A different look at the Battle of Tsushima. (13 photos)

Battle of Tsushima. Hike to the bottom of the Sea of ​​Japan

The Russo-Japanese War is rightfully considered one of the most tragic pages in the history of our state. Were the main reasons for the defeat the failures of Russian diplomacy, the spinelessness and indecisiveness of the tsarist commanders, the remoteness of the theater of operations, or was it all due to the unfavorability of Lady Luck? A bit of everything. Almost all the key battles of this war took place under the banner of doom and excessive passivity, which resulted in complete defeat. The Battle of Tsushima, in which the forces of the 2nd Pacific Squadron of the Russian Empire clashed with the forces of the Japanese Fleet, is an example of this.

The war for Russia did not start as successfully as planned. The blockade in Port Arthur of the 1st Pacific Squadron, the loss of the cruiser "Varyag" and the gunboat "Koreets" in the battle of Chemulpo became the reasons for St. Petersburg's attempts to radically change the situation in the theater of operations. Such an attempt was the preparation and departure of the 2nd and then the 3rd Pacific squadron. Literally halfway across the world, 38 warships passed, accompanied by auxiliary transports, loaded with provisions so that the waterlines were thoroughly under water, worsening the already weak armor protection of Russian ships, which were covered with armor by only 40%, while the Japanese were covered by 60%. %.

Commander of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, Vice Admiral Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhestvensky

Initially, the squadron’s campaign was considered by many theorists of the Russian fleet (for example, Nikolai Lavrentievich Klado) to be already a losing battle and unpromising. Moreover, all personnel - from admirals to ordinary sailors - felt doomed to failure. The news of the fall of Port Arthur and the loss of almost the entire group of the 1st Pacific Squadron added to the futility of the squadron in Madagascar. Having learned about this on December 16, 1904, the squadron commander, Rear Admiral Zinovy ​​Rozhdestvensky, tried to convince his superiors with the help of telegrams that it was advisable to continue the campaign, but instead received orders to wait for reinforcements in Madagascar and attempt to break through to Vladivostok by any means.

It is not customary to discuss orders, and on May 1, 1905, the squadron, which had already reached Indochina by that time, headed for Vladivostok. It was decided to break through the Tsushima Strait - the closest route, since the Sangarsky and La Perouse straits were not considered due to their remoteness and problems with navigation support.

Tsushima Strait

Some battleships, such as the Imperator Nicholas I, were armed with outdated artillery and were forced to use extremely smoky gunpowder, which caused the ship to become clouded with smoke after several salvos, making further shooting significantly more difficult. Coastal defense battleships “Admiral Ushakov”, “Admiral Apraksin” and “Admiral Senyavin”, based on the name of their type, were not intended for long voyages at all, since this class of ships was created to protect coastal fortifications and was more often jokingly called “battleship, guarded shores."

A large number of transport and auxiliary ships should not have been dragged into battle at all, since they did not bring any benefit in battle, but only slowed down the squadron and required a significant number of cruisers and destroyers for their protection. Most likely, they should have split up, going to a neutral port, or tried to go to Vladivostok by long detours. The camouflage of the Russian squadron also left much to be desired - the bright yellow pipes of the ships were a good reference point, while the Japanese ships were olive-colored, which is why they often blended into the water surface.

Coastal defense battleship "Admiral Ushakov"

On the eve of the battle, on May 13, it was decided to conduct exercises in order to increase the maneuverability of the squadron. Based on the results of these exercises, it became clear that the squadron was not at all ready for coordinated maneuvers - the column of ships was constantly being destroyed. The situation with “all of a sudden” turns was also unsatisfactory. Some ships, not understanding the signal, made turns “sequentially” at this time, introducing confusion into the maneuver, and when, on a signal from the flagship battleship, the squadron moved into front formation, complete confusion resulted.

During the time spent on maneuvers, the squadron could have passed the most dangerous part of the Tsushima Strait under the cover of darkness and, perhaps, it would not have been seen by Japanese reconnaissance ships, but on the night of May 13-14, the squadron was spotted by the Japanese reconnaissance cruiser Shinano -Maru." I would like to note that, unlike the Japanese fleet, which was actively conducting reconnaissance operations, the Russian squadron was sailing almost blindly. It was forbidden to conduct reconnaissance due to the danger of revealing the location to the enemy.

The curiosity of the moment reached the point that it was forbidden to pursue enemy reconnaissance cruisers and even interfere with their telegraphing, although the auxiliary cruiser Ural had a wireless telegraph capable of interrupting Japanese reports about the location of the Russian squadron. As a result of such passivity of Admiral Rozhestvensky, the commander of the Japanese fleet, Admiral Heihachiro Togo, knew not only the location of the Russian fleet, but also its composition and even tactical formation - enough to start the battle.

Battleship "Emperor Nicholas I"

Almost the entire morning of May 14, the Japanese reconnaissance cruisers followed a parallel course, only towards noon the fog hid Rozhdestvensky’s squadron from their view, but not for long: already at 13:25 visual contact was established with the Japanese squadron, which was moving across.

The lead battleship was the Mikasa, flying the flag of Admiral Togo. It was followed by the battleships Shikishima, Fuji, Asahi and the armored cruisers Kassuga and Nisshin. Following these ships, six more armored cruisers set out: Izumo, under the flag of Admiral Kamimura, Yakumo, Asama, Azuma, Tokiwa and Iwate. The main Japanese force was followed by numerous auxiliary cruisers and destroyers under the command of Rear Admirals Kamimura and Uriu.

The composition of the Russian squadron at the time of the meeting with enemy forces was as follows: squadron battleships “Prince Suvorov” under the flag of Vice Admiral Rozhestvensky, “Emperor Alexander III”, “Borodino”, “Eagle”, “Oslyabya” under the flag of Rear Admiral Felkerzam, who long before the battle, he died of a stroke, unable to withstand the hardships and trials of a long campaign, “Sisoi the Great”, “Nicholas I” under the pennant of Rear Admiral Nebogatov.

Admiral Togo

Coastal defense battleships: “Admiral General Apraksin”, “Admiral Senyavin”, “Admiral Ushakov”; armored cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov"; cruisers "Oleg" under the flag of Rear Admiral Enquist, "Aurora", "Dmitry Donskoy", "Vladimir Monomakh", "Svetlana", "Izumrud", "Pearl", "Almaz"; auxiliary cruiser "Ural".

Destroyers: 1st detachment - “Bedovy”, “Bystry”, “Buiny”, “Brave”; 2nd squad - “Loud”, “Terrible”, “Brilliant”, “Impeccable”, “Cheerful”. Transports "Anadyr", "Irtysh", "Kamchatka", "Korea", tugboats "Rus" and "Svir" and hospital ships "Orel" and "Kostroma".

The squadron marched in the marching formation of two wake columns of warships, between which there was a detachment of transports, guarded on both sides by the 1st and 2nd detachments of destroyers, while delivering a speed of at least 8 knots. Behind the squadron were both hospital ships, thanks to the bright lighting of which the squadron was spotted the day before.

Tactical formation of the Russian squadron before the battle

Although the list looks impressive, only the first five warships were a serious fighting force, capable of competing with Japanese battleships. In addition, the overall speed of 8 knots was due to the slowness of transports and some obsolete battleships and cruisers, although the main body of the squadron could produce almost twice as much speed.

Admiral Togo was going to undertake a cunning maneuver, turning around in front of the very nose of the Russian squadron, while concentrating fire on the lead battleships - knocking them out of the line, and then knocking out those following the lead ones. Auxiliary Japanese cruisers and destroyers were supposed to finish off disabled enemy ships with torpedo attacks.

Admiral Rozhdestvensky’s tactics consisted, to put it mildly, of “nothing.” The main directive was to break through to Vladivostok, and in the event of loss of control of the flagship battleships, their place was taken by the next one in the column. Also, the destroyers “Buiny” and “Bedovy” were assigned to the flagship battleship as evacuation ships and were obliged to save the vice admiral and his headquarters in the event of the death of the battleship.

Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Iosifovich Behr in his youth

By 13:50 shots were fired from the main caliber guns of the Russian battleships at the lead Japanese "Mikasa", the answer was not long in coming. Taking advantage of Rozhdestvensky's passivity, the Japanese surrounded the head of the Russian squadron and opened fire. The flagships “Prince Suvorov” and “Oslyabya” suffered the most. After half an hour of battle, the battleship Oslyabya, engulfed in fire and a huge list, rolled out of the general formation, and after another half hour it turned upside down with its keel. Along with the battleship, its commander died, Captain 1st Rank Vladimir Iosifovich Behr, who until the last led the evacuation of sailors from the sinking ship. The entire crew of mechanics, engineers and stokers who were in the very depths of the battleship also died: during the battle, the engine room should have been covered with armor plates to protect against fragments and shells, and during the death of the ship, the sailors assigned to lift these plates fled.

Soon the battleship "Prince Suvorov" jumped out of action, engulfed in flames. The battleships Borodino and Alexander III took their place at the head of the squadron. Closer to 15:00, the water surface was shrouded in fog, and the battle stopped. The Russian squadron headed north, having by that time also lost hospital ships sailing at the tail of the squadron. As it turned out later, they were captured by light Japanese cruisers, thereby leaving the Russian squadron without medical assistance.

The last minutes of the life of the battleship Oslyabya

After 40 minutes the battle resumed. The enemy squadrons came to fairly close distances, which led to even faster destruction of Russian ships. The battleships “Sisoi the Great” and “Eagle”, having more dead crew members on board than living crew members, could barely keep up with the main forces.

By half past four in the afternoon, the 2nd Pacific Squadron headed northeast, where it linked up with cruisers and transports that were fighting against the stray cruiser detachments of the Japanese Admiral Uriu. Meanwhile, the wounded Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky and his entire staff were removed from the battleship "Prince Suvorov", which miraculously stayed afloat, by the destroyer "Buiny". The bulk of the crew refused to leave the battleship and, having only small-caliber stern guns in service, continued to fight off enemy attacks. After 20 minutes, "Prince Suvorov", surrounded by 12 enemy ships, was shot almost point-blank from mine vehicles and sank, taking the entire crew with it to the bottom. In total, 17 torpedoes were fired at the battleship during the battle, only the last three hit the target.

Surrounded but not broken “Prince Suvorov”

An hour and a half before sunset, unable to withstand a large number of hits and unable to fend off the increasing list, the lead battleships Borodino and Alexander III sank one after another. Later, the only survivor from the Borodin crew, sailor Semyon Yushchin, was rescued from the water by the Japanese. The crew of the Alexander III was completely lost along with the ship.

Battleship Borodino during sea trials

With the onset of dusk, Japanese destroyers entered the action. Due to their stealth and large numbers (about 42 units), the destroyers were selected at critically close distances to Russian ships. As a result, during the night battle, the Russian squadron lost the cruiser Vladimir Monomakh, the battleships Navarin, Sisoy the Great, Admiral Nakhimov and the destroyer Bezuprechny. The crews of "Vladimir Monomakh", "Sisy the Great" and "Admiral Nakhimov" were lucky - almost all the sailors of these ships were rescued and captured by the Japanese. Only three people were rescued from the Navarin, and not a single one from the Impeccable.

Night attacks by Japanese destroyers on a scattered Russian squadron

Meanwhile, a detachment of cruisers under the command of Rear Admiral Enquist, having lost the cruiser Ural and the tugboat Rus during the battle, persistently tried to head north. This was hindered by the almost non-stop attacks of Japanese destroyers. As a result, unable to withstand the pressure and having lost sight of all the transports and cruisers except the Aurora and Oleg, Enquist took these cruisers to Manila, where they were disarmed. Thus the most famous “ship of the revolution” was saved.

Rear Admiral Oskar Adolfovich Enquist

Starting on the morning of May 15, the 2nd Pacific continued to suffer losses. In an unequal battle, having lost almost half of its personnel, the destroyer Gromky was destroyed. The former royal yacht “Svetlana” could not stand the battle “one against three”. The destroyer "Bystry", seeing the death of "Svetlana", tried to escape the pursuit, but, unable to do this, washed ashore on the Korean Peninsula; his crew was captured.

Closer to noon, the remaining battleships Emperor Nicholas I, Orel, Admiral General Apraksin and Admiral Senyavin were surrounded and surrendered. From the point of view of combat capabilities, these ships could only die heroically without causing any damage to the enemy. The crews of the battleships were exhausted, demoralized and had no desire to fight against the main forces of the Japanese armored fleet.

The fast cruiser Izumrud, which was accompanying the surviving battleships, broke out of the encirclement and broke away from the chase sent, but as bold and glorious as its breakthrough was, the death of this cruiser was just as inglorious. Subsequently, the crew of the Emerald, already off the coast of their homeland, got lost and, constantly tormented by the fear of pursuit by Japanese cruisers, in a fever, ran the cruiser aground and then blew it up. The tortured crew of the cruiser reached Vladivostok by land.

The cruiser "Izumrud", blown up by the crew in Vladimir Bay

By the evening, the commander-in-chief of the squadron, Admiral Rozhdestvensky, who by that time was on the destroyer Bedovy with his headquarters, also surrendered. The last losses of the 2nd Pacific Squadron were the death in battle of the cruiser "Dmitry Donskoy" near the island of Dazhelet and the heroic death of the battleship "Admiral Ushakov" under the command of Vladimir Nikolaevich Miklouho-Maclay, the brother of the famous traveler and discoverer of Australia and Oceania. The commanders of both ships were killed.

On the left is the commander of the battleship "Admiral Ushakov", captain 1st rank Vladimir Nikolaevich Miklukho-Maclay. Right tocommander of the cruiser "Dmitry Donskoy" captain 1st rank Ivan Nikolaevich Lebedev

The results of the Battle of Tsushima for the Russian Empire were disastrous: the squadron battleships “Prince Suvorov”, “Emperor Alexander III”, “Borodino”, “Oslyabya” were killed in battle from enemy artillery fire; coastal defense battleship Admiral Ushakov; cruisers "Svetlana", "Dmitry Donskoy"; auxiliary cruiser "Ural"; destroyers “Gromky”, “Brilliant”, “Impeccable”; transports “Kamchatka”, “Irtysh”; tugboat "Rus".

The squadron battleships Navarin and Sisoy the Great, the armored cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, and the cruiser Vladimir Monomakh were killed in battle as a result of torpedo attacks.

The destroyers Buiny and Bystry and the cruiser Izumrud were destroyed by their own personnel due to the impossibility of further resistance to the enemy.

The squadron battleships “Emperor Nicholas I” and “Eagle” surrendered to the Japanese; coastal battleships "Admiral General Apraksin", "Admiral Senyavin" and the destroyer "Bedovy".

Scheme with the presumable designation of the places of destruction of ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron

The cruisers Oleg, Aurora, and Zhemchug were interned and disarmed in neutral ports; transport "Korea"; tugboat "Svir". The hospital ships "Orel" and "Kostroma" were captured by the enemy.

Only the cruiser Almaz and the destroyers Bravy and Grozny managed to break through to Vladivostok. Suddenly, a heroic fate befell the Anadyr transport, which independently returned to Russia and later managed to fight in World War II.

The 2nd Pacific Squadron of the Russian fleet, out of 16,170 people, lost 5,045 people killed and drowned. 7282 people were captured, including 2 admirals. 2,110 people went to foreign ports and were interned. 910 people managed to break through to Vladivostok.

The Japanese suffered significantly fewer losses. 116 people were killed and 538 wounded. The fleet lost 3 destroyers. Of these, one was sunk in battle - presumably by the cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh" - during the night phase of the battle. Another destroyer was sunk by the battleship Navarin, also while repelling night mine attacks. The remaining ships escaped with only damage.

The crushing defeat of the Russian fleet gave rise to a whole chain of scandals and trials of the perpetrators. During the trial of the Naval Court of the Kronstadt port in St. Petersburg in the case of the surrender to the enemy of the ships of Rear Admiral Nebogatov's detachment: the battleships "Emperor Nicholas I" and "Eagle" and the coastal defense battleships "General-Admiral Apraksin" and " Admiral Senyavin, Rear Admiral Nebogatov, the commanders of the ships that surrendered, and 74 officers of the same 4 ships were put on trial.

At the trial, Admiral Nebogatov took the blame upon himself, justifying his subordinates down to the sailors. After holding 15 hearings, the court passed a verdict according to which Nebogatov and the ship captains were sentenced to death with a petition to Nicholas II to replace it with imprisonment in a fortress for 10 years; the flag captain of the headquarters of Rear Admiral Nebogatov, captain 2nd rank Cross, was sentenced to imprisonment in the fortress for 4 months, senior officers of the ships “Emperor Nicholas I” and “Admiral Senyavin” captain 2nd rank Vedernikov and captain 2nd rank Artschvager - for 3 months; senior officer of the coastal defense battleship "Admiral General Apraksin", Lieutenant Fridovsky - for 2 months. All the others were acquitted. However, not even a few months had passed before Nebogatov and the ship commanders were released early by decision of the emperor.

Rear Admiral Nikolai Ivanovich Nebogatov

Rear Admiral Enquist, who almost treacherously led the cruisers away from the battlefield, received no punishment at all and was dismissed from service with a promotion to vice admiral in 1907. The head of the defeated squadron, Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky, was acquitted due to serious injury and almost unconsciousness at the time of surrender. Under pressure from public opinion, Emperor Nicholas II was forced to dismiss from service his uncle, the chief head of the fleet and the Naval Department, General Admiral Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich, who became famous more for his active social life in Paris than for his competent leadership of the Imperial Navy.

Another unpleasant scandal is associated with the colossal problems of the Russian fleet in the field of shells. In 1906, the battleship Slava, which was still on the stocks at the time of the formation of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, took part in the suppression of the Sveaborg uprising. During the uprising, the battleship fired its main caliber guns at the Sveaborg fortifications. After the uprising was suppressed, it was noticed that none of the shells fired from the Slava exploded. The reason for this was the substance pyroxylin, which was very susceptible to the influence of moisture.

Battleship "Slava", 1906

The battleships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron also used shells with pyroxylin, moreover: before the long voyage, a decision was made to increase the amount of moisture in the squadron's ammunition shells in order to avoid involuntary detonation. The consequences were quite predictable: the shells did not detonate even when they hit Japanese ships.

Japanese naval commanders used the explosive substance shimosa for their shells, shells with which often exploded right in the bores. When they hit Russian battleships or even when they came into contact with the water surface, such shells exploded almost one hundred percent and produced a colossal amount of fragments. As a result, a successful hit by a Japanese shell caused great destruction and often caused a fire, while a Russian pyroxylin shell left behind only a smooth hole.

A hole from a Japanese shell in the hull of the battleship "Eagle" and the battleship itself after the battle

The 2nd Pacific Squadron was not ready for battle either tactically or in terms of weapons, and in fact went to voluntary suicide in the Sea of ​​Japan. War provides costly and important lessons, and the Battle of Tsushima is one of them. Any weakness, any slackness, any letting things take their course leads to approximately the same results. We must learn to appreciate the lessons of the past - the most comprehensive conclusions must be drawn from each defeat. First of all, in the name and for our future victories.

Retired captain 1st rank P.D. BYKOV

Underestimation of the enemy's strength and military capabilities and the excessive self-confidence of the tsarist government, which believed that Russia's positions in the Far East were invulnerable, led to the fact that Russia did not have the necessary forces in the theater of war. The results of the first two months of the war at sea were extremely unfavorable for the Russian squadron in Port Arthur. She suffered such losses that the Japanese fleet gained dominance at sea. This forced the tsarist government to take measures to strengthen its naval forces in the Far East.

The need to strengthen the squadron, which was inferior to the Japanese fleet, especially in the number of cruisers and destroyers, was repeatedly pointed out by Admiral S.O. Makarov when he was commander of the fleet. But all his representations and requests were not fulfilled. Later, the issue of strengthening the squadron was reconsidered with the participation of the new commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Skrydlov, who raised the issue of sending large reinforcements to the East. In April 1904, it was decided in principle to send a squadron from the Baltic Sea, called the 2nd Pacific Squadron.

The squadron was supposed to include ships that were nearing the end of construction, as well as some of the ships of the Baltic Fleet, although somewhat outdated in design and armament, but quite seaworthy. In addition, it was planned to buy 7 cruisers abroad.

Due to the fact that the composition of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was not strong enough to solve independent problems, its sending was mainly aimed at strengthening the Port Arthur squadron. The formation of the squadron and its preparation for the transition to the Far East were entrusted to Rear Admiral Rozhestvensky, who then held the post of Chief of the Main Naval Staff and was appointed commander of the squadron. His closest assistants were the junior flagships Rear Admirals Felkersam and Enquist.

Ship composition of the squadron

The battleships “Sisoi the Great” and “Navarin” were old ships, and the second had old short-range 305 mm guns. Their speed did not exceed 16 knots. The old armored cruiser Admiral Nakhimov, armed with 203 mm cannons, was attached to the battleships. Thus, the armored ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron had very different armament, protection and maneuverability, not to mention the fact that the tactical qualities of the new ships were reduced due to construction defects, and the remaining ships were of outdated design.

The cruisers that were part of the squadron were even more diverse in their tactical and technical elements. There were only seven cruisers. Of these, the modern ones were “Oleg”, “Aurora”, “Pearl” and “Emerald”. The first and last were not ready by the time the squadron left and caught up with it already on the way. Of the other cruisers, “Svetlana” and “Dmitry Donskoy” were old ships, and “Almaz” was an armed yacht.

Of the cruisers, two - “Pearl” and “Emerald” - were of the same type, high-speed (24 knots), but unprotected ships. “Oleg” and “Aurora” had deck armor of 106 mm, but were different in speed. The first gave up to 23 knots, and the second only 20. “Svetlana” had a speed of 20 knots, and “Almaz” - 18. The oldest of the cruisers, “Dmitry Donskoy” had only 16 knots. The weakness and inadequacy of the cruising forces was obvious, so it was decided to assign five armed high-speed steamers to the squadron as high-speed reconnaissance ships - “Ural”, “Kuban”, “Terek”, “Rion” and “Dnepr”, which at different times joined the squadron in Madagascar. The value of these so-called auxiliary cruisers was very little. The squadron included nine destroyers - “Bravey”, “Bodriy”, “Bystryy”, “Bedovyy”, “Stormy”, “Brilliant”, “Impeccable”, “Loudy” and “Groznyy”, which was clearly not enough. The destroyers were armed with three torpedo tubes and developed a speed of no more than 26 knots.

Despite the fact that the decision to send a squadron was made in April, its formation and equipment took a very long time.

The reasons for this were the extremely slow pace of completion of new ships and repair of old ships. Only on August 29, work on the squadron was completed so much that it was able to leave Kronstadt for Revel.

Personnel

Preparation and organization of the squadron

The organization of the squadron, established at the beginning of the campaign, changed several times and was finally established only after leaving the shores of Indochina. The composition of individual detachments changed, which was partly caused by the situation of the campaign. All this could not but affect the relationships and influence of detachment commanders on their subordinates and on the training of ship crews. In addition, this situation led to the fact that the headquarters of the squadron commander had to deal with resolving various minor issues that could have been resolved by junior commanders. The headquarters of the squadron commander itself did not have proper organization. There was no chief of staff, and the flag captain was only the executor of the commander's orders. There was no coordination in the work of the flagship specialists, and each one worked on his own, receiving instructions directly from the squadron commander.

Thus, when the squadron entered the theater of operations, it did not have sufficient combat training and proper organization.

Organization and conditions of transition

First of all, it was necessary to resolve the issues of supplying the ships of the squadron with fuel, water and food, then it was necessary to ensure the possibility of repairs and, finally, to take measures to protect the squadron from possible enemy attempts to attack en route.

The development of all these measures was carried out directly by Admiral Rozhestvensky from the very beginning of the formation of the squadron.

Due to the fact that the new battleships that were part of the squadron had a draft that did not allow passage through the Suez Canal without unloading, which would take a lot of time, the commander of the squadron decided to go with large ships around Africa, sending other ships through the Mediterranean Sea. The connection of both parts of the squadron was to take place on the island. Madagascar. For greater safety of the transition, Rozhdestvensky did not consider it possible to enter into negotiations with foreign governments regarding the squadron’s entry into any specific ports, since this would make its route known in advance. Therefore, no preliminary agreements on this issue were concluded. There were only negotiations with the French government on some private issues, such as the length of stay of Russian ships in French ports, the points most suitable for the squadron’s anchorage, and the possibility of relations with the squadron en route, etc. Some private issues, such as the security of ships traveling through the Suez Canal, were resolved with other foreign governments. But in general, no diplomatic preparations for the transition were made.

Because of this, the transition of the squadron became extremely complicated due to protests from foreign countries when the squadron entered a particular port, a reduction in the stay period, and the impossibility of performing routine repairs and resting personnel.

A matter of particular importance was the timely supply of coal, water and provisions, since the time of arrival of the squadron to the Far East depended entirely on this. Due to the fact that the use of the Russian merchant fleet for this did not resolve the issue, since the purchase of coal would have to be made abroad, it was decided to involve foreign companies in this.

Thus, the possibility of the squadron moving to the East was made dependent on foreign firms and the conscientiousness of their fulfillment of contracts. As one would expect, such an organization of supplies could not but affect the movement of the squadron to the East and was one of the reasons for its delay on the island. Madagascar.

The squadron commander was so concerned about supplying the squadron with coal that they dominated all others, even to the detriment of combat training. To feed the personnel, the ships took increased food supplies from the port. The delivery of fresh provisions was to be made on the basis of contracts concluded with both Russian and some foreign companies. To repair ships en route, the squadron was assigned a specially equipped ship-workshop “Kamchatka”. This steamer and several other transports with cargo for various purposes formed the floating base of the squadron.

The news of the Russian government sending such large reinforcements as the 2nd Pacific Squadron to the Far East could not be kept secret, and this event was discussed in the pages of both the Russian and foreign press. Therefore, it was very likely to assume that the Japanese would try to create various obstacles of a diplomatic and military nature along the entire route of the squadron’s movement, up to and including a direct attack on the squadron and acts of sabotage.

The possibility of such attempts was taken into account by the Russian Naval Ministry, and it was looking for ways to organize a permanent system of observation and protection of areas where the squadron could expect various surprises. The Danish Straits, the Suez Canal and the Red Sea were considered the most dangerous areas.

After negotiations with various departments, it was decided to entrust this matter to the foreign political agents of the security department of the police department, which willingly took upon itself the organization of protecting the squadron’s route in the Danish Straits. To organize security in other places, special people were sent who were supposed to inform Admiral Rozhdestvensky about the movement of Japanese ships.

All of the above measures did not guarantee uninterrupted supply of the squadron ships, nor provision of parking, repairs and rest, nor. finally, protecting the squadron from the possibility of a surprise attack. The extent to which the established organization for guarding the squadron along the way did not meet its purpose was shown by the incident during the squadron’s passage of the North (German) Sea, known as the “Hullic Incident.”

Departure of the squadron and the Gull incident

The squadron made its first transition to Cape Skagen (the northern tip of the Jutland Peninsula), where it was supposed to load coal, and anchored. Here Admiral Rozhdestvensky received information about suspicious ships spotted and about an allegedly impending attack on the squadron. Considering the parking at Cape Skagen dangerous under these conditions, the squadron commander canceled the loading and decided to move on. To cross the North (German) Sea, Rozhdestvensky decided to divide the squadron into 6 separate detachments, which were supposed to weigh anchor sequentially and follow each other at a distance of 20-30 miles. The first two detachments were destroyers, the next two were cruisers, then two detachments of battleships. The last to weigh anchor was a detachment of new battleships. Admiral Rozhestvensky considered this dismemberment of the squadron to be the most appropriate from the point of view of protecting the combat core of the squadron - the battleships.

However, the distances established between the detachments were insufficient and did not exclude the possibility of them colliding at night, in case of any unforeseen delays along the way. The lead detachments were not given the task of reconnaissance of the route, which would have given the main forces, who were also marching without security, a guarantee of safety. Communication between the detachments was not organized, although there were opportunities for this. Each of them followed in isolation from the others. Thus, the marching order adopted by Admiral Rozhestvensky in no way met the requirements for organizing the transition of the squadron in wartime.

The detachment of new battleships, on which Admiral Rozhdestvensky held the flag, weighed anchor on October 8 at 22:00. About 0 o'clock. 55 min. On October 9, the detachment was approaching the Dogger Bank area. Shortly before this, the Kamchatka transport workshop reported on the radio that it was being attacked by destroyers.

As Dogger-bapka passed ahead of the detachment of battleships, the silhouettes of some ships without lights were seen, which were crossing the detachment’s course and approaching it. The squadron decided that the battleships were under attack and opened fire. But when the spotlights were turned on, it turned out that fishing boats had been shot. The fire was stopped. However, during the 10 minutes during which the shooting continued, several fishing boats were damaged. Suddenly, on the left abeam of the battleships, the silhouettes of some other ships were noticed, on which fire was also opened. But after the first shots, it became clear that these were the Russian cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Aurora. On the Aurora, two people were wounded and several holes were made in the surface of the ship.

Having passed the Dogger Bank, the squadron headed for the English Channel and arrived in Vigo (Spain) on October 13. Here the squadron stayed until the conflict between England and Russia, caused by the so-called “Hull Incident,” was resolved.

There is reason to believe that England, which took a hostile position towards Russia and was in an alliance with Japan, deliberately provoked this incident. The purpose of this Anglo-Japanese provocation could be to delay the advance of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, which would worsen Russia's position in the Far East.

After the “Ghull Incident,” the British government threatened to sever diplomatic relations. However, the tsarist government took all measures to eliminate the conflict that arose, agreeing to compensate for losses and provide the families of the dead and wounded with pensions.

Transition of the squadron to the island. Madagascar

The voyage of this detachment with the transports that joined it on the way took place without any particular complications. By December 15, all ships had reached their destination.

The remaining ships are the battleships “Prince Suvorov”, “Alexander III”, “Borodino”, “Orel”, “Oslyabya”, the cruisers “Admiral Nakhimov”, “Dmitry Donskoy”, “Aurora” with the transports “Kamchatka”, “Anadyr”. “Korea”, “Malaya” and “Meteor”, led by Admiral Rozhdestvensky, went around Africa.

The voyage of the main forces that went around Africa was very difficult. The squadron did not have a single favorable stopover along the way, and coal loading was carried out on the open sea. In addition, wanting to reduce the number of stops, Admiral Rozhdestvensky decided to make long transitions. This circumstance made it necessary to accept coal reserves that far exceeded normal ones. So, for example, new battleships took double the amount of coal - instead of one thousand - two thousand tons, although for these ships the acceptance of such large reserves was especially difficult due to their low stability. To accept such a large load, it was necessary to place coal in living decks, cockpits, mine artillery batteries and other places, which extremely constrained the lives of personnel. In addition, loading in intense heat on the ocean swell and waves was very difficult and time-consuming. On average, battleships took from 40 to 60 tons of coal per hour, and thus, the parking time was spent on loading and urgent repairs; the personnel, exhausted by hard work in the tropical heat, were left without rest. Moreover, in conditions when all the rooms on the ships were filled with coal, it was impossible to conduct any serious combat training. Finally, on December 16, having overcome all difficulties, the detachment arrived in Madagascar. Here Admiral Rozhestvensky learned about the death of the 1st Pacific Squadron and the surrender of Port Arthur on December 20.

On December 27, both detachments of the squadron united in Nosi-be Bay (west coast of Madagascar), where the French government allowed the squadron to stay. Here the squadron stayed from December 27 to March 3. The reasons for such a long stay were as follows.

1. The capture of Port Arthur caused a change in the tasks assigned to the squadron and the need to strengthen it.

2. The need to repair some ships in the roadstead.

3. Complications in the further supply of fuel to the squadron.

The situation at the time of the squadron's arrival in Madagascar and the change in the goals of the squadron's campaign

The moment the 2nd Pacific Squadron arrived in Madagascar coincided with a change in the strategic situation in the Far East. If before the death of the ships of the Port Arthur squadron the 2nd Pacific Squadron could be considered as an auxiliary, reserve squadron, now the situation has changed radically. The fall of Port Arthur raised the question of the advisability of the squadron's further movement, since after Russia lost Port Arthur the squadron was forced to move. to Vladivostok, which was extremely difficult to reach,

Rozhdestvensky believed that due to the changed strategic situation, the squadron’s immediate task was to break through to Vladivostok, at least at the cost of losing some of the ships. He telegraphed this to St. Petersburg. The tsarist government, which decided to continue the war, considered the squadron as a force with which to change the situation in the theater of war, and set Rozhdestvensky the task not of breaking through to Vladivostok, but of mastering the Sea of ​​Japan. However, it was recognized that Admiral Rozhdestvensky’s squadron was not strong enough to achieve this goal, and it was decided to strengthen it with ships of the Baltic Fleet, since the purchase of ships abroad had completely failed. In this regard, Rozhestvensky was ordered to wait for the detachments of Dobrotvorsky and Nebogatov in Madagascar.

The first of these detachments, consisting of two new cruisers “Oleg” and “Izumrud” and destroyers “Gromky” and “Grozny”, was part of the 2nd squadron, but at one time its exit from Russia was delayed due to the unavailability of the ships. The second detachment was given the name 3rd Pacific Squadron. The squadron was formed after Rozhestvensky left. It was headed by Rear Admiral Nebogatov, who, like other junior flagships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, had not previously commanded combat squadrons or detachments.

This squadron included the old squadron battleship “Nikolai I”, coastal defense battleships “Admiral General Apraksin”, “Admiral Senyavin”, “Admiral Ushakov” and the old armored cruiser “Vladimir Monomakh”. “Nicholas I” was an outdated battleship with weak artillery weapons, as it had only two short-range 305 mm guns. Coastal defense battleships were armed with 256 mm guns, which, although long-range, were not entirely successful in their design. These ships were not intended for ocean navigation, and therefore did not have sufficient seaworthiness and had reduced maneuverability. There was not a single modern ship in this squadron.

Transition from Madagascar to the shores of Indochina

Unhealthy climate, unusual heat, heavy repair work, nervousness of the command and constant tension, along with forced inaction due to the lack of coal and shells for practical shooting - all this had an extremely negative impact on the personnel and did not at all contribute to increasing the combat readiness of the squadron.

Discipline, which had noticeably decreased by the time the squadron left, now fell even more. On the ships of the squadron, cases of insulting commanding officers and disobedience became more frequent. There were a number of cases of gross violation of discipline by officers.

The lack of a supply of shells did not make it possible to make up for the most important deficiency—teaching the squadron to shoot. The Irtysh transport, which was loaded with additional ammunition for firing practice, was delayed when the squadron left Libau. There was an accident on it and it was abandoned for repairs. At the same time, the ammunition was unloaded from it, and then, by order of the Naval Ministry, the shells were sent to Vladivostok by rail. But Rozhestvensky was not notified about this. After the repairs were completed, the Irtysh set out to join the squadron, but with a load of coal. Thus, the squadron was deprived of much-needed ammunition for firing training en route. During their stay in Nosi-be, the ships of the squadron conducted only four practical firings from distances not exceeding 30 cable lengths. The results of these shootings were completely unsatisfactory. The squadron's joint maneuvering showed its complete unpreparedness in this regard.

Thus, the combat training of the squadron during the transition and stay on the island. Madagascar did not improve at all and it remained as before unprepared for the task.

On March 3, the 2nd Pacific Squadron was able to move on and weighed anchor.

When leaving Nosi-be, Admiral Rozhdestvensky did not communicate his further route in order to achieve secrecy of the transition. And at this time, the 3rd Pacific Squadron, which had left Libau in February, was on its way to join him. Thus, neither the 2nd nor the 3rd squadrons, going to the East for the same purpose, knew where and when they would meet, because the place of their meeting was not determined.

Admiral Rozhdestvensky chose the shortest route - through the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca. Along the way, coal was accepted six times on the open sea. On March 26, the squadron passed Singapore and in April, after a 28-day passage, dropped anchor in Cam Ranh Bay, where the ships had to carry out repairs, load coal and accept materials for further travel. Then, at the request of the French government, the squadron moved to Van Phong Bay. Here, off the coast of Indochina, on April 26, it was joined by the 3rd Pacific Squadron.

The stops in Cam Ranh Bay and then in Van Phong Bay were extremely tense, since, on the one hand, the French government demanded the departure of the squadron, and on the other, a Japanese attack could be expected. During this stay, Admiral Rozhdestvensky sent a telegram to St. Petersburg in which, citing poor health, he asked to be replaced by another commander upon arrival in Vladivostok.

Transition from Indochina to the Korea Strait

The squadron could enter the Sea of ​​Japan through the Korean Straits. Sangarsky or Laperuzov. Admiral Rozhdestvensky decided to choose the shortest route through the Korean Strait, the widest and deepest of all the others. However, this route lay past the main bases of the Japanese fleet and, therefore, a meeting with the Japanese before arriving in Vladivostok was most likely. Admiral Rozhdestvensky took this into account, but believed that the passage through the Sangar Strait presented great difficulties in navigation, and moreover, the strait could be mined (the depths allowed this). The passage through the Strait of La Perouse in May seemed completely impossible to Rozhdestvensky due to the prevailing fogs, navigational difficulties and lack of coal for this longer passage.

The decision to go through the Korean Strait created the most favorable conditions for the battle for the Japanese fleet, since this battle could take place near Japanese bases. The passage of the Russian squadron through other straits, however, did not guarantee it from meeting the Japanese, but still the latter would have been in less favorable conditions, further from their bases, and would have been able to concentrate only their newest ships and large destroyers. The route through the Korea Strait put the 2nd Pacific Squadron at the most disadvantageous position.

Having decided to go through the Korean Strait, Admiral Rozhdestvensky found it necessary to take measures to divert part of the forces of the Japanese fleet to the eastern shores of Japan and the western shores of Korea and partly mask the moment of the breakthrough. To this end, on May 8 and 9, the auxiliary cruisers Kuban and Terek were sent to the Pacific coast of Japan in order to demonstrate their presence there and thus divert part of the Japanese fleet. For the same purpose, the auxiliary cruisers “Rion” and “Dnepr” were sent to the Yellow Sea, separated from the squadron on May 12 along with transports when the squadron approached the Sedelny Islands. The transports separated from the squadron were supposed to go to Shanghai, the busiest trading port, connected by telegraph cables to all major port cities, including Japanese ones.

The measures taken by Admiral Rozhdestvensky could not give a positive result, but rather unmasked his intentions. It is unlikely that the commander of the Japanese fleet would have allocated significant forces to fight the Russian cruisers, having learned about their appearance. Having received information about the arrival of transports in Shanghai, the Japanese could conclude that the Russian squadron, freed from transports, would take the shortest route, i.e. through the Korea Strait.

After the separation of the auxiliary cruisers and transports, the marching order was established as follows: in the right column were the battleships - 1st armored detachment - “Prince Suvorov” (Rozhestvensky flag), “Alexander III”, “Borodino”, “Eagle”; 2nd armored detachment - “Oslyabya” (Felkerzam’s flag), “Sisoy the Great”, “Navarin” and the armored cruiser “Admiral Nakhimov”; on the left - the 3rd armored detachment - “Nikolai I” (Nebogatov’s flag), coastal defense battleships “Apraksin”, “Senyavin”, “Ushakov”, cruisers “Oleg” (Enkvist flag), “Aurora”, “Dmitry Donskoy” , “Vladimir Monomakh”. The reconnaissance detachment, consisting of the cruisers “Svetlana” (the pennant of captain 1st rank Shein), “Almaz” and “Ural”, walked ahead in a wedge formation - at a distance of 3-4 cabins. from the squadron. The cruisers “Pearl” and “Emerald” stayed on the outer flanks of the lead ships of both columns. The transports left with the squadron walked in the middle of the columns between the battleships: the lead Anadyr, followed by the Irtysh, Kamchatka, Korea, tugs Rus and Svir. The destroyers walked on both sides of the transports, between them and the battleships. The hospital ships “Orel” and “Kostroma” were at the tail of the column at a distance of about 2 miles from the rest of the ships. The progress of the squadron was determined by the progress of the Irtysh transport, which had the lowest speed (9.5 knots). At night, the ships carried distinctive lights facing inward of the formation; On hospital ships, not only all navigation lights were lit, but also additional ones to illuminate Red Cross signs.

In this order, the squadron approached the Korean Strait. The squadron was in the area where the enemy was located, but reconnaissance was not organized. There was no fight against enemy reconnaissance. Of the oncoming steamships, only one was detained; the rest were not even inspected. The location of the squadron was unmasked by hospital ships that had full lighting. Under these conditions, there was no need to talk about any kind of secrecy in the movement of the squadron. Admiral Rozhestvensky refused reconnaissance, because he was sure that, moving through the Korean Strait, he would meet all the forces of the Japanese fleet there. In addition, he believed that the deployment of reconnaissance officers would only help the enemy detect the squadron earlier. In addition, he believed that given the Japanese superiority in speed, he would not be able to use the information received by reconnaissance to perform any maneuver.

Refusal of intelligence was completely wrong. Admiral Rozhdestvensky’s reference to the desire to maintain the secrecy of the squadron’s movements does not stand up to criticism at all, since the squadron could easily have been detected by the enemy by the hospital ships that were with it, which in fact happened.

There was no compelling justification for leaving six transports with the squadron, since they did not carry any vital cargo. In the battle, the inevitability of which Rozhdestvensky foresaw, they were only a burden, distracting the cruisers for their defense. In addition, the presence of the low-speed transport Irtysh reduced squadron speed. Thus, at this last stage of the movement of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, Admiral Rozhdestvensky did not take any measures to conceal the movement, did not organize reconnaissance of the enemy, and did not speed up the movement of the squadron itself.

On the night of May 13–14, the 2nd Pacific Squadron entered the Korea Strait. Due to the large number of ships included in the squadron, its marching order was very complex. The squadron marched in formation of three wake columns. The side columns were made up of warships, the middle one - from transports. At the head of the squadron were the cruisers of the reconnaissance detachment, behind, at a distance of about a mile, two hospital ships. Due to such a complex formation, the ships inevitably had to fire at night to prevent the possibility of a collision. On the ships, distinctive lights were lit on the sides facing inward and in the wake; The masthead lights were extinguished. On hospital ships sailing at the tail of the squadron, all lights were open, which made it possible for the enemy to detect the squadron and determine its course and progress.

Moving in such a compact formation, the squadron entered the area where the enemy was located, whose proximity it knew from intercepted radiograms.

On the night of May 14, the ships were ready for battle. The artillery crew rested in places provided for by the combat schedule.

The 2nd Pacific Squadron at that time included 4 new squadron battleships, 4 older ones, 3 coastal defense battleships, an armored cruiser, 8 cruisers of the 1st and 2nd ranks, an auxiliary cruiser, 9 destroyers and 2 hospital ships. The flag of Admiral Rozhdestvensky was on the squadron battleship “Prince Suvorov”. The junior flagships, rear admirals Nebogatov and Enquist, were: the first on the battleship “Nicholas I”, and the second on the cruiser “Oleg”. Rear Admiral Felkerzam died on May 11, but his flag on the battleship Oslyabya was not lowered.

The tactical data of the ships that were part of the 2nd squadron were very diverse. The most powerful ships were the 4 new Borodino-class battleships. These ships were intended for navigation in limited areas, and heavy overloading of coal in excess of the norm, associated with long passages, sharply reduced their combat qualities, since the armor belt was immersed in water and the stability of the ship decreased. The battleship Oslyabya was very different from them - a seaworthy ship, but weak in armor and artillery (Oslyabya was armed with 10-inch guns). Three battleships - “Sisoi the Great”, “Navarin” and “Nicholas I” had nothing in common either with each other or with the previous ships. Of these, the last two had old, short-range guns. Finally, the three small coastal defense battleships of the Admiral Ushakov type were not intended for squadron combat on the high seas, although they had modern 10-inch guns. Of the 8 cruisers, only two were of the same type.

The Japanese armored squadron, which consisted of the same number of armored ships as the Russian one, was more of the same type. It consisted of three Mikasa-class battleships, one Fuji-class battleship, six Asama-class armored cruisers and two Nisshin-class armored cruisers. With the exception of the last two, all the ships were built with the expectation that they would have to fight with Russia, and taking into account the characteristics of the Far Eastern theater.

According to their tactical data, the Japanese battleships were significantly stronger than the Russians, as can be seen from the following table.

Japanese ships were armed with powerful high-explosive shells with a large amount of explosive, up to 14%. Russian shells had only 2.5% explosive. Consequently, Japanese shells were superior to Russian ones in terms of high-explosive effect. In addition, the strength of the explosive (shimoza) in Japanese shells was approximately twice as strong as the pyroxylin used in Russian shells. All this gave the Japanese great advantages in battle, especially considering that Japanese ships were significantly superior to Russian ships in terms of artillery preparation, and also that Russian ships had an unarmored side area almost 1.5 times larger than Japanese ships (60 versus 39 percent) .

In terms of the number of destroyers, the Japanese fleet was much stronger. The Japanese concentrated 30 large and 33 small destroyers against 9 Russians. In addition, the Japanese fleet had a significant number of various types of obsolete and auxiliary ships.

When the 2nd Squadron entered the Korea Strait, the Japanese fleet was at its base in Mozampo. The fleet commander, Admiral Togo, was on the battleship Mikasa. The flag of the head of the 2nd squadron, Vice Admiral Kamimura, was on the armored cruiser Izumo. The observation line was deployed between the island. Kvelpart and the Goto Island group.

About 2 o'clock. 25 min. The auxiliary cruiser Shinano-Maru, the left flank ship of the patrol chain, discovered the lights of the hospital ship Eagle, and then identified the entire squadron. At 4 o'clock. 25 min. a radiogram was given about the appearance of the Russian squadron. The Japanese fleet immediately began preparing for deployment. The reconnaissance cruisers began to converge on the spot where the Russian squadron was discovered. By dawn they had taken positions around her. At 5 o'clock. all warships went to the places assigned according to deployment near the island. Okinoshima.

The Russian squadron, based on the intensive work of Japanese telegraph stations, concluded that it had been discovered, however, Admiral Rozhdestvensky made no attempts to interfere with the negotiations of the Japanese ships.

At dawn, Japanese cruisers were discovered, sailing on a course parallel to the Russian squadron. However, Admiral Rozhdestvensky did not take any measures to drive away the Japanese intelligence officers. Counting, ; Because the distance to the Japanese cruisers was too great to fire successfully, he decided not to send his cruisers out of fear that they might encounter superior Japanese forces in the fog.

Day fight May 14

Having no doubt that the Japanese cruisers observing the squadron were reporting to Togo all the data about its movement, on the basis of which the Japanese commander was also preparing for a corresponding deployment before the battle, Rozhdestvensky decided, taking advantage of the finding stripes of fog, to shoot down the enemy’s crews. To do this, he thought to change the formation at the moment when he found fog and the Japanese cruisers lost sight of him. But as soon as the rebuilding began, the fog cleared, and it was not possible to fulfill the plan. Without finishing the started rebuilding, Rozhdestvensky raised the cancellation signal. The squadron found itself in two wake columns: on the right - four new battleships, on the left - all the rest.

Since the movement of the Russian squadron continued to take place in front of Japanese reconnaissance officers, Admiral Togo had all the information about the composition of the Russian squadron, its course and formations. After weighing everything, he decided to strike at the left column, which consisted of weaker ships. Admiral Togo's plan was to attack the head of the Russian column with armored ships, and for this purpose, taking advantage of his advantage in speed, he crossed its course. At the same time, the light cruisers were supposed to attack the transports and the cruisers covering them.

The main forces of the Japanese fleet were divided into two detachments: the 1st detachment (4 battleships and 2 armored cruisers) under the flag of Admiral Togo and the 2nd detachment (6 armored cruisers) under the flag of Admiral Kamimura.

At 1 p.m. 30 min. from the Russian squadron, on the right bow, the Japanese fleet was discovered, heading to cross the course. Admiral Rozhdestvensky immediately began to line up his ships in one wake column. This restructuring was not yet completed when the Japanese, having moved to the left side of the Russian squadron, began to make a consistent turn to the left in order to cross its course. This turn put the Japanese ships in a risky position. Turning successively at 24 points, they described a loop almost in one place, without being able to shoot.

At the moment of the turn, the distance between the lead ships of the Russian squadron and Togo’s flagship, the Mikasa, was no more than 38 cables. At this moment, at 13 o'clock. 49 minutes, the flagship battleship of the Russian squadron “Suvorov” opened fire. Thus, the commander of the Russian squadron had the opportunity to strike the enemy’s lead ships at the very beginning of the battle. However, Admiral Rozhdestvensky failed to take advantage of the unfavorable position of the Japanese during the turn. Remaining in one wake column, he deprived his new high-speed battleships of the opportunity to get close to the enemy at a distance favorable to them. In addition, in the middle of the Russian squadron, some ships prevented each other from firing, and the end ones fell behind. Therefore, the fire from Russian ships did not cause much damage to the Japanese.

Three minutes later, the Japanese ships returned fire. The distance by this time had decreased to 35 cables. Four lead Japanese ships concentrated fire on the Suvorov, six on the Oslyaba, and two on the Nicholas I. Having an advantage in progress, the Japanese began to overtake the Russian squadron, entering its head.

Japanese artillery caused great destruction on Russian ships; The two flagships especially suffered. At 2 p.m. 25 min. The battleship Oslyabya, having a large list, failed and after 25 minutes capsized and sank. At 2 p.m. 30 min. Due to damage to the rudder, the battleship Suvorov was disabled to the right. Its masts and yards were knocked down, all the halyards were burned, so it was impossible to raise any signals. Admiral Rozhdestvensky was wounded. The lead was the battleship "Alexander III", which, not knowing why the "Suvorov" was out of action, first followed it, but then turned left, intending to pass to the north under the stern of the Japanese battleships, which were on the right of the Russians.

This was the decisive moment of the battle. After the failure of the flagship battleship, the Russian squadron, which had no battle plan and was now also deprived of leadership, was doomed to defeat. Valiantly fighting the Japanese, she tried to somehow get through to Vladivostok.

Noticing the turn of the Russian squadron, the Japanese battleships turned “all of a sudden” to the opposite course in order to again reach the head of the Russian squadron. At the moment of the turn, they were covered by their armored cruisers, which increased fire on the Russian ships, remaining on the same course, and then turned behind the battleships. Due to the fact that the darkness thickened and visibility decreased, the battle temporarily stopped. All attempts by the Russian squadron to break through to the north failed. Each time the Japanese crossed the course, hitting mainly the lead ships.

At 16 o'clock. 20 minutes. The fog again thickened so much that the battle stopped. The Russian squadron, now with Borodino as its lead, turned south. The Japanese temporarily lost the Russians. In search of the Russian squadron, the Japanese battleships turned north, and the armored cruisers headed south. Russian battleships, heading south, approached their transports and cruisers, which were fighting off Japanese cruisers. With their fire they drove away the Japanese cruisers, and one of them was so badly damaged that it had to go to the nearest port. Japanese armored cruisers approaching the battlefield opened fire on the Russians. “Borodino,” and behind it the entire squadron, gradually turned north.

At 6 p.m. 06 min. Japanese battleships approached and, walking on an almost parallel course, concentrated 32 cabs from a distance. fire on “Borodino” and “Alexander III”. The Russian ships veered to the left. At this time, the destroyer “Buiny” was approaching the squadron, on which Admiral Rozhdestvensky was located, photographed together with his headquarters at about 17:00. from “Suvorov”. The signal was raised on the destroyer to transfer command to Admiral Nebogatov. Although this signal was rehearsed by some ships, it was not noticed on “Nicholas I”, and therefore at about 19:00. The destroyer Bezuprechny approached him, from which Rozhdestvensky’s order was transmitted to lead the squadron to Vladivostok.

Meanwhile, the squadron continued to move north. At about 19 o'clock she lost two more battleships: at 18 o'clock. 50 min. "Alexander III" capsized and died at 19:00. 10 min. “Borodino” died in the same way. At 7 p.m. 10 min. Japanese destroyers attacked the broken Suvorov and sank it.

The moment of the death of these ships coincided with the end of the day's battle. The sun set, dusk was coming, and Admiral Togo led his armored ships north, to about. Evenlet, lying on the way from Tsushima to Vladivostok, hoping that Russian ships would go this way. He sent destroyers for night attacks against Russian ships.

During the daytime battle, the Russian cruisers, following the orders of Admiral Rozhestvensky, stayed close to the transports, guarding them, and did not conduct reconnaissance. Therefore, the Russian squadron had absolutely no idea where the Japanese fleet had gone.

In the growing darkness, Japanese destroyers were visible from the Russian squadron approaching from the north, east and south, and only in the southwest was it clear.

Admiral Nebogatov, who took command of the squadron at this time, went to the head of the squadron and turned to the southwest in order to evade the attack. The cruisers also turned and walked ahead of the armored squadron, the formation of which was broken, and the ships only approximately held their positions.

This ended the day's battle. On this day, the Russian squadron lost three new battleships and one old one. Many ships received heavy damage.

Of the Japanese ships, the cruiser Kasagi, which was out of action, received the most severe damage. Of the other ships, Admiral Togo's flagship battleship Mikasa was the most damaged, being hit by more than thirty shells. The inside of the front conning tower, the front and rear bridges were damaged, all the servants of one gun were killed and wounded, several casemates were broken, and the decks were pierced. More than ten Russian shells hit the Shikishima. The Nissin suffered several hits to its gun turrets, destroying three large guns and demolishing part of the bridge. There were 95 sailors and officers killed and wounded on this ship; Vice Admiral Misu, who was holding the flag on the Nissin, was wounded.

The battleships Fiji and the armored cruisers Asama, Yakumo, Iwate, and Kassuga were also damaged. This day of battle was replete with many examples of endurance and courage of Russian sailors, who showed knowledge of their business and fulfilled their duty to the end. Thus, artillery conductor Kalashnikov from the “Sisoi the Great” caused a large fire on the Japanese cruiser “Iwate” with a successful hit from a shell. The artillery quartermaster from the same ship, Dolinin, and the sailor of the 1st class, Molokov, when the ship’s magazine with ammunition was flooded, took turns diving into the water and taking out shells. The helmsman of the cruiser “Oleg” Belousov and signalmen Chernov and Iskrich promptly noticed a torpedo fired by a Japanese destroyer. The cruiser managed to turn away. and the torpedo passed by. The Aurora, which was heading in the wake, was also “warned by signalmen from Oleg” and managed to evade the torpedoes. One of the officers of the cruiser “Aurora” wrote about the behavior of the sailors in battle: “Our teams behaved in battle above all praise. Every sailor showed remarkable composure, resourcefulness and fearlessness. Golden people and hearts! They cared not so much about themselves as about their commanders, warning about every enemy shot, covering the officers at the moment of the explosion. Covered with wounds and blood, the sailors did not leave their places, preferring to die at the guns. They didn’t even go to bandages! You send it, and they say, “It’ll be in time, later, now there’s no time!” It was only thanks to the dedication of the crew that we forced the Japanese cruisers to retreat, sinking two of their ships and putting four out of action, with a large list.” What the officer from the Aurora wrote about the sailors was typical not only for this cruiser, but also for all the ships of the Russian squadron.

Battle on the night of May 14-15

Only Admiral Nebogatov’s detachment held together, with which the only surviving new battleship “Eagle” and the cruiser “Izumrud” were sailing. Having retreated to the southwest, Admiral Nebogatov turned north at about 21 o'clock to go to Vladivostok. Taking into account the experience of Port Arthur, Admiral Nebogatov did not open searchlights at night and evaded attacks from destroyers; none of the ships were damaged. However, on the morning of May 15, at about 10 o'clock, the detachment found itself surrounded by the entire Japanese fleet. Without offering any resistance, Nebogatov surrendered his ships (4 battleships). And only the cruiser “Emerald”, having heard the signal of surrender, gave full speed and, breaking through the ring of Japanese ships, headed towards Vladivostok. On the way there, he entered Vladimir Bay, where he ran into rocks and, on the orders of his commander, was blown up. The team arrived in Vladivostok by land.

The cruising detachment led by the cruiser “Oleg”, evading Japanese destroyers, went south. Some of the cruisers fell behind and, having lost their flagship, turned north to go to Vladivostok.

Only the cruisers Oleg, Aurora and Zhemchug remained united. They walked south all night and in the morning they found themselves south of the Korea Strait. The commander of the cruisers, Rear Admiral Enquist, intending to independently break through to Vladivostok, tentatively decided to call at a neutral port to make some corrections. Believing that Shanghai was too close to Japan, Enquist went to the Philippine Islands, where he arrived on May 21. Here in the port of Manila the cruisers were interned.

The remaining Russian ships sailed in single order. The ships of Admiral Rozhdestvensky's squadron, repelling attacks from destroyers, unmasked themselves by turning on searchlights, and as a result received torpedo hits.

The cruiser Admiral Nakhimov was the first to be torpedoed at about 21:00, then the battleships Sisoy the Great, Navarin and the cruiser Vladimir Monomakh. However, only one battleship Navarin was killed by a torpedo at night; the rest survived on the water until the morning and were then destroyed by their crews.

On May 15, at about 4 p.m., the destroyer Bedovy, to which the wounded Admiral Rozhdestvensky and his staff were transferred, was overtaken by Japanese destroyers and, without making any attempt to fight or escape, surrendered. Thus, the commander of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, along with his entire staff, was captured.

The destroyer “Grozny”, traveling together with “Bedov”, seeing that the latter raised the signal of surrender, gave full speed and went to Vladivostok, pursued by a stronger Japanese destroyer. Having entered into battle with him, “Grozny” caused him such severe damage that the Japanese destroyer was forced to stop pursuing him. Without a compass, with serious damage, “Grozny” nevertheless arrived in Vladivostok.

Around the same time that “Grozny” was fighting, the battleship “Admiral Ushakov” died valiantly. This old ship, due to damage received in the day's battle, fell behind and was heading north alone. At 5 p.m. 30 min. Two Japanese armored cruisers approached him and offered to surrender. The commander of the battleship, Captain 1st Rank Miklukha-Maclay, opened fire in response to the Japanese proposal. At 6 p.m. 10 minutes, when all the combat reserves were used up, by order of the commander, the battleship was destroyed by its crew.

Somewhat later, at about 7 p.m., the cruiser “Dmitry Donskoy”, approaching the island. Dazhelet was overtaken by six Japanese light cruisers. Despite this inequality of forces, the commander of the Dmitry Donskoy, Captain 1st Rank Lebedev, entered the battle, firing on both sides. With the onset of darkness, the cruiser, having a number of serious damages, took refuge under the shore of the island. It even flies. The Japanese ships lost it and retreated to sea. Although this heroic ship fought off an enemy superior in strength, the damage it received in this battle was so significant that the Dmitry Donskoy could not go further and was sunk at great depths, and the crew was taken to the shore.

In addition to the destroyer Grozny, the 2nd rank cruiser Almaz and the destroyer Bravy arrived in Vladivostok. The latter, having been separated from the squadron, evaded the shores of Japan and thus avoided meeting with Japanese ships. This was all that remained of the 2nd Pacific Squadron.

Results of the battle

Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of the ships in the squadron were outdated, the shells were poor, and the incompetent tsarist admirals were essentially unable to control the battle, the Russian sailors showed excellent fighting qualities in the fight against a strong and treacherous enemy. They heroically and selflessly fought the Japanese.

This battle completely revealed the incompetence of the squadron's high command.

1) The commander of the Russian squadron, Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky, who ignored all the experience of the battles at Port Arthur, did not prepare his ships for the battle, which he himself considered inevitable.

2) There was no battle plan. Therefore, the only desire of the squadron was to get to Vladivostok one way or another.

3) There was no reconnaissance, so the appearance of the main forces of the Japanese fleet caught the Russian squadron having not completed its combat formation.

4) Battle management and transfer of command were not organized.

5) The Russian squadron entered the battle at a disadvantage; only the lead ships could fire.

6) The combination of new and old ships in one wake column was impractical, since it made it impossible to fully use the most powerful ships.

7) Maneuvering in one wake column, which was the only thing the squadron was capable of, allowed the Japanese to envelop the head.

8) The incorrect use of searchlights on the ships of Admiral Rozhestvensky’s squadron helped the Japanese destroyers successfully attack the Russians.

9) The personnel of the Russian squadron entered the battle in extremely difficult conditions, having completed a seven-month journey.

Regarding the Japanese fleet, it should be noted:

1) The Japanese squadron was more of the same type, modernly equipped, faster and better trained. This provided more flexible maneuvering.

2) The personnel of the Japanese fleet had eleven months of combat experience.

However, despite these advantages, the Japanese made a number of major mistakes in battle.

1) Reconnaissance during the battle was not properly organized; the Japanese cruisers did not follow the main forces of the Russians, being carried away by the battle with transports. Because of this, the Russian battleships were separated from the Japanese fleet several times, and the Japanese only accidentally found the Russian battleships again.

2) The deployment of Japanese destroyers was incomplete. Admiral Nebogatov's maneuver confused their crews, and they temporarily lost the Russian column. Four squads never found her.

The results of the attacks show insufficient preparation of the destroyers: of all the torpedoes fired, only six hit, and three hit the same ship.

conclusions

The outcome of the Battle of Tsushima had a huge impact on the further course of the entire war. All hopes for a favorable outcome were completely destroyed.

The government of Nicholas II hastened to conclude peace, which was signed in Portsmouth on August 23, 1905.

Photos from open sources

On May 27-28, 1905, the Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron was defeated by the Japanese fleet. "Tsushima" has become a byword for fiasco. We decided to understand why this tragedy happened.

1 Long hike

Initially, the task of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was to help the besieged Port Arthur. But after the fall of the fortress, Rozhestvensky’s squadron was entrusted with the very vague task of independently gaining supremacy at sea, which was difficult to achieve without good bases.

The only major port (Vladivostok) was located quite far from the theater of military operations and had an infrastructure too weak for a huge squadron. The campaign, as is known, took place in extremely difficult conditions and was a feat in itself, since it was possible to concentrate an armada of 38 different types of ships and auxiliary vessels in the Sea of ​​Japan without losses in the ship's personnel or serious accidents.

The squadron command and ship commanders had to solve a lot of problems, from the difficult loading of coal on the high seas to the organization of leisure for crews who quickly lost discipline during long, monotonous stops. All this, naturally, was done to the detriment of the combat situation, and the ongoing exercises did not and could not give good results. And this is more the rule than the exception, since there are no examples in naval history when a squadron that made a long, difficult voyage away from its bases could achieve victory in a naval battle.

2 Artillery: pyroxylin against shimosa

Often in the literature dedicated to the Battle of Tsushima, the terrible high-explosive effect of Japanese shells, which exploded even upon impact with water, is emphasized, as opposed to Russian ammunition. In the Battle of Tsushima, the Japanese fired shells with a powerful high-explosive effect, causing great destruction. True, Japanese shells also had the unpleasant property of exploding in the barrels of their own guns.

Thus, at Tsushima, the cruiser Nissin lost three of its four main caliber guns. Russian armor-piercing shells filled with wet pyroxylin had a less explosive effect, and often pierced light Japanese ships without exploding. Of the twenty-four 305 mm shells that hit the Japanese ships, eight did not explode. So, at the end of the day’s battle, Admiral Kammimura’s flagship, the cruiser Izumo, was lucky when a Russian shell from the Shisoi the Great hit the engine room, but, fortunately for the Japanese, did not explode.

The significant overloading of Russian ships with large amounts of coal, water and various cargoes also played into the hands of the Japanese, when the main armor belt of most Russian battleships in the Tsushima battle was below the waterline. And high-explosive shells, which could not penetrate the armor belt, caused terrible damage in their scale, hitting the skin of the ships.

But one of the main reasons for the defeat of the 2nd Pacific Squadron was not even the quality of the shells, but the competent use of artillery by the Japanese, who concentrated fire on the best Russian ships. The unsuccessful start of the battle for the Russian squadron allowed the Japanese to very quickly disable the flagship "Prince Suvorov" and inflict fatal damage to the battleship "Oslyabya". The main result of the decisive day battle was the death of the core of the Russian squadron - the battleships Emperor Alexander III, Prince Suvorov and Borodino, as well as the high-speed Oslyabya. The fourth battleship of the Borodino class, Orel, received a large number of hits, but retained its combat effectiveness.

It should be taken into account that out of 360 hits from large shells, about 265 fell on the above-mentioned ships. The Russian squadron fired less concentratedly, and although the main target was the battleship Mikasa, due to the disadvantageous position, the Russian commanders were forced to transfer fire to other enemy ships.

3 Low speed

The advantage of Japanese ships in speed became a significant factor that determined the death of the Russian squadron. The Russian squadron fought at a speed of 9 knots; Japanese fleet - 16. However, it should be noted that most Russian ships could develop a much greater speed.

Thus, the four newest Russian battleships of the Borodino type were not inferior to the enemy in speed, and the ships of the 2nd and 3rd combat detachments could give a speed of 12-13 knots and the enemy’s advantage in speed would not be so significant.

By tying himself to slow-moving transports, which were still impossible to protect from attacks by light enemy forces, Rozhdestvensky untied the enemy’s hands. Having an advantage in speed, the Japanese fleet fought in favorable conditions, covering the head of the Russian squadron. The day's battle was marked by a number of pauses, when the opponents lost sight of each other and the Russian ships had a chance of breaking through. But again, the low squadron speed led to the enemy overtaking the Russian squadron. In the battles of May 28, low speed tragically affected the fate of individual Russian ships and became one of the reasons for the death of the battleship Admiral Ushakov and the cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Svetlana.

4 Management crisis

One of the reasons for the defeat in the Tsushima battle was the lack of initiative of the squadron command - both Rozhestvensky himself and the junior flagships. No specific instructions were issued before the battle. In case of failure of the flagship, the squadron had to be led by the next battleship in formation, keeping the given course. This automatically negated the role of Rear Admirals Enquist and Nebogatov. And who led the squadron in the daytime battle after the flagship failed?

The battleships "Alexander III" and "Borodino" perished with their entire crew and who actually led the ships, replacing the retired ship commanders - officers, and maybe sailors - this will never be known. In reality, after the failure of the flagship and the injury of Rozhdestvensky himself, the squadron fought virtually without a commander.

Only in the evening did Nebogatov take command of the squadron - or rather, what he could gather around him. At the outset of the battle, Rozhdestvensky began an unsuccessful restructuring. Historians argue whether the Russian admiral could have seized the initiative, taking advantage of the fact that the core of the Japanese fleet had to fight for the first 15 minutes, essentially doubling the formation and passing the turning point. There are different hypotheses... but only one thing is known - neither at that moment nor later did Rozhdestvensky take decisive action.

5 Night combat, searchlights and torpedoes

On the evening of May 27, after the end of the day's battle, the Russian squadron was subjected to numerous attacks by Japanese destroyers and suffered serious losses. It is noteworthy that only those single Russian ships that turned on searchlights and tried to shoot back were torpedoed. Thus, almost the entire crew of the battleship Navarin perished, and the Sisoy the Great, Admiral Nakhimov and Vladimir Monomakh, which were hit by torpedoes, sank on the morning of May 28.

For comparison, during the battle in the Yellow Sea on July 28, 1904, the Russian squadron was also attacked by Japanese destroyers in the dark, but then, maintaining camouflage, successfully withdrew from the battle, and the night battle was marked by the useless consumption of coal and torpedoes, as well as the misadventures of the Japanese destroyers.

In the Battle of Tsushima, mine attacks, as during the Battle of the Yellow Sea, were poorly organized - as a result, many destroyers were damaged by Russian artillery fire or as a result of accidents. Destroyers No. 34 and No. 35 were sunk, and No. 69 sank after a collision with Akatsuki-2 (formerly Russian Resolute, illegally captured by the Japanese in neutral Chefu).

The 1905 Battle of Tsushima between the Russian Pacific Flotilla and the Imperial Japanese Navy suffered a crushing defeat. As a result of the naval battle, the Russian squadron was defeated and destroyed. The bulk of Russian warships were torpedoed by Japanese sailors and sunk along with their crew members. Some ships announced their capitulation, only four ships returned to the shores of their native harbor. The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) ended with a major military defeat of the Russian fleet off the coast of Tsushima Island (Japan). What are the reasons for the defeat and was a different outcome possible?

Military and political situation in the Far East

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 began with a surprise attack by combat destroyers of the Japanese fleet on Russian ships stationed in the Port Arthur roadstead. As a result of the torpedo attack, two heavy artillery ships and one surface vessel were damaged. The history of the Far East includes many military actions. All of them were aimed at seizing and redistributing spheres of influence in this section of Russian land. Japan's desire to dominate Northeast China and the Korean Peninsula was fiercely supported by England and the United States of America. Russia's small allies, such as France, Germany and others, strongly supported the Russian Emperor Nicholas II in the matter of preserving Russian territories. However, at decisive strategic moments they still tried to adhere to neutrality. Allied cooperation was provided only when it suited their commercial interests.

Making a strategic decision

The ever-increasing Japanese attacks on Port Arthur, the main base of the Russian Pacific Fleet, forced Emperor Nicholas II to take decisive action. The decision was made in July 1904. A squadron under the leadership of Vice Admiral Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhestvensky was sent from Kronstadt to the weakened Pacific squadron to defeat and destroy the Japanese fleet.

Already on the way, the Baltic ships learn that Port Arthur has been taken and all the ships in the roadstead are sunk. The Pacific Flotilla has been destroyed. This is the maritime history of the Russian Far East. Nevertheless, Nicholas II decides to continue the path of the imperial fleet to the shores of Japan. To strengthen the attacking squadron, a detachment of warships under Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov was sent from the Baltic Sea.

Unequal forces of opponents

The course of the Tsushima battle could be predicted by the number of combat units on the opposing sides. The Pacific Flotilla of Vice Admiral Zinovy ​​Petrovich Rozhdestvensky included:

8 squadron heavy artillery ships (battleships) against 4 Japanese;

3 coastal guard battleships against 6 enemy ships;

1 cruiser battleship against 8 units of the Imperial Japanese Navy;

8 cruisers against 16 Japanese cruisers;

5 against Japan's 24 auxiliary military vessels;

9 Russian against 63 Japanese destroyers.

The clear combat advantage of Japanese Admiral Heihachiro Togo speaks for itself. The combat experience of the Japanese fleet was superior to the Russian fleet in all respects, despite the fact that Russia had a much richer history of naval battles. Japanese combat riflemen skillfully mastered the art of hitting enemy targets at long distances, and at one target from several ships. The Russian fleet did not have such experience. The main occupation of that period was the imperial reviews (parades) of naval equipment, which were held annually by order of Emperor Nicholas II.

Mistakes and miscalculations of the Russian admiral

The strategic objective of Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky’s sea campaign was to capture the Sea of ​​Japan. This condition was set by Emperor Nicholas II. However, Z.P. Rozhdestvensky saw the following as his operational goal: to break through to Vladivostok by any force, regardless of the possible losses of his fleet. It is possible that bypassing the Japanese islands from the east would have been a strategically correct decision, and the Tsushima naval battle would not have taken place.

But the naval commander chose a different, shorter route. The decision was made to go through the straits. The Korea Strait, connecting the East China and Sea of ​​Japan, goes around the island of Tsushima, which, in turn, has two routes: the western passage and the eastern (Tsushima Strait). It was there that Japanese Admiral Heitachiro Togo was waiting for the Russian sailors.

All passages are blocked

The commander of the Japanese fleet chose a strategically correct plan for possible military operations. A patrol chain of ships was organized between the islands, which could notify the commander of possible maneuvers and the approach of Russian ships. On the approaches to Vladivostok, the Japanese prudently placed minefields. Everything is ready for battle. The Japanese ships of the Tsushima battle were awaiting the approach of Russian ships. The commander of the Pacific Fleet refused naval reconnaissance, fearing that his squadron would be discovered by enemy reconnaissance cruisers.

The obvious outcome of the main battle of the Russo-Japanese War

To send such a motley armada across three oceans seemed crazy to many. Both veterans with worn-out mechanisms, who had logged hundreds of thousands of nautical miles, and the newest, hastily completed ships that had not passed tests, were sent on this doomed voyage. Sailors always treat their ships as inanimate sentient beings. The battleships with the names of famous commanders seemed to specifically not want to go to inevitable death. They got stuck on the descent during a slip, sank right next to the factory walls during repairs, and ran aground, as if they were giving clear warning signs to their crews.

How not to believe omens?

At the beginning of 1900, an assembly model of the battleship Emperor Alexander III burned down in the workshop. The launch of this ship was marked by the fall of the flagpole with the imperial standard and was accompanied by casualties.

The battleship "Eagle" sank in a civil harbor, and later ran aground several times while catching up with the squadron in the Gulf of Finland. The battleship “Slava” was never able to be sent on a campaign.

However, the high command was unaware of any premonitions. On September 26, 1904, the highest imperial review took place in Reval (formerly Tallinn). Nicholas II walked around all the ships and wished the sailors to reach Port Arthur and join the first squadron of the Pacific Fleet for joint mastery of the Sea of ​​Japan. A week later, seven battleships, a cruiser, and destroyers left their native shores forever. The 220-day, 18,000 nautical mile voyage to the Japanese shores has begun.

Unseen circumstances

The main problem faced by the squadron command was the problem with fuel. According to the international maritime law of that time, warships of a belligerent party could enter the ports of a neutral party only for a day. England, which owned most of the loading stations along the route of the squadron, closed its ports to Russian warships.

The supply of the squadron with coal, provisions and fresh water had to be organized directly at sea. For repairs, a special workshop “Kamchatka” was equipped, staffed by volunteer craftsmen. By the way, they also shared the fate of military sailors. Overall, the implementation of a strategic operation of this scale deserves the highest praise.

The most difficult loading of coal on the high seas, unbearable tropical heat, when the temperature in the boiler rooms reached 70º Celsius, a severe storm at the Cape of Good Hope - all this did not stop the movement of the squadron. None of the ships turned back.

Circumnavigation across three oceans

The Russian squadron loomed like a ghost on the horizon, rarely approaching ports and harbors. The whole world watched her movements. International telegraph and telephone lines were overloaded. Correspondents and reporters guarded the squadron along the entire route:

Port Said (Egypt);

Djibouti (East Africa);

Aden (Yemen);

Dakar (Senegal);

Conakry (Guinea);

Cape Town (South Africa).

But all attempts were to no avail. The first long-term stop was in Masiba Bay (Madagascar). The cruiser detachment of Rear Admiral D. G. von Felkersam also joined there, taking a short route through the Suez Canal. During exercises in Madagascar, Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky became convinced of the inability of his subordinates to shoot accurately and maneuver correctly.

However, this did not surprise anyone. The crews were formed mostly of recruits and penal prisoners. Two months later - a jump across the Indian Ocean. The endlessly tired squadron was met by Chinese fishermen in the straits near Singapore and the Vietnamese in Cam Ranh. The last sea caravan to be seen from Jeju Island were Korean pearl divers. The Battle of Tsushima would begin very soon, and the date of the squadron's destruction was approaching.

First salvo against the enemy

At 13:40, the flagship battleship “Prince Suvorov”, under the leadership of Captain 1st Rank V.V. Ignatius, set course north-east 23. Nine minutes later, its guns opened fire on the Japanese squadron, and two minutes later flashes of response flashed volleys The Tsushima naval battle has begun. For most of the crew, the outcome was clear back in St. Petersburg.

From a letter from the commander of the battleship of the guards crew “Emperor Alexander III”, captain 3rd rank N. M. Bukhvustov: “You wish us victory. Needless to say, how much we wish for her. But there will be no victory. At the same time, I guarantee that we will all die, but we will not give up.” The commander kept his word and died along with the entire crew of the battleship.

Battle of Tsushima, briefly about the main thing

At 14:15, exactly thirty-five minutes after the start of the battle, the battleship Oslyabya, led by Captain 1st Rank V.I. Behr, with a strong bow on the bow and a huge fire on the rostra, rolled out of formation and fell on the left side . Ten minutes later, he disappeared under water, leaving only wooden fragments and people floundering in the water on the surface.

A few minutes after the death of the Oslyabya, one after another, ships torpedoed by Japanese sailors broke down.

By 16 o'clock the battleship "Prince Suvorov" was out of action, which was severely mutilated by Japanese shells. Resembling a burning island, it repelled enemy attacks for about five hours. In the last minutes, the Russian sailors fired back from the only surviving three-inch gun and rifles. The battleship received seven torpedo hits and went under water.

A little earlier we managed to remove Admiral Z.P. Rozhdestvensky with his headquarters to the destroyer “Buiny”. A total of 23 people were evacuated. No one else could be saved. The captain of the 1st rank, a talented marine painter Vasily Vasilyevich Ignatius, commanded a squadron battleship and died on it.

In general, during the Russo-Japanese War, two wonderful artists died, both of them graduates of the naval corps and, by a strange coincidence, complete namesakes. The second artist is Vasily Vasilyevich Vereshchagin, who drowned along with the battleship Petropavlovsk off the coast of Port Arthur. Then, at the same time, Admiral S. O. Makarov, who won many Russian naval battles and was the glory and pride of the Russian fleet, also died. Following the flagship "Prince Suvorov", the Russian Imperial Navy lost:

“Sisoy the Great” under the command of captain 1st rank M.P. Ozerov;

the battleship "Navarin", led by captain 1st rank Baron B. A. Fitingof;

the cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov", which was subordinate to the later captured captain 1st rank A. A. Rodionov;

squadron battleship "Admiral Ushakov", whose commander was captain 1st rank V.N. Miklukhina (the ship was the last of the Russian squadron to die);

"Admiral Senyavin" led by Captain 1st Rank S.I. Grigoriev, who was captured by the Japanese.

The tragedy continues

The Battle of Tsushima in 1905 increasingly carried Russian sailors and their ships into the abyss of the sea. Another mortally mutilated battleship went under water with the entire crew on board. Until the last minute, people - from the commander to the fireman - had a glimmer of hope that they would be able to overcome this terrible battle of Tsushima (1905) and the Russian coast would appear on the north-east course 23. The main thing is to survive. Many people died with this thought. Russian sailors on the following battleships followed with their gaze the place where their comrades died. They whispered with lips black from burning: “Rest their souls, Lord.”

The battleship Emperor Alexander III and its entire crew perished, and a little later the Borodino. Miraculously, only one sailor escaped. The outcome of the battle was predetermined. The Battle of Tsushima in 1905 made us think about the indestructibility of the Russian fleet. The next morning, the remnants of the Russian squadron that survived the night torpedo attacks were surrendered to the Japanese by Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov. Subsequently, Admiral Nikolai Ivanovich Nebogatov was sentenced to ten years in prison by the decision of the Naval Court of His Imperial Majesty.

The fate of the commander

The commander of the destroyer "Buiny", who saved Admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky, was captain 2nd rank Nikolai Nikolaevich Kolomiytsev. The fate of this man is very amazing. Before the Russo-Japanese War, he was a prominent hydrographer, traveler, explorer of Taimyr, and commander of the icebreaker Ermak. He participated in the Russian polar expedition of Baron Eduard Tol. Returning to Russia after Tsushima, where he distinguished himself as one of the best commanders of the Russian fleet, N. N. Kolomiytsev commanded various ships. In World War I he became a vice admiral. In 1918, he was arrested by the Bolsheviks and imprisoned in the Peter and Paul Fortress. In most Soviet-era publications, biographical information about N.N. Kolomiytsev ends with the words: “He died in Petrograd, presumably in 1918.” In 1972, his name was assigned to a new hydrographic vessel. Only very recently it became clear that Nikolai Kolomiytsev fled to Finland in 1918. Later he fought in the Black Sea on the side of Baron Wrangel. Then he moved to France, and died in the United States of America under the wheels of a military truck at the end of 1944. Thus, the ship “Nikolai Kolomiytsev” was the only ship in the Soviet fleet bearing the name of the White Guard admiral and emigrant.

Historical reference

From the lists of naval fleets of that time, two ships that took part in the Battle of Tsushima have survived to this day. These are the well-known cruiser Aurora and the Japanese battleship Mikasa, the flagship of Admiral Heihachiro Togo. The armored deck "Aurora" at Tsushima fired about two thousand shells at the enemy, receiving, in turn, twenty-one hits. The cruiser was seriously damaged, sixteen people from its crew, including the commander, captain 1st rank E.R. Egoriev, were killed, another 83 people were wounded. Unable to move forward, the Aurora, along with the cruisers Oleg and Zhemchug, disarmed in Manila (Philippines). According to some military experts, participation in the Battle of Tsushima gives more reason for the cruiser Aurora to serve as a memorial than the famous blank shot in October 1917.

In the city of Yokosuka, the battleship Mikasa stands as a museum ship. For a very long time, on the anniversaries of Tsushima, meetings of veterans and participants of the Russian-Japanese War were held there. The Japanese treat this historical monument with great reverence.

Memory of the lost sailors at Tsushima

Of the 36 units of the Russian squadron, three arrived in Vladivostok. The messenger ship "Almaz", the destroyers "Grozny" and "Bravey". Most of the ships and 5 thousand sailors found eternal peace at the bottom of the Korea Strait near the islands of Tsushima and Dazhelet. The graves of Russian sailors who died of wounds in captivity are still carefully preserved by the Japanese in Nagasaki. In 1910, in St. Petersburg, the snow-white Church of the Savior on Water, dedicated to the victims of Tsushima, was built with people's money and widows' contributions. The temple did not stand for long, until the mid-30s. The Russo-Japanese War, the Battle of Tsushima - these two terms will forever remain in the eternal memory of the Russian people.

Continuing the topic started in the previous post Russian - Japanese War 1904 - 1905 and her final battle Tsushima naval battle May 14 - 15, 1905 . This time we will talk about the warships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron that took part in the battle with the Japanese fleet, and about their fate. (The date in brackets after the name of the ship means its launching after construction)
In addition, I think it will be interesting for everyone who is interested in the history of the Fatherland to see what Russian warships looked like more than a hundred years ago.

1. Flagship - squadron battleship "PRINCE SUVOROV" (1902)
Killed in battle

2. Armored cruiser "OSLYABYA" (1898)
Killed in battle

3. Armored cruiser "ADMIRAL NAKHIMOV" ( 1885)
Killed in battle

4. 1st rank cruiser "DIMITRY DONSKOY" (1883)
Sunk by crew

5. 1st rank cruiser "VLADIMIR MONOMAKH" (1882)
Sunk by crew

6. Battleship "NAVARIN" (1891)
Killed in battle

7. Squadron battleship "EMPEROR NICHOLAY THE FIRST" (1889)
Surrendered. Later joined the Japanese Navy

8. Coast Guard battleship "ADMIRAL USHAKOV" (1893)
Sunk by crew

9. Coast Guard battleship "ADMIRAL SENYAVIN" (1896)

10. Coast Guard battleship "ADMIRAL GENERAL APRAXIN" (1896)
Surrendered. Joined the Japanese fleet

11. Squadron battleship "SISOY VELIKIY" (1894)
Killed in battle

12. Battleship "BORODINO" (1901)
Killed in battle

13. 2nd rank cruiser "ALMAZ" (1903)
Was the only cruiser to break through to Vladivostok

14. Armored cruiser of the 2nd rank "PEARL" (1903)
He went to Manila, where he was interned, and after the end of the war he returned to the Russian fleet.
(The same applies to all Russian ships that were able to break away from the pursuit of the Japanese
fleet and reached the ports of neutral states)

15. Armored cruiser 1st rank "AURORA" (1900)
Gone to Manila

16. Battleship "EAGLE" (1902)
Surrendered. Joined the Japanese Navy

17. Armored cruiser 1st rank "OLEG" (1903)
Gone to Manila

18. Battleship "EMPEROR ALEXANDER THE THIRD" (1901)
Killed in battle

19. Armored cruiser 1st rank "SVETLANA" (1896)
Sunk by crew

20. Auxiliary cruiser "URAL" (1890)
Sunk by crew

21. Destroyer "BEDOVIY" (1902)
Surrendered. Joined the Japanese Navy

22. Destroyer "FAST" (1902)
Blown up by the crew

23. Destroyer "BUYNYY" (1901)
Killed in battle

24. Destroyer "BRAVE" (1901)

25. Destroyer "BRILLIANT" (1901)
Sunk by crew

26. Destroyer "LOUD" (1903)
Sunk by crew

27. Destroyer "GROZNY" (1904)
Managed to break into Vladivostok

28. Destroyer "IMPRECIABLE" (1902)
Killed in battle

29. Destroyer "BODRY" (1902)
Went to Shanghai

Thus, in the Battle of Tsushima, out of 29 warships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, 17 ships were killed in battle, fighting to the end (including those that, not wanting to surrender to the enemy and not being able to continue the fight, were blown up by their own crew or sunk by the discovery of kingstons, so as not to fall to the enemy). 7 ships valiantly fought the Japanese, after it was all over, in different ways they managed to survive as combat units, leaving for neutral ports, or breaking through to their own in Vladivostok. And only 5 ships surrendered to the Japanese.
This time there will be no conclusion. Do it yourself if you are interested in the history of our country, which consists not only of victories, but also of defeats.

Sergey Vorobiev.