July '43... These hot days and nights of war are an integral part of the history of the Soviet Army with the Nazi invaders. The front, in its configuration in the area near Kursk, resembled a giant arc. This segment attracted the attention of the fascist command. The German command prepared the offensive operation as revenge. The Nazis spent a lot of time and effort developing the plan.

Hitler's operational order began with the words: “I have decided, as soon as weather conditions permit, to carry out the Citadel offensive - the first offensive of this year... It must end with quick and decisive success.” Everything was gathered by the Nazis into a powerful fist. The fast-moving tanks “Tigers” and “Panthers” and super-heavy self-propelled guns “Ferdinands”, according to the Nazis’ plan, were supposed to crush and scatter the Soviet troops, and turn the tide of events.

Operation Citadel

The Battle of Kursk began on the night of July 5, when a captured German sapper said during interrogation that the German Operation Citadel would begin at three in the morning. There were only a few minutes left before the decisive battle... The Military Council of the front had to make a very important decision, and it was made. On July 5, 1943, at two hours and twenty minutes, the silence exploded with the thunder of our guns... The battle that began lasted until August 23.

As a result, events on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War resulted in the defeat of Hitler's groups. The strategy of Operation Citadel of the Wehrmacht on the Kursk bridgehead is crushing blows using surprise against the forces of the Soviet Army, encircling and destroying them. The triumph of the Citadel plan was to ensure the implementation of further plans of the Wehrmacht. To thwart the plans of the Nazis, the General Staff developed a strategy aimed at defending the battle and creating conditions for the liberation actions of the Soviet troops.

Progress of the Battle of Kursk

The actions of the Army Group "Center" and the Task Force "Kempf" of the Armies "South", which came from Orel and Belgorod in the battle on the Central Russian Upland, were to decide not only the fate of these cities, but also change the entire subsequent course of the war. Reflecting the attack from Orel was entrusted to the formations of the Central Front. Units of the Voronezh Front were supposed to meet the advancing detachments from Belgorod.

The steppe front, consisting of rifle, tank, mechanized and cavalry corps, was entrusted with a bridgehead in the rear of the Kursk bend. On July 12, 1943, on the Russian field near the Prokhorovka railway station, the greatest end-to-end tank battle took place, noted by historians as unprecedented in the world, the largest end-to-end tank battle in terms of scale. Russian strength on its own soil passed another test and turned the course of history towards victory.

One day of battle cost the Wehrmacht 400 tanks and almost 10 thousand human losses. Hitler's groups were forced to go on the defensive. The battle on the Prokhorovsky field was continued by units of the Bryansk, Central and Western fronts, starting Operation Kutuzov, the task of which was to defeat enemy groups in the Orel area. From July 16 to 18, the corps of the Central and Steppe Fronts eliminated Nazi groups in the Kursk Triangle and began pursuing it with the support of air forces. With their combined forces, Hitler's formations were thrown back 150 km to the west. The cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov were liberated.

The meaning of the Battle of Kursk

• Of unprecedented force, the most powerful tank battle in history, was key in the development of further offensive actions in the Great Patriotic War;
• The Battle of Kursk is the main part of the strategic tasks of the General Staff of the Red Army in the plans of the 1943 campaign;
• As a result of the implementation of the “Kutuzov” plan and the “Commander Rumyantsev” operation, units of Hitler’s troops in the area of ​​​​the cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov were defeated. The strategic Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov bridgeheads have been liquidated;
• The end of the battle meant the complete transfer of strategic initiatives into the hands of the Soviet Army, which continued to advance to the West, liberating cities and towns.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

• The failure of the Wehrmacht's Operation Citadel presented to the world community the impotence and complete defeat of Hitler's campaign against the Soviet Union;
• A radical change in the situation on the Soviet-German front and throughout as a result of the “fiery” Battle of Kursk;
• The psychological breakdown of the German army was obvious; there was no longer confidence in the superiority of the Aryan race.

Battle of Kursk, 1943

Since March 1943, the headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) has been working on a strategic offensive plan, the task of which was to defeat the main forces of Army Group South and Center and crush enemy defenses on the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. It was assumed that Soviet troops would be the first to go on the offensive. However, in mid-April, based on information that the Wehrmacht command was planning to launch an offensive near Kursk, it was decided to bleed the German troops with a powerful defense and then launch a counteroffensive. Possessing strategic initiative, the Soviet side deliberately began military operations not with an offensive, but with a defense. The development of events showed that this plan was correct.

Since the spring of 1943, Nazi Germany has launched intense preparations for the offensive. The Nazis established mass production of new medium and heavy tanks and increased the production of guns, mortars and combat aircraft compared to 1942. Due to total mobilization, they almost completely made up for the losses suffered in personnel.

The fascist German command decided to conduct a major offensive operation in the summer of 1943 and once again seize the strategic initiative. The idea of ​​the operation was to encircle and destroy Soviet troops in the Kursk salient with powerful counter strikes from the areas of Orel and Belgorod to Kursk. In the future, the enemy intended to defeat Soviet troops in the Donbass. To carry out the operation near Kursk, called “Citadel,” the enemy concentrated enormous forces and appointed the most experienced military leaders: 50 divisions, among others. 16 tanks, Army Group Center (commander Field Marshal G. Kluge) and Army Group South (commander Field Marshal E. Manstein). In total, the enemy strike forces included over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, and more than 2,000 aircraft. An important place in the enemy's plan was given to the use of new military equipment - Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as new aircraft (Focke-Wulf-190A fighters and Henschel-129 attack aircraft).

The Soviet command countered the offensive of fascist German troops against the northern and southern fronts of the Kursk ledge, which began on July 5, 1943, with a strong active defense. The enemy, attacking Kursk from the north, was stopped four days later. He managed to wedge 10-12 km into the defense of the Soviet troops. The group advancing on Kursk from the south advanced 35 km, but did not reach its goal.

On July 12, Soviet troops, having exhausted the enemy, launched a counteroffensive. On this day, in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka railway station, the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place (up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns on both sides). Developing the offensive, Soviet ground forces, supported by air strikes from the 2nd and 17th Air Armies, as well as long-range aviation, by August 23 pushed the enemy back 140-150 km to the west, liberating Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov.

The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions, over 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1.5 thousand tanks, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The balance of forces at the front changed sharply in favor of the Red Army, which provided it with favorable conditions for the deployment of a general strategic offensive.

Having revealed the offensive plan of the fascist German command, the Supreme High Command Headquarters decided to exhaust and bleed the enemy’s strike forces through deliberate defense, and then complete their complete defeat with a decisive counteroffensive. The defense of the Kursk ledge was entrusted to the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts. Both fronts numbered more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3,300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,650 aircraft. The troops of the Central Front (48, 13, 70, 65, 60th combined arms armies, 2nd tank army, 16th air army, 9th and 19th separate tank corps) under the command of General K. K. Rokossovsky should were to repel the enemy's attack from Orel. In front of the Voronezh Front (38th, 40th, 6th and 7th Guards, 69th Armies, 1st Tank Army, 2nd Air Army, 35th Guards Rifle Corps, 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps) , commanded by General N.F. Vatutin, was tasked with repelling the enemy’s attack from Belgorod. In the rear of the Kursk ledge, the Steppe Military District was deployed (from July 9 - Steppe Front: 4th and 5th Guards, 27th, 47th, 53rd Armies, 5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Air Army, 1 Rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized, 3 cavalry corps), which was the strategic reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters.

Enemy troops: in the Oryol-Kursk direction - the 9th and 2nd armies of Army Group "Center" (50 divisions, including 16 motorized tank divisions; commander - Field Marshal G. Kluge), in the Belgorod-Kursk direction - 4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf of Army Group South (commander - Field Marshal General E. Manstein).

The commander of the central front considered Ponyri and Kursk the most likely direction of action for the enemy's main forces, and Maloarkhangelsk and Gnilets as auxiliary forces. Therefore, he decided to concentrate the main forces of the front on the right wing. The decisive massing of forces and assets in the direction of the expected enemy attack made it possible to create high densities in the 13th Army zone (32 km) - 94 guns and mortars, of which more than 30 anti-tank artillery guns, and about 9 tanks per 1 km of front.

The commander of the Voronezh Front determined that the enemy’s attack could be in the directions of Belgorod and Oboyan; Belgorod, Korocha; Volchansk, Novy Oskol. Therefore, it was decided to concentrate the main forces in the center and on the left wing of the front. Unlike the Central Front, the first-echelon armies received wide defense zones. However, even here, in the zone of the 6th and 7th Guards armies, the density of anti-tank artillery was 15.6 guns per 1 km of front, and taking into account the assets located in the second echelon of the front, up to 30 guns per 1 km of front.

Based on our intelligence data and the testimony of prisoners, it was established that the enemy offensive would begin on July 5. Early in the morning of this day, artillery counter-preparation, planned in the fronts and armies, was carried out on the Voronezh and central fronts. As a result, it was possible to delay the enemy’s advance for 1.5 - 2 hours and somewhat weaken his initial blow.

On the morning of July 5, the Oryol enemy group, under the cover of artillery fire and with the support of aviation, went on the offensive, delivering the main blow to Olkhovatka, and auxiliary blows to Maloarkhangelsk and Fatezh. Our troops met the enemy with exceptional resilience. The Nazi troops suffered heavy losses. Only after the fifth attack did they manage to break into the front line of defense of the 29th Rifle Corps in the Olkhovat direction.

In the afternoon, the commander of the 13th Army, General N.P. Pukhov, moved several tank and self-propelled artillery units and mobile barrage units to the main line, and the front commander moved howitzer and mortar brigades to the Olkhovatka area. Decisive counterattacks by tanks in cooperation with rifle units and artillery stopped the enemy’s advance. On this day, fierce battles also broke out in the air. The 16th Air Army supported the fighting of the defending troops of the central front. By the end of the day, at the cost of huge losses, the enemy managed to advance 6-8 km in the Olkhovat direction. In other directions his attacks were unsuccessful.

Having determined the direction of the enemy's main efforts, the front commander decided on the morning of July 6 to launch a counterattack from the Olkhovatka area to Gnilusha in order to restore the position of the 13th Army. The 17th Guards Rifle Corps of the 13th Army, the 2nd Tank Army of General A.G. Rodin and the 19th Tank Corps were involved in the counterattack. As a result of the counterattack, the enemy was stopped in front of the second line of defense and, having suffered heavy losses, was unable to continue the offensive in all three directions in the following days. After delivering a counterattack, the 2nd Tank Army and the 19th Tank Corps went on the defensive behind the second line, which strengthened the position of the troops of the Central Front.

On the same day, the enemy launched an offensive in the direction of Oboyan and Korocha; The main blows were taken by the 6th and 7th Guards, 69th Army and 1st Tank Army.

Having failed to achieve success in the Olkhovat direction, the enemy launched an attack on Ponyri on the morning of July 7, where the 307th Rifle Division was defending. During the day she repelled eight attacks. When enemy units broke into the northwestern outskirts of the Ponyri station, the division commander, General M.A. Enshin, concentrated artillery and mortar fire on them, then launched a counterattack with the forces of the second echelon and the attached tank brigade and restored the situation. On July 8 and 9, the enemy continued attacks on Olkhovatka and Ponyri, and on July 10, against the troops of the right flank of the 70th Army, but all his attempts to break through the second line of defense were thwarted.

Having exhausted their reserves, the enemy was forced to abandon the offensive and on July 11 went on the defensive.

German soldiers in front of a Tiger tank, during the Battle of Kursk in June-July 1943

The enemy also launched a general offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front on the morning of July 5, delivering the main attack with the forces of the 4th Tank Army on Oboyan, and with the auxiliary operational group Kempf on Korocha. The fighting became especially fierce in the Oboyan direction. In the first half of the day, the commander of the 6th Guards Army, General I.M. Chistyakov, moved to the first line of defense part of the anti-tank artillery brigade, two tank and one self-propelled artillery regiments and a tank brigade. By the end of the day, the troops of this army inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and stopped his attacks. The main line of our defense was broken through only in certain areas. In the Korochan direction, the enemy managed to cross the Northern Donets south of Belgorod and seize a small bridgehead.

In the current situation, the front commander decided to cover the Oboyan direction. To this end, on the night of July 6, he moved the 1st Tank Army of General M.E. Katukov, as well as the 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, operationally subordinate to the 6th Guards Army, to the second line of defense. In addition, the army was reinforced with front-line artillery.

On the morning of July 6, the enemy resumed the offensive in all directions. In the Oboyan direction, he repeatedly launched attacks from 150 to 400 tanks, but each time he met powerful fire from infantry, artillery and tanks. Only towards the end of the day did he manage to wedge into the second line of our defense.

On that day, in the Korochan direction, the enemy managed to complete the breakthrough of the main defense line, but its further advance was stopped.

Heavy German tanks "Tiger" (Panzerkampfwagen VI "Tiger I") at the attack line, south of Orel. Battle of Kursk, mid-July 1943

On July 7 and 8, the Nazis, bringing fresh reserves into the battle, again tried to break through to Oboyan, expand the breakthrough towards the flanks and deepen it in the direction of Prokhorovka. Up to 300 enemy tanks were rushing to the northeast. However, all enemy attempts were paralyzed by the active actions of the 10th and 2nd Tank Corps, advanced from the reserves of the Headquarters to the Prokhorovka area, as well as by the active actions of the 2nd and 17th Air Armies. In the Korochan direction, enemy attacks were also repulsed. The counterattack carried out on July 8 by formations of the 40th Army on the left flank of the enemy’s 4th Tank Army, and by units of the 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps on its left flank, significantly eased the position of our troops in the Oboyan direction.

From July 9 to July 11, the enemy brought additional reserves into the battle and at any cost sought to break through along the Belgorod highway to Kursk. The front command promptly deployed part of its artillery to help the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies. In addition, to cover the Oboyan direction, the 10th Tank Corps was regrouped from the Prokhorovka area and the main aviation forces were targeted, and the 5th Guards Tank Corps was regrouped to strengthen the right flank of the 1st Tank Army. Through the joint efforts of ground forces and aviation, almost all enemy attacks were repulsed. Only on July 9, in the Kochetovka area, enemy tanks managed to break through to the third line of our defense. But two divisions of the 5th Guards Army of the Steppe Front and advanced tank brigades of the 5th Guards Tank Army were advanced against them, which stopped the advance of enemy tanks.

SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf", Kursk, 1943.

There was clearly a crisis brewing in the enemy's offensive. Therefore, the chairman of the Supreme Command headquarters, Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky and the commander of the Voronezh Front, General N. F. Vatutin, decided on the morning of July 12 to launch a counterattack from the Prokhorovka area with the forces of the 5th Guards Army of General A. S. Zhdanov and the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P. A. Rotmistrov, as well as the forces of the 6th Guards and 1st Tank Armies in the general direction of Yakovlevo with the goal of the final defeat of the wedged enemy group. From the air, the counterattack was to be provided by the main forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies.

On the morning of July 12, the troops of the Voronezh Front launched a counterattack. The main events took place in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka railway station (on the Belgorod - Kursk line, 56 km north of Belgorod), where the largest oncoming tank battle of the Second World War took place between the advancing enemy tank group (4th Tank Army, Task Force Kempf ") and the Soviet troops that launched a counterattack (5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Guards Army). On both sides, up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns simultaneously participated in the battle. Air support for the enemy strike force was provided by aviation from Army Group South. Air strikes against the enemy were carried out by the 2nd Air Army, units of the 17th Air Army, and long-range aviation (about 1,300 sorties were carried out). During the day of battle, the enemy lost up to 400 tanks and assault guns, over 10 thousand people. Having failed to achieve the intended goal - to capture Kursk from the southeast, the enemy (advanced on the southern front of the Kursk ledge to a maximum of 35 km) went on the defensive.

On July 12, a turning point occurred in the Battle of Kursk. By order of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the troops of the Western and Bryansk Fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. Hitler's command was forced to abandon offensive plans and on July 16 began to withdraw its troops to their original position. The troops of the Voronezh, and from July 18, the Steppe fronts began to pursue the enemy and by the end of July 23 they had mostly reached the line they occupied at the beginning of the defensive battle.

Source: I.S. Konev "Notes of the Front Commander, 1943-1945", Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1989.

The Oryol salient was defended by the troops of the 2nd Tank and 9th Field Armies, which were part of the Center group. They consisted of 27 infantry, 10 tank and motorized divisions. Here the enemy created a strong defense, the tactical zone of which consisted of two stripes with a total depth of 12 - 15 km. They had a developed system of trenches, communication passages and a large number of armored firing points. A number of intermediate defensive lines were prepared in the operational depth. The total depth of its defense on the Oryol bridgehead reached 150 km.

The Oryol group of the enemy was ordered by the Supreme Command Headquarters to defeat the troops of the left wing of the Western Front and the main forces of the Bryansk and Central Fronts. The idea of ​​the operation was to cut the enemy group into separate parts and destroy it with counter strikes from the north, east and south in the general direction of Oryol.

The Western Front (commanded by General V.D. Sokolovsky) received the task of delivering the main blow with the troops of the 11th Guards Army from the area southwest of Kozelsk to Khotynets, preventing the withdrawal of Nazi troops from Orel to the west and, in cooperation with other fronts, destroying them; with part of the forces, together with the 61st Army of the Bryansk Front, encircle and destroy the Bolkhov enemy group; carry out an auxiliary strike by troops of the 50th Army on Zhizdra.

The Bryansk Front (commanded by General M. M. Popov) was supposed to deliver the main blow with the troops of the 3rd and 63rd armies from the Novosil area to Orel, and the auxiliary blow with the forces of the 61st Army to Bolkhov.

The Central Front had the task of eliminating the wedged enemy group north of Olkhovatka, subsequently developing an attack on Kromy and, in cooperation with the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts, completing the defeat of the enemy in the Oryol salient.

Preparations for the operation at the fronts were carried out taking into account the fact that they had to break through the enemy’s prepared and deeply echeloned defenses for the first time and develop tactical success at a high pace. For this purpose, a decisive massing of forces and means was carried out, the combat formations of troops were echeloned deeper, success development echelons were created in the armies, consisting of one or two tank corps, the offensive was to be carried out day and night.

For example, with the total width of the 11th Guards Army's offensive zone being 36 km, a decisive massing of forces and assets was achieved in the 14-kilometer breakthrough area, which ensured an increase in operational-tactical densities. The average artillery density in the army breakthrough area reached 185, and in the 8th Guards Rifle Corps - 232 guns and mortars per 1 km of front. If the offensive zones of the divisions in the counteroffensive near Stalingrad fluctuated within 5 km, then in the 8th Guards Rifle Regiment they were narrowed to 2 km. What was new compared to the counteroffensive at Stalingrad was that the battle formation of rifle corps, divisions, regiments and battalions was formed, as a rule, in two and sometimes in three echelons. This ensured an increase in the force of the strike from the depths and the timely development of the emerging success.

Characteristic of the use of artillery was the creation in armies of destruction and long-range artillery groups, groups of guards mortars and anti-aircraft artillery groups. The artillery training schedule in some armies began to include a period of shooting and destruction.

There have been changes in the use of tanks. For the first time, self-propelled artillery regiments were included in the tank groups for direct support of infantry (NTS), which were supposed to advance behind the tanks and support their actions with the fire of their guns. Moreover, in some armies, NPP tanks were assigned not only to the rifle divisions of the first, but also to the second echelon of the corps. Tank corps constituted mobile army groups, and tank armies were intended to be used for the first time as mobile groups of fronts.

The combat operations of our troops were to be supported by more than 3 thousand aircraft of the 1st, 15th and 16th Air Armies (commanded by Generals M.M. Gromov, N.F. Naumenko, S.I. Rudenko) of the Western, Bryansk and Central Fronts, and also long-range aviation.

Aviation was assigned the following tasks: to cover the troops of strike groups of the fronts during the preparation and conduct of operations; suppress resistance centers at the front line and in the immediate depths and disrupt the enemy command and control system for the period of aviation training; from the beginning of the attack, continuously accompany the infantry and tanks; ensure the introduction of tank formations into battle and their operations in operational depth; fight against suitable enemy reserves.

The counter-offensive was preceded by a lot of preparatory work. On all fronts, the initial areas for the offensive were well equipped, troops were regrouped, and large reserves of material and technical resources were created. A day before the offensive, reconnaissance in force was carried out on the fronts by the forward battalions, which made it possible to clarify the true outline of the front line of the enemy’s defense, and in some areas to capture the front trench.

On the morning of July 12, after powerful air and artillery preparation, which lasted about three hours, the troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive. The greatest success was achieved in the direction of the main attack of the Western Front. By mid-day, the troops of the 11th Guards Army (commanded by General I. Kh. Bagramyan), thanks to the timely entry into battle of the second echelons of rifle regiments and separate tank brigades, broke through the main enemy defense line and crossed the Fomina River. In order to quickly complete the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical zone, on the afternoon of July 12, the 5th Tank Corps was introduced into the battle in the direction of Bolkhov. On the morning of the second day of the operation, the second echelons of rifle corps entered the battle, which, together with tank units, bypassing strong strongholds of the enemy, with the active support of artillery and aviation, completed the breakthrough of the second line of its defense by mid-July 13.

After completing the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone, the 5th Tank Corps and its 1st Tank Corps, introduced into the breakthrough to the right, together with the advanced detachments of rifle formations, proceeded to pursue the enemy. By the morning of July 15, they reached the Vytebet River and crossed it on the move, and by the end of the next day they cut the Bolkhov-Khotynets road. To delay their advance, the enemy pulled up reserves and launched a series of counterattacks.

In this situation, the commander of the 11th Guards Army regrouped the 36th Guards Rifle Corps from the left flank of the army and moved here the 25th Tank Corps, transferred from the front reserve. Having repelled enemy counterattacks, the troops of the 11th Guards Army resumed the offensive and by July 19 advanced up to 60 km, expanding the breakthrough to 120 km and covering the left flank of the Bolkhov enemy group from the southwest.

In order to develop the operation, the Supreme High Command Headquarters strengthened the western front with the 11th Army (commanded by General I. I. Fedyuninsky). After a long march, on July 20, an incomplete army was immediately introduced into battle at the junction between the 50th and 11th Guards armies in the direction of Khvostovichi. In five days, she broke the stubborn resistance of the enemy and advanced 15 km.

In order to completely defeat the enemy and develop the offensive, the commander of the Western Front in the middle of the day on July 26 brought into battle in the zone of the 11th Guards Army the 4th Tank Army transferred to him from the Headquarters reserve (commander General V.M. Badanov).

Having an operational formation in two echelons, the 4th Tank Army, after a short artillery preparation with the support of aviation, launched an offensive on Bolkhov, and then struck at Khotynets and Karachev. In five days she advanced 12 - 20 km. She had to break through intermediate defensive lines previously occupied by enemy troops. Through its actions, the 4th Tank Army contributed to the 61st Army of the Bryansk Front in the liberation of Bolkhov.

On July 30, the troops of the left wing of the Western Front (11th Guards, 4th Tank, 11th Army and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps) in connection with the preparation of the Smolensk offensive operation were transferred to the subordination of the Bryansk Front.

The offensive of the Bryansk Front developed much more slowly than that of the Western Front. The troops of the 61st Army under the command of General P. A. Belov, together with the 20th Tank Corps, broke through the enemy’s defenses and, repelling his counterattacks, liberated Bolkhov on July 29.

The troops of the 3rd and 63rd armies, with the 1st Guards Tank Corps introduced into the battle in the middle of the second day of the offensive, completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone by the end of July 13. By July 18, they approached the Oleshnya River, where they encountered fierce enemy resistance at the rear defensive line.

In order to speed up the defeat of the enemy's Oryol group, the Supreme High Command Headquarters transferred the 3rd Guards Tank Army (commanded by General P. S. Rybalko) from its reserve to the Bryansk Front. On the morning of July 19, it, with the support of formations of the 1st and 15th Air Armies and long-range aviation, went on the offensive from the Bogdanovo-Podmaslovo line and, repelling strong counterattacks of the enemy, by the end of the day broke through its defenses on the Oleshnya River. On the night of July 20, the tank army, having regrouped, struck in the direction of Otrada, assisting the Bryansk Front in defeating the Mtsensk enemy group. On the morning of July 21, after a regrouping of forces, the army attacked Stanovoy Kolodez and captured it on July 26. The next day it was transferred to the Central Front.

The offensive of the troops of the Western and Bryansk Fronts forced the enemy to pull back part of the forces of the Oryol group from the Kursk direction and thereby created a favorable situation for the troops of the right wing of the Central Front to launch a counteroffensive. By July 18, they had restored their previous position and continued to advance in the direction of Krom.

By the end of July, troops on three fronts captured the enemy’s Oryol group from the north, east and south. The fascist German command, trying to prevent the threat of encirclement, on July 30 began the withdrawal of all its troops from the Oryol bridgehead. Soviet troops began pursuit. On the morning of August 4, the troops of the left wing of the Bryansk Front broke into Oryol and by the morning of August 5 liberated it. On the same day, Belgorod was liberated by the troops of the Steppe Front.

Having captured Orel, our troops continued the offensive. On August 18 they reached the Zhizdra, Litizh line. As a result of the Oryol operation, 14 enemy divisions were defeated (including 6 tank divisions)

3. Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (August 3 - 23, 1943)

The Belgorod-Kharkov bridgehead was defended by the 4th Tank Army and the Kempf task force. They consisted of 18 divisions, including 4 tank divisions. Here the enemy created 7 defensive lines with a total depth of up to 90 km, as well as 1 contour around Belgorod and 2 around Kharkov.

The idea of ​​the Supreme High Command headquarters was to use powerful blows from troops from adjacent wings of the Voronezh and steppe fronts to cut the opposing enemy group into two parts, subsequently deeply envelop it in the Kharkov region and, in cooperation with the 57th Army of the Southwestern Front, destroy it.

The troops of the Voronezh Front delivered the main blow with the forces of two combined arms and two tank armies from the area northeast of Tomarovka to Bogodukhov, Valki, bypassing Kharkov from the west, an auxiliary blow, also by the forces of two combined arms armies, from the Proletarsky area in the direction of Boromlya, in order to cover the main groups from the West.

The steppe front under the command of General I. S. Konev delivered the main blow with troops of the 53rd and part of the forces of the 69th armies from the area north-west of Belgorod to Kharkov from the north, an auxiliary blow was delivered by the forces of the 7th Guards Army from the area south-east of Belgorod to west direction.

By decision of the commander of the Southwestern Front, General R. Ya. Malinovsky, the 57th Army launched a strike from the Martovaya area to Merefa, covering Kharkov from the southeast.

From the air, the offensive of the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts was ensured by the 2nd and 5th air armies of generals S.A. Krasovsky and S.K. Goryunov, respectively. In addition, part of the long-range aviation forces was involved.

To achieve success in breaking through the enemy’s defenses, the command of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts decisively massed forces and assets in the directions of their main attacks, which made it possible to create high operational densities. Thus, in the zone of the 5th Guards Army of the Voronezh Front, they reached 1.5 km per rifle division, 230 guns and mortars and 70 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of front.

There were characteristic features in planning the use of artillery and tanks. Artillery destruction groups were created not only in armies, but also in corps operating in the main directions. Separate tank and mechanized corps were to be used as mobile army groups, and tank armies - as a mobile group of the Voronezh Front, which was new in the art of war.

The tank armies were planned to be brought into battle in the offensive zone of the 5th Guards Army. They were supposed to operate in the directions: 1st Tank Army - Bogodolov, 5th Guards Tank Army - Zolochev and by the end of the third or fourth day of the operation reach the Valka, Lyubotin area, thereby cutting off the retreat of the Kharkov enemy group to the west.

Artillery and engineering support for the entry of tank armies into battle was assigned to the 5th Guards Army.

For aviation support, each tank army was allocated one assault and fighter aviation division.

In preparing for the operation, it was instructive to disinform the enemy about the true direction of the main attack of our troops. From July 28 to August 6, the 38th Army, operating on the right wing of the Voronezh Front, skillfully imitated the concentration of a large group of troops in the Sumy direction. The fascist German command not only began to bombard areas of false troop concentrations, but also kept a significant number of its reserves in this direction.

A special feature was that the operation was prepared in a limited time. Nevertheless, the troops of both fronts were able to prepare for the offensive and provide themselves with the necessary material resources.

Hiding behind destroyed enemy tanks, the soldiers move forward, Belgorod direction, August 2, 1943.

On August 3, after powerful artillery preparation and air strikes, front troops, supported by a barrage of fire, went on the offensive and successfully broke through the first enemy position. With the introduction of second echelons of regiments into battle, the second position was broken through. To increase the efforts of the 5th Guards Army, advanced tank brigades of the corps of the first echelon of tank armies were brought into battle. They, together with rifle divisions, completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s main defense line. Following the advanced brigades, the main forces of the tank armies were brought into battle. By the end of the day, they had overcome the second line of enemy defense and advanced 12 - 26 km in depth, thereby separating the Tomarov and Belgorod centers of enemy resistance.

Simultaneously with the tank armies, the following were introduced into the battle: in the zone of the 6th Guards Army - the 5th Guards Tank Corps, and in the zone of the 53rd Army - the 1st Mechanized Corps. They, together with rifle formations, broke the enemy’s resistance, completed the breakthrough of the main defensive line, and by the end of the day approached the second defensive line. Having broken through the tactical defense zone and destroyed the nearest operational reserves, the main strike group of the Voronezh Front began pursuing the enemy in the morning of the second day of the operation.

On August 4, troops of the 1st Tank Army from the Tomarovka area began to develop an offensive to the south. Its 6th Tank and 3rd Mechanized Corps, with reinforced tank brigades ahead, advanced 70 km by mid-day on August 6th. In the afternoon of the next day, the 6th Tank Corps liberated Bogodukhov.

The 5th Guards Tank Army, bypassing the enemy's centers of resistance from the west, struck at Zolochev and broke into the city on August 6.

By this time, the troops of the 6th Guards Army had captured the strong enemy defense center of Tomarovka, surrounded and destroyed his Borisov group. The 4th and 5th Guards Tank Corps played a major role in this. Developing an offensive in the southwestern direction, they bypassed the Borisov group of Germans from the west and east, and on August 7, with a swift strike, they broke into Grayvoron, thereby cutting off the enemy’s escape routes to the west and south. This was facilitated by the actions of the auxiliary group of the Voronezh Front, which went on the offensive on the morning of August 5 in its direction.

The troops of the Steppe Front, having completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone on August 4, captured Belgorod by storm by the end of the next day, after which they began to develop an offensive against Kharkov. By the end of August 7, the breakthrough front of our troops had reached 120 km. Tank armies advanced to a depth of 100 km, and combined arms armies - up to 60 - 65 km.

Kislov Photos

The troops of the 40th and 27th armies, continuing to develop the offensive, reached the Bromlya, Trostyanets, Akhtyrka line by August 11. A company of the 12th Guards Tank Brigade, led by Captain I.A. Tereshchuk, broke into Akhtyrka on August 10, where it was surrounded by the enemy. For two days, Soviet tank crews, without communication with the brigade, were in besieged tanks, repelling the fierce attacks of the Nazis who tried to capture them alive. Over two days of fighting, the company destroyed 6 tanks, 2 self-propelled guns, 5 armored cars and up to 150 enemy soldiers and officers. With two surviving tanks, Captain Tereshchuk fought out of the encirclement and returned to his brigade. For decisive and skillful actions in battle, Captain I. A. Tereshchuk was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

By August 10, the main forces of the 1st Tank Army reached the Merchik River. After capturing the city of Zolochev, the 5th Guards Tank Army was reassigned to the Steppe Front and began regrouping in the Bogodukhov area.

Advancing behind the tank armies, the troops of the 6th Guards Army reached northeast of Krasnokutsk by August 11, and the 5th Guards Army captured Kharkov from the west. By this time, the troops of the Steppe Front had approached the outer defensive perimeter of Kharkov from the north, and the 57th Army, transferred to this front on August 8, from the east and southeast.

The fascist German command, fearing the encirclement of the Kharkov group, by August 11 concentrated three tank divisions east of Bogodukhov (Reich, Death's Head, Viking) and on the morning of August 12 launched a counterattack on the advancing troops of the 1st Tank Army in the general direction on Bogodukhov. An oncoming tank battle unfolded. During this, the enemy pushed back the formations of the 1st Tank Army by 3-4 km, but was unable to break through to Bogodukhov. On the morning of August 13, the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank, 6th and 5th Guards armies were brought into battle. The main forces of front-line aviation were also sent here. It conducted reconnaissance and carried out operations to disrupt the railway and road transport of the Nazis, assisted combined arms and tank armies in repelling counterattacks of the Nazi troops. By the end of August 17, our troops finally thwarted the enemy’s counterattack from the south on Bogodukhov.

Tankers and machine gunners of the 15th Guards Mechanized Brigade advance on the city of Amvrosievka, August 23, 1943.

However, the fascist German command did not abandon its plan. On the morning of August 18, it launched a counterattack from the Akhtyrka area with three tank and motorized divisions and broke through the front of the 27th Army. Against this enemy grouping, the commander of the Voronezh Front advanced the 4th Guards Army, transferred from the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, the 3rd mechanized and 6th tank corps of the 1st Tank Army from the Bogodukhov area, and also used the 4th and 5th separate guards tank corps. These forces, by striking the enemy’s flanks by the end of August 19, stopped his advance from the west to Bogodukhov. Then the troops of the right wing of the Voronezh Front struck at the rear of the Akhtyrka group of Germans and completely defeated it.

At the same time, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began the assault on Kharkov. On the night of August 23, formations of the 69th and 7th Guards armies captured the city.

Soviet soldiers inspect a German heavy tank "Panther" destroyed on the Prokhorovsky bridgehead, Belgorod region. 1943

Photo - A. Morkovkin

The troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts defeated 15 enemy divisions, advanced 140 km in the southern and southwestern direction, and came close to the Donbass enemy group. Soviet troops liberated Kharkov. During the occupation and battles, the Nazis destroyed about 300 thousand civilians and prisoners of war in the city and region (according to incomplete data), about 160 thousand people were driven to Germany, they destroyed 1,600 thousand m2 of housing, over 500 industrial enterprises, all cultural and educational , medical and communal institutions.

Thus, Soviet troops completed the defeat of the entire Belgorod-Kharkov enemy group and took an advantageous position to launch a general offensive with the aim of liberating Left Bank Ukraine and Donbass.

4. Main conclusions.

The counteroffensive of the Red Army near Kursk ended in an outstanding victory for us. Irreversible losses were inflicted on the enemy, and all his attempts to hold strategic bridgeheads in the Orel and Kharkov areas were thwarted.

The success of the counteroffensive was ensured primarily by the skillful choice of the moment when our troops went on the offensive. It began in conditions when the main German attack groups suffered huge losses and a crisis was defined in their offensive. Success was also ensured by the skillful organization of strategic interaction between groups of fronts attacking in the western and southwestern, as well as in other directions. This did not allow the fascist German command to regroup troops in areas that were dangerous to them.

The success of the counteroffensive was greatly influenced by the large strategic reserves of the Supreme High Command Headquarters previously created in the Kursk direction, which were used to develop the offensive of the fronts.

For the first time, Soviet troops solved the problem of breaking through the enemy’s previously prepared, deeply echeloned defense and subsequent development of operational success. This was achieved thanks to the creation of powerful strike groups in the fronts and armies, the massing of forces and means in breakthrough areas and the presence of tank formations in the fronts, and large tank (mechanized) formations in the armies.

Before the start of the counteroffensive, reconnaissance in force was carried out more widely than in previous operations, not only by reinforced companies, but also by advanced battalions.

During the counteroffensive, the fronts and armies gained experience in repelling counterattacks from large enemy tank formations. It was carried out with close cooperation between all branches of the military and aviation. In order to stop the enemy and defeat his advancing troops, fronts and armies with part of their forces switched to a tough defense while simultaneously delivering a powerful blow to the flank and rear of the enemy’s counterattack group. As a result of the increase in the number of military equipment and reinforcement means, the tactical densities of our troops in the counteroffensive near Kursk increased by 2 - 3 times in comparison with the counteroffensive near Stalingrad.

What was new in the field of offensive combat tactics was the transition of units and formations from single-echelon to deeply echeloned combat formations. This turned out to be possible due to the narrowing of their sectors and offensive zones.

In the counteroffensive near Kursk, the methods of using military branches and aviation were improved. On a larger scale, tank and mechanized troops were used. The density of NPP tanks compared to the counteroffensive at Stalingrad increased and amounted to 15 - 20 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of front. However, when breaking through a strong, deeply layered enemy defense, such densities turned out to be insufficient. Tank and mechanized corps became the main means of developing the success of combined arms armies, and tank armies of a homogeneous composition became the echelon for developing the success of the front. Their use to complete the breakthrough of a previously prepared positional defense was a necessary measure, often leading to significant tank losses and weakening of tank formations and formations, but in specific conditions the situation justified itself. For the first time, self-propelled artillery regiments were widely used near Kursk. Experience has shown that they were an effective means of supporting the advance of tanks and infantry.

There were also peculiarities in the use of artillery: the density of guns and mortars in the direction of the main attack increased significantly; the gap between the end of artillery preparation and the beginning of support for the attack was eliminated; army artillery groups by number of corps

Battle of Kursk: its role and significance during the war

Fifty days, from July 5 to August 23, 1943, the Battle of Kursk continued, including the Kursk defensive (July 5 - 23), Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive strategic operations of the Soviet troops. In terms of its scope, the forces and means involved, tension, results and military-political consequences, it is one of the largest battles of the Second World War.

General course of the Battle of Kursk

Huge masses of troops and military equipment were involved on both sides in the fierce clash on the Kursk Bulge - more than 4 million people, almost 70 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, up to 12 thousand aircraft. The fascist German command threw more than 100 divisions into battle, which accounted for over 43% of the divisions located on the Soviet-German front.

The salient in the Kursk region was formed as a result of stubborn battles in the winter and early spring of 1943. Here the right wing of the German Army Group Center hung over the troops of the Central Front from the north, and the left flank of the Army Group South covered the troops of the Voronezh Front from the south. During the three-month strategic pause that began at the end of March, the warring parties consolidated their positions, replenished their troops with people, military equipment and weapons, accumulated reserves and developed plans for further action.

Considering the great importance of the Kursk salient, the German command decided in the summer to carry out an operation to eliminate it and defeat the Soviet troops occupying the defense there, hoping to regain the lost strategic initiative and change the course of the war in their favor. He developed a plan for an offensive operation, codenamed “Citadel”.

To implement these plans, the enemy concentrated 50 divisions (including 16 tank and motorized), attracted over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2.7 thousand tanks and assault guns and over 2 thousand aircraft. The German command had high hopes for the use of new heavy Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand assault guns, Focke-Wulf-190D fighters and Henschel-129 attack aircraft.

The Kursk salient, which had a length of about 550 km, was defended by troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts, which had 1336 thousand people, more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, over 3.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 2.9 thousand aircraft. East of Kursk, the Steppe Front, which was in the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters, was concentrated, which had 573 thousand people, 8 thousand guns and mortars, about 1.4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, and up to 400 combat aircraft.

The Supreme High Command headquarters, having timely and correctly determined the enemy's plan, made a decision: to move on to a deliberate defense on pre-prepared lines, during which they would bleed the strike groups of German troops, and then go on a counter-offensive and complete their defeat. A rare case in the history of war occurred when the strongest side, which had everything necessary for an offensive, chose the most optimal option for its actions from several possible ones. During April - June 1943, a deeply layered defense was created in the area of ​​the Kursk salient.

The troops and local population dug about 10 thousand km of trenches and communication passages, 700 km of wire barriers were installed in the most dangerous directions, 2 thousand km of additional and parallel roads were built, 686 bridges were restored and rebuilt. Hundreds of thousands of residents of the Kursk, Oryol, Voronezh and Kharkov regions participated in the construction of defensive lines. 313 thousand wagons with military equipment, reserves and supply cargo were delivered to the troops.

Having information about the time of the start of the German offensive, the Soviet command carried out a pre-planned artillery counter-training in areas where enemy strike forces were concentrated. The enemy suffered significant losses, and his plans for a surprise attack were thwarted. On the morning of July 5, German troops went on the offensive, but enemy tank attacks, supported by the fire of thousands of guns and aircraft, were defeated by the insurmountable resilience of Soviet soldiers. On the northern face of the Kursk salient he managed to advance 10 - 12 km, and on the southern face - 35 km.

It seemed that nothing living could resist such a powerful steel avalanche. The sky turned black with smoke and dust. The corrosive gases from the explosions of shells and mines blinded my eyes. From the roar of guns and mortars, the clanging of caterpillars, the soldiers lost their hearing, but they fought with unparalleled courage. Their motto became the words: “Not a step back, stand to the death!” German tanks were shot down by the fire of our guns, anti-tank rifles, tanks and self-propelled guns buried in the ground, hit by aircraft, and blown up by mines. The enemy infantry was cut off from the tanks and exterminated by artillery, mortar, rifle and machine gun fire, or in hand-to-hand combat in the trenches. Hitler's aviation was destroyed by our planes and anti-aircraft artillery.

When German tanks broke into the depths of the defense at one of the sectors of the 203rd Guards Rifle Regiment, the deputy battalion commander for political affairs, Senior Lieutenant Zhumbek Duisov, whose crew was wounded, knocked out three enemy tanks with an anti-tank rifle. The wounded armor-piercers, inspired by the officer’s feat, again took up arms and successfully repelled a new enemy attack.

In this battle, armor-piercing officer Private F.I. Yuplankov knocked out six tanks and shot down one Yu-88 plane, armor-piercing junior sergeant G.I. Kikinadze knocked out four, and Sergeant P.I. Houses - seven fascist tanks. The infantrymen boldly let enemy tanks through their trenches, cut off the infantry from the tanks and destroyed the Nazis with fire from machine guns and machine guns, and burned the tanks with combustible bottles and knocked them out with grenades.

A striking heroic feat was performed by the tank crew of Lieutenant B.C. Shalandina. The company in which he was operating began to be surrounded by a group of enemy tanks. Shalandin and his crew members, senior sergeants V.G. Kustov, V.F. Lekomtsev and Sergeant P.E. Zelenin boldly entered into battle with a numerically superior enemy. Acting from an ambush, they brought enemy tanks within direct shot range, and then, hitting the sides, burned two Tigers and one medium tank. But Shalandin’s tank was also hit and caught fire. With the car on fire, Shalandin’s crew decided to ram it and immediately crashed into the side of the “tiger.” The enemy tank caught fire. But our entire crew also died. To Lieutenant B.C. Shalandin was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. By order of the Minister of Defense, he was forever included in the lists of the Tashkent Tank School.

Simultaneously with the fighting on the ground, there were fierce battles in the air. An immortal feat was accomplished here by guard pilot Lieutenant A.K. Gorovets. On July 6, as part of a squadron on a La-5 aircraft, he covered his troops. Returning from a mission, Horowitz saw a large group of enemy bombers, but due to damage to the radio transmitter, he was unable to inform the presenter about this and decided to attack them. During the battle, the brave pilot shot down nine enemy bombers, but he himself died.

On July 12, in the Prokhorovka area, the largest oncoming tank battle in World War II took place, in which up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part on both sides. During the day of the battle, the opposing sides lost from 30 to 60% of tanks and self-propelled guns each.

On July 12, the turning point in the Battle of Kursk came, the enemy stopped the offensive, and on July 18, he began to withdraw all his forces to their original position. The troops of the Voronezh Front, and from July 19, the Steppe Front, switched to pursuit and by July 23 drove the enemy back to the line that he occupied on the eve of his offensive. Operation Citadel failed; the enemy failed to turn the tide of the war in their favor.

On July 12, troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts began an offensive in the Oryol direction. On July 15, the Central Front launched a counteroffensive. On August 3, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began a counteroffensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction. The scale of hostilities expanded even further.

Our troops showed massive heroism during the battles on the Oryol salient. Here are just a few examples.

In the battle for a strong point southwest of the village of Vyatki on July 13, the commander of a rifle platoon of the 457th Infantry Regiment of the 129th Infantry Division, Lieutenant N.D., distinguished himself. Marinchenko. Carefully camouflaging himself, unnoticed by the enemy, he led the platoon to the northern slope of the height and, from close range, brought down a shower of machine-gun fire on the enemy. The Germans began to panic. They threw down their weapons and ran. Having captured two 75-mm cannons at a height, Marinchenko’s fighters opened fire on the enemy from them. For this feat, Lieutenant Nikolai Danilovich Marinchenko was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On July 19, 1943, in the battle for the village of Troena, Kursk Region, a heroic feat was accomplished by the gunner of a platoon of 45-mm cannons of the 896th Infantry Regiment of the 211th Infantry Division, Sergeant N.N. Shilenkov. The enemy here repeatedly launched counterattacks. During one of them, Shilenkov allowed German tanks to reach 100 - 150 m and set one on fire with cannon fire and knocked out three of them.

When the cannon was destroyed by an enemy shell, he took the machine gun and, together with the riflemen, continued to fire at the enemy. Nikolai Nikolaevich Shilenkov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

On August 5, two ancient Russian cities were liberated - Orel and Belgorod. That same day, in the evening, an artillery salute was fired for the first time in Moscow in honor of the troops who liberated them.

By August 18, Soviet troops, having inflicted a heavy defeat on Army Group Center, completely liberated the Oryol bridgehead. At that time, troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts were fighting in the Kharkov direction. Having repelled strong counterattacks from enemy tank divisions, our units and formations liberated Kharkov on August 23. Thus, the Battle of Kursk ended in a brilliant victory for the Red Army.

The date August 23 is now celebrated in our country as the Day of Military Glory of Russia - the defeat of Nazi troops in the Battle of Kursk (1943).

At the same time, it should be noted that victory in the Battle of Kursk came at a very high cost to Soviet troops. They lost over 860 thousand people killed and wounded, more than 6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 5.2 thousand guns and mortars, over 1.6 thousand aircraft. Nevertheless, this victory was joyful and inspiring.

Thus, the victory at Kursk was new convincing evidence of the loyalty of Soviet soldiers to the oath, military duty and combat traditions of our Armed Forces. It is the duty of every soldier of the Russian Army to strengthen and multiply these traditions.

Historical significance of the victory at Kursk

The Battle of Kursk is one of the most important stages on the path to victory in the Great Patriotic War. The crushing defeat of Nazi Germany at the Kursk Bulge testified to the increased economic, political and military power of the Soviet Union. The military feat of the soldiers merged with the selfless work of the home front workers, who armed the army with excellent military equipment and provided it with everything necessary for victory. What is the world-historical significance of the defeat of the Nazi troops at Kursk?

Firstly, Hitler’s army suffered a severe defeat, huge losses, which the fascist leadership could no longer make up for with any total mobilizations. The grandiose battle of the summer of 1943 on the Kursk Bulge demonstrated to the whole world the ability of the Soviet state to defeat the aggressor on its own. The prestige of German weapons was irreparably damaged. 30 German divisions were destroyed. The total losses of the Wehrmacht amounted to more than 500 thousand soldiers and officers, over 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, 3 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3.7 thousand aircraft. By the way, pilots of the French Normandy squadron, who shot down 33 German aircraft in air battles, selflessly fought alongside Soviet pilots in the battles on the Kursk Bulge.

The enemy tank forces suffered the heaviest losses. Of the 20 tank and motorized divisions that took part in the Battle of Kursk, 7 were defeated, and the rest suffered significant losses. The chief inspector of the Wehrmacht tank forces, General Guderian, was forced to admit: “As a result of the failure of the Citadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were put out of action for a long time due to large losses in men and equipment... The initiative finally passed to the Russians.”

Secondly, in the Battle of Kursk, the enemy’s attempt to regain the lost strategic initiative and take revenge for Stalingrad failed.

The offensive strategy of the German troops was a complete failure. The Battle of Kursk led to a further change in the balance of forces at the front, made it possible to finally concentrate the strategic initiative in the hands of the Soviet command, and created favorable conditions for the deployment of a general strategic offensive of the Red Army. The victory at Kursk and the advance of Soviet troops to the Dnieper marked a radical turning point in the course of the war. After the Battle of Kursk, the Nazi command was forced to finally abandon the offensive strategy and go on the defensive along the entire Soviet-German front.

However, at present, some Western historians, shamelessly falsifying the history of the Second World War, are trying in every possible way to belittle the significance of the victory of the Red Army at Kursk. Some of them claim that the Battle of Kursk is an ordinary, unremarkable episode of the Second World War, others in their voluminous works either simply remain silent about the Battle of Kursk, or speak about it sparingly and incomprehensibly, other falsifiers seek to prove that the German- The fascist army was defeated in the Battle of Kursk not under the blows of the Red Army, but as a result of Hitler’s “miscalculations” and “fatal decisions”, due to his reluctance to listen to the opinions of his generals and field marshals. However, all this has no basis and is in conflict with the facts. The German generals and field marshals themselves recognized the inconsistency of such statements. “Operation Citadel was the last attempt to maintain our initiative in the east,” admits the former Nazi Field Marshal, who commanded the artillery group
mission "South" E. Manstein. - With its termination, tantamount to failure, the initiative finally passed to the Soviet side. In this respect, "Citadel" is a decisive, turning point of the war on the Eastern Front."

Thirdly, the victory in the Battle of Kursk is a triumph of Soviet military art. During the battle, Soviet military strategy, operational art and tactics once again proved their superiority over the military art of Hitler's army.

The Battle of Kursk enriched the domestic military art with the EXPERIENCE of organizing a deeply layered, active, sustainable defense, conducting flexible and decisive maneuver of forces and means during defensive and offensive actions.

In the field of strategy, the Soviet Supreme High Command took a creative approach to planning the summer-autumn campaign of 1943. The originality of the decision was expressed in the fact that the side with strategic initiative and overall superiority in forces went on the defensive, deliberately giving an active role to the enemy in the initial phase of the campaign. Subsequently, within the framework of a single process of conducting a campaign, following the defense, a transition to a decisive counter-offensive and the deployment of a general offensive was planned. The problem of creating an insurmountable defense on an operational-strategic scale was successfully solved. Its activity was ensured by the saturation of the fronts with a large number of mobile troops. It was achieved by conducting artillery counter-preparation on the scale of two fronts, wide maneuver of strategic reserves to strengthen them, and launching massive air strikes against enemy groups and reserves. The Supreme High Command headquarters skillfully determined the plan for conducting a counteroffensive in each direction, creatively approaching
choosing the directions of the main attacks and methods of defeating the enemy. Thus, in the Oryol operation, Soviet troops used concentric attacks in converging directions, followed by fragmentation and destruction of the enemy group in parts. In the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, the main blow was delivered by adjacent flanks of the fronts, which ensured the rapid breaking of the enemy’s strong and deep defenses, the dissection of his group into two parts and the exit of Soviet troops to the rear of the enemy’s Kharkov defensive region.

In the Battle of Kursk, the problem of creating large strategic reserves and their effective use was successfully resolved, and strategic air supremacy was finally won, which was held by Soviet aviation until the end of the Great Patriotic War. The Supreme High Command headquarters skillfully carried out strategic interaction not only between the fronts participating in the battle, but also with those operating in other directions.

Soviet operational art in the Battle of Kursk for the first time solved the problem of creating a deliberate positional insurmountable and active operational defense up to 70 km deep.

During the counteroffensive, the problem of breaking through the enemy's deeply layered defense was successfully resolved through the decisive massing of forces and means in the breakthrough areas (from 50 to 90% of their total number), the skillful use of tank armies and corps as mobile groups of fronts and armies, and close cooperation with aviation , which carried out a full front-scale air offensive, which largely ensured the high rate of advance of the ground forces. Valuable experience was gained in conducting oncoming tank battles both in a defensive operation (near Prokhorovka) and during an offensive when repelling counterattacks of large enemy armored groupings.

The successful conduct of the Battle of Kursk was facilitated by the active actions of the partisans. Striking the enemy's rear, they pinned down up to 100 thousand enemy soldiers and officers. The partisans carried out about 1.5 thousand raids on railway lines, disabled more than 1 thousand locomotives and destroyed over 400 military trains.

Fourthly, the defeat of the Nazi troops during the Battle of Kursk was of enormous military-political and international significance. He significantly increased the role and international authority of the Soviet Union. It became obvious that the power of Soviet weapons faced Nazi Germany with inevitable defeat. The sympathy of ordinary people for our country increased even more, the hopes of the peoples of the countries occupied by the Nazis for early liberation strengthened, the front of the national liberation struggle of groups of Resistance fighters in France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway expanded, the anti-fascist struggle intensified both in Germany itself and and other countries of the fascist bloc.

Fifthly, the defeat at Kursk and the results of the battle had a profound impact on the German people, undermined the morale of the German troops and faith in the victorious outcome of the war. Germany was losing influence on its allies, disagreements within the fascist bloc intensified, which later led to a political and military crisis. The beginning of the collapse of the fascist bloc was laid - Mussolini's regime collapsed, and Italy came out of the war on the side of Germany.

The victory of the Red Army at Kursk forced Germany and its allies to go on the defensive in all theaters of World War II, which had a huge impact on its further course. The transfer of significant enemy forces from the west to the Soviet-German front and their further defeat by the Red Army facilitated the landing of Anglo-American troops in Italy and predetermined their success.

Sixth, under the influence of the victory of the Red Army, cooperation between the leading countries of the anti-Hitler coalition strengthened. She had a great influence on the ruling circles of the USA and Great Britain. At the end of 1943, the Tehran Conference took place, at which the leaders of the USSR, USA, and Great Britain I.V. met for the first time. Stalin; F.D. Roosevelt, W. Churchill. At the conference, it was decided to open a second front in Europe in May 1944. Assessing the results of the victory at Kursk, the head of the British government, W. Churchill, noted: “Three huge battles - for Kursk, Orel and Kharkov, all carried out within two months, marked the collapse of the German army on the Eastern Front.”

Victory in the Battle of Kursk was achieved thanks to the further strengthening of the military-economic power of the country and its Armed Forces.

One of the decisive factors that ensured victory at Kursk was the high moral, political and psychological state of the personnel of our troops. In the fierce battle, such powerful sources of victory for the Soviet people and their army as patriotism, friendship of peoples, self-confidence and success emerged with all their might. Soviet soldiers and commanders showed miracles of mass heroism, exceptional courage, perseverance and military skill, for which 132 formations and units received the Guards rank, 26 were awarded the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, and Kharkov. More than 100 thousand soldiers were awarded orders and medals, and 231 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The victory at Kursk was also achieved thanks to a powerful economic base. The increased capabilities of Soviet industry, the heroic feat of home front workers, made it possible to provide the Red Army with huge quantities of advanced models of military equipment and weapons, superior in a number of decisive indicators to the military equipment of Nazi Germany.

Highly appreciating the role and significance of the Battle of Kursk, the courage, resilience and mass heroism shown by the defenders of the cities of Belgorod, Kursk and Orel in the struggle for the freedom and independence of the Fatherland, by Decrees of the President of the Russian Federation dated April 27, 2007, these cities were awarded the honorary title “City of Military Glory” "

Before and during a lesson on this topic, it is advisable to visit the museum of the formation or unit, organize viewing of documentaries and feature films about the Battle of Kursk, and invite veterans of the Great Patriotic War to perform.

In the introductory speech, it is advisable to emphasize the importance of such a historical event as the Battle of Kursk, emphasizing the fact that here a radical turning point in the course of the war ended and the mass expulsion of enemy troops from our territory began.

When covering the first question, it is necessary, using a map, to show the location and balance of forces of the opposing sides at different stages of the Battle of Kursk, while emphasizing that it is an unsurpassed example of Soviet military art. In addition, it is necessary to talk in detail about the exploits, give examples of the courage and heroism of soldiers of their branch of troops committed in the Battle of Kursk.

In the course of considering the second question, it is necessary to objectively show the significance, role and place of the Battle of Kursk in Russian military history, and to consider in more detail the factors that contributed to this great victory.

At the end of the lesson, it is necessary to draw brief conclusions, answer questions from the audience, and thank the invited veterans.

1. Military encyclopedia in 8 volumes. T.4. - M.: Military Publishing House. 1999.

2. The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941 - 1945: A Brief History. - M., 1984.

3. Dembitsky N., Strelnikov V. The most important operations of the Red Army and Navy in 1943 // Landmark. - 2003. - No. 1.

4. History of the Second World War 1939 -1945 in 12 volumes. T.7. - M., 1976.

Lieutenant colonel
Dmitry Samosvat,
Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences, Lieutenant Colonel
Alexey Kurshev

Dates and events of the Great Patriotic War

The Great Patriotic War began on June 22, 1941, on the day of All Saints who shone in the Russian land. Plan Barbarossa, a plan for a lightning war with the USSR, was signed by Hitler on December 18, 1940. Now it was put into action. German troops - the strongest army in the world - attacked in three groups (North, Center, South), aimed at quickly capturing the Baltic states and then Leningrad, Moscow, and in the south, Kyiv.

Kursk Bulge

In 1943, the Nazi command decided to conduct its general offensive in the Kursk region. The fact is that the operational position of the Soviet troops on the Kursk ledge, concave towards the enemy, promised great prospects for the Germans. Here two large fronts could be surrounded at once, as a result of which a large gap would form, allowing the enemy to carry out major operations in the southern and northeastern directions.

The Soviet command was preparing for this offensive. From mid-April, the General Staff began developing a plan for both a defensive operation near Kursk and a counteroffensive. And by the beginning of July 1943, the Soviet command completed preparations for the Battle of Kursk.

July 5, 1943 German troops launched an offensive. The first attack was repulsed. However, then the Soviet troops had to retreat. The fighting was very intense and the Germans failed to achieve significant success. The enemy did not solve any of the assigned tasks and was ultimately forced to stop the offensive and go on the defensive.

The struggle was also extremely intense on the southern front of the Kursk salient - in the Voronezh Front.

On July 12, 1943 (on the day of the holy supreme apostles Peter and Paul), the largest tank battle in military history took place near Prokhorovka. The battle unfolded on both sides of the Belgorod-Kursk railway, and the main events took place southwest of Prokhorovka. As Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces P. A. Rotmistrov, former commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, recalled, the fight was unusually fierce, “the tanks ran at each other, grappled, could no longer separate, fought to the death until one of them burst into flames with a torch or did not stop with broken tracks. But even damaged tanks, if their weapons did not fail, continued to fire.” For an hour, the battlefield was littered with burning German and our tanks. As a result of the battle near Prokhorovka, neither side was able to solve the tasks facing it: the enemy - to break through to Kursk; 5th Guards Tank Army - enter the Yakovlevo area, defeating the opposing enemy. But the enemy’s path to Kursk was closed, and July 12, 1943 became the day the German offensive near Kursk collapsed.

On July 12, the troops of the Bryansk and Western fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction, and on July 15, the troops of the Central front.

On August 5, 1943 (the day of celebration of the Pochaev Icon of the Mother of God, as well as the icon of the “Joy of All Who Sorrow”) Oryol was liberated. On the same day, Belgorod was liberated by the troops of the Steppe Front. The Oryol offensive operation lasted 38 days and ended on August 18 with the defeat of a powerful group of Nazi troops aimed at Kursk from the north.

Events on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front had a significant impact on the further course of events in the Belgorod-Kursk direction. On July 17, the troops of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts went on the offensive. On the night of July 19, a general withdrawal of fascist German troops began on the southern front of the Kursk ledge.

On August 23, 1943, the liberation of Kharkov ended the strongest battle of the Great Patriotic War - the Battle of Kursk (it lasted 50 days). It ended with the defeat of the main group of German troops.

Liberation of Smolensk (1943)

Smolensk offensive operation August 7 - October 2, 1943. According to the course of hostilities and the nature of the tasks performed, the Smolensk strategic offensive operation is divided into three stages. The first stage covers the period of hostilities from August 7 to 20. During this stage, the troops of the Western Front carried out the Spas-Demen operation. The troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front began the Dukhovshchina offensive operation. At the second stage (August 21 - September 6), the troops of the Western Front carried out the Elny-Dorogobuzh operation, and the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front continued to conduct the Dukhovshchina offensive operation. At the third stage (September 7 - October 2), the troops of the Western Front, in cooperation with the troops of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, carried out the Smolensk-Roslavl operation, and the main forces of the Kalinin Front carried out the Dukhovshchinsko-Demidov operation.

On September 25, 1943, troops of the Western Front liberated Smolensk - the most important strategic defense center of the Nazi troops in the western direction.

As a result of the successful implementation of the Smolensk offensive operation, our troops broke through the enemy’s heavily fortified multi-line and deeply echeloned defenses and advanced 200 - 225 km to the West.

During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a protrusion up to 150 kilometers deep and up to 200 kilometers wide, facing west (the so-called “Kursk Bulge”), formed in the center of the Soviet-German front. Throughout April - June, there was an operational pause at the front, during which the parties prepared for the summer campaign.

Plans and strengths of the parties

The German command decided to conduct a major strategic operation on the Kursk salient in the summer of 1943. It was planned to launch converging attacks from the areas of the cities of Orel (from the north) and Belgorod (from the south). The strike groups were supposed to unite in the Kursk area, encircling the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts of the Red Army. The operation received the code name “Citadel”. At a meeting with Manstein on May 10-11, the plan was adjusted according to Gott’s proposal: the 2nd SS Corps turns from the Oboyan direction towards Prokhorovka, where terrain conditions allow for a global battle with the armored reserves of the Soviet troops. And, based on losses, continue the offensive or go on the defensive. (from the interrogation of the chief of staff of the 4th Tank Army, General Fangor)

Kursk defensive operation

The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation - 3 o'clock in the morning (the German army fought according to Berlin time - translated into Moscow time as 5 o'clock in the morning), at 22:30 and 2:20 Moscow time the forces of two fronts carried out counter-artillery preparation with an amount of ammunition 0.25 ammo. German reports noted significant damage to communication lines and minor losses in manpower. There was also an unsuccessful air raid by the 2nd and 17th Air Armies (more than 400 attack aircraft and fighters) on the enemy’s Kharkov and Belgorod air hubs.

Battle of Prokhorovka

On July 12, the largest oncoming tank battle in history took place in the Prokhorovka area. On the German side, according to V. Zamulin, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps took part in it, which had 494 tanks and self-propelled guns, including 15 Tigers and not a single Panther. According to Soviet sources, about 700 tanks and assault guns took part in the battle on the German side. On the Soviet side, the 5th Tank Army of P. Rotmistrov, numbering about 850 tanks, took part in the battle. After a massive air strike [source not specified 237 days], the battle on both sides entered its active phase and continued until the end of the day. By the end of July 12, the battle ended with unclear results, only to resume on the afternoon of July 13 and 14. After the battle, German troops were unable to advance any significantly, despite the fact that the losses of the Soviet tank army, caused by tactical errors of its command, were much greater. Having advanced 35 kilometers between July 5 and 12, Manstein’s troops were forced, after trampling on the achieved lines for three days in vain attempts to break into the Soviet defenses, to begin withdrawing troops from the captured “bridgehead.” During the battle, a turning point came. The Soviet troops, which went on the offensive on July 23, pushed the German armies in the south of the Kursk Bulge back to their original positions.

Losses

According to Soviet data, about 400 German tanks, 300 vehicles, and over 3,500 soldiers and officers remained on the battlefield of the Battle of Prokhorovka. However, these numbers have been called into question. For example, according to G. A. Oleinikov’s calculations, more than 300 German tanks could not have taken part in the battle. According to research by A. Tomzov, citing data from the German Federal Military Archive, during the battles of July 12-13, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division irretrievably lost 2 Pz.IV tanks, 2 Pz.IV and 2 Pz.III tanks were sent for long-term repairs , in the short term - 15 Pz.IV and 1 Pz.III tanks. The total losses of tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS Tank Tank on July 12 amounted to about 80 tanks and assault guns, including at least 40 units lost by the Totenkopf division.

- At the same time, the Soviet 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army lost up to 70% of their tanks

The central front, involved in the battle in the north of the arc, suffered losses of 33,897 people from July 5-11, 1943, of which 15,336 were irrevocable, its enemy - Model’s 9th Army - lost 20,720 people during the same period, which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which took part in the battle on the southern front of the arc, lost from July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), 143,950 people, of which 54,996 were irrevocable. Including the Voronezh Front alone - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they believed that the losses of their front were 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irrevocable. If, contrary to Soviet documents from the war period, the official numbers are considered correct, then taking into account the German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of losses of the Soviet and German sides here is 4.95: 1.

- During the period from July 5 to July 12, 1943, the Central Front used up 1,079 wagons of ammunition, and the Voronezh Front used 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central Front was due to the smaller massing of forces and assets in the direction of the German attack, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate its armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.

Oryol offensive operation (Operation Kutuzov). On July 12, the Western (commanded by Colonel-General Vasily Sokolovsky) and Bryansk (commanded by Colonel-General Markian Popov) fronts launched an offensive against the enemy’s 2nd Tank and 9th Armies in the Orel region. By the end of the day on July 13, Soviet troops broke through the enemy’s defenses. On July 26, the Germans left the Oryol bridgehead and began to retreat to the Hagen defensive line (east of Bryansk). On August 5 at 05-45, Soviet troops completely liberated Oryol.

Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev). On the southern front, the counter-offensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5, at approximately 18-00, Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway on August 11, and captured Kharkov on August 23. The German counterattacks were unsuccessful.

- On August 5, the first fireworks display of the entire war was given in Moscow - in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

- The victory at Kursk marked the transition of the strategic initiative to the Red Army. By the time the front stabilized, Soviet troops had reached their starting positions for the attack on the Dnieper.

- After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as the Watch on the Rhine (1944) or the Balaton operation (1945), were also unsuccessful.

- Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who developed and carried out Operation Citadel, subsequently wrote:

- It was the last attempt to maintain our initiative in the East. With its failure, tantamount to failure, the initiative finally passed to the Soviet side. Therefore, Operation Citadel is a decisive, turning point in the war on the Eastern Front.

- - Manstein E. Lost victories. Per. with him. - M., 1957. - P. 423

- According to Guderian,

- As a result of the failure of the Citadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were put out of action for a long time due to large losses in men and equipment.

- - Guderian G. Memoirs of a Soldier. - Smolensk: Rusich, 1999

Discrepancies in loss estimates

- The losses of the parties in the battle remain unclear. Thus, Soviet historians, including Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences A. M. Samsonov, talk about more than 500,000 killed, wounded and prisoners, 1,500 tanks and over 3,700 aircraft.

However, German archival data indicate that the Wehrmacht lost 537,533 people on the entire Eastern Front in July-August 1943. These figures include the killed, wounded, sick, and missing (the number of German prisoners in this operation was insignificant). And even despite the fact that the main fighting at that time took place in the Kursk region, the Soviet figures for German losses of 500 thousand look somewhat exaggerated.

- In addition, according to German documents, on the entire Eastern Front the Luftwaffe lost 1696 aircraft in July-August 1943.

On the other hand, even Soviet commanders during the war did not consider Soviet military reports about German losses to be accurate. Thus, General Malinin (chief of staff of the front) wrote to lower headquarters: “Looking at the daily results of the day about the amount of manpower and equipment destroyed and captured trophies, I came to the conclusion that these data are significantly inflated and, therefore, do not correspond to reality.”