A day before the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union, on June 21, the Soviet leadership decided to create military front-line associations on the basis of the western border districts. According to this decision, on the very first day of the war, the Baltic, Western and Kiev special military districts were transformed, respectively, into the Northwestern, Western and Southwestern Front. On June 24, the Leningrad Military District was transformed into the Northern Front, and on June 25, the Southern Front was created, uniting part of the forces of the Southwestern Front and the 9th Army, allocated from the Odessa Military District. At the same time, a reserve of the High Command was created - the army of the second line of defense under unified leadership.
On the day of the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR, June 22, a decision was made on martial law, according to which in the regions of the country where it was declared, all functions of state power in relation to defense, ensuring public order and state security were transferred to military authorities. On the same day, a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was published on the mobilization of those liable for military service born in 1905-1918 in the territory of all military districts, except for Central Asian, Transbaikal and Far Eastern. The first day of mobilization was announced as June 23, which made it possible to immediately provide the necessary reinforcements to those divisions that were short-staffed and bring their numbers to wartime levels, and also made it possible to begin the formation of new military formations necessary to strengthen the active army.
The threatening situation in the first days of the war required the creation of a special governing military body, sufficiently centralized and flexible to successfully carry out strategic leadership of military operations. The Headquarters of the High Command, formed on June 23 under the chairmanship of People's Commissar of Defense S.K., became such an emergency body of the highest military command. Tymoshenko. Headquarters was entrusted not only with strategic leadership of the troops' actions, but also with the development of ideas and plans for the most important operations, and the organization of further deployment and improvement of the army and navy in the conditions of the outbreak of war.
One of the largest measures in the centralization of political, state and military leadership, due to wartime requirements, was the creation of another emergency governing body of the country - the State Defense Committee (GKO), chaired by I.V. Stalin. This body was formed in view of the current state of emergency - in order to mobilize the forces of all the peoples of the USSR to repel the enemy and rebuild the entire economy of the country on a war footing.
All power in the state was concentrated in the hands of the State Defense Committee, and all state bodies, all citizens were obliged to unquestioningly carry out all its decisions and orders. The entire party and Soviet leadership in the state was entrusted to the State Defense Committee; all power for the wartime period was concentrated in its hands; its decisions had the force of law. To quickly resolve a number of issues, and above all issues related to the organization and development of military production, a special institute of authorized State Defense Committees was established.
The formation of the State Defense Committee contributed to the necessary centralization in the leadership of the country and made it possible to quickly achieve the most complete mobilization of the state's material and human resources and their use in wartime conditions in order to defeat the enemy. On July 10, 1941, to bring strategic leadership closer to the troops of the active army, their main commands were created in three strategic directions of the Soviet-German front - northwestern (commander-in-chief Marshal K.E. Voroshilov), western (Marshal S.K. Timoshenko), south -western (Marshal S.M. Budyonny). At the same time, some changes occurred in the composition of the Headquarters, which from July 10 began to be called the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The Chairman of the Headquarters became I.V. Stalin, who on July 19 was appointed People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, and from August 8 at the same time the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. At the same time, specific measures were taken to rebuild the national economy on a war footing, which were reflected in mobilization and national economic plans.
On June 23, 1941, a mobilization plan for the production of ammunition was introduced, and the USSR State Planning Committee was instructed to prepare a general mobilization national economic plan for the third quarter of 1941, the foundations of which were developed even before the war. From June 24, a special schedule was introduced on the country's railways, ensuring priority and speedy advancement of military echelons. Passenger transportation was reduced as much as possible. On June 25, a decision was made to increase the production of medium and heavy tanks, and on June 27, a decision was made to accelerate the construction of new aircraft factories. On June 30, the Politburo of the Party Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR approved the draft "General mobilization national economic plan for the third quarter of 1941" presented by the State Planning Committee, which covered all spheres of the national economy. The plan provided for an increase in military production by 20% compared to the pre-war level. Plants and factories that produced civilian products before the war switched to the production of military equipment, weapons, ammunition, fuel for tanks and aircraft, special fabrics for parachutes, uniforms, equipment and other military supplies. Available food resources were directed primarily to supply the army and the population employed in the military industry. Maximum funds were allocated for military-industrial construction.
In order to quickly mobilize all the country's forces for the needs of the front, the work of the state apparatus was restructured. With the formation of the State Defense Committee, all issues of restructuring the national economy on a war footing passed into his hands. The rights of people's commissars in wartime were significantly expanded. New people's commissariats are being created - for the tank industry, mortar weapons, as well as new committees and departments.
In the development of military production, the centralized redistribution of the country's labor resources was important. Due to the mobilization of 5.3 million people into the Red Army by July 1, as well as due to the occupation of part of Soviet territories by the enemy, the number of workers and employees in the national economy of the USSR decreased noticeably. In order to provide workers for the military industry, already in June 1941, the Committee for the Distribution of Labor was formed, which attracted workers from the light and food industries, public utilities, and administrative apparatus to the military industry and related industries. Urban and rural populations were mobilized to work in factories, transport, and construction sites. The working day was increased, regular and additional vacations were cancelled, and mandatory overtime was introduced.
To guide the evacuation, an Evacuation Council was created, and on June 27, 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR issued a resolution listing the material assets to be exported in the first place. On July 4, the State Defense Committee issued a directive on economic policy issues in conditions of the forced evacuation of productive forces, which instructed a special commission to develop a new plan for the comprehensive development of military production, bearing in mind the use of resources and enterprises that existed on the Volga, Western Siberia and the Urals, and as well as resources and enterprises transported to the specified areas in order of evacuation. All these measures, carried out in the first days of the war, became a vital component of the general program of the Soviet leadership to transform the country into a single military camp and to organize a nationwide resistance to the Nazi invaders.
On the eve of the First World War, free cash was accumulated in the amount of 650 million rubles. The gold reserves in the State Bank were estimated at 1,500 million rubles.
The plans for waging the First World War, developed by the general staffs of each of the participating countries, were based on its short duration.
But the war became protracted and forced the warring parties to transfer the economy to a war footing.
Until the spring of 1915, the Russian government did not take serious measures to transfer the economy to a military footing. It was only in August 1915 that the so-called Special Conferences on Defense, Food, Fuel and Transportation were formed, which were headed by the relevant ministers.
These measures gave organization to the process of economic mobilization and strengthened state influence in this area, which made it possible to sharply increase the production of weapons. In particular, the production of rifles for 1914-1916. increased by 11 times, artillery weapons - by 10, ammunition - by 8.5 times.
In general, the war years were distinguished by the intensive development of weapons and military equipment, both in quantity and quality. The firepower of the infantry increased by 2.5-3 times during the war. The number of machine guns increased in the French army by 20 times, the German army by 9, and the Russian army by 6.
The number of light artillery guns increased by 2.3 times, and heavy artillery by more than 6 times. For the first time, such means of destruction as aircraft, submarines, tanks, and toxic substances were used.
If at the beginning of the war in Western European armies there were 400 rubles worth of weapons and property per serviceman, then by the end of the war there were 2000 rubles worth of weapons and equipment. The dynamics of war costs is of interest.
In 1918, one day of war cost Germany 73 million rubles, in 1914 18 million rubles; France - 60 and 18 million rubles, respectively; England 78.5 and 17.5 million rubles. For Russia, one day of war was estimated in 1917 at 55.6 million rubles, in 1914 - 16.3 million rubles.
In World War I, the Entente countries mobilized 10.3% of the population, including Russia - 8.7%. To satisfy the military needs that have increased tenfold and the intensity of military-economic processes, it was necessary to transform the entire system of economic relations and strengthen their state regulation. As a result, a fundamentally new method of economic support for war was created: a complex of specialized industries producing weapons and military equipment was formed in the economy, economic mobilization and consolidation of the phases of the military-economic process were carried out.
In the second half of the 30s of the twentieth century, the threat of world war grew in Europe. The fascist states of Germany and Italy united in 1937 with militaristic Japan into a military-political bloc and launched active preparations for the redivision of the world. The policies of this aggressive bloc created a threat to all of humanity.
In an environment of growing military threat in the Soviet Union, measures were taken to strengthen the army and navy, increase the vigilance and consciousness of people. The country was preparing for war.
On the eve and with the beginning of the Second World War, various measures were taken in connection with the upcoming events in the republics of the Soviet Union. Much attention was paid to organizing labor and improving labor discipline in production. On December 8, 1938, a resolution was adopted “On measures to streamline labor discipline, improve state social insurance and combat abuses in this matter.” The working day increased from seven to eight hours, they switched to a seven-day working week, a ban on unauthorized leaving from institutions and enterprises was introduced, and liability for the production of substandard products was increased.
Preventive measures were taken to provide the front with the necessary materials in the event of the loss of the country's industrial regions. Many important industrial facilities in Kazakhstan came into operation in the late 30s and early 40s of the twentieth century.
In November 1938, a large copper industry enterprise, the Balkhash Copper Smelter, came into operation. The reconstruction of the Irtysh copper smelter has been completed. An enrichment plant at the Leninogorsk plant was built. The Shymkent lead plant has become the largest enterprise. It accounted for almost 2/3 of the lead smelted in the USSR. In 1940, in the Karaganda coal basin there were 22 mechanical mines and one coal mine, equipped with cutting machines and conveyors. In terms of growth rates, level of mechanization and labor productivity, the basin occupied one of the first places in the coal industry of the USSR.
The operating oil fields of Kulsary, Sagiz, and Dzhaksimai came into operation. There were 9 fields and 854 wells at Emba. Kazakhstan is becoming a significant oil region of the country. It took third place in oil production after the RSFSR and Azerbaijan.
Dozens of light industry enterprises came into operation. At the same time, this industry did not yet meet the needs of the population, and up to 80 percent of garments and leather shoes were imported from other regions of the Soviet Union.
The upcoming war made it extremely important to increase the construction of railways in Kazakhstan. In 1938, the following railways were built: Zharyk - Dzhezkazgan, Rubtsovka - Ridder, in 1939 Karaganda-Balkhash, Guryev-Kandagach, Uralsk-Iletsk, and just before the war Kandagach-Orsk. In 8.5 months, the 806-kilometer Akmolinsk-Kartaly highway was laid. It crossed the vast territory of the Karaganda, North Kazakhstan, and Kustanai regions and connected the industrial areas of Central Kazakhstan with the south of the Urals. During 1938-1940, about 2,681 kilometers of railways were built in Kazakhstan. The construction of these roads was of enormous economic and defense importance.
Before the war, the Soviet government decided to expand the acreage in Kazakhstan. The adopted resolution of April 20, 1940 “On the further development of grain farming on collective and state farms in the eastern regions of the USSR” set the task of increasing the area of arable land by the end of 1942 by 4,345 thousand hectares through the development of virgin and fallow lands. In the northeastern regions of Kazakhstan (Akmola, Pavlodar, North Kazakhstan, Kustanai, Semipalatinsk and East Kazakhstan) by this time it was planned to develop more than 1 million hectares of land.
The outbreak of the war posed problems associated with restructuring the economy on a war footing. Perestroika was carried out in the following directions: 1) transfer of industry to the production of military products, 2) increasing the capacity of existing enterprises, 3) cessation of production of a number of important types of products (consumer products, fertilizers, etc.), in order to save raw materials, metals, capacity and workforce to increase military production), 4) changing the range of products of the light and food industry to meet the needs of the war, 5) redistributing raw materials and supplies in favor of the military industry, further centralizing distribution and normalized consumption of metal, fuel, electricity and other types of raw materials and metal, 6) introduction of the universal flow method in production, 7) deployment of new capital construction in the ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, fuel and energy industries, 8) improvement of production organization technology, development of new types of defense products, acceleration of technical progress, 9) securing workers in the military industry throughout the war, introducing mandatory overtime hours at enterprises, mass training of workers, 10) introducing rationed supplies of food and industrial goods to the population. In other words, the system of organization and economic activities covered the sphere of material production, capital construction and material and living support for workers during the war years. These directions were taken into account and necessarily carried out throughout the entire territory of the Soviet Union and in Kazakhstan as well. The country's economy was transferred to a war footing: civilian expenses were reduced to a minimum, many enterprises switched to producing defense products, labor, raw materials, and machine equipment were redistributed in favor of such enterprises.
By December 1941, Belarus, almost all of Ukraine, the Baltic states, and a number of western regions of the RSFSR were occupied by the Nazis. The enemy stood at the walls of Leningrad and Moscow. The economic damage was noticeable. The country's gross output in November 1942 decreased by 2.3 times compared to June of the same year. The mines of the Donetsk and Moscow Region coal basins and the metallurgical plants of the south went out of order. Only a third of the blast furnaces and a little more than half of the open-hearth furnaces were in operation. The production of cast iron decreased to one third, steel - to 42.5 percent, ball bearings - by 21 times. The number of workers and employees throughout the country in November 1941 was only 19.8 million people, or 63 percent of the 1940 level. Due to a shortage of labor, the production of aircraft, tanks, guns, and ammunition decreased. The end of 1941 was the most difficult year in the country's economy.
An integral part of the restructuring of the national economy on a war footing was the reception and placement of evacuated enterprises. The forced evacuation of people, production potential and cultural values from the front line brought many difficulties. In Kazakhstan in 1941-1942, 532.5 thousand residents of the western regions found shelter, work, and their place in the ranks of home front workers. 220 factories, factories, workshops, artels and industrial plants also arrived here and were put into operation. The largest number of enterprises accounted for the food, light and textile industries.
When relocating industrial facilities, many factors were taken into account: the specialization of the region, the capacity of the industrial base, the availability of labor, the qualifications of workers, the nature of scientific institutions, transport connections, the availability of a fuel base, smelting facilities for ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, the nature of mechanical engineering.
The location of new enterprises was carried out in a planned manner - close to sources of raw materials, in areas where there were human and material resources related to the profile of the enterprise. Thus, the oil equipment plant was relocated to Guryev, and the mining equipment plant to Karaganda. The Aktobe Ferroalloy Plant, the construction of which began before the war, received equipment from the Zaporozhye Ferroalloy Plant. The equipment of the non-ferrous metallurgy plant from Ordzhonikidze was relocated to the lead-zinc plant under construction in Ust-Kamenogorsk. In the Karaganda region, even before the war, construction of a cement plant was underway. Equipment from the Novo-Podolsk plant was evacuated there. The unfinished construction of the Alma-Ata Automobile Repair Plant became the base of the Voroshilovograd Heavy Engineering Plant.
However, the relocation process cannot be considered painless. The placement and commissioning of existing evacuated enterprises took place under extremely difficult conditions. The dismantling and relocation of plants and factories was mostly carried out under the bombing of enemy aircraft. Along the route, the evacuated enterprises encountered various obstacles. Huge traffic jams formed at major junction stations. Frequently, wagons with equipment were lost along the way, and precious time was spent searching for them. Enterprises were not always able to operate at full capacity. There were not enough workers and raw materials. For example, the Alma-Ata tobacco factory was constantly in need of sleeves and wrapping paper. The work of the Alma-Ata fruit canning plant was limited to tin, glass jars, and barrel staves. The republic's clothing industry used 66 percent of its installed capacity, as there were not enough workers and cotton industry products.
The restructuring of agriculture on a war footing took place under difficult conditions. Immediately before the 1941 harvest, most of the machine operator personnel went to the front. During the year and a half of the war, the rural population decreased by more than half a million people. There has been a change in the very composition of the rural population. The number of men aged 16 to 49 years in the rural population has decreased by more than half, while the proportion of women has increased.
The war caused the diversion of some funds and forces to the needs of the country's defense. During the first period of the war alone, the total capacity of the machine and tractor fleet in the republic's agriculture decreased by 20 percent. Of the 14 thousand trucks employed in the republic’s agriculture, over 7.5 thousand were mobilized for the needs of the front. The ability of industry to provide agricultural machinery with spare parts was largely limited.
In the pre-war years, horse-drawn agricultural implements gradually went out of circulation. The wartime reduction in tractors raised the issue of horse equipment. The simplest agricultural machine has now become a factor influencing the development of agricultural production.
The issue of developing agriculture in war conditions came up on the agenda. At various meetings and sessions, the progress of wintering livestock, preparation for spring sowing, the results of sowing, caring for crops and preparation for harvesting were discussed.
The Kazakh SSR, which during the war was second only to the RSFSR in the number of livestock, became the largest livestock breeding base in the country. During the war, it was recommended to widely introduce transhumance livestock farming. The practice of year-round transhumance and pasture keeping of livestock was approved. With the outbreak of the war, the reduction of labor force, livestock breeders, in the presence of minimal opportunities for the preparation of roughage and succulent feed, the introduction of transhumance livestock farming into practice was absolutely necessary.
In the early years of the war, the introduction of this livestock farming system overcame great difficulties. There was unsettled housing and shortages in supplies. However, the 100,000-strong army of livestock farmers, mostly women and youth, endured wartime hardships.
In the fall of 1941, a movement of home front workers began throughout the country to provide soldiers with warm clothes. The instigators of this movement were collective farmers and collective farmers of the Alma-Ata rural district of the region of the same name. The call found a response among the population of the republic. Residents devoted their leisure time to knitting woolen sweaters, socks and gloves, sewing linen and uniforms. It is important to note that collection points were organized in all cities, districts, towns, and collective farms to collect warm clothes. In 1941-1942, Kazakhstanis collected and sent over 1.5 million warm clothes to the front.
The transfer of industrial enterprises from a peaceful profile to the production of military products took mainly 3-4 months.
During the war years, the rights and responsibility of the People's Commissariats and their leaders for the state of affairs in industries were expanded. The number of meetings was reduced, efficiency and efficiency increased. At the same time, the practice of the cult of personality and the deformation of internal party life contributed to a slide towards the path of excessive administration. The vicious practice of past years in creating unconstitutional emergency bodies has had an impact. So, for example, in the areas of the Semipalatinsk and Akmola regions, troikas and emergency commissions were created to manage sowing, fight fires, accommodate the evacuated population, etc. Party committees of Akmola, East Kazakhstan, Karaganda, Pavlodar regions in the first period of the war used methods of intimidation of communists and rude administration.
There have been changes in the content of the activities of Councils at all levels. First of all, changes were made to the organizational structure of management bodies. Under the Council of People's Commissars of the Kazakh SSR, bureaus for the distribution of labor, departments for the economic organization of the evacuated population (in some areas they were called Extraordinary Commissions), state support and household organization of military families, departments for military orders and installation of evacuated people were organized in the regions. equipment. In 1944, departments for state benefits for large and single mothers were created under the executive committees of district, city and regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies.
During the war, the executive and administrative function of the Soviets intensified. The adoption of mandatory decisions and orders on the mobilization of the unemployed able-bodied population and the introduction of horse-drawn conscription was widely practiced. The population of cities was involved in the work of cleaning airfields and removing fuel from production sites. The activities of the Soviets during the war were characterized by unity of command, centralization of power, high organization, accuracy and efficiency.
The administrative and legislative functions of the Soviets increased and the cultural and educational functions weakened. The strengthening of the administrative and operational functions of the Soviets, generated by the conditions of war, sometimes ceased to be mere administration.
In general, the restructuring of the national economy on a military basis allowed home front workers to direct all their efforts to strengthening their defense capability. During the war, this was expressed not only in the production of military products, but also other products that could play a decisive role in providing the front with everything necessary. The tireless work of people in production, collective farmers and workers in other fields during the war years can, without embellishment, be called a labor feat.
The restructuring of the country took place in the most difficult conditions. It was necessary to redistribute material, financial and labor resources to the needs of the front, to sharply increase the output of military products and reduce the output of civilian products, to relocate production, and quickly put them into operation in rear areas. All this had to be done not only in an extremely short time, but also in conditions when the territory in which about 40% of the population of the Soviet Union lived in pre-war times, 63% of coal was mined, 58% of steel, 38% of grain was produced , there was a powerful machine-building base, including many defense enterprises. Rolled ferrous metals decreased in the country during the six months of the war by 3.1 times, non-ferrous metals by 430 times, and the production of ball bearings by 21 times. It was necessary to continue the war, in fact, with an economic potential equal to the potential of the country in the early 30s (i.e., before the industrial leap).
Features of the development of the military economy:
Along with With the strengthening of centralization in economic management, the rights of people's commissars and enterprise managers expanded, although not immediately. The administrative staff was reduced, the volume of office work decreased. Among the people who had to lead and organize this work were the head of the rear department of the Red Army A.V. Khrulev, the chairman of the State Planning Committee N.A. Voznesensky, people's commissars B.L. Vannikov, V.V. Vakhrushev, A.I. Efremov, G. D. Malyshev, I. F. Tevosyan, A. I. Shakhurin, D. F. Ustinov and others.
-tightening discipline and working conditions:
Already on June 26, mandatory overtime work was introduced in the country for workers and employees, the working day for adults increased to 11 hours with a six-day work week, and vacations were cancelled. This made it possible to increase the load on production capacity by approximately 1/3 without increasing the number of workers and employees. At the end of July 1941, the executive bodies of the union and autonomous republics, territories and regions were given the right to transfer workers to another job without their consent. All this made it possible to quickly redistribute labor in the interests of military production. However, the labor shortage was growing. The Soviet government and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks are taking a number of emergency measures to provide sectors of the national economy with workers. A certain part of qualified engineers, designers and workers employed at defense industry enterprises were provided with reservations. Office workers, housewives, and students were involved in production. In December 1941, all military production workers were declared mobilized and assigned to work at these enterprises. Sanctions for violators of labor discipline have been tightened. Unauthorized departure from enterprises was punishable by a prison term of 5 to 8 years. In 1942, labor mobilization of the entire urban and rural population over 14 years of age was introduced.
On collective farms, the mandatory minimum of workdays was increased compared to the pre-war period, and significantly - by 1.5 times. A minimum of workdays was also established for adolescents starting at the age of 12. Collective farmers and members of their families who did not work the mandatory minimum workdays were put on trial. True evidence of the troubles and dedication of the Russian village during the war years are the books by F. Abramov “Brothers and Sisters”, V. Tendryakov “Three Bags of Weedy Wheat”.
The ongoing enemy offensive forced the mass evacuation industrial and human resources to the east. On June 24, 1941, a special " Evacuation Council chaired by N. M. Shvernik. In its work, the Council relied on special commissioners. More than 10 million people were evacuated to the east from the western regions, and equipment from a number of the largest factories in Ukraine was relocated. In total, in the first six months of the war, over 1.5 thousand industrial enterprises were evacuated and put into operation. As a rule, the unloading of equipment, its installation, commissioning, and commissioning were carried out in an extremely short time. They started work without finishing the construction of buildings and communications. For the first time in world history, an entire industrial power was moved across vast spaces.
Despite harsh measures and dedicated work, it was impossible to make up for the huge losses of cropland and livestock. In 1942, the country received more than three times less grain than in 1940 d. But this made it possible, although not at a very high level, to provide the army and population with food. The main food supply during the war years was the regions of the Volga region, Siberia, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia.
Conclusions:
By the end of 1942 - beginning of 1943 The restructuring of the economy on a war footing has been completed( The lost capacity of the military industry was not only restored, but also surpassed, which made it possible to eliminate the superiority of Nazi Germany in the production of main types of weapons and their quality). Since 1943, a general rise in production began. During the war years, Soviet industry produced 103 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, 112 thousand aircraft, 482 thousand guns, German industry produced 46, 90 and 320 thousand, respectively.
1944-the first half of 1945 was the time when the output of military products and the level of organization of military production reached their highest point.
(3) The people rise up to fight the aggressor at the front and in the rear (“the people’s, patriotic nature of the war”)
Most of our people who lived outside the war zone did not immediately realize the bitter truth about the situation at the fronts. The meager official reports did not provide a complete picture of events. Only in Stalin’s radio address to the people did people feel the real impending danger. Only the people themselves, with their perseverance, dedication, genuine love for the Motherland, and willingness to give their lives for the sake of its well-being, could save the Fatherland. People tried to give all their strength to achieve victory over the aggressor.
1) Along the entire front, millions of people, mostly women, along with military units are often under artillery fire and bombing they dug trenches, anti-tank ditches, built firing points, forest rubble, dugouts, and wire fences.
2) In the front-line areas they formed fighter battalions and groups to combat saboteurs and paratroopers. Tens of thousands of volunteers in various cities They carried out air surveillance service and were on duty on the roofs of enterprises and houses.
3) A genuine mass movement, which became a manifestation of patriotism, was creation of people's militia in the RSFSR, Ukraine, Transcaucasia, Belarus. Work teams were formed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova. About 2 million people joined these volunteer formations. There were not enough weapons for everyone; many were refused because they were needed at defense enterprises. Poorly armed, sometimes with only melee weapons, the militia went into battle, almost certain death, but delayed the enemy’s advance for hours and days. Young people showed the most active desire to defend the country. Many young men and women who had not reached conscription age came to military registration and enlistment offices and assembly points, demanding to be sent to the front. Among them were the children of those who were hit by the repressive machine of Stalinism. So, these days, the daughter of the repressed Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, who became a national heroine, decided to ask to go to the front.
4) Throughout the country collected funds for the defense fund. Individual citizens, labor collectives, and public organizations contributed money, valuables, things, and food.
5) Active participation in this The movement was accepted by the Russian Orthodox Church, religious associations of Armenia, Georgia, Muslim communities of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Central Asia ii. Believers of various faiths and the majority of the people of our country, forgetting the insults and persecution of the authorities, rushed to the front. Archbishop of the Russian Orthodox Church Luke (professor of medicine in the world, the greatest surgeon V.F. Voino-Yasenetsky), who was in exile, asked to be sent to a front-line hospital. During the years of the war, he saved the lives of thousands of soldiers and commanders. Thousands of people, especially women, became donors and went to work in hospitals.
6) In the rear areas of the country the network of many Gulag camps was maintained. With the outbreak of the war, the Gulag industry acquired special importance: various types of minerals necessary for military production were mined only in the Gulag mines. The tragic existence of millions of people, the high mortality rate from exhaustion - and the hardest pain that the country so needed. Gulag prisoners were eager to go to the front, but they were still kept behind bars. barbed wire. Significant forces of the NKVD troops were diverted to guard them; young, healthy men, instead of the front, found themselves deep in the rear, guarding their own suffering compatriots. And during these months, Stalin sent messages to W. Churchill, demanding the sending of British divisions to fight the Germans on the Soviet-German front.
7)deployment of the partisan movement and underground work ( for example, in Krasnodon, the youth underground group “Young Guard” was executed (see section. In the occupied territories)
8) labor feat of the people:
Worked in production mostly women and children The same situation existed in agriculture. The village was depopulated. Most of the men went to the front. They were replaced by women, teenagers, and old people. In MTS, the number of female tractor drivers and combine operators in 1942 was more than 40%. There were women's tractor teams that worked in the fields 22 hours a day during sowing. Peasant women fed the country.
Formed youth brigades, who fought for the title of front-line soldiers. By the end of 1942, there were more than 10 thousand such brigades. To receive this title, it was necessary to complete tasks for at least 150% for two months with high quality products, good maintenance of the workplace, and high labor discipline.
Many industries have developed movement of speedsters. Workers who fulfilled two standards began to fulfill three standards and mastered related specialties.
In just 18 days in 1943, a formidable 152-mm howitzer was designed, and its mass production was mastered in 40 days. In the spring of 1943, on the eve of the Battle of Kursk, defects were discovered in hundreds of aircraft caused by the low quality of substitute varnishes and paints that covered the skin of the aircraft. In less than 24 hours, dozens of repair teams were organized at ten aircraft factories and transferred to front-line airfields. In a matter of days, the necessary repairs were carried out. Mass production of the famous Katyushas began, serial production of the Yak-9 fighter, followed by the Yak-3, Tu-2 dive bomber and two-seat Il-2 attack aircraft. German factories produced 1,160 aircraft in 1942, Soviet ones - 21,700. With the creation of production lines at factories, the production of tanks and self-propelled guns increased, due to a reduction in the number of light tanks and an increase in medium and heavy tanks. The T-34 became the best tank of the Second World War.
The production process, divided into simple operations, caused great physical stress. The work was wearing out. But people didn't look at it. The main thing was the desire to organize production in such a way as to achieve its highest efficiency. In 1944, a number of enterprises in the defense industry began to use elements of cost accounting, which included material rewards for performing work with a smaller number of workers, saving energy and materials. Initiative, active workers had the opportunity to earn more and thereby purchase goods in the newly opened commercial free-sale stores, where prices were higher than for rationed holidays with coupons and cards.
Some business managers also saw the promise of self-supporting relations. The well-known director of the Moscow ZIS Automobile Plant I. A. Likhachev believed that the time would come when the funded card supply of enterprises would have to be abolished and “the consumer will have to deal with the manufacturer.” However, all these innovations and initiatives were not supported by a legal basis and contradicted the established administrative-command practice. It is no coincidence that the People's Commissar of the Tank Industry, V. A. Malyshev, said that “both now and in the future there will be a need, so to speak, for a legal basis for showing courage.” That is why the sprouts of self-financing did not become widespread enough at that time.
With the liberation of the territories from the enemy, restoration of what was destroyed immediately began. First of all, energy enterprises, mines, ferrous metallurgy and mechanical engineering enterprises, and transport routes were introduced. The enemy has not yet been defeated. The front needed tanks, guns, planes, cars...
(4) Social conditions of life of Soviet people in the rear during the war:
Personal consumption decreased by 40% during the war years. Money depreciated, cards could not always be purchased. The “black” market grew and, as an inevitable consequence of this, speculation and the naturalization of exchange. For a number of categories of nomenklatura workers, special distribution centers continued to exist, and special rations were retained that were not commensurate with the level of consumption of the majority of workers.
The bulk of workers and employees received only 400-500 g of bread per day, and dependents received even less, 300-400 g. The state did everything to ensure that the food supply to the population was sustainable (especially orphanages, hospitals, hospitals). But for the majority of workers, life during the war years had the character of a half-starved state. Workers and employees were allowed to grow food in individual and collective gardens. In this they had advantages over the villagers, whose work on their plots was limited in every possible way. Despite this, the Soviet people were ready to make any sacrifices and deny themselves many things in order to crush the enemy.
The war left millions of people homeless. We had to live in dugouts and barracks.
All this was combined with constant psychological stress: grief due to the death of a loved one, waiting for a letter from the front (what if it was a funeral?), 11-12 hour working days, rare days off, anxiety for children who found themselves virtually unattended. And work - work in the name of bringing victory closer.
(5) Science during the war years.
The war did not break the connection between science and life and production, but only changed the peaceful direction of scientific work. On June 23, 1941, at an emergency meeting, the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences called on scientists to mobilize all forces to fight the Nazi invaders. The newspapers published an appeal from the Academy of Sciences “To scientists around the world.” One of those who signed it, Academician V.I. Vernadsky, noted in his diary that this is the first appeal that does not contain servile official praise “around his government, around I.V. Stalin” and which speaks of fascism: “fascist soldiers the boot threatens to crush the bright light of humanity throughout the world.” The restructuring of the activities of scientific institutions on a war footing had to be carried out under difficult evacuation conditions. In Kazan, Ufa, Frunze, Novosibirsk, the scientific base of the institutes was immediately developed. In August - December 1941, under the leadership of the President of the USSR Academy of Sciences V.L. Komarov and with the participation of academicians I.P. Bardin, V.N. Obraztsov, S.G. Strumilin and other leading scientists, a plan was drawn up for mobilizing the resources of the Urals for the needs of country defense.
The technical thought of our country proved its superiority on the battlefields. Most of the Soviet-style weapons produced were the best in comparison with similar weapons in both Germany and the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. Simple in design, they were easily mastered in production, where the labor of women and teenagers was widely used. Given the constant shortage of qualified personnel, this path was the only possible one.
In the shortest possible time, bauxite deposits were discovered and developed in the Southern Urals, tungsten, molybdenum, copper, manganese deposits in Kazakhstan, and large oil reserves in Tatarstan. New grades of high-quality steel were found, and new technology was proposed in the military industry.
A huge increase in the production of cartridges was achieved thanks to the use of automatic machines designed by the team of the Institute of Automation and Telemechanics of the USSR Academy of Sciences.
For the first time in world practice, the method of casting steel parts in metal molds was mastered, and stamping of the T-34 turret was used. Under the leadership of Academician E.O. Paton, manual welding of armored tank hulls was replaced by automatic welding. All this allowed the tank industry to produce 102.8 thousand tanks during the war years; 43.4 thousand were produced in Germany during the same period.
In September 1943, a new heavy IS tank, created by a design bureau under the leadership of Zh. Ya. Kotin, entered service with the Red Army. In terms of armor protection, it is 1.5 times superior to German heavy Tiger tanks; its armament was also more powerful. Hitler's command ordered its tank crews to avoid oncoming battles with these vehicles and recommended shooting at them from ambushes and shelters.
In 1941 and the fighting in the Black Sea, the enemy used electromagnetic mines, conventional means of combating which turned out to be ineffective. A group of prominent scientists led by L.P. Alexandrov and I.V. Kurchatov created fundamentally new methods for demagnetizing warships, which saved the fleet and saved the lives of thousands of sailors.
Medical scientists solved major problems. They managed to develop the principles and technology for the mass introduction of blood transfusions and the production of dry plasma, develop drugs that can accelerate the healing of wounds, and make devices for removing metal fragments from wounded people.
But many remarkable scientists continued to languish in prisons and Gulag camps. During the war, N.I. Vavilov, P.A. Florensky and others died there.
(6)Culture during the war years.
In the spiritual confrontation with the fascist aggressors, our culture played its special role. All the best that was inherent in the cultural traditions of the peoples of our country sought to manifest itself in such a way as to help millions of people understand their place in the general order.
The most characteristic feature of cultural development is deepening interest in the national classical heritage. And this is no coincidence. Fascism, with its division of peoples into “full-fledged” and “inferior”, was an example of the destruction of the cultural heritage of many peoples. The “superiority of Aryan culture” that the conquerors carried with them inevitably caused a backlash. Fascist barbarism in national shrines - Yasnaya Polyana, Pushkinogorye, Petrodvorets - clearly showed that the destruction of national cultures is one of the main strategic goals of fascism. And millions of people seemed to turn anew to eternal spiritual values. The poems of Pushkin and the novels of Tolstoy, Turgenev, the music of Glinka and Tchaikovsky took on a new meaning.
-The patriotic principle in art was also manifested in works created during the war by Soviet writers, composers, and artists. In days of difficult trials, patriotic journalism came first. Articles and pamphlets by I. G. Ehrenburg, A. N. Tolstoy, M. A. Sholokhov denounced fascism and talked about the most important thing - the fate of the Motherland, the duty of every person. The authors have largely freed themselves from the stereotypes of the pre-war years, their works have become closer and more understandable to people. “It would seem that the roar of war should drown out the voice of the poet,” wrote A. N. Tolstoy, “but the warring people, finding more and more strength in themselves in a bloody and merciless struggle, where only victory or death, demand more and more urgently from their literature. .. rise to the level of moral heights and heroic deeds of the Russian warring people.” What has been said, naturally, can be applied to all the warring peoples of our country.
The first story about the war - “The People are Immortal” by V. Grossman - was published in June - August 1942 in the newspaper “Red Star”. During the war years, such works of domestic prose began to be created as “They Fought for the Motherland” by M. A. Sholokhov, “The Young Guard” by A. A. Fadeev. Russian drama was replenished with the plays “Russian People”* by K. M. Simonov, “Invasion” by L. M. Leonov, and the play “Front” by A. E. Korneichuk was published in Pravda in 1942, > making a significant contribution to education officer corps of the Red Army.
Poetry was experiencing a real boom. The most famous poem of the wartime “Wait for me” by K. M. Simonov was cut out by soldiers from newspaper pages, rewritten, and passed from hand to hand. Poems and poems by A. T. Tvardovsky, S. Neris, M. A. Svetlov, M. A. Aliger, M. F. Rylsky glorified the feat of the Soviet soldier, strengthened confidence in victory, and called on the peoples of the USSR to closely unite in the name of the triumph of justice . Many lyrical poems, which became real folk songs, gained wide popularity: “Dugout”, “Ogonyok”, “In the forest near the front”. The song “Holy War” by A.V. Alexandrov and V.Y. Lebedev-Kumach became a musical symbol of people’s resilience during the war.
In the most difficult days of the siege of Leningrad, D. Shostakovich created the brilliant Seventh Symphony. The patriotic opera “War and Peace” is written by S. S. Prokofiev. Musical images of epic power, heroics combined with sublime themes of love, friendship, devotion - these are the characteristic features of the works of D. B. Kabalevsky, Yu. A. Shaporin, A. I. Khachaturyan, T. N. Khrennikov and other Soviet composers.
-Drama, musical theater, and pop artists also contributed to the common cause of fighting the enemy. In besieged Leningrad, the Comedy Theater did not stop its work. Front-line theaters were extremely popular among soldiers and commanders. As part of these theaters, and there were 25 of them, directors A. D. Dikiy, Yu. A. Zavadsky, S. M. Mikhoels, wonderful actors E. N. Gogoleva, M. I. Prudkin, I. V. went to the front. Ilyinsky, M, I. Tsarev and many others.
The concert activities of musicians and singers at the front and in the rear (“front-line brigades”) took on a large scale. The concerts were attended by L. A. Ruslanova, L. O. Utesov, K. I. Shulzhenko, violinist D. F. Oistrakh, pianist E. G. Gilels and others.
-Patriotic themes have become leading in documentary and feature films.
There were 150 cameramen at the fronts. Soyuzkino-magazine was published regularly, every week. The first full-length documentary film about the war was “The Defeat of German Troops near Moscow,” released in February 1942, and the last film that completed the chronicle of the war was the film “The Court of Nations” about the Nuremberg Trials, released in November 1946. And between they covered films about the Battle of Stalingrad, the liberation of Right Bank Ukraine, about people's avengers. The best feature films told about the people's feat ("Secretary of the District Committee", "She Defends the Motherland", "Two Soldiers"), about the heroic traditions of the peoples of the USSR ("Kutuzov", "Georgiy Saakadze"). Comedy films were also created (“The Adventures of the Good Soldier Schweik”, “Heavenly Slug”).
-The patriotic humanistic principle was the main one in all genres of fine art. Sculptural and pictorial portraits of war heroes, canvases telling about the feats of soldiers and partisans, enemy-defeating caricatures, combat and recruiting posters reflected the civic passion and emotion of the images. The works of Kukryniksy, A. A. Deineka, S. V. Gerasimov, A. A. Plastov made a significant contribution to the artistic chronicle of the Great Patriotic War.
Many of the works of art created during the war carried the main value - they elevated humanistic principles in the life of Soviet people. This process proceeded both through the opposition of the practice of Hitlerism, which destroyed millions of people on racial, national grounds, the fundamental principles of people's life with its readiness to sacrifice in the name of the Fatherland, and a deeper revelation of the foundations of the people's character. An outstanding example of this was the poem about Vasily Terkin, the main character of which combined the features of many real people and a character from folk tales. Naturally, in works like “Vasily Terkin” there was no room for glorification of the leaders, idle talk, and bureaucratic behavior. The best examples of culture clearly show that the consciousness of the people V During the war years, people began to get rid of the oppressive official propaganda that the war was won by a man who thought independently, a man of independent judgments and actions, who felt a deep connection with the history of his people.
(7) State, political regime. Relations with the church.
1) Stalin became more attentive to the voice of his subordinates (the failures of the beginning of the war had an impact) + he began to place emphasis not on class, but on national-patriotic aspects (agreed to the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943, revived the guard, shoulder straps) at the request of the allies; began to nominate those who were proactive and talented, rather than the devoted ones.
2) change in policy regarding the church
On the very first day of the war, the patriarchal locum tenens of the Russian Orthodox Church, Sergius (patriarchal elections had not been held for a long time), made an appeal to the church and people, calling on them to defend the country, condemning those clergy who did not follow his call.
In the occupied territory, the German authorities introduced formal provisions on religious tolerance, allowing the opening of parishes. However, the priests had to be completely subservient to the occupation authorities, who removed any priest if there were doubts about his trustworthiness. Hitler himself argued that “in any case, the creation of a single church for large Russian territories must be prevented. The easiest thing for us would be if each village had its own sect, which would develop its own concept of God." The Nazis sought to instill mysticism and occultism in people's minds.
A significant part of the priests who found themselves in the occupied territory objectively opposed Nazi propaganda, some maintained contact with the underground, and were destroyed by the Nazis. The Moscow Patriarchate publicly condemned those who cooperated with the occupiers. On the initiative of Sergius, Orthodox believers raised funds for the construction of a tank column bearing the name of St. Dmitry Donskoy.
On September 4, 1943, a meeting between Stalin and Sergius took place, the result of which was permission to hold elections of the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia and form the Holy Synod.
Soon several theological seminaries, etc., opened.
The beginning of reconciliation between the state and the Orthodox Church had a historically positive significance, but the Stalinist regime immediately attempted to bring all church activities under its control. The priests were forced from the pulpit to proclaim toasts not only in honor of the victorious soldiers, but also in honor of the “indestructible bloc of communists and non-party people.” The appointment of priests was carried out under the control of the “competent authorities”. But among millions of people, respect for the feelings of believers and for many church hierarchs has increased significantly.
3) about 200 thousand people were released from the Gulag.
The program for mobilizing the country’s forces to fight the aggressor, formulated in the directive of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated June 29
1941 and in the speech of the Chairman of the State Defense Committee I.V. Stalin on July 3, determined the direction, nature and scale of practical measures to create a coherent military economy in a short time.
When developing economic policy for the war period, the Communist Party proceeded from Lenin’s position that the restructuring of the economy on a war footing is comprehensive, that the entire national economy must be put at the service of the front and the interests of organizing a strong rear. The powerful industrial base created in the pre-war years ensured the successful solution of this problem.
Rebuilding the country's economy, the party directed all its forces and means to achieve a sharp increase in the level of military production, through the maximum and targeted use of the military-economic potential of the socialist state, to achieve a decisive material and technical superiority of the Soviet Armed Forces over the troops of Nazi Germany and thereby ensure the achievement complete victory over the enemy.
The most important military-economic measures were the mobilization and redistribution of material, financial and labor resources to meet the needs of the front, the switching of civilian industries to the production of military products; evacuation of the main productive forces from threatened areas, rapid deployment and introduction of them into operation in the east of the country; maintaining the level of agricultural production in the amount necessary to supply the front and rear with food and raw materials; restructuring transport operations on a war footing; redistribution of foreign trade turnover; reorganization of economic management.
In the complex process of restructuring the national economy on a war footing, special attention was paid to the defense industry. First of all, the front was supposed to receive military equipment, weapons, ammunition, and equipment from it. Moreover, the new nature of the work of defense enterprises did not consist in changing the range of products, but mainly in the transition to mass production of the most advanced types of weapons and military equipment.
The restructuring of military and civilian industries was a single, interconnected process. It required an increase in the production of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, chemical products, raw materials and electricity. Perestroika entailed a change in equipment and production technology and required further intensification and technical improvement of production processes. At the same time, it was necessary to ensure a regime of strict economy in all sectors of the national economy, in the expenditure of essential materials, in order to create additional opportunities for increasing the output of military products. All this was carried out under the direct leadership of the Central Committee of the Party and the State Defense Committee. The main branches of the military economy were in charge of members and candidate members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Thus, in addition to the State Planning Committee of the USSR, N. A. Voznesensky was in charge of the production of weapons and ammunition, V. M. Molotov - tanks, G. M. Malenkov - aircraft and aircraft engines, A. I. Mikoyan - food, fuel and clothing property, A. A. Andreev and L. M. Kaganovich - railway transportation. Experienced party and economic workers headed the main industrial people's commissariats: A. I. Shakhurin - aviation industry, V. A. Malyshev - medium mechanical engineering, and then tank industry, D. F. Ustinov - weapons, P. I. Parshin - mortar industry, B. L. Vannikov - ammunition, I. F. Tevosyan - ferrous metallurgy, A. I. Efremov - machine tool industry, V. V. Vakhrushev - coal. Almost three-quarters of all members of the Central Committee and half of the candidates for membership of the Central Committee took direct part in organizing the war economy (306). The efforts of workers at all levels of the party apparatus were aimed at solving military-economic problems.
The thoughtful placement of leading party cadres ensured the necessary unity of the political, economic and military leadership of the country. Lenin's position on the strictest centralization “at the disposal of all the forces and resources of the socialist republics” (307) was strictly implemented. The Communist Party and the Soviet government carried out a series of organizational and economic measures, which began with a revision of economic plans. Following the implementation of the mobilization plan for the production of ammunition and the national economic plan for the third quarter of 1941, it was considered advisable to have a general military-economic plan for a longer period.
On July 4, the State Defense Committee instructed a specially created commission headed by N. A. Voznesensky to “develop a military-economic plan for ensuring the country’s defense, bearing in mind the use of resources and enterprises existing on the Volga, Western Siberia and the Urals, as well as resources and enterprises transported to the specified areas in order of evacuation" (308).
On August 16, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution approving a new military-economic plan for the fourth quarter of 1941 and for 1942 for the regions of the Volga region, the Urals, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia (309). Essentially, the plan defined the basic principles of the accelerated development of the Soviet military economy and the task of developing the military-industrial base of the Soviet Union in the eastern regions of the country, where it was planned to establish mass production of aircraft engines, aircraft, tanks, tank armor, small arms, all types of artillery pieces, mortars and ammunition. A program was developed to increase the production of electricity, aviation gasoline, cast iron, steel, rolled products, aluminum, copper, ammonium nitrate, nitric acid, coal and oil production in the eastern regions. In the general capital construction plan, the share of defense commissariats increased. The number of construction projects for industrial enterprises launched during the Third Five-Year Plan was reduced from 5,700 to 614. Only construction projects that could be completed within a year continued. The plan for the fourth quarter envisaged funding for the restoration of 825 evacuated enterprises, primarily of defense significance.
In the field of agriculture, it was envisaged to increase the area under grain and industrial crops in the eastern regions of the RSFSR, in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Almost all large agricultural engineering plants were transferred to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Military Industry.
The role of the Ural-Siberian railways increased. The military-economic plan provided for the reconstruction and expansion of railway junctions and stations, the construction of second tracks on lines connecting Siberia with the Urals and the Urals with the Volga region.
The creation of a powerful military-industrial base in the east, which began on the eve of the war, continued at an increasing pace. All metal, materials and equipment received under accumulation plans for the previous quarters of 1941 were redistributed to enterprises in the central and eastern regions, and state reserves of fuel, metal, food and industrial goods were increased.
The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the State Defense Committee paid special attention to the development of the metallurgical industry. A significant addition to the plan was the decision to further develop in the east in the shortest possible time a powerful metallurgical base capable of fully satisfying the growing needs of military production, especially for high-quality metal and rolled products. In the Urals and Western Siberia, within a year and a half, it was planned to build and put into operation 15 blast furnaces, 41 open-hearth furnaces, 8 Bessemer converters, 13 electric furnaces, 14 rolling and 3 pipe rolling mills, 10 coke batteries. To quickly commission new capacities, the production bases of the Magnitogorsk, Novo-Tagil, Kuznetsk, Zlatoust metallurgical, Pervouralsk and Sinarsk pipe plants were used, as well as technological and power equipment transferred from metallurgical enterprises in the south and center (310).
Significant changes have been made to the state budget. Allocations for military needs in the second half of 1941 increased by 20.6 billion rubles compared to the first half of the year.
The restructuring of the national economy and the creation of a coherent military economy capable of providing the front with the necessary material and technical means largely depended on the level of party leadership in all spheres of the country's economic life.
The Communist Party raised and brought into action all the forces of the country in the interests of the successful implementation of the military-economic plan adopted by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.
Already the first weeks of the war convincingly showed that the party, its governing bodies, the party apparatus, having the experience accumulated during socialist construction, successfully solved complex military-economic problems. However, this did not exclude the need to change some of the usual forms and methods of organizational and political work of the party in relation to the management of economic life in war conditions. The changes went along the lines of strengthening organizational centralism in the party leadership system, increasing the personal responsibility of party leaders for the state of the economy, and the formation of emergency party bodies when necessary.
The sectoral industrial departments created even before the war (at the end of 1939) in the central committees of the communist parties of the union republics, in the regional committees, regional committees and in many city and district committees of large industrial centers were closely connected with enterprises, they knew well their production capabilities, needs, and degree of readiness to fulfill military orders. As new branches of production developed, corresponding departments were created in party bodies, headed by secretaries. This made it possible to quickly and directly participate in the implementation of plans approved by the State Defense Committee, to achieve the rapid establishment of military production and intersectoral production cooperation. Knowledge of local economic conditions made it possible for party bodies, in cases where the operational connections of the People's Commissariats with enterprises in their industries were disrupted, to take responsibility for solving not only general economic issues, but also special ones - of a production and technical nature. This was also facilitated by the fact that the first secretaries of regional and regional party committees, as a rule, were local representatives of the State Defense Committee.
Party organizations, through their intense activity, ensured the implementation of the directives and instructions of the State Defense Committee on issues of economic construction.
The increased role of party leadership in the national economy did not at all reduce the responsibility of state bodies managing the country's economic life. In its daily activities to develop the war economy, the State Defense Committee relied on the apparatus of the Council of People's Commissars and the State Planning Committee of the USSR, the Union-Republican People's Commissariats and other government institutions. The role of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR as a body of state management of the economy in wartime not only did not weaken, but also intensified.
One of the important acts of the Soviet government, which to a certain extent gave direction to changes in the state apparatus, was the decree of July 1, 1941 “On expanding the rights of the People's Commissars of the USSR in wartime conditions.” Under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Committee for Food and Clothing Supply of the Soviet Army and the main departments for supplying sectors of the national economy with coal, oil, and timber were formed. In the process of reorganizing the state apparatus, there was a sharp reduction in the staff of people's commissariats, institutions and management levels. Specialists from institutions were sent to plants and factories, to production.
The work of the USSR State Planning Committee and the economic planning and supply system were restructured. Departments of weapons, ammunition, shipbuilding, aircraft construction and tank building were created in the State Planning Committee. Based on the assignments of the Central Committee of the Party and the State Defense Committee, they developed plans for the production of military equipment, weapons, and ammunition by enterprises regardless of their departmental subordination, and monitored the state of material and technical support for military production. The State Planning Committee received daily reports on the implementation of State Defense Committee tasks. It had representatives in 25 economic regions of the country for operational communication with production.
The special conditions for the development of the Soviet military economy gave rise to operational forms of economic planning, including short-term production plans (from one to three months), task plans for all sectors of the defense industry and transport.
Based on the directives of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the State Defense Committee, the central committees of the communist parties of the union republics, regional, regional committees and bodies of Soviet power developed plans for the restructuring of industry and agriculture in their economic regions.
The military-economic measures of the Communist Party to restructure the national economy organically included the task of providing it with personnel, since the front immediately diverted significant human resources from work at enterprises. For the correct and systematic distribution and redistribution of labor resources, on June 30, 1941, the party and government established a Committee for the Distribution of Labor (311) under the Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, chaired by P. G. Moskatov, who headed the Main Directorate of Labor Reserves.
Relying on objective economic laws and using the advantages of the Soviet social and state system, the Communist Party brought into action all the forces of the country to organize resistance to the enemy.
The movement of the productive forces of the USSR to the east. The relocation of the main productive forces from the threatened areas of the country to the east was a forced measure caused by the extremely unfavorable situation at the front. At the same time, it became the most important link in the economic policy of the Communist Party, aimed at developing the country’s main military-industrial base in the deep rear.
The Nazis hoped to repeat their “European experience” and seize the enormous industrial potential, material and human resources of the Soviet Union.
The Soviet people had to take effective and emergency measures to thwart the enemy's plans. The deployment of military equipment production and ensuring quantitative and qualitative superiority over the Nazi invaders in all types of weapons largely depended on the pace of movement of the population and production resources from west to east.
The Central Committee of the Party, the State Defense Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR launched a huge effort to relocate the country's productive forces. It was led by the Evacuation Council, whose chairman was N.M. Shvernik, and his deputies were A.N. Kosygin and M.G. Pervukhin. The Council also included A. I. Mikoyan, M. Z. Saburov and others (312). Control over the movement of enterprises from July 11 was carried out by a special group of inspectors, created by decision of the State Defense Committee under the Evacuation Council, headed by A. N. Kosygin.
The council determined the order, timing, priority and final destinations for the evacuation of people and material assets. Its decisions, approved by the government, were binding on all party, Soviet and economic bodies.
A coherent operational system of evacuation authorities has developed in the center and locally. At all the Union People's Commissariats, deputy people's commissars became the representatives of the Council (313), and commissions were created from experienced, qualified employees of the apparatus, which developed specific proposals and plans for relocation to various sectors of the economy and individual large enterprises. In addition, the People's Commissariats sent their representatives to the evacuated plants and factories and to the points of their new location.
In republics and regions that were under the threat of enemy occupation, evacuation commissions were formed, and evacuation points were established at many railway junctions, stations and marinas.
The removal of industrial equipment and other material assets to the eastern regions of the country became the most important task not only for local party and Soviet organizations, but also for the rear services of fronts and armies.
From the very beginning of the evacuation, a huge responsibility fell on the shoulders of transport workers, especially railway workers. On instructions from the Central Committee of the Party, the State Defense Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the transport people's commissariats urgently developed specific plans and measures to ensure the unhindered movement of goods exported to the east.
To provide practical assistance to the bodies of the People's Commissariat of Railways (NKPS), representatives of the Evacuation Council were sent to large railway stations and junctions (314). Later, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks gave instructions to send deputy people's commissars of the maritime fleet and senior officials of the political department of the People's Commissariat of Marine Corps to all sea basins (315).
The transfer of enterprises of defense significance to the rear from the western regions of the country began from the first days of the war. Already on June 29, 1941, a decision was made to remove 11 aircraft factories to the east from the threatened zone. Two days later, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks made decisions to evacuate 10 enterprises of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition from Leningrad and to transfer the armored mill of the Mariupol Ilyich Plant to the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works (316). Soon the State Defense Committee recognized the need to transfer 26 factories of the People's Commissariat of Armaments from the central regions and Leningrad to the cities of the Volga region, the Urals, Siberia and Central Asia. On the basis of these enterprises, it was planned to develop the production of weapons, cartridges and various weapons equipment in new places (317).
On July 20, the State Defense Committee ordered the People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry A.I. Shakhurin to establish the order of transfer of factory workshops so that the evacuation was carried out without violating the production plan.
The difficult situation on the fronts of the Patriotic War forced mass evacuation almost simultaneously from Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Moldova, Crimea, the Northwestern, and later the Central industrial regions. The evacuation from the western border areas was especially intense. It took enormous efforts of local party, Soviet, trade union, Komsomol and military bodies, the population, workers of enterprises and transport to ensure the salvation of millions of people, critical industrial equipment and other material and cultural assets from the enemy.
A significant burden of this most difficult matter fell on the shoulders of young people. At the enterprises of the front-line zone, more than 32 thousand production youth groups, brigades and detachments were engaged in evacuation work (318). They dismantled, loaded and dispatched equipment around the clock.
Trains with cargo and people moved in a continuous stream to the east, and primarily to the regions of the Middle and Southern Urals, the Volga region, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. In just three months, more than 1,360 large, mainly military, enterprises (319) were relocated.
With incredible difficulties, under continuous enemy bombing and shelling, the evacuation of enterprises and the population of the Ukrainian SSR took place. On July 4, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine and the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR sent a special directive to all party and Soviet organizations of the republic, which put forward the urgent task of speeding up the “shipment of valuables, equipment of enterprises and food” (320).
Party bodies made great efforts to ensure the clarity and coherence of the relocation. Recalling the evacuation of large factories, former secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk regional party committee K. S. Grushevoy writes: “We had only a few days to carry out the complete dismantling of these factories, to load machines and various equipment onto trains. First of all, we invited the heads of these factories to the regional committee and familiarized them with the GKO resolution. Following this, the regional committee workers themselves went there. To the engine plant - L. I. Brezhnev, to the machine-building plant - the head of the department of the regional committee, N. L. Telenchakia. At meetings of shop chiefs and secretaries of party organizations, all comrades were familiarized with the plan and procedure for the evacuation of equipment and personnel. The evacuation was carried out in an orderly manner, without nervousness or haste. The equipment, literally down to the last screw and nut, was installed and placed on timely platforms. The engineering and technical personnel, workers and employees were provided with food and money... By mid-July, the last, as we called it, “special” echelon was sent” (321).
At the beginning of August 1941, due to the threat of Nazi troops reaching the Dnieper, the evacuation of industrial facilities in the Dnieper and Crimea reached its maximum tension. Only through the Kiev hub 450 trains were sent to the east, which transported equipment from 197 large enterprises of the Ukrainian capital and over 350 thousand Kiev residents (322).
Since mid-August, mass evacuation of enterprises and the population of Zaporozhye and eastern regions of Dnepropetrovsk regions began, primarily units of the Dnieper hydroelectric power station, large factories, factories and power plants.
In an extremely difficult situation, many Zaporozhye enterprises were evacuated under enemy fire. By the end of August, about 5,500 workers were employed in the dismantling and shipment of equipment at large Zaporozhye metallurgical facilities.
The scale of the evacuation of enterprises and the population can be judged by the fact that about 8 thousand wagons (323) were required to remove Zaporizhstal alone. In total, about 320 thousand tons of machine tools, structures, metal and other cargo were dismantled from the Zaporozhye group of factories and transferred to the rear. By the beginning of October, the removal of the main equipment of the Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk factories was completed. In total, about 550 large industrial enterprises were transported from Ukraine during June - December to the rear (including construction organizations of the republic, factories and factories of the Crimea).
The evacuation of the population and the relocation of productive forces from the territory of the Byelorussian SSR took place under extremely difficult conditions. On June 23, the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus (Bolsheviks) made a decision on the immediate evacuation of children and material assets from cities that were shelled and bombed. However, the rapid advance of fascist troops did not allow evacuation from the Brest, Bialystok, Baranovichi and Pinsk regions, which were occupied just a few days after the start of the war. The evacuation from the eastern part of the republic took place in a more organized manner. Thus, the operational headquarters of the Gomel regional committee of the CP(b)B organized the removal of 38 enterprises of union-republican significance. In three days, the largest plant in Belarus, Gomselmash, was dismantled. More than 1,000 wagons with people, valuable equipment and materials left this enterprise for the Urals (324).
In total, 109 large and medium-sized industrial enterprises (39 of union and 70 of republican significance) were relocated from the territory of Belarus to the eastern regions of the country.
The evacuation from the Baltic States took place in an equally tense situation. Despite the continuous raids of enemy aircraft and the actions of saboteurs, railway workers and workers at enterprises in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia loaded 4 - 5 times more wagons than usual. Transport ships located in the ports of the Baltic coast were also used. But due to lack of time, it was not possible to remove a significant part of the material assets from the Baltic republics.
Evacuation transportation from Leningrad and the region, mainly by rail, began even before the emergence of an immediate enemy threat to the city on the Neva. The entire organization of this work was under the control of A. N. Kosygin, who was sent to the city as an authorized representative of the State Defense Committee. First of all, the equipment of those defense enterprises that could not produce products under the current conditions was exported. The decision of the State Defense Committee to move the Kirov and Izhora plants to the rear was made on August 26, 1941, but two days later their removal was temporarily stopped (325).
On August 29, 1941, the enemy cut the last railway line. By this time, according to the operational reports of the NKPS (from June 29 to August 26), 773,590 people were evacuated from the city of Lenin, including refugees from the Baltic states and the Karelo-Finnish SSR (326), as well as dozens of large enterprises.
Later, already in winter, the removal of population and equipment from Leningrad was carried out by air and across Lake Ladoga - along the Road of Life. From January 22 to April 15, 1942 alone, 554,186 people (327) were transported from Leningrad across the ice of Lake Ladoga.
The evacuation of the population, enterprises and institutions of the central regions of the RSFSR, Moscow and the Moscow region continued for several months. It took on a particularly large scale in the fall due to the threat hanging over the capital, and continued until December 1941. By the end of November, most of the equipment of the 498 most important enterprises was removed from Moscow and the Moscow region to the rear areas. By this time, the total number of evacuated Muscovites reached 2 million people (328).
Despite the enormous difficulties, the movement of productive forces to the rear regions of the country took place, on the whole, smoothly and in accordance with the planned deadlines. In the second half of 1941, 1,523 industrial enterprises, including 1,360 large plants and factories, were completely or partially removed from the front-line zone to the east. Of these, 226 were located in the Volga region, 667 in the Urals, 244 in Western Siberia, 78 in Eastern Siberia, 308 in Kazakhstan and Central Asia.
Together with the relocated enterprises, up to 30 - 40 percent of workers, engineers and technicians arrived. Thanks to the initiative of the party, Soviet, trade union, Komsomol, military and economic bodies of the eastern regions of the country, the entire working population was immediately actively involved in working at these enterprises.
At the same time, grain and food supplies, tens of thousands of tractors and agricultural machines were evacuated to the rear. Collective and state farms in the eastern regions of the country in the second half of 1941 received 2393.3 thousand heads of livestock moved from the front line (329).
Hundreds of scientific institutes, laboratories, schools, libraries, as well as unique works of art from museums in Moscow, Leningrad, Kyiv and other cities were transported to the interior of the country.
Evacuation transportation in 1941 required about 1.5 million railway cars.
From July until the end of navigation, the river fleet managed to transport more than 870 thousand tons of cargo to the rear.
The most important condition for the successful movement of productive forces from West to East was the selfless work of the teams of evacuated enterprises and institutions. Workers, office workers, collective farmers, all working people showed exceptional endurance, courage, and selfless loyalty to the cause of the party and the socialist Motherland in those difficult days.
During the evacuation process, the friendship of the peoples of the USSR, cooperation and fraternal mutual assistance of the Soviet republics emerged with renewed vigor. The relocation of industrial enterprises became a matter not only of the workers of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic republics, Moldova, and the western regions of the RSFSR, but also of the workers of all rear areas.
The deployment of evacuated enterprises in the eastern regions turned out to be possible to a large extent because during the pre-war five-year plans a large industry, a fuel and energy base were created here, mineral deposits were explored, and new transport routes were laid.
The relocation of productive forces to the east is one of the brightest pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War. “One cannot help but admire the feat of Soviet workers, engineers, production commanders, and railway workers, who ensured the evacuation to the east of many hundreds of large enterprises and more than 10 million people,” noted General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev. - In fact, an entire industrial country was moved thousands of kilometers. There, in uninhabited places, often in the open air, machines and machines were literally put into action from railway platforms” (330).
With their heroic efforts, the Soviet people thwarted the Nazis' plans to disorganize the Soviet war economy.
Industrial restructuring. The interests of the comprehensive development of military production required the expansion of the country's raw materials and fuel and energy base, and primarily in the eastern regions, where the main arsenal of the Soviet Union was being created at an accelerated pace.
In this regard, the most difficult tasks faced the metallurgists of the east. They had to not only significantly increase the production of metal, but also significantly change the technology of its production, and in the shortest possible time master the production of new grades of cast iron, steel, and armored rolled products.
Before the war, the share of high-quality steels in the metallurgy of the eastern regions was small. At the Magnitogorsk plant, for example, it was no more than 8.2 percent.
From June 22, the Magnitogorsk city party committee took control of the work of the plant in fulfilling military orders, and especially in producing high-quality steel grades. A committee of scientists created under the city committee took an active part in organizing the production of such steel. As a result, already during the second half of 1941, Magnitogorsk steelmakers were able to master the production of over 30 new grades of steel and organize its special rolling. Due to the lack of necessary rolling mills in the Urals, for the first time in the history of world and domestic metallurgy, blooming was adapted for this purpose.
On July 23, the plant's crimping shop produced the first armor plate. In October 1941, Magnitogorsk residents increased its production 3 times compared to August, and in December - already 7 times. Ural metallurgists produced high-quality armor for tanks a month and a half ahead of the government deadline. The Communist Party and the Soviet government appreciated the labor feat of the Magnitogorsk metallurgists, equal in its significance to winning a major battle. Many of them were awarded orders and medals, and the director of the plant, G. I. Nosov, and the deputy chief mechanic, N. A. Ryzhenko, were awarded the State Prize.
In a short time, the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Plant was transferred to the production of high-quality steel and rolled products. In the second half of 1941, the Zlatoust plant mastered the smelting of 78 new grades of metal.
Soviet scientists, in collaboration with engineers, technicians and workers, in an unprecedentedly short time, managed to solve an extremely important task: to master the smelting of high-grade steel in ordinary open-hearth furnaces.
Previously, the metallurgy of the Urals and Western Siberia received manganese from Ukraine and Transcaucasia to produce high-quality metal. In 1940, the share of the eastern regions in the production of manganese ore did not exceed 8.4 percent. Therefore, the organization of accelerated production of manganese has become of paramount importance. The miners of Nikopol, who arrived in the Northern Urals, began to implement this important military-economic task. And already at the end of 1941, the first Ural manganese went to ferrous metallurgy plants in the eastern regions. The Urals and Eastern Siberia began to provide 13.7 percent of the manganese mined in the country (331). The Ural and then Kazakh manganese ore made it possible to begin the production of blast furnace ferromanganese at metallurgical enterprises in the Urals and Siberia. This was a major victory for miners and metallurgists, which made it possible to sharply increase the output of high-quality rolled products. Its share rose from 23 percent in the first half of 1941 to 49 percent in the second, and at eastern metallurgical plants - from 36.9 percent in July to 70.8 percent in October.
In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the extraction of tungsten ore, vanadium, molybdenum and other rare metals necessary for the production of alloy steels was expanding at an accelerated pace.
The military industry absorbed huge amounts of non-ferrous metals. Therefore, in the second half of 1941, the Soviet government increased capital investments in the development of non-ferrous metallurgy by 25 percent compared to the second half of 1940. To speed up the commissioning of new production capacities, in July 1941, the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR received instructions to send ten construction battalions.
At the same time, aluminum smelters were built in the Sverdlovsk region and Kuzbass.
Five factories for processing and rolling non-ferrous metals were built at a rapid pace. The production capacity of the country's largest smelter, the Balkhash copper smelter in Kazakhstan, increased.
Due to the temporary loss of Donbass and the heavy damage inflicted by the Nazis on the Moscow region coal basin, the fuel problem in the country has sharply worsened. At the same time, the restructuring of the metallurgical industry and the expansion of military production in the eastern regions required a significant increase in coal production, primarily coking coal. The Kuznetsk basin, which before the war accounted for about 14 percent of all-Union production, soon became, along with the Karaganda basin, the main supplier of coking coal and chemical products.
To increase coal production, it was necessary to improve the use of existing mines, establish the excavation of additional workings, lengthen the face lines and equip them with mechanisms. Great assistance in this regard to the miners of the east was provided by a group of economic, engineering and technical workers, experienced specialists from Donbass, which at the end of 1941 - beginning of 1942 came to Kuzbass and the Karaganda basin. Following her, miners arrived, trains with equipment and various units. The Parkhomenko Coal Engineering Plant was relocated from Voroshilovgrad to Karaganda, and the Mining Institute with its teaching staff and students was relocated from Moscow.
The delivery of Kuznetsk and Karaganda coal to metallurgical plants, especially to the Urals, was extremely difficult due to the extreme congestion of the railways. Therefore, the construction of new mines and open-pit coal mines in the eastern regions was of great importance for increasing coal production.
The oil industry found itself in more favorable conditions compared to other industries. All oil refineries were quickly switched to the production of aviation gasoline (primarily high-octane), fuel and lubricating oils for tanks and ships.
During June - October 1941, the level of oil production was higher than in the same months of the previous year (332). However, by the end of the year, due to the lack of pipes, as well as due to transport difficulties, total oil production was reduced and in December amounted to only 65.8 percent of the level of June 1941 (333).
Considering the huge need for petroleum products, the party and government, in accordance with the military-economic plan for the fourth quarter of 1941 and 1942, planned large capital construction in the areas of the Second Baku, in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Along with this, the task was set to speed up the construction of new and expansion of a number of existing oil refineries and plants in Ufa, Saratov, Syzran, Orsk, Ishimbay and other places.
From the very first months of the war, measures were taken to further develop the country's electricity sector. The capacities available in the east were not enough to meet the needs of the growing military industry. A redistribution of electricity resources was carried out: first of all, it was supplied to the military, metallurgical and coal industries; the consumption of electricity by a number of other industries and the population was significantly limited. On July 10, the Soviet government adopted a decision “On speeding up the construction of power plants in the Urals.” Work was carried out at an accelerated pace to bring into operation power plants in Western Siberia.
To speed up the launch of new power plants, the volume of construction and installation work was reduced, thermal and electrical circuits, and the designs of buildings and structures were simplified.
Mechanical engineering and metal products factories played an extremely important role in military production. A number of the largest machine-building plants were transferred to the People's Commissariat of Defense. Heavy engineering almost entirely switched to the production of tanks, guns, mortars, and ammunition.
To organize a coherent military economy, it was necessary, along with restructuring the work of existing enterprises, to launch new capital construction.
The organization of construction work, design deadlines and standards, and construction methods changed radically. The list of high-impact construction projects included military enterprises, power plants, enterprises in the metallurgical, fuel and chemical industries, and railways.
By decision of the State Defense Committee of July 8, 1941, in the People's Commissariat of Construction, special construction and installation units (OSMCh) were created on the basis of existing construction and installation trusts, which were to a certain extent paramilitary organizations. They assigned permanent engineering and technical personnel and skilled workers.
On September 11, 1941, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, in order to speed up the commissioning of industrial enterprises with the expenditure of a minimum amount of materials, adopted a decision “On the construction of industrial enterprises in wartime conditions” (334), which provided for the use of wooden and other materials in construction and the restriction of use for this purpose metal and reinforced concrete.
The front of construction work has moved to the east. The main construction projects were concentrated in the Urals, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia, where, along with the construction of new power plants, mines, and factories, evacuated enterprises were restored.
Much work on the relocation of enterprises and the deployment of shock construction in the east of the country was carried out by such large organizers of industrial and construction work as N. A. Dygai, V. E. Dymshits, L. B. Safrazyan, K. M. Sokolov, P. A. Yudin and others.
The main construction projects of the first war year were blast furnaces at the Magnitogorsk and Chusovsky plants, the Chebarkul high-quality steel plant, automobile plants in Ulyanovsk and Miass, the Altai Tractor Plant in Rubtsovsk and Sibtyazhmash in Krasnoyarsk, a number of aviation and tank plants, ammunition factories and other defense enterprises. meanings.
The rapid concentration of forces and assets in critical areas made it possible to construct defense facilities of primary importance in the shortest possible time.
The deployment of military production was accompanied by the mobilization and redistribution of not only material, but also labor resources. The problem of personnel in war conditions became especially acute. Conscription into the army and exclusion from production of the population who found themselves in the occupied territory led to a reduction in the number of workers and employees from 31.5 million by the beginning of 1941 to 18.5 million by the end of the year.
The labor shortage in leading industries was partially compensated by other sectors of the national economy, through the introduction of mandatory overtime work, and the abolition of regular and additional vacations. This made it possible to increase equipment utilization by about a third (335).
Hundreds of thousands of Soviet patriots, primarily women and youth, voluntarily entered industry, construction and transport. In the second half of 1941 alone, 500 thousand housewives and 360 thousand students in grades 8-10 were involved in production. The system of state labor reserves remained a significant source of replenishment of the ranks of qualified personnel.
Thanks to the help and assistance of party, trade union and Komsomol organizations, the Committee for Accounting and Distribution of Labor managed from July 1941 to January 1942 to transfer to the defense industry from local industrial enterprises, from the service sector, industrial cooperation, public utilities and mobilize from among the unemployed urban and rural population 120,850 people. In addition, construction battalions and work columns numbering 608.5 thousand people were sent to coal mines, oil fields, power plants, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, construction and railway transport.
All these emergency measures largely determined the favorable prospects for the development of military production.
Restructuring of agriculture. Agriculture occupied one of the most important places in the mobilization of the country's economic resources. He was faced with the task of providing the front and the population in the rear with food, and industry with raw materials, and creating state food reserves.
At the same time, it was necessary to collect the harvest in a timely manner and evacuate agricultural equipment and livestock from threatened areas.
The restructuring of agriculture took place in extremely difficult and complex conditions. The most able-bodied and qualified part of the male population of the village went to the front. Hundreds of thousands of collective farmers, collective farm workers, and state farm workers were mobilized to work in industry, logging, and in front-line areas to build defensive structures. The entire working-age rural population, from teenagers to old people, took to the fields of the country. Women on collective and state farms have always been a great force, but now all worries fall almost entirely on their shoulders. Hundreds of thousands of women have mastered tractors and combines. During the first one and a half to two months of the war, machine and tractor stations (MTS) trained 198 thousand tractor drivers and 48 thousand combine operators. Almost 175 thousand of them were women (336).
Due to the lack of people in the countryside, the harvest in 1941 was delayed. The working people of the country's cities came to the aid of collective and state farms. Millions of citizens, including schoolchildren and students, took part in field work. In July - August 1941, after accelerated training, 25,155 students (337) worked as tractor drivers and 16 thousand combine operators in the fields of the country.
However, the progress of agricultural work was negatively affected by the lack of equipment. There were not enough spare parts. Almost the entire fleet of powerful diesel tractors, most of the vehicles and a significant number of horses were sent to the active army. The total number of tractors in agriculture, in terms of 15-horsepower units, decreased by the end of 1941 to 441.8 thousand against 683.8 thousand in 1940. The number of trucks decreased from 228.2 thousand in 1940. up to 66 thousand in 1941. Therefore, during the harvest of the first war year, along with the use of machinery, manual labor was used. On collective farms in the rear regions of the country, 67 percent of the grain crops were harvested by horse-drawn machines and by hand, and on state farms - 13 percent (338).
The labor heroism of collective farmers and state farm workers was comparable to the heroism of soldiers at the front. On the collective and state farm fields there was a real battle for bread, for victory. In the front-line areas, every day lost for harvesting threatened the loss of the entire harvest. “Pravda” wrote in those days: “A rich harvest, nurtured by laboring hands, is heading in... Thieving, envious fascist eyes will stare at it. Hitler... robbed the countries of Western Europe. And now, spreading death, ruin, poverty, hunger on his way, he is getting closer to the bread of the Soviet peasant. This will not happen” (339).
In Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, in Leningrad, Smolensk, Kalinin and other regions of the RSFSR, which became the scene of battles, collective farmers, workers of state farms and MTS often harvested grain under enemy fire. In order to preserve the harvest, preserve herds and public buildings, the rural population in these areas proactively organized fire protection and air defense. This is how millions of pounds of bread and other agricultural products were saved. Collective farms in the eastern regions of Ukraine fulfilled the grain harvest plan in 1941 by 93.8 percent. Over 2.3 million tons of grain were harvested in the republic.
Taking measures to maintain grain production at the required level in subsequent years, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on July 20 reviewed and approved the plan presented by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR to increase the planting of winter crops in the Volga region, the Urals, Siberia and Kazakhstan (340). It was also considered expedient to expand the planting of grain crops in the cotton-growing regions of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.
The unfavorable development of events at the front had a heavy impact on agriculture. The number of collective farms decreased from 236.9 thousand in 1940 to 149.7 thousand by the end of 1941, state farms - from 4159 to 2691, MTS - from 7069 to 4898. Gross grain harvest decreased from 95.6 million tons in 1940 to 55.9 million tons in 1941. The country did not receive thousands of tons of sugar beets, sunflowers and potatoes.
The number of livestock has sharply decreased. As of January 1, 1942, in comparison with the same month of the previous year, it decreased: cattle - from 54.8 million heads to 31.4 million, pigs - from 27.6 million to 8.2 million ., sheep and goats - from 91.7 million to 70.6 million, horses - from 21 million to 10 million (341). Government purchases of agricultural products have decreased accordingly.
Under these conditions, the role of the eastern regions of the country increased significantly, where already in the fall of 1941 the total area of winter crops increased significantly compared to 1940. The 1942 plan provided for a further increase in the area under grain, industrial, vegetable and melon crops and potatoes by more than 4 million hectares (342).
Preparing for the spring of 1942, collective and state farms felt the shortage of people and draft power even more acutely. Party organizations took measures to involve the entire population capable of working in collective and state farm production.
The problem of labor resources was not limited only to the shortage of workers. Large agricultural production needed experienced managers, qualified specialists, and machine operators. The majority of these personnel before the war were men. The party recommended that local bodies boldly nominate leading collective farmers, mostly women, to leadership positions - to the posts of chairmen and foremen.
The problem of restoring equipment has become acute. Worn-out machines needed repairs, spare parts were required, and their production was reduced. At the beginning of 1942, on the initiative of Komsomol members of the Ilovlinsky MTS of the Stalingrad Region, a movement began throughout the country for the collection and restoration of parts for agricultural machines.
The city provided constant assistance to the village in repairing equipment. Industrial enterprises, together with work teams, sent machine tools, metal and tools to the workshops of MTS and state farms.
As a result, by the spring sowing campaign of 1942, the repair plan was almost completely completed, and the main part of the tractor fleet was in working order.
Livestock farming experienced great difficulties: there was not enough feed, the construction of farms stopped, and veterinary services deteriorated.
In Kazakhstan, in particular, land authorities were only half staffed with livestock specialists and veterinarians. The use of cows in field work reduced milk yield. The death rate and slaughter of livestock increased.
On March 11, 1942, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks made a decision on measures to preserve young animals and increase the number of livestock. The party and government demanded to achieve complete preservation of young animals on collective farms, state farms, and personal farms of collective farmers, workers and employees. The state in every possible way encouraged collective farms that raised young animals, provided them with loans, tax breaks, and allocated additional land for use for haymaking and grazing.
Despite the reduction in agricultural production, the Soviet peasantry did everything not to remain in debt to the front.
Thanks to socialist production relations, the country's agriculture was able to become a strong support for the front. Having mobilized all human and material resources, it was able to make full use of its material and technical base, maintain the required level of production of basic products and, at the cost of intense, selfless efforts of rural workers, provide food to the army and population.
Transport restructuring. The transition of the economy to war was closely connected with transport, especially railways. Its important role during the war was primarily that it ensured the uninterrupted delivery of a huge number of troops, military equipment, weapons, ammunition, food and equipment to the front, as well as massive economic transportation. V. I. Lenin pointed out the special place of railway transport in modern military conflicts, calling it “the most important material factor of war, of paramount importance not only for military operations, but also for supplying the Red Army with combat and clothing equipment and food” (343) .
It was possible to successfully solve the entire complex of complex problems facing transport only by quickly restructuring its work on a military scale. The beginning of this big deal was the transfer of train traffic from June 24 to a special military schedule - letter “A”, which was introduced by order of the People's Commissariat of Railways of June 23, 1941, instead of the military schedule of 1938 (344). The new schedule provided for the priority advancement of military echelons and especially mobilization cargo. It was designed for maximum throughput of road sections.
In transport, a special system for regulating cargo flows began to be used, taking into account the increased amount of cargo planned centrally. A significant part of the rolling stock was converted to transport military units, military equipment, ammunition, and the wounded. The positions of NKPS commissioners, endowed with greater rights, were established in the fronts. Measures were taken to increase the capacity of the most important nodes in the eastern regions. In the rear, the construction of new railways and highways began.
The relocation of industry to the east and the new location of military enterprises required the organization of transport, taking into account changes in the economic structure of the eastern regions. Before the war, the network of Ural-Siberian roads was underdeveloped and worked under great strain. The relocation of a large production base here further increased the disproportion between the level of industrial development and the state of transport.
The insufficient capacity of the country's eastern railways, especially felt with the onset of winter, hampered economic transportation, and a number of large enterprises did not receive the required amount of raw materials and fuel. At the beginning of February, coal reserves at the Magnitogorsk Combine remained for 5-6 days. Due to a lack of ore, the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Plant was in danger of stopping its work.
Finished products were not exported from the enterprises. In January 1942, the average daily loading by rail was more than two times lower than pre-war figures (345).
The railways lacked steam locomotives and fuel. At the beginning of the year, there were up to 3 thousand trains without steam locomotives. Two-thirds of them were carrying evacuated equipment (346).
Urgent measures were needed to correct the current situation. On January 24, 1942, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR issued a resolution to accelerate the pace of loading and moving trains with coal along the roads of the Urals and Siberia. Specific tasks were set for the eastern highways to implement this government decision.
On February 14, 1942, a Transport Committee was created under the State Defense Committee, which included I.V. Stalin (chairman), A.A. Andreev (deputy), A.I. Mikoyan, I.V. Kovalev, A.V. Khrulev, G.V. Kovalev, Z.A. Shashkov, P.P. Shirshov, A.G. Karponosov and others. His task included planning and coordinating transportation on the main modes of transport, developing effective measures to improve the material and technical base of the entire transport system.
Due to the acute shortage of coal, by decision of the State Defense Committee, the locomotive fleet of a number of roads was switched to wood fuel and fuel mixture.
At the same time, the State Defense Committee changed the structure of railway management and strengthened the leadership of the NKPS. The Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Chief of Logistics of the Soviet Army, General A. V. Khrulev.
In March and April 1942, the party and government took a number of new measures to improve transport. The wages of railway workers of train and shunting crews were increased. Excess rolling stock from the western front-line roads moved east.
Thanks to these measures and the dedicated work of railway workers, transportation for the army and the national economy increased. By the beginning of May 1942, on only 10 central highways, the volume of loading and unloading increased by 50 percent, and the downtime of cars decreased noticeably.
Other types of transport were also rebuilt. As a result, the level of its cargo turnover gradually increased, as can be seen from Table 3.
Table 3. Growth in freight turnover of the most important types of transport in the USSR in the first half of 1942 (billion ton-kilometers) (347)
Soviet transport workers took their rightful place in the selfless struggle of home front workers to create a coherent military economy capable of ensuring victory over the enemy.
