the end of 1916 in the tsarist army as a cadet, then became a junior battery officer, and then a junior battery officer of the 8th division of the 2nd Ufa corps of Kolchak’s army.

From January 1920 to December 1922, he served as a division commander, was an assistant chief of division artillery, then chief of division artillery, after which he commanded an artillery regiment until December 1929.

During his certification, it was noted that his political preparation was average. He is prone to making decisions without permission, without fear of responsibility. From the end of 1929, Govorov took the position of chief of artillery of the rifle corps and he held it until May 1931, was the chief of artillery of the fortified area, then the chief of artillery of the corps, after which he assumed the post of head of the department in the artillery department of the KVO, after which he became a senior teacher at the department tactics of the Artillery Academy of the Red Army named after. F.E. Dzerzhinsky, then became Deputy Inspector General of Artillery of the GAU of the Red Army and worked in this position until May 1941.

During the Great Patriotic War, from May to June 1941, Govorov served as head of the Red Army Artillery Academy named after. F.E. Dzerzhinsky, after which until August 1941 he was the chief of artillery in the Western direction. He commanded the Reserve Front, after which he served as commander of the 5th Army of the Western Front, and he remained in this position until April 1942.

The commander of the Western Front, Army General Zhukov, wrote in January 1942 in a combat description of Govorov that he was a man of strong will, energetic, brave, and demanding, capable of effectively commanding armies.

From April to August 1942, Govorov served as commander of a group of troops, and then commander of the armies of the Leningrad Front.

At the end of the war, he became commander of the Leningrad Military District and remained in this position until April 1946, then became the chief inspector of the Ground Forces, after which he served as chief inspector of the USSR Armed Forces, then became deputy minister of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, and was commander of the Soviet Air Defense Union while simultaneously holding the position of chief inspector of the USSR Armed Forces. Govorov was also the Deputy Minister of War of the USSR for combat training of the Soviet Army, a position he held until April 1953.

Govorov had the following military ranks: brigade commander he received it in 1936, major general of artillery was awarded to Govorov on June 4, 1940, lieutenant general of artillery on November 9, 1941, colonel general - on January 15, 1943, army general - November 17, 1943, Marshal of the Soviet Union - June 18, 1944

He was a member of the CPSU, starting in 1942, and was a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 2nd-4th convocations.

L.A. passed away Govorov on March 19, 1955. He was buried in Moscow on Red Square near the Kremlin wall.

A prominent place among the names of remarkable Soviet commanders during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 is occupied by Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of the Soviet Union Leonid Aleksandrovich Govorov - a man of high general erudition, a talented organizer of training and education of troops, a great master of military affairs.

Govorov L.A. born on February 22, 1897 into a peasant family in the village of Butyrki in the former Vyatka province (now Kirov region).

Parents of L.A. Govorov: Maria Alexandrovna and Alexander Grigorievich

The Govorov brothers (from left to right) Leonid, Nikolai, Mikhail. 1914

Students Leonid Govorov (left) and his brother Nikolai. Petrograd, 1916

In 1916, he graduated from a real school in the city of Elabuga (now the regional center of the Republic of Tatarstan). In the same year, having passed the entrance exam, he entered the shipbuilding department of the Polytechnic Institute in Petrograd. But the First World War intervened in the fate of the young student, and already in December 1916 he was drafted into the army and he became a cadet at the Konstantinovsky Artillery School. To replenish the army in June 1917, early graduation from the school was carried out. Junker Govorov L.A. he is assigned the military rank of second lieutenant and is sent to Tomsk as a platoon commander of a mortar battery.

After the October Revolution in March 1918, Second Lieutenant Govorov L.A. Resigns from the tsarist army and returns to his parents in Yelabuga. In October 1918, Elabuga was captured by Kolchak’s troops. Second Lieutenant Govorov L.A. upon mobilization, he is sent to the old army and appointed a junior officer of the battery of the eighth division of the second Ufa corps. The hurricane of events of that time dragged him into the civil war on the side of the counter-revolution. In the battles against the Red Army near Ufa and Chelyabinsk, the battery commander L.A. Govorov. I realized that I was fighting against the working people. This was a turning point in the life of a twenty-two-year-old boy and he managed to make a final and irrevocable choice without hesitation.

L.A. Govorov. 1923-1924

In the fall of 1919, he and part of the personnel of his battery deserted from Kolchak’s army and made his way to Tomsk, where he joined the workers’ fighting squad and took part in the uprising against the whites. With the arrival of regular units of the Red Army in the city of Tomsk, he voluntarily joined its ranks. He is assigned to form an artillery battalion in the 51st Infantry Division, which was commanded by Blücher.

wife Lydia Govorova. 1924

Govorov brothers. Bottom row (from left to right): Mikhail, Leonid, Nikolai. Top row: Vladimir and Leonid’s wife, Lydia. Odessa, 1926

With this division L.A. Govorov participated in many battles on the Southern Front. He was wounded twice in 1920, near Kakhovka and during the assault on Perekop, and was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Over ten years of service in the 51st Perekop Rifle Division, he rose from division commander to division artillery chief. In the same division he commanded an artillery regiment for five years. His business and leadership qualities are characterized by the documents that are stored in the personal file of L.A. Govorov. Here is an excerpt from the certification for the position of commander of an artillery regiment for 1925-1926: “Tactically, he is well prepared and knows how to understand any situation. He is inclined to make independent decisions without fear of responsibility. He can conduct political work independently... His character is even, calm, serious. Most inclined to combat artillery work."

Commander of the artillery regiment of the 51st Perekop division L.A. Govorov. 1926

In the certification for 1934-1935 for the position of chief of artillery of the 15th Rifle Corps: “He works a lot to improve the combat training of the artillery units of the corps, which made it possible to have the corps’ artillery well trained... Subject to nomination to the position of chief of the district artillery.”

Brigade commander L.A. Govorov. 1936

All these years of intense service in the troops L.A. Govorov. combined with constant improvement of his knowledge. In 1933, he completed a three-year correspondence course at the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze, and then another one-year course at the operational department of the same academy. At the same time, he studies German and passes an exam in the scope of knowledge of a military translator.

In the spring of 1936, the Academy of the General Staff was established in the Red Army to train senior command personnel and brigade commander L.A. Govorov. , known as a well-trained artilleryman of the Kyiv Military District, becomes a student of her first intake. Six months before graduation, in 1938, he was transferred to teaching at the F.E. Artillery Academy. Dzerzhinsky.

Senior teacher of the Department of Tactics of the VA named after. Dzerzhinsky brigade commander L.A. Govorov. Moscow, 1939

With the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish War, he, as an experienced artillery commander with deep knowledge of artillery tactics, was sent to the artillery headquarters of the 7th Army, where he participated in the development of a plan to break through the reinforced concrete belt of the Mannerheim Line. He was one of the organizers of the destruction of the reinforced concrete pillboxes of the Mannerheim line: with fire from guns of the largest calibers - direct fire from the closest possible distances to clear the way for the attack. For successful actions in the Soviet-Finnish war, L.A. Govorov. assigned the military rank of division commander and awarded the Order of the Red Star.

During this period, a discussion took place in the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper about the role of artillery in modern warfare. Divisional Commander L.A. Govorov spoke about the promising direction of artillery development. In his report at a military scientific conference, he looked far ahead, defining the place of artillery in future battles and new principles for its use in offensive and defensive battles.

Brigade commander L.A. Govorov (far right) during the Soviet-Finnish War. 1940

With the end of the Soviet-Finnish War, a Main Inspectorate for all branches of the military was created under the People's Commissariat of Defense to study experience and eliminate shortcomings, as well as introduce new requirements in the combat training of troops. Leonid Aleksandrovich is appointed Deputy Inspector General of Artillery of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army. He is awarded the rank of major general of artillery. In May 1941, the People's Commissar of Defense nominated him for the post of head of the Artillery Academy. F.E. Dzerzhinsky. The appointment took place, but three weeks later the Great Patriotic War began and already in July 1941 Govorov L.A. appointed chief of artillery of the Western strategic direction. Soon a Reserve Front was created under the command of Army General G.K. Zhukova and Govorov L.A. appointed there as chief of artillery. From that moment until the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, the combat activities of L.A. Govorov takes place largely under the influence and leadership of G.K. Zhukova.

During heavy fighting near Mozhaisk, Artillery Major General L.A. Govorov. October 16, 1941 appointed commander of the 5th Army. In this position, he proved himself to be a decisive, firm and principled leader, and managed to ensure clear control of the troops. This is confirmed by the opinion of G.K. Zhukov, expressed in 1961 to military historian A.N. Kiselyov, justifying the nomination of an artillery general to this position: “We proceeded from two most important circumstances. Firstly, during the battles near Yelnya, General Govorov, being the head of the artillery of the Reserve Front, established himself not only as a specialist who knew his job very well, but also as a strong-willed, energetic commander, deeply versed in operational issues; secondly, in our defense near Moscow, the main burden of the fight against numerous enemy tanks fell primarily on the artillery and, therefore, Govorov’s special knowledge and experience acquired particular value. Subsequent events showed that. The choice made was very successful."

Commander of the 5th Army, Lieutenant General of Artillery L.A. Govorov (center) with subordinate commanders. December 1941

Less than six months Govorov L.A. commanded the 5th Army. During this time, he gained experience in organizing defense in the most important direction to Moscow and conducting an offensive operation to liberate the Russian shrine - Borodino. This was the first very important test of his qualities as a military leader. Being an artilleryman by military specialty, L.A. Govorov took command of a large combined arms formation during the most intense days of the October battles in the Moscow strategic direction, in a very difficult combat situation. During these difficult defensive and offensive battles, he managed to prove himself from the best side. In the combat description signed by G.K. Zhukov indicated: “... He carried out the Mozhaisk and Zvenigorod defensive operations successfully. He is conducting an offensive operation well to defeat the enemy’s Mozhaisk-Gzhatsk group.”

Commander of the 5th Army L.A. Govorov speaks at a rally in liberated Mozhaisk. January 23, 1942 (Author - famous front-line photojournalist A. Shaikhet, from the author’s family archive)

In April 1942 Govorov L.A. appointed commander of a group of troops of the Leningrad Front. In a conversation with Govorov L.A. Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin I.V. gave him a specific task: to prevent the destruction of Leningrad by enemy siege artillery; turn Leningrad into an absolutely impregnable fortress; accumulate forces inside the blockade for future offensive operations.

L.A. Govorov among the commanders of the 5th Army, January 1942

In June 1942, the Headquarters divided the Leningrad Front into the Volkhov Front, which occupied the south from Lake Ladoga to Lake Ilmen, and the Leningrad Front covering the city of Leningrad. Lieutenant General of Artillery L.A. Govorov is appointed commander of the Leningrad Front. Fulfilling the triune task set by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, he constantly demanded: to fully develop tough and stable positional defense, to give it the most active forms, turning the city into an impregnable fortress. By order of the commander of the troops, active operations began to be carried out in many sectors of the front’s defense, which in operational reports were called “battles of local significance.” Such actions constrained and exhausted the enemy, and most importantly, they instilled confidence in our troops in anticipation of future offensive battles. Solving the third task, the front commander began to create a strike group from internal forces for the upcoming major offensive operations. As a result of these events, in the summer and autumn of 1942, seven divisions were withdrawn from the first echelon of defense. Together with one division that had previously been in the front reserve, they formed an attack group, which began to prepare for the upcoming offensive actions of the front.

Commander of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General of Artillery L.A. Govorov, 1942

Speaking about the commander’s work style, Chief of Staff of the Leningrad Front M.M. Popov noted: “The main thing that caught the eye of a person encountering Govorov for the first time was the literally filigree work in preparing the operation.”3 Independently of him, front artillery commander G.F. Odintsov wrote about this: “Extremely hardworking, punctual to the point of pedantry, he personally developed all the necessary calculations in preparation for the discussion of any, even private, operation.”4 He, relying on versatile military training, delved into all the details and calculations of the upcoming operation. This allowed the front commander to have an undeniable advantage and his own opinion when discussing the plan, based on an in-depth study of this issue.

In the battle of Moscow and in besieged Leningrad, the characteristic features of the leadership talent of L.A. Govorov appeared. Analyzing them, it can be argued that he was an unsurpassed master of organizing and conducting a strong defense. During the defensive battles in October and November 1941, which merged into a continuous battle on the Borodino field, near Mozhaisk, in the area of ​​Dorokhov and Kubinka, he promptly and skillfully used minor technical reserves, advanced artillery weapons to tank-dangerous directions, which allowed him to your army to prevent a breakthrough of enemy tank groups and break the defense front.

By his order, separate anti-tank maneuver units of fifteen soldiers were created in each rifle regiment, including an anti-tank rifle crew and a squad of sappers. In each division, two such detachments were created, but of larger numbers, with a platoon of sappers with anti-tank mines and a mobile mortar platoon on vehicles. Three divisional-type detachments were created at army headquarters. The army commander entrusted their direct leadership to the division artillery chief.

Particular attention was paid to organizing anti-tank defense. Anti-tank areas and strong points were created in the combat formations of formations in the most dangerous directions of action of enemy tank groups. In them, along with regimental and divisional artillery, there were also tanks for ambush operations. The anti-tank areas were well equipped in terms of engineering and fit into the created defense system as a whole. Rifle units were assigned to cover them. In the gaps between the anti-tank areas, anti-tank guns and rifle units were located. In the depths of the defense, mechanically driven anti-tank artillery reserves were created in advance, which were ready to move to the area where enemy tanks would break through.

To strengthen anti-tank defense, much attention was paid to constructing barriers. Minefields, anti-tank ditches, scarps, counter-scarps, and forest rubble were created.

Of particular importance Govorov L.A. gave increased stability to the defense. At first, individual rifle trenches were connected along the front by additional communication passages in platoons and companies. Then the strong points turned into battalion defense areas with continuous trenches.

From the first days of his arrival at the Leningrad Front, L.A. Govorov pays main attention to strengthening his defense both on external and internal borders. Based on the experience of defensive battles of the 5th Army in the Moscow direction, he is gradually and persistently improving it by dramatically improving engineering equipment, echeloning in depth and increasing the saturation of firepower.

At the request of the front commander, the main criterion for assessing the effectiveness of defensive work in the defense zone of each division was established - a minimum of losses during massive artillery shelling of positions by the enemy. He sternly asked division commanders if in their defense sectors it was impossible to walk through full-length trenches from the command post to the front line. The trench network was constantly developing not only in depth but also in the direction of the neutral zone towards the enemy.

To strengthen the external defensive lines, field fortified areas (14, 16, 17, 22 and 79 UR) were created on the closest approaches to Leningrad. Studying their composition and influence on the city’s defense, he noticed that artillery and machine-gun battalions, intended for deployment in fortified areas (UR), do not use their firepower, but have actually disappeared into the battle formations of divisions, the first echelon, and are used as ordinary rifle units . In terms of structure and fire capabilities, artillery-machine-gun battalions could, relying on engineering-prepared terrain, independently conduct fire combat with enemy infantry and tanks, not inferior in defensive stability to an infantry regiment. In this situation, the commander decides to introduce artillery and machine-gun battalions into the system of fortified areas. This decision made it possible to increase the density of long-term and field-type fire installations in the regiments of each fortified area to forty or more units per kilometer of front.5 Strong reinforced concrete and wood-earth firing points and shelters fit into the extensive network of trenches at the front edge and in the immediate depths. The trenches were very close to the enemy's front line. The development of defense in this direction made it possible to sharply reduce troop losses from enemy artillery and mortar fire.

With the same persistence, L.A. Govorov also strengthens the city’s internal defense line. To achieve this, Leningrad was divided into seven combat defense sectors, with responsibility for each sector assigned to specific individuals. Understanding the need for internal defense and its impact on increasing the internal stability of the front, the commander strives to increase the number of combat units. As a result of the measures taken, the number of front combat units increased from 22.3 thousand people to 41.5 thousand people over six months, and by the beginning of 1943 it rose to 129 thousand people.6

L. A. Govorov presents the Guards Banner to the commander of the 63rd Guards Rifle Division, Major General N. P. Simonyak for his distinction in breaking the siege of Leningrad. 1943

The experience of organizing defense on the Leningrad Front shows that the troops and population of the city created a multi-line, deeply echeloned defense. On the scale of a front-line formation, a system of continuous trenches was used, connecting individual defensive positions, lines and areas into a single whole. Such a defense system, with the creation of 110 powerful defensive units, made it possible to impart special stability to the defense, ensure covert maneuver of forces and means along the front and from the depths, and, if necessary, quickly concentrate troops in threatened areas. It was precisely this kind of defense that proved impregnable to the enemy.

L.A. Govorov examines captured guns. Leningrad, 1943

Thus, L.A. Govorov was one of the first in the Great Patriotic War to revive trench defense, which was not provided for by our pre-war regulations. Soon this experience became widespread. Trenches became the basis for the engineering equipment of defensive lines in subsequent defensive operations.

Marshal Govorov L.A. possessed the art of professional forecasting of the development of the situation and decisions made during the preparation and conduct of offensive operations.

He worked hard to improve his knowledge. I carefully studied all the information I received about the enemy’s defense system. By comparing and summarizing the facts, he penetrated into the enemy’s plans and, relying on them, promptly set tasks for the troops and headquarters for the upcoming development of events. These qualities of a commander in operational thinking manifested themselves more and more clearly as his powers expanded and were revealed with particular force when he was appointed commander of the Leningrad Front.

Thus, during the development of the counteroffensive of the Soviet troops near Moscow, the troops of the 5th Army under the command of General L.A. Govorov, with their center and left flank, had to advance bypassing Mozhaisk from the south, closely cooperating with the neighboring 33rd Army. When it became clear that, due to a lack of forces and difficult meteorological conditions, the actions of the 33rd Army did not lead to decisive results and were suspended, the commander of the 5th Army took the initiative, skillfully regrouped the troops on his right flank, and organized cooperation with the 16th Army. .TO. Rokossovsky and achieved significant success on the first day of the offensive. Then, during the offensive, he again redirected the main forces of the army and developed an offensive on the left flank, which made it possible to quickly liberate the city of Ruza.

The thoughts of the front commander are heavy. 1943

In preparation for the offensive operation on the Karelian Isthmus, 12 divisions were secretly transferred across the Gulf of Finland by ships of the Baltic Fleet from the Narva direction to the right flank of the front. During the development of the operation, the front forces on the third day encountered a reinforced concrete belt of enemy defense and the offensive slowed down. Leonid Aleksandrovich makes a bold decision - to regroup forces and means and transfer the main blow from the central sector to the left flank of the front, on the coast of the Gulf of Finland. As a result of a brilliantly carried out regrouping, the troops of the Leningrad Front broke through three reinforced concrete lines of enemy defense and on the tenth day completed the final task of the operation - they captured the city of Vyborg. Front Commander L.A. By Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on June 18, 1944, Govorov was awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Confirmation of the skillful use of the created favorable operational situation through the secret regrouping of a large group of troops is the operation to defeat the Nazi troops "Narva" in Estonia in the summer of 1944. Thus, in the July offensive of 1944, the troops of the Leningrad Front by forces of the 8th and 2nd shock The armies broke through the heavily fortified Nazi defenses in the Narva area, completely liberated the city, but were unable to develop a further attack on Tallinn. At this time, the troops of the 3rd Baltic Front, advancing to the left of the Leningrad Front, successfully developing the offensive, captured the cities of Pechera, Vyru, Tartu. The threat of encirclement loomed over the Narva group of fascist troops. Marshal Govorov L.A. proposed to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to transfer the main blow of the Leningrad Front from the Narvo-Tallinn direction to the Tartus-Tallinn direction. To do this, the 2nd Shock Army, numbering 100 thousand people, had to make a march maneuver from the Narva sector along the front, “cross the strait between Lakes Peipus and Pskov and concentrate in the area of ​​Tartu. Headquarters approved this proposal.7

The Leningrad Front received a directive from Headquarters to regroup troops on September 2. The fast and hidden march-maneuver of the 2nd Shock Army near Tartu allowed already on September 17 to deliver a sudden crushing blow, break through the enemy’s defense front and on the very first day of the offensive advance up to 28 km with battles in separate areas.

Such a success of the army's offensive forced the fascist German formations to hastily retreat from the Narva line in the direction of Tallinn. On September 26, troops of the 2nd Shock Army reached the Baltic Sea coast and successfully completed their assigned tasks.

Front Commander L.A. Govorov was an outstanding organizer of the combat use of large masses of artillery in solving various operational and tactical tasks.

Commander of the Leningrad Front, Colonel General Leonid Govorov, and Chief of Logistics of the Red Army, Colonel General Andrei Khrulev. 1943

By the time Govorov L.A. arrived On the Leningrad Front, the Nazis, having failed to take the city of Lenin on the move, began systematically destroying it with artillery fire. Almost all super-heavy siege weapons, up to 420 mm caliber, were deployed near Leningrad. In March 1942 alone, the Germans fired 7.5 thousand shells into the city.8 Only continuous improvement of the methods of combat use of their artillery could help save the city from enemy shelling. To counteract the destruction of the city by artillery, the front commander paid special attention to organizing counter-battery warfare. Govorov L.A. seeks permission to create, from individual artillery regiments and groups, the Leningrad Counter-Battery Artillery Corps, which played a decisive role in the fight against German siege artillery. While leading the counter-battery fight, he provided the artillery commanders with wide scope and initiative in the search for new opportunities for effective suppression. destruction of fascist siege artillery. Enemy batteries were detected by instrumental reconnaissance, their coordinates were determined and immediately hit. For more than two years, in the conditions of a besieged city, front artillerymen waged a counter-battery fight and destroyed hundreds of artillery batteries of the Nazi troops. The damage caused to Leningrad decreased, not only due to a decrease in the intensity of artillery shelling, but also because the enemy was forced to fire most of the shells spend on fighting our artillery. Many thousands of human lives and enormous material and cultural values, including outstanding historical and architectural monuments, were saved.

L.A. Govorov, as a leading artillery specialist, was distinguished by the peculiarity of deep and detailed planning of the use of artillery in offensive operations. He persistently implemented the General Headquarters' demands for the massive use of artillery in the main direction. He resolutely suppressed attempts to distribute firepower evenly among divisions.

Thus, in the operation of the Leningrad Front to defeat the Nazi troops on January 14-20, 1944, in the direction of the main attack of the 42nd Army, 200 guns and mortars were concentrated on 1 km of the front in a strip 17.3 km wide. When breaking through the defenses on the Karelian Isthmus in June 1944, in a breakthrough area of ​​16 km in the offensive zone of the 21st Army on the main direction of the front, 184 guns were concentrated on 1 km of the front, excluding 45-mm and 57-mm guns, and on the main the breakthrough area of ​​the 21st Army in the zone of the 3rd Guards Rifle Corps - 260 guns and mortars. The coastal, railway and naval artillery of the Baltic Fleet was always involved in breaking through the front and destroying the enemy's long-term fire installations.

This concentration of artillery under unified leadership in the main direction of breaking through the defense front became one of the characteristic features of its combat use. On this front, it became for the first time both a tactical and operational weapon in the hands of the front and army commands.

In the offensive operations of 1944, to destroy numerous long-term enemy fire installations at the front line and in the immediate tactical depth of the enemy’s defense, front commander L.A. Govorov introduced preliminary artillery training into practice. She played a vital role in breaking through the defenses on the Karelian Isthmus. In preliminary artillery preparation, the main task was solved by high-power guns, especially coastal and naval artillery. Thanks to this, the reliable destruction and complete suppression of enemy fire installations was ensured, the time for direct artillery preparation of an attack by infantry and tanks was reduced, and it was possible to increase the duration of active operations of troops during daylight hours. The creative use of artillery firepower to break through previously prepared enemy defenses was an important contribution to the development of Soviet operational art.

First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Nikolai Shvernik presents the marshal's star to the commander of the Leningrad Front Govorov (rare photo). 1944

During the war years, the Leningrad Front's reputation as an "artillery front" was firmly established. The actions of the artillery played an important role in disrupting the assault on the city and were of paramount importance when our troops went on the offensive, when they had to break into the reinforced concrete fortifications of the deep-echeloned strips with which the enemy surrounded Leningrad.

It can be reasonably argued that not a single front during the Great Patriotic War conducted a counter-battery fight to destroy Nazi artillery on such a scale and as effectively as the Leningrad front. Skillfully and creatively using various forms of action, artillery was used to engage the enemy by fire and support the advance of rifle subunits and units. All these measures, carried out under the direct leadership of Leonid Alexandrovich, increased the effectiveness of artillery fire strikes.

Marshal Govorov L.A. perfectly mastered the art of organizing operational-tactical interaction of forces and means of all types of troops.

According to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, with the beginning of the defensive battle near Leningrad, the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Military Flotilla were quickly subordinated to the front commander. Such a decision by Headquarters, in the conditions of a blocked coastal region and a large city, made it possible for the front commander to direct the efforts of all troops and naval forces to solve the most important tasks in defense and offensive. He organized good tactical and operational interaction between units and formations of the front's ground forces with the naval forces of the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Flotilla. Good interaction made it possible to most expediently and effectively use naval aviation, coastal and naval artillery, and marine units to reinforce rifle divisions on the coastal flanks and in battles for the city.

The Marine Corps consists of sailors and officers from the ships of the Baltic Fleet, and it staunchly defended the coast of the Gulf of Finland and the approaches to Leningrad from the sea. Warships and submarines of the fleet sank enemy ships and transports, disrupted the supply of enemy Army Group North by water, and disrupted enemy sea communications in the Baltic Sea and the western part of the Gulf of Finland. Naval aviation carried out powerful strikes on enemy targets from the air. The naval forces successfully carried out large-scale transportation by sea of ​​combined arms formations to strike from other, most advantageous directions, landed large amphibious assault forces in the enemy rear and thereby contributed to the successful solution of tasks in offensive operations of the front.

Remaining commander of the troops of the Leningrad Front until the end of the Great Patriotic War, L.A. Govorov, from October 1, 1944, as a representative of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Headquarters, simultaneously coordinated the actions of the 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts. In February 1945, he was appointed commander of the 2nd Baltic Front while simultaneously retaining his post as commander of the Leningrad Front.

The Supreme High Command Headquarters set the task for the 2nd Baltic Front - in cooperation with the Baltic Fleet, to carry out a blockade on the Courland Peninsula of the remnants of the group, the armies "North" (about 30 divisions) and prevent their departure to northern and central Germany. To accomplish the task, the decision of the front commander, Marshal of the Soviet Union L.A. Govorov, additional forces from the Leningrad Front were transferred to Courland. Soon the administration of the 2nd Baltic Front was abolished and the front began to be called Leningrad.

Front commanders at the final stage of the war. First row (from left to right): Marshals of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev, A.M. Vasilevsky, G.K. Zhukov, K.K. Rokossovsky, K.A. Meretskov. Second row: Marshals of the Soviet Union F.I. Tolbukhin, R.Ya. Malinovsky, L.A. Govorov, army generals A.I. Eremenko, I.Kh. Bagramyan. 1945

At the cost of great effort, the front troops consistently broke into the enemy's deeply layered defenses, compressing the encirclement of the Courland group of fascist German troops.

Marshal L.A. Govorov interrogates the former commander of the 16th German Army, Lieutenant General Volkamer. Courland, May 11, 1945

May 7, 1945 front commander Marshal of the Soviet Union L.A. Govorov presented an ultimatum to the German command. On May 8, 1945, the commander of the Kurland group surrendered. The troops of the Leningrad Front disarmed and captured the almost 12,200-strong enemy group.9 The headquarters of the 16th and 18th armies, which for more than two years stormed the city of Lenin and destroyed it with the fire of assault guns, were captured. The front disarmed 7 army corps, 22 divisions, two combat groups, a motorized brigade, captured up to 2 thousand guns, over 400 tanks and self-propelled guns, 11,200 vehicles and many other equipment and weapons. For skillful command of troops in the battle for Leningrad, successful conduct of a number of offensive operations, personal courage and heroism to L.A. Govorov. On January 27, 1943, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Marshall L.A. Govorov at the head of the combined troops of the Leningrad Front at the Victory Parade. June 24, 1945

In the post-war period, the activities of L.A. Govorova was just as fruitful and versatile. From July 1945 to April 1946, he commanded the troops of the Leningrad Military District, then held a number of senior posts in the Armed Forces of the USSR. He was the Chief Inspector of the Ground Forces. In May 1954, after a new reorganization of the troops and the entire air defense system, Marshal of the Soviet Union L.A. Govorov became the first Commander-in-Chief of the country's Air Defense Forces - Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. His authority among the troops remained consistently high. He successfully, with great prospects, resolved issues aimed at improving the armament of air defense troops.

Commander of the Leningrad Military District, Marshal L.A. Govorov meets the Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, Marshal G.K. Zhukov and the Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe, American General D. Eisenhower (future US President). Leningrad, August 1945

L.A. Govorov is on vacation with his wife against the backdrop of war-torn Budapest. Spring 1946 (Stalin insisted that Govorov take a vacation and visit European countries with his wife at his own discretion, from the Soviet occupation zone)

L.A. Govorov with his wife Lydia Ivanovna and sons: Vladimir and Sergei. 1949

L.A. Govorov with his beloved dog Dzhulbars

Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union L.A. Govorov takes part in the parade on Red Square. May 1, 1952

He was awarded five Orders of Lenin, three Orders of the Red Banner, two Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Order of Kutuzov 1st degree, Order of the Red Star and many medals. Awarded the highest military order "Victory". Leonid Aleksandrovich Govorov died on March 19, 1955 from a severe form of hypertension, which he suffered during the war. He saw the highest duty of a warrior in selfless service to the Fatherland at the assigned post and he himself fulfilled it with honor until the last beat of his heart. The last words of the Marshal of the Land of the Soviets were “...I should have done more, but I did what I had time to do, what I could...”. He is buried near the Kremlin wall.

First Vice-President of the Academy of Military Sciences, Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor, retired Colonel General V. Korobushin