Konigsberg operation 1945. The assault on Konigsberg in numbers: They won not by numbers, but by skill

Gennady Viktorovich Kretinin graduated from the Kaliningrad Higher Military Engineering School and the Military Engineering Academy. Doctor of Historical Sciences, Candidate of Military Sciences, Professor of the Baltic Federal University. I. Kanta, full member of the Academy of Military Sciences, Academy of Military Historical Sciences, head of the Baltic regional information and analytical center RISI (Kaliningrad).
Deals with the problems of the Baltic region, aspects of relations between Russia and the EU in relation to the Kaliningrad region, and regional history. He has more than two hundred publications, including in Germany, Poland and Lithuania.

About the number of fighters and losses on both sides

INIn 1945, one of the largest strategic operations of the Red Army against Nazi Germany was East Prussia. It began on January 13, 1945 and ended, according to official data, on April 25, 1945 1 . The group of Soviet troops participating in it consisted of formations of the 2nd Belorussian, 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts with the support of the Baltic fleet and aviation.

East Prussia was of the greatest political and strategic importance for Germany, so the Nazis concentrated significant forces there. Using previously prepared defensive lines and positions, enemy troops offered stubborn resistance to the advancing units of the Red Army, as a result of which the fighting became protracted.

As part of this strategic offensive operation, the Soviet command planned, organized and carried out a series of front-line operations 2, which ultimately led to the defeat of the main enemy forces and the liberation of East Prussia from fascist troops. Each of these operations had its own purpose and solved a specific problem. Undoubtedly, from a military historical perspective, any of them is of interest to researchers. However, until now, it is precisely around the Königsberg offensive operation (the assault on Königsberg) that ideological battles have not stopped, the leitmotif of which is the idea, established in domestic and foreign literature, of significant losses of troops on both sides and casualties among the civilian population of the fortress city. They supposedly provide grounds for blaming the Soviet command for unleashing a powerful group of troops on a weak German garrison, which, in addition to military tasks, was supposed to provide protection for a large civilian population 3 .

In the minds of Russians, the assault on Königsberg remains a symbol of the mass heroism of Soviet soldiers, a victory that cost many victims. Meanwhile, for a number of reasons, it is quite difficult to restore the true picture of the events of the first ten days of April 1945 in the Königsberg area. Contradictory data from the Sovinformburo and German sources on the number of friendly and enemy troops and estimates of the size of the civilian population remaining in the city were not checked or commented on for a long time, despite the fact that free handling of them was possible on both sides. Over time, these data became "generally accepted" among historians, depending on their position.

In open sources, general figures for losses of Soviet troops in World War II operations appeared only at the turn of the 20th–21st centuries. Judging by these data, human losses in the East Prussian strategic offensive operation of 1945 amounted to 584,778 people, of which 126,464 were irrevocable 4 . However, data on losses in army and front-line operations is still extremely rare, which creates the ground for various insinuations, biased conclusions and generalizations in both foreign and domestic publications.

An even more difficult task faced German researchers, participants and witnesses of the events of April 6–9, 1945, since Königsberg was under siege and documentary sources simply did not survive. German publications on the topic under study are based exclusively on the memories of city residents and military personnel, often corrected by later authors.

Military garrison of Koenigsberg. Number of local residents

IN The first generalized data on the number of German troops defending Koenigsberg was presented by the head of the department for the use of war experience of the operational department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front, Colonel A. Vasiliev. In September 1945, he reported that “at the front of the armies” preparing to storm the city, the German command concentrated the 548, 561, 367 and 69th infantry divisions, the 2nd fortress and 75th security regiments - a total of 23,300 personnel composition, 425 artillery pieces, 16 tanks and self-propelled artillery units (SPG). In addition, according to him, “in front of the front of the armies” there were German regiments and reinforcement battalions with a total number of approximately 20 thousand people, 220 guns, 25 tanks and self-propelled guns. In the reserve of the German command was the 1st Infantry Division (6.1 thousand people, 124 guns, 8 tanks and self-propelled guns), and in positions east of Königsberg - units from the 61st Infantry Division (3.5 thousand people, 60 guns). Thus, V combatant parts The enemy had 52.7 thousand personnel with 819 guns, 49 tanks and self-propelled guns.

In addition to them, special and rear units, as well as Volkssturm units, were stationed in the fortress. Prisoners reported that among the defenders there were many conscripts from military factories, air force personnel, automobile units, artillerymen and sailors. These non-combatant parts also took part in the hostilities. A. Vasiliev clarifies: “In total, in the Koenigsberg garrison, together with the rear units, as it turned out later, there were more than 130 thousand people.” In fact, the last figure was a copy of the operational report of the Sovinformburo for April 10, which also reported that the Germans during the assault on Königsberg lost up to 42 thousand people killed, and more than 92 thousand soldiers and officers surrendered.

Soviet historiography clearly accepted the Sovinformburo report on faith, and the indicated figures were included in almost all official publications, memoirs and studies.

It should be noted that A. Vasiliev prepared a section of the report using his intelligence data and combat reports of the troops. Naturally, these data needed clarification, including using German sources. However, the documents of the German command, as already mentioned, were not preserved, and by that time it was already poorly oriented in the situation. Interviews with prisoners of war were processed later, although to date they have not yet been the subject of careful study. The data from Soviet military intelligence, naturally, was not absolutely accurate. But be that as it may, on the eve of the assault, the Soviet command was firmly convinced that the encircled German group numbered about 60 thousand people.

A different situation has developed in German historiography. During interrogation, the commandant of Koenigsberg, Infantry General Otto von Lyash, named the size of the German garrison as “more than 100 thousand.” Moreover, he repeated this figure twice (“The total number of troops subordinate to me, together with the Volkssturm and police units, was more than 100 thousand people” and a little later: “We lost the entire 100 thousand-strong army near Königsberg. There were up to 30 thousand wounded, and also killed there were many").

Later, having returned from Soviet captivity, in which he spent about 10 years, O. Lyash began writing memoirs, using the memories of German generals and officers, and eyewitness accounts. His book “So Königsberg Fell” has no documentary basis, does not contain analytical conclusions or generalizations, but is replete with emotions. In it, the former commandant of the fortress talks about a 35,000-strong garrison.

The figures given in his memoirs raise serious doubts. For example, talking about the preparation of the city for defense, O. Lyash writes: “I can no longer say how many infantry battalions, machine gun and anti-tank companies Würdig’s headquarters formed during the siege of Königsberg, because the data is lost. According to my calculations, about 30 thousand people were sent to the front through the headquarters for the formation of troops...”

However, there were actually much more different formations. For example, Fritz Haase, a resident of Königsberg, detained at the location of the 50th Army in the Quednau 5 area, during interrogation on March 16, 1945, said that the formation of Volkssturm battalions was carried out by party committees. Back in February, the Pregel party committee formed the V-92 6 battalion. Battalions of up to 400 people each consisted of 3–4 companies. O. Lyash mentions 8 Volkssturm battalions, but judging by the numbering, there were significantly more of them.

So, according to O. Lyash, the German units that were newly formed during the siege of Königsberg included 30 thousand soldiers and officers. In addition to them, a significant number of German troops were on the front line, defending the city. It is also necessary to take into account the replenishment of the garrison from external sources, which was carried out by the German command right up to the assault. Thus, in December 1944, a marching battalion of 300 people was formed in Horn (Austria), which in February 1945 took up positions in the Palmburg Bridge area. Apparently, the figure of “35 thousand military personnel” who made up the Königsberg garrison in March–April 1945, according to Lyash’s memoirs, is clearly not accurate, but other German researchers took it on faith.

Meanwhile, during the assault on Königsberg, it became clear to the Soviet command that the size of the German group exceeded the calculated number. This became clear from reports from army headquarters about enemy losses. Judging by these reports, information about the losses of friendly and enemy troops was provided to a higher authority at the end of the day, at the end of the operation, or for a particular period upon request. During the battles in East Prussia, the reporting system was supplemented by ten-day reports on losses, which could contain clarifications for each day, for several days, etc.

For example, the head of the operational department of the operational department of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front, Colonel Berlin, presented to his boss data on enemy losses in the period from April 1 to April 10 along the entire front line: 96,479 people were captured, 61,023 were killed. At the same time, he compiled a certificate about enemy losses only in the Koenigsberg area for the period from April 6 to April 9, clarifying that these data are preliminary. In accordance with this certificate, in the front zone of the 39th Army, 696 prisoners were taken and 32,000 Germans were killed; in the front zone of the 43rd Army - 16,000 and 7,500, respectively; in the 50th band - 6625 and 6200; 11th Guards Army - 22,885 and 7,720. On the certificate, the total losses of the Germans are marked in red pencil without a signature: soldiers and officers - 70,826, guns - 1,721, mortars - 580, tanks and self-propelled guns - 114, etc.

Naturally, the data for the decade looked more impressive and did not contradict the truth: the fighting at that time took place mainly in the Königsberg area. These data formed the basis for the information presented to Headquarters immediately after the storming of the fortress.

It should be noted that as of April 6, 1945, there were already 19,146 prisoners in the frontline network after previous battles. During the reporting period, another 1,396 Germans were captured by other armies and various units. If we add up these and other data, we get a sum very close to the Sovinformburo report of April 10 - 91,088 people. By the way, on one of the documents at the bottom left, such a calculation was made in pencil. Apparently, the front command was already trying to figure out the numbers.

By and large, on April 6–10 and even April 11, all or almost all German military personnel and the bulk of the civilian population in the city were captured and detained in Königsberg. In practice, a kind of census of the conditional population of the city was carried out as of April 10, 1945.

However, according to German data, which some domestic experts agree with, there were from 90 to 130 thousand civilians in Königsberg before the assault, which supposedly confirms the fact that many tens of thousands of civilians died during the assault.

It is worth paying attention to the spread in the data - from 90 to 130 thousand. The difference in indicators reaches almost 50%, which suggests that the information may be arbitrary or distorted for a specific purpose. Indeed, the information of the fortress commandant O. Lyash looks strange, to say the least. The civil and military authorities of the city, right up to the assault, managed to maintain the system of providing the population with food, albeit at greatly reduced standards. This makes it possible to determine quite accurately (in any case, with a significantly less than 50% error) the total number of civilians remaining in the city at the time of the assault. The commandant of the fortress, of course, could not help but know their number.

In German historiography, Jurgen Thorwald was one of the first to indicate the figure of 130 thousand civilians back in 1950 (though without citing a source). However, he himself attributed it to the end of January 1945. Considering the mass exodus of the population from the city in February–March through the corridors formed during the fighting on both banks and along the ice of Friches Huff Bay, by the time of the assault the number of civilians in the city should have been significantly reduced. This was confirmed by the German “languages” taken, which reported that “there is not much of the population left in the city,” and in some areas it was “almost completely evicted” 7 .

Immediately after the end of the fighting, the military authorities of the 3rd Belorussian Front began counting the size of the German population remaining in the city. On April 26, 1945, 23,247 German citizens were registered by military authorities in Königsberg. On May 1, their number was 22,838 people, on May 6 - 26,559. The order of the numbers practically corresponds to the data given above by Colonel Kolesnikov.

It is very difficult to determine, and apparently will no longer be possible, the number of those killed during the assault on the German side (military personnel and civilians). It would be possible to establish it at least approximately from the burials. However, the fighting in East Prussia continued throughout April and the first ten days of May 1945, and the most that regular funeral teams of divisions and armies could do during this time in the depths of the Samland Peninsula was to bury the Red Army soldiers who fell in Königsberg.

After the assault, only military commandant’s offices remained in the city; due to their small numbers, they were unable to conduct mass graves. The military commandant of Koenigsberg, Major General M. Smirnov, decided to involve German prisoners of war and the local population in this. In daily reports to the head of the front's rear services, he reflected the dynamics of registration of the population of Königsberg and the burials of dead Germans without taking into account their social status (the reports indicated: “Germans”, “corpses of soldiers and officers”).

In total, as of May 4, 1945, 33,778 German dead were buried. Considering that the townspeople were in shelters during the assault, and those participating in the battles were exposed to fire, it is logical to assume that the bulk of the dead were Wehrmacht soldiers and Volkssturm fighters.

About the number and losses of Soviet troops

L In the summer of 1945, Colonel Vasiliev, analyzing the preparation and assault on Königsberg, without citing sources, gave “approximate”, as he wrote, data on the number of armies attacking Königsberg: 39th Army - 34,400 personnel, 43rd Army - 36,590, the right flank of the 50th Army (two rifle corps and one rifle division) - 28,296, 11th Guards Army (less one rifle division) - 38,014 people. According to his data, the number of Soviet troops near Koenigsberg before the assault on the city was 137,250 people (although Vasiliev is not precise in his calculations, in fact it was 137,300). Subsequently, this figure became a textbook figure. It was cited by I. Bagramyan and K. Galitsky, it is reported in official publications.

A study of archival documents made it possible to estimate the real number of troops who participated in the assault on Koenigsberg, and it turned out to be significantly lower than according to Colonel Vasiliev - 106.6 thousand people 8.

Already during the fighting, it was decided to change the organizational structure of the rifle divisions. The fact is that the rifle divisions of the 3rd Belorussian Front entered East Prussia, formed according to the state 04/550-578, according to which they were supposed to have 9543 personnel, 12 122-mm howitzers, 14 76-mm and 36 45-mm cannons, 21 120-mm and 83 82-mm mortars, other weapons. However, in protracted battles, the divisions suffered heavy losses, which did not have time to be replenished by marching units. The reports of the army commanders reported that the number of rifle divisions often did not exceed 3 thousand people, which means that they actually could not carry out the combat missions assigned to them, which, when planning the operation, were determined based on full-fledged formations and according to established operational-tactical standards ( width of the offensive zone, breakthrough area, depth of attack, etc.).

In mid-February 1945, the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front changed the staffing structure of the rifle divisions. Army headquarters were instructed to switch to new organizational schemes, which made it possible to have 3–3.5 thousand personnel in rifle divisions. The Guards armies, naturally, had more complete divisions.

In connection with the new staffing structure, divisions were adjusted not only to the standards for conducting combat operations, but also to the nature of their weapons. Taking into account the previous experience of fighting in East Prussia against the enemy defending in field shelters and long-term fortifications, and anticipating battles in large populated areas, the front command tried to increase the relative firepower of the division, primarily through larger caliber artillery pieces.

The new staff of a “front-line” rifle division not only increased the reliability of its management, but also significantly increased its combat capabilities, which immediately affected the effectiveness of combat operations, especially during the assault on Koenigsberg.

It is necessary to pay tribute to the front and army commands, which, in difficult conditions, managed to fully staff the armies according to the new staffing schedule and carry out the necessary training of soldiers, officers and generals for the operation.

When analyzing the number of Soviet troops participating in the assault on Koenigsberg, it is necessary to pay attention to the term used for the first time in the historiography of the East Prussian operation by Colonel A. Vasiliev, which requires a separate comment.

Naturally, not the entire 106,000-strong group of Soviet troops took direct part in the assault. Fortified enemy lines and positions were overcome by specially trained units: assault groups and assault detachments, the basis of which were rifle companies from active fighters. There were 9–10 thousand of them in each army. According to TsAMO and the “Journal of Combat Operations of Front Troops for April 1945” (see note 8), the total number of active fighters was 24,473.

Thus, V direct assault Koenigsberg participated divisions, By number much inferior defending. Of course, with the support of the forces and means of all branches of the 3rd Belorussian Front. The relatively small number of attackers predetermined the relatively small losses of the Red Army.

In general, the question of the size of the losses of Soviet troops in the battles for Königsberg remains open to this day. Attempts have been made to answer it, but not entirely successful. For example, the official catalog “The History of Wars of the 20th Century in Monuments to Their Participants” contains information about Soviet soldiers who fell in battle and were buried in mass graves on the territory of today’s Kaliningrad - a total of 5,597 people. However, it should be taken into account that in the post-war period, burials were enlarged and memorials were reconstructed, during which participants of the East Prussian operation who died outside Königsberg were reburied in mass graves in Kaliningrad. Therefore, the available information does not provide an exact answer to the question posed.

An attempt was made to calculate the losses of Soviet troops during the assault on Königsberg using indirect evidence. So, S.A. Golchikov in the book “Battlefield - Prussia” (Kaliningrad, 2005) appeared figures of 9,230 dead and 34,230 wounded, that is, a total of 43,460 people.

An even more incredible figure is given by V. Beshanov, who claims that “own ( That There is Soviet troops. - G.TO.) losses in Königsberg are known only approximately - more than 50 thousand people killed and wounded.”

The fact that Soviet military science throughout the post-war period did not publish the figures for the losses of the Red Army in the operations of the Second World War allowed not only foreign, but also domestic historians to talk about victory “at the expense of human resources.” And this opinion has become common. Finnish journalist Anna-Leni Lauren recently wrote: “Moscow managed to survive only thanks to several competent generals and practically limitless human resources... The Soviet leadership sent millions of soldiers to the front as “cannon fodder” - without training, without sufficient weapons and ammunition and decent uniforms."

Indeed, during the war, Soviet troops not only won victories, but also suffered bitter defeats. However, we learned how to fight. The operation of the 3rd Belorussian Front to capture Königsberg has every right to be classified as one of those operations V which losses managed reduce To minimum, although they had to storm the city, which had been prepared for defense in advance.

Data on the losses of the armies that took Königsberg were submitted daily, and after the end of the operation - in total. As a rule, operational information included columns about the dead (irretrievable losses), the wounded (sanitary losses) and the overall result. In particular, according to reports from the armies, the losses on April 6 were: in the 43rd Army - 197 killed and 720 wounded; in the 50th Army - 258 killed and 705 wounded; in the 11th Guards Army - 307 killed and 1,452 wounded. In total, on the first day of the battle for Königsberg, the army lost 762 people killed and 2877 wounded.

But most often, data on losses was presented by decade. They are recorded in the final report of the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front, and they can be considered the price for the capture of Koenigsberg, since its assault lasted from April 6 to 9, and on other days of the decade there were practically no active hostilities for obvious reasons. From April 1 to April 10, 1945, 3,506 people were killed, 215 were missing, and 13,177 were wounded.

The word “Königsberg” forever inextricably merges the joy of a well-deserved, hard-fought victory and the tragedy of the civilian population of the city under siege. However, for a long time, the lack of real data about the participants, military losses and civilian casualties gave grounds to belittle the achievements of Soviet military art, the talent and organizational abilities of Soviet military leaders, the courage and heroism of the officers and soldiers of the Red Army. On the other hand, the same lack of information made it possible to extol the actions of the city’s defenders, primarily its military leadership, which supposedly protected the civilian population to the last.

Without going into an analysis of the course of the assault, it should be noted that the actions of the German troops, especially on April 6–7, were indeed organized and courageous, one might even say heroic. And this is natural, since they defended mine a city with a truly fateful history.

Our research showed that as a result of the assault on Königsberg, Soviet troops captured 70.5 thousand people. After the assault, 33.8 thousand fallen were buried, a significant part of which were Wehrmacht soldiers and officers. Thus, the number of Koenigsberg’s defensive group reached 100 thousand. In addition, 23–28 thousand civilians remained in the defeated city, which means that before the assault there were a total of about 130 thousand military personnel and civilians in the city. These figures coincide with the statement of General O. Lyash during interrogation after the fleeting defeat. It turns out that the commandant still knew the true number of besieged by April 6, 1945?

However, having returned from Soviet captivity, he “forgot” about his own testimony and in his memoirs about how Koenigsberg “fell”, he cited other data (90 thousand population and 30 thousand military personnel), which were later adopted by the German military historians, and also appeared on the pages of the works of some Soviet and Russian authors.

Ideological influence, the excessive secrecy of information sources, and their inaccessibility to researchers led to the formation among the Soviet public, and then among Russian historians, of stable ideas about the exceptionally difficult and bloody assault on Koenigsberg, which was ultimately taken thanks to the absolute advantage of the Soviet troops in military equipment and weapons. Of course, they also talk about the talent of the commanders, but no special studies have been conducted on the leadership of troops during the preparation and implementation of the operation.

All this really happened - a bloody assault, technical and combat superiority, and the talent of the commanders. But let's compare: in October 1944 - January 1945, in the battles for the small East Prussian town of Pilkallen (now the village of Dobrovolsk, Kaliningrad region), according to incomplete data, about 5 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers died (the search and memorialization of the dead continues). And during the assault on Koenigsberg - an operation of a much larger scale - 3721, including the missing.

It is necessary to pay tribute to the command of the 3rd Belorussian Front, the organizational abilities and military skills of the chiefs of staff, generals and officers. The purposeful work of the Soviet military command to prepare troops for the assault, planning and organizing the interaction of all types and branches of troops made it possible to avoid large losses in the ranks of the assaulters. In conditions where two large groups of troops (each no less than 100 thousand people) came together in a limited space, with the massive use of all weapons of destruction, irrecoverable losses of 3-4 thousand are actually considered small.

The speed, success and relatively low losses suffered by Soviet troops in the Koenigsberg operation against an enemy blocked in a heavily fortified defensive area indicate that it was carried out in accordance with one of the principles of Suvorov’s science - to win not with numbers, but with skill.

Notes

1 The latest research suggests that the East Prussian operation ended on May 8, 1945 (see about this: Kretinin G. On the periodisation of the battle for East Prussia in 1944–1945 // Baltic region. 2010. No. 2 (4). Kaliningrad: I.Kant State Univ. Press, 2010, pp. 91–98).

2 In the modern interpretation, the historical periodization of the East Prussian operation (in the zone of the 3rd Belorussian Front) includes the Insterburg-Königsberg (January 13 - February 10, 1945), Königsberg (April 6-9) and Zemland (April 13-25) operations. It should be taken into account that the list of front-line operations of the 3rd Belorussian Front immediately after the end of the war included the defeat of the enemy’s Heilsberg group and the capture of the Frische-Nerung spit.

3 See, for example: Gause F. Koenigsberg in Prussia: The History of a European City / Trans. V. Herdt, N. Kondrad. Recklinghausen: Bitter, 1994, pp. 255–257; Lyash ABOUT. So Koenigsberg fell: Memoirs of the commandant of the Koenigsberg fortress / Trans. with him. M.: Akvo-Ink, 1991); Glinski G., Verster P. Koenigsberg: Conigsberg–Konigsberg–Kaliningrad: Past and present: Sat. Art. Berlin; Bonn: Westkreuz-Verlag, 1996; and etc.

4 See, for example: Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century: Losses of the Armed Forces: Stat. research / Under the general ed. G.F. Krivosheeva. M.: OLMA-Press, 2001. P. 304.

5 Quednau - now Northern Mountain, region of Kaliningrad.

6 The Roman numeral indicated the number of the party committee, and the Arabic numeral indicated the serial number of the battalion.

7 TsAMO. F. 405. Op. 9769. D. 461. L. 104, 120; and etc.

8 Information on the staffing of rifle companies of formations of the Zemland Group of Forces as of April 1, 1945 // TsAMO. F. 241. Op. 2593. D. 709 (Directives to the troops of the Zemland Group of Forces to defeat the enemy’s Königsberg garrison, blockade and capture the city of Königsberg). L. 35. See also: Journal of combat operations of front troops for April 1945 // Ibid. D. 686. L. 225.

The myth of the assault on Königsberg

The main myth of the assault on Königsberg in April 1945 is the assertion of Soviet war and post-war propaganda that it was a powerful fortress with a strong garrison and its capture in four days was an outstanding achievement of the military art of the Red Army.

In fact, the capture of Königsberg and East Prussia was achieved only thanks to the overwhelming numerical and technical superiority of the Red Army and cost it heavy losses. Soviet troops began the operation to capture East Prussia on January 13, 1945. It involved the 3rd Belorussian Front of General Ivan Chernyakhovsky, the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front of General Ivan Bagramyan and the 2nd Belorussian Front of Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky. They numbered 1,669 thousand people, 25.4 thousand guns and mortars, about 4 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units and 3.1 thousand combat aircraft. In East Prussia and Northern Poland they were opposed by the troops of Army Group Center under the command of General Hans Georg Reinhardt. The army group, according to Soviet intelligence estimates, which were significantly overestimated, had 580 thousand soldiers and officers, more than 8 thousand guns and mortars, 515 combat aircraft. The advance of Soviet troops in East Prussia was difficult due to the presence of powerful long-term fortifications there, created during the interwar period.

Initially, the 2nd Belorussian Front was supposed to operate with its main forces in Pomerania. However, on January 20, due to the slow advance of the 3rd Belorussian Front, Headquarters ordered the rotation of the 3rd, 48th, 2nd Shock and 3rd Guards Tank Armies to act against the East Prussian group.

The front commander, Marshal Rokossovsky, in his memoirs criticized this decision, since it took four armies away from the main, Berlin, direction to the secondary, East Prussian direction. Probably, the turn of the main forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front against East Prussia was explained by the fact that Stalin sought to annex this province and wanted to occupy it until the end of the war in order to present the allies with a fait accompli.

On January 26, tankers of the 5th Guards Tank Army of General Volsky reached the Baltic Sea north of Elbing. Then the troops of the 48th Army and the 2nd Shock Army entered the area of ​​​​Marienburg and Elbing. On the night of January 27, three German infantry divisions launched an unexpected counterattack and pushed the 48th Army back 10–20 km, defeating two Soviet rifle divisions. By January 30, the Germans were 10 km from Elbing. There was a threat to restore the land connection between East Prussia and the rest of Germany. Chernyakhovsky urgently transferred a rifle, mechanized and two tank corps, a cavalry corps, five anti-tank artillery brigades, a rifle division and other units to the breakthrough area.

On January 29, German troops in East Prussia were divided into Heilsberg, Königsberg and Semland groups. But already on January 30, the tank division “Great Germany” and the motorized division “Hermann Goering” pushed the 11th Guards Army away from the coast and restored contact with Königsberg. On January 31, Soviet troops captured Heilsberg, but further offensive had to be stopped due to fierce enemy resistance.

On February 10, Soviet troops launched an offensive against the Heilsberg and Zemland groups. On February 18, General Chernyakhovsky died, and he was replaced at the head of the 3rd Belorussian Front by Marshal Vasilevsky. On February 19–20, the Germans launched a counterattack, captured the Metgethen position and restored contact between Königsberg and the Zemland group.

By March 29, the group defending the Heilsberg fortified area was destroyed. Its remnants were able to make their way to Königsberg.

On January 30, Königsberg was surrounded by the forces of the 39th and 11th Guards armies. But on February 19–20, the Germans managed to unblock the city with a blow from the northwest, breaking through the positions of the 39th Army. Now it was possible to supply the capital of East Prussia through the port of Pillau.

The assault on Königsberg began on April 6. It was carried out by the 43rd, 50th and 11th Guards Armies under the general leadership of General Bagramyan. They numbered 137 thousand people, 5 thousand guns and mortars, 538 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2444 aircraft.

In Königsberg the Germans had three rings of defense. As the commandant of Koenigsberg, Otto von Lyash, recalled, “the brick used for construction was fired several times, thereby achieving increased strength. Thus, these old fortifications were quite reliable protection, including from modern artillery. However, their disadvantage was that the ability to observe and fire from there was very limited." The two most combat-ready divisions of the Königsberg garrison, infantry and tank, as well as a significant part of the artillery reserves, were withdrawn to the Zemland Peninsula long before the assault. According to the estimate of the commandant of Königsberg, General Otto von Lyash, at the beginning of the assault, there were 35 thousand defenders out of 150 thousand attackers, in addition to which there were about 15 thousand members of the Volkssturm who did not have weapons. Of the armored vehicles, the garrison had only one company of assault guns. This was due to the fact that the commander of the 4th Army and the Zemland Group of Forces, General Friedrich Wilhelm Müller, was going to defend primarily Pillau, through which the evacuation of troops and refugees to Germany took place. He did not imagine that Soviet troops would storm Koenigsberg, believing this action to be pointless. German observers saw Soviet troops regrouping before the assault, but the Koenigsberg garrison could not prevent it due to an acute shortage of shells. Also, the Germans could not withdraw troops from the front lines of the trenches in advance in advance of the enemy’s artillery barrage. There was simply nowhere to take them, since Soviet artillery was shelling the entire territory occupied at that moment by the Koenigsberg group.

The assault began with a powerful artillery barrage, then, at noon, under the cover of a barrage of fire, infantry, tanks and self-propelled guns went on the offensive. The fortifications were blocked and destroyed by Soviet assault groups using tanks, 122 mm guns and flamethrowers. This is how General Lyash remembered the assault on the city: “Our fortress artillery, weak and poor in shells, could not do anything against this fire and not a single German fighter showed up in the sky. Anti-aircraft batteries were powerless against the cloud of enemy aircraft and, moreover, they had difficulty defending against enemy tanks. All means of communication were immediately destroyed and only foot messengers groped their way through the piles of ruins to their command posts or positions. Under a hail of shells, soldiers and city residents huddled in the basements of houses, crowding there in terrible crowded conditions.”

On April 8, Königsberg was completely surrounded. The remnants of the garrison tried to break through to the west along with crowds of refugees on the evening of April 8, but failed. Only a few assault guns and individual units numbering several hundred people were able to break through.

On the night of April 10, the commandant of Königsberg, General Otto Lyash, capitulated on conditions that guaranteed the lives of soldiers and civilians and decent treatment in captivity. On April 10, the last pockets of resistance were eliminated.

Here are the recollections of one of the German officers about the scenes that he observed immediately after the surrender, when the prisoners were driven to a collection point: “Weeping, struggling girls and women were dragged into the houses... The roadside ditches were full of corpses... There were many dead children lying around. Hanged people were hanging from the trees - with their ears cut off, their eyes gouged out... Farms were burning, household belongings were lying on the road, cattle were running around, they were shooting at them, killing them indiscriminately. We could hear the cries of people calling for help.”

On April 25, Pillau was taken. The remnants of the German troops, who retreated to the Frische Nehrung Spit, surrendered on May 9, as part of a general surrender.

According to official Soviet data, the losses of the Red Army in the battles for East Prussia in the period from January 13 to April 25, 1945 amounted to 126.5 thousand killed and missing and 458.3 thousand wounded and sick. The true irreversible losses were several times greater. Soviet forces lost 3,525 tanks and self-propelled artillery, 1,644 guns and mortars, and 1,450 combat aircraft. There is no reliable data on Wehrmacht losses in the battles for East Prussia.

This text is an introductory fragment. From the book Shadow of Victory author Suvorov Viktor

Chapter 8 ABOUT THE FIRST STORM OF KONIGSBERG. Neither in the first nor in the second game the defense of the country’s western borders was set as the main task for the “Easterns”. The main thing in the games was the offensive. “Izvestia” June 22, 1993. P. Bobylev. 1. In January 1941, in the General

author Mukhin Yuri Ignatievich

Assault on Königsberg We arrived in the area north of Königsberg in early March, settled down in a good pine forest in the Kvednau area (now the village of Severnaya Gora, Kaliningrad), and intensive preparations for the assault began. They explained to us what Königsberg is, in

From the book By summons and by conscription [Non-cadre soldiers of the Second World War] author Mukhin Yuri Ignatievich

The surrender of Koenigsberg The evening of April 9, 1945 arrived. I was at my communications center, I was damn sleepy, because we did not sleep at all on the night of April 5-6, and all the previous days and nights we were in continuous battle. Another call comes from the commander

From the book All Myths about World War II. "Unknown War" author Sokolov Boris Vadimovich

The myth of the assault on Königsberg The main myth of the assault on Königsberg in April 1945 is the assertion of Soviet wartime and post-war propaganda that it was a powerful fortress with a strong garrison and its capture in four days was an outstanding military achievement

From the book Teutonic Order [The Collapse of the Crusade Invasion of Rus'] author Wartberg Herman

THE ROLE OF KÖNIGSBERG AS A CENTER OF GERMAN AGGRESSION IN THE 19TH CENTURY After this, difficult days came for Poland, which Frederick II, who now saw no danger from Russia, decided to “peel like a head of cabbage, leaf by leaf,” and managed to fulfill his intention. In 1772

From the book Award Medal. In 2 volumes. Volume 2 (1917-1988) author Kuznetsov Alexander

author

Chapter 11 Assault on the southern forts of Königsberg As already mentioned, the assault on the southern forts from No. 7 to No. 10 was entrusted to the 11th Guards Army. Before the start of the operation, the 11th Guards Army was reinforced by a number of artillery units of the RVGK, including the 10th breakthrough artillery division. All

From the book Artillery in the Great Patriotic War author Shirokorad Alexander Borisovich

Chapter 12 Assault on the northern forts of Königsberg The 43rd Army acted against forts No. V, Va, VI and VIIIa. Army commander Lieutenant General A.P. Beloborodov wrote: “In each division of the first echelon, two assault detachments (reinforced rifle battalions) and four

From the book To Hell with “Greater Germany” author Rehfeld Hans Heinz

From Memel to Konigsberg The journey continues. End of November 1944. Arriving at the harbor, we already see “our ship”. This is a 10,000 ton cargo ship. In the bow and stem there are several 3.7 cm anti-aircraft guns and a four-barrel anti-aircraft gun. Loading on a durable ramp

From the book Tora-Tora-Tora! by Turk Harry

AFTER THE STORM When the roar of the engines of Japanese planes died down in the distance and the bombs stopped falling, silence did not immediately reign on the island. Artillery and machine guns continued to roar everywhere. The dull explosions did not stop in the harbor. Fires raged on the damaged ships,

From the book Cruiser "Emden" author Mücke Hellmuth von

From the book Russian Students in German Universities of the 18th - First Half of the 19th Century author Andreev Andrey Yurievich

Chapter 3 From Marburg to Königsberg

From the book Khojaly Case: Special Folder author Demoyan Hayk

REASONS FOR THE STORM OF KHOJALU The territory of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic proclaimed on September 2, 1991, by the time the firing points in Khojaly were suppressed, had already been under siege for over two years. In addition, the majority of residents of the already mentioned 24 deported villages basically found

Fiction is excluded from the book. Notes from the head of illegal intelligence author Drozdov Yuri Ivanovich

After the assault, V.V. Kolesnik gave the command to cease fire, and we moved the command post directly to the palace. On the platform in front of the palace and inside it, the commanders of groups and units approached both of us with reports and for orders. Evacuation was already underway

author Krishtof Elena Georgievna

Details of the assault The page of the assault that I will now tell you about is probably not the most significant and decisive, but it often stands before my eyes, although I not only was not an eyewitness to the event, but did not even talk to any of the participants. I just read the memoirs

From the book One Hundred Stories about Crimea author Krishtof Elena Georgievna

Another detail of the assault And my Zeiss binoculars are intact. And today I looked at it upside down, as if the spring of forty-four could appear at the other end of the earth... As if I could see the highway along which either past our Alushta house, or past

Exactly 70 years ago, on April 8, 1945, Soviet troops captured the Fifth Fort - the most serious fascist fortification on the route of the formations that stormed Koenigsberg. 70 years ago, my husband’s grandfather and my grandfather, both artillerymen, took part in this assault. Maybe they even knew each other, but we will never know about it. But we know for sure that among their other awards, both grandfathers especially valued the medals “For the Capture of Koenigsberg.” And it is no coincidence - because the battle for the fortified city on the “Royal Mountain” (as Königsberg is translated) was indeed terrible. On the eve of the 70th anniversary of the Victory, our whole family went there. In autumn it’s so beautiful there, as if there was no war...

For a long time, there was a whole system of fortifications around Königsberg - impregnable forts, ramparts and ditches. Despite the fact that their construction began back in the days of the Teutonic Order (1255), they were built so competently and intelligently that even during World War II, the Nazis were able to successfully use these ancient fortifications to defend Königsberg. Anticipating the assault, they modernized them and strengthened them as much as possible.

History is full of paradoxes: in the mid-18th century, when Prussia was part of the Russian Empire, Russian officers and soldiers took part in the restoration of dilapidated defensive structures. They could hardly have imagined then that in the middle of the 20th century all this would be stormed by their descendants - Soviet soldiers and officers.

At the end of the 19th century, a ring of forts was built around Königsberg, turning the city into one of the most powerful fortresses in the world. One of the experts on the construction of the fort ring was the Russian engineer Totleben. Having invented and applied a constructive innovation in the form of heavy artillery firing points on the flanks, he could hardly have guessed what kind of slow-motion pig he planted for his descendants in the Second World War.

The large fort ring, about 50 km long, consisted of 12 forts and three intermediate fortifications. At first the forts had serial numbers, and a little later they were named after Prussian kings and famous commanders. The most impregnable of them, the Fifth Fort, was named after King William Frederick the Third. The forts were used for their intended purpose for the first and last time in April 1945.

In anticipation of the assault on Königsberg, the Nazis managed to create 9 lines of defense in the Königsberg direction at a distance of 12-15 km from each other. Since January 1945, the forts began to be strengthened, which became the front line of defense. Machine-gun and mortar rifle nests were equipped on the crests of the ramparts, and additional long-term firing points, wire barriers and minefields were installed between the forts.

This is what a destroyed pillbox looks like near the 5th fort:

The belt of forts was closed with anti-tank ditches. The roads leading from the forts to Königsberg were equipped with anti-tank hedgehogs and mined. Don’t read abstractly - try to imagine all this, and you will have a completely different sense of the meaning of the phrase “here every centimeter of the earth is watered with blood,” which has become common in descriptions of the Battle of Königsberg.

The most powerful of all, the Fifth Fort is built in the form of a hexagon with a length of 215 m and a width of 105. The walls are made of especially durable ceramic bricks fired many times. The manufacturer was rightfully proud of his bricks, since he put his own mark on each one.

The thickness of the brick walls of the fort reaches 2 meters; the structure is covered with a protective four-meter layer of soil on top. Natural stone and concrete were also used in the construction of the fort. As it turned out during the shelling, it is possible to break through such a wall if you use particularly powerful guns - and only if the shell hits the same crater twice.

Inside the fort there were barracks, an infirmary, a mess hall and ammunition depots, occupying two floors. All this was heated by the boiler room and had ventilation.


The fort's premises were connected by wide underground corridors along which goods could be transported on carts. The fort had courtyards that were used as firing points and internal transport interchanges.


There were elevators for lifting and lowering cargo and ammunition. Here's what's left of one of them:

The fort was surrounded by a water ditch 25 m wide and 4 m deep. This ditch simultaneously served as an obstacle to the enemy and a drainage system for the lower tier of the fort.

The assault on the Fifth Fort began with artillery shelling on April 2, 1945. The fire at the fort was carried out from specially powerful guns of the 245th separate Gumbinnensky division of Lieutenant Colonel S.S. Maltsev.


As I already mentioned, the walls of the fort easily withstood a direct hit from 280 mm shells, and out of 73 direct hits there were only 2 through holes. Therefore, it was not possible to capture the fort right away. The siege and assault of the Fifth Fort was alternately led by assault detachments of the 801st and 806th Infantry Regiments of the 235th Infantry Division, the 1st Battalion of the 732nd Infantry Regiment of the 235th Infantry Division, and the 2nd Battalion of the 550th Infantry Regiment of the 126th Infantry Division.

The feat of the sappers helped move the situation forward. Under cover of darkness and continuous enemy fire, sappers Sergeant Major P.I. Merenkov, senior sergeant G.A. Malygin and Private V.K. The Polupanov crossed the ditch by boat, made passages in the minefield, laid charges and blew up the wall of the fort. Two of them were wounded at the very beginning of the sortie, but found the strength to complete what they started.

A gap appeared in the fortress wall, through which the assault troops entered the fort and entered into hand-to-hand combat with the Nazis. How old are you? Pyotr Merenkov was 31 years old, Grigory Malygin was 23, Vladimir Polupanov was 20.

Here is a surviving suitcase with a “gentleman’s kit” for a sapper of that time:

Throughout the night from April 7 to April 8, there was a battle inside the fort; on the morning of April 8, the fascist garrison capitulated. For the courage and bravery shown during the assault on the Fifth Fort, three sappers and 12 other distinguished fighters - riflemen and artillerymen - were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Here they are.

The fall of the Fifth Fort decided the outcome of the Koenigsberg operation.



On April 9, 1945, Soviet troops took the Königsberg fortress. It took 9 words to write about this in one sentence. To accomplish this, it took months of preparation, a week of continuous bloody battles and thousands of lives.

© Text and photos – Noory San.

10.04.2015 0 11697


« Fight for Konigsberg- this is an episode of the great battle with our Slavic neighbor, which had such a terrible impact on our fate and the fate of our children and whose influence will be felt in the future."- these words belong to the commander of the Koenigsberg garrison, General Otto von Lasch.

The name of the city that he defended is no longer on the geographical map. There is a city Kaliningrad- the center of the region of the same name of the Russian Federation, surrounded from the west, east and south by the countries of the European Union and washed from the north by the Baltic Sea; the only small but important territorial prize that the Soviet Union received after the defeat of Germany.

"The Cradle of PRUSSIAN MILITARISM"

Goebbels's diary entries, dating from early April 1945, contain an interesting admission concerning little-known contacts between Soviet and German representatives in Stockholm. Discussing the theoretical possibility of concluding a separate peace, Mr. Reich Minister was indignant that the Kremlin was demanding East Prussia, but “this, of course, is completely unacceptable.”

View of one of the Königsberg forts

In fact, the fascists should have grabbed such a proposal with their hands and feet, however, both Goebbels and his beloved Fuhrer in this (by no means the only case) attached a certain sacred significance to the East Prussian lands, as a kind of outpost of Germany in the east.

Let us again give the floor to General von Lyash: “Königsberg was founded in 1258 by the German order of chivalry in honor of King Ottokar of Bohemia, who participated in the order’s summer campaign to the East. The castle, the construction of which began during the founding of the city, was its first defensive structure. In the 17th century, the city was fortified with a rampart, ditches and bastions, thus becoming a fortress. These structures gradually deteriorated and did not serve much service either in the Seven Years' War or in the Napoleonic Wars.

In 1814, Koenigsberg was declared an open city, but in 1843 its fortification began again, and what was then called a fortress fence was erected, that is, a ring of fortifications around the city with a length of 11 kilometers. Their construction was completed in 1873. In 1874, construction began on a defensive belt of 15 forward forts, the construction of which was completed in 1882. To protect the mouth of the Pregel, a strong fortification was built on the right bank near the Holstein estate. The fortification of Friedrichsburg on the left bank of the mouth of the Pregel was even stronger.”

Let us note several episodes not mentioned by von Lyash. It was based on Koenigsberg that the German knights waged their campaigns against the Prussians, which ended in the physical destruction or assimilation of this people, who gave their name to the region. In 1758, during the Seven Years' War, Koenigsberg was occupied by Russian troops, and its residents were sworn in to Empress Elizabeth Petrovna, and it is interesting that among those who took it was Emmanuel Kant, a professor at the local university. However, in 1762, the new Russian Emperor Peter III, with a sweeping gesture, returned East Prussia to his idol Frederick the Great.

In 1806-1807, the city was actually the capital of the Kingdom of Prussia, since it was here that Frederick William III, beaten by Napoleon, took refuge “beyond the friendly bayonets” of the Russian army.

In the First World War, Russian troops, targeting Königsberg, launched an offensive from Lithuania and Poland, but suffered a major defeat, which had a noticeable impact on the overall course of hostilities and elevated Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg to the heights of power of Hitler’s future “godfather”. Germany, however, lost the war as a whole, for which it also paid with territories. Restored Poland gained access to the sea with the city of Danzig (modern Gdansk), while East Prussia, on the contrary, was cut off from the rest of Germany.

It was the question of the “Danzig corridor” that served as the Fuhrer’s pretext for attacking Poland and starting World War II. But by the beginning of 1945, the time had come for the Reich to pay its bills. The Red Army, having cleared almost the entire Baltic region (with the exception of Courland, where a large enemy group still held out), aimed to capture the “cradle of Prussian militarism.”

A Soviet infantry unit passes through a destroyed village on the outskirts of Konigsberg. January 30, 1945


HELL OF FIRE

The grand battle began on January 13, 1945, simultaneously with the offensive in Poland, and the timing of the operation was postponed to an earlier date in order to help out the Allies, whom the Germans were beating in the Ardennes. The 3rd Belorussian Front of General Ivan Chernyakhovsky operated from the east. The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front of Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky were moving from the southeast, who were to reach the Baltic Sea and cut off East Prussia from the rest of Germany.

In addition, the Headquarters brought into action the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front of General Ivan Bagramyan. The forces of the Soviet troops numbered 1 million 670 thousand people, more than 25 thousand guns and mortars, about 4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and more than 3 thousand aircraft. They were opposed by Army Group Center of General Georg Reinhardt, numbering 580 thousand soldiers and officers, possessing eight thousand guns and mortars and 560 combat aircraft.

As we can see, the superiority of the attackers was very significant, but here it should be taken into account that not only the largest cities, but the whole of East Prussia literally became a real fortress. The depth of the defensive structures was as much as 200 kilometers, which is comparable to the length of a small European state. They had to chew through the German defenses, and the pace of the offensive was not high - sometimes 2-3 kilometers per day. In addition, the fascist Navy dominated the sea, while the Soviet Baltic Fleet was limited to rare local operations.

Soviet infantry passes through a German settlement on the outskirts of Konigsberg. January 25, 1945

Some historians generally believe that they should have simply blockaded East Prussia and concentrated forces in the Berlin direction, but a larger strategy must be taken into account here. The Germans could not have sat on the defensive, but, having united with the Courland group, delivered such blows that the whole plan of taking Berlin would have been in very big doubt. To prevent such a counterattack, the offensive began.

By January 19, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front reached the approaches to Koenigsberg and, bypassing it from the north, cut off the garrison from the main forces taking up defense on the Zemland Peninsula. A week later, the fascist forces (already renamed Army Group North) were cut into three unequal parts: four divisions ended up in Zemland, five in Konigsberg and up to twenty divisions in the Heilsberg area, southwest of the East Prussian capital.

However, already on January 30, one infantry and one tank (“Greater Germany”) division rushed to the aid of the “encircled” from the west. Land communication with the territory of the Reich was restored, and the Germans were able to hold the resulting corridor until mid-March. This counterattack was glorified by German propaganda, although the Wehrmacht command made many mistakes in this case.

To begin with, the Gauleiter of East Prussia, Erich Koch, who swore that he himself would fight in the trenches, fell into a panic, which was transmitted down the chain to the population through the party organs. Tens of thousands of Königsbergers rushed on foot to the only ice-free port of Pillau (modern Baltiysk) in the hope of evacuating to the mainland. It is unknown how many of them died on the snow-covered roads. It is significant that at the same time, on January 30, the liner Wilhelm Gustloff, located to the west of the port of Gottenhafen (modern Gdynia), was sunk by the submarine S-31 under the command of Captain Alexander Marinesko.

More than 9 thousand people died, mostly children and women, and the responsibility for this tragedy lies with the German command, which ordered the former cruise liner to be painted in the camouflage colors of a warship.

And these were only the first of a series of disasters that befell the population of East Prussia. Thousands of refugees moved along the edge for almost three months, hoping to somehow jump out of the fiery hell and died from bullets and shells that both their “defenders” and the Russian “invaders” rained down on each other.

Soldiers from Captain V. Leskov's battery deliver artillery shells on the approaches to Koenigsberg

BLOW TO BLOW

However, let's return directly to the fighting.

In the last days of January, the fate of East Prussia hung in the balance thanks to the energetic actions of the 39th Army of General Ivan Lyudnikov, which, wedged between the key points of enemy defense, was able to cut the Koenigsberg-Pillau road. General von Lyash missed this daring maneuver and even almost ended up captured, like his subordinates who were a kilometer away from him and sleeping peacefully in their dugouts.

The situation was turned around by the chief of military engineers, General Mikos, who assembled an improvised detachment and recaptured the village of Metgeten with an underground shell factory. Later, Soviet troops had to take this settlement again, this time with heavy losses.

In these battles, the Red Army was often opposed by elderly Volkssturm soldiers and disabled people called up to arms. Although I had to deal with selected units. Thus, in the area of ​​the town of Neuhausen, German grenadiers managed to destroy about 30 Soviet tanks. They still took Neuhausen, but, realizing that they were already acting on the verge of a foul, they stopped in front of the next line, which included two forts and intermediate strong points with artillery and pillboxes.

Soviet soldier guardsman-artilleryman with a cannon shell on which is written: "Across Koenigsberg"

The Soviet offensive ran out of steam, but the Germans gradually came to their senses and launched several counterattacks between February 5 and 7, even managing to encircle the 91st Infantry Division (its main forces, however, were able to break through to their own).

In fact, East Prussia found itself in a blockade, and the narrow corridor connecting it with the Reich along the edge of the coast became a real road of death, since it was constantly attacked by Soviet troops. The results of these attacks were described by the commander of the 3rd Army, General Alexander Gorbatov: “What was happening on the shore of the bay! 3-4 kilometers from the water everything was littered with cars, carts loaded with military equipment, food, and household items. Between the cars and carts lay the corpses of German soldiers. Many horses, which the Germans tied to a hitching post, 200-300 heads each, were killed; they remained tied. Early in the morning I saw hundreds of bags of coffee on the shore, thousands of boxes of canned food lying on the parapet of the trenches..."

To expand the road, the Germans first decided to unite the forces located on the Land Peninsula and in Konigsberg, especially since they were also separated by a small corridor occupied by Soviet troops.

They made such an attempt on February 18, and fighting broke out in neighboring areas. In one of them, General Chernyakhovsky was killed by a stray shell.

Street fight on the outskirts of Königsberg 1945

The Germans broke through the corridor, but it was also narrow, and to protect it they had to use two divisions, which, as subsequent events showed, were not superfluous in Konigsberg.

If Headquarters were thinking about simply blockading East Prussia, they now firmly decided to focus on capturing the region. The operation was entrusted to man No. 2 in the Soviet military hierarchy - the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky, who on this occasion was appointed commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, at the same time replenishing this front with formations of the disbanded 1st Baltic Front.

Reconnaissance intensified, hundreds of saboteurs were sent behind enemy lines, among whom there were many German defectors and anti-fascists. The Germans were also preparing. Everyone who could hold a weapon in their hands was called into service. The deserters alone, who were spared from the gallows on this occasion, numbered about 30 thousand.

The search through the bottom of the barrel turned out to be so effective that many units were staffed beyond the regular staff. The number of the group directly defending Koenigsberg alone was 128 thousand.

On March 13, Vasilevsky went on the offensive, clearing the coast of Frisch Gaff Bay from the enemy. Of the 150 thousand soldiers and officers who were here, 93 thousand were destroyed, and 46 thousand were taken prisoner.

Thus, six armies were freed, three of which were concentrated to take the city, and three headed towards Berlin. Now we had to deal with Koenigsberg itself.

A Soviet infantry unit is fighting on one of the streets of Koenigsberg

BATTLE AMONG THE RUINS

Let's give the floor to Vasilevsky: “By the beginning of the assault, the front had 5,000 guns and mortars, 47% of them were heavy guns, then large and special power ones - with a caliber from 203 to 305 mm. To fire at the most important targets, as well as to prevent the enemy from evacuating troops and equipment along the Koenigsberg Sea Canal, 5 naval railway batteries (11 - 130 mm and 4 - 180 mm guns, the latter with a firing range of up to 34 km).

The ground forces advancing on the city were assisted by large-caliber guns (152- and 203-mm) and 160-mm mortars allocated to the commanders of the rifle divisions. To destroy particularly durable buildings, structures and engineering structures, corps and divisional groups were created, to which rocket artillery was given special power. Assault military groups were also saturated with artillery to the limit: they had up to 70% of divisional artillery, and in some cases, heavy guns.”

And here are the impressions of his opponent von Lyash:

“On April 6, Russian troops launched a general offensive of such power that I have never experienced, despite rich experience in the east and west. About thirty divisions and two air fleets continuously bombarded the fortress with shells from guns of all calibers and “Stalinist organs” for several days. Wave after wave of enemy bombers appeared, dropping their deadly cargo on the burning city, which had turned into piles of ruins.

Our fortress artillery, weak and poor in shells, could not do anything against this fire, and not a single German fighter showed up in the sky. Anti-aircraft batteries were powerless against the cloud of enemy aircraft, and besides, they had difficulty defending against enemy tanks. All means of communication were immediately destroyed, and only foot messengers made their way by touch through the piles of ruins to their command posts or positions.”

The artillery unit of Lieutenant Sofronov's guard is fighting on one of the streets of Koenigsberg. April 9, 1945

The legendary U-2 bombers distinguished themselves here; thanks to their low speed, they fought at low altitudes both at night and in bad weather. They were mainly flown by female pilots, whom the Nazis nicknamed “night witches.”

In Königsberg the Germans had three rings of defense. The first - 6-8 kilometers from the city center - consisted of trenches, an anti-tank ditch, wire fences and minefields, as well as 15 forts with garrisons of 150-200 people with 12-15 guns. The second defense ring ran along the outskirts of the city and consisted of stone buildings, barricades, firing points and minefields. The third ring, in the city center, consisted of nine bastions, towers and ravelins.

The Red Army launched attacks in converging directions simultaneously from the north and south. Another pinning blow on Pillau was intended for the Zemland group.

To storm the fortifications, 26 assault detachments and 104 assault groups were created, which included flamethrowers who literally burned out enemy fortified points, as well as units of chemical troops.

Guardsman V. Surnin, the first to break into one of the buildings in Koenigsberg during the attack on the city, strengthens the flag with his name on the roof of the house


Here are the impressions of the direct participants in the assault.

Senior Sergeant Nikolai Batsev: “We were hunting for “cuckoos” - individual soldiers or groups of soldiers with radio stations that transmitted information about the movement and concentration of our troops. I caught such “cuckoos” twice: they were groups of three people. They hid in fields, in basements on farmsteads, in pits. And Il-2 planes constantly flew over our heads; the Germans called them “Black Death.” I have only seen so many planes when we took Vilnius!”

Lieutenant Nikolai Chernyshov: “The Katyushas began to play, the artillery began to sing, and our 11th Army went on the attack. I remember April 6th well, the moment we entered the city.

After the battle, we ran from the streets into empty apartments and, by inertia, smashed everything with machine guns: glass, mirrors, dishes. My hands were shaking, I had to throw out the energy. And they violated the regulations. The thirst was so tormenting that we, without fear of poisoning, opened jars of cherry and apple compotes and drank!”

Captain Peter Chagin: “On April 7, I and my soldiers went to the German artillery factory, which was located on what is now Dzerzhinsky Street. We went inside: the workshops were intact, the equipment was there, only the windows were broken. And we see - in the middle of the workshop there is a bunch of bicycles. Well, we think the Germans left the ride! It must have been mined. And they checked: they tied a rope, walked around the corner and pulled. It exploded! After all, the Germans laid a couple of infantry mines!”

Senior lieutenant of the medical service Anna Saikina: “I was part of the ORMU - this is a separate company of medical reinforcement, we were thrown into the hottest spots. In East Prussia, unusual Gothic architecture was striking. Despite the fact that the city was destroyed, the sterile cleanliness and neatness of the Germans could be seen everywhere in the surviving places. This surprised us very much then. Our headquarters was located five kilometers from Koenigsberg, somewhere on the road to present-day Svetlogorsk. A medical hospital was set up in the forest.

During the fierce battles for the capture of Koenigsberg, wounded came to us in an endless stream. I remember there was a case where a healthy German Luftwaffe pilot with hard eyes and a dissatisfied face was lying in the ward. Everything felt wrong and wrong for him, as if he had arrived at a resort. So, taking a syringe to give an injection, I chose the thickest needle. He winced and said “schlecht schwesser”, which means “bad nurse”... But we never divided the soldiers into friends and foes, we bandaged, operated on, treated and hid the wounded from the bombings.”

The corpses of German soldiers on the side of the Primorskoye Highway southwest of Koenigsberg, left after the battle. Movement of carts with Soviet soldiers of the 3rd Belorussian Front

PAY

During the assault on one of the forts, the ISU-152 self-propelled gun, commanded by Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya’s brother Alexander, distinguished itself. On the side of his car was written “For Zoya!” Having fired a volley at the thick brick walls of the fort, the self-propelled gun broke through them and immediately burst into the fortification. The garrison of 350 people capitulated. 9 tanks, 200 vehicles and a fuel warehouse were captured. The battery commander was presented with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, which was awarded to him posthumously. Senior Lieutenant Alexander Kosmodemyansky died there, in East Prussia, on April 13 during the assault on the village of Vierbrüderkrug...

On April 8, the garrison was asked to surrender. Some units tried to break through to the west, but were intercepted by the 43rd Army. Some detachments surrendered on their own, without orders, sometimes killing their officers. Lyash himself gave the order to surrender on April 9, while already in captivity. The bunker where he was captured is now a branch of the regional museum of local history. He returned to Germany only in 1955, lived for another 16 years, writing the book “So Konigsberg Fell.” Together with him, up to 90 thousand soldiers and officers were captured.

Soviet sappers clear mines from the streets of Koenigsberg


The irretrievable losses of the 3rd Belorussian Front directly during the assault, according to official data, amounted to 3,700 people, so, considering the city they had to take, the price turned out to be relatively low. Another thing is that in total in East Prussia, again according to official data, 126,640 soldiers and officers of the Red Army died. A terrible, but understandable price for victory in the centuries-old confrontation between Germany and the Slavs.

In total, about 760 thousand people were awarded the medal “For the Capture of Koenigsberg” (which, however, was given to participants in the entire East Prussian operation).

According to the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper, as of April 7, 2009, 283 veterans who participated in the assault remained alive in Kaliningrad. Now, of course, even less.

Group of Heroes of the Soviet Union of the 5th Army, awarded this title for battles in East Prussia.
From left to right: Guards ml Lieutenant Nezdoliy K., Guards. Captain Filosofov A., Major General Gorodovikov B.B., Guards Captain Kotin F., Sergeant Major Voinshin F.


Dmitry MITYURIN, journalist (St. Petersburg)
Photos from the website victory.rusarchives.ru

I apologize for the long quote, but we must somehow fight fascism! We took Koenigsberg, but it’s a shame to give Pandora to the Nazis! Read, you caring people, think about how many signs are there around you?

“Eternal Fascism” is a report given by Umberto Eco at a symposium held by the Italian and French departments of Columbia University (New York) on April 25, 1995, the anniversary of the liberation of Europe. Published under the title "Eternal Fascism" in the New York Review of Books, June 22, 1995.

In my adolescence there were two such years, when there were SS men, fascists and partisans around, everyone was firing at each other, I learned to dodge the shots. A useful skill.

The term "fascism" is used everywhere because even if one or more aspects of the Italian fascist regime are removed, it is still recognizable as fascist.

To overcome this confusion, in my opinion, it is necessary to identify a list of typical characteristics of Eternal Fascism (ur-fascism); in fact, the presence of even one of them is enough for the fascist nebula to begin to condense.

1) The first characteristic of ur-fascism is the cult of tradition. Traditionalism is older than fascism. It has dominated counter-revolutionary Catholic thought since the French Revolution, but it originated in the late Hellenistic period as a reaction to the rationalism of classical Greece.

It follows from this that there is no place for the development of knowledge. The truth has already been proclaimed once and for all; All that remains is to interpret her dark words. Just look at the “clips” of any fascist cultures: they include only traditionalist thinkers. German-fascist gnosis was fed from traditionalist, syncretistic, occult sources. The most important theoretical source of the new Italian right, Julius Evola, confuses the Grail with the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, alchemy with the Holy Roman Empire. The very fact that, in order to enrich their horizons, some of the Italian right has now expanded its scope to include De Maistre, Guenon and Gramsci is a brilliant demonstration of syncretism.

2) Traditionalism inevitably leads to rejection of modernism. Both Italian fascists and German Nazis seemed to adore technology, while traditionalist thinkers usually stigmatized technology, seeing it as a negation of traditional spiritual values. But, in fact, Nazism enjoyed only the external aspect of its industrialization. In the depths of his ideology, the theory of Blut und Boden - “Blood and Soil” - dominated. The denial of the modern world was carried out under the sign of the denial of capitalist modernity. This is, in essence, a denial of the spirit of 1789 (and also, of course, 1776) - the spirit of the Enlightenment. The Age of Rationalism is seen as the beginning of modern depravity. Therefore, ur-fascism can be defined as irrationalism.

3) Irrationalism is closely associated with the cult of action for the sake of action. The action is beautiful in itself and therefore is carried out outside and without reflection. Thinking is an unmanly thing. Culture is seen with suspicion, being a potential carrier of a critical attitude. It’s all here: Goebbels’s statement “When I hear the word “culture”, I grab a gun,” and nice commonplaces about intellectual scum, egg-headed intellectuals, radical snobbery and universities - breeding grounds for the communist infection. Suspicion of the intellectual world always signals the presence of Ur-fascism. Official fascist thinkers were mainly engaged in accusing contemporary culture and the liberal intelligentsia of departing from eternal values.

4) No form of syncretism can bear criticism. The critical approach operates with distinctions, and distinctions are an attribute of modernity. In modern culture, the scientific community respects disagreement as the basis for the development of science. In the eyes of ur-fascism, disagreement is betrayal.

5) Disagreement is also a sign of otherness. Ur-fascism is growing and seeking consensus, exploiting the innate fear of the foreign. The first slogans of the fascist or pre-fascist movement are directed against foreigners. Ur-fascism is thus, by definition, implicated in racism.

6) Ur-fascism is born out of individual or social frustration. Therefore, all historical fascisms were based on frustrated middle classes, suffering from some kind of economic or political crisis and fearing a threat from the irritated lower classes. In our time, when the former “proletarians” are turning into the petty bourgeoisie, and the lumpen are withdrawing from political life, fascism will find an excellent audience in this new majority.

7) For those who are generally socially disadvantaged, ur-fascism says that the only guarantee of their privileges is the fact of birth in a certain country. This is how nationalism is forged. And the only thing that can unite a nation is its enemies. Therefore, at the heart of ur-fascist psychology is an obsession with the idea of ​​a conspiracy, if possible international. People must feel besieged. The best way to focus the audience on a conspiracy is to use xenophobic springs. However, an internal conspiracy is also suitable; Jews are well suited for this, because they are both inside and outside at the same time.

8) Members should feel insulted by the fact that enemies flaunt wealth and flaunt strength. When I was little, I was taught that the British were “a nation of five meals a day.”

The British eat more intensively than the poor but honest Italians. Jews are also rich, and besides, they help their own people and have a secret network of mutual assistance. This is on the one hand; at the same time, the members are convinced that they will be able to defeat any enemy. Thus, thanks to the vibration of rhetorical strings, enemies are depicted at the same time as both too strong and too weak. For this reason, fascisms are doomed to always lose wars: they are not able to objectively assess the combat effectiveness of the enemy.

9) For ur-fascism there is no struggle for life, but there is life for the sake of struggle. If so, pacifism means fraternization with the enemy. Pacifism is reprehensible because life is an eternal struggle. At the same time, there is also a Last Judgment complex. Since the enemy must be - and will be - destroyed, it means that the final battle will take place, as a result of which this movement will gain complete control over the world. In the light of such a “total solution”, the advent of an era of universal peace, a Golden Age, is expected.

However, this contradicts the thesis of permanent war, and not a single fascist leader has yet managed to resolve the resulting contradiction.

10) For all reactionary ideologies, elitism is typical, due to its deep aristocracy. Throughout history, all aristocratic and militaristic elitisms have been based on contempt for the weak.

Ur-fascism professes populist elitism. Ordinary citizens are the best people in the world. The party is composed of the best ordinary citizens. An ordinary citizen can (or is obliged) to become a party member.

However, there cannot be patricians without plebeians. The leader, who knows that he received power not through delegation, but seized it by force, also understands that his strength is based on the weakness of the masses, and this mass is weak enough to need and deserve a Driver.

Therefore, in such societies, organized hierarchically (according to the militaristic model), each individual leader despises, on the one hand, his superiors, and on the other, his subordinates.
This strengthens mass elitism.

11) Anyone and everyone is raised to become a hero. In myth, the hero embodies a rare, extraordinary being; however, in the ideology of ur-fascism, heroism is the norm. The cult of heroism is directly related to the cult of death. It is no coincidence that the Falangists' motto was Viva la muerte! Normal people are told that death is sad, but they must face it with dignity. Believers are told that death is a painful method of achieving supernatural bliss. The hero of ur-fascism longs for death, which was prescribed to him as the best compensation for his heroic life. The hero of ur-fascism cannot bear to die. In heroic impatience, we note in parentheses, he much more often happens to kill others.

12) Since both permanent war and heroism are quite difficult games, ur-fascism transfers its desire for power to the sexual sphere. The cult of masculinity is based on this (that is, disdain for women and the merciless persecution of any non-conformist sexual habits: from chastity to homosexuality). Since sex is a rather difficult game, the hero of ur-fascism is played with a pistol, that is, an ersatz phallus. Constant war games are based on the inescapable invidia penis.

13) Ur-fascism is built on qualitative (qualitative) populism. In a democracy, citizens enjoy individual rights; the totality of citizens exercises their political rights only if there is a quantitative basis: the decisions of the majority are executed. In the eyes of ur-fascism, the individual does not have personal rights, and the People appear as a quality, as a monolithic unity expressing the collective will. Since no number of human beings can actually have a combined will, the Chief claims to represent all. Having lost the right to delegate, ordinary citizens do not act, they are only called upon - part for the whole - to play the role of the People. The people, therefore, exist as a purely theatrical phenomenon.

For an example of quality populism, one need not look to Nuremberg Stadium or Rome's crowded square in front of Mussolini's balcony. In our near future, the prospect of quality populism is television or the Internet, which are able to present the emotional reaction of a selected group of citizens as the “judgment of the people.”

Standing firmly on its qualitative populism, ur-fascism takes up arms against “rotten parliamentary democracies.” The first thing Mussolini said at his speech in the Italian parliament was: “I would like to turn this dull, gray hall into a gym for my children.” He, of course, quickly found a much better refuge for “his kids,” but nevertheless dispersed the parliament.

Every time a politician questions the legitimacy of parliament because it allegedly no longer reflects the “judgment of the people,” the stench of Eternal Fascism is clearly smelt.

14) Ur-fascism speaks Newspeak. Newspeak was invented by Orwell in 1984 as the official language of Ingsoc, English socialism, but elements of ur-fascism are characteristic of a variety of dictatorships. Both Nazi and fascist textbooks were distinguished by poor vocabulary and primitive syntax, wanting to limit as much as possible the set of tools for complex critical thinking for the student. But we must be able to identify other forms of Newspeak, even when they have the innocent appearance of a popular television talk show.



Did you like the article? Share with your friends!