The Belarusian operation is a strategic offensive military operation of the USSR troops against Germany at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, named after the hero of the Patriotic War of 1812, commander P. I. Bagration. By June 1944, a bulge of German troops had formed on the front line in Belarus (the Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev - Zhlobin line), facing east. In this wedge, the German command created a deeply layered defense. The Soviet command set its troops the task of breaking through the enemy’s defenses on the territory of Belarus, defeating the German Army Group Center and liberating Belarus.
Operation Bagration began on June 23, 1944. It developed on a 400 km front line (between German Army Groups North and South), Soviet troops of the 1st Belorussian (Army General K.K. Rokossovsky) were advancing, 2nd Belorussian (Army General G.F. Zakharov), 3rd Belorussian (Colonel General I.D. Chernyakhovsky) and 1st Baltic (Army General I.Kh. Bagramyan) fronts. With the support of partisans, they broke through the defenses of the German Army Group Center in many areas, surrounded and eliminated large enemy groups in the areas of Vitebsk, Bobruisk, Vilnius, Brest and Minsk.
By August 29, 1944, German Army Group Center was almost completely defeated; Army Group North found itself cut off from all ground communication routes (until the surrender in 1945, it was supplied by sea). The territory of Belarus, a significant part of Lithuania and the eastern regions of Poland were liberated. Soviet troops reached the Narew and Vistula rivers and the borders of East Prussia.
Orlov A.S., Georgieva N.G., Georgiev V.A. Historical Dictionary. 2nd ed. M., 2012, p. 33-34.
Belarusian operation - offensive June 23 - August 29, 1944 by Soviet troops in Belarus and Lithuania. 4 fronts took part in the offensive: 1st Baltic (General I.Kh. Bagramyan), 1st Belorussian (General K.K. Rokossovsky), 2nd Belorussian (General G.F. Zakharov) and 3rd Belorussian ( General I.D. Chernyakhovsky). (Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945). The troops were equipped with vehicles, tractors, self-propelled artillery and other types of equipment.
This significantly increased the maneuverability of Soviet formations. Three years after the start of the war, a completely different army returned to Belarus - a battle-hardened, skillful and well-equipped army. She was opposed by Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal E. Bush.
The balance of forces is shown in the table.
Source: History of the Second World War: In 12 vols. M., 1973-1979. T. 9. P. 47.
In Belarus, the Germans hoped to stop the Soviet onslaught with the help of a pre-prepared and deeply echeloned (up to 270 km) defense, which relied on a developed system of field fortifications and convenient natural boundaries (rivers, wide swampy floodplains, etc.). These lines were guarded by the highest quality military contingent, which retained many veterans of the 1941 campaign in its ranks. The German command believed that the terrain and powerful defense system in Belarus precluded the Red Army from successfully carrying out a major offensive operation here. It expected that the Red Army would deliver its main blow in the summer of 1944 south of the Pripyat marshes, where the main German tank and motorized forces were concentrated.
Perhaps none of the previous major Soviet operations had been prepared with such care.
For example, before the offensive, sappers removed 34 thousand enemy mines in the direction of the main attack, made 193 passages for tanks and infantry, and established dozens of crossings across the Drut and Dnieper. On June 23, 1944, the day after the 3rd anniversary of the start of the war, the Red Army struck Army Group Center with an unprecedented blow, fully paying for its humiliating defeat in Belarus in the summer of 1941.
Convinced of the ineffectiveness of individual offensive operations in the central direction, the Soviet command this time attacked the Germans with forces on four fronts at once, concentrating up to two-thirds of its forces on the flanks. The first strike involved the bulk of the forces intended for the offensive. The Belarusian operation contributed to the success of the Second Front in Europe, which opened on June 6, since the German command could not actively transfer troops to the west to contain the onslaught from the east.
Meanwhile, the 1st and 3rd Belorussian Fronts launched deeper flank attacks in converging directions towards Minsk. On July 3, Soviet troops liberated the capital of Belarus, encircling a 100,000-strong German group to the east. Belarusian partisans played a huge role in this operation.
Actively interacting with the advancing fronts, the people's avengers disorganized the operational rear of the Germans, paralyzing the latter's transfer of reserves. In 12 days, Red Army units advanced 225-280 km, breaking through the main lines of German defense.
A peculiar result of the first stage was the procession through the streets of Moscow of over 57 thousand German soldiers and officers captured during the operation.
So, at the first stage, the German front in Belarus lost stability and collapsed, allowing the operation to move into the maneuver stage. Field Marshal V. Model, who replaced Bush, was unable to stop the Soviet offensive. At the second stage (July 5 - August 29), Soviet troops entered the operational space. On July 13, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front struck south of the Pripyat marshes (see Lvov-Sandomierz operation), and the Soviet offensive unfolded from the Baltic states to the Carpathians. At the beginning of August, the advanced units of the Red Army reached the Vistula and the borders of East Prussia.
The Belarusian operation was distinguished by the largest loss of personnel of the Red Army in strategic operations of 1944. The average daily losses of Soviet troops were also the highest in the 1944 campaign (over two thousand people), which indicates the high intensity of the fighting and stubborn resistance of the Germans. This is evidenced by the fact that the number of killed Wehrmacht soldiers and officers in this operation is almost 2.5 times higher than the number of those who surrendered. Nevertheless, this was one of the largest defeats of the Wehrmacht in the Great Patriotic War. According to the German military, the disaster in Belarus put an end to the organized resistance of German troops in the East. The Red Army's offensive became general.
Book materials used: Nikolay Shefov. Battles of Russia. Military-historical library. M., 2002.
Read further:
Vitebsk-Orsha operation 1944, offensive operation of the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts in the Great Patriotic War, carried out on June 23 - 28 during the Belarusian operation.
| In the Soviet Union, during the years of industrialization, several dozen new sectors of the national economy were created that did not exist in 1913. But at the same time, people have never seen part of the products produced at the newly built enterprises in everyday life. During the war, the troops were equipped with tractors, self-propelled artillery and other types of equipment that the soldier, a former peasant, had never seen before. It’s a different matter now: everyone can buy at least a KAMAZ, even a Shaanxi or HOWO tractor. Chinese tractors have become more accessible than all those miracles of domestic heavy industry that we were proud of throughout the world. And now everyone can be proud of their own (from the word “property”) iron construction or transport monster. |
Operation Bagration is considered one of the largest military operations in the history of mankind.
It represents the third stage of the “Rail War”, which took place in June and August 1944 on the territory of Belarus.
During this operation, the German troops were dealt such a strong blow that they could no longer recover from it.
Prerequisites
At that time, the Germans were advancing on several fronts. On the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, Soviet troops managed to accomplish the unprecedented: liberate almost the entire territory of the republic and destroy a huge number of Nazi troops.
But on Belarusian territory the Red Army was unable to organize a successful breakthrough to Minsk for a long time. The German forces were lined up in a wedge directed towards the USSR, and this wedge stood at the line Orsha - Vitebsk - Mogilev - Zhlobin.
Belarusian operation photo
At the same time, part of the troops was transferred to Ukraine, which the Wehrmacht still hoped to recapture. Therefore, the General Staff and the Supreme High Command decided to change the direction of action and concentrate efforts on the liberation of Belarus.
Strengths of the parties
The offensive in Belarus was organized on four fronts. Soviet troops were opposed here by four German armies:
- 2nd Army of the “Center”, located in the area of Pinsk and Pripyat;
- 9th Army of the “Center”, located in the Berezina area near Bobruisk;
- 4th Army of the “Center” - the space between the Berezina and Dnieper rivers and between Bykhov and Orsha;
- 3rd Tank Army of the “Center” - there, as well as Vitebsk.
Progress of the operation
Operation Bagration was very large-scale and was carried out in two stages. At the first stage, actions were carried out on Belarusian territory, and at the second - on the territory of Lithuania and Eastern Poland.
On June 22, 1944, reconnaissance in force began to clarify the precise location of enemy guns. And on the morning of June 23, the operation itself began. Soviet troops surrounded a group of five divisions near Vitebsk and liquidated it on June 27. Thus, the main defensive forces of the Army Center were destroyed.
In addition to the actions of the Red Army, Operation Bagration was accompanied by unprecedented partisan activity: during the summer of 1944, almost 195 thousand partisans joined the Red Army.
Soviet troops in attack photo
Eike Middeldorf noted that “Russian partisans” carried out more than ten thousand explosions on railways and other communications, which delayed the movement of German troops for several days. On the other hand, partisan actions facilitated the offensive actions of the Soviet army.
The partisans planned to carry out much more explosions - up to forty thousand, however, what was done was enough to deal a crushing blow to the German side.
Polish Committee of National Liberation
At the height of Bagration, Soviet troops entered Polish territory. There they formed a provisional government, which many experts regard as a puppet government. The provisional government, called the Polish Committee of National Liberation, did not take into account the emigrant Polish government and consisted of communists and socialists. Subsequently, some of the emigrants joined the Committee, but the rest decided to remain in London.
Result of the operation
Operation Bagration exceeded all the expectations of the Soviet command. The Red Army showed the superiority of its military theory and demonstrated careful organization and consistency of action. Many believe that the defeat of the Germans on the Belarusian front is the largest in the entire history of World War II.
Bulletin of the Academy of Military Sciences 03-2004
BELARUSIAN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATION (BAGRATION ")
Army General M. A. GAREEV, Doctor of Military Sciences, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, President of the Academy of Sciences
Lessons and conclusions
Operation Bagration is one of the most instructive and outstanding offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. It was carried out from June 23 to August 28, 1944 with the main goal of defeating the strongest and largest group of Nazi troops - Army Group Center, liberating Belarus, part of the territory of Lithuania and Poland.
Strategic situation at the start of the operation
In order to better understand the features and lessons arising from the experience of this operation, it is necessary to remember in what conditions of the military-political and strategic situation it took place, which preceded this operation.
After the defeats at Stalingrad and Kursk, by the beginning of 1944, the fascist German army finally switched to a tough strategic defense. At subsequent stages of the war, it also launched strong counterattacks and individual offensive operations (as, for example, in the area of Lake Balaton, the Ardennes at the beginning of 1945), but these active actions were already of a private nature, subordinated to the interests of defense with the aim of prolonging the war and concluding a separate or a multilateral peace on terms acceptable to Germany. The assassination attempt on Hitler in July 1944 was also designed for this purpose.
By the beginning of 1944, the German armed forces numbered over 10 million people; they still held the Baltic states, Karelia, a significant part of Belarus, Ukraine, the Kalinin and Leningrad regions, Crimea and Moldova. As part of the active army, they had 6.7 million people, of which about 5 million people were on the Soviet-German front - 198 divisions (out of 314 divisions and brigades), 56.6 thousand guns and mortars, 5,400 tanks and assault guns, more than 3,000 combat aircraft. Until July 1944, military production was still growing.
However, Germany's situation worsened. Its defeat on the Soviet-German front led to an aggravation of the internal political situation in Germany itself and in the camp of its allies. The situation with human resources has especially worsened.
In general, the military-political and strategic situation changed radically in favor of the USSR and its allies. In 1942-1944. In the eastern regions of our country, 2,250 enterprises were rebuilt and over 6 thousand enterprises were restored in the liberated areas. The defense industry in 1944 produced 5 times more tanks and aircraft monthly than in 1941.
By the beginning of 1944, the Soviet active army had more than 6.3 million people, over 86.6 thousand guns and mortars (excluding anti-aircraft guns and 50-mm mortars), about 5.3 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 10 ,2 thousand aircraft.
By this time, there was no overwhelming superiority of the Soviet armed forces over the German ones. It appeared when the Allies landed a large landing in Normandy in June 1944 and a second front was opened in Europe, which made it even more difficult for the German command to maneuver forces and means from one front to another.
The Soviet armed forces were faced with the task of preventing the fascist German army from gaining a foothold on the occupied lines and prolonging the war, completing the liberation of the territory of their country, liberating other peoples of Europe from fascist occupation and ending the war with the complete defeat of fascist Germany together with the Western allies. These problems could only be solved by active offensive actions.
In accordance with the agreement with the allies at the Tehran Conference, a new powerful strategic offensive was launched in 1944, when the Red Army carried out 10 major offensive operations, starting with an offensive to liberate right-bank Ukraine and lift the siege of Leningrad in the winter of 1944. The Vyborg-Petrozavodsk, Belorussian, Lvov-Sandomierz, Iasi-Kishinev operations were carried out.
Our allies delayed opening a second front for three years, and only after seeing that the Soviet armed forces could crush Hitler’s army without them, they finally began the Normandy landing operation on June 6, 1944.
For the first time since the beginning of World War II, Nazi Germany found itself under coordinated attacks from the East and West. The successful Allied offensive in France was greatly facilitated by the Belarusian operation.
The successive offensive operations carried out by Soviet troops in different directions (operations in new directions began, as a rule, while operations in other directions were still ongoing) disoriented the German command, forced them to disperse their forces and deprived them of the opportunity to repel or disrupt the offensive actions of the Soviet troops. Moreover, successive offensive operations alternated not only along the front, but also in depth, when from the moment of completion of some without significant operational pauses, new offensive operations were undertaken with the aim of their further development.
These were grandiose, unprecedented in scale offensive operations, unfolding on a front from 2 to 4.5 thousand km and to a depth of 800 km, in which from 8 to 11 fronts participated with the active action of the Navy, long-range aviation and the country's air defense forces. The level of strategic leadership, operational and tactical skills of command personnel and headquarters have increased; In general, the military art of the Soviet armed forces reached its greatest flourishing. Our army's confidence and morale were on the rise.
By the beginning of the Belarusian operation, the front line in Belarus with a length of over 1100 km passed along the line: Lake. Neshcherda, east of Vitebsk, Mogilev, Zhlobin, along the river. Pripyat, forming a huge ledge, with its top facing the East. From this ledge, the German command continued to threaten Moscow; from the airfields located here, it was possible to launch air strikes in the western, northern and southern directions along the shortest route.
The group of fascist German troops, occupying the so-called Belorussian balcony with a well-developed network of roads, had the opportunity to widely maneuver along internal lines, create the threat of flank attacks on the Baltic and Belorussian fronts, blocking the Soviet troops’ path to Warsaw.
This ledge was defended by the troops of the Army Group "Center" (commander Field Marshal E. Bush, from July 28 - Field Marshal V. Model) consisting of the 3rd Panzer, 4th, 9th and 2nd armies under support of the 6th and partially the 1st and 4th air fleets. In total, the group consisted of 63 divisions and 3 brigades, I, 2 million people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, 900 tanks and assault guns, 1350 combat aircraft.
It should also be noted that the fascist German troops occupied a pre-prepared, deeply echeloned defense with a developed system of field fortifications and natural lines beneficial for conducting defensive actions.
The concept and preparation of Operation Bagration
The plan of the Belarusian strategic operation was to pin down the enemy from the front with the forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front and, delivering the main blows with the forces of the 3rd and 1st Baltic Fronts from the north and the 1st Belorussian Front from the south, first defeat the most powerful flanking enemy groups, encircle and destroy them in the area of Vitebsk and Bobruisk, and then, developing an offensive in depth, encircle the enemy’s Minsk grouping and thereby prevent its withdrawal to the West.
It is interesting to note that initially front operations were planned at a depth of 200-250 km. When the fronts were assigned such relatively limited tasks, apparently, the syndrome of unsuccessful offensive operations of the Western Front in the autumn-winter campaign of 1943-1944 was reflected. This circumstance also affected the decisions of the German command. Having believed from the experience of previous military operations in the strength of its defense on the territory of Belarus, it believed that the Soviet command would not dare to deliver the main blow in Belarus in the summer of 1944 and therefore waited for it in the south, in the Lvov direction. Army commands and groups had only 11 divisions in reserve. By the beginning of the summer offensive of the Soviet troops, 24 of 34 tank and motorized divisions were kept south of Polesie. Looking ahead, let's say that when the Belarusian operation began, the command of the fascist German troops began to transfer the majority of tank formations to Belarus, but at that time, with some delay in time, the Lvov-Sandomierz operation of the 1st Ukrainian Front began, and some of these German divisions had to return to the south. This thwarted German plans for the massive use of the bulk of armored forces to consistently launch counterattacks and disrupt the Soviet offensive in the Lvov and Belorussian directions. This once again shows how skillfully and thoughtfully the Soviet command chose the timing and sequence of strikes against the enemy.
To carry out the Belarusian operation, the following group of troops was created:
1st Baltic Front (commanded by Army General I.Kh. Bagramyan): 4th shock, 6th guards, 43 armies, 1st tank corps;
3rd Belorussian Front (commander Colonel General I.D. Chernyakhovsky): 39th, 5th, 11th Guards, 31st Army, 5th Guards. TA, cavalry mechanized group, 2nd Guards Tank Corps;
2nd Belorussian Front (commander Colonel General G.V. Zakharov): 33rd, 49th, 50th armies, 1st tank corps;
1st Belorussian Front (commander General of the Army K.K. Rokossovsky): 3, 48, 65, 28, 61, 70, 47, K Guards, 69 Armies, during the operation - 1st Army of the Polish Army (General Berling ), Dnieper Military Flotilla (Rear Admiral V.V. Grigoriev). Front troops were supported by: 3, 1, 4, 6, 16 air armies. Long-Range Air Defense Aviation was also involved.
In total, the group included: 20 combined arms and 2 tank armies, 166 rifle divisions, 12 tank and mechanized corps, 21 brigades, 2.4 million personnel, 36 thousand guns and mortars, 5.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns , 5.3 thousand combat aircraft. Power ratio: sex/s 2:1; artillery 3.8:1; tanks 5.8:1; aircraft 3.9:1 in our favor. Approximately 20% of these forces and assets were transferred to the fronts during the operation.
The coordination of the actions of the 1st PF and 3rd BF was carried out by Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, "and the 1st BF - Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov. Moreover, if in previous strategic operations representatives of the Supreme High Command Headquarters were assigned ONLY coordination of actions and control over implementation tasks, then in the Belarusian operation their rights were expanded, they were given the right to clarify tasks and directly manage the combat operations of the fronts during the operation.
Belarusian partisans provided great assistance to the troops during the operation. By the summer of 1944, 150 partisan brigades and 49 separate detachments with a total number of 143 thousand partisans were operating on Belarusian soil. On the night of June 20 alone they blew up 40 thousand rails.
Expecting the intensification of partisan actions from the beginning of the offensive of our troops, the command of Army Group Center decided to send all reserve divisions and security units to destroy ■ the main forces of the partisans and blocking, the remaining detachments in deep forests and swampy areas || away from critical communications. The main partisan formations and units found themselves in an extremely difficult situation, and alarming signals were sent from them to provide urgent assistance. In this regard, the offensive of our troops was launched several days earlier than expected.
To help the partisans, 10 columns of 50-60 vehicles with food and medicine were prepared in advance, which began moving to the partisans’ base areas following the advanced units immediately after breaking through the enemy’s defenses. The author of these lines happened to lead one of the columns that was heading to the Palik Lake area.
The plan for the Belarusian strategic offensive operation as a whole and the plans for front operations were approved at the Supreme Command Headquarters at the end of May. Directives to the fronts were issued on May 30, signed by I.V. Stalin and G.K. Zhukov. Initially, in accordance with the plan of the General Staff, the 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to deliver one blow in the Bobruisk direction. During the report to I. Stalin of his decision, K. Rokossovsky proposed delivering not one, but two approximately equally powerful strikes with the aim of encircling and destroying the enemy’s Bobruisk group. But theoretically it has always been accepted that one of the strikes should be the main one, and I.V. Stalin attached paramount importance to the choice of the direction of the main strike. Therefore, he twice invited Rokossovsky to go out and think about his decision again.
Konstantin Konstantinovich insisted on his own and ultimately, with the support of G.K. Zhukov, he managed to get his decision approved. It was, of course, justified. The 1st Belorussian Front included 10 combined arms armies - 50% of all forces and assets participating in the Belarusian operation, and it was irrational to use all these forces in one direction, where the enemy could transfer all his reserves and troops from others that were not attacked directions.
The commanders of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic Fronts also achieved clarification of the plan originally outlined by the General Staff. I.D. Chernyakhovsky also proposed, instead of one strike, to deliver two strikes on the Bogushevsky and Orsha directions of the enemy’s defense; I.Kh. Bagramyan convinced Headquarters that after the breakthrough, it would be more profitable for his troops to develop an offensive not in the southwest, but in the western direction. From this we see how far from the truth are the statements of some historians that I.V. Stalin did not take anyone into account. In reality, the process of making decisions and planning operations was of a purely creative, business nature, when the plans of the General Staff and the fronts seemed to overlap each other, and under the leadership of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief the most rational decisions were developed.
When the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front encircled and destroyed the enemy’s Bobruisk group, even the very restrained Stalin was forced to say: “What a fine fellow!... he insisted and achieved his goal...”. Even before the end of the Belarusian operation, K. Rokossovsky was awarded the rank of marshal, and I. Chernyakhovsky - army general.
Practically, the preparation of the troops of all the mentioned fronts for the offensive began back in April 1944. It acquired the most purposeful character after the approval of the operation plans at the Supreme High Command Headquarters (May 23-25) and the subsequent assignment of combat missions to formations and formations. A huge amount of preparatory work was carried out at all levels: on reconnaissance, planning combat operations, organizing combat, interaction between military branches, engineering equipment of starting positions, communication routes, combat training of each unit taking into account specific upcoming tasks, replenishing troops with personnel and equipment, operational camouflage, delivery of ammunition, fuels and lubricants and other materiel. By order of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the troops concentrated 4 ammunition loads, 10-20 fuel and lubricant refills, 30-day food supplies - a total of 400 thousand tons of ammunition, 300 thousand tons of fuel and lubricants, 500 thousand tons of food and fodder. Just to deliver one round of ammunition, 130 railway cars were required.
Moral and psychological preparation was carried out purposefully with the task of creating a high offensive impulse among personnel. A large number of improvised means were prepared for overcoming the swamps with personnel and equipment (wet stools, flooring, etc.).
Features of the development of an offensive operation.
Considering that when our troops carried out previous offensive operations, the fascist German troops suddenly withdrew their advanced units into the depths before our artillery preparation; a decision was made, one day before the main forces launched an offensive, to conduct reconnaissance in force with the forward battalions in order to clarify the outline of the front line, the enemy’s fire system and achieve the greatest effectiveness of artillery preparation. In order to hide the direction of advance of the strike groups, reconnaissance in force was carried out on a wide front - 450 km. On the very first day, these battalions penetrated the enemy’s defenses to a depth of 2-4 km.
The enemy, mistaking the attack of the advanced battalions for the attack of the main forces, brought into action the main forces, which, with the start of the general offensive on the morning of July 23, came under the influence of our powerful artillery fire and air strikes. All this from the very beginning predetermined the successful breakthrough and development of the offensive in the offensive zones of the 1st Baltic, 3rd Belorussian and 2nd Belorussian fronts. The 1st Belorussian Front began its offensive a day later - on June 24. At the beginning, the breakthrough of the defense was very difficult; by 12.00 the attacking units only managed to reach the second enemy trench. G.K. Zhukov explained this by poor reconnaissance, overestimated breakthrough areas in the zones of the 3rd and 48th armies and some other reasons. These circumstances apparently had a certain significance. But it is not difficult to guess that with the start of the offensive on June 23 of other fronts, the enemy in the zone of the 1st Belorussian Front prepared to repel attacks, and the element of tactical surprise was lost. In connection with the current situation, the commander of the front troops ordered army commanders A.V. Gorbatov and N.A. Romanenko regroup forces north of the direction of the main attack and introduce reserves to continue the offensive.
On July 26, especially after the introduction of the 9th Tank Corps into the battle, a turning point occurred, and the troops, having broken through the enemy’s defenses, began developing an offensive in operational depth.
Historically, the course of the Belarusian operation is divided into two stages. At the first stage (from June 24 to July 4, 1944), the Polotsk, Bobruisk, Vitebsk-Orsha, and Mogilev operations were carried out and the encirclement of the Minsk group of enemy forces was completed. In the Vitebsk area, joint actions of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts encircled and defeated 5 enemy divisions. Initially, the enemy broke through the encirclement ring in the 39th Army zone and began to reach the rear of the 5th Army. Commander 5. And General N.I. Krylov, on his own initiative, threw parts of the 45th Rifle Corps into this threatening area and the group that broke through was destroyed or captured.
On July 1, troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front liberated the city of Borisov. The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, having broken through the enemy’s defenses, crossed the Pronya, Basya, and Dnieper rivers and liberated the city of Mogilev on June 28.
The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front surrounded and destroyed 6 enemy divisions in the Bobruisk area and reached the line of Svisloch, Osipovichi, Starye Dorogi. The enemy group surrounded in Bobruisk tried to break out of the encirclement, but this action was thwarted by massive attacks by the 16th Army.
As a result of the Minsk operation, Minsk was liberated on July 3, to the east of which the 100,000-strong group of the main forces of the 4th and 9th German armies was surrounded.
The task of completing the destruction of the Minsk group and its capture was assigned to the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front and the 31st army of the 3rd Belorussian Front.
On July 17, over 57 thousand German prisoners of war who surrendered to Soviet troops were marched through the streets of Moscow.
The 1st Baltic Front liberated Polotsk and developed an offensive on Siauliai; in 12 days, front troops advanced to a depth of 225-280 km with an advance rate of 20-25 km per day.
Thus, Army Group Center suffered a serious defeat. Field Marshal Bush was removed from office. With the arrival of our troops at the line of Polotsk, Lake. Naroch, Molodechno, Nesvizh a gap of up to 400 km was formed in the strategic front of Hitler’s troops. Taking advantage of these favorable conditions, our troops developed a rapid pursuit of the enemy.
The German command began to urgently transfer reserves from the depths (including from the territory of France, Italy, Poland, Hungary, where the Normandy operation took place), from Lvov and other strategic directions. From June 23 to July 16 alone, 46 divisions and 4 brigades were transferred to Belarus.
As G.K. Zhukov noted, in this situation, the new commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal V. Model, showed operational flexibility. He did not take up defensive positions with suitable reserves throughout the entire zone, but concentrated his forces into one powerful strike fist and launched quite strong counterattacks on our advancing troops, thereby delaying the development of our offensive in the Warsaw direction. We have to talk about this in order to remind once again that we were dealing with a very strong, skillful, determined enemy, and even in generally successful operations, victory was not easy; it had to be achieved in difficult, intense battles. During the second stage of the Belarusian operation (from June 5-1J to August 29), the advancing fronts, closely interacting with each other, successfully carried out the Siauliai, Vilnius, Kaunas, Bialystok and Lublin-Brest operations.
On July 16, the city of Grodno was liberated, and on July 26, Brest. Our troops completed the liberation of Belarus, part of the territory of Lithuania, Poland and reached the approaches to Warsaw, and on August 17 they reached the East Prussian border. Advancing in a zone of up to 1100 km along the front, our troops advanced to a stump of 550-600 km and created favorable conditions for conducting offensive operations in the Lvov-Sandomierz direction and the subsequent offensive in the Warsaw-Berlin direction.
Not only during preparation, but also during the successfully developing offensive operation, many difficulties and problems arose. During the offensive, not all tasks were solved easily. The Supreme Command Headquarters and the front commanders were very demanding in achieving the assigned tasks. When crossing the river. Berezina and subsequently the 5th Guards Tank Army acted unsuccessfully, as a result of which the army commander P.A. Rotmistrov was removed from office. After the war they wrote that it was removed unreasonably, since the army could not advance due to lack of fuel. But when General M. Solomatin was appointed instead, he ordered to collect the remaining fuel from all the tanks, fill the tanks of 7O 80 vehicles with it, and the advanced units resumed the offensive. It turns out that a way out can always be found if you don’t stop in front of difficulties and persistently look for ways to overcome them.
A lot of creativity, tactical ingenuity and perseverance in carrying out tasks was shown by army commanders, commanders of formations, units and subunits. The organization of combat operations and their comprehensive support had to be constantly dealt with not only before the start of the operation, but also during the development of the offensive. For new tasks constantly arose, and the implementation of each of them required a lot of organizational work.
The majority of the personnel selflessly and skillfully carried out combat missions, showing courage and bravery. Everyone knows the feat of Private Yu. Smirnov from the 11th Guards. army and other warriors.
In a number of cases, tank units that pulled ahead took partisan detachments with them as infantry.
1,500 soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union; in July-August alone, over 400 thousand soldiers were awarded orders and medals. Many formations and units received the honorary names of Minsk, Bobruisk, Vitebsk, and the names of other cities. For example, the legendary 120 guards. The rifle division became Rogachevskaya.
Marshal G.K. Zhukov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the second time, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
During the Belarusian operation, the main forces of Army Group Center were defeated, German troops lost 409.4 thousand soldiers and officers, including 255.4 thousand - irrevocably, 200 thousand German troops were captured by our troops.
Our losses were also heavy - 765,813 people were killed, wounded, missing and sick, of which 178,507 were irretrievable losses. From July 23 to August 29, troops on four fronts lost 2,957 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,447 guns and mortars, and 822 combat aircraft. From June 23 until the end of July, when the battles for the liberation of Belarus took place, our losses amounted to 440,879 people, incl. 97,233 people were killed (6.6% of the total number of troops). In the counteroffensive near Moscow, irretrievable losses reached 12-14 percent. Thus, almost 100 thousand Soviet people - Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians and representatives of other nations - gave their lives for the liberation of Belarus.
The relatively large losses of our troops in the Belarusian operation, in addition to the general reasons characteristic of other operations, were explained, first of all, by the fact that Army Group Center included selected German formations and units that successfully defended the territory for almost two years. territories of the Smolensk region, Belarus and created a strongly fortified defense.
In addition, unlike the fronts of the southern direction, which over the past years have carried out a number of large offensive operations, the troops of the western direction had to mainly defend themselves or conduct offensives limited in scale. And they had no experience in conducting large offensive operations. At the second stage of the Belarusian operation, rifle and some other units were staffed mainly by the local population of the liberated areas, which were included in the combat units without prior military training. And in general, the tasks assigned to the troops were successfully completed.
Thus, first of all, at the operational-strategic level, every element of the decision, every practical step in preparing the operation was so comprehensively thought out, with such foresight, possible options for the course of the operation were determined, and the necessary measures in case of unfavorable developments of events, that subordinate troops were placed in the most favorable conditions for performing the tasks assigned to them.
The main thing was that the concept and scope of Operation Bagration, the purposeful and specific creative and organizational work of the commanders and staffs created a general atmosphere of uplift and confidence, which very often neutralizes and makes, as it were, not so significant shortcomings in the actions of commanders and tactical troops ( yen and create favorable conditions for them to carry out their assigned tasks. In one case, as was the case on the Western and Crimean fronts, the high command, without taking all the necessary efforts that depend on it, completely shifts the entire burden of combat operations to subordinate troops, relying on its toughness. pressure to squeeze out of them everything possible and impossible and force them to complete the task at any cost, blaming them for failures. In another case, as happened on the 1st and 3rd Belarusian fronts in the Belarusian operation, the high command took on a significant part of the burden, with. in order to place subordinate troops in the most favorable conditions for carrying out combat missions. Such bosses will never shift the blame onto their subordinates, but will take full responsibility upon themselves.
These are the most important operational and strategic conclusions from the experience of the Belarusian operation, which are of current importance in modern conditions.
New in the art of war
During the Belarusian operation, Soviet military art received further development. First of all, in contrast to the winter campaign of 1943-1944, when the Western and Belorussian fronts carried out scattered front-line operations, in the summer of 1944, the Supreme High Command Headquarters organized and carried out an integral, unified strategic operation, the concept of which was to unite efforts and coordinated actions of the troops of four fronts , Long-range aviation and air defense formations, which made it difficult for the enemy to maneuver with forces and means. As part of the Belarusian operation, several operations were carried out to encircle and destroy the enemy (Vitebsk, Bobruisk, Minsk). Moreover, in the Minsk operation, for the first time, a large enemy group was surrounded not in its original position, as was the case at Stalingrad, but during the development of the offensive in operational depth. And if at Stalingrad 6 the army of fascist German troops was first surrounded, and then for 2.5 months they were engaged in its destruction, then the encirclement, dismemberment and destruction of the enemy group east of Minsk was carried out simultaneously as a single operational process. At the same time, frontal and parallel pursuit of the enemy was carried out with moving units reaching the enemy’s flanks and rear. This was a new phenomenon in the art of war.
The Belarusian operation is also characterized by a more daring and decisive massing of forces and means in the directions of the main attacks. Up to 50% of personnel, 60-65% of artillery and tanks, and the bulk of aviation were concentrated in these directions, which accounted for approximately 1/3 of the total length of the front. Taking into account the increased depth and strength of the enemy's defense, high densities of forces and means were created. Thus, in breakthrough areas, which made up 10-15% of the total offensive zone of the fronts, up to 50% of rifle divisions, 50-80% of artillery, over 80% of tanks and self-propelled guns and almost all aviation were concentrated, which ensured a density of up to 250-300 guns and mortars , 20-30 tanks and self-propelled guns (taking into account the tank corps and armies deployed in these sectors - up to 80 armored units) on 1 km of the front. Thus, decisive superiority over the enemy was achieved in breakthrough areas: in infantry - by 3-5 times, in artillery and tanks - by 6-8 times, in aviation - by 3-5 times. Artillery and aviation training became more powerful. Fire damage was carried out to a depth of 8-10 km. For comparison, let us recall that in the offensive operations of 1941-1942. The density of forces and assets did not exceed 20-80 for guns and mortars, and 3-12 for tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of front. The bold and secretive massing of forces and means ensured the enormous power of the first strike and the rapid development of success in depth and towards the flanks.
During the operation, especially during the defeat of the Vitebsk, Bobruisk and Minsk enemy groupings, massive use of aviation was carried out, which made it possible to achieve the destruction of the most important enemy groupings and the defeat of its suitable reserves in a short time. During the Belarusian operation, the Air Force carried out 153 thousand sorties.
In conditions when in Belarus it was necessary to break through the enemy’s defense in depth, it was necessary to abandon the formal replenishment of the requirements of NKO Order No. 306 and the 1942 Military Regulations on the single-echelon formation of military formations up to and including the division. In armies, corps, divisions and regiments operating in the main directions, a two-echelon formation of battle formations was carried out or strong reserves were allocated.
A new method of artillery support for infantry and tank attacks was applied in the form of a double barrage.
All front commanders and most army commanders acted with great foresight, providing in advance the necessary measures in case of unforeseen enemy actions and other changes in the situation.
There was a lot to learn about ensuring the secrecy of the preparation of an operation and the surprise of actions.
For example, K. Rokossovsky and I. Bagramyan in some directions struck in the most difficult areas of the terrain and achieved success only because the enemy did not expect this. The youngest commander of the front forces, I. Chernyakhovsky, was particularly distinguished by his great creativity and ingenuity. He did everything not in the usual way, not according to the standard rules of military art, but in such a way that his actions took into account the peculiarities of the current situation to the maximum extent and were unexpected for the enemy.
Usually, before the start of an offensive, disinformation measures are carried out for operational camouflage in order to show preparations for defense.
But Chernyakhovsky, contrary to this hackneyed rule, begins to designate a false concentration of troops using wooden models precisely in those areas where the actual concentration of strike groups for the offensive was envisaged. The Germans, as a sign that they had “revealed” the plan of our command, bombed these areas several times with wooden bombs. Only after this the front commander moves his troops to the initial areas for the offensive. As a result, the attacks of the 3rd Belorussian Front were unexpected for the enemy.
In general, General I.D. Chernyakhovsky’s decision on the operation turned out to be not only original, visionary, very well thought out, taking into account the weaknesses and strengths of the enemy and his search, terrain conditions, but also very flexible, which ensured early readiness to respond to changes in the situation and guaranteed the successful development of the offensive under any circumstances. Thus, the encirclement of the enemy’s Vitebsk group from the south was entrusted to the 39th Army. But at the same time, in case it broke through from encirclement, one division of the second echelon of the 45th Rifle Corps of the 5th Army was aimed at this direction. As it turned out later, without these additional forces, the encircled enemy could have made a breakthrough to the south.
The 5th Guards Tank Army - a mobile group of the front - was intended for operations in the Orsha direction in the zone of the 11th Guards Army. But at the same time, the issues of introducing the 5th Guards Tank Army in the 5th Army zone were carefully worked out, which was very useful, since the offensive of the 11th Guards Army developed slowly at first and the tank army had to be introduced according to the second option.
Command and control of troops at the operational and tactical level was characterized by being as close as possible to the troops in front. If in the operations of 1941-1942. front command posts were located 60-80 km from the front line (on the Western Front and in 1943 - 100 km), army command posts 40-80 km, and permanent observation posts were not always created, then in the Belarusian operation command posts front points were located in the directions of action of the main groupings at a distance of 25-40 km, armies - 8-15 km from the front line. During this period, observation posts began to play the role of forward command posts and were located at a distance of 2-3 km from the front line. This increased the efficiency of troop control, allowed commanders to directly observe the battlefield, communicate closely with subordinates, and quickly respond to changes in the situation. The command posts of formations and units were located directly in the combat formations of the forward units.
During the offensive operation, commanders of fronts, armies, formations and units widely maneuvered forces and means, quickly increasing the power of the offensive in the directions where the greatest success was expected.
The high tempo of the offensive, increased maneuverability of troops, and efficiency of command and control were facilitated by the equipping of artillery, tank and mechanized units, and headquarters with all-terrain vehicles received under Lend-Lease.
Lessons for training in modern conditions
The most important lesson is to understand the fact that, along with many other objective factors, the personality of the commander, military commander, commander, creatively and actively working on initiative is of great and sometimes decisive importance.
A good example. Belorussian and Western fronts in the autumn-winter campaign of 1943-1944. they operated under approximately the same conditions, but for Rokossovsky the operation was relatively successful, while for Sokolovsky it was a complete failure. How can we draw lessons from this positive and bitter experience for today in terms of training, education and selection of military personnel, especially instilling efficiency in their activities, decisively getting rid of formalism, improving the working methods of command and command and control staffs taking into account modern requirements?
Based on the experience of the Belarusian operation, we will dwell mainly only on the moments that the author of these lines had to witness, who had the opportunity to see the work of the commander of the front forces, General I.D. Chernyakhovsky, the commander of the 5th Army, General N.I. Krylov, the commander of the 45th Rifle Corps, General S. G. Poplavsky and a number of other commanders. All their activities were so deeply imbued with the interests of carrying out the plan of the operation, so organically fused with the subtlest features of the situation, and the methods of organizing military operations were so specific and objective that in this entire creative and organizational process there was no room left for formalism, abstract talk and theoretical rhetoric. Only what was needed for the upcoming battle and operation was done.
This is how, for example, General Chernyakhovsky worked in the 184th Infantry Division of Major General B. Gorodovikov. Instead of hearing the decision in detail, as was the case before, he carefully studied the decision cards (silently, intently), then asked several questions: where exactly is the enemy’s front line, the lines for transferring artillery fire during an attack, the calculation of the time for moving tanks from their starting positions, where counterattacks and forces and means to repel them are possible.
After listening to the answers, he briefly and clearly clarified the procedure for solving some problems. When working on the front line, he demanded to indicate the locations of passages in enemy minefields and the procedure for overcoming them, and compared the planned artillery fires on the maps of the commanders of the rifle battalion and artillery division. Having discovered one inaccuracy, he ordered the division commander to compare all the cards of the commanders of the rifle and artillery units. He gave the command to fire two shells at one of the prepared areas of fire. I made sure that the fire was prepared, mostly accurately. Having arrived at the initial area where the NPP tanks were concentrated, he listened to a brief report from the officers of the tank technical service of the front about the readiness of the tanks for battle and then ordered the company commander and the driver of the lead tank to lead it along the route of advance of the NPP tanks. Having reached the deployment line and making sure that the company commander knew the locations of passages in his minefields, he went to the positions of the regimental artillery group. No stories or verbal explanations of how promotions, position changes, or other tasks will be accomplished. Everything was checked only practically, in practice. There was a strict demand for problems and errors in the preparation of military operations. A deadline was set for eliminating the deficiencies. When mistakes were repeated, some commanders were removed from office and replaced by more energetic and experienced ones.
Such military leaders as K.K. Rokossovsky, I.D. Chernyakhovsky. N.I. Krylov, P.I. Batov, I.I. Lyudnikov, S.G. Poplavsky and many others, taking into account the acquired combat experience, especially clearly understood that the most important, decisive for a successful breakthrough of the defense are two most important conditions: the first is a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy’s defense system and fire weapons, the second is the precise application of artillery fire and air strikes on specific identified targets in order to reliably destroy and suppress them. If we exaggerate this problem a little, then from the practice of all attacks and offensive battles carried out, it becomes increasingly clear that if these two tasks - reconnaissance and fire destruction - are carried out accurately and reliably, then even with a not very organized attack, a successful advance of troops and a breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses are achieved . This, of course, is not about any underestimation of the need for successful actions by infantry, tanks and other types of troops during the attack and development of the offensive. Without this, it is impossible to fully use the results of fire defeat of the enemy. But it is also true that no harmonious and “beautiful” attack will overcome the enemy’s resistance if his firepower is not suppressed. This is equally important in large and small wars, and in the fight against terrorism.
The attitude towards this issue also determined the direction of combat training before the start of the offensive operation. In some cases, as was noted in the troops of the Western Front in the winter of 1943-1944, everything came down to training in the deployment and movement of units to attack, and only formally (often verbally) the tasks of reconnaissance and fire destruction were practiced. In others, as was the case in the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, along with training the actions of troops in an attack and during an offensive, the main emphasis was placed on training commanders, staff officers, reconnaissance units, artillery and infantry observers to identify enemy fire weapons and accurately, effectively use of all their fire weapons. Strong points were also set up in the rear, similar to those that were to be encountered in the depths of the enemy’s defense.
During classes and exercises, painstaking work was carried out to determine the location of enemy fire weapons day and night, to compare diagrams (maps) of the designated defense and the results of its reconnaissance, methods of calling, transferring and ceasefire and many other issues of interaction between small arms, tank, artillery and sapper units. Such exercises and exercises were not as flashy and attractive as attacks by tanks and infantry; we can say that they were outwardly very routine and even seemed boring to some commanders, but in fact they were full of great internal content, reproducing the most complex and difficult issues conduct of the battle, on which its success primarily depended.
It took a lot of time and a lot of labor until commanders and reconnaissance officers mastered the art of identifying, pinpointing and accurately plotting enemy fire weapons on maps. I with the same thoroughness were worked out with commanders of all levels on other issues of organizing the battle. All this ensured the success of the Belarusian operation.
From all that has been said, the conclusion arises how important it is when making a decision, planning an operation, not only to determine the groupings, but also to reveal the possible plan of the enemy’s actions, to foresee and think through the possible conditions for the development of the operation, to carefully calculate the balance of forces, to create the necessary groupings of one’s troops, to determine the most appropriate and unexpected methods of action for the enemy, comprehensively ensure and prepare the operation in moral, political, operational, logistical and technical terms.
Decision-making and planning of operations were considered as very important, but only the initial part of their preparation. After this, directly on the ground, the troops continued intense work to study the enemy, clarify tasks, organize interaction, supply material, engineering equipment for the starting position, carry out camouflage, disinformation and other activities for all types of operational, logistical and technical support, combat training of troops taking into account upcoming combat missions. The proposed course of the operation was worked out with the commanders and headquarters of the operational level at command post exercises.
G.K. Zhukov, A.V. Vasilevsky, commanders of the Fronts and armies, when preparing the operation, met not only with commanders, commanders, but also with officers and soldiers on the front line. And in general, in the entire system of measures to prepare for the operation, educational work occupied an extremely important month-10 with the goal of achieving a high political spirit, courage, courage and offensive impulse of personnel, mobilizing them for the successful completion of assigned combat missions. The complex and varied activities of the command and staff in preparation for the operation were carried out with great responsibility and the utmost strain of human strength and capabilities.
Particularly great importance was attached to the training of commanders, staffs and troops. A distinctive feature of all these exercises and training was their purposefulness, specificity and the maximum approximation of training to the actual conditions of the combat mission that the troops were directly to carry out. In the areas where the second echelon formations were located, strongholds approximately the same as those at the enemy's location were set up, and the troops trained in assaulting and overcoming them.
All battalion, regimental and other similar exercises involved artillery, engineering units and other reinforcement assets, which were supposed to jointly carry out combat missions. The exercises and training were initially carried out mainly using the tactical drill method, and then ended with the integrated development of all training issues and combat coordination of units and units.
Not all commanders were able to immediately comprehend the “secrets” and master the art of such substantive preparatory work. During training and exercises, the issues and methods of action that were decisive for the success of the offensive were not always carefully worked out. The newly arrived officers and generals at the front did not really believe that these were the methods of organizing combat operations, because they were too different from what they had been taught. Already during the Belarusian operation, when military operations to cross the Neman River were being prepared, the deputy chief of staff of the 5th Army, who had recently arrived from the academy, came to the 184th Infantry Division “to control and provide assistance.” For a long time he watched in bewilderment as the division commander, Major General B. Gorodovikov, worked with one or another regiment commander for the NP, or rather, it would be more accurate to say - he thought with them, consulted, argued, and then came to a definite decision and determined the tasks, the order of artillery preparation, crossing the river and actions on the bridgehead (the issues of crossing tanks and artillery pieces along the river bottom were considered in most detail). B. Gorodovikov had an authoritative character and, when setting tasks, could, of course, have acted more categorically. But the responsibility was so great that in the process of live communication with regiment commanders, he apparently wanted to once again verify the correctness of his decisions and not only formally order, but at the same time convince his subordinates that this is exactly how they should act.
After about 1-1.5 hours, the inspecting general, whose patience was already at its limit, turned to the division commander: “Comrade Gorodovikov! I’m waiting for you to give the combat order.” “Now I’ll explain to the regiment commanders how to cross the river, how to take that bank, there will be time left, I’ll give this combat order,” the division commander replied.
This small episode reflected two different eras in the field of command and control, two different approaches to solving specific military problems. The representative of the academic school recognized only a monologue when issuing a combat order and organizing interaction with the obligatory listing of all points and statutory requirements. The commander, who had drank in full combat experience, was absorbed only in how best to convey the task to his subordinates and achieve its deep understanding. Any experienced commander during the war knew that he would be judged not by how he outwardly “correctly” organized the battle, but solely by how the combat mission was accomplished. Therefore, it was pointless for him to pay attention to the external side of the matter.
All this had to be recalled more than once during post-war exercises, when, after a loud and pompously announced lengthy combat order and many hours of instructions on interaction, subordinate commanders and heads of military branches could not really understand what tasks were assigned and how they needed to act. For the entire process of developing a solution, setting tasks, organizing combat operations was imbued with formalism, and the main concern of commanders and staffs was not to better complete the task (exercises often went according to plan, and the leadership was more concerned about this than the trainees), but in an effort to better “show” oneself. And the commanders were judged mainly by how they reported. Outwardly everything seemed to be “correct,” but completely divorced from the essence of the matter. All the complex work of preparing a battle and an operation began to be largely reduced to the development of numerous, cumbersome documents, where specific tasks and the essence of the matter were buried among the abundance of abstract theoretical provisions. The main part of the work of commanders and staffs in organizing the battle began to fade into the background. Gradually, the precious experience gained during the war began to be lost. Exercises where the commanders of formations and formations themselves acted as leaders of exercises conducted with these formations and formations and acted in these exercises, knowing in advance the situation on both sides and the course of its development, brought especially great harm.
Thus, the perverted system of operational and combat training gave rise to military leaders of various calibers, who became more like bad propagandists of military affairs than combat commanders.
Defects in the training and education of personnel affected the overall quality of combat training of troops. The more and louder they talked about bringing troop training as close as possible to what is required in war, the more it became divorced from the interests of combat reality.
In the 60s, when he was the chief of staff of the 28th Army of the Belarusian Military District, the author had the opportunity to conduct a regimental tactical exercise, where the main emphasis was placed on working out issues of reconnaissance and fire destruction of the enemy, i.e. tasks, the solution of which, according to the experience of the war, depended on the success of the battle and operation. All the intelligence chiefs of formations and units, as well as all the division’s wartime reconnaissance assets, were involved in the exercise. In the location of the defending side, all enemy fire weapons were actually designated and simulated, which periodically changed their locations. Despite the availability of reconnaissance means that were required by the state and more advanced than during the war, during the three days of preparation for the offensive, only 15-18% of all targets available in the enemy’s defense were identified and accurately detected. Then, with the permission of the district headquarters, we asked the Grodno regional military commissar to call up 30 artillery and other reconnaissance personnel with combat experience from the reserves. Despite the fact that they, too, had largely lost their previous skills, after two days 50-60% of the enemy’s fire weapons were exposed. Using this example, one could once again see how complex this matter is - real intelligence, for the effective conduct of which it is completely insufficient to study foreign armies. Here we need practical skills brought to perfection, which are acquired through repeated training in reconnaissance.
The senior commander who came to the training was extremely dissatisfied that so much training time was spent on working on just one training issue. “During this time,” he said, “it was possible to work out 5-6 attacks.” And sad pictures of our endless attacks in the operations of the Western Front floated before my eyes, and how successfully the offensive developed in the summer of 1944, and how in many post-war exercises we reduced everything to just completely unprepared attacks, and how success was given to the troops depending on that whether the enemy has been scouted and suppressed or not. And in the light of all this, it was with mental pain that we thought that in the event of war we would have a hard time again.
How did it happen that in an army consisting mainly of many people who fought well, the combat experience gained during the war was so easily lost? This is one of the biggest mysteries, the answer to which is not so easy to give. But one of the reasons, apparently, was that far from the best personnel came to leadership; there were many teachers left in military schools and academies who had not properly sipped on the “lead experience” and did not understand the full depth of its inner essence. Front-line soldiers who came to military educational institutions, both as students and teachers, being not yet very knowledgeable in the field of theory, at first looked at it more with reverence than from the point of view of critical experience. At the same time, for some reason they believed that military science was the highest sphere of activity that should be dealt with by special people, although, as it has now become clear, it was people with combat experience who were supposed to feed science with new ideas and thoughts. And the whole system of pomp and show that was established after the war, neglect of work, encouragement of dullness and suppression of creativity did not really contribute to the organic combination of theory and practice.
And today in higher educational institutions the main drawback of military training and education of officers is that they are reduced mainly to the study of theoretical principles, the development of various documents, and the development of command character, developed operational-tactical thinking, strong-willed, organizational qualities necessary for manifestations of military art. The main flaw in the methodology of operational and combat training is that the situation characteristic of modern combat operations is not fully reproduced, conditions are not created in which trainees could train themselves and systematically express themselves.
It is well known that in order to cultivate the intelligence, courage, and management of officers, it is necessary to place them in conditions in all classes and exercises where they could systematically, in practice, demonstrate these qualities.
We are not talking about the need to teach the army after the war what happened in the last war. Everyone understands that the content of military training should be focused on future achievements of military art. But the very approach to solving operational and tactical problems, the broad creativity and methods of specific organizational work that were manifested in this case, the thoroughness and painstaking practice of all preparatory measures with subordinate commanders and troops, the ability to train troops exactly what may be required of them cannot become obsolete. in a combat situation, and much more, which determines the entire spirit of military art, in which there are, if not “eternal”, then very long-lived principles and provisions.
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A unit of the 3rd Belorussian Front crosses the Luchesa River.
June 1944
This year marks 70 years since the Red Army carried out one of the largest strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War - Operation Bagration. During it, the Red Army not only liberated the people of Belarus from occupation, but also, having significantly undermined the enemy’s forces, brought closer the collapse of fascism - our Victory.
Unparalleled in spatial scope, the Belarusian offensive operation is rightfully considered the largest achievement of Russian military art. As a result, the most powerful group of the Wehrmacht was defeated. This became possible thanks to the unparalleled courage, heroism of determination and self-sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers and partisans of Belarus, many of whom died a brave death on Belarusian soil in the name of Victory over the enemy.
Map of the Belarusian operation
After the offensive in the winter of 1943-1944. the front line formed a huge protrusion in Belarus with an area of about 250 thousand square meters. km, with its top facing east. It penetrated deeply into the location of Soviet troops and had important operational and strategic significance for both sides. The elimination of this protrusion and the liberation of Belarus opened the shortest route to Poland and Germany for the Red Army, threatening flank attacks by the enemy Army Groups “North” and “Northern Ukraine”.
In the central direction, the Soviet troops were opposed by Army Group Center (3rd Tank, 4th, 9th and 2nd Armies) under the command of Field Marshal E. Bush. It was supported by aviation of the 6th and partially of the 1st and 4th air fleets. In total, the enemy group included 63 divisions and 3 infantry brigades, which numbered 800 thousand people, 7.6 thousand guns and mortars, 900 tanks and assault guns and more than 1,300 combat aircraft. Army Group Center's reserve included 11 divisions, most of which were deployed to fight against the partisans.
During the summer-autumn campaign of 1944, the Supreme Command Headquarters planned to conduct a strategic operation for the final liberation of Belarus, in which troops from 4 fronts were to act in concert. Troops of the 1st Baltic (commanding army general), 3rd (commanding colonel general), 2nd (commander colonel general G.F. Zakharov) and 1st Belorussian fronts (commanding army general) were involved in the operation. , Long-Range Aviation, the Dnieper Military Flotilla, as well as a large number of formations and detachments of Belarusian partisans.
Commander of the 1st Baltic Front, Army General
THEIR. Bagramyan and Chief of Staff of the Front, Lieutenant General
V.V. Kurasov during the Belarusian operation
The fronts included 20 combined arms, 2 tank and 5 air armies. In total, the group consisted of 178 rifle divisions, 12 tank and mechanized corps and 21 brigades. Air support and air cover for front troops was provided by 5 air armies.
The concept of the operation included deep strikes on 4 fronts to break through enemy defenses in 6 directions, encircle and destroy enemy groups on the flanks of the Belarusian salient - in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk, and then, attacking in converging directions towards Minsk, encircle and eliminate them east of the Belarusian capital the main forces of Army Group Center. In the future, increasing the impact force, reach the line Kaunas - Bialystok - Lublin.
When choosing the direction of the main attack, the idea of concentrating forces in the Minsk direction was clearly expressed. The simultaneous breakthrough of the front in 6 sectors led to the dissection of the enemy’s forces and made it difficult for him to use reserves when repelling the offensive of our troops.
To strengthen the group, the Headquarters in the spring and summer of 1944 replenished the fronts with four combined arms, two tank armies, four breakthrough artillery divisions, two anti-aircraft artillery divisions, and four engineer brigades. In the 1.5 months preceding the operation, the size of the group of Soviet troops in Belarus increased by more than 4 times in tanks, almost 2 times in artillery, and by two-thirds in aircraft.
The enemy, not expecting large-scale actions in this direction, hoped to repel a private offensive of Soviet troops with forces and means of Army Group Center, located in one echelon, mainly only in the tactical defense zone, which consisted of 2 defensive zones with a depth of 8 to 12 km . At the same time, using the terrain favorable for defense, he created a multi-line, deeply echeloned defense, consisting of several lines, with a total depth of up to 250 km. Defense lines were built along the western banks of the rivers. The cities of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Borisov, Minsk were turned into powerful defense centers.
By the beginning of the operation, the advancing troops numbered 1.2 million people, 34 thousand guns and mortars, 4070 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and about 5 thousand combat aircraft. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in manpower by 1.5 times, in guns and mortars by 4.4 times, in tanks and self-propelled artillery by 4.5 times, and in aircraft by 3.6 times.
In none of the previous offensive operations did the Red Army have such a quantity of artillery, tanks and combat aircraft, and such superiority in forces, as in the Belarusian one.
The directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters defined the tasks for the fronts as follows:
Troops of the 1st Baltic Front break through the enemy’s defenses northwest of Vitebsk, capture the Beshenkovichi region, and part of the forces, in cooperation with the right-flank army of the 3rd Belorussian Front, encircle and destroy the enemy in the Vitebsk region. Subsequently, develop the offensive towards Lepel;
The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front and the 2nd Belorussian Front, defeat the Vitebsk-Orsha enemy group and reach the Berezina. To accomplish this task, the front had to strike in two directions (with the forces of 2 armies in each): on Senno, and along the Minsk highway to Borisov, and with part of the forces - on Orsha. The main forces of the front must develop an offensive towards the Berezina River;
The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left wing of the 3rd and the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front, defeat the Mogilev group, liberate Mogilev and reach the Berezina River;
Troops of the 1st Belorussian Front defeat the enemy group in Bobruisk. To this end, the front had to deliver two strikes: one from the Rogachev area in the direction of Bobruisk, Osipovichi, the second from the lower Berezina area to Starye Dorogi, Slutsk. At the same time, the troops of the right wing of the front were to assist the 2nd Belorussian Front in the defeat of the enemy’s Mogilev group;
The troops of the 3rd and 1st Belorussian Fronts, after the defeat of the enemy's flank groupings, were to develop an offensive in converging directions towards Minsk and, in cooperation with the 2nd Belorussian Front and partisans, encircle its main forces east of Minsk.
The partisans were also given the task of disorganizing the work of the enemy rear, disrupting the supply of reserves, capturing important lines, crossings and bridgeheads on rivers, and holding them until the approach of the advancing troops. The first rail demolition took place on the night of June 20.
Much attention was paid to concentrating aviation efforts on the direction of the main attacks of the fronts and maintaining air supremacy. Just on the eve of the offensive, aviation carried out 2,700 sorties and carried out powerful aviation training in areas where fronts were broken through.
The duration of artillery preparation was planned from 2 hours to 2 hours 20 minutes. Support for the attack was planned using the methods of a barrage of fire, sequential concentration of fire, as well as a combination of both methods. In the offensive zones of the 2 armies of the 1st Belorussian Front, operating in the direction of the main attack, support for the attack of infantry and tanks was carried out for the first time using the method of a double barrage.
At the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front. Chief of Staff Colonel General M.S. is on the phone. Malinin, far left - front commander, Army General K.K. Rokossovsky. Bobruisk region. Summer 1944
Coordination of the actions of the front troops was entrusted to representatives of the Headquarters - the Chief of the General Staff of the Marshal of the Soviet Union and the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Marshal of the Soviet Union. For the same purpose, the head of the operational department of the General Staff, General, was sent to the 2nd Belorussian Front. The actions of the air armies were coordinated by Air Chief Marshal A.A. Novikov and Air Marshal F.Ya. Falaleev. Artillery Marshal N.D. arrived from Moscow to assist the artillery commanders and staffs. Yakovlev and Colonel General of Artillery M.N. Chistyakov.
To carry out the operation, 400 thousand tons of ammunition, about 300 thousand tons of fuel, and over 500 thousand tons of food and fodder were required, which were supplied in a timely manner.
According to the nature of the combat operations and the content of the tasks, Operation Bagration is divided into two stages: the first - from June 23 to July 4, 1944, during which 5 front-line operations were carried out: Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk and Minsk, and the second - from July 5 to August 29, 1944, which included 5 more front-line operations: Siauliai, Vilnius, Kaunas, Bialystok and Lublin-Brest.
The 1st stage of Operation Bagration included a breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses to the entire tactical depth, expansion of the breakthrough towards the flanks and the defeat of the nearest operational reserves and the capture of a number of cities, incl. liberation of the capital of Belarus - Minsk; Stage 2 - developing success in depth, overcoming intermediate defensive lines, defeating the enemy's main operational reserves, capturing important positions and bridgeheads on the river. Vistula. Specific tasks for the fronts were determined at a depth of up to 160 km.
The offensive of the troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd and 2nd Belorussian fronts began on June 23. A day later, troops of the 1st Belorussian Front joined the battle. The offensive was preceded by reconnaissance in force.
The actions of the troops during Operation Bagration, like in no other operation of the Soviet troops before, almost exactly corresponded to its plan and the tasks received. During 12 days of intense fighting in the first stage of the operation, the main forces of Army Group Center were defeated.
German captured soldiers of Army Group Center are escorted through Moscow.
July 17, 1944
The troops, having advanced 225-280 km at an average daily pace of 20-25 km, liberated most of Belarus. In the areas of Vitebsk, Bobruisk and Minsk, a total of about 30 German divisions were surrounded and defeated. The enemy front in the central direction was crushed. The results achieved created the conditions for a subsequent offensive in the Siauliai, Vilnius, Grodno and Brest directions, as well as for the transition to active operations in other sectors of the Soviet-German front.
Fighter, liberate your Belarus. Poster by V. Koretsky. 1944
The goals set for the fronts were fully achieved. The headquarters used the success of the Belarusian operation in a timely manner for decisive actions in other directions of the Soviet-German front. On July 13, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the offensive. The general offensive front expanded from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians. On July 17-18, Soviet troops crossed the state border of the Soviet Union with Poland. By August 29, they reached the line - Jelgava, Dobele, Augustow and the Narev and Vistula rivers.
Vistula River. Tank crossing. 1944
Further development of the offensive with an acute lack of ammunition and fatigue of the Soviet troops would not have been successful, and they, by order of Headquarters, went on the defensive.
2nd Belorussian Front: front commander army general
G.F. Zakharov, member of the Military Council, Lieutenant General N.E. Subbotin and Colonel General K.A. Vershinin discuss a plan for an air strike against the enemy. August 1944
As a result of the Belarusian operation, favorable conditions were created not only for launching new powerful attacks on enemy groups operating on the Soviet-German front in the Baltic states, East Prussia and Poland, in the Warsaw-Berlin direction, but also for the deployment of offensive operations by Anglo-American troops, landed in Normandy.
The Belarusian offensive operation of a group of fronts, which lasted 68 days, is one of the outstanding operations not only of the Great Patriotic War, but also of the entire Second World War. Its distinctive feature is its enormous spatial scope and impressive operational and strategic results.
Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front. From left to right: Chief of Staff of the Front, Colonel General A.P. Pokrovsky, member of the Front Military Council, Lieutenant General V.E. Makarov, commander of the front troops, Army General I.D. Chernyakhovsky. September 1944
The Red Army troops, having launched an offensive on June 23 on a front of 700 km, by the end of August advanced 550 - 600 km to the west, expanding the front of military operations to 1100 km. The vast territory of Belarus and a significant part of eastern Poland were cleared of German occupiers. Soviet troops reached the Vistula, the approaches to Warsaw and the border with East Prussia.
Battalion commander of the 297th Infantry Regiment of the 184th Division of the 5th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front, Captain G.N. Gubkin (right) with officers on reconnaissance. On August 17, 1944, his battalion was the first in the Red Army to break through to the border of East Prussia
During the operation, the largest German group suffered a crushing defeat. Of the 179 divisions and 5 brigades of the Wehrmacht then operating on the Soviet-German front, 17 divisions and 3 brigades were completely destroyed in Belarus, and 50 divisions, having lost more than 50% of their personnel, lost their combat effectiveness. German troops lost about 500 thousand soldiers and officers.
Operation Bagration showed vivid examples of the high skill of Soviet commanders and military leaders. She made significant contributions to the development of strategy, operational art and tactics; enriched the art of war with the experience of encircling and destroying large enemy groups in a short time and in a wide variety of environmental conditions. The task of breaking through the enemy’s powerful defenses, as well as quickly developing success in operational depth through the skillful use of large tank formations and formations, was successfully solved.
In the struggle for the liberation of Belarus, Soviet soldiers showed massive heroism and high combat skill. 1,500 of its participants became Heroes of the Soviet Union, hundreds of thousands were awarded orders and medals of the USSR. Among the Heroes of the Soviet Union and those awarded were soldiers of all nationalities of the USSR.
Partisan formations played an extremely important role in the liberation of Belarus.
Parade of partisan brigades after liberation
capital of Belarus - Minsk
Solving problems in close cooperation with the Red Army troops, they destroyed over 15 thousand and captured more than 17 thousand enemy soldiers and officers. The Motherland highly appreciated the feat of the partisans and underground fighters. Many of them were awarded orders and medals, and 87 who distinguished themselves became Heroes of the Soviet Union.
But the victory came at a high price. At the same time, the high intensity of combat operations, the enemy's advance transition to defense, difficult conditions in the wooded and swampy terrain, and the need to overcome large water barriers and other natural obstacles led to large losses in people. During the offensive, the troops of the four fronts lost 765,815 people killed, wounded, missing and sick, which is almost 50% of their total strength at the beginning of the operation. And irretrievable losses amounted to 178,507 people. Our troops also suffered heavy losses in weapons.
The world community appreciated the events in the central sector of the Soviet-German front. Western political and military figures, diplomats and journalists noted their significant influence on the further course of World War II. “The speed of the advance of your armies is amazing,” wrote the President of the United States of America F. Roosevelt on July 21, 1944. I.V. Stalin. In a telegram to the head of the Soviet government on July 24, British Prime Minister William Churchill called the events in Belarus “victories of enormous importance.” One of the Turkish newspapers stated on July 9: “If the Russian advance develops at the same pace, Russian troops will enter Berlin faster than the Allied forces will complete operations in Normandy.”
Professor at the University of Edinburgh, a well-known English expert on military-strategic problems, J. Erickson, in his book “The Road to Berlin,” emphasized: “The defeat of Army Group Center by Soviet troops was their greatest success, achieved... as a result of one operation. For the German army... it was a catastrophe of unimaginable proportions, greater than Stalingrad.”
Operation Bagration was the first major offensive operation of the Red Army, carried out during the period when the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain began military operations in Western Europe. However, 70% of the Wehrmacht's ground forces continued to fight on the Soviet-German front. The disaster in Belarus forced the German command to transfer large strategic reserves here from the west, which, of course, created favorable conditions for the offensive actions of the Allies after the landing of their troops in Normandy and the waging of the coalition war in Europe.
The successful offensive of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts in the western direction in the summer of 1944 radically changed the situation on the entire Soviet-German front and led to a sharp weakening of the Wehrmacht's combat potential. Having eliminated the Belarusian salient, they eliminated the threat of flank attacks from the north for the armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which were conducting an offensive in the Lvov and Rava-Russian directions. The capture and retention of bridgeheads on the Vistula by Soviet troops in the Pulawy and Magnuszew areas opened up prospects for new operations to defeat the enemy with the goal of completely liberating Poland and attacking the German capital.
Memorial complex "Mound of Glory".
Sculptors A. Bembel and A. Artimovich, architects O. Stakhovich and L. Mickiewicz, engineer B. Laptsevich. The total height of the memorial is 70.6 m. The earthen hill, 35 m high, is crowned with a sculptural composition of four bayonets, lined with titanium, each 35.6 m high. The bayonets symbolize the 1st, 2nd, 3rd Belarusian and 1st Baltic fronts that liberated Belarus. Their base is surrounded by a ring with bas-relief images of Soviet soldiers and partisans. On the inside of the ring, made using the mosaic technique, there is the text: “Glory to the Soviet Army, the Liberator Army!”
Sergey Lipatov,
Researcher at the Scientific Research Institute
Institute of Military History of the Military Academy
General Staff of the Armed Forces
Russian Federation
.
5. Liberation of Belarus from the Nazi invaders.
As a result of the strategic offensive of the Red Army in 1943, the front approached Belarus. On September 23, the first regional center of Komarin was liberated. Twenty soldiers who distinguished themselves during the crossing of the Dnieper in the Komarin area were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. At the end of September, Khotimsk, Mstislavl, Klimovichi, and Krichev were liberated. On November 23, 1943, Gomel was liberated, where the Central Committee of the CP(b)B, the Council of People's Commissars of the BSSR and the BSPD immediately moved. In January-March, the Kalinkovichi-Mozyr operation was carried out with the participation of the Gomel, Polesie and Minsk partisan formations, as a result of which Mozyr and Kalinkovichi were liberated.
One of the largest operations at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War was the Belarusian one, which went down in history under the code name "Bagration". The Germans created a defense in depth in Belarus. It was held by the army group “Center”, two army groups “North” and “Northern Ukraine”. They had 63 divisions, 3 brigades, 1.2 million people, 9.5 thousand guns and mortars, 900 tanks and assault guns, 1350 aircraft. On the Soviet side, troops of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts (commanding Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky, Army General G.F. Zakharov and Colonel General I.) were involved in participation in Operation Bagration. D. Chernyakhovsky), as well as troops of the 1st Baltic Front (commander-general of the army I.Kh. Bagramyan). The total number of Soviet troops was 2.4 million soldiers and officers, 36,400 guns and mortars, 5,200 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, 5,300 aircraft. An important role in the liberation of the republic was assigned to the Belarusian partisans and the Normandie-Niemen squadron.
On the morning of June 23, 1944, Operation Bagration began. On June 24, the defensive line of German troops was broken through. On June 25, the Vitebsk enemy group consisting of 5 divisions was surrounded and then liquidated. On June 27, Orsha was liberated, and on June 29, the encircled Bobruisk enemy group was defeated. Here the Nazis lost 50 thousand people. On July 1, troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front liberated Borisov. In the Minsk “cauldron” in the east of the city, a 105,000-strong enemy group was surrounded. On July 3, 1944, tank crews and infantrymen of the 1st and 2nd Belarusian Fronts liberated the capital of Belarus, Minsk.
As a result of the first stage of Operation Bagration, the enemy army group Center suffered a complete defeat, its main forces were defeated.
During the second stage of the Belarusian operation in July 1944, Molodechno, Smorgon, Baranovichi, Novogrudok, Pinsk, and Grodno were liberated. The liberation of Brest on July 28 completed the expulsion of the Nazi invaders from the territory of Belarus. At the end of August, Soviet troops reached Riga, the border with East Prussia, Narva and the Vistula.
During the Belarusian operation, 17 enemy divisions and 3 brigades were defeated, and 50 divisions lost more than half of their strength. The total losses of German troops amounted to 500 thousand killed.
For the courage and heroism shown on Belarusian soil, more than 1,600 generals, officers and soldiers received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, more than 400 thousand soldiers and partisans were awarded orders and medals. 747 military units and formations received the honorary title “Krichevskaya”, “Minskaya”, etc.
On August 16, 1945, an agreement on the Soviet-Polish border was signed between the USSR and Poland. In accordance with it, the entire Bialystok region was transferred to Poland. The Kleschelsky and Gainovsky districts of the Brest region also went to Poland.
The Belarusian people made a significant contribution to the victory over Nazi Germany. More than 1,100 thousand Belarusian soldiers fought on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. After the liberation of Belarus, more than 600 thousand of its inhabitants, including 180 thousand partisans, were drafted into the Red Army and fought bravely, bringing complete victory over the enemy closer.
Thousands of soldiers and officers, natives of Belarus, fought heroically on Polish soil. 61 Belarusian soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for their heroic deeds during the liberation of Poland. Thousands of our fellow countrymen took part in battles in Germany. 70 of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Thousands of Belarusians distinguished themselves in battles during the defeat of Japan, many Belarusians participated in the European Resistance Movement. They fought in anti-fascist units in Italy, France, Yugoslavia, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The highest order of France was awarded to a native of the Mogilev region, Lieutenant F. Kozhemyakin. The name of V. Meshkov is known in Europe, whose partisan detachment destroyed a German radar station near Clermont and others.
Over 300 thousand Belarusian soldiers were awarded government awards of the USSR. 443 Belarusians became Heroes of the Soviet Union. The highest award was twice received by Belarusians, Major General of Aviation P.Ya. Golovachev and Marshal of the Soviet Union I.I. Yakubovsky.
Hundreds of thousands of Belarusians worked selflessly in the rear, providing the Red Army with weapons, ammunition, food, etc. Tens of thousands of our compatriots were awarded orders and medals for their labor feats during the Great Patriotic War.
