This was required both by the state of the country’s economy and by the same security interests. As performers of this task, previous eras gave him into his hands a class of people who were historically brought up in labor over the task of gathering all of Rus'. This class fell into the hands of Peter Alekseevich not only ready for those improvements that life had long demanded, but also adapting to those new methods of struggle with which Peter I began the campaign. The old task and the old familiar task of solving it - war - left neither time, nor opportunity, nor even the need, since the latter can be accepted historically, to care a lot about innovations, a new structure and a new purpose for the service class. Essentially, under Peter I, the same principles in the estate that were put forward in the 17th century continued to develop.

Attaching the service class to military service

Busy with war almost the entire time of his reign, Peter, just like his ancestors, if not more, needed to attach estates to a specific business, and under him, attaching the service class to the affairs of the state was the same inviolable principle as in the 17th century.

The measures of Peter I in relation to the service class during the war were of a random nature and only about a year later, when the tsar took up “citizenship” in earnest, began to become general and systematic.

From the “old” in the structure of the service class under Peter, the former enslavement of the service class through the personal service of each service person to the state remained unchanged. But in this enslavement its form has changed somewhat. In the first years of the Swedish war, the noble cavalry still served military service on the same basis, but it was not the main force, but only an auxiliary one. During the year, stewards, solicitors, Moscow nobles, tenants, and so on continued to serve in Sheremetev’s army. In 1712, due to fears of war with the Turks, all these ranks were ordered to equip themselves for service under a new name - courtiers. Since - years, the expressions: boyar children, service people, are gradually going out of circulation in documents and decrees and are being replaced by the expression nobility borrowed from the Kingdom of Poland, which, in turn, was taken by the Poles from the Germans and converted from the word “Geschlecht” - clan. In Peter's decree of 1712, the entire service class was called the nobility. The foreign word was chosen not only because of Peter’s predilection for foreign words, but because in Moscow times the expression “nobleman” meant a relatively very low rank, and people of senior service, court and Duma ranks did not call themselves nobles. In the last years of the reign of Peter and under his immediate successors, the expressions “nobility” and “gentry” were equally in use, but only since the time of Catherine II the word “gentry” completely disappeared from everyday speech in the Russian language.

So, the nobles of the times of Peter the Great are assigned to serve in public service for life, just like the servicemen of Moscow times. But, remaining attached to the service all their lives, the nobles under Peter carried out this service in a rather modified form. Now they are obliged to serve in regular regiments and in the navy and perform civil service in all those administrative and judicial institutions that have been transformed from the old ones and have arisen again, and military and civil service are demarcated. Since service in the Russian army, navy and new civil institutions required some education, at least some special knowledge, school preparation for service from childhood was made mandatory for nobles.

A nobleman of Peter's time was enrolled in active service from the age of fifteen and had to begin it without fail from the "foundation", as Peter put it, that is, as a private (soldier, reiter, dragoon, and so on) in the army or a sailor in the navy, non-commissioned officer or collegium cadet in civilian institutions. According to the law, one was supposed to study only until the age of fifteen, and then one had to serve, and Peter very strictly ensured that the nobility was in business. From time to time, he organized reviews of all adult nobles, who were and were not in the service, and noble “minors,” as noble children who had not reached the legal age for service were called. At these reviews, held in Moscow and St. Petersburg, the tsar sometimes personally distributed nobles and minors into regiments and schools, personally placing “kryzhi” on the lists against the names of those who were suitable for service. In 1704, Peter himself reviewed more than 8,000 noblemen summoned there in Moscow. The clerk of the rank called out the nobles by name, and the tsar looked at the notebook and made his marks.

In addition to serving their studies abroad, the nobility had compulsory school service. After completing compulsory education, the nobleman went to serve. The noble minors “according to their suitability” were enlisted, some in the guard, others in army regiments or “garrisons”. The Life Guards Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments consisted exclusively of nobles and were a kind of practical school for officers for army regiments. A decree of 1714 prohibited the promotion of officers “from noble breeds” who had not served as soldiers in the Life Guards.

Attaching nobles to the civil service

In addition to military service, civil service became the same compulsory duty for the nobility under Peter. This inclusion in the civil service was big news for the nobility. In the 16th and 17th centuries, only one military service was considered real service, and servicemen, even if they occupied the highest civil positions, performed them as temporary assignments - these were “deeds”, “parcels”, and not service. Under Peter, civilian service became equally honorable and obligatory for a nobleman, as did military service. Knowing the ancient dislike of service people for “drop seed,” Peter ordered “not to reproach” the performance of this service by people of noble noble families. As a concession to the arrogant feeling of the gentry, who disdained to serve alongside the clerical children, Peter the Great decreed in 1724 “not to appoint someone from the gentry to the rank of secretary, so that later they could become assessors, advisers and higher”; from the clerical rank, only those promoted to the rank of secretary were in case of exceptional merit. Like military service, the new civilian service - under the new local government and in the new courts, in the collegiums and under the Senate - required some preliminary preparation. For this purpose, at the capital's chancelleries, collegiate and senate, they began to establish a kind of schools, where they handed over young noblemen to study the secrets of administrative office work, jurisprudence, economy and “citizenship”, that is, they generally taught all non-military sciences, the knowledge of which is necessary for a “civilian” » services. The General Regulations in 1720 deemed it necessary to establish such schools, placed under the supervision of secretaries, at all offices, so that each would have 6 or 7 noble children in training. But this was poorly implemented: the nobility stubbornly shunned the civil service.

Realizing the difficulty of getting the nobility to voluntarily gravitate towards civilian service, and on the other hand, bearing in mind that subsequently easier service would attract more hunters, Peter did not give the nobility the right to choose service at their own discretion. At the reviews, nobles were appointed to serve according to their “suitability”, appearance, abilities and wealth of each, and a certain proportion of service in the military and civil departments was established: only 1/3 of its existing members could consist of each family in civil positions registered for service. This was done so that “there would not be a shortage of servicemen at sea and on land.”

1. general nominal and separately;
2. which of them are suitable for work and will be used and for what purpose and how much will then remain;
3. how many children does anyone have and how old are they, and from now on who will be born and die male.”

The fight against evasion of service by nobles

In order to elevate the importance of his unborn companions in the eyes of those around him, Peter began to bestow upon them foreign titles. Menshikov was elevated to the rank of His Serene Highness Prince in 1707, and before that, at the request of the Tsar, he was made a Prince of the Holy Roman Empire. Boyar F.A. Golovin was also first elevated by Emperor Leopold I to the dignity of a count of the Roman Empire.

Along with the titles, Peter, following the example of the West, began to approve the coats of arms of the nobles and issue certificates of nobility. Coats of arms, however, became a big fashion among the boyars back in the 17th century, so Peter only legitimized this tendency, which began under the influence of the Polish nobility.

Following the example of the West, the first order in Russia was established in the year - the “cavalry” of St. Apostle Andrew the First-Called, as the highest sign of distinction. Since the time of Peter the noble dignity acquired through service has been passed down by inheritance as granted for length of service, which is also news unknown to the 17th century, when, according to Kotoshikhin, nobility, as a class dignity, “was not given to anyone.” "So, according to the table of ranks,- said Professor A. Romanovich-Slavatinsky, - a ladder of fourteen steps separated every plebeian from the first dignitaries of the state, and nothing prevented every gifted person, having stepped over these steps, from reaching the first ranks in the state; it opened wide the doors through which, through rank, “vile” members of society could “ennoble themselves” and enter the ranks of the nobility.”

Decree on unified inheritance

The gentry of the times of Peter the Great continued to enjoy the right of land ownership, but since the foundations of this right changed, the nature of land ownership itself changed: the distribution of state-owned lands into local ownership ceased by itself as soon as the new nature of the noble service was finally established, as soon as this service, having concentrated in regular regiments, it lost its former militia character. Local distribution was then replaced by the granting of inhabited and uninhabited lands to full ownership, but not as a salary for service, but as a reward for exploits in the service. This consolidated the merger of estates and estates into one that had already taken place in the 17th century. In his law “On movable and immovable estates and on joint inheritance”, issued on March 23 (April 3) of the year, Peter did not make any distinction between these two ancient forms of service land ownership, speaking only about immovable estate and meaning by this expression both local and patrimonial land.

The content of the decree on single inheritance is that a landowner who has sons could bequeath all his real estate to one of them whom he wanted, but certainly only to one. If the landowner died without a will, then all real estate passed by law to one eldest son. If the landowner did not have sons, then he could bequeath his estate to one of his close or distant relatives, whomever he wanted, but certainly to just one. If he died without a will, the estate passed to the closest relative. When the deceased turned out to be the last in his family, he could bequeath real estate to one of his maiden daughters, a married woman, a widow, whomever he wanted, but certainly only one. The real estate passed to the eldest of the married daughters, and the husband or fiancé was obliged to take the surname of the last owner.

The law on single inheritance concerned, however, not just the nobility, but all “subjects, whatever their rank and dignity.” It was forbidden to mortgage and sell not only estates and estates, but also courtyards, shops, and any real estate in general. Explaining, as usual, the new law in the decree, Peter points out, first of all, that “if the immovable property will always go to one son, and the rest will only be movable, then state revenues will be more manageable, because the master will always be more satisfied with the big one, although he will take it little by little, and there will be one house, not five, and it is better to benefit his subjects rather than ruin them.”.

The decree on unified inheritance did not last long. He caused too much discontent among the nobles, and the nobility tried in every possible way to circumvent him: fathers sold part of the villages in order to leave money for their younger sons, obliging the sole heir with an oath to pay their younger brothers their part of the inheritance in money. A report submitted by the Senate in the year to Empress Anna Ioannovna indicated that the law on single inheritance causes among members of noble families “hatred and quarrels and prolonged litigation with great loss and ruin for both sides, and it is not unknown that not only some brothers and neighbors relatives among themselves, but children also beat fathers to death.” Empress Anna abolished the law on single inheritance, but retained one essential feature of it. The decree abolishing single inheritance ordered “from now on, both estates and votchinas will be called equally one immovable estate - votchina; and it is the same for fathers and mothers to divide their children according to the Code, and it is the same for daughters to give dowries as before.”.

In the 17th century and earlier, service people who settled in the districts of the Moscow state lived a fairly cohesive social life, created around the work that they had to serve “even until death.” The military service collected them in some cases in groups, when each had to settle in on its own so that they could all serve together at the review, choose a governor, prepare for a campaign, elect deputies to the Zemsky Sobor, etc. Finally, the very regiments of the Moscow army were composed of each nobles of the same locality, so that the neighbors all served in the same detachment.

Corporate spirit of the nobility

Under Peter the Great, these principles of social organization ceased to exist in some respects, and were further developed in others. Neighborhood guarantees for each other in regularly reporting for service disappeared, the very service of neighbors in the same regiment stopped, the elections of “salary workers” stopped, who, under the supervision of a “big man” sent from Moscow, collected information about the service of each nobleman and, on the basis of this information, made the allocation of local dachas and cash salaries when they were due. But Peter took advantage of the ancient ability of service people to act together, or, as they say, corporately, to entrust the local nobility with some participation in local government and in the collection of state duties. In 1702, the abolition of labial elders followed. After the reform of the provincial administration in 1719, the local nobility elected land commissioners from 1724 and supervised their activities. The commissioners had to report every year on their activities to the county noble society, which elected them and, for noticed malfunctions and abuses, could bring the perpetrators to trial and even punish them: a fine or even confiscation of the estate.

All these were pitiful remnants of the former corporate unity of the local nobility. It now participates in local work far from being in full force, since most of its members serve, scattered throughout the empire. At home, in the localities, only the old and small and very rare vacationers live.

Results of the class policy of Peter the Great

Thus, the new structure, new methods and techniques of service destroyed the previous local corporate organizations of the nobility. This change, according to V. O. Klyuchevsky, “was, perhaps, the most important for the fate of Russia as a state.” The regular regiments of Peter the Great's army are not single-class, but multi-class and do not have any corporate connection with the local worlds, since they consist of people recruited randomly from everywhere and rarely returning to their homeland.

The place of the former boyars was taken by the “generals”, consisting of persons of the first four classes. In this “general”, personal service hopelessly mixed up representatives of the former clan nobility, people raised by service and merit from the very bottom of the provincial nobility, advanced from other social groups, foreigners who came to Russia “to pursue happiness and rank.” Under the strong hand of Peter, the generals were unresponsive and submissive executors of the will and plans of the monarch.

Peter's legislative measures, without significantly expanding the class rights of the nobility, clearly and significantly changed the forms of the duties that lay on service people. Military affairs, which in Moscow times was the duty of service people, is now becoming the duty of all segments of the population. The lower strata supply soldiers and sailors, the nobles, still continuing to serve without exception, but having the opportunity to more easily advance to the ranks thanks to the school training they receive at home, become the head of the armed masses and direct their actions and military training. Further, in Moscow times the same people carried out both military and civil service; under Peter, both services were strictly differentiated, and part of the nobility must devote themselves exclusively to civil service. Then, the nobleman of Peter the Great still has the exclusive right of land ownership, but as a result of the decrees on single inheritance and audit, he becomes an obligated manager of his real estate, responsible to the treasury for the tax service of his peasants and for peace and tranquility in his villages. The nobility is now obliged to study and acquire a number of special knowledge in preparation for service.

On the other hand, having given the service class the general name of the nobility, Peter assigned to the title of nobility the meaning of an honorary noble dignity, bestowed coats of arms and titles on the nobility, but at the same time destroyed the former isolation of the service class, the real “nobility” of its members, revealing through length of service, through the report card ranks, wide access to the gentry for people of other classes, and the law on single inheritance opened the way out of the nobility into merchants and clergy for those who wanted it. This point in the table of ranks led to the fact that in the 18th century the best names of old service people were lost in the mass of nobles of new, service origin. The nobility of Russia, so to speak, has democratized: from an estate whose rights and advantages were determined by origin, it becomes a military-bureaucratic estate, the rights and advantages of which are created and hereditarily determined by the civil service.

Thus, at the top of the social division of Russian citizens, a privileged agricultural layer was formed, supplying, so to speak, the command staff for the army of citizens who create state wealth with their labor. While this class is still attached to service and science, the intense labor that it carries out justifies, one might say, the great advantages that it has. Events after the death of Peter show that the nobility, replenishing the guard and government offices, is a force whose opinion and mood the government must take into account. After Peter, the generals and the guard, that is, the nobility in service, even “created a government” through palace coups, taking advantage of the imperfection of the law on succession to the throne.

Having concentrated the land in their hands, having the labor of the peasants at their disposal, the nobility felt itself to be a major social and political force, but no longer so much a service force as a landowner. Therefore, it begins to strive to free itself from the burdens of forced serfdom to the state, while retaining, however, all those rights with which the government thought to ensure the ability of the nobility to work.

(continuation)

1. Measures regarding classes. The measures taken by Peter the Great regarding the estates seem to many to be a complete reform of the entire social system; in fact, Peter did not change the basic position of the estates in the state and did not remove the previous estate duties from them. He only gave a new organization to state duties of different classes, which is why the organization of the classes themselves changed somewhat, receiving greater certainty. Only the urban class, which was small in Rus', significantly changed its position thanks to Peter’s exceptional concerns about its development. Consideration of legislative measures for individual classes will show us the fairness of the stated position.

The nobility in the 17th century, as we have already had occasion to show, was the highest social class; it owed the state personal, mainly military service, and in recompense for it enjoyed the right of personal land ownership (patrimonial and local); with the extinction of the old boyars, the nobility acquired more and more administrative importance; Almost the entire Moscow administration came out of it. Thus, the nobles were a military, administrative and landowning class before Peter. But as a military class, the nobility in the 17th century. no longer satisfied the needs of the time, because the disorganized noble militias could not fight the regular European troops; at the same time, the noble troops were characterized by poor mobility and were slow to gather: with success they could only carry out local defensive service on the borders. The Moscow government therefore began to establish in the 17th century. regular regiments, recruiting soldiers from “walking people” (but these regiments also had their drawbacks). The nobility appeared in them as officers. Thus, the military service of the nobility already before Peter was in need of restructuring. As administrators, the pre-Petrine nobles did not have any special training and did not remain permanently in civilian positions, because there was no separation of military and civilian positions at that time. If, therefore, the noble duties to the state were organized unsatisfactorily, then noble land ownership, on the contrary, the further, the more it developed. Nobles at the end of the 17th century. (1676) achieved the right to inherit estates by law, as they had previously inherited them by custom; on the other hand, the power of the landowners over the peasants grew more and more - the nobles completely equated their peasants with serfs planted on arable land ("backyard people").

Peter I set out to give a better organization to the service of the nobles and achieved this in this way: with terrible severity he recruited nobles to serve in public service and, as before, demanded indefinite service as long as he had enough strength. Nobles were required to serve in the army and navy; no more than one third of each “surname” was allowed into the civil service, which under Peter became separated from the military. Growing up nobles were required to attend parades, which were often conducted by the sovereign himself in Moscow or St. Petersburg. At the reviews, they were either assigned to one type of service or another, or sent to study in Russian and foreign schools. Primary education was made compulsory for all young nobles (according to the decrees of 1714 and 1723). They had to learn literacy, numbers and geometry by the age of 15 in specially established schools at monasteries and bishops' houses. Anyone who evaded compulsory education lost the right to marry. Upon entering the service, a nobleman became a soldier of the guard or even the army. He served with people from the lower classes of society who were recruited. It depended on his personal abilities and diligence to become an officer; personal merit promoted even a simple peasant soldier to become an officer. No nobleman could become an officer unless he was a soldier; but every officer, no matter who he was by origin, became a nobleman.

So, quite deliberately, Peter made the basis of service personal service instead of the old basis - birth. But this was not news; personal service was recognized already in the 17th century; Peter gave her only the final advantage, and this replenished the ranks of the nobility with new noble families. The entire mass of serving nobles was placed under direct subordination to the Senate instead of the previous Rank Order, and the Senate was in charge of the nobility through a special official, the “master of arms.” The former noble "ranks" were destroyed (before they were class groups: Moscow nobles, policemen, boyar children); instead of them, a ladder of official ranks (actually, positions) appeared, determined by the famous “Table of Ranks” of 1722. Previously, belonging to a certain rank was determined by a person’s origin, but under Peter it began to be determined by personal merit. Outside of official positions, all the nobles merged into one continuous mass and received the general name of the nobility (it seems that since 1712).

Table of ranks (original)

Thus, the service of the nobles became more correct and difficult; entering the regiments, they were detached from the area, were regular troops, served without breaks, with rare leaves home, and could not easily hide from service. In a word, the organization of state service for the nobles has changed, but the essence of service (military and administrative) remains the same.

But the reward for service has become stronger. Under Peter, we no longer see the distribution of estates to service people; if someone is given land, it is as a votchina, that is, as hereditary property. Moreover, Peter's legislation also turned old estates into fiefs, expanding the right to dispose of them. Under Peter, the law no longer knows the difference between local and patrimonial ownership: it differs only in origin. Whoever can prove ownership of land is a patrimonial owner; whoever remembers that his ancestral land belongs to the state and was given to his ancestors for possession is a landowner. But, having turned estates into estates by law, Peter looked at estates as estates, considering them possessions existing in the interests of the state. Previously, for the benefit of the state, it was not allowed to split up estates when transferring them to posterity. Now Peter, in the same form, extended this rule to the estates. By decree of 1714 (March 23rd) he prohibited nobles from splitting up land holdings when bequeathing to their sons. “Whoever has several sons can give real estate to one of them, to whomever he wants,” the decree said. Only when there was no will did the eldest son inherit; Therefore, some researchers somewhat incorrectly call Peter's law on single inheritance the law on primogeniture. This law, observed by the nobility regarding estates, caused strong opposition when it was transferred to the estates. Abuses, circumvention of the law, “hatred and quarrels” began in noble families, and in 1731 Empress Anna abolished Peter’s law and at the same time destroyed any distinction between estates and estates. But with this last order she completed only what Peter recognized, for the difficulties of his service he gave the nobility more rights to estates.

But in addition to the expansion of landownership rights, which made the ownership of estates more secure, the nobility under Peter also gained a stronger grip on the peasants. This question about the attitude of the nobles towards the peasants leads us to the general question about the position of the latter under Peter I.

“The problem of motivation has been perplexing for several generations of managers. One reason for this problem is that motivation is not directly observable.”
G.P. Latham, E.A. Lock

Let's start with the terms. Motivation is a psychological phenomenon that determines human activity. The motive is based on a need aimed at a specific object. Stimulation is the use of external factors to obtain a given human reaction. In the management process, the employee’s internal motivation and external stimulation must be in consistent interaction. And here a serious difficulty arises, indicated in the epigraph.

In order for a manager to match the incentives applied to the motives of employees, he needs a practical way to determine the motives of employees. The model described below suggests such a way. The model combines all the diversity of motives for activity into two fundamental groups:

• a group of motives for creative transformation (here we will call them “creative motives”);
• a group of motives for maintaining the status quo (“conservative motives”).

Next - more about the characteristics of the labor behavior of employees with predominant motives of one or another group and, then, about the practical application of this model, primarily for organizing systemic material incentives.

Conservative motive

For people with a strong conservative motive, work is part of a necessary life order. Such people get a job because it is “supposed to be so.” Paying wages and ensuring normal working conditions, in the opinion of this employee, is the absolute responsibility of the employer. For his part, such a person intends (having received “normal” conditions) to work “normally” too, conscientiously. If working conditions, including a guaranteed salary, satisfy the employee, then he will value such work and strive to keep it.

Conservative motivation leads to the emergence of “protective” behavior aimed at minimizing risks. Security behavior manifests itself in reliance on rules and resistance to risky changes. Simply put, to maintain stability, an employee tends to follow the rules and not do anything that will increase risks. Accordingly, such an employee perceives incentives aimed at maintaining order well. The presence of rules and restrictions and an understanding of penalties for violations are, as a rule, sufficient incentives for him. But the conservative employee also treats punishments with understanding, especially if they are justified and orderly.

Conversely, incentives aimed at encouraging achievement have a poor effect on such employees. Evaluating work can be perceived as a manifestation of distrust, and promising bonuses for special successes can be perceived as unfair dissatisfaction with his conscientious work. Variable salary, even clearly tied to performance indicators (KPI), is a strong stressor for such an employee (and therefore reduces labor productivity).

And since his criteria for evaluating his own work are usually vague (he serves “faithfully”, the company pays “worthily”), a slightly under or slightly overstated salary does not in any way affect the intensity and quality of his work. If the needs for wages and normal working conditions are not met significantly and constantly, the employee becomes dissatisfied with work. He may complain about the discomfort or the low salary, but he won't do anything special to earn more. A demotivated conservative does not dare to look for another job for a long time, but begins to “allow” himself all forms of laziness for which there are no penalties. This is precisely the situation that is described by the old Soviet aphorism: “They think they pay us, so let them think we work for them.”

What happens if the needs of a conservative are greatly “oversatisfied”? An inflated guaranteed salary, however, like other unjustified preferences, does not in any way encourage people to do something beyond the norm. But “oversatisfied” needs certainly enhance “protective” behavior, and the more undeserved benefits such an employee receives, the more careful he will be in his decisions and actions.

Creative motive

The format of the article will not allow us to delve into the nature of creative and conservative motivation. Therefore, we simply postulate that the antipode of protective behavior is creative behavior.

If the conservative type is motivated to resist changes in the content, organization and working conditions, then the creative type is aimed at continuous change and transformation of reality. Here is the formulation of Nikolai Berdyaev: “The creative act is always liberation and overcoming. There is an experience of power in him.” For such an employee, work is a way of self-realization and recognition. Naturally, for such an employee, the main thing in the work is its content and freedom of activity. Standards, norms, routine are the main demotivators for this type of employee.

Here it must be emphasized that creative behavior is not an exclusive feature of the so-called “liberal” professions. Any innovative, project activity, marketing, commerce and, of course, management - all this presupposes the author’s transformation of reality (we will return to the connection between motivation and professions below). How else can you characterize an employee with creative motivation? Such features can be easily formulated by “reversing” the characteristics of a conservative outlined in the previous part. So, the creative type strives more for development than for stability; sees new opportunities rather than threats; He prefers desire to responsibilities, experiments to standards, and initiative to discipline.

The main driver for this type of employee is the expectation of the joy of experiencing success. According to the precise formulation of William Schutz, “joy is the feeling that arises in a person as a result of the awareness of the realization of his capabilities.” Therefore, the most important part of the motivational program should be the criteria for success when setting goals, and its recognition when summing up the results.

What is the significance of material incentives in the case of an employee with creative motivation? Obviously – absolutely symbolic, in the literal sense of the word. Receiving even a high salary is not quite the same as being successful. For this type of person, a bonus is not so much a material benefit as a sign and measure of success. Just as the success of an athlete is determined by the number of medals won, the success of an employee can be determined by himself through the size of his bonuses. But only if the bonus is in harmony with actual and recognized merits.

Without a motive

It remains to deal with the situation when the employee has neither a conservative nor a creative motive. Such an employee could be called unmotivated (or demotivated if he has lost his former motivation). But he is unmotivated only in the sense that he sees no interest in either working conditions or labor victories. But there is no activity without a motive. Therefore, such an employee needs an additional motive. This is where money comes to the rescue.

Without going into details, we note that the motive for the work of such an employee is outside this activity. As a rule, he needs work to provide a material basis for his existence outside of work. He, as they say, “earns a living.” Or such work has an ultimate goal for him - to save up to purchase something. Since the employee is motivated solely by money, his salary should be as closely related to his performance as possible. In other words, this situation is the basis of piecework payment.

Here it must be emphasized that such a situation is not at all bad or even special: not every profession and position implies the possibility and necessity of motivating an employee by the content or working conditions. Quite the contrary – which explains the prevalence of deals in remuneration.

Motivation options

Here we are considering a model, i.e. an obviously simplified representation of a real phenomenon. But to reduce the motivation of all people to just three types is too rough an approximation of reality. As a rule, people are driven not by one type of motives, but by a combination of them. And we can only talk about the type of motivation that predominates in a person. And to display such combined motifs we can use a coordinate grid:

In the figure you see a matrix, on the axes of which three degrees of expression of each motive are plotted. Cells Nos. 3 and 7 show the groups described above with the maximum degree of conservative and creative motivation, respectively. Number 1 is the same “unmotivated”, or rather, the type motivated solely by money. The remaining cells contain combinations of these motifs in different “proportions”.

The diagonal shades of green background display the importance of money as an incentive to work. Let us emphasize once again: a white background does not mean that such an employee does not need money. It means that the promise of a bonus or the threat of a de-bonus does not affect the work behavior of such an employee.

Finally, we note that motivation is the result of the influence on a person of many fundamental and situational factors, which, in fact, creates the opportunity for a manager to influence the work behavior of employees with the help of incentives.

How to work with the model

First and obvious: it is useful for a manager to focus his personal approach on the type of motivation of his subordinates. Using the criteria described above, you can determine the type of motivation of each of your employees (one of nine “subtypes”) and then apply incentives that best suit their “profiles.”

But in addition to an individual approach, the company also needs systemic solutions implemented in corporate rules of rewards and penalties, and in the remuneration system. To make systemic decisions, you need to find out which types of motivation form the majority at the enterprise (this will be the rule), and which form the minority (exceptions) - both in general and in the context of professional groups or divisions.

What determines the actual distribution of enterprise personnel by types of motivation? In an established enterprise, people who work are not at all random in terms of motivation. Most people choose a profession and job based on their inclinations. Therefore, accountants usually work as pedantic, attentive people who are good at routine. People who are proactive, communicative and flexible succeed in commerce. And those who want to bring something new into the world, depending on their skills, become artists or startupers. Thus, industry-specific professional characteristics and the organizational structure of the enterprise create unique filters that select workers with certain motives in the labor market for each division.

After this, a secondary selection occurs within the enterprise related to organizational culture, which, in turn, depends on the values ​​professed by management and on the stage of the company’s life cycle. In young start-up companies, the focus should be shifted to the creative “corner”; in companies at the stage of rapid growth, along with a strong creative component, there should be a lot of money-oriented personnel; in old stagnating companies, conservative motivation prevails.

Therefore, at a specific enterprise, an incentive system can be developed that focuses on the specifics of the enterprise and its divisions, and not on the individual characteristics of employees. And, of course, such a system of incentives, in turn, forms one of the most important “filters” that attracts and retains in the company personnel that correspond to its motivational profile, and displaces “unsuitable” personnel.

The matrices above show a generalized approximate picture. The first thing you can do in such a matrix is ​​to depict the actual and target company profiles. They will be the same if you are satisfied with the nature of the organizational culture, or they will be different if you have the intention to change something in this regard.

Profiles can be defined in a group of expert managers. The fact that you do not have an accurate tool for measuring motives is not a problem: experienced leaders are able to intuitively summarize their knowledge, observations and feelings, and group discussion minimizes subjective errors.

You can then check the current incentive system against the profile to see how appropriate it is. Let's say, if you have a profile like the one in the central matrix in the figure above (“STARTUP”), and in fact 30% of employees receive a fixed salary and 70% work on a direct deal, there is an obvious contradiction between the desired motivation profile and incentive tools.

From the company profile you can go to the department profiles. Of course, each department may have employees with different types of motivation. But the personnel who set the tone in the organizational culture (primarily the manager) must correspond to the target profile of their department.

The matrix can be constructed using the MS Excel “bubble chart” tool, taking into account the number of personnel groups (the size of the “bubbles” corresponds to the number). The example below shows such a diagram, which also includes the goals of changes in the nature of the motivation of three groups of employees (red “bubbles”):

So, by comparing target motivation profiles with the behavior actually observed and with the incentives actually applied, you can identify problems in staffing and changes needed in reward and penalty systems.

Finally, this same matrix will help you choose the optimal forms of remuneration. The matrix below shows proportions illustrating the logic of incentives. “C” means “deal”, “F” means “fixed payment”, “B” means “bonuses”. Bonuses here refer to large bonuses paid for successfully completed projects or special achievements, and a “bargain” is, of course, a salary tied to measurable work results. The entry “F 50% C 50%” means that half of the planned salary of such an employee should be fixed (depending on the conscientious performance of job duties during working hours), and the second half - piecework, depending on the measured performance indicators. Of course, the proportions shown are arbitrary and demonstrate the general logic of the model.

So, now you can define the actual and target motivation profiles of the company, divisions and individual positions, and assign an incentive system that matches the target profiles.

Here we did not understand what exactly bonuses should be paid for, what piecework payment and material sanctions should be tied to. But that, as they say, is a completely different story.

NO BLUE GUNDOWDER

The expressive effectiveness of an expression ensures its long-term existence - and long after related words and even the form of the same word have already been lost in living speech or have undergone drastic semantic changes. Many idiomatic phrases have developed and been preserved due to their vivid expressiveness.

Here's an example. In modern Russian, the colloquial expression is rarely used no sign of gunpowder(no, will not remain) in the meaning of the negative quantity “nothing”. ”“ - Well, I’ll die, and - no blue powder there won’t be any left after me!” Tiunov said convincingly.” No blue powder - for us an indecomposable idiom. Its complexity is palpable, but its lexical composition defies immediate awareness and explanation; in it even the syntactic connection of elements is broken. Obviously, no blue powder goes back to an archaic phrase no blue powder(cf. in broad daylight, from young to old and so on.). Collocation blue powder not common among us. However, even in the “Tale of Igor’s Campaign” we find: “blue wine”, “blue darkness”; Wed in “The Tale of Transdonshchina”: “the birds of heaven, grazing, fly under the blue shells.” Academician I. I. Sreznevsky points out that in the Old Russian language blue also meant “dark, blue-dark” (cf. sints – Ethiopian, black creature) (Sreznevsky, 3, p. 358). It should be remembered that in Serbian sûњ means “blue and greyish”; si?њav – “gray”). Etymologically related to blue seems to be located gray(cf. Preobrazhensky, 2, p. 287). Powder in this regard, indicates dust, a speck of dust.

Word powder in the meaning of “dust, ashes” was still alive in the Russian literary language of the late 18th – early 19th centuries. (see words AR 1822.5, pp. 8–9; words - gunpowder, powder, powder).

In the 1847 dictionary in the word powder, in addition to its modern meaning, was also noted as the main “small particle of earth; dust, ashes (...)". " Gunpowder in the eye hit” (1867–1968, 3, p. 792).

Blue powder in the eyes as an image it takes on the meaning “the smallest, smallest amount”, with a negation - “not at all” (like one speck of powder in the eye). For example, in the “Painter” of 1772 (fol. 23) in the message “To my son Falaley”: “The girl is poor, she can read and write, and most of all, she is a great housekeeper: she has nor blue powder it won’t go to waste, son, I have found such and such a bride for you” (Russian satirical magazine of the 18th century, p. 196). Compared like blue powder in the eye or simply gunpowder in the eye - expressed singularity, the extreme limit of uniqueness. For example, in “The Painter” (l. 24): “Give me joy, my light; You're the only one I have, like blue powder in the eye How can I not love you (ibid., p. 198). Wed. from D. Fonvizin in “Nedorosl”: “Would it really be necessary to meet our own father, on whom we have all our hope, who is our only one, like gunpowder in the eye"(Prostakova to Starodum).

In V.I. Dahl’s “The Adventures of Violdamur and his Arshet”: “... in the opposition party, stands, one like a finger - one, like a poppy - one like blue gunpowder in the eye - alone like the sun in the sky - alone like a goblin in a swamp - stands Violdamur’s new friend, Mr. Mokrievich-Khlamko-Nagolny, acquired in Sumbura...” (Dal, 1898, 10, p. 135). In A. I. Levitov’s story “Sweet Life”: “... the captain is nothing - powder the smallest could not be noticed in his eyes...” (1911, 1, p. 98). From Saltykov in “Provincial Sketches”: “... after two hours they, one might say, no blue powder will not remain..." (in the speech of Mother Mavra Kuzmovna). In Leskov’s essays “Laughter and Grief”: “... I see that my room is carefully tidied and washed and that not a single thing of mine is left in it, positively, as they say, no blue powder" From P. P. Gnedich in “The Tree of Life”: “I thought I’d give you a sheepskin coat for the holiday out of family feelings, but now I won’t give it to you.” no blue powder" In the memoirs of B. N. Chicherin (vol. 2, “Moscow of the forties,” p. 82): “And you have a mind no blue powder. And the darling in you is so kind!” (Alyabyev’s poems about D.P. Golokhvastov). Wed. in Pisemsky’s story “Leshy”: “I... interrupted everything before blue gunpowder, however, I didn’t find what I was looking for” (in the police officer’s speech).

The article has not been previously published. The archive preserved the manuscript (5 sheets of different formats, yellowed with time) and the typescript without the author's correction.

It is printed from the manuscript with the necessary corrections and clarifications. – E.X.

Institutional Economics Odintsova Marina Igorevna

4.4. Moral hazard and ways to prevent it

4.4.1. Conditions for the occurrence of moral hazard

Your TV is broken and you go to a repair shop. The technician tells you that a small but expensive part has failed and offers to replace it. You must make a decision based on the information that the master has presented to you. You don't understand TVs, and you have to trust the technician and agree to replace an expensive part. You may encounter a moral hazard problem here, which can be formulated as follows.

If a person who has the information necessary to make a decision has interests that differ from the interests of the person making the decision, then this person may try to use the information advantage in order to influence the adoption of a decision that is beneficial to him. It will be interested in not presenting complete and accurate information that is essential for making a decision.

In this example we are dealing with hidden information. You receive a TV from repair, it works for a week, and then it fails again. You contact another master, and he tells you that the part that the first master installed for you was of poor quality. You again need to pay for repairs, and you also waste a lot of time trying to repair your TV. You are again faced with moral hazard on the part of the first master, the cause of which was another type of information asymmetry - hidden actions. So, we can define this type of moral hazard as follows.

If buyers cannot control the quality of the goods or services they purchase, then suppliers have incentives to provide low quality goods and services with minimal effort and without due diligence and care. An example of hidden information is the services of experts: doctors, lawyers, repairers, managers and politicians.

In both the first and second examples, not only the buyer suffers, but also the entire society as a whole - resources are wasted.

In general, moral hazard can be defined as follows.

Moral hazard is the actions of economic agents to maximize their own utility at the expense of others in situations where they do not experience the full consequences (or do not enjoy the full benefits) of their actions due to uncertainty and incomplete contracts that prevent them from imposing all the harm (or receiving all the benefits). to the relevant agent.

Situations in which moral hazard arises are characterized by a combination of the following conditions:

1) the interests of the contractor and the customer do not coincide, the contractor pursues its own interests to the detriment of the interests of the customer;

2) performers are insured against the adverse consequences of their actions;

3) the customer is not able to exercise complete control and perfect coercion.

Moral hazard is ubiquitous. It always arises when concluding an employment agreement. Frederick Taylor, the father of "scientific management", wrote that one could hardly find a competent worker who did not devote a large part of his time to learning how slowly he could work so that the employer would still be left with the impression that he was working at an acceptable pace ( Quoted from: [Milgrom, Roberts, 1999, vol. 1, p. 264]). An employee may spend work time studying for an exam or chatting with a friend on the phone, although there is work awaiting him. The concealment by enterprises of information necessary for the development of plans by central planning authorities was a common phenomenon under socialism. Enterprises overestimated their resource needs and underestimated production capabilities. This concealment of information was necessary for them to avoid setting too intense planning targets. At one of the Ford plants, a production manager secretly reduced the wooden slats that separated one car frame from another on the assembly line in order to produce additional cars that were hidden from the company's central management in Detroit. The purpose of these additional vehicles (called "Kitties") was to create a hidden reserve of vehicles to avoid punishment for failure to complete overly strenuous production tasks under unfavorable conditions. Thus, in good times, maximum production capabilities were hidden from the company management. After all, if they became known, they would be set as planned targets.

Some resources are more susceptible to moral hazard than others. Resources or investments are called plastic, if the use of a resource for its intended purpose is difficult to control, and there may be many legal ways to use it. The person who makes the decision (manages the use of a plastic resource) in this case has more opportunities to secretly influence the expected results in his own interests. If controlling the use of a plastic resource requires high costs, then in this case the danger of moral hazard arises. Resources that are not malleable do not require control over their use.

Examples of an industry with a low degree of resource plasticity include railroads, utilities, airlines, and oil refining (as opposed to geological exploration of oil fields). The most flexible resource is human capital. Therefore, research companies and enterprises where human capital plays a major role, such as the fashion industry, law firms, enterprises involved in the creation of computer programs, architectural studios, etc., are most susceptible to moral hazard.

Money is also a highly plastic resource. Since loans can be used for other purposes, which jeopardizes their repayment, and monitoring the actions of borrowers is quite complex and requires high costs, the danger of moral hazard in this area is very serious.

A special case of moral hazard is the problem called the principal-agent (customer-executor) problem, or the problem of agency relations (agency). The idea behind these concepts is very simple. The agent acts on behalf of the principal, but it is difficult for the principal to control the actions of his agent. What the principal can observe are mostly the results. If the principal is the owner of the company, then the manager is the agent, and the result will be profit at the end of the year. If there were no external circumstances that could affect the results, then the principal could evaluate the firm's performance and draw conclusions about the agent's behavior (the level of his effort). However, if external circumstances could influence the results, in this case the agent may have serious arguments to justify himself. He will attribute the poor performance to unfavorable external conditions, and the principal will not be able to pinpoint what caused the poor performance. Any contract with an agent will be incomplete.

The problem here arises from information asymmetry, which occurs when two conditions are present:

– the agent’s activities are not directly observable by the principal;

– the activity of an agent cannot be judged by its final results.

The principal may face the risk of serious losses. His well-being depends on the actions of the agent. Costs in agency relationships consist of the following components:

– control costs on the part of the principal;

– the costs of the performer associated with the voluntary acceptance of more stringent conditions, for example the costs of posting bail;

– residual losses, i.e. losses of the principal from the agent’s decisions that deviate from the decisions that the principal himself would make if he had the information and abilities of the agent.