The original plan for the attack on the USSR. Plan Barbarossa

UK air weapons

One of the decisive factors when considering the state of the Air Force as a branch of the armed forces is military doctrine. According to the “Military Encyclopedic Dictionary”, military doctrine is understood as “a system of views adopted in the state for a given (certain) time on the essence, goals, nature of a possible future war, on the preparation of the country and the Armed Forces for it and on the methods of waging it. The main provisions of the Doctrine military are determined by the socio-economic and political system of the state, the level of development of the economy and means of warfare, as well as the geographical location of one’s country and the country (countries) of a potential enemy.

Military doctrine has two closely related and interdependent sides - socio-political and military-technical. The socio-political side covers issues related to the methodological, economic, social and legal foundations for achieving the goals of a possible future war. It is decisive and has the greatest stability, since it reflects the class essence and political goals of the state, which are relatively constant over a long time. The military-technical side, in accordance with socio-political goals, includes issues of direct military development, technical equipment of the Armed Forces and their training, determination of forms and methods of conducting operations by the Armed Forces and war in general."

Let's move on to consider the air force of Great Britain, one of the most developed capitalist countries in the world.

The English military-political doctrine was defined by researcher D. Fuller, who emphasized in his work “The Second World War 1939-1945” that “Britain sought... to divide the great continental powers through rivalry and maintain a balance between them... The enemy did not become the worst state, but the one that... was usually the strongest of the continental powers... Therefore, the purpose of the war was to weaken the strongest state so that the balance of power could be restored." The political content of the British military doctrine also determined its military-technical side. A sharp difference from the German doctrine was the theory of war of attrition - a long-term and coalition war, requiring enormous effort. This was fully reflected in the air force, which was considered as a strategic means of waging war and was assigned important tasks. Since 1923, the offensive doctrine of “air deterrence” was adopted in England. The military leadership believed that, relying on the fleet and aviation, England could undermine the military-economic potential of the enemy by destroying its political and industrial centers with aerial bombardment, while ground forces would only complete the blow against the enemy.

The increased attention to strategic air warfare was also explained by the fact that the Chief of the General Staff of the British Air Force and its leader during the period from the end of the First World War to 1930 was Air Marshal Trenchard, who commanded a formation of strategic bombers during the First World War. Until 1933, when the Nazi government came to power in Germany, the headquarters of the British Air Force considered France and the USSR the most likely enemy. At the beginning of 1936, he developed a set of requirements for a new heavy bomber, and on May 27 of the same year, a conference specially convened for this purpose opened. “Achieving the required range of 3,000 miles (4,827 km) for attacks on the USSR was considered very desirable...”, noted V. Kornilov, a researcher of the history of aviation technology, speaking about it. In 1937, the Ministry of Aviation began planning military operations against a specific enemy - Germany. The research group came to the conclusion that it was necessary to develop fighter aircraft as well, which urgently began to be implemented in 1938. As for many issues in the theory and practice of the construction and use of tactical aircraft, they were never resolved. This was due to the fact that the role of the ground forces themselves (which, according to Field Marshal Montgomery, were completely unprepared to conduct major combat operations) was never truly defined in British military doctrine until September 1939. And since 1938, the air force began to be considered the first important branch of the armed forces.

As noted above, long-range bombers played a special role in the British Air Force. Back in November 1938, the British set an absolute world record for flight range on the Vickers Wellesley bomber, which lasted until 1945. “To assess the progress of air operations in the Second World War, it is important to note that the British had long considered a heavy bomber with powerful weapons “Best suited for conducting a strategic air war. Even before the start of the Second World War, the British air force had two types of similar bombers - the Armstrong-Whitworth and the Vickers Wellington,” notes G. Feuchter, further emphasizing that they “were such successful models that the German armed forces did not have a single aircraft that could even approximately compare with them in their armament, bomb load and flight range.” “Design and preparation for production of four-engine Schott Stirling bombers,” Handley Page “Halifax” and Avro “Lancaster”, which were the main aircraft for strategic air operations against Germany from 1941 until the end of the war,” notes G. Feuchter, “were also started long before the Second World War,” saying concluding that “this shows how correctly the British assessed the possibilities of strategic air warfare and how purposefully they acted.” “The Royal Air Force, alone among the European air forces, pinned its hopes on operational bombing,” reported the English historian A. Taylor in his work “The Second World War,” emphasizing that “the British were constantly feeling the threat ... from Germany, hoped for the opportunity... to threaten it." “The Royal Air Force had an impressive core of strategic bomber aircraft for that time (which Germany did not have). British aircraft could strike Northern Germany and the Ruhr. Thus, a formidable weapon was ready for immediate action,” assessed the English researcher D. Kimhe the state and capabilities of the British Air Force at the beginning of the Second World War.

"Southern option"

By the beginning of the Second World War, the Baku oil industry produced 80% of high-grade aviation gasoline, 90% of naphtha and kerosene, 96% of motor and tractor oils of the total production in the USSR. The attention of the Anglo-French allies to the Baku oil fields and the search for possible ways to disable them appeared almost immediately after the start of the war between Germany and Poland, in which the USSR took part from September 17, 1939. The theoretical possibility of an air attack on Soviet oil fields was for the first time reviewed already in September 1939 by the liaison officer between the General Staff and the French Foreign Ministry, Lieutenant Colonel Paul de Villelum. And on October 10, French Finance Minister P. Reynaud asked him a specific question: is the French Air Force “able to bomb oil fields and oil refineries in the Caucasus from Syria.” In Paris it was understood that these plans should be carried out in close cooperation with the British. The US Ambassador in Paris, W. Bullitt, was also informed of these plans by the head of the French government, E. Daladier, and other French politicians in connection with the signing of a mutual assistance treaty between England, France and Turkey on October 19, 1939. He telegraphed to Washington about the possibility of "bombing and destroying Baku" being discussed in Paris. Although the French coordinated their plans with the British, the latter were not far behind them in developing their own similar projects. One of the first properly English documents is dated October 31, 1939 and is a letter from the British Secretary of Supply to the Foreign Secretary. “This letter is written in a realistic spirit and was written by a man who spent a lot of time studying this problem and came to the conviction of the need to have a certain opportunity to deprive his potential enemy of the “carburetor” that feeds his entire mechanism,” the author of the letter said . He noted that “in the armies of many states, a procedure has been established that provides for the compilation of a list of targets that are subject to priority bombing by their aviation forces. I think that in almost all cases, according to generally accepted belief, oil reserves are indicated as target No. 1.” The letter pointed out the vulnerability of Soviet oil sources, the largest of which was Baku, followed by Grozny and Maykop. The author stated that “the study by our General Staff of the issue... of the possibility of destroying oil sources could turn out to be a very effective means of intimidation. If Russian oil fields are destroyed (and all of them are gushing type developments and therefore can be very easily destroyed), not only Russia will lose oil, but also any ally of Russia who hopes to get it from this country." The letter indicated distances from some border points of Turkey and Iran to Baku, Maykop and Grozny, from which it followed that the shortest distance to Baku is from Iranian territory. The author proposed that the British and Iranian general staff jointly consider the possibility of bombing Soviet targets, emphasizing “that it is extremely important to have our own in our hands. a kind of trump card when carrying out transactions with the USSR." A copy of this letter was sent on November 6, 1939 by the British Foreign Secretary G. L. Ismay to the Military Chiefs of Staff Committee, the intelligence subcommittee to verify the stated facts and the joint planning subcommittee to study the strategic side this problem and preparing a draft report. From the documents of the British War Cabinet dated December 6 it followed that in London it was planned to create a “system against the USSR” in the Near and Middle East. On December 19, the British ambassador in Ankara, H. Knatchbull-Hugessen, reported on negotiations between English, French, and Turkish representatives on strengthening Turkish troops at the Soviet borders at the expense of Anglo-French supplies and on secret Turkish measures to prepare an anti-Soviet uprising of the local population in the Soviet border areas.

Until the end of 1939, planning for the bombing of the USSR in France resulted in another option, dated at the end of November, concerning the Caucasus. On December 24, the French military attache to the USSR, General Pallas-Auguste Antoine, in response to a request dated December 19 from the French Minister of National Defense and Armed Forces and the 2nd Branch of the Bureau of the General Staff of the French Army, sent information to Paris about the theater of Soviet operations in the South Caucasus, where the option that the USSR, in the event of hostilities, could undertake the occupation of “parts of Turkish Armenia and Iranian Azerbaijan, including air and hydroair bases that pose a threat to the Baku region” to “ensure the security of an area vital for Russia, which includes the centers of the oil industry in the Caucasus” . It was precisely about striking at these developments through Turkey that was discussed in the document of the French General Staff dated December 30. And the next day, English General S. Butler arrived in Ankara to discuss the problems of Anglo-Turkish military cooperation, primarily against the USSR, in particular the issue of the British using airfields and ports in Eastern Turkey. Thus ended 1939 for the Anglo-French allies.

On January 11, 1940, the British embassy in Moscow reported that an action in the Caucasus could “bring Russia to its knees in the shortest possible time,” and the bombing of the Caucasian oil fields could deal a “knockout blow” to the USSR. On January 15, the Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry Léger informed the American Ambassador W. Bullitt that Daladier proposed sending a squadron to the Black Sea to blockade Soviet communications and bomb Batumi, as well as attack the Baku oil developments from the air. Moreover, the purpose of these operations was not just to prevent oil supplies from the USSR to Germany. Leger said: “France will not break diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union or declare war on it, it will destroy the Soviet Union, if possible - if necessary - with the help of guns.” A very important document in the light of the Allied war plans with the USSR is dated January 19, 1940. This is a note from the French Prime Minister E. Daladier on the proposed operation to invade the USSR in order to destroy oil sources, which was addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Ground Forces in France and the Deputy Chairman The Supreme Military Council to General M. Gamelin, as well as the Commander-in-Chief of the French Fleet, Admiral Darlan. Two copies of this document were sent respectively to General L. Kelz, Commander of the French Ground Forces and General Joseph Vuillemin, Chief of the General Staff of the French Air Force and Commander-in-Chief of its Air Fleet. E. Daladier asked Gamelin and Darlan to prepare their thoughts on the upcoming operation in three options, one of which included a direct invasion of the Caucasus. And on January 24, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff of England, General E. Ironside, presented to the War Cabinet a memorandum “The Main Strategy of the War,” where he indicated the following: “in determining our strategy in the current situation, it will be the only right decision to consider Russia and Germany as partners.” Ironside emphasized: “In my opinion, we can provide effective assistance to Finland only if we attack Russia from as many directions as possible and, most importantly, strike Baku, an oil production area, in order to cause a serious state crisis in Russia.” . Ironside was aware that such actions would inevitably lead the Western allies to war with the USSR, but in the current situation he considered it completely justified. The document emphasized the role of British aviation in the implementation of these plans and, in particular, stated that “economically, Russia is heavily dependent on oil supplies from Baku in waging war. This area is within the reach of long-range bombers, but provided that they have the ability to fly over the territory of Turkey or Iran." As we see, the issue of war with the USSR has moved to the highest military-political level in the leadership of the Anglo-French bloc.

On January 30, the British chiefs of staff went to Paris, having received General Gamelin's proposal the day before for "direct Allied intervention in Finland." And on January 31, at a meeting of the chiefs of staff of England and France, General Gamelin said: “The French high command understands that the political consequence of direct assistance from Finland’s allies would be that they would, in fact, unleash military action against Russia, even if there were no formal declaration of war." Gamelin then specifically pointed out that the best help to Finland from England would be to send long-range aircraft from the British Isles, which, using forward bases, “could bomb targets deep inside Russia.” Already on February 1, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the British Air Force, Marshal R. Pearce, outlined comments on Gamelin’s proposals: “We take the consequences of military action against Russia very seriously... In general, we would be ready to recommend taking the risk of military action against Russia in order to achieve a great goal. ..".

On February 1, Iranian Minister of War A. Nakhjavan raised the question of purchasing 60 bombers and 20 fighters from England in addition to the 15 fighters already promised by the British to the British military attaché in Tehran H. Underwood, and the minister justified the desire to purchase bombers by the desire to wage war on enemy territory . He even expressed his “readiness to sacrifice half of Iran’s bomber force for the purpose of destroying or damaging Baku”! The minister also proposed "coordination of Iranian and British offensive plans for the war against Russia."

MacLean's note dated February 2 proposed an option that, in his opinion, was possible even without Turkish help: by flying over Turkish and Iranian territories, the British and French “would be able to cause serious damage to oil wells and oil refineries in Baku and the North Caucasus, oil pumping hubs ... and the oil pipeline connecting them." The air risk "would be negligible compared to the significant benefits that could be obtained from these actions."

On February 3, the French General Staff gave the commander of the French Air Force in Syria, General J. Jonot, who held the point of view “the outcome of the war will be decided in the Caucasus, and not on the Western Front,” instructions to study the possibility of carrying out an air attack on the Caucasus. On February 7, the problem of preparing an attack on Soviet oil fields was discussed at a meeting of the British War Cabinet, which came to the conclusion that the successful implementation of these actions “could fundamentally paralyze the Soviet economy, including agriculture.” The Chiefs of Staff Committee was instructed to prepare an appropriate document in the light of the new tasks. General Chardiny, who served as head of the French mission in Tiflis during the Allied intervention against Russia, stated in his report on February 18 that the importance of the destructive operation against Baku justifies any risk. Following this, the 3rd Bureau of the French General Staff, in a special document “Study of the operation aimed at depriving Germany and the USSR of the oil resources of the Caucasus,” noted that the operation “will shake the Soviet government.” This document formed the basis of the R.I.P. plan. (Russian abbreviation of the plan "Russia. Industry. Fuel."), which summarized the details of the future operation.

A month after Daladier's request on January 19, General Gamelin presented a memorandum on February 22 with a plan to attack the USSR from the Caucasus. The plan emphasized that due to the weak road network, the participation of ground forces would be difficult, so the decisive role was assigned to air strikes primarily in the areas of Baku and Batumi. Gamelin pointed out that “the operation against the oil industry of the Caucasus will deal a heavy, if not decisive blow to the military and economic organization of the Soviet Union. Within a few months, the USSR may face such difficulties that this will create the threat of complete disaster. If such a result is achieved, then around Germany, which will lose all supplies from Russia, will close the blockade ring in the East." Since Grozny and Maikop were beyond the reach of allied aviation, Gamelin intended to use forces, concentrating them against Baku. We could be talking about heavy bombers with a total of 6-8 air groups of 13 aircraft each. Emphasizing that Baku provides 75% of all Soviet oil, Gamelin noted that bases for raids should be in Turkey, Iran, Syria or Iraq.

The next day, February 23, the chiefs of staff submitted a report to the British War Cabinet on its instructions regarding contacts with Iran, noting the need to maintain Iranian neutrality “until the time when we need Iranian cooperation for offensive operations against Russia.” The report stated: "Further examination of the offensive operation we could undertake against Russia confirmed our view that the Caucasus is one of the regions where Russia is particularly vulnerable, and that this region can be successfully hit by air attack." The report made the following conclusions: existing aircraft cannot reach the territory of the Caucasus from existing bases in Iraq, and, therefore, successful operations require either re-equipping bomber squadrons in Iraq with long-range aircraft, which will take a lot of time, or if “it will be necessary to act against the Russians oil development in the near future, we will have to resort to active assistance from Iran." This was the conclusion of the British Chiefs of Staff.

As we see, both English and French plans were developed with almost absolute synchronicity in time. The practical plan for accomplishing the task seemed approximately the same to the developers. Both sides informed each other about their decisions, although even without this there was a similarity in both their main goal and the ways to solve it.

On February 28, the headquarters of the French Air Force prepared a document that contained specific calculations about the forces and means necessary to destroy the oil refineries of Baku, Batumi and Poti.

Anglo-French negotiations began on this issue. Thus, on March 7, General Weygand held a meeting with the commanders of the British and French Air Forces in the Middle East. General W. Mitchell, representing Great Britain, informed Weygand that he had received instructions from London to prepare for a possible bombing and had arrived in Beirut on his way to Ankara. Mitchell said he intended to ask the Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Army, Marshal Cakmak, for permission to inspect Turkish airfields that could be used for intermediate landings of aircraft flying from Cezire. The Jezire base was located in northeast Syria and Mitchell, with Weygand’s permission, visited this French Air Force airfield.

On March 8, a very important event took place in the context of preparations for war with the Soviet Union by Great Britain and France. On this day, the British Chiefs of Staff presented a report to the government entitled “Military Consequences of Military Actions against Russia in 1940.” Compared to Gamelin’s memorandum of February 22, which clearly outlined the area of ​​attack on the USSR from the southern border and proposed specific forms of attack, the English document was more general in nature.

“We are going to present to the War Cabinet assumptions about the main military factors that are relevant for considering the consequences of allied military actions against Russia in 1940 in the context of the main goal in this war - the defeat of Germany,” the authors began their report and then moved on to an analysis of the prospects for the Soviet -German economic and military cooperation, an assessment of the vulnerable points of the Soviet system, and concluded the report with a statement of “methods by which the Allies can strike at Russia.”

The report provided for three main directions of military action: - northern, in the areas of Petsamo, Murmansk and Arkhangelsk; - Far Eastern, in the areas of Soviet ports; - southern. The first two options involved the use of mainly naval forces or a combination of them with air forces (in the north). But the report outlined the third, “southern” option in most detail, and the main role in it was played by the air force. “Since there are only a few important Russian targets in the Scandinavian region, the Committee of Chiefs of Staff recommends an attack on the southern regions of the USSR. In these areas, the most vulnerable points of the Soviet Union can be hit. At the first stage, such intervention should be limited to air strikes.”

The reason for the authors' preference for the third option was explained by Caucasian oil. The report said: "The fundamental weakness of the Russian economy is its dependence on oil supplies from the Caucasus. The armed forces depend on them. Russian agriculture is mechanized... 80% of oil production and 90% of oil refining enterprises are concentrated in the Caucasus. Large-scale disruption of oil supplies from this region will therefore have far-reaching consequences for the Soviet economy." If there is a reduction in oil production, then “there could be a complete collapse of Russia’s military, industrial and agricultural systems.”

Three options for strikes were considered: “firstly, an attack from the air, secondly, the actions of naval forces in the Black Sea and, finally, the actions of Turkish ground forces from Eastern Anatolia.”

“The most vulnerable targets in the Caucasus are the oil industrial areas in Baku, Grozny and Batumi,” the report emphasized. It noted: “A plan to attack these installations is currently being developed by Air Force Headquarters in the Middle East, and is also being considered by the Air Ministry. It is estimated that the destruction of the main oil refineries can be achieved through continuous operations over several weeks by forces of at least three bomber squadrons... Three squadrons of Blenheim Mk-4 aircraft could be provided from the home forces, and if all the preparatory work was carried out at once, they would be ready to operate from bases in Northern Iraq or Syria by the end of April." By the way, the report took into account that the French side had already developed “a plan for attacking the Caucasus with long-range bombers from bases in Syria.”

It was also indicated that “there is a possibility that it will be possible to attract Iran,” in which case it would be possible to “use Tehran as a forward airfield.” Naval forces could also be involved in air strikes: "aircraft carrier raids in the Black Sea to bomb refineries, oil storage facilities or port facilities in Batumi and Tuapse would be a useful complement to the main air raids on the Caucasus region and could lead to the temporary destruction of Russian defenses ".

The report also explained some of the difficulties in implementing the plan. There was a severe shortage of Blenheim MK-4 bombers. At the time of the report, they were needed in the metropolis in case of repelling large German operations and to protect the bases of the British fleet. In addition, ground forces were also needed to support their operations from Syrian and Iraqi airfields.

Summing up the consequences of possible air attacks, the authors of the report believed that oil fields would be out of action for “at least nine months.” “We must state that bombing in the Caucasus will certainly cause significant casualties among the civilian population,” they admitted.

As we can see, with a more detailed examination of the various options for action against the USSR, this plan still had a lot in common with Gamelin’s plan of February 22. Both of them intended to choose the oil fields of the Caucasus as the main place for concentrating military efforts; they both emphasized air power in their attack; both the French and British sides intended to use each other's air bases and coordinate their plans; both plans involved military cooperation with Turkey and Iran.

The French side recognized its interest in the “southern” option in comparison, for example, with plans to conduct military operations in Finland. This, in particular, follows from Gamelin’s note on the possible participation of Franco-British troops in operations in Finland in connection with the outbreak of hostilities between Finland and the USSR on March 10. Gamelin notes that “if we proceed from the weight of the results, then the most appropriate are military actions in the Balkans and the Caucasus, where Germany can be cut off from sources of oil.” He also reported to Prime Minister Daladier on March 12 that, in his opinion, “further development of the issue of an attack on Baku and Batumi” is necessary. On the same day, he gave specific instructions to Weygand, informing him that operations in the Middle East should be carried out under the leadership of the British High Command, and Weygand himself was ordered to take part in all preparatory work. Ground operations in the Caucasus will be carried out by Turkish troops under Turkish command and will involve the Allied Air Force and, possibly, special contingents of the Allied Forces. Weygand was allowed to enter into contact with Chakmak on this issue.

On the same day, March 10, Weygand was informed by the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in the Middle East, General Wavell, that London had received instructions from the British War Ministry to “study the preconditions for possible actions against the Caucasus in the event of a war with Russia.” And from March 9 to 13, negotiations were held in Ankara between the military representatives of England and France - Mitchell and Jono - with the leadership of the Turkish general staff. From these meetings of representatives of the allied command, including the above-mentioned meeting between Weygand and Mitchell on March 7, a period of active Anglo-French cooperation began not only at the highest levels on the European continent, but also directly at the proposed springboard for planned military operations against the USSR in the Near and Middle East .

On March 12, at a meeting of the British War Cabinet, the report of the Chiefs of Staff of March 8 was discussed. Speaking to justify the provisions of the report, the Chief of the Air Force Staff, Air Chief Marshal Newall, emphasized: “An attack on the Caucasus oil fields is the most effective way in which we can strike at Russia.” He expressed hope that within one and a half to three months the oil fields would be completely out of commission, and also informed the military cabinet that modern long-range bombers had been sent to Egypt, which could be used to staff squadrons intended to carry out air strikes in the Caucasus.

When discussing the report, Halifax expressed some doubts about the reasonableness of the actions outlined in it, in particular regarding the “expediency of declaring war on Russia.” "She doesn't want a war with us," he said, suggesting that they hold off on sending bombers to the Middle East. It was considered possible to delay the political decision.

This was the situation with the Anglo-French strategic plans for an attack on the USSR from the south at the end of the Soviet-Finnish or “Winter” War on March 13, 1940. It should be noted that there were concerted efforts between England and France, the priority of London in the proposed operations and the role of air weapons in the methods of their implementation. All that was missing was a political decision to attack. The “Winter War” itself sharply intensified the development of such plans and it was very important to monitor their implementation after its end, when the formal pretext for an attack in the light of the hostilities ongoing between the USSR and Finland simply ceased to exist.

Allied preparation of air strikes against the USSR from the end of the Winter War to the beginning of the Western campaign

The conclusion of a peace treaty with Finland did not remove the problem of confrontation with the Anglo-French allies from the USSR. Diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and these two Western countries reached a critical point - the British ambassador left Moscow, the Soviet plenipotentiary in France was declared “persona non grata” on March 19. The government crisis in France led to the fall of the cabinet of E. Daladier, accused of insufficient assistance to Finland, and a government led by P. Reynaud came to power.

Meanwhile, preparations for an air strike in the Caucasus have by no means stopped. Moreover, she received an additional boost.

Already on March 22, 1940, the day after Paul Reynaud became chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied ground forces, General Gamelin, prepared a note on the proposed operation in the Caucasus, with the aim of depriving Germany and the USSR of sources of oil. And on March 25, Reynaud sent a letter to the British government, where he persistently called for action to “paralyze the economy of the USSR,” insisting that the allies must take “responsibility for the break with the USSR.”

On March 26, the British chiefs of staff came to the conclusion that it was necessary to come to an agreement with Turkey; in their opinion, this would allow “if we have to attack Russia, to act effectively.”

On March 27, members of the British War Cabinet examined in detail Reynaud's letter of March 25. It was decided that "we should state that we wish to prepare such plans, but should not make any commitments in relation to this operation."

On the same day, a meeting of the Allied Chiefs of Staff took place. Chief of Staff of the British Air Force Newall reported that the British had completed preparation of the plan, the implementation of which was scheduled to begin in a month. It was planned to send three squadrons of long-range Blenheim-type aircraft to Egypt. They were supposed to fly to the Caucasus from Syria, crossing the territory of Turkey. This was one of the difficulties in implementing the plan.

Spy raids

These are one of many documents that were alarming signals for the Soviet leadership from the southern borders of the country...

"The sun had not yet risen over the gray sand dunes near the British military camps in Habbaniya, Iraq. The engines of the Lockheed 12A aircraft parked on the tarmac were already warm. Its original registration number was G-AGAR, but now all its markings were painted over The numerous aerial photography devices with which the aircraft was equipped were also not visible to prying eyes.

A week ago, on March 23, 1940, this plane took off from London and, after making two intermediate landings in Malta and Cairo, arrived in Habbaniya. The crew for this mission was selected by the British Secret Service, namely the head of the SIS air unit, Colonel F.W. Winterbotham (F.W. Winterbothem). He employed the best British air spy, Australian Sidney Cotton. Shortly before sunrise on March 30, 1940, Lockheed rose from Habbaniya Base into clear, cloudless skies and headed northeast.

The mission assigned to the four-man crew, commanded by Hugh Mac Phail - Cotton's personal assistant - was aerial reconnaissance (espionage) of Soviet oil fields in Baku. At an altitude of 7000 m, Lockheed circled over Baku. The shutters of automatic cameras clicked, and two crew members - photographers from the RAF - took additional pictures with hand-held cameras. Closer to noon - after 10 o'clock - the spy plane landed in Habbaniya. Four days later he took off again. This time he made a reconnaissance of oil refineries in Batumi. At the same time, Mac Phail had to go through shelling from Soviet anti-aircraft artillery.

Aerial photographs have already been transmitted to the headquarters of the British and French air forces in the Middle East. Moreover, already in January 1940 there was a task from the British and French governments, simply a “grand” plan: an air strike on the Caucasian oil fields in the Soviet Union. Within 10-45 days, nine squadrons of bombers were to destroy to the ground 67 oil refineries in Baku, 43 in Grozny and 12 in Batumi. “The destruction of the targets in question,” as the British Air Force headquarters indicated, should “sooner or later lead to the complete destruction of the military potential of the USSR and could decide the outcome of the war.”

This is what English spy raids looked like as described by the German researcher O. Groler on the pages of his monograph “The Struggle for Air Supremacy”, in the chapter “Plan Barbarossa”.

The stationary photographic equipment installed on the Lockheed 12A consisted of three F.24 cameras: from an altitude of 6000 m they could photograph stripes 18.5 km wide. Since the shooting took place at a high altitude, the warm air removed from the engines was used to condition the cameras. Sidney Cotton's special unit, in which, in addition to Lockheed-12A aircraft, a Supermarine Spitfire aircraft was equipped for aerial reconnaissance in 1940, was based at Heston commercial airport near London.

NKVD message about violation of the Soviet border by an aircraft from Turkish territory

April 5 p.m. At 11.15, in the area of ​​the Soviet village of Sarp (14 km southwest of Batumi), at an altitude of 2000 m, one twin-engine silver aircraft flew over the border from Turkey. Identification marks are not defined. The plane was heading towards Batumi.

At 11.22 the plane is over the island. Nuryu-Gel, on the southwestern outskirts of Batumi, was shelled by four artillery shots, after which it headed northeast, towards the Batumi oil refinery (about 15 km from the border).

Having been fired a second time by 30 anti-aircraft artillery shells and anti-aircraft machine guns, the plane headed east and disappeared into the mountains. A few minutes later the same plane flew over the village at an altitude of 2000 m. Adjaris-Tskali and in the area of ​​the border village. Oglauri fled to Turkey. A protest is lodged with the Turkish border commissioner. Komkor Maslennikov."

TELEGRAM OF THE Plenipotentiary REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR IN GREAT BRITAIN I. M. MAISKY TO THE NKID USSR
April 20, 1940 Immediately
From a source, the absolute reliability of which I cannot vouch for, but which certainly deserves attention, I received the following information: on the twentieth of March, at the airfield in Heston (London), two bomb carriers of the latest American type were disguised as civilian aircraft and equipped with cameras. One of these planes flew to Iraq, and from there, from the airfield in Khabaniya, flew to Baku specifically for photographic filming of oil fields and areas. Around April 12th the said plane returned to London, bringing with it well-taken photographs of Baku and an area covering an area of ​​approximately 100 square miles. According to the aircraft's crew, the flight went without any difficulties, only once the aircraft was fired upon (but without damage) while it was over Soviet territory. The plane was branded "G-AGAR". The second camouflaged plane, contrary to initial assumptions, was not sent to Baku, since the first one brought quite sufficient photographic material. On 15 April, a bomber squadron flew from Heston (London) to Habaniya (Iraq). All this, apparently, must be considered not in the plane of any immediate action by the British against us (the general military-political situation is now of a somewhat different order), but in the plane of preparation in the event of a conflict with the USSR in the further course of the war.
May"

As you can see, the information from the USSR plenipotentiary in England was quite objective, despite the reservations. Such information - from a variety of sources - could not help but force the Soviet leadership to take urgent action.

Specific activities of the USSR (until recently) were not considered. In reality, the reaction of the USSR followed immediately. Already on April 4, 1940, the People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov wrote a note to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov, which, in particular, spoke about the transfer of formations returning from the front to the south and the strengthening aviation and anti-aircraft artillery of the southern borders of the country: additionally 17 medium-caliber divisions were formed and consolidated into regiments for the air defense of Baku, Tbilisi, Batumi, Tuapse and Novorossiysk; 7 small-caliber artillery divisions were formed only for the air defense of Baku.

10 days later, at a meeting of the highest command staff of the Red Army, J.V. Stalin said, speaking about the results of the Winter War: “The question is, who did we defeat?... The entire defense of Finland and the war were conducted at the behest, at the instigation, on the advice of England and France... Result talks about this.

We defeated not only the Finns - this is not such a big task. The main thing in our victory is that we defeated the technology, tactics and strategy of the advanced states of Europe, whose representatives were the teachers of the Finns. This is our main victory."

The influence of the “English factor” (the “allied” or Anglo-French factor simply ceased to exist from the end of June 1940) remained in the specific outlines of Soviet military plans until the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. This is not surprising, considering that even on May 10, 1940, the day of the German offensive in the West, Reynaud called Churchill to report Weygand’s readiness to bomb Baku from May 15, and the British circles themselves did not rule out a German attack on the USSR. the possibility of strikes on Baku in order to prevent Germany from using Soviet oil.

Example - Order of the People's Commissar of Defense on establishing a training system and procedure for staffing air force universities and improving the quality of training of flight and technical personnel No. 080 dated March 3, 1941, where in section D on the training of Air Force staff commanders it is stated that the intended opponents are Germany , Japan, Turkey and England.

The collection of documents "1941. Documents", published in 1998, practically for the first time confirmed the materials leaking into the open press about the Anglo-Soviet confrontation of 1939-1941. In a conversation between Komsomolskaya Pravda columnist Sergei Maslov and one of the compilers of the collection, the famous historian Lev Bezymensky (The Truth about June 22 - Komsomolskaya Pravda, June 18, 1998), the latter stated: “As for Stalin, he, of course, was not he liked the strengthening of Germany and its transformation into a European hegemon. But, pushing Hitler towards military adventures, he hoped to deal with his most sworn enemy. And from many of Stalin’s speeches it followed that he considered England as the main enemy of the Soviet Union.”

The available material allows us to trace the influence of the “English factor” not only on the example of the crisis of the spring of 1940 in the south or the general “anti-English” activities of the USSR in 1939-1941, but also on a specific example, even more visual and impressive than the general background itself. example of the development (and deformation) of Soviet military aviation in the two years preceding the Great Patriotic War...

For the first time, the question of the influence of the so-called “English factor” on the development of Soviet military aviation was raised in 1990 by researcher V.A. Belokon (at that time - candidate of physical and mathematical sciences, head of the interfaculty laboratory of Forecasting Problems of Moscow State University, graduated from the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology in aerodynamics and worked at TsAGI.

This is how he presented this thesis:

“Another important point, which is still ignored by even our most knowledgeable historians, is that after the signing of the friendship treaty between the USSR and Germany in September 1939, and even more so after the outbreak of the war with Finland, Stalin predicted a war with Great Britain: he claimed control over the Turkish straits and redistribution of the world map in the area of ​​Iraq and Iran. According to S. M. Yeger and R. di Bartini, when the ANT-58 model was approved, the typical targets for bombing were the battleship Nelson and the British Navy base in Scapa Flow. By the same logic, the gunner-radio operator was removed from the Il-2, since the small-caliber machine guns of the Hurricanes and Spitfires of that time could not hit the Il pilot, who was protected by powerful armor, including the transparent armored glass of the cockpit. For the same reason, it was the Mig-3 that was put into mass production, primarily as an interceptor of high-altitude British bombers."

Belokon (now an academician) restated his concept in the article “What prevented Stalin from conquering the world” (Ogonyok, 1998, No. 25, pp. 42-45). He noted the existence of two versions of the general concept of the outbreak of the war between the USSR and Germany, which led to the defeat of the Western group of Soviet troops: the first - the war took the USSR preparing for a defensive war by surprise, the second - Hitler's sudden offensive took the USSR troops by surprise, who were preparing for an offensive war against Germany. Belokon offers a third version - failures befell the USSR due to the fact that it focused on war not with Germany, but with Great Britain: “... an impartial analysis of the aircraft fleet of the USSR Air Force shows the possibility of the existence of a completely different, third version of the start of the war.” Belokon notes that in addition to its heavy bombers, Great Britain could rely on supplies of B-17 and B-24 aircraft from the United States.

I would like to note that the publication of the “techie” Belokon practically coincided in time with the publication of the mentioned materials in the collection “1941. Documents”. His 1990 publication could not rely on this data, so even without direct evidence of the USSR’s anti-British policy, he still came to similar conclusions by analyzing the development of Soviet military aircraft. Thus, the latest publications confirm the main conclusions of V. A. Belokon.

The top leadership of the USSR was well aware of the British aircraft industry. For example, the monthly production of fighters during the Battle of Britain in August - September 1940 was 460-500 aircraft, and according to Soviet data it was 480-549. These and other data were contained in the report of the intelligence department of the General Staff of the Red Army on military equipment and the economy of foreign states, sent to the People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry of the USSR Shakhurin N665027ss - similar reports regularly came to the NKAP. A report dated January 9, 1941, announced the launch of four-engine bombers at the Birmingham Austin plant and the cessation of production of single-engine Battle aircraft. Post-war materials from the British side indeed say that on November 7, 1940, 344 Battles were excluded from Austin’s order (although, before the switch to Stirling, 100 of them were still released). And the report dated January 12 spoke of minor damage to the Austin plant in Coventry, where Stirlings are produced. Having made their first flight on May 14, 1939, these aircraft were first used in combat on the night of February 10-11, 1941. Thus, the USSR knew about these aircraft even before their first real combat flight.

Awareness of Great Britain's plans in terms of considering it as one of the possible opponents could not but affect the prospects for the development of the Red Army Air Force. The sad fate of the MiG-Z, which was discontinued during a critical period for the country due to the inconsistency of its inherent qualities with the real situation of the war with Germany, is well known. But until now, none of the Russian works by both military historians and historians of technology has given a specific explanation of the reason for the launch of the Mig-Z high-altitude fighter, which became the most popular Soviet aircraft of the new series at the largest aircraft plant in the country No. generation, although many publications note that the Soviet leadership knew about the lack of heavy bombers in the German Air Force operating within the MiG ceiling. But after all, Great Britain was the only country (besides the United States) that developed and subsequently massively used bombers of this class.

Thus, we can conclude that the “English factor” has a negative impact on the combat effectiveness of the Red Army Air Force at a critical time for the country. This important problem is still practically not considered by Russian researchers.

The art of war is a science in which nothing succeeds except what has been calculated and thought out.

Napoleon

Plan Barbarossa is a plan for a German attack on the USSR, based on the principle of lightning war, blitzkrieg. The plan began to be developed in the summer of 1940, and on December 18, 1940, Hitler approved a plan according to which the war was to end in November 1941 at the latest.

Plan Barbarossa was named after Frederick Barbarossa, the 12th century emperor who became famous for his campaigns of conquest. This contained elements of symbolism, to which Hitler himself and his entourage paid so much attention. The plan received its name on January 31, 1941.

Number of troops to implement the plan

Germany was preparing 190 divisions to fight the war and 24 divisions as reserves. 19 tank and 14 motorized divisions were allocated for the war. The total number of troops that Germany sent to the USSR, according to various estimates, ranges from 5 to 5.5 million people.

The apparent superiority in USSR technology is not worth taking into account, since by the beginning of the wars, Germany's technical tanks and aircraft were superior to those of the Soviet Union, and the army itself was much more trained. Suffice it to recall the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, where the Red Army demonstrated weakness in literally everything.

Direction of the main attack

Barbarossa's plan determined 3 main directions for attack:

• Army Group "South". A blow to Moldova, Ukraine, Crimea and access to the Caucasus. Further movement to the line Astrakhan - Stalingrad (Volgograd).
• Army Group "Center". Line "Minsk - Smolensk - Moscow". Advance to Nizhny Novgorod, aligning the Volna - Northern Dvina line.
• Army Group "North". Attack on the Baltic states, Leningrad and further advance to Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. At the same time, the “Norway” army was supposed to fight in the north together with the Finnish army.

Around the end of October 1941, the German command planned to reach the Volga - Northern Dvina line, thereby capturing the entire European part of the USSR. This was the idea behind the lightning war. After the blitzkrieg, there should have been lands beyond the Urals, which, without the support of the center, would have quickly surrendered to the winner.

Until about mid-August 1941, the Germans believed that the war was going according to plan, but in September there were already entries in the diaries of officers that the Barbarossa plan had failed and the war would be lost. The best proof that Germany in August 1941 believed that there were only a few weeks left before the end of the war with the USSR was Goebbels’ speech. The Minister of Propaganda suggested that the Germans collect additional warm clothes for the needs of the army. The government decided that this step was not necessary, since there would be no war in the winter.

Implementation of the plan

The first three weeks of the war assured Hitler that everything was going according to plan. The army rapidly moved forward, winning victories, but the Soviet army suffered huge losses:

• 28 divisions out of 170 were put out of action.
• 70 divisions lost about 50% of their personnel.
• 72 divisions remained combat-ready (43% of those available at the start of the war).

Over the same 3 weeks, the average rate of advance of German troops deep into the country was 30 km per day.

By July 11, the Army Group “North” occupied almost the entire Baltic territory, providing access to Leningrad, the Army Group “Center” reached Smolensk, and the Army Group “South” reached Kyiv. These were the latest achievements that were fully consistent with the plan of the German command. After this, failures began (still local, but already indicative). Nevertheless, the initiative in the war until the end of 1941 was on the side of Germany.

Germany's failures in the North

Army “North” occupied the Baltic states without any problems, especially since there was practically no partisan movement there. The next strategic point to be captured was Leningrad. Here it turned out that the Wehrmacht was beyond its strength. The city did not capitulate to the enemy and until the end of the war, despite all efforts, Germany was unable to capture it.

Army Failures Center

Army "Center" reached Smolensk without problems, but was stuck near the city until September 10. Smolensk resisted for almost a month. The German command demanded a decisive victory and the advancement of troops, since such a delay near the city, which was planned to be taken without large losses, was unacceptable and called into question the implementation of the Barbarossa plan. As a result, the Germans took Smolensk, but their troops were pretty battered.

Historians today evaluate the Battle of Smolensk as a tactical victory for Germany, but a strategic victory for Russia, since it was possible to stop the advance of troops towards Moscow, which allowed the capital to prepare for defense.

The advance of the German army deep into the country was complicated by the partisan movement of Belarus.

Failures of the South Army

Army “South” reached Kyiv in 3.5 weeks and, like Army “Center” near Smolensk, was stuck in battle. Ultimately, it was possible to take the city due to the clear superiority of the army, but Kyiv held out almost until the end of September, which also hampered the advance of the German army and made a significant contribution to the disruption of Barbarossa’s plan.

Map of the German advance plan

Above is a map showing the German command's offensive plan. The map shows: in green – the borders of the USSR, in red – the border to which Germany planned to reach, in blue – the deployment and plan for the advancement of German troops.

General state of affairs

• In the North, it was not possible to capture Leningrad and Murmansk. The advance of the troops stopped.
• It was with great difficulty that the Center managed to reach Moscow. At the time the German army reached the Soviet capital, it was already clear that no blitzkrieg had happened.
• In the South it was not possible to take Odessa and seize the Caucasus. By the end of September, Hitler's troops had just captured Kyiv and launched an attack on Kharkov and Donbass.

Why Germany's blitzkrieg failed

Germany's blitzkrieg failed because the Wehrmacht prepared the Barbarossa plan, as it later turned out, based on false intelligence data. Hitler admitted this by the end of 1941, saying that if he had known the real state of affairs in the USSR, he would not have started the war on June 22.

The tactics of lightning war were based on the fact that the country has one line of defense on the western border, all large army units are located on the western border, and aviation is located on the border. Since Hitler was confident that all Soviet troops were located on the border, this formed the basis of the blitzkrieg - to destroy the enemy army in the first weeks of the war, and then quickly move deeper into the country without encountering serious resistance.

In fact, there were several lines of defense, the army was not located with all its forces on the western border, there were reserves. Germany did not expect this, and by August 1941 it became clear that the lightning war had failed and Germany could not win the war. The fact that the Second World War lasted right up to 1945 only proves that the Germans fought in a very organized and brave manner. Thanks to the fact that they had the economy of the whole of Europe behind them (speaking of the war between Germany and the USSR, many for some reason forget that the German army included units from almost all European countries) they were able to fight successfully.

Did Barbarossa's plan fail?

I propose to evaluate the Barbarossa plan according to 2 criteria: global and local. Global(reference point - the Great Patriotic War) - the plan was thwarted, since the lightning war did not work out, the German troops were bogged down in battles. Local(landmark – intelligence data) – the plan was carried out. The German command drew up the Barbarossa plan based on the assumption that the USSR had 170 divisions on the country’s border and there were no additional echelons of defense. There are no reserves or reinforcements. The army was preparing for this. In 3 weeks, 28 Soviet divisions were completely destroyed, and in 70, approximately 50% of the personnel and equipment were disabled. At this stage, the blitzkrieg worked and, in the absence of reinforcements from the USSR, gave the desired results. But it turned out that the Soviet command had reserves, not all troops were located on the border, mobilization brought high-quality soldiers into the army, there were additional lines of defense, the “charm” of which Germany felt near Smolensk and Kiev.

Therefore, the failure of the Barbarossa plan should be considered as a huge strategic mistake of German intelligence, led by Wilhelm Canaris. Today, some historians connect this man with English agents, but there is no evidence of this. But if we assume that this is really the case, then it becomes clear why Canaris palmed Hitler off with the absolute lie that the USSR was not ready for war and all the troops were located on the border.

Great Patriotic War

German attack plan on the USSR

Adolf Hitler studying a map of Russia

The Soviet-Finnish war served as a harsh lesson for the country's leadership, showing that our army, weakened by mass repressions, was not ready for a modern war. Stalin made the necessary conclusions and began to take measures to reorganize and re-equip the army. In the upper echelons of power there was complete confidence in the inevitability of war, and the task was to have time to prepare for it.

Hitler also understood our unpreparedness. In his inner circle, he said shortly before the attack that Germany had made a revolution in military affairs, ahead of other countries by three to four years; but all countries are catching up, and Germany may soon lose this advantage, and therefore it is necessary to solve the military problems on the continent in a year or two. Despite the fact that Germany and the USSR made peace in 1939, Hitler still decided to attack the Soviet Union, as it was a necessary step towards world domination by Germany and the “Third Reich”. German intelligence officers came to the conclusion that the Soviet army was in many ways inferior to the German one - it was less organized, less prepared and, most importantly, the technical equipment of Russian soldiers left much to be desired. It should be emphasized that the British intelligence service MI6 also played a role in inciting Hitler against the USSR. Before the war, the British managed to acquire the German Enigma encryption machine and thanks to this they read all the encrypted correspondence of the Germans. From Wehrmacht encryption they knew the exact timing of the attack on the USSR. But before Churchill sent a warning to Stalin, British intelligence tried to use the information they received to spark a German-Soviet conflict. She also owns a fake that was distributed in the United States - supposedly the Soviet Union, having received information about Hitler's impending attack, decided to get ahead of him and was itself preparing a preemptive strike on Germany. This disinformation was intercepted by Soviet intelligence and reported to Stalin. The widespread practice of fakes caused him to distrust all information about the imminent Nazi attack.

Plan Barbarossa

In June 1940, Hitler instructed Generals Marx and Paulus to develop a plan for an attack on the USSR. On December 18, 1940, the plan, codenamed Plan Barbarossa, was ready. The document was produced in only nine copies, of which three were presented to the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces, air force and navy, and six were hidden in the safes of the Wehrmacht command. Directive No. 21 contained only a general plan and initial instructions on waging war against the USSR.

The essence of the Barbarossa plan was to attack the USSR, taking advantage of the enemy’s unpreparedness, defeat the Red Army and occupy the Soviet Union. Hitler placed the main emphasis on modern military equipment that belonged to Germany and the effect of surprise. The attack on the USSR was planned in the spring-summer of 1941, the final date of the attack was made dependent on the success of the German army in the Balkans. Setting a deadline for aggression, Hitler said: “I will not make the same mistake as Napoleon; when I go to Moscow, I will set out early enough to reach it before winter.” The generals convinced him that a victorious war would last no more than 4-6 weeks.

At the same time, Germany used the memorandum of November 25, 1940 to put pressure on those countries whose interests were affected by it, and primarily on Bulgaria, which in March 1941 joined the fascist coalition. Soviet-German relations continued to deteriorate throughout the spring of 1941, especially with the invasion of Yugoslavia by German troops hours after the signing of the Soviet-Yugoslav Friendship Treaty. The USSR did not react to this aggression, as well as to the attack on Greece. At the same time, Soviet diplomacy managed to achieve a major success by signing a non-aggression pact with Japan on April 13, which significantly reduced tension on the Far Eastern borders of the USSR.

Tank group

Despite the alarming course of events, the USSR, until the very beginning of the war with Germany, could not believe in the inevitability of a German attack. Soviet supplies to Germany increased significantly due to the renewal of the 1940 economic agreements on January 11, 1941. In order to demonstrate its “trust” to Germany, the Soviet government refused to take into account the numerous reports received since the beginning of 1941 about an attack on the USSR being prepared and did not take the necessary measures on its western borders. Germany was still viewed by the Soviet Union "as a great friendly power."

According to the “Barbarossa Plan,” 153 German divisions were involved in aggression against the USSR. In addition, Finland, Italy, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary intended to participate in the upcoming war. Together they fielded another 37 divisions. The invasion force consisted of about 5 million soldiers, 4,275 aircraft, 3,700 tanks. The troops of Germany and its allies were united into 3 army groups: “North”, “Center”, “South”. Each group included 2-4 armies, 1-2 tank groups, and from the air German troops were supposed to cover 4 air fleets.

The most numerous was the army group "South" (Field Marshal von Rundstedt), consisting of German and Romanian soldiers. This group was tasked with defeating Soviet troops in Ukraine and Crimea and occupying these territories. Army Group Center (Field Marshal von Bock) was supposed to defeat Soviet troops in Belarus and advance to Minsk-Smolensk-Moscow. Army Group North (Field Marshal von Leeb), with the support of Finnish troops, was to capture the Baltic states, Leningrad, and the Russian North.

Discussion of the OST plan

The final goal of the “Barbaros plan” was the destruction of the Red Army, access to the Ural ridge and the occupation of the European part of the Soviet Union. The basis of German tactics was tank breakthroughs and encirclements. The Russian company was supposed to become a blitzkrieg - a lightning war. Only 2-3 weeks were allotted to defeat the Soviet troops located in the western regions of the USSR. General Jodl told Hitler: “In three weeks this house of cards will fall apart.” The entire campaign was planned to be completed in 2 months.

German troops received instructions to carry out a policy of genocide towards the Slavic and Jewish populations. According to the OST plan, the Nazis intended to destroy 30 million Slavs, and the rest were to be converted into slaves. The Crimean Tatars and the peoples of the Caucasus were considered as possible allies. The enemy army was an almost perfect military mechanism. The German soldier was rightfully considered the best in the world, the officers and generals were excellently trained, the troops had a wealth of experience in combat operations. The most significant drawback of the German army was the underestimation of the enemy’s forces - German generals considered it possible to wage war in several theaters at once: in Western Europe, in Eastern Europe, in Africa. Later, already during the Great Patriotic War, such miscalculations as lack of fuel and unpreparedness for combat operations in winter conditions would take their toll.

Gabriel Tsobekhia

On December 5, 1940, at the next secret military meeting with Hitler, the main command of the ground forces, represented by Halder, reported, in accordance with the results of staff exercises, a plan for an attack on the USSR, initially coded as the “Otto” plan. The decision read: “Start preparations in full swing in accordance with the plan we proposed. The estimated start date for the operation is the end of May” (1941) ( Halder F. Military diary, vol. 2, p. 278). Hitler approved this plan.

General Warlimont was entrusted with drawing up a directive on the war against the USSR, taking into account the decisions made at meetings with Hitler. Jodl, having made some minor corrections, presented it to Hitler for approval on December 17, 1940.

Discussing the Barbarossa plan with the generals, Hitler considered it completely justified. According to the plan, the troops, having broken through the Soviet defenses, went deeper to the east, and then, turning towards Leningrad and Ukraine, completely completed the defeat of the Red Army ( See: Nuremberg Trials, vol. 1, p. 365-366).

On December 18, 1940, the now infamous Directive No. 21, called Plan Barbarossa, was endorsed by Jodl and Keitel and signed by Hitler. It became the main guide for all military and economic preparations of Nazi Germany for an attack on the USSR ( See: ibid., p. 364-367).

It was a bloody plan that embodied the most predatory and barbaric aspirations of the German fascists. “It was based on the idea of ​​waging a war of annihilation with the unlimited use of the most brutal methods of armed violence” ( History of the Second World War 1939-1945, vol. 3, p. 243).

Plan Barbarossa consisted of three parts: the first set out its general goals, the second named Germany's allies in the war against the USSR, and the third planned military operations on land, sea and air. The plan read: “The German armed forces must be prepared to defeat Soviet Russia through a quick military operation even before the end of the war with England” ( The Nuremberg Trials, vol. 1, p. 364).

The immediate and most important strategic goal was the destruction of the main forces of the Red Army in the western border zone “in bold operations with deep advance of tank units.” It was believed that in this way 2/3 of all the forces of the Red Army would be destroyed, and the remaining troops would be pinned down on the flanks by the active participation of Romania and Finland in the war against the Soviet Union. “The ultimate goal of the operation is to isolate ourselves from Asian Russia along the common line Arkhangelsk - Volga” ( Ibid., p. 365).

The main military-strategic objects that had important political and diplomatic significance were considered in the plan to be Leningrad, Moscow, the Central Industrial Region and the Donetsk Basin. A special place was given to the capture of Moscow. The plan provided for the offensive of strike groups in three strategic directions. The first, northern group, concentrated in East Prussia, was supposed to strike Leningrad and destroy Soviet troops in the Baltic states. The second group attacked from the Warsaw area and north of it to Minsk and Smolensk in order to destroy the forces of the Red Army in Belarus. The task of the third group, concentrated south of the Pripyat marshes, in the Ljubljana region, was to strike Kyiv. After the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt, it was planned to continue the “offensive operation to capture the most important center of communications and defense industry - Moscow” ( Ibid., p. 366).

The delivery of auxiliary strikes was planned from the territory of Finland to Leningrad and Murmansk and from the territory of Romania to Mogilev-Podolsky, Zhmerinka and along the Black Sea coast.

Hitler planned to give the order for an attack on the USSR “eight weeks before the scheduled start of the operation.” “Preparations,” he ordered, “requiring more time, must be started (if they have not already begun) now and completed by 15.5.41” ( Ibid., p. 365). The appointed period was explained by the peculiarities of the climatic conditions of the USSR: Hitler was “in a hurry” to finish the campaign to defeat the Soviet country before the severe Russian frosts.

Due to special secrecy, the Barbarossa plan was prepared in only nine copies, which fully corresponded to the task of keeping the preparation of Germany’s treacherous attack on the Soviet Union in deep secrecy. Copy No. 1 was sent to the High Command of the Ground Forces, No. 2 to the High Command of the Navy, No. 3 to the High Command of the Air Force. The remaining six copies remained at the disposal of the Supreme High Command of the German Armed Forces, in the safes of the OKW headquarters, five of them in the operational department "L" of the Supreme High Command in the Maybach camp.

The goal of Plan Barbarossa itself characterizes it as a purely aggressive plan; This is also evidenced by the fact that “the plan did not provide for defensive measures at all” ( Ibid., p. 369). If there were no other evidence, then even “with this,” Paulus rightly wrote, “the false assertions about preventive war against the threatening danger, which, similar to the frenzied Goebbels propaganda, were disseminated by the OKW,” are debunked ( Ibid.).

The Barbarossa plan was based on the theories of total and lightning wars, which were the basis of the Nazi military doctrine. It was the “highest Achievement” of the military art of Nazi Germany, accumulated over the years of preparation for an aggressive war, during the seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia, in the war against Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Holland, France and England. When planning the “lightning-fast” defeat of the USSR, fascist German strategists proceeded from a vicious theory about the fragility of the Soviet state system, the weakness of the Soviet Armed Forces, which would not be able to withstand the massive attacks of the armored fist of Guderian’s tank divisions, first-class Luftwaffe aircraft, and German infantry.

The following figures eloquently demonstrate how adventurous the Wehrmacht's strategy was.

Planning and launching an attack on the USSR with 153 German divisions on a front from the Black Sea to the Barents Sea, exceeding 2 thousand km, the German General Staff expected to advance German troops to a strategic depth of more than 2 thousand km before the winter of 1941 and stretch the front by more than 3 thousand km This meant that German troops had to advance continuously, covering 25-30 km per day. Even if we assume the incredible, i.e., that the Red Army would not offer fierce resistance to the Nazi invaders, then moving continuously at such a speed would be simply unthinkable. By the end of the winter campaign in the USSR, the German army would have had an operational density unacceptable in military tactics - one division per 20-odd kilometers of front ( See: Projector D. Decree, op., p. 397).

The self-confidence of German generals is characterized by controversy about the time frame during which the USSR will be defeated. If initially E. Marx called the period 9-17 weeks, then the General Staff planned a maximum of 16 weeks. Brauchitsch later gave a time frame of 6-8 weeks. Finally, in a conversation with Field Marshal von Bock, Hitler boastfully declared that the Soviet Union would be finished within six, and maybe three weeks ( See: Bezymensky L. Decree, op., p. 156).