The beginning of the Crimean War. Influence on military affairs

The reason for the Crimean War was the outbreak that arose in the early 50s. dispute between the Orthodox and Catholic churches about the “Palestinian shrines” located on the territory of the Ottoman Empire. The discussion was about who would be the guardian of the especially revered temples in Jerusalem. This dispute served as a detonator in a long-overdue military conflict. Nicholas I sought to use the conflict that arose for a decisive offensive against the Ottoman Empire and to profitably solve the problem of the Black Sea straits for himself, believing that he would have to wage war with one weakened empire. The fact is that in the 40s. XIX century Through the efforts of European diplomacy, the straits came under international control and were closed to all military fleets. This could not suit the Russian Empire. A military clash became inevitable, but Nicholas I’s calculations for a quick victory turned out to be wrong.In November 1853, Admiral P.S. Nakhimov, at the head of a squadron of six battleships and two frigates, attacked the Ottoman fleet taking refuge in Sinop, and during a 4-hour battle, he burned almost all the Ottoman ships and destroyed coastal fortifications. The brilliant victory of the Russian fleet at Sinop was the reason for the direct intervention of England and France in the military conflict between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. At the beginning of March 1854, England and France presented Russia with an ultimatum to cleanse the Danube principalities and, having received no response, declared war on Russia. The fate of the war was decided in Crimea, although military operations were carried out on the Danube, in Transcaucasia, and in a number of other places. At the beginning of September 1854, Allied troops began landing on the Crimean Peninsula near Evpatoria. The first battle took place on the river. Alma, lost by the Russians. In October 1854, the heroic defense of Sevastopol began, which lasted 11 months. The defense was headed by Vice Admiral V.A. Kornilov, and after his death - P.S. Nakhimov, who was mortally wounded during intense shelling of the city at the end of June. The situation in Sevastopol turned out to be hopeless, so it was decided to abandon the fortress. The fall of Sevastopol predetermined the outcome of the war. Peace negotiations began in September 1855. On March 18, 1856, the Treaty of Paris and several conventions were signed between Russia, the Ottoman Empire, England, France, Austria, Prussia and Sardinia. Russia lost the southern part of Bessarabia with the mouth of the Danube. The most difficult condition of the Paris Treaty for Russia was the proclamation of the principle of “neutralization” of the Black Sea, which was declared, in modern terms, a “demilitarized zone.” Russia and the Ottoman Empire were prohibited from having a navy on the Black Sea, as well as military fortresses and arsenals on the shores. The Black Sea straits were declared closed to military vessels of all countries for the duration of peace.

The Crimean War, called the Eastern War in the West (1853-1856), was a military clash between Russia and a coalition of European states that came out in defense of Turkey. It had little impact on the external position of the Russian Empire, but significantly on its internal policy. The defeat forced the autocracy to begin reforms of the entire state administration, which ultimately led to the abolition of serfdom and the transformation of Russia into a powerful capitalist power

Causes of the Crimean War

Objective

*** Rivalry between European states and Russia in the matter of control over the numerous possessions of the weak, collapsing Ottoman Empire (Turkey)

    On January 9, 14, February 20, 21, 1853, at meetings with the British Ambassador G. Seymour, Emperor Nicholas I proposed that England share the Turkish Empire together with Russia (History of Diplomacy, Volume One pp. 433 - 437. Edited by V. P. Potemkin)

*** Russia's desire for primacy in managing the system of straits (Bosphorus and Dardanelles) from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean

    “If England is thinking of settling in Constantinople in the near future, then I will not allow it... For my part, I am equally disposed to accept the obligation not to settle there, of course, as an owner; as a temporary guardian is a different matter" (from the statement of Nicholas the First to the British Ambassador Seymour on January 9, 1853)

*** Russia's desire to include in the sphere of its national interests affairs in the Balkans and among the southern Slavs

    “Let Moldova, Wallachia, Serbia, Bulgaria come under Russian protectorate. As for Egypt, I fully understand the importance of this territory for England. Here I can only say that if, during the distribution of the Ottoman inheritance after the fall of the empire, you take possession of Egypt, then I will have no objection to this. I will say the same about Candia (the island of Crete). This island may suit you, and I don’t see why it shouldn’t become an English possession” (conversation between Nicholas I and British Ambassador Seymour on January 9, 1853 at an evening with Grand Duchess Elena Pavlovna)

Subjective

*** Turkey's weakness

    “Türkiye is a “sick man”. Nicholas did not change his terminology all his life when he spoke about the Turkish Empire" ((History of Diplomacy, Volume One pp. 433 - 437)

*** Nicholas I's confidence in his impunity

    “I want to speak to you as a gentleman, if we manage to come to an agreement - me and England - the rest doesn’t matter to me, I don’t care what others do or will do” (from a conversation between Nicholas the First and British Ambassador Hamilton Seymour on January 9, 1853 at the evening at Grand Duchess Elena Pavlovna)

*** Nicholas's suggestion that Europe is unable to present a united front

    “the tsar was confident that Austria and France would not join England (in a possible confrontation with Russia), and England would not dare to fight him without allies” (History of Diplomacy, Volume One pp. 433 - 437. OGIZ, Moscow, 1941)

*** Autocracy, the result of which was the wrong relationship between the emperor and his advisers

    “... Russian ambassadors in Paris, London, Vienna, Berlin, ... Chancellor Nesselrode ... in their reports distorted the state of affairs before the Tsar. They almost always wrote not about what they saw, but about what the king would like to know from them. When one day Andrei Rosen convinced Prince Lieven to finally open the Tsar’s eyes, Lieven answered literally: “So that I would say this to the Emperor?!” But I'm not a fool! If I wanted to tell him the truth, he would throw me out the door, and nothing else would come of it" (History of Diplomacy, Volume One)

*** The problem of "Palestinian shrines":

    It became apparent back in 1850, continued and intensified in 1851, weakened in the beginning and middle of 1852, and again unusually worsened just at the very end of 1852 - beginning of 1853. Louis Napoleon, while still president, told the Turkish government that he wanted to preserve and restore all the rights and benefits of the Catholic Church confirmed by Turkey back in 1740 in the so-called holy places, that is, in the churches of Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The Sultan agreed; but a sharp protest followed from Russian diplomacy in Constantinople, pointing out the advantages of the Orthodox Church over the Catholic Church based on the conditions of the Kuchuk-Kainardzhi Peace. After all, Nicholas I considered himself the patron saint of the Orthodox

*** France's desire to split the continental union of Austria, England, Prussia and Russia, which arose during the Napoleonic wars n

    “Subsequently, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Napoleon III, Drouey de Luis, very frankly stated: “The question of holy places and everything that relates to it has no real significance for France. This whole eastern question, which is causing so much noise, served the imperial government only as a means of disrupting the continental union, which had paralyzed France for almost half a century. Finally, the opportunity presented itself to sow discord in a powerful coalition, and Emperor Napoleon grabbed it with both hands" (History of Diplomacy)

Events preceding the Crimean War of 1853-1856

  • 1740 - France obtained from the Turkish Sultan priority rights for Catholics in the Holy Places of Jerusalem
  • 1774, July 21 - Kuchuk-Kainardzhi peace treaty between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, in which preferential rights to Holy Places were decided in favor of the Orthodox
  • 1837, June 20 - Queen Victoria took the English throne
  • 1841 - Lord Aberdeen took over as British Foreign Secretary
  • 1844, May - friendly meeting between Queen Victoria, Lord Aberdeen and Nicholas I, who visited England incognito

      During his short stay in London, the Emperor charmed everyone with his chivalrous courtesy and royal grandeur, charmed with his cordial courtesy Queen Victoria, her husband and the most prominent statesmen of the then Great Britain, with whom he tried to get closer and enter into an exchange of thoughts.
      Nicholas’s aggressive policy in 1853 was due, among other things, to Victoria’s friendly attitude towards him and the fact that the head of the cabinet in England at that moment was the same Lord Aberdeen, who listened to him so kindly at Windsor in 1844

  • 1850 - Patriarch Kirill of Jerusalem asked the Turkish government for permission to repair the dome of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. After much negotiation, a repair plan was drawn up in favor of the Catholics, and the main key to Bethlehem Church was given to the Catholics.
  • 1852, December 29 - Nicholas I ordered to recruit reserves for the 4th and 5th infantry corps, which were driving along the Russian-Turkish border in Europe and to supply these troops with supplies.
  • 1853, January 9 - at an evening with Grand Duchess Elena Pavlovna, at which the diplomatic corps was present, the tsar approached G. Seymour and had a conversation with him: “encourage your government to write again about this subject (the partition of Turkey), to write more fully, and let it do so without hesitation. I trust the English government. I am asking him not for an obligation, not an agreement: this is a free exchange of opinions, and, if necessary, the word of a gentleman. That's enough for us."
  • 1853, January - the Sultan's representative in Jerusalem announced the ownership of the shrines, giving preference to Catholics.
  • 1853, January 14 - second meeting of Nicholas with British Ambassador Seymour
  • 1853, February 9 - an answer came from London, given on behalf of the cabinet by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord John Rossel. The answer was sharply negative. Rossel stated that he does not understand why one can think that Turkey is close to the fall, does not find it possible to conclude any agreements regarding Turkey, even the temporary transfer of Constantinople into the hands of the tsar considers unacceptable, finally, Rossel emphasized that both France and Austria will be suspicious of such an Anglo-Russian agreement.
  • 1853, February 20 - third meeting of the Tsar with the British Ambassador on the same issue
  • 1853, February 21 - fourth
  • 1853, March - Russian Ambassador Extraordinary Menshikov arrived in Constantinople

      Menshikov was greeted with extraordinary honor. The Turkish police did not even dare to disperse the crowd of Greeks, who gave the prince an enthusiastic meeting. Menshikov behaved with defiant arrogance. In Europe, they paid a lot of attention even to Menshikov’s purely external provocative antics: they wrote about how he paid a visit to the Grand Vizier without taking off his coat, how he spoke sharply to Sultan Abdul-Mecid. From Menshikov’s very first steps, it became clear that he would never give in on two central points: first, he wants to achieve recognition of Russia’s right to patronage not only of the Orthodox Church, but also of the Sultan’s Orthodox subjects; secondly, he demands that Turkey’s consent be approved by the Sultan’s Sened, and not by a firman, i.e., that it be in the nature of a foreign policy agreement with the king, and not be a simple decree

  • 1853, March 22 - Menshikov presented Rifaat Pasha with a note: “The demands of the imperial government are categorical.” And two years later, 1853, on March 24, a new note from Menshikov, which demanded an end to the “systematic and malicious opposition” and a draft “convention” that made Nicholas, as diplomats of other powers immediately declared, “the second Turkish Sultan”
  • 1853, end of March - Napoleon III ordered his navy stationed in Toulon to immediately sail to the Aegean Sea, to Salamis, and be ready. Napoleon irrevocably decided to fight with Russia.
  • 1853, end of March - a British squadron set off for the Eastern Mediterranean
  • 1853, April 5 - the English ambassador Stratford-Canning arrived in Istanbul, who advised the Sultan to concede on the merits of the demands for holy places, since he understood that Menshikov would not be satisfied with this, because that was not what he came for. Menshikov will begin to insist on demands that will already be clearly aggressive in nature, and then England and France will support Turkey. At the same time, Stratford managed to instill in Prince Menshikov the conviction that England, in the event of war, would never take the side of the Sultan.
  • 1853, May 4 - Türkiye conceded in everything related to the “holy places”; immediately after this, Menshikov, seeing that the desired pretext for occupying the Danube principalities was disappearing, presented his previous demand for an agreement between the Sultan and the Russian emperor.
  • 1853, May 13 - Lord Redcliffe visited the Sultan and informed him that Turkey could be helped by the English squadron located in the Mediterranean Sea, as well as that Turkey must resist Russia. 1853, May 13 - Menshikov was invited to the Sultan. He asked the Sultan to satisfy his demands and mentioned the possibility of reducing Turkey to a secondary state.
  • 1853, May 18 - Menshikov was informed of the decision taken by the Turkish government to promulgate a decree on holy places; issue a firman protecting Orthodoxy to the Patriarch of Constantinople; propose concluding a senedd giving the right to build a Russian church in Jerusalem. Menshikov refused
  • 1853, May 6 - Menshikov presented Turkey with a note of rupture.
  • 1853, May 21 - Menshikov left Constantinople
  • 1853, June 4 - The Sultan issued a decree guaranteeing the rights and privileges of the Christian churches, but especially the rights and privileges of the Orthodox Church.

      However, Nicholas issued a manifesto that he, like his ancestors, must defend the Orthodox Church in Turkey, and that in order to ensure that the Turks fulfill previous treaties with Russia, which were violated by the Sultan, the Tsar was forced to occupy the Danube principalities (Moldova and Wallachia)

  • 1853, June 14 - Nicholas I issued a manifesto on the occupation of the Danube principalities

      The 4th and 5th infantry corps, numbering 81,541 people, were prepared to occupy Moldova and Wallachia. On May 24, the 4th Corps moved from Podolsk and Volyn provinces to Leovo. The 15th Division of the 5th Infantry Corps arrived there at the beginning of June and merged with the 4th Corps. The command was entrusted to Prince Mikhail Dmitrievich Gorchakov

  • 1853, June 21 - Russian troops crossed the Prut River and invaded Moldova
  • 1853, July 4 - Russian troops occupied Bucharest
  • 1853, July 31 - “Vienna Note”. This note stated that Turkey undertakes to comply with all the terms of the Adrianople and Kuchuk-Kainardzhi peace treaties; The position on the special rights and advantages of the Orthodox Church was again emphasized.

      But Stratford-Radcliffe forced Sultan Abdul-Mecid to reject the Vienna Note, and even before that he hastened to draw up, ostensibly on behalf of Turkey, another note, with some reservations against the Vienna Note. The king, in turn, rejected her. At this time, Nicholas received news from the ambassador in France about the impossibility of a joint military action by England and France.

  • 1853, October 16 - Türkiye declared war on Russia
  • 1853, October 20 - Russia declared war on Turkey

    The course of the Crimean War of 1853-1856. Briefly

  • 1853, November 30 - Nakhimov defeated the Turkish fleet in Sinop Bay
  • 1853, December 2 - victory of the Russian Caucasian army over the Turkish in the battle of Kars near Bashkadyklyar
  • 1854, January 4 - the combined Anglo-French fleet entered the Black Sea
  • 1854, February 27 - Franco-English ultimatum to Russia demanding the withdrawal of troops from the Danube principalities
  • 1854, March 7 - Union Treaty of Turkey, England and France
  • 1854, March 27 - England declared war on Russia
  • 1854, March 28 - France declared war on Russia
  • 1854, March-July - siege of Silistria, a port city in north-eastern Bulgaria, by the Russian army
  • 1854, April 9 - Prussia and Austria joined diplomatic sanctions against Russia. Russia remained isolated
  • 1854, April - shelling of the Solovetsky Monastery by the English fleet
  • 1854, June - the beginning of the retreat of Russian troops from the Danube principalities
  • 1854, August 10 - conference in Vienna, during which Austria, France and England put forward a number of demands to Russia, which Russia rejected
  • 1854, August 22 - the Turks entered Bucharest
  • 1854, August - the Allies captured the Russian-owned Åland Islands in the Baltic Sea
  • 1854, September 14 - Anglo-French troops landed in the Crimea, near Evpatoria
  • 1854, September 20 - unsuccessful battle of the Russian army with the allies at the Alma River
  • 1854, September 27 - the beginning of the siege of Sevastopol, the heroic 349-day defense of Sevastopol, which
    headed by admirals Kornilov, Nakhimov, Istomin, who died during the siege
  • 1854, October 17 - first bombardment of Sevastopol
  • 1854, October - two unsuccessful attempts by the Russian army to break the blockade
  • 1854, October 26 - the battle of Balaklava, unsuccessful for the Russian army
  • 1854, November 5 - unsuccessful battle for the Russian army near Inkerman
  • 1854, November 20 - Austria announced its readiness to enter the war
  • 1855, January 14 - Sardinia declared war on Russia
  • 1855, April 9 - second bombing of Sevastopol
  • 1855, May 24 - the Allies occupied Kerch
  • 1855, June 3 - third bombardment of Sevastopol
  • 1855, August 16 - an unsuccessful attempt by the Russian army to lift the siege of Sevastopol
  • 1855, September 8 - the French captured Malakhov Kurgan - a key position in the defense of Sevastopol
  • 1855, September 11 - the Allies entered the city
  • 1855, November - a series of successful operations of the Russian army against the Turks in the Caucasus
  • 1855, October - December - secret negotiations between France and Austria, concerned about the possible strengthening of England as a result of the defeat of Russia and the Russian Empire about peace
  • 1856, February 25 - the Paris Peace Congress began
  • 1856, March 30 - Peace of Paris

    Peace terms

    The return of Kars to Turkey in exchange for Sevastopol, the transformation of the Black Sea into neutral: Russia and Turkey are deprived of the opportunity to have a navy and coastal fortifications here, the concession of Bessarabia (the abolition of the exclusive Russian protectorate over Wallachia, Moldova and Serbia)

    Reasons for Russia's defeat in the Crimean War

    - Russia's military-technical lag behind leading European powers
    - Underdevelopment of communications
    - Embezzlement, corruption in the rear of the army

    “Due to the nature of his activity, Golitsyn had to learn the war as if from scratch. Then he will see heroism, holy self-sacrifice, selfless courage and patience of the defenders of Sevastopol, but, hanging around in the rear on militia affairs, at every step he was faced with God knows what: collapse, indifference, cold-blooded mediocrity and monstrous theft. They stole everything that other - higher - thieves did not have time to steal on the way to Crimea: bread, hay, oats, horses, ammunition. The mechanics of the robbery were simple: suppliers provided rotten goods, which were accepted (as a bribe, of course) by the main commissariat in St. Petersburg. Then - also for a bribe - the army commissariat, then the regimental commissariat, and so on until the last spoke in the chariot. And the soldiers ate rotten stuff, wore rotten stuff, slept on rotten stuff, shot rotten stuff. Military units themselves had to purchase fodder from the local population with money issued by a special financial department. Golitsyn once went there and witnessed such a scene. An officer arrived from the front line in a faded, shabby uniform. The feed has run out, hungry horses are eating sawdust and shavings. An elderly quartermaster with major's shoulder straps adjusted his glasses on his nose and said in a casual voice:
    - We’ll give you money, eight percent is okay.
    - Why on earth? — the officer was indignant. - We are shedding blood!..
    “They sent a newbie again,” the quartermaster sighed. - Just small children! I remember that captain Onishchenko came from your brigade. Why wasn't he sent?
    - Onishchenko died...
    - May the kingdom of heaven be upon him! - The quartermaster crossed himself. - It's a pity. The man was understanding. We respected him, and he respected us. We won't ask for too much.
    The quartermaster was not embarrassed even by the presence of an outsider. Prince Golitsyn approached him, grabbed him by the soul, pulled him out from behind the table and lifted him into the air.
    - I’ll kill you, you bastard!..
    “Kill,” the quartermaster wheezed, “I still won’t give it without interest.”
    “Do you think I’m joking?” The prince squeezed him with his paw.
    “I can’t... the chain will break...” the quartermaster croaked with the last of his strength. - Then I won’t live anyway... The Petersburgers will strangle me...
    “People are dying there, you son of a bitch!” - the prince cried out in tears and disgustedly threw away the half-strangled military official.
    He touched his wrinkled throat, like a condor’s, and croaked with unexpected dignity:
    “If we were there... we would have died no worse... And please, please,” he turned to the officer, “comply with the rules: for artillerymen - six percent, for all other branches of the military - eight.”
    The officer twitched his cold nose pathetically, as if he was sobbing:
    “They’re eating sawdust... shavings... to hell with you!.. I can’t come back without hay.”

    - Poor troop control

    “Golitsyn was amazed by the commander-in-chief himself, to whom he introduced himself. Gorchakov was not that old, a little over sixty, but he gave the impression of some kind of rottenness, it seemed that if you poked a finger at him, he would crumble like a completely rotten mushroom. The wandering gaze could not concentrate on anything, and when the old man released Golitsyn with a weak wave of his hand, he heard him humming in French:
    I'm poor, poor poilu,
    And I'm not in a hurry...
    - What else is that! - the colonel of the quartermaster service said to Golitsyn when they left the commander-in-chief. “At least he goes to the position, but Prince Menshikov didn’t remember at all that the war was going on.” He just made it all witty, and I must admit, it was caustic. He spoke about the Minister of War as follows: “Prince Dolgorukov has a threefold relationship with gunpowder - he did not invent it, did not smell it and does not send it to Sevastopol.” About commander Dmitry Erofeevich Osten-Sacken: “Erofeich has not become strong. I'm exhausted." Sarcasm at least! - the colonel added thoughtfully. “But he allowed a psalmist to be appointed over the great Nakhimov.” For some reason, Prince Golitsyn did not find it funny. In general, he was unpleasantly surprised by the tone of cynical mockery that reigned at headquarters. It seemed that these people had lost all self-respect, and with it any respect for anything. They didn’t talk about the tragic situation of Sevastopol, but they relished ridiculing the commander of the Sevastopol garrison, Count Osten-Sacken, who only knows what to do with priests, read akathists and argue about divine scripture. “He has one good quality,” the colonel added. “He doesn’t interfere in anything” (Yu. Nagibin “Stronger than all other commands”)

    Results of the Crimean War

    The Crimean War showed

  • The greatness and heroism of the Russian people
  • Defectiveness of the socio-political structure of the Russian Empire
  • The need for deep reforms of the Russian state
  • In short, the Crimean War broke out due to Russia's desire to seize the Bosporus and Dardanelles from Turkey. However, France and England joined the conflict. Since the Russian Empire lagged far behind economically, its defeat was only a matter of time. The consequences were heavy sanctions, the penetration of foreign capital, the decline of Russian authority, as well as an attempt to resolve the peasant question.

    Causes of the Crimean War

    The opinion that the war began because of a religious conflict and “protection of the Orthodox” is fundamentally incorrect. Since wars have never started because of different religions or infringement of some interests of fellow believers. These arguments are only a reason for conflict. The reason is always the economic interests of the parties.

    Türkiye by that time was the “sick link of Europe.” It became clear that it would not last long and would soon fall apart, so the question of who would inherit its territories became increasingly relevant. Russia wanted to annex Moldavia and Wallachia with its Orthodox population, and also in the future to capture the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits.

    The beginning and end of the Crimean War

    The following stages can be distinguished in the Crimean War of 1853-1855:

    1. Danube campaign. On June 14, 1853, the emperor issued a decree on the start of a military operation. On June 21, the troops crossed the border with Turkey and on July 3 entered Bucharest without firing a single shot. At the same time, minor military skirmishes began at sea and on land.
    1. Battle of Sinop. On November 18, 1953, a huge Turkish squadron was completely destroyed. This was Russia's largest victory in the Crimean War.
    1. Entry of the Allies into the war. In March 1854, France and England declared war on Russia. Realizing that he could not cope with the leading powers alone, the emperor withdrew his troops from Moldavia and Wallachia.
    1. Sea blockade. In June-July 1854, a Russian squadron of 14 battleships and 12 frigates was completely blocked in the Sevastopol Bay by the Allied fleet, numbering 34 battleships and 55 frigates.
    1. Allied landing in Crimea. On September 2, 1854, the Allies began to land in Yevpatoria, and already on the 8th of the same month they inflicted a fairly large defeat on the Russian army (a division of 33,000 people), which was trying to stop the movement of troops to Sevastopol. The losses were small, but they had to retreat.
    1. Destruction of part of the fleet. On September 9, 5 battleships and 2 frigates (30% of the total number) were sunk at the entrance to Sevastopol Bay to prevent the Allied squadron from breaking into it.
    1. Attempts to release the blockade. On October 13 and November 5, 1854, Russian troops made 2 attempts to lift the blockade of Sevastopol. Both were unsuccessful, but without major losses.
    1. Battle for Sevastopol. From March to September 1855 there were 5 bombings of the city. There was another attempt by Russian troops to break out of the blockade, but it failed. On September 8, Malakhov Kurgan, a strategic height, was taken. Because of this, Russian troops abandoned the southern part of the city, blew up rocks with ammunition and weapons, and sank the entire fleet.
    1. The surrender of half the city and the sinking of the Black Sea squadron produced a strong shock in all circles of society. For this reason, Emperor Nicholas I agreed to a truce.

    War participants

    One of the reasons for Russia's defeat is the numerical superiority of the allies. But actually it is not. The ratio of the ground part of the army is shown in the table.

    As you can see, although the allies had an overall numerical superiority, this did not affect every battle. Moreover, even when the ratio was approximately parity or in our favor, Russian troops still could not achieve success. However, the main question remains not why Russia did not win without having numerical superiority, but why the state was not able to supply more soldiers.

    Important! In addition, the British and French caught dysentery during the march, which greatly affected the combat effectiveness of the units .

    The balance of fleet forces in the Black Sea is shown in the table:

    The main naval force were battleships - heavy ships with a huge number of guns. Frigates were used as fast and well-armed hunters that hunted transport ships. Russia's large number of small boats and gunboats did not provide superiority at sea, since their combat potential was extremely small.

    Heroes of the Crimean War

    Another reason is called command errors. However, most of these opinions are expressed after the fact, that is, when the critic already knows what decision should have been taken.

    1. Nakhimov, Pavel Stepanovich. He showed himself most at sea during the Battle of Sinop, when he sank a Turkish squadron. He did not participate in land battles, since he did not have the relevant experience (he was still a naval admiral). During the defense, he served as governor, that is, he was involved in equipping the troops.
    1. Kornilov, Vladimir Alekseevich. He proved himself to be a brave and active commander. In fact, he invented active defense tactics with tactical sorties, laying minefields, and mutual assistance between land and naval artillery.
    1. Menshikov, Alexander Sergeevich. It is he who receives all the blame for the lost war. However, firstly, Menshikov personally led only 2 operations. In one he retreated for completely objective reasons (numerical superiority of the enemy). In another he lost because of his miscalculation, but at that moment his front was no longer decisive, but auxiliary. Secondly, Menshikov also gave quite rational orders (sinking ships in the bay), which helped the city survive longer.

    Causes of defeat

    Many sources indicate that Russian troops lost because of the fittings, which the Allied armies had in large quantities. This is an erroneous point of view, which is duplicated even on Wikipedia, so it needs to be analyzed in detail:

    1. The Russian army also had fittings, and there were enough of them too.
    2. The rifle was fired at 1200 meters - it’s just a myth. Really long-range rifles were adopted much later. On average, the rifles were fired at 400-450 meters.
    3. The rifles were shot very accurately - also a myth. Yes, their accuracy was more accurate, but only by 30-50% and only at 100 meters. As the distance increased, the superiority dropped to 20-30% or lower. In addition, the rate of fire was 3-4 times lower.
    4. During major battles in the first half of the 19th century, the smoke from gunpowder was so thick that visibility was reduced to 20-30 meters.
    5. The accuracy of a weapon does not mean the accuracy of a fighter. It is extremely difficult to teach a person to hit a target from 100 meters even with a modern rifle. And from a rifle that did not have today’s aiming devices, it was even more difficult to shoot at a target.
    6. During combat stress, only 5% of soldiers think about targeted shooting.
    7. The main losses were always caused by artillery. Namely, 80-90% of all killed and wounded soldiers were from cannon fire with grapeshot.

    Despite the numerical disadvantage of guns, we had an overwhelming superiority in artillery, which was determined by the following factors:

    • our guns were more powerful and more accurate;
    • Russia had the best artillerymen in the world;
    • the batteries stood in prepared high positions, which gave them an advantage in firing range;
    • The Russians were fighting on their territory, which is why all positions were targeted, meaning we could immediately start hitting without missing a beat.

    So what were the reasons for the loss? First, we have completely lost the diplomatic game. France, which supplied the bulk of its troops to the theater of operations, could be persuaded to stand up for us. Napoleon III did not have any real economic goals, which means there was an opportunity to lure him to his side. Nicholas I hoped that the allies would keep their word. He did not request any official papers, which was a big mistake. This can be deciphered as “dizziness with success.”

    Secondly, the feudal system of troop control was significantly inferior to the capitalist military machine. First of all, this manifests itself in discipline. A living example: when Menshikov gave the order to scuttle the ship in the bay, Kornilov... refused to carry it out. This situation is the norm for the feudal paradigm of military thinking, where there is not a commander and a subordinate, but a suzerain and a vassal.

    However, the main reason for the loss is Russia's huge economic lag. For example, the table below shows the main economic indicators:

    This was precisely the reason for the lack of modern ships, weapons, as well as the inability to supply ammunition, ammunition and medicines on time. By the way, cargo from France and England arrived at Crimea faster than from the central regions of Russia to Crimea. And another striking example is that the Russian Empire, seeing the deplorable situation in Crimea, was unable to deliver new troops to the theater of operations, while the allies were transporting reserves across several seas.

    Consequences of the Crimean War

    Despite the local nature of the hostilities, Russia suffered greatly in this war. First of all, a huge public debt appeared - over a billion rubles. The money supply (assignations) increased from 311 to 735 million. The ruble has fallen in price several times. By the end of the war, market sellers simply refused to exchange silver coins for paper money.

    Such instability led to a rapid rise in the price of bread, meat and other food products, which led to peasant revolts. The schedule of peasant performances is as follows:

    • 1855 – 63;
    • 1856 – 71;
    • 1857 – 121;
    • 1858 – 423 (this is already the scale of Pugachevism);
    • 1859 – 182;
    • 1860 – 212;
    • 1861 - 1340 (and this is already a civil war).

    Russia lost the right to have warships in the Black Sea and gave up some lands, but all this was quickly returned during the subsequent Russian-Turkish wars. Therefore, the main consequence of the war for the empire can be considered the abolition of serfdom. However, this “abolition” was only a transfer of peasants from feudal slavery to mortgage slavery, as clearly evidenced by the number of uprisings in 1861 (indicated above).

    Results for Russia

    What conclusions can be drawn? In war after the 19th century, the main and only means of victory is not modern missiles, tanks and ships, but the economy. In case of mass military clashes, it is extremely important that the weapons are not only high-tech, but that the state economy can constantly update all weapons in the conditions of the rapid destruction of human resources and military equipment.

    The Crimean War, or, as it is called in the West, the Eastern War, was one of the most important and decisive events of the mid-19th century. At this time, the lands of the western Ottoman Empire found themselves at the center of a conflict between the European powers and Russia, with each of the warring parties wanting to expand their territories by annexing foreign lands.

    The war of 1853-1856 was called the Crimean War, since the most important and intense fighting took place in the Crimea, although military clashes went far beyond the peninsula and covered large areas of the Balkans, the Caucasus, as well as the Far East and Kamchatka. At the same time, Tsarist Russia had to fight not just with the Ottoman Empire, but with a coalition where Turkey was supported by Great Britain, France and the Kingdom of Sardinia.

    Causes of the Crimean War

    Each of the parties that took part in the military campaign had its own reasons and grievances that prompted them to enter into this conflict. But in general, they were united by one single goal - to take advantage of Turkey’s weakness and establish themselves in the Balkans and the Middle East. It was these colonial interests that led to the outbreak of the Crimean War. But all countries took different paths to achieve this goal.

    Russia wanted to destroy the Ottoman Empire, and its territories to be mutually beneficially divided between the claiming countries. Russia would like to see Bulgaria, Moldova, Serbia and Wallachia under its protectorate. And at the same time, she was not against the fact that the territories of Egypt and the island of Crete would go to Great Britain. It was also important for Russia to establish control over the Dardanelles and Bosporus straits, connecting two seas: the Black and Mediterranean.

    With the help of this war, Turkey hoped to suppress the national liberation movement that was sweeping the Balkans, as well as to take away the very important Russian territories of Crimea and the Caucasus.

    England and France did not want to strengthen the position of Russian tsarism in the international arena, and sought to preserve the Ottoman Empire, since they saw it as a constant threat to Russia. Having weakened the enemy, the European powers wanted to separate the territories of Finland, Poland, the Caucasus and Crimea from Russia.

    The French emperor pursued his ambitious goals and dreamed of revenge in a new war with Russia. Thus, he wanted to take revenge on his enemy for his defeat in the military campaign of 1812.

    If you carefully consider the mutual claims of the parties, then, in essence, the Crimean War was absolutely predatory and aggressive. It’s not for nothing that the poet Fyodor Tyutchev described it as a war of cretins with scoundrels.

    Progress of hostilities

    The start of the Crimean War was preceded by several important events. In particular, it was the issue of control over the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Bethlehem, which was resolved in favor of the Catholics. This finally convinced Nicholas I of the need to begin military action against Turkey. Therefore, in June 1853, Russian troops invaded the territory of Moldova.

    The response from the Turkish side was not long in coming: on October 12, 1853, the Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia.

    First period of the Crimean War: October 1853 – April 1854

    By the beginning of hostilities, there were about a million people in the Russian army. But as it turned out, its weapons were very outdated and significantly inferior to the equipment of Western European armies: smooth-bore guns against rifled weapons, a sailing fleet against ships with steam engines. But Russia hoped that it would have to fight with a Turkish army approximately equal in strength, as happened at the very beginning of the war, and could not imagine that it would be opposed by the forces of a united coalition of European countries.

    During this period, military operations were carried out with varying degrees of success. And the most important battle of the first Russian-Turkish period of the war was the Battle of Sinop, which took place on November 18, 1853. The Russian flotilla under the command of Vice Admiral Nakhimov, heading to the Turkish coast, discovered large enemy naval forces in Sinop Bay. The commander decided to attack the Turkish fleet. The Russian squadron had an undeniable advantage - 76 cannons firing explosive shells. This is what decided the outcome of the 4-hour battle - the Turkish squadron was completely destroyed, and the commander Osman Pasha was captured.

    Second period of the Crimean War: April 1854 – February 1856

    The victory of the Russian army in the Battle of Sinop greatly worried England and France. And in March 1854, these powers, together with Turkey, formed a coalition to fight a common enemy - the Russian Empire. Now a powerful military force, several times larger than her army, fought against her.

    With the beginning of the second stage of the Crimean campaign, the territory of military operations expanded significantly and covered the Caucasus, the Balkans, the Baltic, the Far East and Kamchatka. But the main task of the coalition was intervention in Crimea and the capture of Sevastopol.

    In the fall of 1854, a combined 60,000-strong corps of coalition forces landed in the Crimea near Evpatoria. And the Russian army lost the first battle on the Alma River, so it was forced to retreat to Bakhchisarai. The garrison of Sevastopol began to prepare for the defense and defense of the city. The valiant defenders were led by the famous admirals Nakhimov, Kornilov and Istomin. Sevastopol was turned into an impregnable fortress, which was defended by 8 bastions on land, and the entrance to the bay was blocked with the help of sunken ships.

    The heroic defense of Sevastopol continued for 349 days, and only in September 1855 the enemy captured the Malakhov Kurgan and occupied the entire southern part of the city. The Russian garrison moved to the northern part, but Sevastopol never capitulated.

    Results of the Crimean War

    The military actions of 1855 weakened both the allied coalition and Russia. Therefore, there could no longer be any talk of continuing the war. And in March 1856, the opponents agreed to sign a peace treaty.

    According to the Treaty of Paris, Russia, like the Ottoman Empire, was prohibited from having a navy, fortresses and arsenals on the Black Sea, which meant that the country's southern borders were in danger.

    As a result of the war, Russia lost a small part of its territories in Bessarabia and the mouth of the Danube, but lost its influence in the Balkans.

    Crimean War (briefly)

    Brief description of the Crimean War of 1853-1856.

    The main reason for the Crimean War was the clash of interests in the Balkans and the Middle East of such powers as Austria, France, England and Russia. Leading European states sought to open up Turkish possessions to increase the sales market. At the same time, Türkiye wanted in every possible way to take revenge after defeats in the wars with Russia.

    The trigger for the war was the problem of revising the legal regime for the Russian fleet's navigation of the Dardanelles and Bosporus straits, which was fixed in 1840 in the London Convention.

    And the reason for the outbreak of hostilities was a dispute between the Catholic and Orthodox clergy about the correct ownership of the shrines (the Holy Sepulcher and the Church of Bethlehem), which were at that moment on the territory of the Ottoman Empire. In 1851, Türkiye, instigated by France, handed over the keys to the shrines to the Catholics. In 1853, Emperor Nicholas I put forward an ultimatum excluding a peaceful resolution of the issue. At the same time, Russia occupies the Danube principalities, which leads to war. Here are its main points:

    · In November 1853, the Black Sea squadron of Admiral Nakhimov defeated the Turkish fleet in the bay of Sinop, and a Russian ground operation was able to push back the enemy troops by crossing the Danube.

    · Fearing the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, France and England declared war on Russia in the spring of 1854, attacking the Russian ports of Odessa, the Addan Islands, etc. in August 1854. These blockade attempts were unsuccessful.

    · Autumn 1854 - landing of sixty thousand troops in the Crimea to capture Sevastopol. The heroic defense of Sevastopol for 11 months.

    · On August twenty-seventh, after a series of unsuccessful battles, they were forced to leave the city.

    On March 18, 1856, the Paris Peace Treaty was formalized and signed between Sardinia, Prussia, Austria, England, France, Turkey and Russia. The latter lost part of its fleet and some bases, and the Black Sea was recognized as neutral territory. In addition, Russia lost power in the Balkans, which significantly undermined its military power.

    According to historians, the basis for the defeat during the Crimean War was the strategic miscalculation of Nicholas the First, who pushed feudal-serfdom and economically backward Russia into a military conflict with powerful European states.

    This defeat prompted Alexander II to carry out radical political reforms.



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