Historians and military leaders of the Great Patriotic War are almost unanimous in the opinion that the most significant miscalculation that predetermined the tragedy of 1941 was the outdated doctrine of warfare adhered to by the Red Army.

Researchers V. Solovyov and Y. Kirshin, placing responsibility on Stalin, Voroshilov, Timoshenko and Zhukov, note that they “did not understand the content of the initial period of the war, made mistakes in planning, in strategic deployment, in determining the direction of the main attack of German troops.”

Unexpected blitzkrieg

Despite the fact that the blitzkrieg strategy was successfully tested by Wehrmacht troops in the European campaign, the Soviet command ignored it and counted on a completely different beginning of a possible war between Germany and the USSR.

“The People’s Commissar of Defense and the General Staff believed that the war between such major powers as Germany and the Soviet Union should begin according to the previously existing pattern: the main forces enter the battle a few days after the border battles,” Zhukov recalled.

The command of the Red Army assumed that the Germans would launch an offensive with limited forces, and only after the border battles would the concentration and deployment of the main troops be completed. The General Staff hoped that while the covering army would conduct an active defense, exhausting and bleeding the fascists, the country would be able to carry out a full-scale mobilization.

However, an analysis of the strategy of warfare in Europe by German troops shows that the success of the Wehrmacht was primarily associated with powerful attacks by armored forces, supported by aviation, which quickly cut through the enemy’s defenses.

The main task of the first days of the war was not the seizure of territory, but the destruction of the defenses of the invaded country.
A miscalculation by the USSR command led to the fact that German aviation destroyed more than 1,200 combat aircraft on the very first day of the war and actually secured air supremacy. As a result of the surprise attack, hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers were killed, wounded or captured. The German command achieved its goal: control of the Red Army troops was disrupted for some time.

Poor deployment of troops

As many researchers note, the nature of the location of Soviet troops was very convenient for striking German territory, but detrimental for carrying out a defensive operation. The dislocation that emerged at the beginning of the war was formed earlier in accordance with the General Staff plan to launch preventive strikes on German territory. According to the September 1940 version of the “Fundamentals of Deployment”, such deployment of troops was abandoned, but only on paper.

At the time of the attack by the German army, the military formations of the Red Army were not with their rears deployed, but were divided into three echelons without operational communication with each other. Such miscalculations of the General Staff allowed the Wehrmacht army to quite easily achieve a numerical superiority and destroy Soviet troops piecemeal.

The situation was especially alarming at the Bialystok Ledge, which stretched for many kilometers towards the enemy. This deployment of troops created a threat of deep envelopment and encirclement of the 3rd, 4th, and 10th armies of the Western District. The fears were confirmed: literally in a matter of days, three armies were surrounded and defeated, and on June 28 the Germans entered Minsk.

Reckless counterattacks

On June 22 at 7 o'clock in the morning, Stalin issued a directive, which said: “troops with all forces and means should attack enemy forces and destroy them in the area where they violated the Soviet border.”

Such an order indicated a lack of understanding by the USSR high command of the scale of the invasion.
Six months later, when German troops were driven back from Moscow, Stalin demanded a counteroffensive on other fronts. Few could object to him. Despite the unwillingness of the Soviet army to conduct full-scale military operations, a counteroffensive was launched along the entire front - from Tikhvin to the Kerch Peninsula.

Moreover, the troops received orders to dismember and destroy the main forces of Army Group Center. The headquarters overestimated its capabilities: the Red Army at this stage of the war was unable to concentrate sufficient forces in the main direction and could not massively use tanks and artillery.
On May 2, 1942, one of the planned operations began in the Kharkov area, which, according to historians, was carried out while ignoring the enemy’s capabilities and neglecting the complications that an unfortified bridgehead could lead to. On May 17, the Germans attacked from two sides and a week later turned the bridgehead into a “cauldron.” About 240 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers were captured as a result of this operation.

Unavailability of inventories

The General Staff believed that in the conditions of an impending war, material and technical means needed to be brought closer to the troops. 340 of the 887 stationary warehouses and bases of the Red Army were located in border districts, including more than 30 million shells and mines. In the area of the Brest Fortress alone, 34 wagons of ammunition were stored. In addition, most of the artillery of the corps and divisions was not in the front-line zone, but in training camps.

The course of military operations showed the recklessness of such a decision. In a short time, it was no longer possible to remove military equipment, ammunition and fuel and lubricants. As a result, they were either destroyed or captured by the Germans.
Another mistake of the General Staff was the large concentration of aircraft at airfields, while camouflage and air defense cover were weak. If the advanced units of army aviation were based too close to the border - 10-30 km, then the units of front-line and long-range aviation were located too far - from 500 to 900 km.

Main forces to Moscow

In mid-July 1941, Army Group Center rushed into the gap in Soviet defenses between the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers. Now the way to Moscow was open. Predictably for the German command, Headquarters placed its main forces in the Moscow direction. According to some reports, up to 40% of the Red Army personnel, the same amount of artillery and about 35% of the total number of aircraft and tanks were concentrated on the path of Army Group Center.

The tactics of the Soviet command remained the same: meet the enemy head-on, wear him down, and then launch a counter-offensive with all available forces. The main task - to hold Moscow at any cost - was completed, but most of the armies concentrated in the Moscow direction fell into the “cauldrons” near Vyazma and Bryansk. In two “cauldrons” there were 7 field army departments out of 15, 64 divisions out of 95, 11 tank regiments out of 13 and 50 artillery brigades out of 62.
The General Staff was aware of the possibility of an offensive by German troops in the south, but concentrated most of the reserves not in the direction of Stalingrad and the Caucasus, but near Moscow. This strategy led to the success of the German army in the Southern direction.

Introduction

From June 1941 to December 1941, the country was subjected to a barbaric attack by Nazi Germany and experienced a period of enormous difficulties and military failures.

Speaking about the most difficult first period of the war for the USSR, one cannot help but pay tribute to the courage and heroism of the Soviet soldier, who showed unprecedented examples of perseverance and indestructible moral spirit. We must also remember the commanders and political workers, the glorious galaxy of Soviet commanders and military leaders who managed to ensure a turning point in the further development of events.

In writing the abstract, I was helped by the works of many historians, including the works of A.D. Kolesnik, I. Mints, D.I. Romanov. and etc.

The indestructible moral and political unity of Soviet society predetermined the unity of the people and the army, unprecedented in history, the unprecedented scale and truly nationwide nature of the struggle against the aggressor. The main part of my essay consists of two paragraphs, which analyze the failures of the Red Army and the mobilization of the country's resources. The abstract uses page-by-page footnotes.

The chronological scope of the abstract is the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, June - December 1941.

The territorial scope of the abstract is the territories of Belarus, the Baltic states, Ukraine, bordering Germany, as well as the Urals and Siberia.

The abstract aims to examine the situation at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

Reasons for the temporary failures of the Red Army

In the first days of the war, the Red Army suffered heavy losses, especially in aviation. By June 1941, the Red Army Air Force consisted of 79 air divisions and 5 air brigades. The basis of the aircraft fleet was made up of aircraft of various designs, most of which had low flight speed and weak armament R-5, I-15, TB-3.

The new aircraft (MiG-3, Yak-1, LaGG-3, Pe-2, Il-2) were not inferior in combat capabilities to the aircraft of the Nazi army, and were superior to them in a number of indicators. The arrival of aircraft of new designs, developed in accordance with the assignments of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of 1939, to aviation units began only shortly before June 22, 1941. By this time, there were 2,739 of them, practically not yet mastered by either the flight or engineering staff of the Air Force.

The Luftwaffe at the beginning of the war consisted of:

30 bomber groups (1180 bombers);

13 fighter groups (771 fighters);

9 groups of dive bombers (336 aircraft);

10 fighter-bomber groups (408 aircraft);

1 group of attack aircraft (40 aircraft);

552 transport aircraft;

23 squadrons of long-range and 30 squadrons of short-range reconnaissance aircraft (721 aircraft);

14 squadrons of coastal aviation, 2 squadrons of ships and 2 squadrons of carrier aircraft (240 aircraft in total);

55 special purpose aircraft.

A total of 4303 aircraft, twice Goering's requirements for 1934. Romanov D.I. Air combat weapons. - M.: Military Affairs, 2000. - P.55.

On the first day of the war, fascist German aviation carried out surprise attacks on the airfields of the western border military districts, as a result of which we lost 1,200 aircraft on the ground and in the air. The Belarusian Military District alone lost 738 aircraft.

On the same day of the war, our pilots flew 6 thousand sorties and inflicted significant damage on advancing tank formations and aircraft. Over 200 enemy aircraft were shot down in air battles, but the superiority of forces remained on the enemy's side. Enemy aircraft seized air supremacy. This put the Soviet Ground Forces and Air Force in a difficult position and was one of the reasons for the temporary failures of the Red Army. The army was retreating, but while retreating, it was preparing reserves for world-famous attacks on the enemy, the first of which were near Tikhvin (11/10-12/30/1941) and near Moscow (12/5/1941-04/20/1942).

Despite the heroic resistance of Soviet soldiers, fascist German troops quickly advanced deep into our territory. Hitler and his military leaders rejoiced.

The first blow of 170 German divisions was taken by our border detachments and units of the Red Army located near the border. They fought off the onslaught of the fascist hordes with exceptional heroism. Hitler's army, which had hitherto fought against weak countries, encountered serious resistance for the first time. Already in the first days of the war, the best German divisions and aviation units were defeated. But our border troops, despite their steadfastness, were still unable to withstand the pressure of an enemy that was many times superior in numbers. The Germans invaded our country. They continued to throw new forces into battle and rush forward. History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. T. 2/ Ed. Pospelova P.N. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1961. - p. 42

Despite their heroism, Soviet troops were forced to retreat deeper into the country. They retreated fighting, defending every inch of their native land.

The withdrawal of our troops is explained by the fact that the war of Nazi Germany against the USSR began under favorable conditions for the German troops and under unfavorable conditions for the Red Army.

The lessons of history teach that aggressive nations interested in a new war, as nations preparing for war over a long period of time and accumulating forces for this, are usually - and should be - more prepared for war than peace-loving nations not interested in a new war.

This was especially true for aggressive Germany, which, before the attack on the USSR, waged war in Western Europe for two years. The troops of Germany, as a country waging war, were already completely mobilized and moved to our borders. And the troops of the USSR, as a peace-loving country, entirely engaged in peaceful construction, still needed to be mobilized and moved to the borders. This had to be done already during the period of hostilities. This required time, which the fascist army took advantage of.

Further, in Germany, as a country waging war, all industry had long been transferred to military production. In addition, it had at its disposal the entire industry of occupied Western Europe, which produced military equipment for the Nazi army. Therefore, in the first period of the war, Hitler’s troops had significantly more tanks and aircraft than the Red Army.

The reason for the failures of the first period of the war was not only that the war captured the country on the verge of rearmament of the Air Force, but also that almost all German pilots acquired combat experience in the war even before the attack on the USSR and had dozens of downed English and French aircraft in combat. and Polish planes. They mastered the aircraft technology used in war down to the smallest detail.

Our aviation personnel were trained in aviation academies, in 78 flight and 18 technical schools and colleges. Romanov D.I. Air combat weapons. - M.: Military Affairs, 2000. - P.56. The subject of study and development was mainly aircraft of the pre-war generation. New technology was studied for show.

The flight personnel upon graduating from the schools did not have sufficient skills in conducting air combat and the combat use of aircraft weapons in comparison with German pilots.

For our pilots, the pinnacle of combat use of weapons was shooting at aerial targets towed by an aircraft without maneuvering. In military units, maneuverable training air combat was practiced timidly and was mainly reduced to maneuverable piloting of aircraft in designated areas.

The experience of air combat in Spain, Mongolia and China was practically not introduced or disseminated with caution, since the reports of commanders and ordinary pilots who had learned the lessons of the war were kept classified as “secret” or “top secret”.

The total flying time of pilots, especially those who arrived in aviation units from military schools just before the war, was three to five times less than that of German pilots. The weapons system of the main fighter aircraft I-15, I-153 and I-16 did not match the combat effectiveness of actions against enemy air targets, despite the very high second salvo of machine-gun fire.

The pilots fired almost all the ammunition at the enemy bombers, but failed to shoot them down.

Our heroic pilots launched a ramming attack on the enemy when ammunition was used up or when weapons failed in battle. It was for these reasons that in the very first days of the war, massive ramming of enemy aircraft appeared.

Germany’s most important advantage was also that it was not alone in opposing the USSR. In alliance with her, Romania, Finland, Italy, and Hungary started the war. In addition, Germany was helped by fascist Spain, Bulgaria, and Japan. The Red Army had to fight alone against the united armies of the bloc of fascist states.

An important advantage of the German army was that it suddenly attacked our country. This allowed her to keep the initiative of military operations in her hands at first.

The advantage of Hitler's army was also that during two years of war in Western Europe it had accumulated experience in conducting large-scale combat operations in modern conditions, using new equipment. The Red Army had yet to gain such experience.

Finally, a well-known advantage was the fact that the Nazi troops managed to win a number of victories over the armies of European countries. True, in the war with Poland the Germans achieved success, having a threefold advantage in strength; In the war with France, the Germans were helped to win by traitors from among the French big bourgeoisie. But Hitler’s propagandists used these successes to hammer into the heads of German soldiers that supposedly no one could resist them. This is how the myth of the invincibility of the Nazi army was created.

Consequently, the successes of the fascist army were explained not by the fact that it was invincible, as the Nazis shouted everywhere, but by the fact that it had a number of temporary but important advantages.

These advantages are surprise and treachery of the attack, combat experience, etc. - are called temporary because they do not play a decisive role in the outcome of a long war. The outcome of the war depended not on temporary, but on permanent conditions. Such conditions that decide the fate of the war are the strength of the rear, the morale of the army, the number and quality of divisions, the armament of the army, and the organizational abilities of the commanding staff. Our people knew that the advantage in this was on the side of the Soviet Union, and did not lose heart when the Red Army was forced to retreat, leaving a number of areas.

On the contrary, in the face of these trials the Soviet people united even more closely.

As a result of the persistent resistance of the Red Army in the first four months of the war, Germany lost more than four and a half million people killed, wounded and captured.

Thus, during the first battles of 1941, the Red Army, despite temporary setbacks and implementing active defense tactics, dispelled the Nazis’ dreams of defeating the Soviet Union in a few weeks.

7. Ivan iy – the Terrible – the first Russian Tsar. Reforms during the reign of Ivan iy.

8. Oprichnina: its causes and consequences.

9. Time of Troubles in Russia at the beginning of the 19th century.

10. The fight against foreign invaders at the beginning of the 15th century. Minin and Pozharsky. The accession of the Romanov dynasty.

11. Peter I – Tsar-Reformer. Economic and government reforms of Peter I.

12. Foreign policy and military reforms of Peter I.

13. Empress Catherine II. The policy of “enlightened absolutism” in Russia.

1762-1796 The reign of Catherine II.

14. Socio-economic development of Russia in the second half of the xyiii century.

15. Internal policy of the government of Alexander I.

16. Russia in the first world conflict: wars as part of the anti-Napoleonic coalition. Patriotic War of 1812.

17. Decembrist movement: organizations, program documents. N. Muravyov. P. Pestel.

18. Domestic policy of Nicholas I.

4) Streamlining legislation (codification of laws).

5) The fight against liberation ideas.

19 . Russia and the Caucasus in the first half of the 19th century. Caucasian War. Muridism. Gazavat. Imamat of Shamil.

20. The Eastern question in Russian foreign policy in the first half of the 19th century. Crimean War.

22. The main bourgeois reforms of Alexander II and their significance.

23. Features of the internal policy of the Russian autocracy in the 80s - early 90s of the XIX century. Counter-reforms of Alexander III.

24. Nicholas II – the last Russian emperor. Russian Empire at the turn of the 19th – 20th centuries. Class structure. Social composition.

2. Proletariat.

25. The first bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia (1905-1907). Reasons, character, driving forces, results.

4. Subjective attribute (a) or (b):

26. P. A. Stolypin’s reforms and their impact on the further development of Russia

1. Destruction of the community “from above” and the withdrawal of peasants to farms and farms.

2. Assistance to peasants in acquiring land through a peasant bank.

3. Encouraging the resettlement of land-poor and landless peasants from Central Russia to the outskirts (to Siberia, the Far East, Altai).

27. The First World War: causes and character. Russia during the First World War

28. February bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1917 in Russia. Fall of the autocracy

1) Crisis of the “tops”:

2) Crisis of the “grassroots”:

3) The activity of the masses has increased.

29. Alternatives to the autumn of 1917. The Bolsheviks came to power in Russia.

30. Exit of Soviet Russia from the First World War. Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

31. Civil war and military intervention in Russia (1918-1920)

32. Socio-economic policy of the first Soviet government during the civil war. "War Communism".

7. Housing fees and many types of services have been cancelled.

33. Reasons for the transition to NEP. NEP: goals, objectives and main contradictions. Results of NEP.

35. Industrialization in the USSR. The main results of the country's industrial development in the 1930s.

36. Collectivization in the USSR and its consequences. The crisis of Stalin's agrarian policy.

37.Formation of a totalitarian system. Mass terror in the USSR (1934-1938). Political processes of the 1930s and their consequences for the country.

38. Foreign policy of the Soviet government in the 1930s.

39. USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War.

40. Attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union. Reasons for the temporary failures of the Red Army in the initial period of the war (summer-autumn 1941)

41. Achieving a fundamental turning point during the Great Patriotic War. The significance of the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk.

42. Creation of an anti-Hitler coalition. Opening of a second front during the Second World War.

43. Participation of the USSR in the defeat of militaristic Japan. End of the Second World War.

44. Results of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War. The price of victory. The meaning of the victory over fascist Germany and militaristic Japan.

45. The struggle for power within the highest echelon of the country's political leadership after the death of Stalin. N.S. Khrushchev's rise to power.

46. Political portrait of N.S. Khrushchev and his reforms.

47. L.I. Brezhnev. The conservatism of the Brezhnev leadership and the increase in negative processes in all spheres of life of Soviet society.

48. Characteristics of the socio-economic development of the USSR from the mid-60s to the mid-80s.

49. Perestroika in the USSR: its causes and consequences (1985-1991). Economic reforms of perestroika.

50. The policy of “glasnost” (1985-1991) and its influence on the emancipation of the spiritual life of society.

1. It was allowed to publish literary works that were not allowed to be published during the time of L. I. Brezhnev:

7. Article 6 “on the leading and guiding role of the CPSU” was removed from the Constitution. A multi-party system has emerged.

51. Foreign policy of the Soviet government in the second half of the 80s. “New political thinking” by M.S. Gorbachev: achievements, losses.

52. The collapse of the USSR: its causes and consequences. August putsch 1991 Creation of the CIS.

On December 21 in Almaty, 11 former Soviet republics supported the Belovezhskaya Agreement. On December 25, 1991, President Gorbachev resigned. The USSR ceased to exist.

53. Radical transformations in the economy in 1992-1994. Shock therapy and its consequences for the country.

54. B.N. Yeltsin. The problem of relationships between branches of government in 1992-1993. October events of 1993 and their consequences.

55. Adoption of the new Constitution of the Russian Federation and parliamentary elections (1993)

56. Chechen crisis in the 1990s.

40. Attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union. Reasons for the temporary failures of the Red Army in the initial period of the war (summer-autumn 1941)

World War II began on September 1, 1939 and ended on September 2, 1945. Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany (June 22, 1941 - May 9, 1945) - is an integral part of the Second World War. The Soviet-German front was the main front of the Second World War. On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany launched a treacherous attack on the Soviet Union. Romania, Finland, Italy, Hungary, and Slovakia sent their troops to the Soviet-German front against the USSR. In total, Germany's European allies fielded 37 divisions against the USSR. Hitler was actually supported by Bulgaria, Türkiye, and Japan, which formally remained neutral. According to other data from Soviet historians, the enemy outnumbered our troops in men by 1.8 times, in guns and mortars by 1.25 times, in tanks by 1.5 times, and in aircraft by 3.2 times.

All these figures need clarification. The Soviet divisions on the western border were not fully equipped. Many tank, motorized and aviation formations were in the stage of reorganization and formation. Many Soviet historians believe that the Red Army was not inferior to the aggressor in the amount of military equipment, but most of the tanks and aircraft were of outdated designs. There were 1,475 new types of tanks, KV and T-34, and 1,540 new types of combat aircraft. The signalmen were poorly equipped. German plan "Barbarossa" a lightning war (“blitzkrieg”) was envisaged in 4-8 weeks. It was necessary to destroy 50 million people from the Slavic peoples and create a “living space” for Germany.

The offensive of the German troops was carried out in three directions - Army Group North (to Leningrad), Center (to Moscow), and South (to Kyiv). In the first months of the war, under enemy attacks, the Red Army retreated. By December 1, 1941, according to various estimates, up to 7 million Soviet soldiers died. Almost all aircraft and tanks were lost. Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, right-bank Ukraine (with Kiev), and Moldova were occupied. The territory of the USSR occupied by the enemy in the first months of the war exceeded 1.5 million km 2 . Before the war, 74.5 million people lived there. In early September, fascist troops broke through to Lake Ladoga, cutting off Leningrad from land. The siege of Leningrad began, lasting 900 days. A major event in August-September 1941 was the Battle of Smolensk, during which formations of rocket-propelled mortars (Katyusha) began to operate. The enemy was temporarily stopped, which helped strengthen the defense of Moscow.

At the end of September, Soviet troops suffered a serious defeat near Kiev. By order of Headquarters, Soviet troops abandoned Kyiv. Five armies were surrounded, and more than half a million were captured.

Measures were taken to organize resistance to the enemy. Martial law and mobilization into the army were declared, and the slogan “Everything for the front, everything for victory” was put forward. The rear was rebuilt in a military manner. The State Defense Committee (GKO) was created, headed by Stalin, who, in addition to leading the party, became chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, People's Commissar of Defense, and Supreme Commander-in-Chief. A single information center has been created - Sovinformburo.

The main reasons for the temporary failures of the Red Armyduring the initial period of the war (summer-autumn 1941):

Stalin's gross miscalculations in determining the timing of the start of the war. Stalin ignored Soviet intelligence data and other information about the specific preparations and timing of the attack by Nazi Germany.

Miscalculations in anticipationdirection of the enemy's main attack. The Soviet leadership expected the main blow in the southwestern direction, towards Kyiv. In fact, the main blow was delivered by the Center group in the western direction, through Minsk - Smolensk to Moscow.

The armed forces of the USSR were not prepared for defense. The military doctrine focused on war on foreign territory and victory with “little bloodshed.” The enemy's forces were underestimated and the capabilities of our troops were overestimated. The border was poorly fortified.

The Red Army was drained of blood by repressions (1936-1939) against the command staff. In the pre-war years, more than 40 thousand major military leaders were repressed.

The rearmament of the Red Army was not completed. The production of the latest designs of tanks, aircraft, artillery, and small arms was just picking up pace.

The surprise of the German invasion was a consequence of political and military-strategic miscalculations of the Soviet leadership. Stalin, planning to delay the start of the war by one or two years, was afraid of provocations of war. Our troops were not brought into combat readiness in time and were taken by surprise.

Soviet aviation suffered heavy losses at its own airfields, which allowed the enemy to seize air supremacy.

1,200 aircraft were destroyed at the airfields. The logistical insecurity of border cover. The warehouses were located too close to the border. On the very first day of the war, most of the border warehouses were lost. From September 30, 1941 to the end of April 1942 it lasted. On October 19, a state of siege was introduced in Moscow. In November, the Germans approached Moscow by 30 km. Only at the end of the month, at the cost of enormous efforts and losses, the troops of the Western Front (commander G.K. Zhukov) managed to stop the German advance. The enemy, according to the Typhoon plan, was supposed to capture the capital of the USSR in order to hold a parade on Red Square on November 7. It was supposed to flood Moscow. December 5-6 began Red Army counteroffensive under the command of Zhukov. The enemy was driven back 100-250 km from Moscow. Thus, the myth of the invincibility of the Nazi army was dispelled and the Barbarossa plan, a plan for a lightning war, was thwarted.

Hitler's command underestimated Russia as an enemy. Underestimated the size of the armed forces; vast Russian spaces; poor condition of roads and upcoming difficulties in using railway tracks; there was a miscalculation when assessing the enemy’s ability to resist.

What are reasons for the defeat of the Germans near Moscow?

Hitler's generals and Western historians believe that the Russians were helped by the severe frosts of the continental winter. Domestic historians, on the contrary, focus on moral and political factors. The mud and frosts created equal inconveniences and gave equal gains to both sides. However, the Red Army was unable to maintain the initiative. In the spring and summer of 1942, the Soviet command, led by Stalin, again made major miscalculations, which led to huge losses in the Crimea, near Kharkov and in a number of other areas. The enemy moved to the Crimea, the Caucasus, and approached the Volga.

Military experts say one of the main reasons for the failures was the miscalculations of the country's military-political leadership in assessing the timing of Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. Despite the regular receipt of information from Soviet intelligence since mid-1940 about the preparation of Nazi Germany for an attack on the USSR, Stalin did not exclude the possibility that in 1941 war could be avoided and through various political maneuvers the start of it could be delayed until 1942. For fear of provoking a war, the Soviet troops were not given the task of bringing the border districts to full combat readiness, and the troops did not occupy the designated defensive lines and positions before the enemy attack began. As a result, the Soviet troops were actually in a peacetime position, which largely predetermined the unsuccessful outcome of the border battles of 1941.

Of the 57 divisions intended to cover the border, only 14 design divisions (25% of the allocated forces and assets) managed to occupy the designated defense areas, and then mainly on the flanks of the Soviet-German front. The construction of the defense was designed only to cover the border, and not to conduct a defensive operation in order to repel the offensive of superior enemy forces.

Before the war, the military-political leadership of the USSR did not sufficiently develop and master the forms and methods of strategic and operational defense. The methods of conducting operations in the initial period of the war were incorrectly assessed. There was no provision for the possibility of the enemy going on the offensive at once with all available pre-deployed groupings of troops simultaneously in all strategic directions.

Difficulties in preparing a theater of military operations (TVD) were created by the transfer of the border and the withdrawal of the bulk of the troops of the western military districts to the territory of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, the Baltic republics and Bessarabia. A significant part of the fortified areas on the old border was mothballed. There was a need for urgent construction of fortified areas on the new border, expansion of the airfield network and reconstruction of most airfields.

The possibility of conducting military operations on its territory was practically excluded. All this had a negative impact on the preparation of not only defense, but also in general theaters of military operations in the depths of its territory.

It also turned out to be a mistake to concentrate the main forces of the Soviet troops in the southwestern strategic direction at the beginning of the war, i.e. in Ukraine, while the fascist troops delivered the main blow in June 1941 in the western direction - in Belarus. The decision to bring supplies of material and technical resources closer to the border, which made them vulnerable at the outbreak of war, was also unjustified.

Not enough attention was paid to the mobilization preparation of industry. The mobilization plans developed for transferring the national economy to a war footing were designed for too long a period.

Before the war, a major organizational and technical reorganization of the Soviet Armed Forces began, which was planned to be completed before 1942. A radical restructuring of the system of operational, combat and political training of the armed forces began. And here major miscalculations were made. Excessively cumbersome formations and associations were created without taking into account the real possibilities of equipping them with modern weapons and staffing. The completion dates for the formation of most new compounds turned out to be unrealistic. As a result, by the beginning of the war, a significant part of them could not be formed, equipped with equipment and trained. This happened, for example, with new mechanized corps that were formed almost simultaneously, many of which turned out to be ineffective.
The Soviet troops were not fully equipped with command and rank-and-file personnel, as well as tanks, aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, automobiles, means of traction for artillery, fuel supply, equipment repair and engineering weapons.

The Red Army did not have sufficient quantities of such important technical equipment as radio, engineering equipment, cars, and special tractors for artillery.

Soviet troops were inferior to the enemy in the number of personnel and artillery, but outnumbered them in the number of tanks and aircraft. However, qualitative superiority was on the side of Germany. It was expressed in better technical equipment, higher coherence, training and staffing of troops. The enemy had tactical and technical superiority in the main aircraft fleet.

For the most part, Soviet tanks were no worse, and the new ones (T34, KB) were better than German ones, but the main tank fleet was badly worn out.
On the eve of the war, enormous damage was done to the personnel of the Soviet armed forces and intelligence: almost 40 thousand of the most qualified commanders and political workers were subjected to massive repression. The majority of commanders of military districts, fleets, armies, commanders of corps, divisions, regiments, members of military councils, and other party and political workers were arrested and destroyed. Instead, military personnel who did not have the necessary practical experience were hastily promoted to leadership positions.
(Military encyclopedia. Military publishing house. Moscow, in 8 volumes. 2004)

In the management system of the Armed Forces, there were continuous changes in leadership in the central apparatus and military districts. Thus, in the five pre-war years, four chiefs of the General Staff were replaced. In the year and a half before the war (1940-1941), the heads of the air defense department were replaced five times (every 3-4 months on average); from 1936 to 1940, five heads of the intelligence department, etc., were replaced. Therefore, most officials did not have time to master their duties related to the implementation of a wide range of complex tasks before the war.

By this period, the command staff of the German army had acquired the necessary practical skills in command and control, in organizing and conducting large offensive operations, and in using all types of military equipment and weapons on the battlefields. The German soldier had combat training. As the events of the first weeks of the war showed, the presence of combat experience in the German army played an important role in the first successes of the fascist troops on the Soviet-German front.

As a result of the defeat suffered by the European states in the first period of World War II, the economic and military resources of almost all of Western Europe were in the hands of fascist Germany, which significantly strengthened its military-economic potential.

The material was prepared based on information from open sources.

Alarming messages about an impending German attack came from everywhere:

In March 1941, intelligence officer Richard Sorge (who worked as a German journalist in Japan) reported on the possible timing of the attack.

Radiograms from Soviet ships from foreign ports.

Pro-Soviet citizens of Poland, Hungary, and Romania reported.

Information from diplomats and ambassadors.

Messages from border districts.

From other scouts.

But Stalin ignored these messages, because he feared provocations from England, sought to maintain an alliance with Hitler, and believed that Germany would not fight the USSR on 2 fronts and would first defeat England. June 14, 1941 - a special TASS message appeared, saying that all rumors about the war with Germany are lies. The troops were not put on combat readiness, although Zhukov, who was appointed chief of the General Staff in January 1941, insisted on this.

The Great Patriotic War began June 22, 1941 year at 4 o'clock in the morning. The German attack was sudden. This provided advantages. German aviation dominated the air - bombing strikes were carried out to a depth of 400 kilometers, 60 airfields were bombed, and 1,200 aircraft were destroyed on the first day (800 on the ground). The Soviet command did not have a clear idea of the scale of the invasion, and conflicting directives were issued.

The Germans developed their offensive in accordance with the Barbarossa plan in three directions:

Army Group North was advancing on the Baltic states and Leningrad - by July 10 it had advanced 500 kilometers.

Army Group Center was advancing on Moscow and advanced 600 kilometers.

Army Group "South" - to Kyiv, advanced 300 kilometers.

Our army suffered huge losses, the loss ratio was 1:8, about 3 million were captured, out of 170 divisions, 28 were completely destroyed, 70 lost up to half of their strength. The situation was catastrophic. But everywhere the Germans met desperate resistance. The border outposts were the first to take the enemy's blow - the outpost of Lieutenant Lopatin fought for 11 days, the Brest Fortress for 1 month, rams in the air, an oncoming tank battle near Rovno.

When the situation became clear, it was accepted strategic defense plan.

Major defensive battles took place in all three directions:

June - August - defense of Tallinn - the main base of the Baltic Fleet.

Mogilev defended itself for 23 days.

July 10 - September 10 - defense of Smolensk (September 5, near the city of Yelnya, Zhukov managed to organize a counter-offensive, the Soviet Guard was born).

Kyiv defended itself for 2 months.

Odessa defended itself for 73 days.

250 days - defense of Sevastopol (German losses were greater than during the capture of Europe).

Thus, despite huge losses, the Red Army is fighting stubborn defensive battles. Hitler concentrates his main forces in the central direction.

Urgent measures are being taken to organize resistance to the enemy:

1. General military mobilization of men born in 1905 - 1918 was announced. This allowed 5.5 million people to be drafted into the army by July 1.

2. Martial law was introduced in the western regions of the country.

3. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was formed (Stalin, Voroshilov, Budyonny, Shaposhnikov, Timoshenko, Zhukov).

4. June 24 - a special evacuation council was created (headed by Shvernik, 1.5 thousand enterprises and 10 million people were evacuated in 6 months).

5. On August 8, Stalin was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief and People's Commissar of Defense (+ since May 5 headed the government + head of the party).

6. The State Defense Committee was created to guide the activities of all government departments and institutions in war conditions.

7. Militia units are formed.

8. A mobilization economic plan for the 4th quarter of 1941 was approved, according to which:

Enterprises were transferred to the production of military products.

Enterprises from threatening areas were evacuated to the east, to the Urals and Central Asia.

The population was involved in the construction of defensive lines.

An 11-hour working day was introduced, vacations were canceled, and mandatory overtime was introduced.

9. A call by the country's leadership to develop various forms of socialist competition, to raise funds for the defense fund, and to donate.

The war becomes domestic, the enthusiasm of the people in organizing resistance to the enemy is clearly manifested: participation in the construction of defensive structures, joining fighter battalions to fight saboteurs, joining the people's militia, volunteering in the ranks of the Red Army, duty in aid of air defense, collecting funds and things for the defense fund .

Results of the initial period of the war:

Loss of a huge territory (the Baltic states, part of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, a number of regions of Russia).

Huge casualties in the army and among the civilian population.

Economic problems - loss of areas with large enterprises in various industries and agricultural production, the process of evacuation of enterprises.

Urgent measures are being taken to organize resistance to the enemy.

The mood of the German soldiers changed (the war in Russia is not a stroll through Europe).

Reasons for failures in the initial period of the war:

1. The surprise of the attack for the army, which was not in full combat readiness, and for the population, who were confident that there would be no war with Germany in the near future.

2. The superiority of the German army (in numbers, in technology, in combat experience, in the quality of officer personnel, there were plans, allies, huge economic potential was involved, intelligence work).

3. Miscalculations of the high command and Stalin personally:

The timing of the attack was incorrectly determined,

Intelligence data and reports about the possible outbreak of war were ignored,

Flawed military doctrine

The direction of the main strike is incorrectly determined.

4. Low professional level of officers (due to repression).

5. The incompleteness of the process of reorganizing the army and rearmament of the army, the construction of defensive fortifications on the western borders.

6. The need to maintain large armed forces in the Far East (against Japan), in the south (against Turkey and Iran), in the northwest (against Finland) and in the Gulag (to guard prisoners).

Thus, in the initial period the war turned out extremely unsuccessfully for the USSR, it is difficult to turn the situation around, but everything possible is being done to achieve this.