Explanation.
1. It may be noted that the writer’s fate was ambiguous and dramatic:
On the one hand, his plays (for example, “Days of the Turbins”) were staged in theaters (at the Moscow Art Theater, etc.) and were popular;
On the other hand, in the 1930s. Bulgakov's works were banned, not published, some of them were published only in the 1960s, after his death;
In the last years of his life, the writer was practically deprived of the opportunity to earn a living through literary work and lived in isolation.
2. When explaining the reasons that Bulgakov’s fate developed in this way, it can be said, for example, about the biased, ultimately unfriendly attitude towards him and his work on the part of I.V. Stalin
C2 No. 2017. Read an excerpt from the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov and briefly answer questions C1-C3. Answers involve the use of information from the source, as well as the application of historical knowledge from the history course of the relevant period.
“Thousands of colorful rockets shot into the air. At this signal, 140 searchlights, located every 200 meters, flashed. More than 100 billion candles illuminated the battlefield, blinding the enemy and snatching attack targets from the darkness for our tanks and infantry. It was a picture of great impressive power...
Hitler's troops were literally drowned in a continuous sea of fire and metal. A solid wall of dust and smoke hung in the air, and in some places even the powerful rays of anti-aircraft searchlights could not penetrate it.
Our aviation flew over the battlefield in waves... However, the enemy, having come to his senses, began to counteract from the Seelow Heights with his artillery and mortars... a group of bombers appeared... And the closer our troops came to the Seelow Heights, the stronger the increase enemy resistance...
On April 20, on the fifth day of the operation, long-range artillery opened fire... The historic assault began..."
Using the text and knowledge from the history course, name at least two features of this operation. Which Soviet military leaders distinguished themselves in this battle?
Explanation.
The following features of the Berlin operation can be named:
The Berlin enemy group was surrounded as a result of the offensive of 3 fronts of the Red Army (1st and 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian);
During a night frontal assault on enemy positions, Red Army units used searchlights to blind the enemy;
Marshals distinguished themselves: G.K. Zhukov (1st Belorussian Front), Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky (2nd Belorussian Front), Marshal I.S. Konev (1st Ukrainian Front)
C2 No. 2020. Read an excerpt from the memoirs of the German general G. Guderian and briefly answer questions C1-C3. Answers involve the use of information from the source, as well as the application of historical knowledge from the history course of the relevant period.
“The offensive began on July 5 with a maneuver long known to the Russians from numerous previous operations, and therefore guessed by them in advance. Hitler... wanted to destroy the Russian positions advanced in an arc with a double envelopment... and thereby seize the initiative on the Eastern Front again into his own hands.
From July 10 to 15, I visited both advancing fronts... and learned on the spot in conversations with tank commanders the course of events, the shortcomings of our tactical techniques in offensive battles and the negative aspects of our equipment. My fears about the lack of preparedness of the Panther tanks for combat operations at the front were confirmed. 90 Porsche Tiger tanks... also showed that they do not meet the requirements of close combat; these tanks, as it turned out, were not even sufficiently supplied with ammunition. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that they did not have machine guns... They were unable to either destroy or suppress the enemy's infantry firing points and machine-gun nests to allow their infantry to advance... Having advanced about 10 km, Model's troops were stopped. True, there was greater success in the south, but it was not sufficient to block the Russian arc or reduce resistance. On July 15, the Russian counterattack on Orel began... On August 4, the city had to be abandoned. On the same day Belgorod fell...
As a result of the failure of the offensive……………. we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were put out of action for a long time due to large losses in men and equipment... It goes without saying that the Russians hastened to take advantage of their success. And there were no more calm days on the Eastern Front. The initiative has completely passed to the enemy.”
What was the name of the operation of the German command, which is mentioned in the memoirs? Name at least two tasks that the German command set for its troops during this operation?
Explanation.
The German command's operation was called "Citadel";
The tasks of the German command were:
- “leveling” one of the important sections of the Soviet-German front by destroying the arced positions of the Red Army;
Return of strategic initiative to German troops.
C2 No. 2023. Read an excerpt from the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov and briefly answer questions C1-C3. Answers involve the use of information from the source, as well as the application of historical knowledge from the history course of the relevant period.
“After going through all the possible options, we decided to offer I.V. Stalin has the following plan of action: first, to continue to wear down the enemy with active defense, second, to begin preparing counter-offensives in order to inflict on the enemy... such a blow that dramatically changed the strategic situation in the south in our favor...
When assessing the enemy, we proceeded from the fact that Nazi Germany was no longer able to fulfill its 1942 strategic plan. The forces and means that Germany had by the fall of 1942 will not be enough to complete the tasks either in the North Caucasus or in the Don and Volga region...
The General Staff, based on data from the fronts, studied the strengths and weaknesses of the German, Hungarian, Italian and Romanian troops. The satellite troops, compared to the German ones, were worse armed, less experienced, and insufficiently combat-ready even in defense. And most importantly, their soldiers and many officers did not want to die for other people’s interests on the distant fields of Russia...
The enemy's position was further aggravated by the fact that... he had very few troops in the operational reserve, no more than six divisions, and even those were scattered on a wide front... The operational configuration of the entire enemy front also favored us: our troops occupied an enveloping position..."
Using your knowledge of history, what is the historical significance of winning this battle? Please indicate at least two provisions.
Explanation.
The following provisions can be mentioned:
Beginning of a radical fracture
Germany's invincible status has been shaken
The Soviet Union launched a large-scale counteroffensive on all fronts
Germany suffered its biggest defeat since the start of the war
Contributed to the unity of the anti-Hitler coalition
C2 No. 2026. Read an excerpt from an article by Western historian B.L. Hart and briefly answer questions C1-C3. Answers involve the use of information from the source, as well as the application of historical knowledge from the history course of the relevant period.
“The three-month struggle for the capture of the city in tactical terms for the Germans came down to frontal ramming attacks... The deeper the Germans were drawn into the residential areas of the city with their numerous houses, the slower their offensive developed.
At the last stage of the siege, the front line passed a few hundred meters from the western bank of the Volga, but by this time the German onslaught began to weaken as a result of exceptionally heavy losses. Each step forward cost them more and more and brought less and less results.
The difficult conditions of street fighting with a stubbornly defending enemy were more favorable to the Russians, although they were also in a difficult position. In the current situation, they had to transport reinforcements and ammunition on ferries and barges across the Volga under artillery fire. This limited the size of the force that the Russians could maintain and supply on the west bank of the river to defend the city. Because of this, the defenders of the city were repeatedly subjected to severe trials... The tension of the heroic defenders reached the limit, but they survived.”
Based on the text and knowledge from the history course, name at least three problems that the defenders of the city faced.
Explanation.
The following problems can be identified:
The need to transport reinforcements and ammunition across the Volga;
The tenacity of the enemy with which he stormed Stalingrad;
Presence of civilians in the city;
Lack of combat experience among a significant part of the Soviet soldiers defending the city
C2 No. 2030. Read an excerpt from a work devoted to the history of the Great Patriotic War and briefly answer questions C1-C3.
“The winter campaign..., which lasted almost five months, was of great importance for the further course of the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War. It was at this time that the war entered a new period of its development - the period of …………………. Essentially, the winter campaign constituted the first and most difficult phase of this period, many times accelerated the development of crisis trends in the enemy camp, and marked the beginning of the mass expulsion of the invaders from the Soviet land they occupied.
It is also important that in winter, for the first time, major defeats were inflicted not only on the German troops themselves, but also on the armies of Germany’s main allies - ………………………………………………………. Finally, during this winter campaign, the Soviet armed forces managed to reduce to zero all the results achieved by the Wehrmacht troops in summer operations....... g. The front line moved beyond the original lines from which the enemy began his summer offensive At the same time, our troops liberated important areas lost in 1941.
In terms of its strategic content, the winter campaign.........was extremely complex and intense. It was replete with many critical situations, was associated with making risky decisions and using a wide variety of forms and methods of struggle. During it, interconnected strategic and front-line counter-offensive, offensive and defensive operations were carried out, and major regroupings of troops, forces and assets were carried out.”
What most important battle of the Great Patriotic War is described in this passage? Using your knowledge of history, indicate which of the Soviet military leaders distinguished himself in it? Please provide at least three names)
Explanation.
May be specified:
The Battle of Stalingrad is described
During the battle, military leaders distinguished themselves: G. K. Zhukov, N. F. Vatutin, K. K. Rokossovsky, A. I. Eremenko, V. I. Chuikov
C2 No. 2033. Read an excerpt from a historical source and briefly answer questions C1-C3. Answers involve the use of information from the source, as well as the application of historical knowledge from the history course of the relevant period.
From the Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the magazines “Zvezda” and “Leningrad”.
“Recently, many unprincipled, ideologically harmful works have appeared in the Zvezda magazine. The gross mistake of “Zvezda” is to provide a literary platform to the writer Zoshchenko, whose works are alien to Soviet literature... It is known that Zoshchenko has long specialized in writing empty, meaningless and vulgar things, in preaching rotten lack of ideology, vulgarity and apoliticality, designed to disorient our youth and poison her mind.
...The magazine “Leningrad” is poorly maintained, which constantly provided its pages for vulgar and slanderous speeches by Zoshchenko, for empty and apolitical poems by Akhmatova. Like the editors of Zvezda, the editors of Leningrad made major mistakes by publishing a number of works imbued with a spirit of sycophancy towards everything foreign.”
What charges were brought against magazine editors and writers in the resolution? Name at least three provisions (charges).
Explanation.
It may be stated that the charges were made:
The editors of magazines are that they make major mistakes and publish “unprincipled” works;
Writers are accused of publishing works imbued with a spirit of sycophancy towards everything foreign;
Writers are reproached for the fact that their works can poison the minds of young people
C2 No. 2038. Read an excerpt from a historical source and briefly answer questions C1-C3. Answers involve the use of information from the source, as well as the application of historical knowledge from the history course of the relevant period.
From an article by Marshal S.F. Akhromeeva
“In general, for the Armed Forces in peacetime, the expenditure of material resources in Afghanistan was very sensitive. Afghanistan was expensive. Each day of war cost the 40th Army 6.0 million rubles. In addition, the Afghan troops had to be constantly supplied with everything they needed. As a result, every day of war cost the country 10-11 million rubles.
The war in Afghanistan damaged the authority of the Soviet Armed Forces. They were given an unlawful and unrealistic task: to force a people of 17 million people by military means to submit to an unpopular government backed by Soviet bayonets. It was also unbearable for an army of 75 thousand people, which was then increased to 108 thousand... Reasonable people were aware in advance of the illusory nature of the illusions that some people had about the fact that Soviet troops would not need to fight in Afghanistan. They, they say, will stand as garrisons, protecting the revolutionary regime from attempts to overthrow it by external forces, and the Afghan army will cope with the internal rebel forces. Reality quickly dispelled these illusions. Soviet troops had to be drawn into a nine-year bloody adventure...”
What caused the participation of Soviet troops in this military conflict? Give at least three reasons.
Explanation.
The following reasons may be given:
In the conditions of a “bipolar” world (“Cold War”), the leadership of the USSR was afraid of establishing US control over Afghanistan;
The unstable situation in Afghanistan, which the USSR leadership considered a zone of its geopolitical influence;
The desire of the high command of the Armed Forces of the USSR to test the combat capability of the army in a local war;
Threat to stability in the Central Asian regions of the USSR.
C2 No. 2040. Read an excerpt from a historical source and briefly answer questions C1-C3. Answers involve the use of information from the source, as well as the application of historical knowledge from the history course of the relevant period.
From an article by Yu. Kushnerova and T. Chernikova.
“The main provisions of the reform were developed by a group of economists led by Lieberman. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers..... was an active supporter of the ideas of this group, which boiled down to the organization of a managed “socialist market” based on “cost accounting” (economic independence) of individual enterprises: the state established a stable, general plan for 5 years for price, quantity and the quality of the required products, but did not regulate how the goods would be produced.
In addition to gross indicators (total price and quantity of products produced), a new indicator was introduced into the plan - the cost of products sold. This was supposed to encourage factories to stop producing products that were not in demand and improve the quality of production... The state bought products above the plan at a higher price.
To stimulate initiative, part of the income was left at the disposal of enterprises. These funds were divided into 3 parts: a material incentive fund, from which salaries and bonuses were paid for exceeding the plan; a social and cultural fund intended for the construction of housing, kindergartens, and sanatoriums; and a self-financing fund from which the enterprise purchased raw materials and other things.
State investments were intended for the purpose of reconstructing production, introducing scientific and technological advances, including those acquired abroad.”
Using the text of the article, indicate at least two features related to the system of a managed “socialist market”. Name at least two ways in which the state stimulated the initiative of industrial enterprises.
Explanation.
The following signs may be indicated:
Cost accounting (economic independence);
Availability of a general plan for the quantity and quality of products;
Lack of minute regulation of how the plan will be implemented;
The main indicator of labor productivity was the cost of products sold.
The following methods may be specified:
Products above the plan were purchased at a higher price;
Part of the income was left at the disposal of the enterprise;
Government investments were used to reconstruct enterprises.
C2 No. 2043. Read an excerpt from a historical source and briefly answer questions C1-C3. Answers involve the use of information from the source, as well as the application of historical knowledge from the history course of the relevant period.
From a historical source
“The Council of Ministers of the USSR decides:
1. To increase and put into effect from May 1, 1965, purchase prices for wheat and rye sold to the state by collective farms, state farms and other farms, according to the appendix.
2. Establish and put into effect from May 1, 1965, premiums of 50 percent to purchase prices for wheat and rye sold to the state ... above the established plan for wheat, rye and other grain crops in general.
3. To increase and put into effect from May 1, 1965, uniform rules for collective farms, state farms and other farms in the regions of the North-Western, Central, Volga-Vyatka regions of the RSFSR, the Kaliningrad and Perm regions, the Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the Byelorussian SSR, the Lithuanian SSR, the Latvian SSR , Estonian SSR and Polesie regions of the Ukrainian SSR, purchase prices for barley (feed) in the amount of 90 rubles and for oats in the amount of 75 rubles per ton of basic conditions.”
Name at least two specific proposals aimed at implementing the decisions of this resolution.
Explanation.
The following specific proposals may be indicated:
To increase, from May 1, 1965, purchase prices for wheat and rye sold to the state by collective and state farms;
Establish, from May 1, 1965, a 50% premium on purchase prices for wheat and rye sold to the state in excess of the established plan;
C2 No. 2046. Read an excerpt from a historical source and briefly answer questions C1-C3. Answers involve the use of information from the source, as well as the application of historical knowledge from the history course of the relevant period.
From the memoirs of Soviet party leader B.A. Medvedev.
“On June 11... a meeting was held at the CPSU Central Committee on issues of accelerating scientific and technological progress. The report implemented to the maximum extent the developments that were carried out during these years in preparation for the plenum of the Central Committee.
The meeting deepened the critical analysis of the previous period of development. At the same time, it was clearly discovered that the acceleration of scientific and technological progress, and therefore the socio-economic development of the country, rests on the economic mechanism inherited from the past. Further practice confirmed that even carefully developed extensive programs for the development of science and technology, modernization of domestic mechanical engineering... cannot count on success under the conditions of the old economic mechanism, therefore the center of gravity and attention in the economic sphere began to gradually shift to the development of the economic mechanism. And behind this, the whole chain gradually followed.
Upon in-depth analysis of the problems of improving the economic mechanism, it turned out that it is unthinkable without reforming the entire political system, and this, in turn, dictates the need to reconsider the role of the party itself.”
Give at least three characteristic features of the “old economic mechanism” mentioned in the text.
Explanation.
The following characteristic features can be named:
Administrative-command methods of economic management;
State ownership of the means of production (absence of private ownership of the means of production);
The planned nature of the economy;
State control over pricing;
State monopoly on foreign trade;
Weak interest of workers in the results of their work.
C2 No. 2049. Read an excerpt from a historical source and briefly answer questions C1-C3. Answers involve the use of information from the source, as well as the application of historical knowledge from the history course of the relevant period.
From the memoirs of a representative of the highest party and state leadership of the USSR G.I. Voronova.
“All this was prepared for about a year... Brezhnev himself in the list of members of the Central Committee put “pros” (who is ready to support him in the fight...) and “cons” against each name. Each one was treated individually...
Today you understand: the goal<его>the confusion was not the correction of mistakes, not a more accurate adherence to the course of the 20th Congress, but the seizure of power in order to turn away from this course...
The participants of the Plenum had different motives, but the mistake was common: instead of correcting the mistakes of one bright personality who stood at the head of the party, we relied on another much less bright personality. Such mistakes are inevitable when there is no mechanism for criticizing the leadership, directing its mistakes, and, when necessary, replacing it.
The trouble is that the experience and skills of democracy were still weak then. Trying to overcome the burden of the past,<он>and we, the people around him, were largely a product of that past and did not take care to expand the framework of democracy to include the people in the process of transformation.
For this half-hearted democracy, which is also not secured by any political guarantees, to all of us, including<ему>I had to pay."
Based on the text and knowledge of history, indicate what main issue was decided by the Plenum named in the text. Who prepared this decision of the Plenum and why? Why did the Plenum accept it?
Explanation.
It may be stated that:
The Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee resolved the issue of removing N. S. Khrushchev from all his posts;
The decision of the Plenum was prepared by a group of senior party and state leaders under the leadership of L. I. Brezhnev;
The traditionally thinking part of the top leadership of the party and state was opposed to N.S. Khrushchev and the reforms he carried out, breaking the existing structures of the administrative-command system.
C2 No. 2052. Read an excerpt from a historical source and briefly answer questions C1 – C3. Answers involve the use of information from the source, as well as the application of historical knowledge from the history course of the relevant period.
From “The Tale of Igor’s Campaign”
“…. Then Grand Duke Svyatoslav uttered a golden word, mixed with tears, and said: “O my nephews, Igor and Vsevolod! Early on you began to insult the Polovtsian land with swords and seek glory for yourself. But without honor you prevailed, without honor you shed vile blood. Your brave hearts are made of strong damask steel, shackled and tempered with courage. What did they create from my silver gray hair?
But I no longer see the power of my strong, and rich, and abundantly fighting brother Yaroslav, with the Chernigov boyars. But you said: “Let’s be courageous ourselves: we’ll steal the past glory for ourselves, and share the future ourselves”...
Grand Duke Vsevolod! Are you thinking of flying from afar to watch over your father’s golden throne? You can splash the Volga with oars and scoop up the Don with helmets.
You, violent Rurik, and Davyd!... Step, gentlemen, into the golden stirrup for the insult of our time, for the Russian land, for the wounds of Igor, the violent Svyatoslavich!
Galician Osmomysl Yaroslav!... Your thunderstorms flow across the lands, you open the gates of Kyiv. You shoot from your father's golden throne at the Saltans beyond the lands. Shoot, Lord, Konchak, the filthy slave, for the Russian land, for the wounds of Igor, the violent Svyatoslavich!”
Explanation.
1. It can be stated that the reason for the author’s bitter thoughts about the fate of the Russian land was:
Strife between the princes became the reason for the defeat of Rus' in the fight against the Steppe (“filthy”)
They were looking for glory for themselves
They tried to carry out the campaign only with the forces of their own land, and did not coordinate their actions with other princes.
C2 No. 2055. Read an excerpt from a historical source and briefly answer questions C1 - C3. Answers involve the use of information from the source, as well as the application of historical knowledge from the history course of the relevant period.
From the work of historian V.O. Klyuchevsky.
From the half of the 12th century. signs of desolation of Kievan Rus become noticeable. The river strip along the middle Dniester with its tributaries, which has long been so well populated, has been empty since that time, its population disappears somewhere. ...Among the seven desolate cities of the Chernigov land we meet one of the oldest and richest cities in the Dnieper region - Lyubech. Simultaneously with the signs of an ebb of population from Kievan Rus, we also notice traces of the decline of its economic well-being: Rus', while emptying, at the same time became poorer. ...The outflow of population from the Dnieper region went in two directions, in two opposite streams. One stream was directed to the west, to the Western Bug, to the region of the upper Dniester and upper Vistula, deep into Galicia and Poland. Thus, the southern Russian population from the Dnieper region returned to long-forgotten places abandoned by their ancestors. Another stream of colonization from the Dnieper region is directed to the opposite corner of the Russian land, to the northeast, beyond the Ugra River, between the Oka and Upper Volga rivers. ...It is the source of all the main phenomena that have emerged in the life of Upper Volga Rus' since the half of the 12th century; The entire political and social life of this Rus' was formed from the consequences of this colonization.
What phenomena characteristic of this period does the document indicate? Name at least two phenomena. Using the text of the document and knowledge of history, indicate the reasons for these phenomena (at least two reasons).
Explanation.
1. The following phenomena can be named:
Ebb of population from Kievan Rus
Desolation of the cities of Kievan Rus
Colonization of northwestern and northeastern Russian lands
2. The reasons for these phenomena can be named:
Kiev’s loss of its historical role as a result of:
a) the movement of the main trade routes, the decline in the role of the “route from the Varangians to the Greeks”;
b) constant civil strife caused by the struggle for the “Kiev table”;
c) Polovtsian raids that weakened the Kyiv land
C2 No. 2058. Read an excerpt from a historical source and briefly answer questions C1-C3. Answers involve the use of information from the source, as well as the application of historical knowledge from the history course of the relevant period.
From the work of a modern historian.
“Almost all the important events of Russian history of the late 11th - early 12th centuries revolve around his name... He stood out for his brilliant abilities as a statesman, his ability to oppose the needs of his state to narrow, selfish interests... During his reign, the oldest known chronicle was compiled - "The Tale of Bygone Years". He himself wrote “Instructions for Children,” which shows that this prince had literary talent. In this work, he noted that he made more than eighty large campaigns against the Polovtsians, but he cannot remember the small ones. In later times, a legend appeared that the Byzantine emperor - his own grandfather - sent him signs of royal dignity.
Using knowledge of history and the text of the document, note what the prince’s main merits were. Give at least three provisions.
Explanation.
The merits of the prince can be indicated:
Vladimir Monomakh stopped the collapse of the Ancient Russian state
Successfully fought with the Polovtsians
He continued the wise public policy of his grandfather - Yaroslav the Wise
1
When it comes to war, we remember Stalingrad, and when we remember Stalingrad, we remember Zhukov. It was he, the greatest commander of the twentieth century, who was the creator of one of the most brilliant operations of the Second World War, and, perhaps, of all world history. Stalingrad is a confirmation of the undeniable truth: where Zhukov is, there is victory! Stalingrad is proof of Zhukov’s genius: he glanced at the map and immediately found a solution!
Let's shout three times "Hurray" to the genius, and then ask a question about the reliability of the information. Let's get to the roots. Let's establish how it became known that the plan for the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation was proposed by Zhukov?
The source is easy to find: Zhukov himself said this. It was he who declared himself the author of the operation plan, although he admitted that there was also a co-author - A.M. Vasilevsky. It is described like this:
“On the afternoon of September 12, I flew to Moscow and four hours later I was in the Kremlin, where the Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky was also summoned...
The Supreme Commander took out his map with the location of General Headquarters reserves and looked at it for a long time and intently. Alexander Mikhailovich and I moved away from the table to the side and talked very quietly about the fact that, apparently, we need to look for some other solution.
What is the “other” solution? - suddenly, raising his head, asked I.V. Stalin.
I never thought that I.V. Stalin had such a keen ear. We approached the table...
The whole next day A.M. and I Vasilevsky worked at the General Staff... After going through all the possible options, we decided to propose to Stalin the following plan of action..." ("Memories and Reflections". M. APN. 1969. P.401-402)
From the above it follows that at the origins of the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation there were three people: Stalin, Zhukov and Vasilevsky. Stalin's merit is that his hearing is sharp. Stalin heard that Zhukov and Vasilevsky were whispering, became interested, and it was then that Zhukov and his comrade in arms gave the Supreme Commander-in-Chief a brilliant idea...
Zhukov said that Stalin doubted success, was afraid to take risks, and proposed carrying out an operation, but not on such a scale, but more modestly. But Zhukov persuaded Stalin, and everything turned out as it should.
2
About Stalingrad, through the mouths of his literary blacks, Zhukov speaks in detail and at length: “On July 12, the headquarters created a new Stalingrad Front...” “By the end of July, the Stalingrad Front included...” “Great organizational work was carried out by the regional committee and city party committee of Stalingrad on the formation and preparation of the people's militia..."
All this is true, all this is interesting, but let us pay attention to a small detail: in July 1942, Zhukov was not in Stalingrad and could not have been. He was in a completely different direction, very far from Stalingrad. Anyone who is interested in the war has the opportunity to reconstruct the chronology of Zhukov’s work at the front day by day, from the first to the last day of the war. Sometimes - accurate to hours and minutes. From October 11, 1941 to August 26, 1942, Zhukov commanded the troops of the Western Front, which fought in a completely different direction, a thousand kilometers from Stalingrad. Until August 26, 1942, Zhukov could not and did not have the right to deal with the affairs of Stalingrad.
This is what happened at Stalingrad. In the spring of 1942, the Soviet Southwestern Front collapsed. The culprits of the disaster are Timoshenko, Khrushchev and Bagramyan. But the main culprit is Zhukov. Because of his lies, because of his victorious reports about grandiose victories in the main direction of the war, Stalin squandered strategic reserves and at a critical moment was not able to close the gap that had formed. German troops rushed into the breakthrough. A popular uprising broke out in the rear of the Red Army. The population of the Don, Kuban, North Caucasus, and Kalmyk steppes rose up against the communists. The Red Army found itself in the position of an occupier on its own land, the ground was burning under its feet. The rebels hanged security officers, communists and commissars, crushed their heads, and drowned them in rivers and swamps. Soviet regiments and divisions crumbled, troops scattered. Meanwhile, the flow of German troops was divided in two. One direction of attack is towards Grozny and Baku. The intention is to reach sources of oil. The second direction is to Stalingrad. The intention is to protect the troops rushing to the Caucasus from a possible attack on the flank and to cut the Volga - the oil aorta of the Soviet Union. The critical situation at Stalingrad developed in July 1942. The exit of German troops to the Volga at that moment inevitably led to the collapse of the entire southern wing of the Soviet-German front with catastrophic consequences for the country's economy.
By personal order of Stalin, a new Stalingrad Front was created, which included four combined arms and one air army from the collapsed Southwestern Front. In addition, from his strategic reserve, Stalin moved the 62nd, 63rd and 64th armies to the Stalingrad area. On July 28, Stalin single-handedly signed the draconian order No. 227 “Not a step back!” Stalin personally took full responsibility for the situation at Stalingrad and for any measures that could stop the flight of Soviet troops. On July 30, by order of Stalin, the 51st Army was included in the Stalingrad Front. On August 9, Stalin threw the 1st Guards Army at Stalingrad. At the head of this army, Stalin placed the former head of the GRU, his future deputy, Lieutenant General F.I. Golikova. The 1st Guards Army was equipped with the best human material. Five airborne corps were sent to form it, which were turned into guards rifle divisions. In mid-August, Stalin sent the 24th and 66th armies to the Stalingrad area. Troops marched towards Stalingrad in a continuous stream. Dozens of penal battalions and companies were sent here. At Stalingrad, Stalin abandoned nineteen military schools, including Zhitomir, Vinitskoe, Grozny, 1st and 2nd Ordzhonikidze infantry schools, Krasnodar machine gun and mortar schools, Chelyabinsk, Stalingrad, Omsk, Kazan tank schools. And in each of these schools there were “from 3.5 to 5 thousand of the best Red Army soldiers and sergeants aged 18-22, selected from advanced positions and with experience in participating in battles.” (A.M. Samsonov “Know and Remember.” Moscow IPL. 1989. P. 136) Stalin sent the 5th, 7th, 8th and 10th sapper armies to build defensive structures near Stalingrad. I know what an engineer company and an engineer battalion are. I saw with my own eyes the engineer regiment in full force and in all its glory. I didn’t get to see the full sapper brigade, but I can clearly imagine it. But I can’t imagine a sapper division. Does not exceed. There are too many sappers. Moreover, I can’t imagine a corps that consists of only sappers. But Stalin is not talking about sapper brigades, divisions and corps. Stalin had entire sapper armies in reserve. The Soviet Union is the only country in the world that had sapper armies. Stalin sent four such armies at once to build defensive lines near Stalingrad. In addition to these sapper armies, Stalin moved several defensive construction departments of the RVGK from his personal reserve to Stalingrad to create a strategic defensive belt. What they were can be judged from one example. Only the personnel of the 24th Defense Construction Directorate from Stalin’s personal reserve dug 1,448 kilometers of trenches and trenches, 57 kilometers of anti-tank ditches, 51 kilometers of scarps, 8 kilometers of gouges and 24,400 firing points in the Stalingrad area. Firing points were created not only from wood and earth, but from reinforced concrete and steel. The personnel of the 24th Defense Construction Directorate of the RVGK alone assembled 1,112 tons of metal structures and 2,317 cubic meters of reinforced concrete structures. ("Red Star" January 10, 1985) To the work of the 24th defensive construction department of the RVGK we will add the work of other defensive construction departments and the work of four sapper armies. Imagine the scale of defensive work in this area, we can only be amazed at the tenacity of Hitler and his generals, who threw their divisions into suicidal attacks on such defenses.
In addition to the artillery that was part of ten combined arms and one guards army, Stalin from his personal reserve nominated 129 artillery regiments of the RVGK and 115 separate divisions of rocket artillery to Stalingrad. One can endlessly list fighter, assault and bomber aviation regiments, divisions and corps, reserve aviation groups, tank and mechanized brigades and corps, mortar divisions and regiments, communications units and units, repair, medical and other formations that Stalin threw into the battle on the Volga . In July and August 1942, all these regiments, brigades, divisions, corps and armies were either already in the Stalingrad area, or were being transferred to the Stalingrad area, or were preparing to be transferred. I'm not talking about the 2nd Guards and 5th Tank Armies, the four tank and two mechanized corps, which in the summer of 1942 were formed deep in the rear and prepared for winter battles. In any case, we cannot escape the recognition: many troops were sent to Stalingrad. All this was done while Zhukov was on another, namely, the Western Front. In July and August 1942, the main thing was done without Zhukov - panic in the troops was suppressed by draconian measures, fleeing troops were stopped, a new Soviet front was created in the area of the strategic breakthrough of German troops, an insurmountable defense was erected, fresh divisions, corps and armies were brought up. In the summer of 1942, the enemy's actions were transformed from rapid, unstoppable movement into protracted battles for every line, every trench and every firing point, which was extremely disadvantageous for him. And winter is ahead. In any case, in the summer of 1942, conditions were created in the Stalingrad area that inevitably led the German army to disaster. So many forces were gathered at Stalingrad that military genius was not required.
3
And so we open Zhukov’s book and read about how in the summer of 1942 the enemy rushed to Stalingrad, how the Red Army heroically fought the enemy, how it stopped the enemy offensive. Zhukov vividly recalls and colorfully talks about events to which he had nothing to do. If we are interested in the situation in July 1942 near Stalingrad, we will find enough sources. The book “Memories and Reflections” was written on behalf of Zhukov, so it would be correct to talk not about the Stalingrad Front, where Zhukov was not, but about the Western Front, which Zhukov commanded at that moment. But everything that happened in the spring and summer of 1942 on the Western Front is described in the memoirs in one paragraph. The authors of Zhukov’s memoirs were carried to strategic heights: “The 37th and 12th armies of the North Caucasus Front received the task...” Why are they telling us about the Caucasus if Zhukov was not there? But they don’t let up: “At the call of the Central Committee of the Party of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, armed detachments were formed...”
Zhukov's memoirs describe in detail the 1942 disaster in the Kharkov region. And the culprits were named. But Zhukov was not there either. Zhukov was not responsible for this direction. The disaster of the Crimean Front is described. And again the culprits are named. But Zhukov didn’t fight in Crimea either; Crimea is not his concern. Zhukov’s memoirs describe the defeats of Soviet troops near Voronezh; the authors recalled the fall of Sevastopol and the unsuccessful attempt by the troops of the North-Western Front to eliminate the German group in the Demyansk region. Zhukov did not take part in all these events. Why is all this included in the memoirs?
Firstly, they demonstrated the strategic breadth of Zhukov’s horizons.
Secondly, they showed the harsh bitter truth: look at the defeats... of Zhukov’s neighbors, look at the miscalculations of stupid Stalin and the commanders of all fronts where Zhukov is not present.
Thirdly, they filled the chapter about 1942 with extraneous descriptions so that there was no room left for the story about Zhukov himself and his deeds.
Meanwhile, 1942 for the Western Front, commanded by Zhukov, was a year of severe defeats and huge losses. On the Western Front, Zhukov carried out continuous stupid offensive operations, each of which ended in failure. The bloodiest of them: Rzhevsko-Sychevskaya - July 30 - August 23.
It is interesting that the “Soviet Military Encyclopedia” (Vol. 7, pp. 119-120) clearly defines the timing of this operation, lists the armies and corps that were involved in carrying it out, and includes a map. If an encyclopedia describes an operation, then it deserves it. But Zhukov, who carried out this operation, does not report the timing of the operation, nor the forces that were involved, and does not include a map. Instead, from Zhukov’s memoirs we learn:
- about the insidious policies of the USA and Great Britain;
- about Stalin's plans for 1942;
- about Hitler's plans for 1942;
- about party-political work in the Red Army;
- about the exploits of ordinary soldiers and sergeants;
- about the resistance of the Soviet people behind enemy lines;
- about the heroic work of workers and peasants;
- about the leading and guiding role of the Communist Party and its wise Central Committee;
- about operations on all fronts except the Western.
In Zhukov’s memoirs there is no map of the Rzhev-Sychevsky operation, which Zhukov carried out, but there is another map: this is how the Germans rushed to Stalingrad, in which Zhukov was not at that time, for the defense of which Zhukov was not responsible at that moment.
And we are not interested in Stalingrad, but in Zhukov and the Rzhev-Sychevsk operation, about which he modestly keeps silent. To carry out this operation, Zhukov concentrated the 20th and 31st armies, the 1st air army, the 6th and 8th tank corps, and the 2nd guards cavalry corps. Neither Zhukov nor the Soviet Military Encyclopedia report how many people, tanks, guns, aircraft there were in these armies and corps. But we ourselves see that the forces are considerable. Zhukov’s memoirs say that the Germans suffered “great losses” at Sychevka. Sources are silent about our losses. Apparently there were no losses.
To help Zhukov, troops from the left wing of the Kalinin Front struck in the direction of the same Sychevka: the 29th and 30th armies with the support of the 3rd Air Army.
Four combined arms armies, a cavalry corps, two separate tank corps supported by two air armies... for the assault on Sychevka!?
Is not it too much?
No. This was not enough for Zhukov.
Did the brilliant Zhukov take that same Sychevka with such forces? Alas.
What is the reason for the failure? Who is guilty? The reason is that they didn’t put enough effort into Sychevka. In total, Zhukov had only ten armies on the Western Front at that moment. He still lacked “one or two armies.” It is clear that Stalin is to blame for not giving these armies to Zhukov. “If we had one or two armies at our disposal, it would be possible... Unfortunately, this real opportunity was missed by the Supreme Command.” ("Memories and Reflections" Page 395)
But this assault on Sychevka is not the first. From January to August 1942, five armies of Konev and ten armies of Zhukov rushed to Rzhev and Sychevka. Let me remind you again: Zhukov was not only the commander of the Western Front, but also the commander-in-chief of the Western direction, which included the Western Front (Zhukov) and the Kalinin Front (Konev). In other words, Konev’s five armies were also subordinate to Zhukov. Before the next Rzhev-Sychevsk operation, the Supreme Command Headquarters on August 5, 1942 once again confirmed Zhukov’s powers: he led not only the operations of his Western Front, but also the neighboring Kalinin Front. (VIZH 1991, No. 10. P. 24)
In the area of Rzhev and Sychevka, the corpses of Soviet soldiers killed in previous assaults were already lying in layers. Entire cemeteries of burnt-out Soviet tanks were already piled up there. All the front-line soldiers remembered the months-long stupid meat grinder near Rzhev and Sychevka under the leadership of the brilliant Zhukov. One of the most poignant poems about the war was written by Alexander Tvardovsky. And it’s not for nothing that it’s called “I was killed near Rzhev.” Let's remember:
The front was burning without subside,
Like a scar on the body.
I'm killed and I don't know:
Is Rzhev finally ours?
Storm. Storm. Storm. Head-on. Same pattern as yesterday. According to the same program. Five attacks a day. Seven each. Ten each. To the same high-rise buildings. Month after month. From January to August. Forward! Zhukov is with us!
4
Our official historians have invented a special language and a whole series of special techniques with which they hide failures in the war, primarily Zhukov’s failures. However, there are quite reliable indicators of lies. Here's one of them. Let's say you come across a description of an offensive operation, but the code name of this operation is not reported. Know that this is a lie.
The point here is this. Most defensive operations do not have code names. The enemy strives to do what we do not expect, what we are not ready for, what our plans do not provide for. The enemy is trying to strike where we planned defensive actions on a much smaller scale or did not plan them at all. Therefore, in many cases, a defensive operation is an improvisation. In addition, in a defensive operation there is no need to hide our intentions. If we defend Stalingrad, therefore, we intend to hold it.
And we are preparing the offensive operation ourselves. We must hide from the enemy the time, place, purpose, intention, composition of forces and much more. Therefore, the preparation of an offensive operation begins with assigning a code name to it. This is done to maintain secrecy. There is a conversation going on at the General Staff about "Little Saturn", if you are privy to the secret, you understand what we are talking about. If you are not entrusted with the secret, then you will not understand anything. "Uranus", "Anadyr", "S.3-20", "Thunderstorm", "Bagration". What is this? What are the generals talking about? If you know, everything is simple. If you don't know, it's a dead end. Even a cryptographer, admitted to many great secrets, has no idea what the essence of the transmitted message is. He writes: “Iskra”, but does not know what is hidden behind this name.
Half a century has passed since the war, and in a very thick encyclopedia we find descriptions of offensive operations with strange names: Rzhevsko-Sychevskaya, Rzhevsko-Vyazemskaya, Sychevsko-Vyazemskaya. The code names of these operations are not reported. And we’ll figure it out: could Zhukov, at the headquarters of the Western Front, plan an operation and call it Rzhevsko-Sychevskaya or Sychevsko-Vyazemskaya? No, I couldn't. If he called the operation that way, then by the very name of the operation he gave away his intentions and his plan to all the staff typists and telephone operators, all the draftsmen, clerks and security guards. If Zhukov is not a complete idiot, it means that he used code names when preparing these operations. Why aren’t they telling us after half a century?
Because these operations are still, after 50 and 60 years, still classified. The reason for secrecy is this. It was planned, for example, to defeat the German Army Group Center with a breakthrough 600 kilometers deep and the entry of Soviet troops to the coast of the Baltic Sea. But the group of German armies was not defeated, they did not break through the defenses, they advanced not 600 kilometers, but 23. They planned to reach Vitebsk, Minsk and Riga, but they only reached Sychevka, and could not take it.
How to cover up the embarrassment? State secret. In this case, our military-historical oligarchs classify the entire operation as secret. The code name, goals, objectives and design of the operation, the composition of the forces and assets involved, and most importantly, losses, fall into the category of state secrets. Instead of all this, our academics write in the encyclopedia: yes, there were battles in this area, but nothing serious was planned, planned or conceived here. They just wanted to capture Rzhev, which is 6 kilometers from the front line, and Sychevka, which is already 50 kilometers away. True, neither Rzhev nor Sychevka were taken either the first time, or the third, or the thirteenth, or the forty-first.
Let's think about this: could Stalin have given Zhukov a combat mission to capture some Sychevka? Isn't it too small for Stalin? And for Zhukov? And for the Western Front, which is assisted by the Kalinin Front?
On August 23, 1942, the next attack on Sychevka failed, and on August 26, Stalin appointed Zhukov as his deputy.
Let us note: not after great victories, the commander of the Western Front, Zhukov, was promoted and became Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, but after eight months of bloody, hopeless meat grinder. It is not for brilliant victories that Stalin raises Zhukov, not for brilliant thoughts. Stalin liked Zhukov for other qualities: he drove hundreds of thousands of people to death for many months and did not even flinch his face!
Stalin needed to have two people with completely different characteristics as assistants. It’s like a regiment commander: the chief of staff is a thinker, and the deputy regiment commander is a go-getter. The regiment commander is responsible for everything. The chief of staff is nearby. He is a generator of ideas. He is the Control Mechanism. And where the most important task is being solved at the moment, the commander sends his deputy there to yell and swear.
At all other levels, the system is the same: any boss should always have one assistant, so to speak, in the thinking part, and another in the punching part. Stalin did the same at the very top. Under Stalin - the thinker Vasilevsky. He makes plans. But we also need someone whose job is to drive people to death. And this is work for Zhukov. Zhukov is the eldest, where they will send him. This is the deputy on the firing line, the assistant to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief for the massacre.
5
Zhukov first arrived in Stalingrad on August 31, 1942. He tried to launch counterattacks on the German troops that had broken through. Nothing came of this venture. The counterattacks ended in failure. By the way, a hint of failure is also contained in Zhukov’s memoirs. He visited Stalingrad, did something there for almost two weeks, and returned to Moscow on September 12. And then in Stalin’s office the same scene takes place, which Zhukov has repeatedly described with gusto: he whispered with Vasilevsky that it was necessary to look for some other solution. Stalin heard and became interested: what is the solution?
Zhukov said these words after he visited Stalingrad and tried to launch counterattacks there. Zhukov proposes to look for another solution because no sense came of the solution that Zhukov had already tried to implement at Stalingrad in the first days of September. Zhukov's actions turned out to be fruitless and useless.
There were several more trips by Zhukov to Stalingrad during the defensive battle. But Zhukov was not the only one who appeared there. Politburo member Georgy Malenkov, among others, visited Stalingrad. We do not declare Malenkov a strategist and savior for this. And we are not sculpting an equestrian statue of Malenkov. And we do not rank among the saints.
The last time Zhukov left the Stalingrad area was on November 16, 1942. And the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops began on November 19. Without Zhukov. Stalin again threw Zhukov into the Western direction. Again - against Sychevka!
On the day when the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation began, Zhukov was exactly one thousand kilometers from Stalingrad and was engaged in a completely different matter.
Chapter 16. AND AGAIN TO SYCHEVKA!
Arriving with the troops at the front, I was immediately able to grasp the situation, take control over the threads of control and turn events in the right direction.
1
The Stalingrad counteroffensive was conceived as a secondary operation. Anyone can find ample evidence of this in the memoirs of the participants in this operation. Marshals of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, K.K. Rokossovsky, A.I. Eremenko, Chief Marshal of Artillery N.N. Voronov and others report that, having completed the encirclement of German troops at Stalingrad, Soviet commanders were surprised to find that there were three times more German divisions in the pocket than expected. The Soviet command intended to encircle 7-8 German divisions in the Stalingrad area, but there were 22 of them. In other words, the operation at Stalingrad was not planned to be as grandiose as it actually turned out. The result at Stalingrad was expected to be three times more modest. And the main operation was being prepared in the Western direction. Again, a breakthrough was planned at Rzhev, Sychevka and Vyazma in the direction of the Gulf of Riga. Zhukov is doing the same job again: coordinating the actions of the Kalinin and Western fronts. In addition, the offensive of the two fronts is supported by troops of the North-Western and Bryansk fronts.
To carry out this grandiose operation, greater forces were assembled than for the counteroffensive at Stalingrad. Under the command of Zhukov this time there were almost two million soldiers and officers, 3,300 tanks, more than a thousand combat aircraft, 24 thousand guns and mortars. The total combat weight of Soviet tanks involved in this operation was 2.8 times higher than the combat weight of all German tanks that Hitler threw at the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.
And Zhukov failed this operation again in November-December 1942.
Where Zhukov was, there was a shameful defeat, rivers of blood, pyramids of soldiers' bones and almost two thousand burnt Soviet tanks. This is in addition to what was already put into the ground in the area from January to August. And at Stalingrad, where Zhukov was not there, there was victory.
2
Another failure of Zhukov at Sychevka, Rzhev and Vyazma has disappeared from our history. They forgot about him. And if any of the meticulous researchers are curious about where the great strategist Zhukov was at the time of the start of the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation, then the answer was prepared for such: Zhukov was in a secondary direction, there he carried out a diversionary operation.
During Brezhnev’s time, the entire ideological machine of the Soviet Union worked to inflate Zhukov’s personality cult. In those glorious times, Marshal Vasilevsky, who was already 82 years old and had a year left before his death, was forced to write: “On November 13... Zhukov was ordered to begin preparing a diversionary operation on the Kalinin and Western fronts, and I was entrusted with coordinating the actions of three fronts of the Stalingrad direction during the counter-offensive." ("VIZH" 1977 No11, p. 63)
Isn't that interesting? On November 19, 1942, a grandiose offensive operation begins near Stalingrad, which should turn the tide of the war in our favor, and a week before that, on November 13, the greatest commander of the twentieth century, Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Army General Zhukov, is given the task of conducting a diversionary operation in a completely different place! Surely, a diversionary operation cannot be entrusted to Konev, Govorov, Rokossovsky, Golikov, Tolbukhin, Bagramyan, Biryuzov, Voronov, Malinovsky or anyone else? Why did Stalin send Zhukov to the main direction in all operations, but during the Stalingrad strategic offensive operation he sent him to a secondary direction to carry out a diversionary operation?
The answer is simple: the operation near Sychevka, Rzhev and Vyazma in November-December 1942 was not a distraction, it was the main one. Zhukov failed it, so it was retroactively relegated to the category of secondary and distracting.
3
The operation in the Western strategic direction in November-December 1942 was not a diversionary operation, because a diversionary operation always precedes the main operation. First, the magician somehow lulls our vigilance, and then takes out a white rabbit from a black hat. First, the pickpocket's henchmen show us someone else's wallet: weren't you the one who dropped it? And then the pickpocket himself, with a gentle movement, takes away our tight wallet. First, Odessa thief Benya Krik sets fire to a house opposite the police station, then, when the police rush to help the neighbors, he starts a fire in the police station. First the fighter makes a feint movement, then hits. It’s the same in war: first, a diversionary strike is launched in a secondary direction, then the main one in the main direction.
The counteroffensive at Stalingrad began on November 19, 1942, and the “diversionary” offensive of the Kalinin and Western fronts began on November 25, 1942. Let us ask: which of these operations should divert the enemy’s attention?
The operation of the Kalinin and Western fronts was not secondary and distracting, because more troops took part in it than in the offensive at Stalingrad. Zhukov, as part of the Kalinin and Western fronts, had 15 combined arms, 2 shock, 1 tank and 2 air armies. In addition, this “diversionary” offensive was facilitated by troops of the North-Western and Bryansk fronts. These are 7 more combined arms, 1 shock and 2 air armies. In addition, behind this group there were one combined arms (68th) and two reserve (2nd and 3rd) armies. In total, Zhukov has 23 combined arms, 3 shock, 1 tank, 4 air and 2 reserve armies.
And Vasilevsky near Stalingrad has 10 combined arms, 1 tank and 3 air armies.
Which of these operations is the main one, which one is distracting?
The offensive of the Kalinin and Western fronts with the assistance of the Northwestern and Bryansk fronts in November-December 1942 was not distracting, and we learn this from the book of Zhukov himself. Here is the directive to the Kalinin and Western fronts issued on December 8, 1942. The immediate task of the Western Front: “During December 10-11, break through the enemy’s defenses in the Bolshaya Kropotovo - Yarygino sector and no later than November 15, capture Sychevka, December 20, withdraw at least two rifle divisions to the Andreevskoye area to organize the closure together with the 41st Army of the Kalinin Front of the encircled enemy." (Memories and reflections. pp. 435-436)
The Kalinin Front, among other things, was given the task of breaking through the front and “closing the encircled enemy group from the south together with units of the Western Front.” (Ibid.)
So, the Kalinin and Western fronts, led by Zhukov, were given the same task as the fronts at Stalingrad: to break through the enemy’s defenses in two sectors, break through with mobile formations deep into his rear and close the encirclement ring around the enemy group.
Let's believe communist propaganda. Let's assume that the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts under the leadership of Vasilevsky in November 1942 broke through the enemy's defenses and closed the encirclement in order to turn the tide of the war in their favor. And in the same November, the Kalinin and Western fronts under the leadership of Zhukov were supposed to break through the enemy’s defenses and close the encirclement simply in order to divert Hitler’s attention.
And here is how the fronts led by Zhukov coped with their task. A word from Zhukov himself (or those who wrote his memoirs): “The command of the Kalinin Front, represented by Lieutenant General M.A. Purkaev, coped with its task. The group of front troops advancing south of the city of Bely, having successfully broken through the front, moved in the direction of Sychevka The group of troops of the Western Front, in turn, was supposed to break through the enemy’s defenses and move towards the troops of the Kalinin Front, in order to close the encirclement around the Rzhev group of Germans. But it so happened that the Western Front did not break through the defenses... At this time. The situation on the Kalinin front in the area of our breakthrough became more complicated. With a strong blow to the flanks, the enemy cut off our mechanized corps, commanded by Major General M.D. Solomatin, and the corps remained surrounded." (Memories and reflections. pp. 436-437)
Let's assume that all this was done for the sake of distraction. What is the result? The result is obvious. The troops led by Zhukov did not break through the German front, did not encircle the enemy, on the contrary, they themselves were surrounded. If you believe that this was simply a diversionary operation in a secondary direction, then we have to admit that at the moment when all the attention of Hitler and his field marshals was focused on Stalingrad, the troops under the leadership of Zhukov, even in the secondary direction, were unable to complete the task.
Several articles and books have already been written about Zhukov’s grandiose offensive in November-December 1942. To avoid being accused of malice, I will describe it not in my own words, but by quoting other authors. On June 8, 2001, the article “Not for battle, but for slaughter” appeared in the Independent Military Review. A story about the actions of the 20th Army of the Western Front alone in the next Rzhev-Sychevsk operation in November-December 1942. The authors of the article are M. Khodarenok and O. Vladimirov.
In this operation, the 20th Army of the Western Front, in addition to the forces it had, received reinforcements - two tank corps, eight separate tank brigades and a corresponding amount of artillery.
Subtitles of the article: “An unsuccessful start”, “The battle for the vegetable gardens of the village of Zherebtsovo”, “Stubbornness turning into madness”. This is said about the greatest strategist of the twentieth century.
Here are excerpts from the article:
“The troops on November 25 were actually sent not into battle, but to slaughter, under well-organized enemy fire.”
“Two rifle brigades of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps - the 148th and 150th - stormed the village of Khlepen, located on the high bank of the Vazuza, for four days... near the village, the 148th and 150th rifle brigades were killed almost in full force, in of which there was no one left except the headquarters and support units."
“The inexorable Headquarters and its representative Georgy Zhukov demanded only one thing - an offensive at all costs. The 20th Army was further reinforced by the 5th Tank Corps and four rifle divisions.”
“The battlefield was littered with our burnt tanks. In particular, already on December 6, six of the eight tank brigades of the 20th Army, which had lost almost all their materiel, were withdrawn to the rear to restore combat capability.”
“Already on December 13, the 6th Tank Corps had 26 tanks in service, and two days ago the 5th Tank Corps, brought into battle, had only 30. One tank corps fought for the village of Maloe Kropotovo, the second tried to storm the village of Podosinovka.”
“During the week (December 11-18) of extremely bloody, fierce and essentially ineffective battles, the offensive capabilities of the 20th Army were completely exhausted. Ammunition and fuel and lubricants ran out. The material of all eight tank brigades and both tank brigades was almost completely lost buildings. The surviving people, who had been without sleep and food for several days, were extremely exhausted and mortally tired."
“For 23 days of continuous fighting, the troops of the 20th Army in an 8-kilometer sector bit into the enemy’s defenses for 10 kilometers. The average daily rate of attack was just over 400 meters per day. For each kilometer we had to pay with six thousand killed and wounded soldiers.”
“Events unfolded in approximately the same scenario in the offensive zones of other armies of the Western and Kalinin fronts.”
"The total human losses of the Kalinin and Western fronts amounted to more than 215 thousand people killed and wounded."
4
The 20th Army was not the only one to "distract". In the same way, all fifteen combined arms, two shock and one tank armies of the Western and Kalinin fronts, under the wise leadership of a brilliant commander, “distracted” Hitler’s attention. In addition, on other fronts, according to Zhukov’s scenario, seven more combined arms and one shock army were engaged in “distraction”.
Enough documents have been published about the actions of each army in this grandiose “diversionary” operation. It was not in vain that I chose the 20th Army. The 20th Army died in October 1941 near Yelnya. I won't say whose fault it is. Remember for yourself who stormed Yelnya for two months, bled the troops, wasted all the ammunition and fuel and lubricants and left for another front, exposing the exhausted and battered troops to defeat.
In November 1941, a new 20th Army was created. From the old 20th Army it inherited only its number. This new, poorly put together and untested association already in January 1942 under the command of Major General A.A. Vlasova worked miracles on the Lama River. And then Zhukov stood over Vlasov. And now a year has passed. The same 20th Army, the same Western Front. It's winter again. Now the 20th Army already has a year of combat experience. And again, general leadership is carried out by Zhukov. But now everything is not going as it should: reconnaissance is working poorly, artillery is firing not at targets but at areas, the entire preparation of the operation is clumsy. The enemy long ago realized where and what attacks would be delivered and did everything possible to repel them.
What is missing? General Vlasov is missing. Without him, Zhukov turned into an ordinary non-commissioned officer from the First World War.
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IN THE MARINE CORPS
“It was clear that the upcoming battle was of the greatest military and political importance.
With the fall of Stalingrad, the enemy command had the opportunity to cut off
south of the country from the center. We could also lose the Volga.
Having gone through all possible options, we decided to offer J.V. Stalin
the following plan of action: first, continue to wear down the
enemy; the second is to begin preparing a counteroffensive.
J.V. Stalin said that another commander should be placed at the head of the Front.
Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky was presented as a candidate for this post.
The map-plan for the counteroffensive was signed by G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky. “I affirm!” -
signed by the Supreme."
G.K.Zhukov
Fate led the way,
Shout - “Happy journey!”
If you drive for a very long time -
You'll get there somehow!
You will get there with an honest thought
Along the path and virgin soil -
Where in the multi-seater,
Where - on painted armor!
Distinguish between lights and signs -
Here a stream, there a bank:
"To Stalingrad!" - the warriors shout,
"To Stalingrad!" - said the People's Commissar!
"To Stalingrad!" - and the train rushes,
"To Stalingrad!" - and hard running,
Everything will be decided soon,
What did the Commander-in-Chief plan?
Apparently the hour has already been set,
A terrible battle is coming -
Those who don’t know are puzzled
Who is sure - just wait!
Stop stations and country roads -
Everything is packed to the top,
Vanya Pchelkin was surprised -
“So many guns and cars!”
They immediately took the gullies,
An hour - and a ruble for transportation,
These tracks would go with tractors,
Yes to the village, yes to the collective farm!
There - pasha! Plows are a mass,
Furrow? Hurry - plant!
There would be a harvest - “what we need”
A real harvest!
Plans are on time! Then - chants,
The slogan is in the golden sky!
...That’s not what you’re talking about, Vanya Pchelkin,
You're thinking about the wrong thing!
What about fields and sowing?
What about the gray-haired collective farm grandfather?
This is your native country
At the peak of Glory and Victory!
Consider it that way! Consider from now on -
It is not a sin to be mistaken!
...They don’t think that way in Berlin,
Something else has been decided!
There are other people's plans - arrows,
There is a fascist row in affairs -
Look, the enemy is crazy,
Rushing towards the city of Stalingrad!
He is confident in every company -
The rear is strong and the front is strong,
He's already on the horizon
He is at Stalin's gates!
The whole panorama - in binoculars -
Haze, Volga and dawn:
The question here is about timing,
And there are no other questions!
Who will decide in the mad dash?
Here decide in the madness of days -
Whose field marshals-strategists
More noble and smarter?
Whose swords and edges are sharper?
Whose soldier's bayonet is stronger?
What's the dispute? On the battlefield
Find out who's great!
...In the meantime - the carriage and the shelves,
It’s a pity, not a bathhouse and shelves -
You are not a strategist, Vanya Pchelkin,
You are a division and a regiment,
You are the Front! There's no room for argument here,
Dispute is useless and harmful,
You are a great support
And the parent of all Victories!
You are a fighter for home and truth,
You are the breadwinner of poor mouths,
Approaching Stalingrad,
Be ready for anything!
Be prepared for random food
About the dream - silent for now:
You see, in this cramped space
Has the sailor settled down?
Everything he has with him is a pea coat and a flask,
And there are too many badges,
Peak cap and vest,
Black ribbon - “Baltic Fleet!”
Flared trousers! Size - for force,
The look is deliberately stern,
It’s clear even without a question -
He's from the Baltic cruisers!
Talk? For God's sake -
In words - ahead:
“I’ve been in the naval brigade for a long time,
From forty-one, I guess!”
Curiosity - immediately up the hill,
They know that this is not the time for lies:
“You, brother, are talking about Aurora!” -
Tell us about Aurora!”
What to say? Yes, everything is honorable
I am immensely pleased to inform you,
Why is she standing still?
Defending Leningrad!
Those who are capable are all at the Front,
Sometimes the battle is urban,
All Aurors are in the infantry,
But, as is customary, in the sea!
...Conversation is a joy to the soul,
Not home, but rushing to death -
Stalingrad from Leningrad,
Surprised, we distinguish
And let's evaluate the fact and the truth,
A glass of vodka, strong tea -
“I wish I could join your brigade!” -
Pchelkin abandoned it by accident!
That’s how it is here - the reaches are seething,
Surprise honest people -
“You have only sailors there,
Or is there a platoon of soldiers?
What's the answer? Fate is a hassle
Blood flows like water -
“We are knocked out before the deadline,
Fuck the sailors!
But they are sworn by enemies,
Sailors are all heroes,
Replenishment - soldiers,
Ask and you will get it!
Yes, we have empty states,
Sometimes we sit without fighters -
Here are the coordinates for you,
Come and we’ll determine it!”
“Okay, guy, don’t worry -
I’ll also apply for the Navy!
What's your name?" "Terkin Vasya,
Just know that I am not “the one”!
“That one” is Smolensk, not Pskov,
I'm definitely not related -
Tvardovsky wrote about “him”,
About “him” - not about me!
If you look at God's scroll -
One workbench made them all,
There is clearly an abundance of Terkins,
If you count it, it’s true!
One sign for everyone
And a single seal -
One can see the poet's gift for this,
To notice the funny ones!”
...The right choice - in a minute,
I dreamed and a dream came out:
Pchelkin was at the assembly point
Dedicated to sailors!
In this whirlwind - like a die,
But not broken and not crushed:
From the “sea” there is only a vest,
Like a gift from the guys!
That's all the equipment
And a shell overhead -
Seems to feel awkward
It seems like he doesn’t belong yet!
Terkin is a friend! Severe and cheerful -
“Be yourself, brother,
What about the deadline?
Get ready! Tomorrow we go to battle!
That's all the clarity in reality -
We must carry out the order!
...Mood danger
Picks it up every time!
On the night of September 14-15, 1942, the 13th Guards Rifle Division under the command of General Rodimtsev crossed from the left bank of the Volga to the center of Stalingrad, when the fate of the city was being decided in a fierce battle with the enemy. The 13th Guards fought in Stalingrad for 140 days and nights. Its fighters defended Pavlov's House, fought for the central railway station and Mamayev Kurgan. Marshal Nikolai Krylov, chief of staff of the legendary 62nd Army during the defense of Stalingrad, wrote in his memoirs: “The glory given to the guardsmen of Major General Rodimtsev is well deserved by them. If they had not crossed that night, it might have turned out that there was nowhere to cross. If we managed to prevent the enemy from cutting through the remnants of our army and establishing a foothold on the Central Embankment on September 14, then we would probably be able to hold back the next enemy onslaught of such force (and now from the initial positions, which in some places were a little over a kilometer from the Volga), without receiving reinforcements by the morning , they couldn’t... The reinforcements were not late, and this made it possible to hold the city. For eleven days - until the Nazi command changed the direction of the main attack - Rodimtsev’s division played a decisive role in the defense of Stalingrad.” The crossing was carried out on motor ferries, minesweepers, armored boats, tugboats and even fishing boats. The boat, which had a company of machine gunners on board, was killed by artillery fire, and there were losses on other ships as well. The artillery regiment of the 13th division, which took up firing positions on the left bank, was able, like other artillery stationed beyond the Volga, to support the infantry only when its front edge was more clearly defined.
In many places between the embankment and the railway, something like a layer cake was created: houses, courtyards, shelters, captured by the Nazis and held by us, were located interspersed. Staff operators did not always know which pencil - red or blue - to circle such and such a building on the city plan. This is how Krylov recalled his first meeting with Rodimtsev: “I don’t remember exactly at what time the division commander of the 13th Guards, Alexander Ilyich Rodimtsev, reached the army command post. In any case, by that time his regiments had already gone significantly deeper into the city, clearing the water pumping station, department store, nail factory and other objects from the Nazis (the House of Specialists continued to be held by an isolated group of Germans). The guide who accompanied Rodimtsev was killed on the way. The division commander himself must have had to take refuge in ruins or craters more than once, and he, like everyone else who came from the city, entered the dungeon, shaking off lime and dust. Chuikov (Vasily Chuikov, commander of the 62nd Army - author) asked Rodimtsev what his mood was here in Stalingrad. Alexander Ilyich replied: “I’m a communist and I’m not going anywhere from here.” Meanwhile, the position of the division, or more precisely, its two regiments that had crossed, became more and more difficult with each passing hour. The guardsmen reached the line of the railway passing through the city, but did not have time to gain a foothold there before the enemy resumed the offensive. The enemy, having not decided on a major attack at night, although he missed the moment when we actually had only small detachments left in the city center, now had a huge numerical superiority: each of Rodimtsev’s regiments was opposed by a division, reinforced by a significant number of tanks. And as usual, the Nazi attacks were preceded by massive air strikes.” None of those who fought in Stalingrad yet knew that at Headquarters at that time work had already begun to prepare a large-scale counter-offensive near Stalingrad.
This is where it all began, according to the memoirs of Marshal Georgy Zhukov: “The Supreme Commander took out his map with the location of General Headquarters reserves and looked at it for a long time and intently. Alexander Mikhailovich (Vasilevsky, Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army - author) and I moved away from the table to the side and very quietly talked about the fact that, apparently, we need to look for some other solution. - What is the “other” solution? - J.V. Stalin suddenly raised his head and asked. I never thought that I.V. Stalin had such acute hearing. We approached the table. “That’s what,” he continued, “go to the General Staff and think carefully about what needs to be done in the Stalingrad area.” Where and what troops can be transferred from to strengthen the Stalingrad group, and at the same time think about the Caucasian Front. Tomorrow at 9 o'clock in the evening we will gather here again... Having gone through all possible options, we decided to propose to I.V. Stalin the following plan of action: first, continue to wear out the enemy with active defense; the second is to begin preparing a counteroffensive in order to inflict such a blow on the enemy in the Stalingrad area that would dramatically change the strategic situation in the south of the country in our favor. As for the specific plan for the counteroffensive, naturally, we could not prepare detailed calculations in one day, but it was clear to us that the main attacks needed to be delivered on the flanks of the Stalingrad group, covered by the royal Romanian troops. Approximate calculations showed that it would be impossible to prepare the necessary forces and means for a counteroffensive before mid-November.”
On November 19, 1942, the plan for the offensive operation, called “Uranus,” began to be implemented. The idea of breaking through the positions of the Romanian royal troops turned out to be brilliant and fully justified itself. “Another solution,” the conversation about which Stalin overheard Zhukov and Vasilevsky, turned out to be one of the most successful in the history of the Red Army...
