How the first nuclear submarines were made in the USSR. The history of the creation of the first Soviet nuclear submarine The first nuclear submarine was called

In the 50s, a new era began in underwater shipbuilding - the use of nuclear energy to propel submarines. According to their properties, nuclear energy sources are the most suitable for submarines, since, without the need for atmospheric air or oxygen reserves, they allow one to obtain energy for an almost unlimited time and in the required quantity.

In addition to solving the problem of long-term movement underwater at high speed, the use of a nuclear source removed restrictions on the supply of energy to such relatively high-capacity consumers as life support devices and systems (air conditioners, electrolyzers, etc.), navigation, hydroacoustics and control weapons. The prospect of using submarines in Arctic regions under ice has opened up. With the introduction of nuclear energy, the duration of continuous navigation of boats in a submerged position began to be limited, as many years of experience have shown, mainly by the psychophysical capabilities of the crews.

At the same time, from the very beginning of the introduction of nuclear power plants (NPPs), new complex problems that arise have become clear: the need to ensure reliable radiation protection of personnel, increased requirements for the professional training of personnel servicing NPPs, the need for a more developed than for diesel-electric submarines, infrastructure (basing, repair, delivery and reloading of nuclear fuel, removal of spent nuclear fuel, etc.). Later, as experience was gained, other negative aspects emerged: the increased noise of nuclear submarines (NPS), the severity of the consequences of accidents of nuclear power plants and boats with such installations, the difficulty of decommissioning and disposing of used nuclear submarines.

The first proposals from nuclear scientists and military sailors to use nuclear energy to propel boats in both the USA and the USSR began to arrive in the late 1940s. The deployment of practical work began with the creation of submarine designs with nuclear power plants and the construction of ground stands and prototypes of these installations.

The world's first nuclear submarine was built in the USA - Nautilus - and entered service in September 1954. In January 1959, after completion of tests, the first domestic nuclear submarine of Project 627 was put into operation by the USSR Navy. The main characteristics of these nuclear submarines are given in table. 1.

With the commissioning of the first nuclear submarines, almost without interruption, a gradual increase in the pace of their construction began. In parallel, there was a practical development of the use of atomic energy during the operation of nuclear submarines, and a search for the optimal design of nuclear power plants and the submarines themselves.

Table 1

*Equal to the sum of the surface displacement and the mass of water in completely filled main ballast tanks.
**For American nuclear submarines (hereinafter) the test depth, which is close in meaning to the maximum.

Rice. 6. The first domestic serial nuclear submarine (project 627 A)

Rice. 7. The first American nuclear submarine “Nautilus”

Rice. 8. The first domestic nuclear submarine “Leninsky Komsomol” (project 627)

Already in 1960, due to a number of problems that emerged during operation, the liquid-metal coolant reactor on the Seawolf nuclear submarine was replaced by the S2WA pressurized water reactor, which was an improved modification of the NautiIus nuclear submarine reactor.

In 1963, the USSR introduced the Project 645 nuclear submarine into the fleet, also equipped with a reactor with a liquid metal coolant, which used an alloy of lead and bismuth. In the first years after construction, this nuclear submarine was successfully operated. However, it did not show any decisive advantages over nuclear submarines with pressurized water reactors being built in parallel. However, the operation of a liquid-metal cooled reactor, especially its basic maintenance, caused certain difficulties. Serial construction of this type of nuclear submarine was not carried out; it remained a single copy and was part of the fleet until 1968.

Along with the introduction of nuclear power plants and equipment directly related to them on submarines, their other elements also changed. The first American nuclear submarine, although larger in size than the diesel submarine, differed little from them in appearance: it had a stem bow and a developed superstructure with an extended flat deck. The hull shape of the first domestic nuclear submarine already had a number of characteristic differences from the diesel submarine. In particular, its nasal extremity was given contours that were well streamlined in the underwater position, having a semi-elliptical outline in plan and cross sections close to circular. The fencing of retractable devices (periscopes, RDP devices, antennas, etc.), as well as the hatch and bridge shafts, were made in the form of a streamlined body like a limousine, hence the name “limousine” shape, which later became traditional for the fencing of many types of domestic nuclear submarines.

To make maximum use of all the opportunities to improve the tactical and technical characteristics caused by the use of nuclear power plants, research was launched to optimize the hull shape, architecture and design, controllability when moving underwater at high speeds, automation of control in these modes, navigation support and habitability in conditions of long-term underwater diving without surfacing.

A number of issues were resolved using specially built experimental and experimental non-nuclear and nuclear submarines. In particular, in solving the problems of controllability and propulsion of nuclear submarines, an important role was played by the experimental submarine “Albacore”, built in the USA in 1953, which had a hull shape close to optimal in terms of minimizing water resistance when moving in a submerged position (the ratio of length to width was about 7.4). Below are the characteristics of the Albacore diesel submarine:

Dimensions, m:
length................................................. ...........................................62.2
width................................................. ........................................8.4
Displacement, t:
surface........................................................ ....................................1500
underwater........................................................ ....................................1850
Power plant:
power of diesel generators, l. s........................................1700
electric motor power *, l. s........................about 15000
number of propeller shafts................................................... .......................1
Full submerged speed, knots................................................... ..33
Test immersion depth, m...................................................185
Crew, people................................................... ...........................................52

*With silver zinc battery.

This submarine was refitted several times and was used for a long time to test propellers (including coaxial counter-rotating ones), controls when moving at high speeds, new types of propellers and solving other problems.

The introduction of nuclear power plants on submarines coincided with the development of a number of fundamentally new types of weapons: cruise missiles (CR) for firing along the coast and for hitting sea targets, later - ballistic missiles (BR), long-range radar detection of air targets.

Advances in the creation of land- and sea-based ballistic missiles have led to a revision of the role and place of both land and sea weapons systems, which is reflected in the development of the type of nuclear submarines. In particular, missile launchers intended for shooting along the shore gradually lost their importance. As a result, the United States limited itself to building only one nuclear submarine, the Halibut, and two diesel submarines, Grayback and Growler, with the Regulus cruise missile, and the nuclear submarines with the cruise missile built in the USSR to hit coastal targets were subsequently converted into nuclear submarines with only torpedo launchers. weapons.

A single copy of the Triton radar patrol nuclear submarine built in the United States during these years, designed for long-range detection of air targets using especially powerful radar stations, remains in one copy. This submarine is also notable for the fact that, of all the American nuclear submarines, it was the only one that had two reactors (all other US nuclear submarines are single-reactor).

The world's first launch of a ballistic missile from a submarine was carried out in the USSR in September 1955. The R-11 FM missile was launched from a converted submarine from the surface position. From the same submarine, five years later, the first launch of a ballistic missile in the USSR from an underwater position was carried out.

Since the late 50s, the process of introducing ballistic missiles on submarines began. First, a small-missile nuclear submarine was created (the dimensions of the first domestic liquid-fueled naval ballistic missiles did not allow the creation of a multi-missile nuclear submarine at once). The first domestic nuclear submarine with three ballistic missiles launching from the surface was put into operation in 1960 (by this time several domestic submarines with ballistic missiles had been built).

In the United States, based on the successes achieved in the field of naval ballistic missiles, they immediately went to create a multi-missile nuclear submarine with support for launching missiles from an underwater position. This was facilitated by the Polaris solid fuel ballistic missile system, which was successfully implemented in those years. Moreover, to shorten the construction period of the first missile carrier, the hull of a serial nuclear submarine, which was under construction at that time, was used

Rice. 9. George Washington-class nuclear-powered missile submarine

In the years following the creation of the first submarines, there was a continuous improvement of this new type of naval weapons: an increase in the flight range of naval ballistic missiles to intercontinental, an increase in the rate of fire of missiles up to salvo, the adoption of ballistic missiles with multiple warheads (MIRVs) containing consisting of several warheads, each of which can be aimed at its own target, increasing the ammunition load of missiles on some types of missile carriers to 20-24.

table 2

At the end of the 60s, the USSR created nuclear submarines of a fundamentally new type - multi-missile submarines - carriers of missile launchers with underwater launch. The appearance and subsequent development of these nuclear submarines, which had no analogues in foreign navies, was a real counterweight to the most powerful surface combatants - attack aircraft carriers, including those with nuclear power plants.

Rice. 10. Nuclear submarine missile carrier (project 667A)

Due to the characteristics of the environment in which submarines operate, the determining factors in the problem of stealth and detection are the noise reduction of submarines and the range of the hydroacoustic equipment installed on them. It was the improvement of these qualities that most strongly influenced the formation of the technical appearance that modern nuclear submarines acquired.

In the interests of solving problems arising in these areas, many countries have launched research and development programs of unprecedented scope, including the development of new low-noise mechanisms and propulsors, testing of serial nuclear submarines under special programs, re-equipment of built nuclear submarines with the introduction of new technical solutions on them and finally, the creation of nuclear submarines with power plants of a fundamentally new type. The latter includes, in particular, the American nuclear submarine Tillibee, commissioned in 1960. This nuclear submarine was distinguished by a set of measures aimed at reducing noise and increasing the efficiency of sonar weapons. Instead of the main steam turbine with a gearbox, used as an engine on nuclear submarines being serially built at that time, the Tullibee was implemented with a full electric propulsion scheme - a special propeller electric motor and turbogenerators of appropriate power were installed. In addition, for the first time, a hydroacoustic complex with a spherical bow antenna of increased size was used for a nuclear submarine, and in connection with this, a new arrangement of torpedo tubes was used: closer to the middle of the submarine’s length and at an angle of 10-12° to its center plane.

When designing the Tillibee, it was planned that it would become the lead in a series of new type of nuclear submarines, specifically designed for anti-submarine operations. However, these intentions were not realized, although many of the technical means and solutions used and tested on it (hydroacoustic complex, layout of torpedo tubes, etc.) were immediately extended to the Thresher-class serial nuclear submarines being built in the 60s.

Following the Tillibee, two more experimental nuclear submarines were built to test new technical solutions to increase acoustic stealth: in 1967, the Jack nuclear submarine with a gearless (direct-acting) turbine installation and coaxial propellers in the opposite direction of rotation (like those used on torpedoes) and in 1969, the Narwhal nuclear submarine, equipped with a new type of nuclear reactor with an increased level of natural circulation of the primary coolant. This reactor was expected to have a reduced level of noise emissions due to a reduction in the power of the primary circuit circulation pumps. The first of these solutions was not developed, but as for the new type of reactor, the results obtained were used in the development of reactors for serial nuclear submarines in subsequent years of construction.

In the 70s, American specialists again returned to the idea of ​​​​using full electric propulsion on nuclear submarines. In 1974, the construction of the nuclear submarine Glenard P. Lipscomb with a turboelectric power plant consisting of turbogenerators and electric motors was completed. However, this nuclear submarine was not accepted for mass production. The characteristics of the nuclear submarines "Tillibee" and "Glenard P. Lipscomb" are given in table. 3.

The refusal to “replicate” nuclear submarines with full electric propulsion suggests that the gain in noise reduction, even if it occurred on nuclear submarines of this type, did not compensate for the deterioration of other characteristics associated with the introduction of electric propulsion, primarily due to the impossibility of creating electric motors of the required power and acceptable dimensions and, as a consequence, a decrease in the speed of full underwater progress compared to nuclear submarines with turbo-drive units that were close in time when they were created.

Table 3

The world practice of submarine shipbuilding so far knows only one exception, when the full electric propulsion scheme was implemented not on one prototype, but on several serial nuclear submarines. These are six French nuclear submarines of the Rubis and Amethyste type, commissioned in 1983-1993.

The problem of acoustic secrecy of nuclear submarines did not simultaneously become dominant in all countries. Another important area for improving nuclear submarines in the 60s was considered to be achieving the highest possible underwater speed. Since the possibilities of reducing water resistance to movement by optimizing the shape of the hull had been largely exhausted by this time, and other fundamentally new solutions to this problem did not give real practical results, to increase the underwater speed of nuclear submarines there was only one way left - increasing their power supply (measured by the ratio power used to move the installation to displacement). At first, this problem was solved directly, i.e. through the creation and use of nuclear power plants of significantly increased power. Later, already in the 70s, designers took the path of simultaneously, but not so significantly, increasing the power of nuclear power plants and reducing the displacement of nuclear submarines, in particular by sharply increasing the level of control automation and reducing the crew size in this regard.

The practical implementation of these directions led to the creation in the USSR of several nuclear submarines with a speed of over 40 knots, i.e., significantly higher than that of the bulk of nuclear submarines being simultaneously built both in the USSR and in the West. The record for full submerged speed - almost 45 knots - was achieved in 1969 during testing of the domestic nuclear submarine with the Project 661 cruise missile.

Another characteristic feature of the development of nuclear submarines is a more or less monotonous increase in immersion depth over time. Over the years since the commissioning of the first nuclear submarines, the immersion depth, as can be seen from the data below for serial nuclear submarines of the last years of construction, has more than doubled. Of the combat nuclear submarines, the domestic experimental nuclear submarine Komsomolets, built in the mid-80s, had the greatest diving depth (about 1000 m). As you know, the nuclear submarine was destroyed by fire in April 1989, but the experience gained during its design, construction and operation is invaluable.

By the mid-70s, subclasses of nuclear submarines gradually emerged and stabilized for some time, differing in the purpose and composition of the main strike weapons:
- multi-purpose submarines with torpedo weapons, anti-submarine missiles, and later cruise missiles fired from torpedo tubes and special launchers, designed for anti-submarine operations, destruction of surface targets, as well as for solving other traditional submarine tasks (mine laying, reconnaissance, etc. );
- strategic missile submarines armed with ballistic missiles to destroy targets on enemy territory;
- submarines carrying cruise missiles, designed mainly to destroy surface ships and transports.

Abbreviated designation for submarines of these subclasses: nuclear submarines, SSBNs, SSGNs (respectively English abbreviations: SSN, SSBN, SSGN).

The above classification, like any other, is conditional. For example, with the installation of silos for launching cruise missiles on multi-purpose nuclear submarines, the differences between nuclear submarines and specialized SSGNs are largely erased, and the use of cruise missiles with nuclear submarines, intended for firing at coastal targets and carrying nuclear warheads, transfers such submarines to the category of strategic ones. The navies of different countries, as a rule, use their own classification of ships, including nuclear submarines.

The construction of combat submarines is carried out, as a rule, in series of several (sometimes several dozen) submarines each based on one basic design, to which, as experience in the construction and operation of submarines accumulates, relatively insignificant changes are made. For example in table. 4 shows data on the serial construction of nuclear submarines in the USA. The series, as is usually customary, are named accordingly to the head

Table 4

The level of development of ALL reached by the mid-90s is characterized by those given in table. 5 data for three American nuclear submarines in recent years of construction.

Table 5

In relation to nuclear submarines (sometimes also to nuclear submarines), the rather conventional but widespread concept of “generation” is used. The signs by which nuclear submarines are classified as belonging to a particular generation are: proximity in time of creation, commonality of technical solutions incorporated in the projects, the same type of power plants and other equipment for general ship purposes, the same hull material, etc. One generation can be classified as nuclear submarines for various purposes and even several successive series. The transition from one series of submarines to another, and even more so the transition from generation to generation, is preceded by comprehensive research in order to justify the choice of optimal combinations of the main tactical and technical characteristics of new nuclear submarines.

Rice. 11. The newest Russian multi-purpose nuclear submarine of the Bars type (project 971)

As a rule, these studies are not limited only to the design of nuclear submarine variants, but also include entire programs of research and development work in hydrodynamics, strength, hydroacoustics and other areas, and in some cases, discussed above, also the creation of special experimental nuclear submarines.

In countries that build nuclear submarines most intensively, three or four generations of these ships have been created. For example, in the United States, among multi-purpose nuclear submarines, generation 1 usually includes nuclear submarines of the “Skate” and “Skipjack” types, generation 2 - “Thresher” and “Sturgeon”, generation 3 - “LosAngeles”. The Seawolf nuclear submarine is considered as a representative of a new, fourth generation of US Navy nuclear submarines. Among the missile carriers, the first generation includes the boats “George Washington” and “Ethan Allen”, the second - “Lafayette” and “Benjamin Franklin”, the third - “Ohio”.

Rice. 12. Modern Russian nuclear submarine missile carrier "Akula" type (project 941)

Table 6

According to the forecast, the total number of nuclear submarines that will be in service in 2000 will be (excluding nuclear submarines of the Russian Navy) about 130, of which about 30 are SSBNs.

The stealthiness of nuclear submarines and almost complete independence from weather conditions makes them an effective means for conducting various kinds of special reconnaissance and sabotage operations. Typically, submarines are used for these purposes after completing their service for their intended purpose. For example, the previously mentioned US Navy nuclear submarine Halibut, which was built as a carrier of Regulus cruise missiles, was converted in the mid-60s to search (using special devices it carried) for objects lying on the ground, including sunken submarines . Later, to replace it for similar operations, the torpedo nuclear submarine of the US Navy "Parche" (Sturgeon type) was converted into the hull of which a section about 30 m long was cut into and a special underwater vehicle was received on the deck. The nuclear submarine became notorious for participating in a spy operation in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk in the 80s. By installing a special device on an underwater cable, she, according to data published in the United States, ensured that communications between the Soviet naval base in Kamchatka and the mainland were eavesdropped.

Rice. 13. The newest American nuclear submarine “Seawolf”

Over the forty-odd years of the nuclear submarine’s existence, as a result of accidents (fires, explosions, depressurization of sea water lines, etc.), two nuclear submarines of the US Navy and four nuclear submarines of the USSR Navy sank, of which one sank twice in places with relatively shallow depths and was raised both times means of the emergency rescue service. The remaining sunken nuclear submarines have serious damage or are almost completely destroyed and lie at depths of one and a half kilometers or more.

There was one case of combat use of a nuclear submarine against a surface ship: the nuclear submarine Conqueror of the British Navy during the conflict over the Falkland Islands in May 1982 attacked and sank the Argentine-owned cruiser G.Belgrano with torpedoes. Since 1991, American Los Angeles-class nuclear submarines have launched Tomahawk cruise missile attacks on targets in Iraq several times. In 1999, attacks with these missiles on the territory of Yugoslavia were carried out from the English nuclear submarine Splendid.

(1) This shape, characteristic of diesel-electric submarines, ensured satisfactory performance while on the surface.

(2) Previously, if a submarine had a strong deckhouse protruding beyond the hull, it was called a deckhouse fencing.

(3) It should be noted that at different times the US Navy intended to create submarines with cruise missiles, but each time preference was given to multi-purpose submarines.

(4) Previously, nuclear submarines used a set of sonar systems for various purposes.

(5) For construction, the design of serial nuclear submarines of the “Thresher” type was used and officially the nuclear submarine was considered the seventh ship of the series.

(6) Two electric motors with an estimated power of 11,000 hp were used. With. each placed one after the other.

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Nikolay Mormul, Lev Zhiltsov, Leonid Osipenko

The first Soviet nuclear submarine. History of creation

N. Mormul

Revolution underwater

August 6 and 9, 1945 are undoubtedly turning points in human history. The appearance of atomic weapons will upend the scale of established values ​​and change the way of thinking. We have the right to talk about the world before and after Hiroshima.

But all these changes, as well as the awareness of the revolution that has taken place, will come over the years. For now, humanity is simply shocked by the destruction of two Japanese cities and the death of thousands of civilians, which was not justified by any military considerations. It still does not realize that (as the English physicist P. Blackett would later say) the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not so much the last military act of the Second World War as the first act of the Cold War against the Soviet Union.

“The United States is the most powerful nation today; there is no one stronger than it,” President Truman said. “With such power, we must take responsibility and lead the world.” In other words, America was determined to dictate its will to other countries, neutralizing possible contenders for world domination. The first of these contenders, of course, was the Soviet Union.

Immediately after the end of the war, Stalin made a lot of efforts to create a socialist camp in Eastern Europe. This worries the United States so much that Truman decides to use the atomic bomb in Europe in the event of “extraordinary circumstances.” Voices are increasingly being heard in the press and in military circles demanding that a preventive war be launched against the USSR while the possession of atomic weapons is a US monopoly. In 1953, the American administration officially adopted a new course, known as the policy from a position of strength and the strategy of “massive retaliation.”

US nuclear strategy in the post-war years

At first, long-range bombers were thought of as carriers of the atomic bomb. The United States has extensive experience in the combat use of this type of weapon, American strategic aviation had a reputation as the most powerful in the world, and finally, US territory was considered largely invulnerable to an enemy retaliatory strike.

However, the use of aircraft required their basing in close proximity to the borders of the USSR. As a result of the efforts made by American diplomats, already in July 1948 the Labor government agreed to station 60 B-29 bombers with atomic bombs on board in Great Britain. After the signing of the North Atlantic Pact in April 1949, all of Western Europe was drawn into the US nuclear strategy, and the number of American bases abroad reached 3,400 by the end of the 60s.

But gradually there is a growing understanding among the American military and politicians that the presence of aviation on foreign territory is in one way or another associated with the risk of changing the political situation in a particular country. Therefore, the navy is increasingly seen as a partner in the use of atomic weapons in a future war. This trend is finally strengthening after the convincing tests of atomic bombs at Bikini Atoll. The naval forces - at that time the US superiority in this type of troops was decisive - have since been entrusted with the implementation of major strategic tasks. They are already capable of directly influencing the course of the war.

It is important to emphasize here that the power of the American fleet was directed primarily against the shore - Pentagon strategists did not consider the Soviet navy as a rival.

Fundamental changes in views on the role and place of the Navy in war and on the significance of ocean theaters of military operations occurred in the second half of the 50s. Considering the balance of power in the international arena and the limited capabilities of the Soviet fleet, the Americans are relegating the traditional problem of protecting ocean communications to the background. In 1957, based on the report of the special commission “Poseidon”, this issue was classified as secondary. From now on, for the American military, the oceans became only vast launching pads for launching nuclear weapons carriers. At sea, no matter where they are, Americans feel at home.

The increased development of aviation and navy to the detriment of ground forces is clearly visible in the distribution of appropriations. From 1955 to 1959, 60% of funds for the purchase of new weapons were allocated to aviation, about 30% to the navy and marines, and only about 10% to the army.

The “massive retaliation” strategy developed in the United States is being transformed within NATO into the “sword and shield” strategy. The role of the “sword” is assigned to US strategic aviation and strike aircraft carriers, while the “shield” is the armed forces of the North Atlantic Treaty countries deployed in Europe. It was assumed that the bloc's armed forces would use nuclear weapons regardless of whether the enemy would take such a measure. In relation to the Soviet Union, the conduct of military operations without the use of an atomic bomb was practically excluded.

This military policy remained important until the early 60s. Only the Kennedy administration undertook a partial revision of the strategic line, having been able to correctly assess the changes that had occurred in the balance of power on the world stage.

The main reason for these changes was the growth of the military power of the USSR. This is not the place to talk about the cost at which it was achieved; however, there is no doubt that the economic development of the country was sacrificed to this political choice. The purpose of the book is to tell about one of the decisive episodes in the struggle between the USSR and the USA for military superiority and about the people whose dedication made it possible to restore balance, regardless of any hardships.

But first, let’s see what the USSR could oppose to the military power of the United States.

Before the war, the USSR had one of the most powerful submarine fleets - 218 boats. Their superiority was especially impressive in the Baltic Sea - 75 Soviet submarines against five German ones. In the first months of the war, Soviet submarines were subjected to massive attacks by the German fleet and aircraft, and some of them were trapped in the Gulf of Finland by minefields. The submarine fleet suffered heavy losses in the Black Sea and in the North. As a result, the picture in 1945 was dismal, especially compared to the increasingly powerful US Navy.

“During the Second World War, after the treacherous Japanese attack on the US naval base at Pearl Harbor (Hawaii Islands), the construction time for submarines in the United States was reduced by almost half. The duration of construction of one diesel submarine by the Americans was six to seven months. By the end of the war, the United States of America had 236 diesel-electric submarines in service.

During the Second World War, Japan built 114 submarines, by the time of surrender it consisted of 162 submarines, 130 units were destroyed...

Great Britain lost 80 submarines during World War II.

In Germany, during the six years of World War II, 1,160 submarines operated, of which it lost 651 submarines as a result of combat operations, and 98 units were scuttled by the crews during the surrender of Germany.

During the Second World War, the Germans monthly launched and commissioned an average of 25 submarines into the Navy, and in four months of 1945 - 35 units.

During the Second World War, submarines of the warring countries sank 5,000 ships and ships with a total displacement of 20,000,000 tons.”

Stalin knew very well that several dozen German submarines almost brought Great Britain to its knees, sinking about 2,700 ships. Modern battleships, such as the Bismarck and the Repulse, lost the battle to the modest submarines. That is why, after the creation of the atomic bomb in the USSR, priority was given to the massive construction of submarines to neutralize the maritime threat. According to some sources, Stalin's original plan called for the construction of 1,200 boats.

The limitations of diesel-electric submarines were already apparent. Intelligence reported: the Americans were creating a nuclear-powered submarine, the appearance of which would change the strategic picture of a future war. It is difficult to say at what point Stalin finally made the decision to begin building a nuclear submarine fleet. It is only known that at the end of 1952, a man was summoned to the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Malyshev, whose name remained a secret to the public twenty years after his death.

Archimedes' Law

Before proceeding with the main story, it seems necessary to explain, at least schematically, what a submarine is and how it functions. Imagine a huge steel cigar, more than 100 m long and about 10 m in diameter, sealed with spherical caps at the ends. This rugged submarine hull houses reactors, turbines, electrical equipment, weapons, weapons, electronics, living quarters and various systems that support the life of people and machinery. The durable hull can withstand hundreds of thousands of tons of seawater pressure when immersed to depths. It is covered with a lightweight hull, giving a streamlined shape to the submarine. Main ballast tanks are formed in such a hull, thanks to which the submarine’s buoyancy reserve is created. Filling these tanks with sea water, the boat submerges, displacing (blowing) water from them with high-pressure compressed air, and the submarine floats to the surface.

In 1944, the head of the Manhattan Project (the American atomic program), General Leslie Groves, created a small working group to study the possibilities of the “non-destructive use” of nuclear energy.

Thus, work began on the creation of nuclear power plants for ships. Due to the independence of the nuclear power plant from atmospheric air, the submarine fleet has become a priority area of ​​its application. The use of such installations on submarines made it possible to radically increase autonomy and stealth - because now the submarine did not need to surface to recharge its batteries.

Theoretical studies have shown the practical feasibility of building a nuclear ship propulsion system. Their results were presented to Congress in a special report in 1951, after which legislators allocated the necessary funds. This allowed the fleet to sign contracts with Electric Boat, Westinghouse Electric and Combusting Engineering to develop a design for a submarine and a nuclear reactor for it. For the latter, we chose a circuit with pressurized water cooling (PWR) - as further experience has shown, it is the safest and easiest to operate. The ground reactor prototype was designated S1W, and the prototype intended for installation on a submarine was designated S2W. The letter "S" meant that the reactor was intended for a submarine (reactors for aircraft carriers are designated by the letter "A", and for cruisers - "C"), and the "W" indicated the development company Westinghouse.

The design and construction of the submarine was carried out very quickly. Already on June 14, 1952, at the Electric Boat shipyard in Groton (Connecticut), in the presence of US President Harry Truman, the laying of the first nuclear submarine took place, and on January 21, 1954, the boat was launched. Mamie Eisenhower, the wife of US President Dwight Eisenhower, became the ship's godmother. The boat, named Nautilus and hull number SSN-571, was officially accepted into the fleet on January 30, 1954. But she remained at the shipyard berth for another three months, since a number of important works were not completed. On December 30, the reactor was launched. On January 17, 1955, the Nautilus finally left the pier. The submarine's commander, Commander Eugene P. Wilkinson, transmitted the historic signal: "I'm going under nuclear propulsion."

DESIGN FEATURES

For its time, the Nautilus had significant dimensions: according to the design, its underwater displacement reached 3.5 thousand tons, and its length was 98.7 m. It surpassed the latest American diesel-electric submarines of the Teng type in displacement by 50%, and in length by 15.2 m. The outlines of the Nautilus hull were based on the German project XXI (during the Second World War). The large diameter of the hull (8.5 m) made it possible to organize three decks along most of the length of the hull and create fairly comfortable conditions for the crew, which consisted of 12 officers and 90 petty officers and sailors. The officers were accommodated in cabins (although only the commander was in a single room). Each of the rank and file had a personal bed (on diesel-electric submarines, as a rule, the number of beds was less than the number of crew, taking into account the fact that some of the personnel were constantly on watch). The officer's wardroom could accommodate all officers at the same time. In the wardroom of ordinary personnel, 36 people could eat at the same time, and as a cinema hall it could accommodate up to 50 people. The Nautilus's armament consisted of six bow torpedo tubes with an ammunition load of 26 torpedoes. The initial project envisaged arming the boat with Regulus cruise missiles (launched from the surface), but due to a significant increase in the mass of the reactor’s biological protection, this had to be abandoned. The main means of illuminating the situation were two hydroacoustic stations - the passive AN/BQR-4A (with a large cylindrical antenna in the bow of the boat) and the active AN/SQS-4.

POWER POINT

The Nautilus used a single-reactor, two-shaft main power plant. The S2W reactor vessel weighed about 35 tons, had the shape of a cylinder with a spherical lid and a hemispherical bottom. Its height was 3 m, diameter 2.7 m. The reactor vessel was mounted in a vertical position on the base of the water protection tank, which in turn was mounted on the foundation in the hold of the reactor compartment. Together with water and composite protection, the height of the reactor was about 6 m and the diameter was 4.6 m. The reactor core was cylindrical in shape with a diameter of about 1 m. The total weight of the reactor load was about 100 kg. The steam produced by cooling the reactor powered two steam turbines. For emergencies and coastal maneuvering, the submarine had two diesel generators.

SERVICE HISTORY

The very first tests of the nuclear submarine Nautilus yielded stunning results: the submerged submarine covered the distance between the submarine fleet bases of New London and San Juan in 90 hours.

During this time, the Nautilus covered 1,381 nautical miles (2,559 km) at an average speed of 15.3 knots. Diesel-electric submarines at that time were capable of traveling under water at most 200 miles at a speed of 4-5 knots.

On subsequent voyages, the Nautilus demonstrated an average ground speed close to the maximum - an indicator that previously submariners could only dream of. The submarine turned out to be capable of outrunning the anti-submarine torpedoes then in service with the US Navy! The maneuverability of the submarine also turned out to be excellent.

However, tests also showed significant shortcomings of the boat, primarily the high noise level. Its main cause was not the power plant, but the vibration of the ship's structure, caused by disturbances in the flow of water behind the wheelhouse fence. If the frequency of these vibrations exceeded 180 per minute, there was a real threat of serious damage to the structure of the boat. High noise significantly reduced the combat value of the Nautilus: at speeds above 4 knots, the effectiveness of the sonars became zero - the boat simply “jammed” them with its own noise. If the speed exceeded 15 knots, the shift located in the central post had to shout to hear each other. Later, the submarine was subjected to modifications that somewhat alleviated the noise problem. But throughout its 35-year service, the Nautilus remained essentially an experimental ship, and not a combat unit,

TO THE NORTH POLE

The exceptional capabilities of the nuclear power plant made it possible to achieve the ambitious goal of reaching the North Pole underwater. However, the first attempt, made in August 1957, was unsuccessful. Having entered the pack ice, the Nautilus tried to surface at the point where the echometer showed a hole in the ice, but ran into a drifting ice floe, seriously damaging the only periscope. The boat had to return. A year later, a second attempt was made, which turned out to be successful - on August 3, 1958, the Nautilus sailed under the North Pole. This event occurred during the submarine’s trans-Arctic voyage from Pearl Harbor (Hawaii) to London, confirming the possibility of maneuvering nuclear submarines between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans through the Arctic. Since conventional means of navigation in circumpolar waters are of little use, the Nautilus was equipped with the North American N6A-1 inertial navigation system, a shipborne version of the system used on the Navajo intercontinental cruise missiles. The entire voyage under the ice took four days (96 hours), during which the boat covered 1,590 miles, surfacing northeast of Greenland.

Nautilus became the first submarine to reach the North Pole underwater. The first boat to surface at the North Pole was another American nuclear submarine, the Skate. After returning from the Nautilus voyage, he visited New York. And if many submarines visited the North Pole after him, then not a single nuclear submarine ever entered the New York port.

FURTHER SERVICE

The Nautilus spent most of its active service as part of the 10th Submarine Squadron, based in New London. The submarine participated in providing combat training to the US Atlantic Fleet and the naval forces of its NATO allies. Participation in maneuvers in conditions close to combat conditions sometimes led to very dangerous incidents. The most dangerous of these took place on November 10, 1966, when the Nautilus, maneuvering at periscope depth, collided with the anti-submarine aircraft carrier Essex (CVS-9). The aircraft carrier received a hole, but remained afloat. The submarine seriously damaged the wheelhouse, but did not lose momentum and was able to get to the base. During its service on the Nautilus, the reactor core was recharged three times: in 1957, 1959, and 1967. In total, the boat traveled more than 490 thousand miles. The intensity of its operation in the initial period of service was much higher. If in the first two years the submarine covered 62.5 thousand miles (of which more than 36 thousand were submerged), and in the next two - more than 91 thousand, then from 1959 to 1967 (eight years) it covered 174 .5 thousand miles, and for 12 years from 1967 to 1979 - 162.3 thousand. On March 3, 1980, Nautilus was withdrawn from service. It was supposed to be disposed of, but soon they decided to preserve the first American nuclear submarine as a museum. After appropriate preparation and cutting from the reactor compartment body, the Nautilus was opened to visitors on April 11, 1986. The boat, which has National Landmark status, is located in Groton.

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Zhiltsov: - You have been appointed senior assistant to the commander of the first experimental nuclear submarine. I also learned that the commander of the boat has not yet been selected and all the work of selecting, calling, arranging and organizing crew training will have to be led by me. I admit, I was taken aback. I, a twenty-six-year-old lieutenant commander, had to resolve all issues in departments where any officer was senior to me both in rank and age. The documents required when forming a crew will have to be signed by high-ranking managers. But I didn’t know how to click my heels on the parquet floor, and my favorite uniform was an oiled work jacket.

Seeing my confusion, the new boss hastened to “encourage” me: upon completion of testing of the new submarine, the best officers will be presented with high state awards. There was, however, an alarming nuance: testing a boat of a fundamentally new design that had not yet been built with a crew that had not yet been selected and trained was supposed to take place in six to eight months!

Since there was no question of In order to tell someone about my new appointment, I had to urgently come up with an intelligible legend even for those closest to me. The hardest thing was to fool my wife and brother, also a sailor. I told them that I had been assigned to the non-existent “submarine crewing department.” The wife did not fail to insert the pin: “Where is your determination to sail the seas and oceans? Or did you mean the Moscow Sea?” My brother gave me a briefcase without a word - in his eyes I was a complete loser.

Commentary by nuclear submarine commander L.G. Osipenko: A natural question is: why was Lev Zhiltsov chosen from among many young, capable, disciplined officers for the key position of chief mate of a nuclear submarine, in the creation of which every step was a pioneering step? Meanwhile, there were enough reasons for such an appointment.

After the command is given from the center to allocate for the formation of a crew trained, competent, disciplined, without penalties, etc., the search for the right people begins primarily in the Black Sea Fleet. Everyone was eager to serve there: it was warm, and in the summer it was just a resort. It cannot be compared, for example, with the Northern Fleet, where there is winter for nine months of the year and polar night for six. There were no “thieves” at that time, and the most capable people ended up in this blessed place. The best graduates of naval schools had the right to choose the fleet in which they would like to serve. Zhiltsov graduated from the Caspian School 39th out of more than 500 cadets, then with honors from mine and torpedo classes. Of the 90 people, only three, besides him, became assistant commanders. A year later, Zhiltsov was appointed senior assistant on the S-61.

The boat was considered exemplary in many respects. This was the first, lead boat of the largest post-war series, which owes much of its technical excellence to the engineers of the Third Reich. At that time, all new types of weapons, new radio engineering and navigation equipment were tested on it. And the people on the boat were chosen accordingly. It is no coincidence that it was the training base for dozens of other crews.

Zhiltsov served without criticism, as did his subordinates and the equipment entrusted to him. Although he did not have access to independent control, the commander trusted him with the boat even during such complex maneuvers as remooring. Both the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet and the brigade commander went to sea when Zhiltsov was in charge. Last but not least, the young officer was awarded an inspection from Moscow for his exemplary conduct of political training. Then it was believed that the better politically savvy you are, the more capable you are of leading people. This is how Lev Zhiltsov was chosen from the many young officers.

The next day began with a joyful event: Boris Akulov, assigned to the same crew, appeared on Bolshoi Kozlovsky. We have known each other since 1951, when a division of new submarines arrived in Balaklava. Akulov then served as commander of the BC-5 (power plant on submarines). He was a little older than me - in 1954 he turned thirty. Boris Akulov graduated from the Naval Engineering School. Dzerzhinsky in Leningrad. On the first day, he went through the same procedure of being introduced to secrecy, only now with my participation. We were allocated a workplace (one for two), and we began to form a crew.

Ironically The department to which we were subordinated was testing nuclear weapons for the Navy. Naturally, there were not only submariners, but also naval engineers in general. Therefore, despite all the desire of the management officers to help us, they were of little use.

We could only rely on our own experience submarine service of the post-war generation. Strictly classified bulletins from the foreign press also helped us. There was practically no one to consult with: in the entire Navy, only a few admirals and officers of the so-called expert group were allowed to see our documentation, who looked down on us, the green lieutenant commanders.

In parallel with work on the staffing table Akulov and I studied personal affairs and called people whose need was already obvious. Weekly, or even more often, we received detailed “field files” from the fleets, which included service and political characteristics, punishment and reward cards. Naturally, nowhere was there a word or hint about a nuclear submarine. Only by looking at the set of military specialties could naval personnel officers guess about forming a crew for an extraordinary ship.

For each vacancy, three candidates were presented who met the strictest requirements for professional training, political and moral qualities and discipline. We studied their cases in the most meticulous way, because we knew that we would be controlled by “another authority” and if she rejected the candidacy, we would have to start all over again. They were screened out based on the most absurd criteria, as I understood even then: some ended up in occupied territory as a child, some had a wife’s father who was captured, and some, even though “Russian” was listed in the “nationality” column, The mother's patronymic is clearly Jewish.

If most of our future colleagues languished in idleness, Akulov and I did not notice how we flew by day after day. In addition to the routine work associated with the arrival of people, interviews, and accommodation, we had to resolve issues on which the operation of the future boat depended. Let me give you one example. The staffing table provided for only three managers for two main power plants with a minimum salary in the fleet of 1,100 rubles per month.

It took several months to prove: only six engineers can provide a full three-shift shift at the power plant. And how right was the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR V. A. Malyshev, who later proposed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy S. G. Gorshkov to create an all-officer crew - a forge of qualified personnel for the development of the nuclear fleet. Unfortunately, this turned out to be impossible, including for objective reasons: someone needed to do heavy physical and auxiliary work.

By early October 1954 All the officers were in Moscow, and there was a need to plan specifically who and where to train. It was decided to send officers from navigational, radio engineering and mine-torpedo specialties to the relevant institutes and design bureaus that created equipment for the boat, and then to the Northern Fleet, to Polyarny, for training on diesel submarines.

Another, larger group, which included commanding officers, officers of the electromechanical combat unit and chiefs of the medical service, had to undergo a course of study and practical training in operating a nuclear power plant. By that time, such training could only be carried out at the world's first nuclear power plant (NPP), launched in the summer of 1954 in the village of Obninsky, 105 km from Moscow. At that time, the location of the nuclear power plant was considered a state secret, and the village - later the city of Obninsk - was partially closed to entry, and only those working with special passes were allowed into certain zones.

Directorate of the Navy agreed on our trip to Obninsk to agree on specific plans and deadlines for October 2, 1954. The dress code is civilian. The head of the facility, which was called “Laboratory “B” of the Ministry of Internal Affairs,” and later became the Institute of Nuclear Research, was Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR Dmitry Ivanovich Blokhintsev. He introduced us to affairs and life in Obninsky, listened attentively to our story about the tasks and desired timing of officer training. We agreed on the time of classes and internship, and then went to see the nuclear power plant.

Its director Nikolai Andreevich Nikolaev was skeptical about our plans to master the control of a nuclear reactor in two to three months. In his opinion, this should take at least a year. And while he explained to us the operating principle of a nuclear reactor using demonstration diagrams, walked us through all the rooms of the station and showed us the work of the operators on the control panel, his words acquired more and more weight. But we continued to do our best and discussed with him the principle of distributing officers into shifts during the internship period, the timing of passing exams for admission to independent management, etc. Nikolai Andreevich no longer objected, but finally remarked, as if jokingly: “Well, well.” , our people haven’t been on vacation for several years. So all hope lies with your engineers.

Looking ahead, I’ll say: he was ironic in vain. Our internship began at the end of January 1955, and already in March the first officers passed the exam for access to reactor control. In April, they took control of the station themselves, and the station operators went on vacation. To be fair, I note that the nuclear power plant workers and Nikolaev himself did everything in their power to help us.

But for now our task was to dress all the officers in civilian clothes, since the appearance of a group of military sailors in Obninsk would immediately betray the intention of the Soviet Union to create a ship with a nuclear power plant. Since the choice of clothing in the Navy warehouses was not very rich, and the officers tried, no matter what, to follow the requirements of the then modest fashion, we found ourselves dressed in the same hats, coats, suits, ties, not to mention sparkling naval boots. When leaving for Obninskoye in November 1954, on the station platform, our group resembled Chinese students studying in Moscow. This was immediately noticed by the employees of the regime of Laboratory “B”, and even at the pass office we were asked to immediately “protect ourselves” and, above all, not to travel in a crowd.

First acquaintance with the nuclear-powered ship. In parallel with the formation of the crew, the creation of the boat itself was in full swing. The time was approaching to convene the mock-up commission and defend the technical design. And then the chief designer, Vladimir Nikolaevich Peregudov, received news about the internship of future officers in Obninsk and those already appointed as the first mate and chief mechanic. The chief designer asked to urgently send both officers to him in Leningrad for ten days.

Even if we had not been assigned to the first nuclear-powered ship, the interest in us was explained by the fact that we served on boats of the latest generation. Our 613th project, unlike wartime ships, was equipped with location, hydraulics, and many other technical innovations. It is no coincidence that so many boats were built according to this project and were actively sold abroad - to Poland and Indonesia. And we, in addition to sailing on this boat, also had experience in testing and training crews.

Top secret design bureau was located on one of the most famous squares of Leningrad on the Petrograd side. We were escorted to him by an employee with pre-prepared passes who met us at the appointed place. Opposite the cozy little park between two shops there was an inconspicuous door without identification marks. Having opened it, we found ourselves in front of a turnstile, manned by two guards who looked more like orderlies, with the only difference being that their white coats bulged on their right sides. And having passed the turnstile, we suddenly found ourselves in the realm of the most advanced technologies at that time, where the first-born of the country’s nuclear fleet was born.

The main difficulty was, to create a boat that would be superior to American nuclear-powered ships in all respects. Already in those years there was an attitude that became widely known during the time of Khrushchev: “Catch up and overtake America!” Our boat had to give a hundred points ahead of the American one, which by that time was already sailing - and sailing well. They have one reactor, we will make two with the highest parameters in mind. In the steam generator, the nominal water pressure will be 200 atm, the temperature will be more than 300 °C.

Responsible managers did not particularly think about the fact that in such conditions, with the slightest cavity in the metal, the slightest fistula or corrosion, a microleak should immediately form. (Subsequently, in the instructions, all these parameters were reduced as unjustified.) This means that tons of lead will have to be driven under water for reliable protection against radiation. At the same time, the advantages of such harsh operating conditions seemed very doubtful.

Yes, high reactor operating parameters made it possible to develop a speed under water not about 20 knots, like the Americans, but at least 25, that is, approximately 48 km/h. However, at this speed, the acoustics stopped working, and the boat rushed forward blindly. When on the surface, it is generally not worth accelerating more than 16 knots, since the nuclear-powered ship can dive and bury itself under the water with the hatch open. Since surface ships try not to sail at speeds exceeding 20 knots, there was no point in increasing the reactor power.

In our first conversation Vladimir Nikolaevich, of course, did not express all the doubts. Only later did I have to think about it myself and understand the unnecessaryness of this race for superiority. By the way, when testing our boat, we reached a design speed of 25 knots somewhere while using 70–75% of the reactor power; at full power we would reach speeds of about 30 knots.

Naturally, there was little help from us for the design bureau on all technical issues.. However, Peregudov wanted to create optimal conditions for submariners to maintain equipment and live on board during long voyages. It was assumed that the boat should be able to not float to the surface for months, so living conditions came to the fore. The purpose of our trip was stated as follows:

- Climb all the compartments on the layouts, all residential and domestic premises and think about how to improve them. Look at how compartments in railway cars, cabins on passenger ships, airplane cabins are equipped, down to the smallest detail - where are the flashlights and ashtrays. (Although there was no smoking on our boat.) Take everything that is most convenient, we will transfer it to the nuclear-powered ship.

In a conversation with the chief designer, we heard concerns and fears for the first time, due to the fact that the boat was created in an emergency manner. The Ministry of Medium Engineering was responsible for the order, many of whose employees had not seen the sea at all. The design bureau was formed from employees of various bureaus, among whom there were many inexperienced young people, and the novelty of the tasks being solved was beyond the capabilities of even many veterans of the design bureau. Finally - and this seems incredible! - in the Peregudov Design Bureau there was not a single observation officer who sailed on submarines of post-war projects or participated in their construction.

The layouts were located in five different locations in the city. They were built life-size mainly from plywood and wooden logs. Pipelines and power cable routes were marked with hemp ropes with appropriate markings. At one of the factories, three end compartments were mocked up at once, and both bow compartments were hidden in a basement in the very center of Leningrad, not far from the Astoria Hotel.

Not for every submariner I had to see my boat in its infancy. As a rule, formation commanders, their deputies, and occasionally flagship specialists, that is, people who will have to sail on these boats from time to time, participate in the work of the mock-up commission. And to be able to manage and arrange the premises as conveniently as possible is the dream of every submariner.

In a week Boris and I We climbed all the accessible and hard-to-reach corners of the future nuclear-powered ship, fortunately our slender figures allowed this. Sometimes we sawed off one “device” in the form of a wooden block right on the model with a hacksaw and moved it to a more convenient place. It was clear that the equipment was placed without really delving into its purpose and the requirements associated with its operation. Everything bore the imprint of the hellish haste in which the nuclear-powered ship was created. Nowadays, any ship takes a good ten years to be created - it manages to become outdated before they begin to build it. But Stalin gave two years for everything. And although he was no longer alive then, like Beria, their spirit still hovered over the country, especially at the top. Malyshev was a Stalinist type: they asked him without discounts, and he asked accordingly.

With all the cruelty of this system and the errors it generated, which we encountered so many times in the process of creating a nuclear-powered submarine, it had two undoubted advantages: the manager was indeed endowed with great rights, and there was always a specific person from whom one could ask.

Our proposed changes concerned not only household amenities. For example, in a number of compartments, purely for layout reasons, many specialists found themselves sitting with their backs facing the direction of the boat. Even in the central control room, the control panel faced the stern, therefore, the ship’s commander and navigator also looked there. For them, the left side automatically turned out to be on the right hand, and vice versa. That is, they will have to constantly transform left into right as soon as they sit down at their workplace, and do the opposite operation as soon as they stand up. It is clear that such an arrangement could become a source of constant confusion, and in an emergency, lead to disaster. Of course, first of all, Akulov and I tried to correct such absurdities.

The cabins also underwent significant modifications., as well as an officer's wardroom. It was already clear to us that, in addition to the main crew, the experimental and lead boat would always have nuclear specialists, engineers testing new devices, and, on missions of particular importance, representatives of the command. And there were only eight seats in the wardroom. We refitted one cabin, thus adding four more berths and replacing the otherwise inevitable three-shift meal plan with a two-shift meal plan. But this was not enough. During the tests, we had so many engineers, specialists and command representatives with us that we ate in five shifts.

It also happened that the modifications we required encountered resistance from the compartment designers. For example, it was not easy for us to convince them that three powerful refrigerators in the galley would not replace the refrigerator in the wardroom. It’s quite hot on board, and the appetizer is prepared for everyone at once, which means that by the second shift they’ll have to scoop up the butter with a spoon.

Besides, in order to smooth out the monotony in food, and most importantly in drinks, officers chip in and form a “black cash register”. When sailing, you are allowed one hundred grams of dry wine per person per day. For a strong man - not much, especially since alcohol is considered a good remedy against radiation. Therefore, the wardroom allocates a person in charge who buys “Aligote” in addition to this norm, and on Sunday at least a bottle of vodka for four. Where should I put all this? Of course, in the refrigerator.

Of course, we kept silent about the “black cash register”(although this was not a secret for the people who sailed), and our question was formulated in front of the designers like this: “What if there is a holiday or guests on the boat? Where to put champagne or Stolichnaya? In my opinion, it was the last argument that worked, although the designers did not want to change anything - the compartment was already closed. “Okay,” they told us, “try to find a refrigerator that will fit through the removable sheet to load the battery.”

After work, Akulov and I went to an electrical store, fortunately there was no shortage of refrigerators back then, we tried everything on and found that the Saratov would fit in if the door was removed from it. Those in charge of the compartment had no choice but to agree, and Saratov was solemnly installed in the mock-up wardroom without dismantling the bulkhead.

Looking ahead, I’ll say, that at the mock-up commission we had to endure another battle for the refrigerator. The old submariners who were part of it, who sailed during the war on “little ones”, deprived of the most basic amenities, did not want to come to terms with the idea that for some, a voyage of many months could be combined with a minimum of comfort. For them, our requests to provide an electric meat grinder or a press for flattening cans were unnecessary “lordship” that only dampened the sailors. Victory remained ours, but when the chairman of the commission, who read out the act, reached the part where it was said about the refrigerator, he looked up from the text and added on his own, to the grins and laughter of those present: “So that Stolichnaya is always cold.”

Why, you ask, talk about such a little thing? The fact is that several years later, in the most difficult campaigns, we many times had to note with joy how necessary our perseverance was, and regret the things that we were not able to defend. Moreover, we fought not only for our boat, but for dozens of others that should be built in this series. But the main result of our work turned out to be different. During this trip, the entire concept of the first nuclear-powered submarine was called into question, which, in our opinion, was a pure gamble.

Kamikaze boat. The plan for the combat use of the boat, laid down by the designers, boiled down to the following. The submarine is secretly removed from its home base by tugboats (hence, it does not need an anchor). She is exported to the dive point, from where she continues to swim underwater on her own.

At that time, rockets as carriers of atomic weapons did not yet exist, and only traditional means of delivery were thought of: aerial bombs and torpedoes. So, it was planned to arm our boat with a huge torpedo 28 m long and one and a half meters in diameter. On the model, which we first saw in the basement of one of the residential buildings near Nevsky Prospekt, this torpedo occupied the entire first and second compartments and rested against the bulkhead of the third. Another compartment was allocated for the equipment that controls its launch and movement. There were no electronic devices then, and it all consisted of motors, rods, wires - the design was cumbersome and, by our modern standards, extremely antediluvian.

So, a boat equipped with a giant torpedo with a hydrogen head, had to secretly go out to the initial area and receive an order to fire, entering into the torpedo control devices a program for moving along the approach fairways and the moment of detonation. Large enemy naval bases were seen as the target - this was the height of the Cold War.

Just in case, two more torpedoes with smaller nuclear charges remained on board the boat in two torpedo tubes. But no spare torpedoes on the racks, no torpedoes for self-defense, no countermeasures! Our boat was clearly not intended to be an object of persecution and destruction, as if it were floating alone in the vast oceans of the World.

Having completed the task, the boat had to go to the area where a meeting with the escort was scheduled, from where it was supposed to be towed with honor to its home pier. There were no plans for the nuclear-powered vessel to surface during its entire autonomous voyage (there was even a zinc coffin on board), nor for anchorage. But the most important thing was not even the lack of an anchor and means of protecting the boat itself. Akulov and I, as submariners, immediately became aware of what would happen to the boat when a torpedo of this size was fired. Only the mass of water filling the annular gap in the apparatus (the diameter of which is 1.7 m) will amount to several tons.

At the moment of launch, this entire mass of water had to be shot out along with the torpedo, after which an even larger mass, taking into account the vacated space of the torpedo, had to flow back into the boat’s hull. In other words, when fired, an emergency trim will inevitably be created. First the boat will stand on its butt. To level it, submariners will have to blow out the bow tanks of the main ballast. An air bubble will be released to the surface, allowing you to immediately detect the boat. And with the slightest mistake or hesitation by the crew, it could surface off the enemy’s coast, which meant its inevitable destruction.

But, as already said, the submarine project was financed and created by the Ministry of Medium Engineering, and neither the Main Headquarters of the Navy nor research institutes made calculations for the use of its weapons. Although meetings of the mock-up commission had to take place before the technical design was approved, the torpedo compartments were already built in metal. And the giant torpedo itself was tested on one of the most beautiful lakes of our vast country

after with the boat concept The first operating specialists got acquainted and were given tasks to study how realistic the proposed project was. The calculations of the shipbuilding section fully confirmed our and Akulov’s fears regarding the behavior of the boat after the shot. Moreover, operators of the General Staff of the Navy established how many bases and ports there were not only in the United States, but all over the world, which, in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, could be destroyed with sufficient accuracy by a giant torpedo.

It turned out that there are two such bases! Moreover, they had no strategic significance in the future conflict. Thus, it was necessary to immediately develop another version of the boat’s armament. The project for using a giant torpedo was buried, the life-size equipment made was thrown away, and the reconstruction of the bow of the boat, already made of metal, took a whole year. In the final version, the boat was equipped with normal-sized torpedoes with both nuclear and conventional warheads.

Regarding the anchor, then its necessity was recognized, and it was installed on all subsequent boats. However, it technically turned out to be so difficult to equip an already developed nuclear-powered submarine with it that our boat received it only after the first repair. So we sailed for the first time without an anchor. When we had to surface, the boat turned toward the wave with its lag, and the entire time we were on the surface, we were rocking sideways. When anchored, the boat would turn its bow against the wind, and we would not rock.

It was worse when near the shore the boat began to be carried by the wind onto the rocks - the anchor in this case is simply irreplaceable. Finally, at the base, when we couldn’t get to the pier, we had to moor behind a barrel - a huge floating cylinder with a butt, to which the mooring rope is hooked. One of the sailors had to jump on it, and in winter it freezes over. The poor fellow had to cling to it almost with his teeth until the cable was secured.

Leaving Leningrad, Akulov and I assigned work to everyone, including ourselves. It became clear to us that the combat organization of the service and the staff of the submarine should be based on the basic mode of operation of the crew: underwater position and long-term maintenance of a three-shift watch. Consequently, we had to immediately redo the table of command posts and combat posts, as well as the staffing table.

Layout commission, which simultaneously considered the technical project, began work after the October holidays, on November 17, 1954. Representatives of all interested organizations of the Navy and industry gathered in Leningrad. The commission was headed by Rear Admiral A. Orel, Deputy Head of the Submarine Directorate. The heads of the sections were experienced employees of the departments and institutes of the Navy - V. Teplov, I. Dorofeev, A. Zharov.

Our command section was headed by Captain 1st Rank N. Belorukov, who himself commanded a submarine during the war. And yet there were some things he resolutely refused to understand. - Here's another thing, give them potato peelers, refrigerators, smoking rooms! How did we sail during the war without all this and not die? At the section he was often supported by front-line soldiers like him. Heated skirmishes arose, from which we did not always emerge victorious. Sometimes, seeing how several elders were piling on me at once, Akulov disappeared, and I knew: he went to Orel for support.

The commission worked for two weeks. In addition to our comments, which she basically confirmed, more than a thousand proposals were made to improve the design of the boat. For example, despite the fairly good technical parameters of the turbines, they did not meet the requirements for stealth navigation. The misconception about the purpose of the boat has finally been dispelled: to shoot a giant torpedo, swim only under water and enter the base only in tow.

Layout commission gave a conclusion on the need to make changes to the preliminary design. In its existing form, the technical project could not be accepted - the Navy, the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry, the Ministry of Medium Machine Building and other organizations expressed a special opinion on it. Their objections were reported at the very top, in any case not below the level of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers V. A. Malyshev.

Not only the boat was created by organizations that were not previously connected by industrial relations or had never been involved in the implementation of this type of project. For a long time they did not know who to subordinate her future crew to.

As already stated, at first we belonged to the Navy Personnel Directorate. When we returned from the mock-up commission to Moscow, we learned that our military units had been transferred to the subordination of the Shipbuilding Department. Now we were commanded by engineer-rear admiral M.A. Rudnitsky. Time will pass until we are reassigned to our intended purpose - the Submarine Division in Leningrad. But the Submarine Directorate, then commanded by Rear Admiral Boltunov, had already become interested in us. After working in the layout commission, A. Orel reported to him about us.

Attempt at contract recruitment. V. Zertsalov (senior mate of the second crew) and I were called to the Main Headquarters of the Navy. We arrived from Obninsk in civilian clothes, and at the checkpoint the commandant detained us as suspicious. I had to make a note on my identity card: “Wearing civilian clothes while on duty is permitted.” (For many years, this note helped our officers in the most incredible circumstances. In those years, it was enough, for example, with a mysterious look to show this mark to the administrator of a hotel in which there were no free rooms, so that you were immediately accommodated.)

Boltunov listened carefully to all our considerations regarding personnel training. Our biggest doubts were the possibility of operating nuclear submarines by conscript personnel. A sailor, an eighteen-year-old boy who has barely graduated from school, needs at least two to three years to master a truly new specialty. At that time, they served in the navy for four years, which means that in a year this sailor will leave and give way to a newcomer.

We thought, that it was necessary to recruit over-conscripts to fill the jobs or sign contracts with the most promising sailors in their first or second year of military service. These people would spend, if not their entire lives, then at least many years with their new profession. Then professional competence, the desire to improve skills, and actions in emergency situations would become automatic.

Boltunov instructed me and Zertsalov As soon as possible, develop a special regulation on the contractual hiring of conscript personnel for nuclear submarines. We dealt with it quickly, but the regulation was introduced... several years later and lasted about ten years. The highest military, including naval, apparatus resisted with all its might the introduction of the contract system at the most critical military installations. The result of this persistence was, in particular, a high accident rate on nuclear submarines. Only in May 1991 was it allowed, as an experiment, for the Navy to recruit sailors who had served at least six months under a contract for a period of 2.5 years.

Our preparation schedule moved towards advance: instead of two months, a little more than a month was enough for the theory. Already during the January holidays of 1955, we were transferred to an internship directly at the reactor, assigning three to four people to each of the four shifts of nuclear power plant personnel.

Shortly after the Christmas holidays of 1959, Admiral Ralph posted the following notice at the entrance to his office: “ I, Commander, US Atlantic Fleet, promise a case of Jack Daniels whiskey to the first submarine commander to present proof that the enemy submarine was exhausted by pursuit and was forced to surface.».

This wasn't a joke. The admiral, as if at the hippodrome, bet on the miracle of American military thought - nuclear submarine. The modern submarine produced its own oxygen and was able to remain underwater throughout the entire voyage. Soviet submariners could only dream of such a ship. During a long voyage, their crews suffocated and were forced to surface, becoming easy prey for the enemy.

The winner was the crew submarine« USS Grenadier» tail number « SS-525"chased for about 9 hours and forced it to surface off the coast of Iceland. The commander of the US submarine, Lieutenant Commander Davis, received the promised box of whiskey from the admiral's hands. They had no idea that very soon the Soviet Union would present them with its gift.

In 1945, the United States openly demonstrated to the world the destructive power of its new weapons, and now it must have a reliable means of delivering them. By air, as it was with Japan, is associated with great risk, which means the only reasonable way to deliver nuclear cargo should be submarine, but one that could secretly, without ever surfacing, deliver a decisive blow was ideal for this nuclear submarine. Creating such a submarine was a daunting task at that time, even for the United States. Less than a year later, the first ship was laid down at a shipyard in New London, Connecticut. nuclear-powered icebreaker« USS Nautilus» tail number « SSN-571" The project was implemented in an atmosphere of such extreme secrecy that intelligence information about it reached Stalin’s desk only two years later. The Soviet Union again found itself in the role of catching up. In 1949, the first Soviet atomic bomb was tested, and in September 1952, Stalin signed a decree on the creation nuclear submarines in USSR.

Domestic designers, as happened more than once, were forced to go their own way, as circumstances were difficult for the Soviet Union in general and for Soviet military science in particular. In the USSR, defense work was always headed by people unknown to the general public, who were not written about in the newspapers. The creation of the submarine project was entrusted to the designer V. N. Peregudov. The technical design was approved.

Technical characteristics of the Project 627 nuclear submarine “K-3”, code “Kit”:

Length - 107.4 m;
Width - 7.9 m;
Draft - 5.6 m;
Displacement - 3050 tons;
- nuclear, power 35,000 hp;
Surface speed - 15 knots;
Underwater speed - 30 knots;
Immersion depth - 300 m;
Navigation autonomy - 60 days;
Crew - 104 people;
Armament:
Torpedo tubes 533 mm: bow - 8, stern - 2;

The idea of ​​combat use submarine was as follows: a boat armed with a giant torpedo is taken out by tugs from the base point to the dive point, from where it continues to swim underwater to a given area. Upon receiving the order, the nuclear submarine fires a torpedo, attacking enemy naval bases. During the entire autonomous navigation, ascent nuclear-powered ship not planned, means of protection and counteraction are not provided. After completing the task, she becomes practically defenseless. Interesting fact, first nuclear submarine was designed and built without the participation of the military. The only torpedo with a thermonuclear charge submarines had a caliber of 1550 mm and a length of 23 m. Submariners it immediately became clear what would happen to submarine when launching this super-torpedo. At the moment of launch, the entire mass of water will be fired along with the torpedo, after which an even larger mass of water will fall inside the hull and will inevitably create an emergency trim. To level it, the crew will have to blow out the main ballast systems and an air bubble will be released to the surface, allowing them to immediately detect nuclear submarine, which means its immediate destruction. In addition, specialists from the Navy General Staff found that not only in the United States, but throughout the world there are only two military bases that can be destroyed by such a torpedo. Moreover, they had no strategic significance.

The giant torpedo project was buried. Life-size mock-ups of the equipment were destroyed. Change project nuclear submarine took a whole year. Workshop No. 3 became a closed production facility. Its workers did not have the right to tell even their relatives where they worked.

In the early 50s, hundreds of kilometers from Moscow, the GULAG forces built the first nuclear power plant, the purpose of which was not to produce electrical energy for the national economy - it was a prototype of a nuclear installation for nuclear submarine. The same prisoners built a training center with two stands in a pine forest. Over the course of six months, all the fleets of the Soviet Union recruited the crew of the future nuclear submarine, long-term sailors and officers. Not only health and military training were taken into account, but also a pristine biography. Recruiters had no right to utter the word atom. But somehow, in a whisper, rumors spread where and what they were invited to. Getting to Obninsk became a dream. Everyone was dressed in civilian clothes, the military chain of command was abolished - everyone addressed each other only by first name and patronymic. The rest is strictly military order. The personnel were painted as on a ship. The cadet could answer anything from strangers, except that he was a submariner. It was always forbidden to pronounce the word reactor. Even during lectures, teachers called it a crystallizer or apparatus. The cadets practiced a variety of actions to escape the release of radioactive gas and aerosols. The most significant problems were fixed by the prisoners, but the cadets also had their share. No one really knew what radiation was. In addition to alpha, beta and gamma radiation, there were harmful gases in the air, even household dust was activated, no one thought about it. The traditional 150 grams of alcohol was considered the main medicine. The sailors were convinced that this was how they removed the radiation picked up during the day. Everyone wanted to go sailing and were afraid of being written off even before the descent submarine to the water.

Lack of coordination between departments has always hindered any project in the USSR. So for the crew of the first nuclear submarine and throughout submarine fleet in general, two hits are made. The Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal Zhukov, who, with all due respect to his land-based services in the navy, understood little, issued an order halving the wages of long-term conscripts. Practically trained specialists began to submit reports for dismissal. Of the six recruited crew first nuclear submarine There is only one left who loves his business more than his well-being. With the next blow, Marshal Zhukov canceled the second crew nuclear submarine. With the advent of the submarine fleet, the order was established - two crews. After a multi-month campaign, the first went on vacation, and the second took up combat duty. The tasks of submarine commanders have become exponentially more complicated. They had to come up with something to find time for the crew to rest without canceling combat duty.

launch of the first nuclear submarine of the USSR

And at the Severodvinsk Machine-Building Plant it is ready nuclear submarine« K-3", laid down on September 24, 1954, was already waiting for its first crew. The interiors looked like works of art. Each room was painted in its own color, bright colors pleasing to the eye. One of the bulkheads is made in the form of a huge mirror, and the other is a picture of a summer meadow with birch trees. The furniture was made to special order from valuable wood and, in addition to its intended purpose, could be turned into an object to help in emergency situations. So the large table in the wardroom was transformed into an operating room if necessary.

The design of the Soviet submarine was very different from the American one submarines. On a submarine " USS Nautilus» the usual diesel principles were repeated submarines, only a nuclear installation was added, and the Soviet submarines« K-3“It was a completely different architecture.

On July 1, 1958, the time came for launching. A canvas was stretched over the conning tower, hiding the forms. As you know, sailors are superstitious people, and if a bottle of champagne does not break on the side of the ship, they will remember this at critical moments during the voyage. Panic arose among the members of the selection committee. The entire cigar-shaped hull of the new ship was covered with a layer of rubber. The only hard place on which a bottle can break is the small fence of the horizontal rudders. Nobody wanted to take risks and take responsibility. Then someone remembered that women are good at breaking champagne. Young employee of KB " Malachite" confidently swung, and everyone took a breath of relief. Thus was born the first-born of the Soviet nuclear submarine fleet.

By evening when leaving nuclear submarine a strong wind rose into the open sea, which gusts blew away all the carefully installed camouflage from the hull, and submarine appeared before the eyes of the people who found themselves on the shore in its original form.

An interesting fact - when the Americans opened the archives of the Cold War, it was discovered that quite a short time after the launch of the first nuclear submarine "K-3", Captain 1st Rank of the US Navy Berins sailed his submarine at the mouth of the canal leading to the port of Murmansk. He got so close to a Soviet port that he was able to observe the sea trials of a Soviet, but diesel, ballistic missile submarine. The Americans never found out about the Soviet nuclear submarine.

Project 627 nuclear submarines received NATO classification “November”

Nuclear submarine« K-3"turned out excellent in all respects. In comparison with the American submarine, it looked more impressive. After passing all the required tests, the nuclear submarine " K-3"Project 627 was given the name " Leninsky Komsomol"And on July 4, 1958, she became part of the USSR Navy. Already in the summer of 1962, the crew Lenin Komsomol" repeated the feat of the Americans, who in 1958 first nuclear submarine USA " USS Nautilus"made a trip to the North Pole, and then repeated it several times on other nuclear submarines.

Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev personally presented awards to the submariners for the Arctic campaign. The captain of the nuclear submarine Lev Zhiltsov became a Hero of the Soviet Union. The entire crew, without exception, received orders. Their names became known throughout the country.

After the feat in the ice nuclear submarine« Leninsky Komsomol"has become a modern "Aurora" and the subject of visits by numerous delegations. Propaganda window dressing almost completely replaced military service. The captain of the submarine was sent to study at the General Staff Academy, experienced officers were sent to headquarters and ministries, and sailors, instead of servicing complex military equipment, took part in all kinds of congresses and conferences. Soon they had to pay for it in full.

According to Soviet intelligence, it became known that American aircraft were secretly patrolling in the neutral waters of the Mediterranean Sea. The leadership of the USSR Navy hastily began to discuss who to send there and it turned out that there were no available people nearby. We remembered about nuclear submarine« K-3». Submarine hastily equipped with a prefabricated crew. A new commander was appointed. On the third day of the trip to submarine the aft horizontal rudders were de-energized and the air regeneration system failed. The temperature in the compartments rose to 40 degrees. A fire started in one of the combat units, and the fire quickly spread throughout the compartments. Despite persistent rescue efforts, 39 submariners died. Based on the results of an investigation conducted by the Navy command, the crew’s actions were recognized as correct. And the crew was nominated for state awards.

But soon on submarine« Leninsky Komsomol“A commission arrived from Moscow, and one of the staff officers found a lighter in the torpedo compartment. It was suggested that one of the sailors climbed in there to smoke, which was the reason nuclear submarine disaster. Award sheets were torn to shreds, and penalties were announced instead.

submarine "Leninsky Komsomol" in Pala Bay, 2004

Superpower rivalry in submarine fleets was intense. The struggle was on power, size and reliability. Powerful nuclear missiles have appeared, for which there are no flight range limits. To sum up the confrontation, we can say that in some ways the US naval forces were superior to the Soviet navy, but in some ways they were inferior.

So, Soviet nuclear submarines were faster and with a greater reserve of buoyancy. The records of immersion and underwater speed still remain with the USSR. About 2,000 enterprises of the former Soviet Union were involved in the production of nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles on board. During the Cold War, the USSR and the USA each threw $10 trillion into the arms race. No country could withstand such wastefulness.

the first nuclear submarine "Leninsky Komsomol" in illustrations

The Cold War has faded into history, but the concept of defense capability has not disappeared. 50 years after the firstborn " Leninsky Komsomol» 338 were built nuclear submarines, 310 of which are still in service today. Exploitation nuclear submarine« Leninsky Komsomol"continued until 1991, while the submarine served on a par with other nuclear-powered ships. After write-off " K-3» submarine they plan to convert it into a museum ship, the corresponding project has already been developed at the design bureau " Malachite", but for unknown reasons the ship remains inactive, gradually falling into disrepair.