Annexation of the Caucasus to Russia

The beginning of Russia's movement towards the Caucasus dates back to the early period of the history of the Russian state, to the time of the reign of Svyatoslav, that is, to the end of the 10th century. Having defeated the Khazars, whose possessions at that time extended to many parts of the Caucasus and the southeastern steppes of the present-day European part of Russia, Svyatoslav reached the Yasses and Kosogi, who lived along the foothills of the Caucasus east of the Sea of ​​Azov, defeated them and thus crossed the Russian border to the Kuban itself, where the Russian Tmutarakan principality later appeared. But then, during the appanage period, Rus' was moved far away from the shores of the Sea of ​​​​Azov. The beginning of relations between Russia and the Caucasus dates back to the end of the 15th century.

Random photos of the Caucasus

For the first time, active action on the part of Russia in relation to the Caucasus appeared under Peter I. In an effort to open a trade route to India, for which it was necessary to become the owner of the Caspian Sea, Peter undertook a campaign in 1722-1723. and conquered the Caspian provinces. However, Russia's attack on the mountainous Caucasus caused the formation of a movement of murids - fighters for the faith - among the Muslim mountaineers. Under the leadership of the leader - the imam - the murids waged a holy war - ghazavat - against the infidels (Christians). In 1834, Shamil was proclaimed imam, creating a strong theocratic state in Dagestan and Chechnya. In 1830-1840 Shamil managed to win a number of victories over Russian troops. However, the severity of the internal order in Shamil’s state and the cruel oppression of the imam’s associates gradually corrupted the imamate from within. In 1859, Shamil’s troops were finally defeated, and he himself was captured. The main stages of Russia's advance into the Caucasus.

The first stage, which began in the mid-16th century, lasted until the end of the 17th century and was a period of peaceful colonization of the region. It is characterized by vassal-allied forms of relations between the Moscow kings and the elders of the Chechen communities. Moscow tried to expand its influence in the region, mainly through political and trade and economic means. This policy was successful and the Chechen communities on a voluntary basis (through the conclusion of treaties) declared recognition of the supreme power of the Moscow state.

The second stage, which lasted almost the entire 18th century, marks the beginning of Russia's open military expansion into the North Caucasus. During the reign of Peter I and then Catherine II, the doctrine of military colonization of mountain lands dominated. And although in 1781 the voluntary subordination of the Chechen communities of Russia bordering on Russian fortresses was formalized by oaths, in 1785 a powerful national movement began in Chechnya under the leadership of Sheikh Mansur. From this moment on, the armed struggle of the Chechen people for freedom and independence begins. This is where the Chechen national movement originated. From the end of the 18th century. Sheikh Mansur was the first to attempt to unite the North Caucasian peoples under the banner of Islam into a single state. However, Sheikh Mansour failed to fully implement this idea.

The anti-colonial movement of the highlanders that began in Chechnya also spread to some other regions of the North Caucasus. It was attended mainly by the lower social classes of the mountaineers. The propertied layers of the mountain peoples initially tried to use the anti-colonial movement of the peasants in the interests of consolidating their power in the mountain communities, as well as to restore the lost positions of freedom of choice in relations with Moscow. But soon, frightened by the growth of the anti-feudal orientation of Sheikh Mansur’s movement, the mountain elite not only moved away from him, but in a number of cases, together with Russian troops, took part in pacifying the rebellious peasants. The first imam of the highlanders of the North Caucasus waged a war with the tsarist troops for about six years, but was defeated. Sheikh Mansur was captured in 1791 and died in the Shlisselburg fortress.

The third stage occurs in the first half of the nineteenth century. With the appointment of General A.P. Ermolov (1816-1827) as commander of the Russian army in the Caucasus, the systematic advance of Russian troops deep into the territory of Chechnya began, and military pressure intensified. In response, a national movement is growing in Chechnya. It has been headed by Beybulat Teymiev for more than 30 years. He managed to unite the majority of Chechen societies for the first time. He also tried to unite the mountain peoples by concluding an alliance of free Chechnya with the feudal principalities of the North Caucasus. Beybulat Teymiev was a supporter of a peaceful resolution of the conflict and sought to avoid a major war with Russia. His treacherous murder contributed to the escalation of hostilities.

In 1834, Imam Shamil managed to complete what Sheikh Mansur began: to unite part of the highlanders of the North Caucasus in the fight against Tsarist Russia and create an imamate - a secular-religious state, which was able to resist the then strongest military power in the world for 27 years.

In 1859, Shamil was defeated and became an honorary prisoner of Emperor Alexander II. He and his relatives were treated kindly by the tsar and renounced the ideals of the Caucasian War. Chechnya found itself in the hands of the tsarist military administration. Instead of the promised autonomy in internal affairs, the Chechens received a colonial regime. They were pushed back to the foothills and mountainous areas. In agreement with Turkey, tsarism began the voluntary-forced resettlement of Chechens to the Ottoman Empire. As a result, the tsarist authorities got rid of a significant part of the population. The Chechens responded to the policy of seizures, deportations, and violence with uprisings. Tsarism tried to solve the problem by force. However, the violence only provoked new protests. And then the so-called military-people's government was introduced in Chechnya, in other words, a military-occupation regime.

Analyzing the causes of the Caucasian War, it should be noted that it was a consequence not only of the military expansion of tsarism, but also of internal strife in the Caucasus, the struggle of local elites for power and influence in mountain societies. Aggressive ethno-nationalism and religious extremism in Chechnya have always been opposed by pro-Russian forces that supported the idea of ​​​​creating a secular, democratic state and traditional Islam. In addition, the basis of national movements, uprisings, revolutions and wars in the Caucasus were socio-economic reasons: backwardness and poverty of the majority of the population of the region, given over to the corrupt colonial administration and local bureaucracy.

In general, the history of Russian-Caucasian relations during this period testifies not to a war of peoples and their cultures, but to a confrontation at the level of the interests of the elites, which did not always coincide with the interests of the nation. Undoubtedly, at the heart of the confrontation between Chechnya and Russia there was an element of intercivilizational conflict, but it was not dominant. The Chechen national movement often had a religious overlay. However, the idea of ​​preserving and developing an ethnic group always prevailed over the idea of ​​religious wars. Violence, gross interference in the traditional way of life of the mountaineers - this is what pushed them to war with Russia. The same thing happened in the modern Chechen war. Having launched large-scale military operations against the civilian population, Moscow provoked massive resistance of Chechens to federal troops and gave rise to aggressive separatism (nationalism). But this time, only part of the Chechen population took part in the armed struggle. The majority of Chechens were against the war with Russia. Just as at one time there were Chechen communities that fought against Imam Shamil, so now there were those who consciously opposed Dudayev. But it was during the Caucasian War that the ideology of Chechen militant ethnonationalism was born. Modern Chechen separatists rely on it, rejecting the idea of ​​a union of Chechnya with democratic Russia, erasing from history the peaceful creative periods of development of Russian-Chechen relations.

Fourth stage. During the period that Chechnya was part of Russia (the second half of the 19th century), tsarism pursued a policy of carrots and sticks. State-minded representatives of the tsarist administration realized that violence could not solve the problem of the mountaineers. In the 70-90s. There is a weakening of the police regime, and a pro-Russian Chechen elite is being formed. The first Russian schools for highlanders were created. The region is gradually being drawn into the economic system of Russian capitalism. In Grozny, oil production and refining begins, a railroad is built, and a national bourgeoisie is formed. It was during this period (the years of the reign of the reformer Tsar Alexander II) that Chechnya put forward such spiritual leaders as Kunta-Khadzhi, Soltsa-Khadzhi, Denis-Sheikh Arsanov, Bammat-Girey Mitaev, Ali Mitaev, Sugaip-Mullu - bearers of the ideas traditional for Chechnya ( Sufi) Islam. During this period, favorable conditions developed for the peaceful resolution of national problems within the framework of the beginning of liberalization of the Russian political system towards the formation of a constitutional monarchy. The elite strata of Chechen society, despite relapses of ethnocide against Chechens and Ingush, tried to fit into Russian society and thereby enable their people to benefit from the fruits of Russian culture. It is noteworthy that Chechnya, after joining Russia, took an active part in almost all of its wars. And this despite the fact that the Chechens were exempt from military service. Chechen and Ingush volunteer soldiers became famous in the Russian-Turkish (1877-1878), Russian-Japanese, Russian-German wars. Interesting in this regard is the assessment by Russian Emperor Nicholas II of the actions of the Ingush and Chechen regiments during the Brusilov breakthrough on the Russian-German front (1915). In a telegram to the Governor-General of the Terek Region, Nicholas II wrote: Like a mountain avalanche, the Ingush regiment fell on the German Iron Division. He was immediately supported by the Chechen regiment. In the history of the Russian Fatherland, including our Preobrazhensky Regiment, there was no case of a cavalry attack on an enemy unit armed with heavy artillery: 4.5 thousand killed, 3.5 thousand captured, 2.5 thousand wounded, it stopped in less than an hour and a half there was an iron division, which the best military units of our allies were afraid to come into contact with. Convey on my behalf, the royal court, on behalf of the entire Russian army, fraternal heartfelt greetings to the fathers, mothers, sisters, wives and brides of these brave eagles of the Caucasus, who with their fearless feat marked the beginning of the end of the German hordes. Russia will never forget this feat, honor and praise to them. With fraternal greetings, Nicholas II. August 25, 1915. The Chechen regiment was part of the so-called Wild Division, created on the initiative of the younger brother of Nicholas II - Grand Duke Mikhail Alexandrovich. During the First World War, the regiment fought on the South-Eastern Front of the Russian Army, commanded by General Alexei Brusilov. The Chechens distinguished themselves not only in the famous “Brussilov breakthrough” of the Austro-German defense, but also in the battles in Galicia and the Carpathians, in crossings across the Dniester and Prut, in the battles of Polyanchik, Rybne, Tyshkovets, Stanislavov, in the area of ​​the Lomnice River and other operations. The desperate forays and heroic attacks of the “eagles of the Caucasus” were appreciated by the command of the Russian army - every month from 40 to 150 officers and horsemen of the Chechen regiment were awarded military orders, medals, honorary weapons, and received new titles for bravery in battles. On awards that were given to subjects of non-Christian religion, images of Christian saints (St. George, St. Vladimir, St. Anna, etc.) were replaced by the state emblem of the Russian Empire - the double-headed eagle.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, tsarism has relied on violence in relations with mountain peoples. In response, the national movement of the Chechens takes the form of abrekism. (abrek - robber, people's defender). During the period of three Russian revolutions, Russian social democracy had a noticeable influence on Chechen society. Socialism soon becomes a competing ideology with Islam among some of the intelligentsia. Public figures - T. Eldarkhanov, A. Sheripov, and others were engaged in educational work and raising national consciousness. The fifth stage of relations covers the Soviet era. During the years of revolutions and civil war (1917 to 1925), anarchy and anarchy reigned in Chechnya. The national movement split and failed to consolidate society. It identified three directions: state nationalism, oriented towards the Soviets (communists); democratic ethnic nationalism, oriented to the West; radical nationalism, oriented towards Islam and pan-Turkism. The attempt to create a theocratic state (the emirate of Sheikh Uzun-haji) was unsuccessful. Ultimately, most of the population chose in favor of the Soviet government, which promised freedom, equality, land, and statehood.

During the class clashes of the 20s, Grozny repeatedly changed hands. In March 1918 The Terek Soviet Republic was created. The Mountain ASSR was proclaimed in January 1921. Since November 1922, the Chechen Autonomous Region of the RSFSR existed for some time. And on January 15, 1934, the Chechen and Ingush Autonomous Regions were transformed into the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The years of the Civil War left names in Chechen history that are kept by the grateful people's memory: participants in the hundred-day defense of Grozny, defenders of the village of Goyty... And the monument on People's Friendship Square in Grozny - Chechen Aslanbek Sheripov, Russian Nikolai Gikalo, Ingush Gapur Akhriev - they fought together. According to the five-year plans before the Great Patriotic War, a lot was done to reconstruct the industry of Chechnya and develop culture. Thus, literacy rose from 0.8% in 1920 to 85% in 1940. The history of all scientific institutions also began during this period: GrozNII was founded in 1928, the Institute of History, Sociology and Philology in 1926.

The industry of the Chi ASSR and the entire people of the republic worked with great effort during the war years for the needs of the front. Chechens fought both in the army and in partisan detachments. Thousands of them were awarded orders and medals. 36 people became Heroes of the Soviet Union. Transcaucasian Federation Soviet form, state form of unification of the peoples of Transcaucasia in 1922-36. Internal and foreign policy of Azerbaijan, SSR, Armenia, Georgia. USSR after the civil war and military intervention of 1918-20. dictated the need for their economic and military-political unification in the fight against the hostile actions of the imperialists and the remnants of the ordered counter-revolution, for the restoration of the economy, the elimination of interethnic mistrust and enmity, which became clear as a result of the 3-year rule of the Musavatists, Dashnaks and Georgians.

The idea of ​​unification was put forward by V.I. Lenin on March 12, 1922. in Tbilisi a plenipotentiary conference of representatives of the Central Election Commission of Azerbaijan. SSR, the Central Executive Committee approved the agreement on the creation of the Federative Union of Socialist Soviet Republics of Transcaucasia. [FSSSRZ] its highest authority was recognized as the Plenipotentiary Conference of representatives elected in equal numbers by the governments of the republics, and the Union Council elected by the conference as the unified executive body. On December 13, 1922, the first Transcaucasian Congress of Soviets in (Baku) transformed the FSSSRZ into a single Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic [ZSFSR], while maintaining the independence of its member republics. The congress approved the Constitution of the TSFSR, formed the Transcaucasian Central Executive Committee and was responsible to the united Council of People's Commissars of the TSFSR. Georgians and national deviationists opposed the creation of the Transcaucasian Federation. Their position did not receive support from the workers and were condemned by communist organizations. Transcaucasia On December 30, 1922, the TSFSR united with the RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR into the Union of SSR. According to the USSR Constitution of 1936, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia became part of the USSR as an independent union republic.

In the history of the peoples of the USSR. Imamate is the state of the murids in Dagestan and Chechnya, which arose in the late 20s of the 19th century during the struggle of the peoples of the Caucasus against the colonialist policies of tsarism. The Imamate received a particularly vivid expression during the reign of Shamil (1834-1859). Shamil’s Imamat was a state that covered its purely secular goals with a religious shell of muridism: strengthening the class dominance of the Dagestan and Chechen feudal lords who led the fight against the tsarist troops. The Imamat relied on militarized murids, the closest circle of the Imamate, and the apparatus of power on the locals. By the beginning of the 50s, the internal crisis of the Imamate deepened and the contradiction between the peasants, who began to move away from Shamil’s movement, intensified.

Annexation of the Caucasus to Russia

The annexation of the Caucasus to Russia had multiple meanings. Firstly, the military-strategic danger was eliminated, the bridgeheads from which invasions of Russian territory proper had taken place or could have taken place at any moment were eliminated. Secondly, these wars had a clear connotation of revenge for the suffering and destruction once caused by the horde, which created a favorable psychological climate in the Russian troops. Thirdly, the state included lands that were very tempting for colonization. And fourthly, the need to ensure the security of Russia's Asian trade. Already at the beginning of the 19th century. Russia's top leadership began to increasingly clearly demonstrate its political, economic and military-strategic interests in the Caucasus. Possession of the Caucasian coast of the Black and Caspian seas opened up great and tempting prospects. Having in front of it such rivals as Iran and Turkey, encouraged by England and France, and behind its back the rebellious and warlike Caucasian mountaineers, the Russian government was forced to act in Transcaucasia with great caution . Territorial acquisitions here were the result not only of military actions, but also of the voluntary transfer of local rulers to Russian citizenship.

In 1801-1804. Eastern Georgia, Mingrelia, Guria and Imereti voluntarily became part of Russia. At the same time, most of the possessions located on the Caucasian coast of Dagestan and Transcaucasia were peacefully annexed to Russia: the Sheki, Karabakh, Shirvan khanates and the Shuragel Sultanate. At the beginning of 1806, Russian troops entered Baku.

Iranian Khan Abbas Mirza made an attempt to stop the advance of the Russians in the Caucasus region, but was defeated on the Araks River in October 1812. According to the peace treaty signed in October 1813, the inclusion of Dagestan, Georgia, Imereti, and Guria into Russia was finally secured , Mingrelia and Abkhazia, as well as Karabakh, Derbent, Kuba, Baku and a number of other khanates. Russia has achieved the exclusive right to have a navy in the Caspian Sea. Russian merchants could now trade freely in Iran. A year earlier, Türkiye, under the Bukhara Peace Treaty, recognized Russia’s right to all Caucasian lands that voluntarily became part of it. In 1826-1827 Iranian Khan Abbas Mirza again tried to stop the Russian advance in the Caucasus, but was again defeated. According to the Turkmanchay Peace Treaty (February 1828), the Erivan and Nakhichevan khanates of Armenia became part of Russia. The Turkmanchay (Russia-Iran, 1828) and Adrianople (Russia-Turkey, 1829) peace treaties finally secured the annexation of Transcaucasia to Russia.

The military actions of Russian troops in the North Caucasus in 1817-1864 were aimed at annexing these territories to the Russian Empire and received the name “Caucasian War” in historiography. According to the plan of General A.P. Ermolov, approved by Emperor Alexander I, it was planned to gradually advance Russian troops to the south of the Caucasus and suppress the resistance of the highlanders. The first step on this path was the transfer of the fortified line from the Terek River to the Sunzha River. In 1817, construction of the Sunzha defense line began.

The plan was based on the tactics of constructing strategic points through which it was possible to reach fertile valleys. The mountaineers were pushed into areas where, without arable land and winter pastures, it was impossible to maintain the economy and provide the population with food. The government resettled mountaineers from high-mountain villages to valleys and mobilized the population to build roads and bridges. During this period, the fortresses Groznaya (1818), Vnezapnaya (1819), Burnaya (1821) were built, which became the main strongholds of Russian troops in Dagestan. In response to the actions of the Russian command, the Dagestan and Chechen rulers attacked the Sunzha line, but were defeated (1819-1821). Their lands were confiscated and transferred to the pro-Russian nobility, many Chechen and Dagestan villages were ruined. An attempt to suppress the nascent liberation movement by military force caused a powerful surge of uprisings in Kabarda (1821-1826), Adygea (1821-1826) and Chechnya (1825-1826).

They were suppressed by special punitive detachments. Soon, scattered clashes escalated into a war that engulfed the Northwestern Caucasus, Dagestan, and Chechnya and lasted almost 50 years. The liberation movement was complex. It intertwined general dissatisfaction with the arbitrariness of the tsarist administration, the injured national pride of the mountaineers, the struggle of the political elite for power, the fear of the Muslim clergy of religious oppression by the Christian government of Russia and other motives. The government of Nicholas I chose a more flexible tactic for conquering the Caucasus. General I.F. Paskevich, who replaced Yermolov in 1827, abandoned the idea of ​​a “quick war” and concentrated his efforts on strengthening Russian positions in the Caucasus. In 1828, the Sukhumi Military Road was built, connecting Kabarda and Abkhazia, and in 1830, the Lezgin fortified line was built, separating Kakheti from Dagestan. At the same time, fortified points were erected on the Black Sea coast.

During the Caucasian War, several stages can be distinguished: 1817 - early 1820s, when Russian troops encountered resistance from individual detachments of mountaineers and quite easily suppressed them; since the 20s The unification of mountain Muslims into a single state under the banner of “muridism” takes place. Muridism (or novitiate) preached the spiritual improvement of Muslims. He demanded that novices completely submit their will to their spiritual mentor. In the conditions of the national-religious war (gazavat), this resulted in the unquestioning submission of the murids to the imam.

In the late 1820s - early 1830s. In Chechnya and Mountainous Dagestan, a single military-theocratic state was formed - the Imamate. All administrative, military, judicial and spiritual power in it was concentrated in the hands of the imam. The only law that governed the murids was Sharia law - a set of religious and ethical precepts. Arabic was recognized as the official language.

In 1828, Gazi-Magomed became the first imam to lead the “holy war”. He proclaimed the unification of the Muslim peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan in the face of Christian expansion. However, Gazi-Magomed failed to subjugate all the leaders of the mountain detachments. Thus, the Avar Khan refused to recognize his power. In 1830, the imam besieged the capital of Avaria - Khunzakh, but was not successful.

After this, the imam’s main actions focused on the liquidation of Russian troops and fortresses. In 1831, Gazi-Magomed with an army of 10,000 took Tarki, besieged the fortresses of Burnaya and Vnezapnaya, then battles broke out on the approaches to the fortresses of Vladikavkaz and Groznaya. Russian troops managed to push the imam's troops back to Mountainous Dagestan. In 1832, a punitive expedition led by General G.V. Rosen was launched against Gazi-Magomed. She managed to surround the imam in the village of Gimry. Gazi-Magomed himself died in battle. His successor, Gamzat-bek continued Gazavat. He completed the defeat of the Avar khans. In 1834, he managed to capture Khunzakh and destroy the khan's family. But he himself fell victim to bloody revenge.

In the same year, Shamil (1799-1871) was proclaimed the new imam. He was a well-educated man. Under him, the struggle of the mountaineers received the widest scope. However, the power of the new imam was not immediately recognized by the Muslim nobility. Several years were spent strengthening Shamil’s position and eliminating rivals For 25 years he ruled over the highlanders of Dagestan and Chechnya. Under him, the Imamate was divided into districts, headed by naibs. A disciplined, trained army of 10-15 thousand people was created.

With them, Shamil left Avaria deep into Dagestan. In the center of the mountain range of the North-Eastern Caucasus, in the village of Akhulgo, the residence of the imam was built. The Russian command decided that the movement of the mountaineers was largely suppressed and was limited to individual punitive expeditions. Shamil used the respite to consolidate his power and rally the mountaineers for further struggle. In 1836, rebel detachments of Dagestanis and Chechens joined him. At the same time, the imam made an attempt to establish contact with foreign powers and receive financial and diplomatic support from them.

At first, England actively responded to the proposal, trying to control the situation in the Caucasus. But in 1836, off the Black Sea coast, the Russian government intercepted an English schooner with weapons on board, and London hastened to quell the political scandal with a promise not to interfere in the Caucasian conflict. Military operations in the Caucasus resumed in 1837. But the offensive of Russian troops on Dagestan was not successful. Therefore, after the conclusion of a truce (during which Shamil accepted Russian citizenship and handed over the Hostages), the tsarist government returned to the proven tactics of building fortified fortresses, mountain roads, and relocating mountain villages.

However, a year later in 1839, Shamil rebelled. To suppress it, two detachments were sent: one to Southern Dagestan, the second, under the command of General P.H. Grabbe, was able to capture and destroy the fortified village of Akhulgo. The wounded Shamil with a small detachment broke into Chechnya. The attack on the village cost the Russians great losses. The development of the Caucasian War led to more and more victims. Official Russia considered it a duty of honor for the Russian army to suppress the resistance of the “wild” mountaineers and did not recognize the national war as just. Moreover, the administration insisted on the rapid suppression of resistance by force of arms, regardless of the casualties.

Meanwhile, the Caucasian War became increasingly unpopular in Russian and European society. Doubts about the correctness of government actions were expressed by many officers from the top army command. Thus, General N.N. Raevsky believed that the national feelings of the highlanders should be taken into account and the population of the Caucasus should be integrated into the empire by peaceful means, and not by suppression. Similar thoughts were expressed by General D.A. Milyutin, Colonel Tchaikovsky, as well as cultural figures, writers, scientists (A.S. Griboedov, L.N. Tolstoy, etc.). 1840s became the period of Shamil’s greatest military successes. He managed to inflict a number of sensitive blows on the detachments of the Caucasian Corps: the fortifications of the Black Sea coastline were captured, Avaria was occupied, and power over Dagestan was re-established. At this time, the territory of the imamate more than doubled, the size of the rebel army increased to 20 thousand people. It was an impressive force to counter the tsarist government.

Alarmed by the situation in the Caucasus, Emperor Nicholas I appointed General M.S. Vorontsov as governor and commander-in-chief of the troops, giving him emergency powers (1844). In May 1845, the new governor made a new attempt. At the cost of numerous casualties, he took Shamil’s residence, the village of Dargo, but then his detachment was surrounded, from which few soldiers emerged. As a result of the Dargin expedition, more than 3 thousand Russian soldiers died.

Since 1846, Vorontsov returned to Ermolov’s plan: he began to compress the imamate with a ring of fortifications. This turned out to be more effective, since the balance of forces was in favor of the Russian Corps, and in addition, dissatisfaction of ordinary murids with the despotism of the naibs began to grow in the imamate. In the late 1840s - early 1850s. Shamil's imamat began to decline. Its boundaries were narrowing. Naibs and representatives of state bodies of the imamate turned into peasant owners, which exacerbated social contradictions. Part of the aul elite also began to go over to the side of the tsarist government. Shamil, losing support, intensified repression against infidel supporters.

In 1853, his troops were pushed back to mountainous Dagestan, where they were in dire need of food. On the eve of the Crimean War, Shamil managed to agree with the Turkish command on joint actions in the Caucasus. During their course, the imam managed to break through the Lezgin line and capture Tsinandali (Kakheti) in the summer of 1854. But this was Shamil's last military success. Outraged by the arrogant tone of the Turkish command towards the highlanders, the imam broke off contact with him and withdrew his troops to Dagestan.

General N.N. Muravyov, appointed commander of the Caucasian district and governor in November 1854, recognized the right of the mountain peoples to independence. In 1855, he concluded an agreement on trade relations with Shamil, which established a relative truce. However, the peaceful tactics of the Russian command were changed after the conclusion of the Paris Peace of 1856. It made it possible to draw significant military forces into the Caucasus region, and General A.I. Baryatinsky, who replaced N.N. Muravyov in 1856, developed a plan for an attack on the highlanders with a strong consolidation occupied territories. The Caucasian Corps was transformed into an army. A massive advance into the mountainous regions of the North Caucasus began.

As a result, in 1857-1858. Chechnya was occupied, an offensive was launched against Dagestan. In February-March 1859, a detachment of General N.I. Evdokimov besieged Shamil’s temporary residence - the village of Vedeno. The Imam with 400 murids was forced to leave it and hid in the village of Gunib on August 25, 1859. Shamil surrendered. In November 1859, the main forces of the Adyghe people surrendered. The Belorechensk fortified line with the Maykop fortress passed through the Adyghe lands. Trans-Kuban region began to be populated by Russian Cossacks. At the final stage of the Caucasian War, Russian troops under the command of Evdokimov occupied the entire North Caucasus. Pushed to the sea or driven into the mountains, the Adyghe people were forced to either move to the Kuban steppes or emigrate to Turkey. In May 1864, the last center of resistance of the mountaineers, the Kbaada tract, was suppressed. This day is considered the date of the end of the Caucasian War, although in some areas of the North Caucasus military operations continued until the end of 1864.

The essence of the Caucasian won, in my opinion, is the following, with the formation in the 15th century. From the Moscow centralized state, Russian tsarism launched military-colonial expansion, including in the Caucasian direction. Its motivations were related to geostrategic and, to a lesser extent, ideological considerations. During the era of Catherine II, Russia's advance to the south became especially intense. Using purely forceful or flexible diplomatic methods in the North Caucasus, the tsarism relied on local feudal, clerical and tribal elites who needed external support. The military-colonialist and class-exploitative policies of Russia caused a protest among the mountain social “lower classes” against the newcomers and their “own” oppressors. Since the 80s XVII century on the territory of Chechnya and Dagestan, similar structures find their way into anti-colonial and anti-feudal uprisings under the religious flag. The social basis of the war is considered to be the Chechen and Dagestan community members (uzdenstvo), the main goal is liberation from the tsarist colonialists and the mountain feudal-exploitative elite, the ideological catalyst is the idea of ​​muridism (a type of Islam) and the slogans of gazavat (holy war against infidels). In this clash, the mountaineers were led by outstanding leaders, the most prominent of whom was Imam Shamil, a deep scholar of the Koran, strategist and organizer, devoted to the ideals of national independence and social justice. During the war, he managed to unite disparate and warring communities, creating for the first time a military-theocratic state-imamate on the territory of mountainous Chechnya and Dagestan. Thanks to mass support and his extraordinary qualities as a leader, Shamil for many years secured strategic advantages over the Russian army and moral and political superiority over the influence of Russian tsarism in the Northeast Caucasus. This was greatly facilitated by both objective, natural-geographical conditions (high mountainous terrain) and subjective military-strategic mistakes of St. Petersburg.

Shamil died in battle, did not throw himself at the enemy’s bayonets in a fanatical outburst, did not commit suicide to avoid shameful capture by the infidels, but deliberately and voluntarily laid down his arms in front of the victorious enemy in an absolutely hopeless situation. The enemy, in turn, responded in a very unusual way. Shamil was not executed, not thrown into prison, not exiled to Siberia, shackled, not even arrested in the usual sense of the word at that time. He was treated with the reverence due to a great personality. He was seen as an outstanding commander and politician who lost with dignity and courage. Shamil was sent to St. Petersburg, where he was honored as a hero, to the complete amazement of the imam himself, who considered himself a prisoner. The capital’s Felstonists joked about the general “shamilemania”: who really won the Caucasian War.

It is also worth noting such an award as the Cross “For Service in the Caucasus. The cross “For Service in the Caucasus” is a four-pointed cross with widened ends, in the center of which there is a round shield depicting the state emblem of the Russian Empire (a double-headed eagle). The shield is crossed by two swords crossed with their hilts down. At the ends of the cross there are inscriptions: on the left - “FOR SERVICE”, on the right, as a continuation of the inscription, - “TO THE CAUCASUS?”. At the upper end of the cross there is the monogram of Emperor Alexander II, at the lower end the date is indicated - “1864”, meaning the year the hostilities in the Caucasus ended.

In total, four varieties of the cross “For Service in the Caucasus” were minted, three of which (gold, silver and light bronze) were of the same size (48x48 mm), and the fourth variety was a smaller cross made of light bronze (34x34 mm). All four crosses differ from each other only in the quality of execution. For example, gold and silver crosses are made with applied swords, a rosette and inscriptions, on the reverse side of which there are pins for attaching to clothing. And the bronze cross was minted from a single piece and had a simple pin on the back.

Crosses “For Service in the Caucasus,” which were worn on the left side of the chest, below all orders, were awarded to all ranks of the Russian army who took an active part in the war with the highlanders from 1859 to 1864. The awarding of one or another type of cross was carried out depending on rank and merits to the fatherland. The silver cross was awarded to officers. The bronze cross was awarded to all lower military ranks (including the Caucasian police) and numerous volunteers who took part in various battles, as well as all government officials, priests and doctors who performed their functional duties during military operations. Subsequently, the shape of the cross “For Service in the Caucasus” migrated to the regimental insignia of several military units of the tsarist army, which distinguished themselves in battles with the highlanders in the Caucasus, and became their background, and in some cases even an integral part of the applied elements.

The end of the Caucasian War allowed Russia to firmly establish itself in the North Caucasus, which, while maintaining its distinct originality, gradually became an integral administrative, political and economic part of the empire. The Caucasian War had enormous geopolitical consequences. Reliable communications were established between Russia and its Transcaucasian periphery. Russia has finally managed to firmly establish itself in the most vulnerable and strategically very important sector of the Black Sea - on the northeastern coast. The same applies to the northwestern part of the Caspian Sea, where St. Petersburg previously did not feel entirely confident. The Caucasus took shape as a single territorial and geopolitical complex within the imperial “supersystem” - a logical result of Russia’s southern expansion. Now it could serve as a secure rear and a real springboard for advancing to the southeast, to Central Asia, which was also of great importance for the development of the imperial periphery. In other words, the causes, course and results of the Caucasian War fit organically into the broader process of geopolitical expansion of the Russian Empire, which had not yet reached the “naturally necessary” limits of territorial saturation and had the corresponding military-economic and civilizational potential.

Taking all this as a basis for comparison, let's move on to the Chechen war of 1994-1996. The obvious fact that it took place in a completely different environment is hardly worthy of debate. Leaving aside the hypothetical question of whether it was predetermined or accidental, the Chechen tragedy was provoked by a whole complex of objective and subjective reasons of global, regional and local origin. In the most general form, they boil down to the following: the crisis of the Soviet system, the collapse of the USSR, the revolutionary-shock, feverish reform of Russia “from above” (including national relations), devoid of qualified intellectual support and common sense. Fans of the “scientific” method of total typology of historical and modern events, apparently, do not feel much curiosity about the “inconvenient” fact for them that in the vast expanse of multinational Russia, struck by standard post-Soviet ailments, the separatist movement broke out only and precisely in Chechnya . Often the causes of the Chechen war are established deliberately a priori - using the textbook “who benefits from it.” And they immediately point to “certain forces” in Moscow and Grozny. However, this approach, no matter how effective it may seem, explains little. The “objective” interest of some people in the war does not mean at all that it was started by them. And vice versa, the “objective” disinterest of other people does not at all provide them with an absolute alibi, because in politics events sometimes happen against the will and desire of people, without rational motivation. “Certain forces” can be as conditional and flexible a concept as those for whom “it is unprofitable.”

Many authors, considering the Chechen war to be an inevitable and natural product of the previous crisis, associate it with the internal state of Chechnya, wittingly or unwittingly borrowing the method of historians who use the same approach in studying the origins of the Caucasian War of the 19th century. Following this example, it is not difficult to discover that, despite all the features, Chechnya at the turn of the 80-90s. XX century in terms of the level of general, so to speak, formational development and the level of integration into the Russian socio-economic, political and cultural system, it cannot be compared with the isolated patriarchal Chechen communities of the times of Sheikh Mansur and Shamil. Since the Chechen (like the Caucasian) war is usually viewed as an inevitable derivative product of global laws, the role of the personal factor in it is often relegated to the background. The main characters of this tragedy, with their passions, complexes, prejudices and other human weaknesses, appear almost as victims of the fatal course of history, on which little depends. Specific people who made specific decisions under the influence of specific ideas find themselves captive to the ideas of an “objective” environment that deprives them of choice. The question of responsibility, of course, loses its relevance. However, we are not talking about the moral or legal side of the matter - a very important topic, but in this case, not directly related to the subject of conversation. We are talking about the fundamental significance of the “subjective” principle in the genesis of the Chechen war.

Indeed, from the point of view of real historical conditions, Chechnya in the mid-1980s. until December 1994, it was an almost unchanged substance in terms of the level of instability and severity of internal problems. It is hardly accidental that, “all other things being equal,” the war arose not before, but after, new people came to power in Moscow and Grozny. And although they all came out of the party-Soviet “overcoat” and were, to one degree or another, its flesh, they were already worried about other values, which they defended more authoritarianly and more aggressively than their predecessors. Grozdy decided to try out the doctrine of national sovereignty with a dictatorial-theocratic bent. In response, Moscow risked testing the concept of power-based “democratic centralism” on the “Chechen testing ground.” And if Dudayev, having become a hostage to his own radicalism, essentially already asked for help from the Kremlin, in exchange for serious concessions on his part, then Yeltsin - it doesn’t really matter under whose decision - took an ultimatum tone. Thus, he, perhaps, hoped to hasten the fall of his opponent, but he achieved exactly the opposite. The mutual personal hostility of two politically similar leaders, fueled by the capital’s “experts” on the Caucasus, hastened the denouement. If Yeltsin had behaved more subtly, or if in his place there had been a person with a different mindset and character, everything could have turned out differently. Recognizing the absolute speculativeness of such a hypothesis (since it relates to what has already happened), we nevertheless perfectly understand those authors who insist on the existence of a real alternative to the Chechen war.

It is really difficult to resist this proposal, knowing how much depended on specific, powerful persons, and not on the “clockwork” of history. Despite all the hopelessness of arguments in favor of a failed version of the development of past events, posing the problem of a historical alternative is still not entirely useless, at least as a lesson for the future. A “situation of choice” can be created by circumstances, but a person finds a way out of it. By the way, the “personal” factor is underestimated in the context of the origin of not only the person in the Chechen, but also the Caucasian war. As is clear from numerous sources, Shamil and his predecessors, starting with Sheikh Mansur, acted, in principle, in the same domestic and foreign policy conditions. However, only under the third imam did events acquire that new qualitative content and that unprecedented scope that made the Caucasian war “Caucasian”. Almost along its entire length, alternatives arose for Shamil, as well as for his Russian counterpart Nicholas I, capable of stopping the bloodshed. And each time, preference on both sides was consciously and voluntarily given to war. The preconditions for the Chechen war also determined its corresponding content, in which it also differs from the Caucasian war. There is almost nothing anti-colonial or people's liberation in it in the sense in which these categories are applicable (when they are applicable) to the first half of the 19th century. especially anti-feudal. Due to its uniqueness, the Chechen conflict does not fit into any clear typology, forming a unique, so to speak, separatist variety of civil war within a single country with a single state-political, economic and social structure.

In terms of time and internal essence, the Caucasian war was a historical era; The Chechen war is rather a historical event. A century and a half ago, due to the social one-sidedness of Chechnya, the scale of its involvement in Shamil’s movement was enormous. In modern, deeply hierarchical Chechen society, there is no longer the patriarchal former unity of interests, including on the issue of attitude towards Moscow.

Over two centuries, the role of the religious factor has noticeably changed - not in external manifestations, but in essence. The main characters of the Caucasian War - devout and dedicated people - often prioritized the ideas of Islam as the basis for fundamental social transformations. Sheikh Mansur, Kazi Mullah. Shamil demanded from the mountaineers, first of all, the adoption of Sharia, and then the destruction of the wicked infidels (and not only Russians, but also their fellow tribesmen). People were subjected to cruel punishments for sins against faith much more often than for loyalty to Russia. The common, dominant idea to this day of muridism only as an “ideological shell” or a propaganda means for creating an “enemy image” is far from corresponding to the real significance of this religious doctrine in the history of the Caucasian War.

To the leaders of Chechnya in the 90s. XX century with their completely secular natures, Shamile’s “fundamentalism” is generally alien. They readily take an oath in the Koran (sometimes, by the way, in Russian), observe Muslim rituals and surround themselves with the necessary paraphernalia. However, they do not appear to be the fanatics they are sometimes portrayed to be. And how could they, the generation that grew up under “developed socialism,” be like that? In contrast to Shamil, they do not persecute folk, traditional culture, and do not try to supplant it with Sharia. For them, Islam is rather part of this culture, although they cannot be denied the ability to use religion for political and ideological purposes.

With the current leaders of the Chechen resistance movement everything is different. They act largely not of their own free will, but in response to a situation not created by them. Despite their courage, determination and apparent freedom of choice, these are, in essence, figures driven by circumstances and other people. Their creative potential is severely limited by the need to take into account the official and public opinion of Russia, various interests and moods. The behavior of the Chechen military-political elite sometimes coincides strikingly with what the Kremlin is counting on. Observers who believe that the Chechen crisis is being controlled from Moscow may not be so far from the truth.

Compared to the same Shamil, the leaders of Ichkeria, for objective and subjective reasons, are much more dependent on their society, which they are not able to control. If the imam (and this is his merit) turned the patriarchal “chaos” into Islamic order, then the current Chechen reformers (and this is not only their fault) turned the Soviet “order” into Islamic chaos.

Moscow’s “personal” support for the Chechen war is much poorer. Here, outstanding figures comparable to Ermolov, Vorontsov, Baryatinsky, Milyutin... and even Nicholas I are generally unnoticed. Of course, not because potentially such personalities cannot exist in the modern Russian army and in Russian politics. The point is different. In the first half of the 19th century. for purely technical reasons (lack of quick communication between St. Petersburg and Tiflis), the Caucasian governors were given fairly broad powers that stimulated initiative and flexible, strategic thinking. Today, when distances have been abolished, the performer is deprived of his former advantages and remains only an executor of someone else’s (alien) orders, often inconsistent and simply stupid.

The enormous importance of the factor of moral readiness for action, confidence in the rightness of one’s cause. For soldiers and generals of the Russian army in the Caucasus in the first half of the 19th century. There was no such problem. They perceived their mission as a kind of natural, sovereign necessity that excluded moral torment. The attitude of ordinary Russian soldiers and commanders towards the Chechen war is different. No political and educational robot is able to give it a fair, patriotic meaning, to convince people that this is not a fatal mistake. Deep doubts on this score are also inherent in Russian public opinion. At the time of the entry of troops into Grozny (December 1994), it was obvious that the situation, at least in one way, was not similar to the first half of the 19th century: Chechnya and Russia were in a single state-civilizational space. Perhaps they did not have tender, “historical” love for each other, but in politics this is not the most important thing. “Whatever is their own” - approximately this formula defined their mutual feelings. The “action to restore constitutional order” dealt severe damage to this stereotype. Russia won the Caucasian War. Determining the nominal (“technical”) winner in the Chechen war, which was suspended, just as it was started, by order from Moscow, but is much more difficult to stop. And what does this actually give? If the idea of ​​the insolvency of the Russian armed forces is confirmed (about which journalists write with glee, worthy of better use), then it is permissible to ask: what enemy, in this case, revealed this “inconsistency” - the Chechens with guns and daggers from the time of Shamil: Or the same wife the Russian army with modern weapons, combat training, high-quality officers, and even excellent knowledge of the terrain: Truly a “Zarnitsa”, if only there was not so much blood and grief.

Until the consequences of the Chechen war appear in full, it is probably too early to compare them with the results of the Caucasian war. But at least one preliminary conclusion seems in order. Shamil's defeat marked the end of the era-long Caucasian period in the southern expansion of the Russian Empire, the resolution of major geopolitical problems and the beginning of a new stage - the state development of Chechnya and Dagestan with the aim of integrating them into the imperial structure. In the Chechen war, unlike the Caucasian war, there are no winners, no matter how much they say the opposite. Everyone in it is a loser. It, being the result of a systemic crisis in Russia and in the minds of its leaders, led to a further weakening of the country and created a real threat to Russian statehood.

The unification is based on the gradual aggravation of various contradictions (political, territorial, economic, interethnic, etc.). In its development, it undergoes several stages (inception, aggravation, crisis), which makes the process of conflict resolution manageable. Resolving it is a national task, not just a military one. It must be resolved by using a complex of diplomatic and military measures. Using the entire arsenal of peaceful means backed by military power makes it possible to prevent conflict at an early stage. The main bottleneck in organizing conflict prevention remains the absence, inconsistency, and sometimes contradictory nature of existing legislation.

The Russian government was guided by a kind of advance to the South to protect Russian borders and the region as a whole from possible expansion from the outside.

2.Vert P.V. From “resistance” to subversion”: the power of the empire, the confrontation of the local population and their interdependence // Russian Empire in foreign historiography. Works of recent years.

3. Gardanov V.K. Social system of the Adyghe peoples (XVIII - first half of the 19th century). M., 1967. P. 121 Coll. articles. M., 2005. P.48-83.

4. Degoev V. Three silhouettes of the Caucasian War: A.P. Ermolov, M.S. Vorontsov, A.I. Baryatinsky // The Great Game in the Caucasus: history and modernity. M., 2001. pp. 156-204.

5. Dubrovin N.F. The history of war and Russian rule in the Caucasus. T.1-6. St. Petersburg, 2006. - 412 p.

6. Zakharova L.G. Russia and the Caucasus: a view from the 19th century // Russia and the Caucasus through two centuries. St. Petersburg, 2001. pp. 126-137.

7. Zisserman A.L. Field Marshal Prince Alexander Ivanovich Baryatinsky. 1815-1879. T.1-3. M., 2005. - 147 p.

8. Pokrovsky M. N. Caucasian wars and the Imamate of Shamil. M., 2009. - 436 p. 9. Smirnov N. A. Politics of Russia in the Caucasus in the 16th - 19th centuries. M., 2008. -412 p.

A week-long tour, one-day hiking and excursions combined with comfort (trekking) in the mountain resort of Khadzhokh (Adygea, Krasnodar Territory). Tourists live at the camp site and visit numerous natural monuments. Rufabgo waterfalls, Lago-Naki plateau, Meshoko gorge, Big Azish cave, Belaya River Canyon, Guam gorge.

1. Prerequisites for the Caucasian War

The war of the Russian Empire against the Muslim peoples of the North Caucasus was with the goal of annexing this region. As a result of the Russian-Turkish (in 1812) and Russian-Iranian (in 1813) wars, the North Caucasus was surrounded by Russian territory. However, the imperial government failed to establish effective control over it for many decades. The mountain peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan have long lived largely by raiding the surrounding lowland territories, including Russian Cossack settlements and soldier garrisons. When the raids of the mountaineers on Russian villages became unbearable, the Russians responded with reprisals. After a series of punitive operations, during which Russian troops mercilessly burned down “offending” villages, the emperor in 1813 ordered General Rtishchev to change tactics again, “try to restore calm on the Caucasian line with friendliness and condescension.”

However, the peculiarities of the mentality of the mountaineers prevented a peaceful resolution of the situation. Peacefulness was seen as weakness, and the raids on the Russians only intensified. In 1819, almost all the rulers of Dagestan united in an alliance to fight against the Russians. In this regard, the policy of the tsarist government switched to establishing direct rule. In the person of General A.P. Ermolov, the Russian government found the right person to implement these ideas: the general was firmly convinced that the entire Caucasus should become part of the Russian Empire.

2. Caucasian War 1817-1864

Caucasian war

Caucasian War 1817-64, military actions related to the annexation of Chechnya, Mountainous Dagestan and the North-Western Caucasus by Tsarist Russia. After the annexation of Georgia (1801 10) and Azerbaijan (1803 13), their territories were separated from Russia by the lands of Chechnya, Mountainous Dagestan (although legally Dagestan was annexed in 1813) and the Northwestern Caucasus, inhabited by warlike mountain peoples who raided the Caucasian fortified line, interfered with relations with Transcaucasia. After the end of the wars with Napoleonic France, tsarism was able to intensify military operations in this area. General A.P., appointed commander-in-chief in the Caucasus in 1816. Ermolov moved from individual punitive expeditions to a systematic advance into the depths of Chechnya and Mountainous Dagestan by surrounding mountainous areas with a continuous ring of fortifications, cutting clearings in difficult forests, building roads and destroying “rebellious” villages. This forced the population either to move to the plane (plain) under the supervision of Russian garrisons, or to go into the depths of the mountains. Has begun first period of the Caucasian War with an order dated May 12, 1818 from General Ermolov to cross the Terek. Ermolov drew up a plan of offensive action, at the forefront of which was the widespread colonization of the region by the Cossacks and the formation of “layers” between hostile tribes by relocating loyal tribes there. In 1817 18 the left flank of the Caucasian line was moved from the Terek to the river. Sunzha in the middle reaches of which was in October 1817. The fortification of Pregradny Stan was laid, which was the first step in a systematic advance into the territories of the mountain peoples and actually marked the beginning of K.V. The Grozny fortress was founded in the lower reaches of the Sunzha. A continuation of the Sunzhenskaya line were the fortresses of Vnezapnaya (1819) and Burnaya (1821). In 1819, the Separate Georgian Corps was renamed the Separate Caucasian Corps and strengthened to 50 thousand people; The Black Sea Cossack army (up to 40 thousand people) in the North-West Caucasus was also subordinated to Ermolov. In 1818 a number of Dagestan feudal lords and tribes united in 1819. began the march to the Sunzhenskaya line. But in 1819 21 they suffered a series of defeats, after which the possessions of these feudal lords were either transferred to Russian vassals with subordination to Russian commandants (the lands of the Kazikumukh Khan to the Kyurinsky Khan, the Avar Khan to Shamkhal Tarkovsky), or became dependent on Russia (the lands of Utsmiya Karakaitag), or were liquidated with the introduction of Russian administration ( Mehtuli Khanate, as well as the Azerbaijani Khanates of Sheki, Shirvan and Karabakh). In 1822 26 A number of punitive expeditions were carried out against the Circassians in the Trans-Kuban region.

The result of Ermolov's actions was the subjugation of almost all of Dagestan, Chechnya and Trans-Kubania. General I.F., who replaced Ermolov in March 1827 Paskevich abandoned a systematic advance with the consolidation of occupied territories and returned mainly to the tactics of individual punitive expeditions, although under him the Lezgin Line was created (1830). In 1828, in connection with the construction of the Military-Sukhumi road, the Karachay region was annexed. The expansion of colonization of the North Caucasus and the cruelty of the aggressive policy of Russian tsarism caused spontaneous mass uprisings of the mountaineers. The first of them occurred in Chechnya in July 1825: the highlanders, led by Bey-Bulat, captured the Amiradzhiyurt post, but their attempts to take Gerzel and Grozny failed, and in 1826. the uprising was suppressed. At the end of the 20s. in Chechnya and Dagestan, a movement of mountaineers arose under the religious cover of muridism, an integral part of which was ghazavat (Jihad) “holy war” against the “infidels” (i.e., Russians). In this movement, the liberation struggle against the colonial expansion of tsarism was combined with opposition to the oppression of local feudal lords. The reactionary side of the movement was the struggle of the top of the Muslim clergy for the creation of a feudal-theocratic state of the imamate. This isolated supporters of Muridism from other peoples, incited fanatical hatred of non-Muslims, and most importantly, preserved backward feudal forms of social structure. The movement of the highlanders under the flag of Muridism was the impetus for expanding the scale of the KV, although some peoples of the North Caucasus and Dagestan (for example, Kumyks, Ossetians, Ingush, Kabardians, etc.) did not join this movement. This was explained, firstly, by the fact that some of these peoples could not be carried away by the slogan of Muridism due to their Christianization (part of the Ossetians) or the weak development of Islam (for example, Kabardians); secondly, the policy of “carrot and stick” pursued by tsarism, with the help of which it managed to attract part of the feudal lords and their subjects to its side. These peoples did not oppose Russian rule, but their situation was difficult: they were under the double oppression of tsarism and local feudal lords.

Second period of the Caucasian War- represent the bloody and menacing era of Muridism. At the beginning of 1829, Kazi-Mulla (or Gazi-Magomed) arrived in the Tarkov Shankhaldom (a state on the territory of Dagestan in the late 15th - early 19th centuries) with his sermons, while receiving complete freedom of action from the shamkhal. Gathering his comrades, he began to go around aul after aul, calling on “sinners to take the righteous path, instruct the lost and crush the criminal authorities of the auls.” Gazi-Magomed (Kazi-mullah), proclaimed imam in December 1828. and put forward the idea of ​​uniting the peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan. But some feudal lords (Avar Khan, Shamkhal Tarkovsky, etc.), who adhered to the Russian orientation, refused to recognize the authority of the imam. Gazi-Magomed's attempt to capture in February 1830 Avaria's capital, Khunzakh, was not successful, although the expedition of the tsarist troops in 1830 in Gimry failed and only led to the strengthening of the imam’s influence. In 1831 the murids took Tarki and Kizlyar, besieged Burnaya and Sudden; their detachments also operated in Chechnya, near Vladikavkaz and Grozny, and with the support of the rebel Tabasarans they besieged Derbent. Significant territories (Chechnya and most of Dagestan) came under the authority of the imam. However, from the end of 1831 The uprising began to decline due to the desertion of the peasantry from the murids, dissatisfied with the fact that the imam had not fulfilled his promise to eliminate class inequality. As a result of large expeditions of Russian troops in Chechnya, undertaken by the appointed in September 1831. Commander-in-Chief in the Caucasus, General G.V. Rosen, the detachments of Gazi-Magomed were pushed back to Mountainous Dagestan. The imam with a handful of murids took refuge in Gimry, where he died on October 17, 1832. during the capture of the village by Russian troops. Gamzat-bek was proclaimed the second imam, whose military successes attracted almost all the peoples of Mountain Dagestan, including some of the Avars, to his side; however, the ruler of Avaria, Hansha Pahu-bike, refused to speak out against Russia. In August 1834 Gamzat-bek captured Khunzakh and exterminated the family of Avar khans, but as a result of a conspiracy by their supporters, he was killed on September 19, 1834. In the same year, Russian troops, in order to stop the relations of the Circassians with Turkey, conducted an expedition to the Trans-Kuban region and laid down the fortifications of Abinsk and Nikolaevsk.

Shamil was proclaimed the third imam in 1834. The Russian command sent a large detachment against him, which destroyed the village of Gotsatl (the main residence of the murids) and forced Shamil’s troops to retreat from Avaria. Believing that the movement was largely suppressed, Rosen remained inactive for 2 years. During this time, Shamil, having chosen the village of Akhulgo as his base, subjugated part of the elders and feudal lords of Chechnya and Dagestan, brutally dealing with those feudal lords who did not want to obey him, and won wide support among the masses. In 1837 the detachment of General K.K. Fezi occupied Khunzakh, Untsukul and part of the village of Tilitl, where Shamil’s detachments withdrew, but due to heavy losses and lack of food, the tsarist troops found themselves in a difficult situation, and on July 3, 1837. Fezi concluded a truce with Shamil. This truce and the withdrawal of the tsarist troops were actually their defeat and strengthened the authority of Shamil. In the North-West Caucasus, Russian troops in 1837. They laid the fortifications of the Holy Spirit, Novotroitskoye, Mikhailovskoye. In March 1838 Rosen was replaced by General E.A. Golovin, under whom in the North-West Caucasus in 1838. fortifications Navaginskoye, Velyaminovskoye, Tenginskoye and Novorossiysk were created. The truce with Shamil turned out to be temporary, and in 1839. hostilities resumed. Detachment of General P.Kh. Grabbe after an 80-day siege on August 22, 1839. took possession of the residence of Shamil Akhulgo; The wounded Shamil and his murids broke through to Chechnya. On the Black Sea coast in 1839. the Golovinskoye and Lazarevskoye fortifications were laid and the Black Sea coastline from the mouth of the river was created. Kuban to the borders of Megrelia; in 1840 The Labinsk line was created, but soon the tsarist troops suffered a number of major defeats: the rebellious Circassians in February April 1840. captured the fortifications of the Black Sea coastline (Lazarevskoye, Velyaminovskoye, Mikhailovskoye, Nikolaevskoye). In the Eastern Caucasus, the Russian administration's attempt to disarm the Chechens sparked an uprising that spread throughout Chechnya and then spread to Mountainous Dagestan. After stubborn battles in the area of ​​​​the Gekhinsky forest and on the river. Valerik (July 11, 1840) Russian troops occupied Chechnya, the Chechens went to Shamil’s troops operating in Northwestern Dagestan. In 1840-43, despite the reinforcement of the Caucasian Corps by an infantry division, Shamil won a number of major victories, occupied Avaria and established his power in a large part of Dagestan, expanding the territory of the Imamate by more than doubling and increasing the number of his troops to 20 thousand people. In October 1842 Golovin was replaced by General A. I. Neigardt and 2 more infantry divisions were transferred to the Caucasus, which made it possible to somewhat push back Shamil’s troops. But then Shamil, again seizing the initiative, occupied Gergebil on November 8, 1843 and forced the Russian troops to leave Avaria. In December 1844, Neigardt was replaced by General M.S. Vorontsov, who in 1845 captured and destroyed Shamil's residence aul Dargo. However, the highlanders surrounded Vorontsov’s detachment, which barely managed to escape, having lost 1/3 of its personnel, all its guns and convoy. In 1846, Vorontsov returned to Ermolov’s tactics of conquering the Caucasus. Shamil’s attempts to thwart the enemy’s offensive were unsuccessful (in 1846, the failure of the breakthrough into Kabarda, in 1848, the fall of Gergebil, in 1849, the failure of the assault on Temir-Khan-Shura and the breakthrough in Kakheti); in 1849-52 Shamil managed to occupy Kazikumukh, but by the spring of 1853. his troops were finally driven out of Chechnya into Mountainous Dagestan, where the position of the mountaineers also became difficult. In the North-Western Caucasus, the Urup Line was created in 1850, and in 1851 the uprising of Circassian tribes led by Shamil's governor Muhammad-Emin was suppressed. On the eve of the Crimean War of 1853-56, Shamil, counting on the help of Great Britain and Turkey, intensified his actions and in August 1853. tried to break through the Lezgin line at Zagatala, but failed. In November 1853, Turkish troops were defeated at Bashkadyklar, and Circassian attempts to seize the Black Sea and Labinsk lines were repulsed. In the summer of 1854, Turkish troops launched an offensive against Tiflis; At the same time, Shamil’s troops, breaking through the Lezgi line, invaded Kakheti, captured Tsinandali, but were detained by the Georgian militia, and then defeated by Russian troops. Defeat in 1854-55. The Turkish army finally dispelled Shamil's hopes for outside help. By this time, what had begun in the late 40s had deepened. internal crisis of the Imamate. The actual transformation of Shamil's governors, the naibs, into self-interested feudal lords, whose cruel rule aroused the indignation of the mountaineers, exacerbated social contradictions, and the peasants began to gradually move away from Shamil's movement (in 1858, an uprising against Shamil's power even broke out in Chechnya in the Vedeno region). The weakening of the Imamate was also facilitated by devastation and heavy casualties in a long, unequal struggle in conditions of shortages of ammunition and food. Conclusion of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856 allowed tsarism to concentrate significant forces against Shamil: the Caucasian Corps was transformed into an army (up to 200 thousand people). The new commanders-in-chief, General N. N. Muravyov (1854 56) and General A.I. Baryatinsky (1856 60) continued to tighten the blockade ring around the Imamate with a strong consolidation of the occupied territories. In April 1859, Shamil's residence, the village of Vedeno, fell. Shamil with 400 murids fled to the village of Gunib. As a result of the concentric movements of three detachments of Russian troops, Gunib was surrounded and on August 25, 1859. taken by storm; Almost all the murids died in battle, and Shamil was forced to surrender. In the Northwestern Caucasus, the disunity of the Circassian and Abkhazian tribes facilitated the actions of the tsarist command, which took away fertile lands from the mountaineers and handed them over to the Cossacks and Russian settlers, carrying out the mass eviction of the mountain peoples. In November 1859 The main forces of the Circassians (up to 2 thousand people) led by Muhammad-Emin capitulated. The lands of the Circassians were cut by the Belorechensk line with the Maykop fortress. In 1859 61 the construction of clearings, roads and the settlement of lands seized from the highlanders were carried out. In the middle of 1862 resistance to the colonialists intensified. To occupy the territory remaining with the mountaineers with a population of about 200 thousand people. in 1862, up to 60 thousand soldiers were concentrated under the command of General N.I. Evdokimov, who began advancing along the coast and deep into the mountains. In 1863, tsarist troops occupied the territory between the rivers. Belaya and Pshish, and by mid-April 1864 the entire coast to Navaginsky and the territory to the river. Laba (along the northern slope of the Caucasus ridge). Only the mountaineers of the Akhchipsu society and the small tribe of Khakuchi in the valley of the river did not submit. Mzymta. Pushed to the sea or driven into the mountains, the Circassians and Abkhazians were forced either to move to the plain or, under the influence of the Muslim clergy, to emigrate to Turkey. The unpreparedness of the Turkish government to receive, accommodate and feed masses of people (up to 500 thousand people), the arbitrariness and violence of local Turkish authorities and difficult living conditions caused a high mortality rate among the displaced, a small part of whom returned to the Caucasus again. By 1864, Russian control was introduced in Abkhazia, and on May 21, 1864, tsarist troops occupied the last center of resistance of the Circassian Ubykh tribe, the Kbaadu tract (now Krasnaya Polyana). This day is considered the date of the end of K.V., although in fact military operations continued until the end of 1864, and in the 60-70s. Anti-colonial uprisings took place in Chechnya and Dagestan.

Historians cannot agree on a start date Caucasian wars , just as politicians cannot agree on an end date. The name itself " Caucasian war "is so broad that it allows one to make shocking statements about its supposedly 400-year or one-and-a-half-century history. It is even surprising that the starting point from Svyatoslav’s campaigns against the Yasses and Kasogs in the 10th century or from the Russian naval raids on Derbent has not yet been adopted in the 9th century (1). However, even if we discard all these obviously ideological attempts at “periodization,” the number of opinions is very large, which is why many historians now say that in fact there were several. Caucasian wars . They were conducted in different years, in different regions of the North Caucasus: in Chechnya, Dagestan, Kabarda, Adygea, etc. (2). They can hardly be called Russian-Caucasian, since the mountaineers participated on both sides. However, the traditional point of view on the period from 1817 (the beginning of an active aggressive policy in the North Caucasus sent there by General A.P. Ermolov) to 1864 (the capitulation of the mountain tribes of the North-West Caucasus) as a period of constant fighting that engulfed most of the North Caucasus. It was then that the question of the actual, and not just formal, entry of the North Caucasus into the Russian Empire was decided. Perhaps, for better mutual understanding, it is worth talking about this period as the Great Caucasian war .

Geopolitical situation

Two rivers - the Kuban, running west to the Black Sea, and the Terek, rushing east to the Caspian Sea - are like two arcs of surprised eyebrows over the mountain ranges of the North Caucasus. The border line ran along these rivers at the end of the 18th century. Russia . It was guarded by the Cossacks who settled here since the 16th century. (according to other data from the XIII-XIV centuries. Approx. RUSFACT .RU), reinforced by several fortresses (such as Kizlyar - since 1735, Mozdok - since 1763) and fortifications. The existing border (so-called Caucasian ) the line bore little resemblance at that time to the lines of impassable “control strips” familiar to everyday consciousness. It was much more like a “frontier” between the Indians and settlers in North America. Modern historians call such a border a “contact zone,” since it did not so much divide as connect two different civilizations. Over the centuries, cultural contacts, including the emerging family ties, have created not a gap, but rather a seam between cultures and civilizations. But in addition to social history, there was also a political situation that affected the interests of powerful states: the Ottoman Empire, Persia and, especially from the 18th century, the Russian Empire.
Several peace treaties crowning the Russian-Turkish and Russian-Persian wars the end of the 18th - beginning of the 19th centuries clarify the international legal situation in the region. According to the Gulistan Peace Treaty of 1813, which regulated Russian-Persian relations, “the Shah forever recognized Russia Dagestan, Georgia, the khanates of Karabakh, Ganzhin (Elisavetpol province), Sheki, Shirvan, Derbent, Kuba, Baku, a significant part of the Talyshin khanate"(3). Moreover, by this time the rulers of the North-Eastern Caucasus themselves recognized the dominion Russia . Most recently, for the first time in 183 years, documents on the entry into citizenship in 1807 were published Russia and Chechens(4) (some Chechen societies began to accept Russian citizenship back in the 18th century)(5). The last Russian-Persian war 1826-1828 did not lead to a change in the international status of the North-East Caucasus. The rulers of Dagestan received Russian military ranks (up to general) and monetary allowances from the emperor (up to several thousand rubles a year). It was understood that their service would consist not only of participation in hostilities Russia , but also in maintaining legal order in the territories under their control.
The Northwestern Caucasus was dominated by the Ottoman Empire for a long time. Agreement Russia and Turkey, concluded at the end of the 18th century, implied the obligation of the Sultan of Turkey “to use all power and means to curb and restrain the peoples on the left bank of the Kuban River, living along its borders, so that they do not launch raids on the borders of the All-Russian Empire” (6). The Treaty of Adrianople in 1829 transferred the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus (south of the mouth of the Kuban) to the dominion of the Russian emperor. This meant the legal annexation of the peoples of the North-West Caucasus to the Russian Empire. We can say that by 1829 the North Caucasus was formally annexed to the Russian Empire. However, in this case it is necessary to emphasize the word formal, bearing in mind the characteristic situation of “mutual misunderstanding” that existed then between the Russian government and the mountaineers. When accepting any obligations regarding Russia the mountain rulers were guided not by the principles of European international law (“pacta sunt servanda” - “treaties must be respected”), but by the principles of Muslim law. Its norms were that “any international treaty concluded with an infidel state may be violated by the ruler of a Muslim state if the violation benefits that state” and that “an oath against an infidel is not binding on a Muslim” (7). In addition, many highlanders and mountain societies did not feel like subjects of their feudal rulers and recognized their supremacy “by the right of the strong.” It was generally incomprehensible to them why they needed to change their way of life in connection with someone else’s contracts. The subordination of Circassia to the Russian Tsar was explained by the mountaineers according to the logic they understood. “It’s strange,” they reasoned, “why do the Russians need our mountains, our little land? They probably have nowhere to live:” (8) As historian-general N.F. Dubrovin emphasized back in the 19th century, the lack of reliable information about The peculiarities of the life of the mountaineers “led to many mistakes that had unfavorable and serious consequences” (9).
Dmitry OLEINIKOV, Candidate of Historical Sciences
http://www.istrodina.com/rodina_articul.php3?id=111&n=7

Caucasus under Ermolov (1816-1827)

Lieutenant General Alexey Petrovich Ermolov

At the beginning of the 19th century. part Russia included Georgia (1801-1810) and Northern Azerbaijan (1803-1813). But Transcaucasia was separated from the main territory Russia Caucasian mountains inhabited by warlike mountain peoples who raided lands that recognized the power Russia , and interfered with relations with Transcaucasia. After graduation wars With Napoleonic France, the government of Alexander I Pavlovich was able to intensify its actions in the Caucasus, concentrating significant military resources there. In 1816 commander-in-chief Caucasian General A.P. Ermolov was appointed as a force - decisive, cruel towards the enemy and popular among the troops.

He proposed a plan for the conquest of the mountainous Caucasus, which included abandoning the tactics of punitive expeditions in favor of a regular siege of mountainous areas by cutting wide clearings in the forests, laying roads and creating defensive lines of outposts and fortresses. The villages of rebellious peoples were to be destroyed, burned to the ground, and the population was to be resettled to the plain under the supervision of Russian troops. There were two centers of resistance to the power of the Russian Tsar in the Caucasus: in the east - Chechnya and Mountainous Dagestan, in the west - Abkhazians and Circassians. In the center Caucasian Loyal people lived in the mountains Russia peoples - Ossetians and Ingush.

In 1817, the advance of the left flank began Caucasian line from the Terek to the Sunzha, in the middle reaches of which the Pregradny Stan fortress was founded in October 1817 - this event was actually the beginning Caucasian wars . In 1818, the Grozny fortress was founded in the lower reaches of the Sunzha. The fortresses of Vnezapnaya (1819) and Burnaya (1821) became a continuation of the Sunzhenskaya line. In 1819, the Separate Georgian Corps was strengthened to 50 thousand people and renamed the Separate Corps Caucasian frame; The 40,000-strong Black Sea Cossack army, which defended Caucasian line from the mouth of the Kuban to the Laba River.

In 1819 a number of hostile Russia Chechen and Dagestan tribes launched an attack on the Sunzhenskaya line. A stubborn struggle continued until 1821. The Highlanders were defeated; part of the possessions of the mountain feudal lords was liquidated, part was divided between vassals Russia . Muslim Persia and Turkey, who fought with Russia in 1826-1828 and 1828-1829, but were defeated. As a result of these wars Russia strengthened its position in Transcaucasia, Türkiye recognized the right Russia on the Black Sea coast from the mouth of the Kuban to the fortress of St. Nicholas - the northern border of Adjara. The largest uprising of the highlanders in these years was the uprising in Chechnya, which broke out in July 1825. The highlanders, led by Bey-Bulat, captured the Amaradzhiyurt post and tried to take the fortresses of Gerzel and Grozny. However, in 1826 the Bey-Bulat uprising was suppressed. The construction of the Military-Sukhumi road led to the annexation of the Karachay region in 1828. By the end of the 1820s, Ermolov managed to pacify and subjugate almost the entire Caucasus, with the exception of the most inaccessible areas.

Formation of the Imamate (1827-1834)

With the accession of Nicholas I, Ermolov, popular among the troops, was taken under secret supervision and in March 1827 replaced by General I. F. Paskevich. New commander of the Separate Caucasian The corps abandoned Yermolov’s strategy of systematic advance deep into the mountains with the consolidation of occupied territories and returned to the tactics of punitive campaigns. Nevertheless, it was under Paskevich in 1830 that the Lezgin Line was created, covering North-Eastern Georgia from raids by the highlanders.

At the end of the 1820s, the religious teaching of muridism, which called for the creation of a theocratic state - the imamate, became widespread among the peoples of Dagestan and the Chechens. An integral part of Muridism was jihad - sacred war against the infidels. Muridism caused an expansion in scope Caucasian wars , although not all Caucasian peoples joined this movement: some because of their Christianization (Ossetians), others because of the weak influence of Islam (Kumyks, Kabardians). Some of the mountaineers took pro-Russian positions (Ingush, Avars) and were hostile to the murids.

In December 1828, Gazi-Magomed (Kazi-Mullah) was proclaimed imam - the first head of a military-theocratic state. He put forward the idea of ​​uniting the peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan in order to fight the infidels. Some of the Dagestan rulers (Avar Khan, Shamkhal of Tarkov) did not recognize the authority of the imam. During the military operations of 1831-1832, Gazi-Magomed and his close murids were surrounded in the village of Gimrakh, where he died on October 17, 1832 during the capture of the village by Russian troops (commander-in-chief from September 1831 - General G.V. Rosen).

The second imam, Gamzat-bek, after a series of military successes, brought under his banner all the peoples of Mountain Dagestan, even some of the Avars, but the ruler of Avaria, Khansha Pakhu-bike, remained faithful Russia . In August 1834, Gamzat-bek took Khunzakh, the capital of Avaria, and massacred the entire family of Avar khans. But Gamzat-bek himself fell victim to the conspiracy of his henchmen on September 19, 1834.

Fight against Shamil (1834-1853)

Shamil was proclaimed the third imam in 1834. The beginning of his reign began with defeat from Russian troops in Avaria. Believing that the murid movement was suppressed, Rosen did not take active action for two years. During this time, Shamil, having settled in the village of Akhulgo, subjugated part of the elders and rulers of Chechnya and Dagestan to his power.

The expedition of General K.K. Fezi against Shamil ended in failure: due to heavy losses and lack of food, on July 3, 1837 he had to conclude a truce with Shamil. This truce and the withdrawal of troops from Mountainous Dagestan inspired the mountain peoples and raised the authority of Shamil. Strengthening his power, he mercilessly dealt with the disobedient. In 1837-1839, the Russians founded a number of new fortifications in the Caucasus. Military operations resumed in 1839. General P.H. Grabbe captured Akhulgo after an 80-day siege, but the wounded Shamil escaped to Chechnya.

The commander of the troops in the Caucasus (from March 1839), General E. A. Golovin, partially returned to Ermolov’s tactics: he built fortifications and established lines (the Black Sea coastal, Labinskaya), but military operations under him proceeded with varying degrees of success. In February-April 1840, an uprising of the Circassians broke out, who captured the fortifications of the Black Sea coastline.

("...Events related to the founding and defense of strongholds on the Black Sea coastline are perhaps the most dramatic in the history of the Caucasus wars . There is no land road along the entire coast yet. The supply of food, ammunition and other things was carried out only by sea, and in the autumn-winter period, during storms and storms, there was practically no supply. The garrisons from the Black Sea line battalions remained in the same places throughout the existence of the “line”, virtually without change and as if on islands. On one side there is the sea, on the other there are mountaineers on the surrounding heights. It was not the Russian army that held back the highlanders, but they, the highlanders, kept the garrisons of the fortifications under siege. Yet the biggest scourge was the damp Black Sea climate, disease and, above all, malaria. Here is just one fact: in 1845, 18 people were killed along the entire “line”, and 2,427 died from disease.

At the beginning of 1840, a terrible famine broke out in the mountains, forcing the mountaineers to look for food in Russian fortifications. In February-March they launched raids on a number of forts and captured them, completely destroying the few garrisons. Almost 11 thousand people took part in the assault on Fort Mikhailovsky. Private Tenginsky regiment Arkhip Osipov blows up a powder magazine and dies himself, taking another 3,000 Circassians with him. On the Black Sea coast, near Gelendzhik, there is now a resort town - Arkhipovoosipovka..."http://www.ricolor.org/history/voen/bitv/xix/26_11_09/)

In the Eastern Caucasus, the Russian administration's attempt to disarm the Chechens sparked a new uprising that engulfed Chechnya and part of Dagestan. At the cost of enormous efforts, the Russians managed to defeat the Chechens in the battle on the Valerik River on July 11, 1840 (described by M. Yu. Lermontov). Russian troops occupied Chechnya, pushing the rebels into Northwestern Dagestan, where they replenished Shamil’s troops. In the battles of 1840-1843, military fortune leaned towards Shamil: he occupied Avaria, doubled the territory under his control and increased the number of his troops to 20 thousand people.

The new Russian commander, General M. S. Vorontsov, having received significant reinforcements, in 1845 managed to capture the village of Dargo, Shamil’s residence. But the highlanders surrounded Vorontsov’s detachment, which barely managed to escape - it lost up to a third of its personnel, convoys and artillery. Having suffered defeat, Vorontsov switched to Yermolov’s siege tactics: firmly securing the captured territories with a system of fortresses and outposts, he carefully moved higher and higher into the mountains. Shamil undertook separate offensive operations, but they were not successful. In 1851, an uprising of the Circassians led by Muhammad-Emin, Shamil’s governor, was suppressed in the Northwestern Caucasus. In the spring of 1853, Shamil was forced to leave Chechnya for Mountainous Dagestan; his situation became extremely complicated.

Crimean war and the defeat of Shamil (1853-1859)

With the beginning of the Crimean wars The jihad of the Muslim mountaineers received new impetus. In the western Caucasus, the activity of the Circassians has increased. Although they refused to recognize themselves as subjects of the Sultan, they constantly attacked Russian fortifications. In 1854 the Turks tried to go on the offensive against Tiflis. At the same time, Shamil’s murids (15 thousand people) broke through the Lezgin line and occupied the village of Tsinandali, 60 km northeast of Tiflis. Only with the help of the Georgian militia did the Russians manage to drive Shamil back to Dagestan. The defeat of the Turkish army in Transcaucasia in 1854-1855 deprived the murids of hopes for outside support.

By this time, the crisis of the Imamate that had begun in the late 1840s had deepened. The despotic power of the naibs (the imam's governors) aroused the indignation of the mountaineers, an increasing number of whom were burdened by the need to lead many years of fruitless war . The weakening of the Imamate was facilitated by the devastation of the mountainous regions and large human and economic losses. The new commander and governor of the Caucasus, General N. N. Muravyov, offered the mountaineers the conditions of a truce: independence under protectorate Russia and a trade agreement - and in 1855 hostilities practically ceased.

The conclusion of the Paris Peace in 1856 allowed Alexander II to transfer additional forces to the Caucasus. Separate Caucasian The corps was transformed into an army of 200 thousand people. Its commander, General A.I. Baryatinsky, continued to tighten the blockade ring against the Imamate. In 1857, the Russians began operations to oust the murids from Chechnya. In February 1858, a detachment of General N.I. Evdokimov besieged the center of resistance of the highlanders in Chechnya, the village of Vedeno, and captured it on April 1, 1858. Shamil with 400 murids disappeared into Dagestan. But as a result of the concentric offensive of three Russian detachments, the Dagestan village of Gunib, the last residence of Shamil, was surrounded. On August 25, 1859, Gunib was taken by storm, almost all the murids were killed, and Shamil himself surrendered.

Conquest of the Circassians and Abkhazians (1859-1864)

After the pacification of Chechnya and Dagestan, the mountaineers of the Northwestern Caucasus continued to resist the Russians. But already in November 1859 the main forces of the Circassians (up to 2 thousand people) led by Muhammad-Emin capitulated. The lands of the Circassians were cut by the Belorechensk line with the Maykop fortress. During 1859-1861, the construction of clearings, roads and the settlement of lands taken from the highlanders were carried out here.

In mid-1862, the resistance of the Circassians intensified. For the final occupation of the territory remaining with the mountaineers with a population of about 200 thousand people, 60 thousand soldiers were concentrated under the command of General N. I. Evdokimov. Pushed to the sea or driven into the mountains, the Circassians and Abkhazians were forced to move to the plain under the supervision of the Russian authorities or emigrate to Turkey. In total, up to half a million Circassians and Abkhazians left the Caucasus.

By 1864, the Russian authorities had established strong control over Abkhazia, and on April 21, 1864, General Evdokimov’s detachment occupied the last center of resistance of the Circassian Ubykh tribe - the Kbaadu tract (now Krasnaya Polyana) in the upper reaches of the Mzymta River. This day is considered to be the last day

About the Caucasian War in brief

Kavkazskaya vojna (1817—1864)

The Caucasian War began
Caucasian War causes
Caucasian War stages
Caucasian War results

The Caucasian War, in short, is a period of prolonged military conflict between the Russian Empire and the North Caucasian Imamate. The war was fought for the complete subjugation of the mountainous regions of the North Caucasus, and is one of the most fierce in the 19th century. Covers the period from 1817 to 1864.

Close relations between Russia and the peoples of the Caucasus began after the collapse of Georgia in the 15th century. Since the 16th century, many oppressed states of the Caucasus range asked for protection from Russia.

The main reason for the Caucasian War, in short, was that Georgia, the only Christian state in the Caucasus, was constantly under attack and attempts to subjugate it from neighboring Muslim countries. Repeatedly, the rulers of Georgia asked for Russian protection. In 1801, Georgia formally became part of the Russian Empire, but was isolated from it by neighboring countries. There was a need to create the integrity of Russian territory. This was possible only with the subjugation of other peoples of the North Caucasus.

Some states became part of Russia almost voluntarily - Kabarda and Ossetia. The rest - Adygea, Chechnya and Dagestan - categorically refused to do this and put up fierce resistance.
In 1817, the main stage of the conquest of the North Caucasus by Russian troops began under the leadership of General A.P. Ermolova. It was after his appointment as commander of the army in the North Caucasus that the Caucasian War began. Until this time, the Russian authorities were rather lenient towards the mountaineers.
The difficulty of conducting military operations in the Caucasus was that at the same time the Russian Empire had to participate in the Russian-Turkish and Russian-Iranian war.

The second stage of the Caucasian War is associated with the emergence of a single leader in Chechnya and Dagestan - Imam Shamil. He managed to unite disparate peoples and start a “gazavat” - a liberation war - against the Russian troops. Shamil was able to quickly create a strong army and for 30 years waged successful military operations with Russian troops, who suffered huge losses in this war.

Annexation of the Caucasus to Russia in the 19th century

“The conquest of the Caucasus is so important for Russia, it has so strengthened the international position of our Fatherland that at least a brief acquaintance with this gigantic struggle and with those people who laid down their bones for their homeland is the moral duty of every Russian person.”

(Essays on the conquest of the Caucasus. St. Petersburg, 1911.)

Wars for the annexation of the Caucasus Mountains were fought by the Russian Empire, which needed to protect its southern borders from constant invasions, raids and control of trade routes connecting Russia through the Caspian and Black Seas with eastern markets, during the 18th–19th centuries. They fought not only with the Caucasian highlanders, but also with Iran and Turkey who did not want to give up control over the Caucasus.

Russia's Caucasian wars include the Persian campaign of 1722–1723, the Persian campaign of 1796, the Russian-Iranian wars of 1804–1813 and 1826–1828, the Caucasian part of the Russian-Turkish wars of 1768–1774, 1787–1791, 1806– 1812, 1828–1829, the Crimean War of 1853–1856, the Caucasian War of 1817–1864, which completed the complete annexation of the Caucasus to Russia.

In the middle of the 16th century, Russian troops liquidated the Kazan and Astrakhan khanates. The conquest - annexation of the Volga region moved the border of the Muscovite kingdom to the Terek River and provided Russia with access to the Caspian Sea with the widespread sale of its traditional goods, including furs, without intermediaries in the East. It was necessary to gain a foothold in the Caspian part of the Great Silk Road, capturing the mouth of the Terek and the Dagestan coast. In the Caucasus at that time there were wars against Iranian and Turkish invaders, internal strife, some of the mountain tribes sought to get help or even enter into an alliance with Moscow. In 1554, diplomatic negotiations began with Kabarda and the Dagestan Shamkhalate Tarkovsky, as a result of which in 1557 Kabarda accepted Russian citizenship, and in 1567 the Terki fortress was founded at the mouth of the Sunzha River, and in 1588 the Terek town was built in the Terek delta. The lower reaches of the Terek were populated by Cossacks who migrated from the Don and Volga.

In 1594, and later in 1604–1605, Russian detachments of governors Buturlin and Pleshcheev tried to break into coastal Dagestan, fighting with the Kumyk Shamkhal Tarkovsky, but were unsuccessful.

In 1720, by decree of Peter I, 5 Cossack villages were built on the lower bank of the Terek. During the Persian campaign of 1722–1723, the troops of Peter I occupied the entire Dagestan coast, including Derbent. At the same time, the Kuban Khanate passed into Russian citizenship. The Russian army even occupied Baku, but failed to gain a foothold on the coast - Turkey, which was still strong at that time, did not allow it. The border of the Russian Empire returned to the Terek, where under Anna Ioannovna the construction of Caucasian fortified lines began.

In 1735–1739, the Kizlyar fortified line was built with the construction of a fortress and fortifications along the Terek River. By 1769, the line reached Mozdok, and by 1780 the Azov-Mozdok fortified line was completely created - from the Azov to the Caspian Sea. This became possible after the Russian-Turkish war of 1768–1774, as a result of which Russia received, in particular, Kabarda and North Ossetia, and the Kuban highlanders gained independence from Turkey.

The Ukrainian fertile steppes and Crimea became part of the Russian Empire. The Azov-Mozdok line (Mozdok was built in 1763) provided further advance to the mountainous Caucasus, occupation of the fertile Cis-Caucasian plain and access to the Black Sea shores of the Caucasus.

By decree of 1782, occupied lands were distributed to the Russian nobility. Until 1804, more than half a million dessiatines were distributed. Vorontsov, Bezborodko, Chernyshev, and many others received the Caucasian lands.

In 1783, A. Suvorov, then the commander of the Kuban Corps, pushed the Nogai tribes to the Urals and beyond the Kuban in battles. In 1784, Shamkhal Murtaza Ali became a Russian citizen - Russia reached the northern Dagestan coast of the Caspian Sea. In the same year, the Vladikavkaz fortress was founded and the construction of fortifications began on the Georgian Military Road being created.

This made it possible in 1785 to create a single Caucasian line, later divided into the left flank, center, right flank and the Black Sea cordon line - from the village of Ust-Labinskaya to the mouth of the Kuban, populated by former Zaporozhye Cossacks who became the Black Sea Cossack army.

Two years earlier, the king of Kartli and Kakheti, Irakli II, squeezed by the Iranians, Turks, subjected to constant raids by the Avars, turned to Russia and Eastern Georgia, according to the Treaty of Georgievsk in 1783, was declared a Russian protectorate, Russian troops entered there, but at first they failed to gain a foothold there - in Chechnya and Kabarda, the uprising of Sheikh Mansur, a Muslim preacher, began, trying to unite the Caucasian tribes under the banner of gazavat - a war against infidels.

At the head of the Caucasian tribes were feudal lords - khan, chanka, bek, depending on whom were local nobles - uzdeni, who bore duties to the beks, who distributed peasant households to them. The nukers, the inner circle of the feudal lords, also received them. Some tribes did not yet have private ownership of land, which belonged to clans - teips, whose members, like the teips themselves, were considered equal to each other. However, “strong” tapes also constantly stood out.

The Russian detachment of Colonel Pierre, sent to suppress it, was destroyed by the Chechens. Mansur tried to take Kizlyar and Mozdok, but was repulsed. A year later, the attempt to march on Kizlyar was repeated, the Chechens were again driven back, Mansur went to Transkuban, where the uprising began. The threat of a new Turkish war and the actions of Mansur forced Russian troops to withdraw from Eastern Georgia.

During the outbreak of the Russian-Turkish war of 1787–1791, the Turkish army of Batal Pasha in 1790 was defeated by Russian troops in the upper reaches of the Kuban River, who were also forced to act against the Adyghe troops of Mansur, whose base was in then Turkish Anapa and Sujuk-Kale (future Novorossiysk). In 1791, Russian troops took Anapa, Mansur was captured and exiled to the Solovetsky Monastery, where he died.

According to the Yassy Peace Treaty, Anapa was returned to Turkey, the Adyghe tribes were recognized as independent, the right flank of the Caucasian fortified line was moved to the Kuban River, and its center, a few years later, was moved to Mount Beshtau and Pyatigorsk founded there, which later became the first resort of the Caucasian Mineral Waters and Cherkessk.

In 1795, Georgia was attacked by Iran and Russian troops were again brought into the country. A year later, during the Persian campaign, the Russian army V.A. Zubova took Derbent, Cuba, Baku and Shemakha. Paul I, who ascended the Russian throne, interrupted the campaign and withdrew Russian troops from Transcaucasia. In 1799, Eastern Georgia was attacked - the threat of dividing the country between Iran and Turkey became real. The Georgian king George XII turned to Paul I. Russian troops again entered Eastern Georgia, together with Georgian soldiers on November 7, 1800 on the Iora River in Kakheti, defeating the army of the Avar and Kazikumukh khans. A year after the death of George XII, by the manifesto of Paul I, Eastern Georgia became part of the Russian Empire.

The 19th century began in the Caucasus with numerous uprisings. In 1802 the Ossetians rebelled, in 1803 - the Avars, in 1804 - the Georgians.

In 1802, the Georgian prince in Russian service P.D. was appointed commander of the troops of the Caucasian fortified line. Tsitsianov. In 1803, a successful military expedition of General Gulyakov was carried out - the Russians reached the Dagestan coast from the south. In the same year, Mingrelia passed into Russian citizenship, and in 1804, Imereti and Türkiye. Most members of the Georgian royal house by Prince P.D. Tsitsianov was deported to Russia. The remaining Tsarevich Alexander, the main contender for the Georgian throne, took refuge in Ganja, with the local khan. Ganja belonged to Azerbaijan, but this did not stop Prince Tsitsianov. Ganja was taken by storm by Russian troops, under the pretext that it had once been part of Georgia. Ganja became Elizavetpol. The march of Russian troops on Erivan-Yerevan and the capture of Ganja served as the pretext for the Russian-Iranian War of 1804–1813.

In 1805, the Shuragel, Sheki, Shirvan, and Karabakh khanates came under Russian citizenship. And although Prince Tsitsianov was treacherously killed near Baku, the uprising of Khan Sheki was suppressed and the detachment of General Glazenap took Derbent and Baku - the Derbent, Kuba and Baku khanates went to Russia, which caused the Russian-Turkish war of 1806-1812. It was the alliance of Iran and Turkey that prevented the Russians, who had captured Nakhichevan, from taking Erivan.

The Persian troops that entered the Yerevan Khanate and Karabakh were defeated by the Russians on the Araks, Arpachai and near Akhalkalaki. In Ossetia, General Lisanevich’s detachment defeated the troops of the Cuban Khan Shikh-Ali. On the Black Sea coast, Russian troops took the Turkish fortresses of Poti and Sukhum-Kale. In 1810, Abkhazia became part of Russia. Dagestan also announced the adoption of Russian citizenship.

In 1811, Russian troops of the commander in the Caucasus, Marquis Pauluchi, took the Akhalkalaki fortress. The detachment of General I. Kotlyarevsky defeated the Persians in 1812 at Aslanduz, and a year later took Lankaran. Russia's wars with Iran and Turkey ended almost simultaneously. And although, according to the Peace of Bucharest of 1812, Poti, Anapa and Akhalkalaki were returned to Turkey, according to the Peace of Gulistan of 1813, Persia lost the Karabakh Ganja, Sheki, Shirvan, Derbent, Kuba, Baku, Talyshin khanates, Dagestan, Abkhazia, Georgia, Imereti, Guria, Mingrelia. Most of Azerbaijan with Baku, Ganja, Lankaran became part of Russia.

The territories of Georgia and Azerbaijan, annexed to Russia, were separated from the empire by Chechnya, Mountainous Dagestan and the North-West Caucasus. The Battle of the Mountains began with the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815.

In 1816, the hero of the Patriotic War of 1812, General A.P., was appointed commander of a separate Caucasian corps. Ermolov, who was aware of the difficulties of repelling the raids of the highlanders and mastering the Caucasus: “The Caucasus is a huge fortress, defended by a garrison of half a million. We must storm it or take possession of the trenches.” A.P. himself Ermolov spoke out in favor of a siege.

The Caucasian Corps numbered up to 50 thousand people; A.P. The 40,000-strong Black Sea Cossack army was also subordinate to Ermolov. In 1817, the left flank of the Caucasian fortified line was moved from the Terek to the Sunzha River, in the middle course of which the Pregradny Stan fortification was founded in October. This event marked the beginning of the Caucasian War.

A line of fortifications erected along the Sunzha River in 1817–1818 separated the flat fertile lands of Chechnya from its mountainous regions - a long siege war began. The fortified line was intended to prevent raids by the mountaineers into the regions occupied by Russia; it cut off the mountaineers from the plain, blocked the mountains and became a support for further advance into the depths of the mountains.

The advance into the depths of the mountains was carried out by special military expeditions, during which “rebellious villages” were burned, crops were trampled, gardens were cut down, and the mountaineers were resettled on the plain, under the supervision of Russian garrisons.

The occupation of the Beshtau-Mashuk-Pyatigorye region by Russian troops at the end of the 18th – beginning of the 19th centuries caused a series of uprisings that were suppressed in 1804–1805, in 1810, 1814 and even at the beginning of 1820. Under General Ermolov, a system of forest cutting was first introduced - creating clearings the width of a rifle shot - to penetrate into the depths of the Chechen lands. To quickly repel an attack by the mountaineers, mobile reserves were created and fortifications were built in clearings. The Sunzha fortified line was continued by the Grozny fortress, built in 1818.

In 1819, part of the Chechen and Dagestan highlanders united and attacked the Sunzhenskaya line. Having defeated one of the Russian detachments, the attackers were thrown back into the mountains in a series of battles, and in 1821 the Sheki, Shirvan, and Karabakh khanates were liquidated. The Sudden fortress, built in 1819 in the Kumyk lands, blocked the Chechens’ path to Dagestan and the lower Terek. In 1821, Russian troops founded the Burnaya fortress - present-day Makhachkala.

The fertile lands of Transkuban were occupied by the Black Sea Cossacks. The raids were repulsed - in 1822, the expedition of General Vlasov, which crossed the Kuban, burned 17 villages. The general was removed from command, tried and acquitted.

Fighting also took place in Dagestan, where General Madatov’s detachment defeated the last khan, the Avar Sultan-Ahmed, in 1821. General A.P. Ermolov wrote in an order to the troops, “There are no more peoples in Dagestan opposing us.”

During this period, the Muridist sect that came from Sharvan began to operate in Southern Dagestan - the Muslim sect of the Naqshbandi tariqa, the second stage of religious improvement of a Muslim after Sharia). Murid – student, follower. The teachers of the murids and their leaders were called sheikhs, who put forward demands for the equality of all Muslims, which at the beginning of the 19th century were taken up by many simple mountaineers. The transfer of Muridism from Shirvan to Southern Dagestan is associated with the name of Kurali-Magoma. Initially, Ermolov limited himself to only ordering the Kurinsky and Ukhsky Aslan Khan to stop the activities of Kurali-Magoma. However, through the secretary of Aslan Khan Dzhemaleddin, who was elevated to sheikh by Kurali-Magoma, the tariqa penetrated into Mountainous Dagestan, in particular, into the Koysubulin society, which had long been a hotbed of the anti-feudal peasant movement. The Uzda elite significantly modified the tariqa, which became ghazavat - a teaching aimed at fighting the infidels. In 1825, a large anti-Russian uprising began in the Caucasus, led by the Chechen Bey-Bulat. The rebels took the fortification of Amir-Adji-Yurt, began the siege of Gerzel-aul, but were repulsed by the Russian garrison. Bey-Bulat attacked the Grozny fortress, was repulsed and General Ermolov suppressed the uprising, destroying several villages. In the same year, the expedition of General Velyaminov suppressed the incipient uprising in Kabarda, which never rebelled again.

In 1827, General A.P. Ermolov was replaced in the Caucasus by General I.F. Paskevich, who in the same year, during the outbreak of the Russian-Iranian War of 1826–1828, took Yerevan by storm. The Russians also won the war of 1828–1829 with the Turks. According to the Peace of Turkmanchay in 1828, Russia received the Erivan and Nakhichevan khanates, and according to the Peace of Adrianople in 1829, the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus from the mouth of the Kuban to Poti. The strategic situation in the Caucasus has changed dramatically in favor of Russia. The center of the Caucasian fortified line passed at the headwaters of the Kuban and Malka rivers. In 1830, the Lezgin cordon line of Kvareli-Zagatala was built - between Dagestan and Kakheti. In 1832, the Temir-Khan-Shura fortress was built - the current Buinaksk.

In 1831, Count I.F. Paskevich was recalled to St. Petersburg to suppress the Polish uprising. In the Caucasus he was replaced by General G.V. Rosen. At the same time, a Muslim state, the Imamate, was formed in Chechnya and Mountainous Dagestan.

In December 1828, in the village of Gimry, the Koisubulin Avar preacher Gazi-Magomed-Kazi-Mullah, who put forward the idea of ​​​​unifying all the peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan, was proclaimed the first imam. Under the banner of Gazavat, Kazi Mullah, however, failed to unite everyone - Shamkhal Tarkov, the Avar Khan, and other rulers did not submit to him.

In May 1830, Gazi-Magomed, with his follower Shamil, at the head of an 8,000-strong detachment, tried to take the capital of the Avar Khanate, the village of Khunzakh, but was repulsed. The Russian expedition of the imam to the village of Gimry also failed. The influence of the first imam increased.

In 1831, Gazi-Magomed with a 10,000-strong detachment went to the Tarkov Shamkhalate, in which there was an uprising against the Shamkhal. The imam defeated the tsarist troops at Atly Bonen and began the siege of the Burnaya fortress, which ensured continuity of communication with Transcaucasia along the shores of the Caspian Sea. Finding himself unable to take Burnaya, Gazi-Muhammad, however, prevented Russian troops from penetrating further than the coast. The growing uprising reached the Georgian Military Road. Commander-in-Chief in the Caucasus G.V. Rosen sent a detachment of General Pankratov to Gerki to suppress the uprising. Gazi-Muhammad went to Chechnya. He captured and devastated Kizlyar, tried to take Georgia and Vladikavkaz, but was repulsed, as well as from the Sudden fortress. At the same time, the Tabasaran beks tried to take Derbent, but were unsuccessful. The imam did not live up to the hopes of the Caucasian peasantry, did practically nothing for them, and the uprising itself began to fade. In 1832, a Russian punitive expedition entered Chechnya; About 60 villages were burned. On October 17, Russian troops besieged the residence of the imam, the village of Gimry, which had several lines of defense built in tiers. Gimry was taken by storm, Gazi-Magomed was killed.

The Avar Chanka Gamzat-bek was elected as the successor of the murdered imam, who concentrated his efforts on taking the Avar Khanate of Pakhu-bike, but in 1834, during negotiations in the camp of Galuat-bek near the capital of the Avar Khanate Khunzakh, his murids killed the sons of Pakhu-bike Nutsal Khan and Umma Khan, and the next day Galuat Beg took Khunzakh and executed Pahu-bike. For this, the Khunzakhs, led by Khanzhi-Murat, organized a conspiracy and killed Galuat-bek, the village of Khunzakh was taken by a Russian detachment.

The third imam was the candidate of the Koisubulin brigade, Shamil. At the same time, in Transkuban region, Russian troops built fortifications Nikolaevskoye and Abinsk.

Shamil managed to unite the mountain peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan under his rule, destroying the rebellious beks. With great administrative abilities, Shamil was an outstanding strategist and organizer of the armed forces. He managed to field up to 20 thousand soldiers against the Russian troops. These were massive military militias. The entire male population from 16 to 50 years old was required to perform military service.

Shamil paid special attention to creating a strong cavalry. Among the cavalry, the best part militarily were the Murtazeks, who were recruited from one out of ten families. Shamil sought to create a regular army, divided into thousands (alphas), capable of mobile defense in the mountains. Knowing perfectly all the mountain paths and passages, Shamil made amazing treks in the mountains of up to 70 km per day. Thanks to its mobility, Shamil’s army easily left the battle and evaded pursuit; but it was extremely sensitive to the rounds that Russian troops usually used.

Shamil's talent as a commander was reflected in the fact that he was able to find tactics that suited the characteristics of his army. Shamil established his base in the center of the mountain system of the northeastern Caucasus. Two gorges lead here from the south - the valleys of the Avar and Andean Koisu rivers. At their confluence, Shamil built his famous fortification Akhulgo, surrounded on three sides by impregnable cliffs. The mountaineers covered the approaches to their strongholds with rubble, built fortified posts and entire tiers of defensive lines. The tactics were to delay the advance of the Russian troops, to wear them down in continuous skirmishes and unexpected raids, especially on the rearguards. As soon as the Russian troops were forced to retreat, it always took place in difficult conditions, since the incessant attacks of the highlanders eventually exhausted the strength of the retreating ones. Taking advantage of his central position in relation to the Russian troops scattered around, Shamil made formidable raids, unexpectedly appearing where he counted on the support of the population and the weakness of the garrison.

The significance of the high-mountain base for Shamil’s military operations will become even clearer if we consider that here he organized military, albeit simplified, production. Gunpowder was produced in Vedeno, Untsukul and Gunib; saltpeter and sulfur were mined in the mountains. The population of the villages that produced saltpeter were exempt from military service and received a special payment - one and a half silver rubles per family. Melee weapons were made by handicraftsmen; rifles were usually made in Turkey and Crimea. Shamil's artillery consisted of guns captured from Russian troops. Shamil tried to organize the casting of guns and the production of gun carriages and artillery boxes. Fugitive Russian soldiers and even several officers served as craftsmen and artillerymen for Shamil.

In the summer of 1834, a large Russian detachment was sent from the Temir-Khan-Shura fortress to suppress Shamil’s uprising, which on October 18 stormed the main residence of the murids - the villages of Old and New Gotsatl in Avaria - Shamil left the khanate. The Russian command in the Caucasus decided that Shamil was not capable of active action and until 1837 was limited to small punitive expeditions against “rebellious” villages. Shamil, in two years, subjugated the entire mountainous Chechnya and almost the entire Accident with the capital. The ruler of Avaria called the Russian army for help. At the beginning of 1837, a detachment of General K.K. Fezi, who left the most interesting memories, took Khunzakh, Untsukutl and part of the village of Tilitl, to which Shamil retreated. Having suffered heavy losses and lacking food, K. Fezi’s troops found themselves in a difficult situation. On July 3, a truce was concluded and the Russian troops retreated. This event, as always, was perceived as a defeat for the Russians, and to rectify the situation, a detachment of General P.H. Grabbe was sent to take possession of the residence of Shamil Akhulgo.

After an 80-day siege, as a result of a bloody assault on August 22, 1839, Russian troops took Akhulgo; the wounded Shamil with part of the murids managed to break into Chechnya. After three days of fighting on the Valerik River and in the Gekhin Forest area in July 1840, Russian troops occupied most of Chechnya. Shamil made the village of Dargo his residence, from where it was convenient to lead the uprising in both Chechnya and Dagestan, but Shamil was then unable to take serious action against the Russian troops. Taking advantage of Shamil's defeat, Russian troops intensified their offensive against the Circassians. Their goal was to surround the Adyghe tribes and cut them off from the Black Sea.

In 1830, Gagra was taken, in 1831, the Gelendzhik fortification was built on the Black Sea coast. At the beginning of 1838, a Russian landing force landed at the mouth of the Sochi River and built the Navaginsky fortification; the Taman detachment built the Vilyaminovskoe fortification at the mouth of the Tuapse River in May 1838; At the mouth of the Shapsugo River, the Russians built the Tengin fortification. On the site of the former Sudzhuk-Kale fortress at the mouth of the Tsemes River, a fortress was founded, the future Novorossiysk. In May 1838, all the fortifications from the mouth of the Kuban River to the border of Mingrelia were united into the Black Sea coastline. By 1940, the Black Sea coastline of Anapa - Sukhumi was supplemented by fortification lines along the Laba River. Subsequently, by 1850, fortifications were built along the Urup River, and by 1858 - along the Belaya River with the founding of Maykop. The Caucasian fortified lines were abolished as unnecessary in 1860.

In 1840, the Circassians took the forts of Golovinsky and Lazarev, the fortifications of Vilyaminovskoye and Mikhailovskoye. Soon Russian troops drove them out of the Black Sea coastline, but the movement of the highlanders intensified, and Shamil also became more active.

In September 1840, after fierce battles near the villages of Ishkarty and Gimry, Shamil retreated. Russian troops, exhausted by continuous fighting, retreated to winter quarters.

In the same year, Hadji Murat fled from under arrest on the denunciation of the Avar Khan Ahmed from Khunzakh to Shamil and became his naib. In 1841, Naib Shamil Kibit-Magoma practically completed the encirclement of the Avar Khanate, the strategic key to Mountainous Dagestan.

To hold the Avalanche, almost all of Russia's free troops in the Caucasus were brought in - 17 companies and 40 guns. At the beginning of 1842, Shamil took the capital of the Kazikumukh Khanate - the village of Kumukh, but was driven out of there.

A detachment of General P.H. Grabbe was sent in pursuit of Shamil - about 25 battalions - with the goal of occupying the residence of the imam, the village of Dargo. In the six-day battles in the Ichkerian forests, the detachment was badly battered by the imam’s soldiers and the Russians returned, having suffered heavy losses in killed and wounded - 2 generals, 64 officers, more than 2,000 soldiers. The retreat of P.H. Grabbe made such an impression on the Minister of War Chernyshev, who was at that moment in the Caucasus, that he obtained an order to temporarily suspend new military expeditions.

The defeat in Chechnya worsened the already tense situation in Nagorno-Dagestan. The accident itself was lost, since Russian troops, even before Shamil’s appearance here, could fear an attack from the local population every minute. Inside Avaria and Nagorno-Dagestan, the Russians held several fortified villages - Gerbegil, Untsukul, 10 km south of the village of Gimry, Gotsatl, Kumukh, and others. The southern border of Dagestan on the Samur River was covered by the Tiflis and Akhta fortifications. It was based on these fortifications that the field armies operated, usually acting in the form of separate detachments. About 17 Russian battalions were scattered over a vast area. The confused Caucasian command did nothing to concentrate these forces scattered across small fortifications, which Shamil took advantage of with great skill. When he launched an attack on Avaria in mid-1843, most of the small Russian detachments were killed. The highlanders took 6 fortifications, captured 12 guns, 4,000 gun charges, 250 thousand cartridges. Only a Samur detachment hastily transferred to Avaria helped hold Khunzakh. Shamil occupied Gerbegil and blocked the Russian detachment of General Pasek in Khunzakh. Communication with Transcaucasia through Dagestan was interrupted. The assembled Russian troops in the battle near Bolshiye Kazanischi threw back Shamil and Pasek’s detachment escaped from the encirclement, but the accident was lost.

Shamil expanded the territory of the Imamate twice, having more than 20,000 soldiers under arms.

In 1844, Count M.S. was appointed commander of the Separate Caucasian Corps with emergency powers. Vorontsov. The king’s order read: “It will be possible to break up Shamil’s crowd, penetrating into the center of his dominion, and establish himself in it.”

The Dargin expedition began. Vorontsov managed to reach Dargo without encountering serious resistance, but when the empty aul, lit by the mountaineers, was occupied by Vorontsov, the detachment, surrounded by the mountaineers and cut off from the food supply, found itself trapped. An attempt to bring food under a strong escort failed and only weakened the detachment. Vorontsov tried to break through to the line, but the continuous attacks of the mountaineers disorganized the detachment so much that he, being already not far from the fortified line, was forced to stop his advance. Only the appearance of General Freytag’s detachment, operating in the Chechen forests, saved the expedition, which ended, in general, in failure, although Vorontsov received a princely title for it. But the uprising did not grow - the peasants received practically nothing and only endured the hardships of the war. The enormous funds spent on the war were only partly covered by military booty; extraordinary military taxes, in the collection of which the naibs showed complete arbitrariness, ruined the mountain population. Naibs - the heads of individual districts - widely practiced various extortions and fines, which they often appropriated to themselves. At the same time, they began to force the population to work for them for free. Finally, there are sources about the distribution of lands to naibs and persons close to Shamil. Detachments of murtazeks began to be used to suppress discontent with the naibs that arose here and there. The nature of military operations has also changed in significant ways.

The Imamat began to fence itself off from the enemy with a wall of fortified villages - the war was increasingly turning from a maneuver to a positional one, in which Shamil had no chance. Among the mountain population there was a saying: “It is better to spend a year in a pit-prison than to spend a month on a campaign.” Dissatisfaction with the exactions of the naibs is growing more and more. It is especially pronounced in Chechnya, which served as the main food supply for Nagorno-Dagestan. Large purchases of food, produced at low prices, the resettlement of Dagestani colonists to Chechnya, the appointment of Dagestanis as Chechen naibs, the settlement of Dagestanis in Chechnya - all this taken together created an atmosphere of constant fermentation there, which erupted in small uprisings against individual naibs, such as an uprising against Shamil in 1843 in Cheberloy.

The Chechens switched to defensive tactics against Russian troops, which directly threatened the ruin of the villages. Accordingly, with the change in the situation, the tactics of the Russian troops also changed. Military expeditions to the mountains cease and the Russians switch to trench warfare - Vorontsov compresses the Imamate with a ring of fortifications. Shamil tried several times to break through this ring.

In Dagestan, Russian troops systematically besieged fortified villages for three years. In Chechnya, where Russian troops encountered obstacles in their advance in dense forests, they systematically felled these forests; The troops cut wide clearings within the range of a rifle shot, and sometimes a cannon shot, and methodically fortified the occupied space. A long “siege of the Caucasus” began.

In 1843, Shamil broke through the Sunzha fortified line into Kabarda, but was repulsed and returned to Chechnya. Having tried to break through to the Dagestan coast, Shamil was defeated in the battle of Kutishi.

In 1848, after the secondary siege of M.S. Vorontsov took the village of Gergebil, but a year later he did not take the village of Chokh, although he repelled the attempt of Shamil’s mountaineers to enter Kakheti, having built the Urus-Martan fortification a year before in Lesser Chechnya.

In 1850, as a result of a military expedition to Inguschtia, the western part of the Imamate was transferred to the Karabulaks and Galashevites. At the same time, in Greater Chechnya, Russian troops took and destroyed the fortification built by Shamil - the Shalinsky trench. In 1851–1852, two campaigns of the imamate to Tabasaran were repulsed - Hadji Murad and Buk-Mukhamed, defeated near the village of Shelyagi. Shamil quarreled with Hadji Murat, who went over to the Russian side; Other naibs followed him.

In the western Caucasus, Circassian tribes stormed the Black Sea coastline. In 1849, Effendi Muhammad Emmin, who replaced Hadji Mohammed and Suleiman, became the head of the Circassians. In May 1851, the speech of the envoy Shamil was suppressed.

In Chechnya during 1852 there was a stubborn struggle between the detachments of Prince A.I. Baryatinsky and Shamil. Despite the stubborn resistance of the Imamate A.I. At the beginning of the year, Baryatinsky walked through the whole of Chechnya to the Kura fortification, which caused some of the villages to fall away from Shamil, who tried to retain Chechnya for himself, suddenly appearing either in the Vladikavkaz region or near Grozny; near the village of Gurdali he defeated one of the Russian detachments.

In 1853, a major battle took place on the Michak River, Shamil’s last stronghold. A. Baryatinsky, having 10 battalions, 18 squadrons and 32 guns, bypassed Shamil, who had collected 12 thousand infantry and 8 thousand cavalry. The highlanders retreated with heavy losses.

After the outbreak of the Crimean War of 1853–1856, Shamil announced that from now on the holy war with Russia would be waged jointly with Turkey. Shamil broke through the Lezgin fortified line and took the Zagatala fortress, but was again driven into the mountains by Prince Dolgorukov-Argutinsky. In 1854, Shamil invaded Kakheti, but was again repulsed. England and France sent only the Polish detachment of Laninsky to help the Circassians. And although, due to the threat of the Anglo-French fleet, Russian troops liquidated the Black Sea coastline, this did not have a significant impact on the course of the war. The Turks were defeated in battles on the Cholok River, on the Chingil Heights and at Kyuryuk-Dara, Kars was taken; The Turks were defeated in their campaign against Tiflis.

The Paris Peace Treaty of 1856 freed the hands of Russia, which concentrated a 200,000-strong army against Shamil, led by N.N., who replaced him. Muravyov Prince A.I. Baryatinsky, who also had 200 guns.

The situation in the Eastern Caucasus during this period was as follows: the Russians firmly held the fortified Vladikavkaz-Vozdvizhenskaya line, however, further to the east, up to the Kurinsky fortification, the Chechen plain was unoccupied. From the east, a fortified line ran from the Vnezapnaya fortress to Kurakha. Shamil moved his residence to the village of Vedeno. By the end of 1957, the entire plain of Greater Chechnya was occupied by Russian troops. A year later, General Evdokimov’s detachment captured Lesser Chechnya and the entire course of the Argun. Shamil tried to take Vladikavkaz, but was defeated.

In 1859, Russian troops took the village of Tauzen. Shamil tried to delay the offensive by taking a position with 12,000 troops at the exit from the Bas Gorge, but this position was bypassed. At the same time, Russian troops were advancing on Ichkeria from Dagestan.

In February 1859, General Evdokimov began the siege of Vedeno, where the mountaineers built 8 redoubts. After the defeat of the key Andean redoubt on April 1, Shaml with 400 murids escaped from the village. His naibs went over to the side of the Russians. The mountaineers began to be evicted en masse to the plain. Shaml retreated to the south, to Andia, where on the shore of the Andean Koisu he took a powerful fortified position - Mount Kilitl, at the same time occupying both banks of the Andean Koisu, which were fortified with stone rubble, on which 13 guns stood.

The Russian offensive was carried out by three detachments simultaneously: the Chechen General Evdokimov, moving south through the Andean ridge; the Dagestani General Wrangel, advancing from the east; Lezgins, advancing from the south along the Andean Gorge. The Chechen detachment, approaching from the north and descending into the Koisu valley, threatened Shamil’s old main position. A major role was played by the detour of the Dagestan detachment, which captured the right bank of the Koysu River and cut off Shamil from Avaria. Shamil abandoned the Andean position and went to his last refuge on the impregnable Mount Gunib. Two weeks later, Gunib was completely surrounded by Russian troops. On August 25, the Russians managed to climb, unnoticed by the besieged, from different sides to the considered impregnable Gunib-Dag and surround the village of Gunib, after which Shamil surrendered and was sent to Russia, to Kaluga.

After 1859, there was only one serious attempt to organize resistance of the Circassians, who created Medzhik. His failure marked the end of the active resistance of the Circassians.

The mountaineers of the northwestern Caucasus were evicted to the plain; they left and sailed en masse to Turkey, dying in thousands along the way. The captured lands were populated by Kuban and Black Sea Cossacks. The war in the Caucasus was completed by 70 battalions, a dragoon division, 20 Cossack regiments and 100 guns. In 1860, the resistance of the Natukhaevites was broken. In 1861–1862, the space between the Laba and Belaya rivers was cleared of mountaineers. During 1862–1863, the operation was moved to the Pshekha River, and roads, bridges, and redoubts were built as the troops advanced. The Russian army advanced deep into Abadzekhia, to the upper reaches of the Pshish River. The Abadzekhs were forced to fulfill the “peace conditions” prescribed to them. The Upper Abadzekhs on the crest of the Caucasus, the Ubykhs and part of the Shapsugs put up longer resistance. Having reached the Goytkh Pass, Russian troops forced the upper Abadzekhs to surrender in 1863. In 1864, through this pass and along the Black Sea coast, Russian troops reached Tuapse and began the eviction of the Shapsugs. The last to be conquered were the Ubykhs along the Shakh and Sochi rivers, who offered armed resistance.

Four Russian detachments moved from different sides against the Khakuchi into the valley of the Mzylta River. On May 21, 1864, Russian troops occupied the Kbaada tract (currently the Krasnaya Polyana resort), where the last Circassian base was located, ending almost half a century of the history of the Caucasian War. Chechnya, Mountainous Dagestan, the Northwestern Caucasus, and the Black Sea coast were annexed to Russia.