The Third Reich was preparing for an attack on the USSR very thoroughly; by the time the war began, a group of the armed forces of the Reich and the armed forces of Germany’s satellite countries, which had no analogues until that time, was concentrated on the borders of the Soviet Union. To defeat Poland, the Reich used 59 divisions; in the war with France and its allies - Holland, Belgium, England - it deployed 141 divisions; 181 divisions were concentrated to attack the USSR, this together with the allies. Berlin made serious preparations for war, literally in a few years transforming its armed forces from one of the weakest armies in Europe, because according to the Versailles agreements, Germany was allowed to have only 100 thousand. an army, without combat aviation, heavy artillery, tanks, a powerful navy, universal conscription, into the best army in the world. This was an unprecedented transformation, of course, influenced by the fact that in the period before the Nazis came to power, with the help of the “financial international” it was possible to preserve the military potential of industry and then quickly militarize the economy. The officer corps was also preserved, passing on its experience to new generations.
The myth that “intelligence reported on time.” One of the most persistent and dangerous myths, which was created under Khrushchev, and even more strengthened during the years of the Russian Federation, is the legend that intelligence has repeatedly reported on the date of the start of the war, but “stupid”, or in another version “enemy of the people” “Stalin brushed aside these reports, believing more in his “friend” Hitler. Why is this myth dangerous? He creates the opinion that if the army had been brought into full combat readiness, it would have been possible to avoid the situation when the Wehrmacht reached Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad, they say, it would have been possible to stop the enemy at the border. Moreover, it does not take into account the geopolitical realities of that time - the USSR could be accused of armed provocation, as in 1914, when the Russian Empire began mobilization and was accused of “starting a war,” Berlin received a reason to start a war. There was a possibility that we would have to forget about the creation of the “Anti-Hitler Coalition.”
There were intelligence reports, but there is a very big “But” - in the spring of 1941, the intelligence of the People’s Commissariats of State Security and Defense literally bombarded the Kremlin with reports about the “final and firmly established” date for the start of the invasions of the Reich troops. At least 5-6 such dates were reported. April, May, and June dates were reported about the Wehrmacht invasion and the start of the war, but they all turned out to be misinformation. So, contrary to the myths about the War, no one ever reported the date of June 22. The Reich troops should have learned about the hour and day of the invasion only three days before the war, so the directive stating the date of the invasion of the USSR reached the troops only on June 19, 1941. Naturally, not a single intelligence officer had time to report this.
The same famous “telegram” from R. Sorge that “an attack is expected early in the morning of June 22 along a wide front” is a fake. Its text differs sharply from real similar ciphergrams; Moreover, no responsible government leader would take any serious action on the basis of such reports, even if it comes from a reliable informant. As already mentioned, Moscow received such messages regularly. Already in our years, on June 16, 2001, the organ of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation “Red Star” published the materials of a round table dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, where there were confessions from SVR Colonel Karpov: “Unfortunately, this is a fake that appeared in Khrushchev’s times . Such “fools” are simply launched...” That is, the lie that Soviet intelligence knew everything and reported the day and hour of the start of the invasion was launched by N. Khrushchev when he “debunked” the cult of personality.
Only after the Wehrmacht received the directive of June 19, various “defectors” began to cross the border and signals went through the border service to Moscow.
Intelligence also made a mistake in the size of the Wehrmacht troop group, which was supposedly thoroughly revealed by Soviet intelligence officers. The total strength of the Reich's armed forces was determined by Soviet intelligence to be 320 divisions; in reality, at that time the Wehrmacht had 214 divisions. It was believed that the Reich's forces were divided equally in the western and eastern strategic directions: 130 divisions each, plus 60 in reserve, the rest in other directions. That is, it was not clear where Berlin would direct its attack - it was logical to assume that it would be against England. A completely different picture would have emerged if intelligence had reported that out of 214 Reich divisions, 148 were concentrated in the East. Soviet intelligence was unable to track the process of increasing the power of the Wehrmacht in the east. According to USSR intelligence data, the Wehrmacht grouping in the east from February to May 1941 increased from 80 to 130 divisions, a significant build-up of forces, but at the same time it was believed that the Wehrmacht grouping against England had doubled. What conclusions could be drawn from this? One could assume that Berlin was preparing for an operation against England, which it had been planning to do for a long time and was actively spreading disinformation about it. And in the east they strengthened the group to more reliably cover the “rear”. Wasn't Hitler planning a war on two fronts? This is unequivocal suicide for Germany. And a completely different picture would have emerged if the Kremlin had known that in February, out of all 214 German divisions, there were only 23 in the east, and by June 1941 there were already 148.
True, there is no need to create another myth, that intelligence is to blame for everything, it worked, collected information. But we must take into account the fact that she was still young, in comparison with Western intelligence services, she did not have enough experience.
Another myth is that Stalin is to blame for incorrectly determining the main direction of attack of the German armed forces - the most powerful group of the Red Army was concentrated in the Kiev Special Military District (KOVO), believing that this was where the main attack would take place. But, firstly, this is a decision of the General Staff, and secondly, according to intelligence reports, the Wehrmacht command deployed at least 70 divisions, including 15 tank divisions, against the KOVO and the Odessa Military District (OVO), and the German command against the Western Special Military District (ZOVO) concentrated 45 divisions, of which only 5 were tank divisions. And according to the initial developments of the Barbarossa plan, Berlin planned the main attack precisely in the southwestern strategic direction. Moscow proceeded from the available data; we are now able to put all the pieces of the puzzle together. In addition, in southern Poland, south of Lublin, at the beginning of June 1941, there were actually 10 tank and 6 motorized divisions of the Wehrmacht and SS troops. And therefore, opposing them with 20 tank and 10 motorized divisions of KOVO and OVO was a completely correct step by our command. True, the problem is that our reconnaissance missed the moment when 5 tank and 3 motorized divisions of Heins Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Group were transferred to the Brest area in mid-June. As a result, 9 tank and 6 motorized divisions of Germany were concentrated against the Western Special Military District, and 5 tank divisions and 3 motorized divisions remained against KOVO.
T-2
The Wehrmacht group in the east consisted of 153 divisions and 2 brigades, plus reinforcement units; they were distributed mainly across theaters of military operations: from Norway to Romania. In addition to the German troops, large forces of the armed forces of Germany's allied countries were concentrated on the borders with the Soviet Union - Finnish, Romanian and Hungarian divisions, a total of 29 divisions (15 Finnish and 14 Romanian) and 16 brigades (Finnish - 3, Hungarian - 4, Romanian - 9).
The main striking power of the Wehrmacht was represented by tank and motorized divisions. What were they? In June 1941, there were two types of tank divisions: tank divisions with a tank regiment of two battalions, they had 147 tanks - 51 light tanks Pz.Kpfw. II (according to the Soviet classification T-2), 71 medium tanks Pz.Kpfw. III (T-3), 20 medium tanks Pz.Kpfw. IV (T-4) and 5 command tanks without weapons. A tank division with a tank regiment of three battalions could be armed with German or Czechoslovak tanks. The tank division, equipped with German tanks, had: 65 T-2 light tanks, 106 T-3 and 30 T-4 medium tanks, as well as 8 command tanks, for a total of 209 units. The tank division, equipped mainly with Czechoslovak tanks, had: 55 T-2 light tanks, 110 light Czechoslovak Pz.Kpfw tanks. 35(t) or Pz.Kpfw. 38(t), 30 T-4 medium tanks and 14 Pz.Kpfw command tanks. 35(t) or Pz.Kpfw. 38(t), total – 209 units. We must also take into account the fact that most of the T-2 and Pz.Kpfw tanks. 38(t) had time to modernize, their frontal armor of 30 and 50 mm was now not inferior in armor protection to medium tanks T-3 and T-4. Plus, the quality of sighting devices is better than in Soviet tanks. According to various estimates, in total the Wehrmacht had approximately 4,000 tanks and assault guns, with the allies - more than 4,300.
Pz.Kpfw. 38(t).
But we must take into account that a Wehrmacht tank division is not only tanks. Tank divisions were reinforced: 6 thousand motorized infantry; 150 artillery barrels, along with mortars and anti-tank guns; a motorized sapper battalion that could equip positions, set up minefields or clear minefields, and organize a crossing; A motorized communications battalion is a mobile communications center based on cars, armored cars or armored personnel carriers that could provide stable control of division units on the march and in battle. According to the staff, the tank division had 1963 units of vehicles, tractors (trucks and tractors - 1402 and cars - 561), in some divisions their number reached up to 2300 units. Plus 1,289 motorcycles (711 units with sidecars) in the state, although their number could also reach 1,570 units. Therefore, tank divisions were organizationally an excellently balanced combat unit, which is why the organizational structures of this formation of the 1941 model, with minor improvements, were preserved until the end of the war.
Tank divisions and motorized divisions were reinforced. Motorized divisions differed from ordinary Wehrmacht infantry divisions by the complete motorization of all units and subunits of the division. They had two regiments of motorized infantry instead of 3 infantry in the infantry division, two light howitzer battalions and one heavy artillery division in the artillery regiment instead of 3 light and 1 heavy in the infantry division, plus they had a motorcycle rifle battalion, which was not in standard infantry division. Motorized divisions had 1900–2000 cars and 1300–1400 motorcycles. That is, tank divisions were reinforced with additional motorized infantry.
The German armed forces were the first among other armies in the world not only to understand the need to have self-propelled artillery to support their infantry, but also to be the first to put this idea into practice. The Wehrmacht had 11 divisions and 5 separate batteries of assault guns, 7 divisions of self-propelled tank destroyers, and another 4 batteries of 150-mm self-propelled heavy infantry guns were transferred to the Wehrmacht tank divisions. The assault gun units supported the infantry on the battlefield; this made it possible not to divert tank units from the tank divisions for these purposes. Divisions of self-propelled tank destroyers became the highly mobile anti-tank reserve of the Wehrmacht command.
The Wehrmacht infantry divisions numbered 16,500–16,800 people, but you need to know that, contrary to military myths, all the artillery of these divisions was horse-drawn. In the Wehrmacht infantry division, there were 5,375 horses on staff: 1,743 riding horses and 3,632 draft horses, of which 2,249 draft horses belonged to the artillery regiment of the unit. Plus a high level of motorization - 911 cars (of which 565 are trucks and 346 are cars), 527 motorcycles (201 units with a sidecar). In total, the German armed forces, concentrated on the borders of the Soviet Union, had more than 600,000 vehicles of various types and more than 1 million horses.
Artillery
Traditionally, the artillery of the German Armed Forces was strong: up to a quarter of the guns of German divisions were guns with a caliber of 105–150 mm. The organizational structure of the Wehrmacht military artillery made it possible to ensure a significant strengthening of infantry units in battle. Thus, the infantry regiments had 150-mm heavy field guns. This provided the German infantry with a significant advantage in battle. When firing direct fire with shells weighing 38 kg, 150 mm guns could quickly suppress enemy firing points, clearing the way for advancing units. Divisional artillery could support infantry and motorized regiments with a division of light 105-mm howitzers, while the commanders of the Wehrmacht infantry and motorized divisions still had a heavy howitzer division of 150-mm howitzers at their disposal, and the commanders of tank divisions had at their disposal a mixed heavy division of 105-mm guns and 150 mm howitzers.
The tank and motorized divisions also had air defense guns: according to the staff, the division had a company of ZSU (18 units), these were self-propelled anti-aircraft guns based on half-track tractors, armed with single-barreled or quadruple 20-mm anti-aircraft guns. The company was part of the anti-tank fighter division. The ZSU could fire both stationary and on the move while on the march. Plus anti-aircraft divisions with 8-12 88-mm Flak18/36/37 anti-aircraft guns, which, in addition to fighting the enemy air force, could fight enemy tanks, performing anti-tank functions.
To strike the Red Army, the Wehrmacht command also concentrated significant forces of the Reserve of the Main Command of the Ground Forces (RGK): 28 artillery divisions (12 105-mm heavy guns in each); 37 divisions of heavy field howitzers (12 150 mm units each); 2 mixed divisions (6 211 mm mortars and three 173 mm guns each); 29 heavy mortar divisions (9 211 mm mortars in each division); 7 motorized heavy artillery divisions (9 149.1 mm heavy guns in each division); 2 heavy howitzer divisions (four 240 mm heavy Czechoslovak howitzers in each division); 6 anti-tank fighter divisions (36 37-mm Pak35/36 anti-tank guns in each); 9 separate railway batteries with 280 mm naval guns (2 guns per battery). Almost all of the RGK's artillery was concentrated in the direction of the main attacks, and all of it was motorized.
To ensure comprehensive preparation for combat operations, the Wehrmacht strike groups included: 34 artillery instrumental reconnaissance divisions, 52 separate engineer battalions, 25 separate bridge-building battalions, 91 construction battalions and 35 road-building battalions.
Aviation: 4 Luftwaffe air fleets, plus Allied aviation, were concentrated to strike the USSR. In addition to 3,217 bombers and fighters, the Reich Air Force had 1,058 reconnaissance aircraft, which played a vital role in supporting the actions of ground forces and the German Navy. Plus 639 transport and communications aircraft. Of the 965 German single-engine Bf.109 Messerschmitt fighters, almost 60% were aircraft of the new Bf.109F modification; they surpassed in speed and climb rate not only the old Soviet I-16 and I-153 fighters, but also the new ones, only "Yak-1" and "LaGG-3" entered into the Red Army Air Force.
The Reich Air Force had a large number of communications and control units and units, which made it possible to maintain their high controllability and combat effectiveness. The German Air Force included anti-aircraft divisions that provided air defense for ground forces and rear facilities. Each anti-aircraft division included air surveillance, warning and communications units, logistics and technical support units. They were armed with 8-15 anti-aircraft divisions with 88-mm Flak18/36/37 anti-aircraft guns, 37-mm and 20-mm Flak30 and Flak38 anti-aircraft automatic guns, including quadruple installations of 20-mm Flakvierling38/1 automatic guns. At the same time, the Air Force anti-aircraft divisions interacted well with ground forces, often moving directly along with them.
In addition to the armed forces themselves, the striking power was reinforced by numerous auxiliary paramilitary forces, such as the Speer Transport Corps, the Todt Organization, the National Socialist Automobile Corps and the Reich Labor Service. They carried out logistical, technical and engineering support tasks for the Wehrmacht. There were many volunteers there from Western and Eastern European countries that were not formally at war with the USSR.
To summarize, it must be said that this military machine at that time had no equal. It was not for nothing that Berlin, London and Washington believed that the USSR would not withstand the blow and would fall within 2-3 months. But we miscalculated once again...
Sources:
Isaev A.V. Unknown 1941. The stopped blitzkrieg. M., 2010.
Pykhalov I. The Great Slandered War. M., 2005.
Pykhalov I. The great slandered leader. Lies and truth about Stalin. M., 2010.
http://nvo.ng.ru/history/2011-06-10/1_2ww.html
http://militera.lib.ru/h/tippelskirch/index.html
http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa
http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Patriotic_War
http://vspomniv.ru/nemetskie.htm
http://www.sovross.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=588260
http://waralbum.ru/
http://ww2history.ru/artvermaht
http://www.airpages.ru/lw_main.shtml
http://putnikost.gorod.tomsk.ru/index-1271220706.php
The names of many Soviet traitors who sided with the enemy have long been known: Lieutenant General Andrei Vlasov, Hero of the Soviet Union fighter pilot Semyon Bychkov and others. It is less known that during World War II, many soldiers of the German army defected to the Red Army.
Warcryer
On June 21, 1941, Alfred Liskov, a soldier of the 222nd Regiment of the 75th Infantry Division of the German Army, learned of an imminent move to attack the Soviet Union. The former furniture factory worker was not deluded by the ideas of Nazism and looked at things soberly. On the evening of June 21, 30-year-old Liskov left his unit, which was stationed near the borders of the USSR north of Lemberg (present-day Lvov), swam across the Bug River and surrendered to Soviet soldiers, patrolmen of the 90th Border Service, telling about the planned invasion.
During the night interrogation, Liskov confirmed that the next morning Nazi troops would attack the Soviet Union. The next morning the Great Patriotic War began. Liskov's information was confirmed, and the Soviet authorities decided to use the defector as an agitator. Until the end of the summer, he was actively involved in propaganda events. Subsequently, Liskov came into conflict with the leadership of the Comintern, receiving accusations of anti-Semitism and fascism from Georgiy Dimitrov.
In January 1942, Liskov was arrested and sent to a prison camp, where he successfully feigned insanity. According to the Book of Memory of Bashkotorstan, on July 16, 1942, the first Wehrmacht defector to the Union was rehabilitated. However, at the end of the same year, Liskov was sent to Novosibirsk, where his traces were completely lost. The former soldier of the fascist army had practically no chance of surviving in a country where even innocent Soviet Germans were exiled for their nationality to Northern Kazakhstan or driven to the mines in the Labor Army.
The first "swallows"
On June 25, 1941, a German Junkers 88 bomber landed near Kyiv. Its crew of four decided to defect to the Red Army. The Sovinformburo reported on June 28, 1941 that the pilots served in the second group of the 54th squadron. The crew included: a native of Breslau (Middle Silesia) non-commissioned officer Hans Hermann, an observer pilot from Frankfurt am Main Hans Kratz, a native of Brno (Moravia) senior corporal Adolf Appel and a radio operator from Regensburg Wilhelm Schmidt.
The pilots did not want to fight against the inhabitants of the Soviet Union. Having been sent on a mission, they dropped all the bombs into the Dnieper, and then landed near Kyiv and surrendered to the peasants they met. The entire crew signed an appeal “To German pilots and soldiers,” in which they called: “Brother pilots and soldiers, follow our example. Abandon Hitler’s killer, come here to Russia!”
In the same month, the second Junkers flew to the area where Soviet troops were deployed,” but of the entire crew, only the flight mechanic agreed to contact the German troops. Others feared persecution of their families in Germany. Only before the end of the summer, at least 20 German pilots went over to the side of the Red Army.
The infantry did not lag behind the pilots
The Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper wrote in June 1942: “The squad commander of the 2nd company of the 48th regiment of the 12th Infantry Division, Ionny Schonfeldt, has long been gradually finding out how his soldiers look at the possibility of going over to the Red Army. Exhausting battles and serious losses weakened the people - it turned out that 7 people dream of ending the war and are ready to go over to the Russians.”
At the end of May 1942, in the midst of a battle for a small village, Corporal Schoenfeldt ordered his soldiers to lay down their arms and follow him. They all rushed to the forest, located several tens of meters from the trenches. A German officer, seeing the desertion, fell to the machine gun and opened fire on those fleeing. Four were killed, but three survived and surrendered.
Fritz Paul Schmenkel desperately did not want to fight for the Nazis. In 1932, his communist father was killed by the Nazis during a demonstration. Fritz later joined the Communist Youth International of Germany. In 1938 they tried to conscript him for military service. Shmenkel feigned illness and evaded service, for which he was convicted and kept until 1941 in Torgau prison.
With the outbreak of war on the territory of the Soviet Union, Shmenkel petitioned to be sent to the front. In October 1941 he was released, sent to the school for junior artillery commanders. Once at the front, Shmenkel almost immediately fled and from November 1941 hid in the villages of the Smolensk region. In February 1942, he went to the partisans and convinced them that he was against Nazism.
In the first battle, Shmenkel killed a fascist sniper who was ambushing the partisans. The detachment recognized Fritz's courage and honesty and fell in love with him, calling him Ivan Ivanovich. Shmenkel fought valiantly against the Nazis. So, he advised the commander to open fire on the fuel barrels installed on the tanks. This helped destroy 5 German tanks. With his help, 11 policemen were also captured and handed over to the partisans without a fight.
At the beginning of November 1942, Shmenkel got hold of a general's uniform, changed clothes and sent a German convoy he had stopped on the road into the forest. This provided the partisans with food and ammunition for a long time. The Nazis quickly heard about the valiant German, placing a large reward on Shmenkel’s head.
In the spring of 1943, the partisans were transported to Moscow, since the territory where the detachment fought was liberated by the Red Army. Shmenkel was seconded to the intelligence department of the Western Front, where, after training, he was appointed deputy commander of the DRG “Pole”. In December, he, together with scouts Vinogradov and Rozhkov, was transported behind the front line to the Orsha region. Unfortunately, at the beginning of 1944, Fritz Schmenkel was captured by the Nazis near Minsk and executed on February 22.
Shmenkel’s feat became known only in 1961, when the KGB discovered papers about the policemen he had killed at the head of a partisan group. The search for document information went on for three years. In October 1964, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to citizen Schmenkel Fritz Paul (posthumously).
Great-grandson of the Iron Chancellor
Count Heinrich von Einsiedel on his mother's side was the great-grandson of Otto von Bismarck. As an 18-year-old volunteer, he joined the air force. By the beginning of World War II, the nobleman von Einsiedel became an Me-109 fighter pilot as part of the von Richthofen squadron. The brave Count (this nickname was given to him by his fellow soldiers) took part in disrupting the attack of British torpedo bombers on German ships, and personally shot down several British aircraft.
In June 1942, an experienced pilot, Lieutenant von Einsiedel, was transferred to the hottest place of the war - to the Eastern Front. In one month of the battle of Stalingrad, Graf shot down 31 Soviet aircraft as part of the Udet squadron. On August 20, 1942, von Einsiedel’s Messerschmitt was shot down near Beketovka, and he himself was captured and sent to a camp near Krasnogorsk. German prisoners who were opposed to Hitler and his ideology were concentrated there. In November 1943, von Einsiedel joined the anti-fascist organization Free Germany. While in captivity, he wrote an open letter in which he quoted the words of his great-grandfather: “Never go to war against Russia.” Von Einsiedel supervised the production of anti-fascist leaflets, becoming commissar of propaganda.
In 1947, von Einsiedel was allowed to return to East Germany, from where he later moved to the West. The count worked as a journalist, screenwriter, translator, and wrote the memoirs “Diary of a Captured German Pilot: Fighting on the Enemy’s Side. 1942-1948". Von Einsiedel lived a long life. The count died in Munich in 2007 at the age of 85.
German Vlasov
Lieutenant General, Knight of the Iron Cross Walter von Seydlitz-Kurzbach was captured in January 1943. He considered Hitler an “upstart” and treated him without respect. In a prisoner of war camp, he decided to cooperate with the Soviet authorities in order to overthrow the Fuhrer. In the fall of 1943, von Seydlitz-Kurzbach was elected chairman of the Union of German Officers at the founding conference in Lunevo. Together with him, generals Alexander von Daniels, Martin Lattman, and Otto Korfes entered the Union.
Von Seydlitz-Kurzbach was often called the “German Vlasov.” It was he who was appointed deputy chairman of the National Committee of Free Germany. The general was sentenced to death in absentia by the military court of Dresden. After the end of the war and the dissolution of Free Germany, von Seydlitz-Kurzbach served for 5 years in the Military Historical Directorate of the USSR General Staff. In 1950, he was arrested and sentenced to death in the USSR. Subsequently, the sentence was commuted to 25 years in prison, five of which the general spent in Butyrka prison.
In 1955, von Seydlitz-Kurbach was released and transferred to Germany at the personal request of Adenauer. He lived as a recluse until he was 87 and died in 1976 in Bremen. 20 years after his death, the General Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation rehabilitated the general posthumously.
How many were there?
There are no exact statistics about German soldiers who defected to the Red Army. It is known that the number of those who made an informed choice was in the hundreds. In the final months of the war, when Germany's situation became hopeless, tens of thousands of Germans surrendered.
Defectors were rarely allowed into combat. As a rule, former Wehrmacht soldiers worked in the anti-fascist propaganda committee “Free Germany” in Krasnogorsk, and were also sent to the Trudarmiya in the rear. Those who managed to escape Stalin's camps after the war were allowed to return to the GDR.
In the summer of 1940, after the successful completion of the campaign in Western Europe, the armed forces of Nazi Germany were superior in numbers, technical equipment, combat experience, proven strategic and operational principles, and aggressive fanaticism of personnel to any of the armies of capitalist countries. By that time, the Wehrmacht ground forces had 156 divisions, of which 10 were tank and 6 were motorized. 120 divisions were in Western Europe, 15 in Poland, near the western borders of the Soviet Union. The rest were located in Germany and Czechoslovakia (13 divisions), and carried out occupation service in Norway (7 divisions) and Denmark (1 division). Without taking into account captured weapons, the Wehrmacht had over 3 thousand tanks and assault guns and about 33 thousand guns and mortars (excluding anti-aircraft artillery). The air force consisted of over 4 thousand combat aircraft.
However, the fascist elite believed that for aggression against the Soviet Union it was necessary to carry out new major measures for the mobilization deployment of the Wehrmacht, primarily the ground forces, which were called upon to solve the main tasks. As part of the ground forces, 4 new directorates of field armies, 4 directorates of tank groups, 16 corps directorates, 58 divisions, including 11 tank and 8 motorized, were formed. The backbone for the newly formed infantry formations were parts of the personnel divisions of the active army. New tank divisions were created on the basis of motorized and infantry divisions, and motorized formations - on the basis of infantry ones. The number of reinforcement and support units increased: self-propelled artillery, artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, engineering, communications, etc. For example, 11 separate divisions and 2 batteries of self-propelled artillery units, 14 motorized anti-tank fighter divisions of the OKH reserve were additionally formed ( B. Müller-Hillebrand. German Land Army 1933 - 1945, vol. II, pp. 171 - 172, 216.).
Hitler's leadership attached particular importance to the technical equipment of the ground forces, primarily tanks. Starting the Second World War, fascist strategists hoped to win all campaigns with the help of high-speed light tanks T-I and T-II. But the fighting in Poland and especially in France revealed their vulnerability. They had thin armor, weak weapons, and therefore tank units suffered heavy losses. The speed qualities of light vehicles did not compensate for these shortcomings. In preparation for the attack on the USSR, the German leadership decided to significantly increase the number of medium tanks T-III and T-IV, the speed of which was combined with greater power of armor and weapons (Table 18). By June 21, 1941, the number of Wehrmacht medium tanks had more than tripled compared to May 1940, while the number of T-I and T-II light tanks had decreased.
Table 18. Tactical and technical data of the main German tanks (by mid-1941) (W. Oswald. Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer der Reichswehr, Wehrmacht und Bundesvehr. Stuttgart, 1971, S. 205, 211, 217, 227.)
The organizational structure of tank divisions underwent a restructuring. To give them greater maneuverability and independence in action, the ratio between tank and motorized units was changed: the proportion of tank units was reduced and the proportion of motorized units was increased. Of the 19 tank divisions intended for operations in the east, 11 began to have one two-battalion tank regiment and two motorized regiments, 8 divisions - one three-battalion tank regiment and two motorized regiments ( B. Müller-Hillebrand. German Land Army 1933 - 1945, vol. II, pp. 145 - 146, 248 - 252.). The tank division consisted of about 16 thousand personnel, 147 - 209 tanks, 27 armored vehicles and 192 guns and mortars. The maneuverability of tank divisions has increased. To increase the range of the tanks, they were given trailers with fuel, and to overcome difficult terrain, the tanks were equipped with fascines. But in terms of striking power, the tank divisions of the new organization were somewhat inferior to the previous ones ( G. Guderian. Tanks - forward! Translation from German. M., 1957, p. 28.).
The motorized division also underwent staff reorganization. It now had two motorized infantry regiments of three battalions and an artillery regiment - a total of 14,029 people, 37 armored vehicles, 237 guns and mortars. The number of automatic weapons in the new division has increased significantly. For example, the number of submachine guns increased from 31 to 762 units ( Combat actions of the Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War of 1941 - 1945. Brief military-historical sketch. T. 1. M., 1958, p. 362; W. Keiig. Das deutsche Heer 1939 - 1945. Bd. II. Bad Nauheim, 1956, Doc. 102, S. 3.).
The combat capabilities of infantry divisions have increased. They received more automatic small arms, mortars (50 mm and 81 mm), field (105 mm and 150 mm) and anti-tank artillery (37 mm and 50 mm), as well as modernized anti-tank rifles ( Combat actions of the Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War of 1941 - 1945, vol. 1, pp. 358-359.). According to the states in 1941, the German infantry division consisted of 16,859 people, 299 guns and mortars and consisted of three infantry and one artillery regiments (three divisions of 105 mm and one 150 mm howitzers), support and service units ( Right there.).
The mountain rifle and light infantry divisions, intended for operations in mountainous and wooded areas, each consisted of two mountain rifle or light infantry regiments and one artillery regiment, which was armed with 75 mm mountain guns, 105 mm and 150 mm howitzers. According to the staff, there were about 14 thousand people in the mountain rifle division, and up to 11 thousand people in the light infantry division.
Artillery and small arms weapons were modernized. Light anti-tank rifles with a caliber of 7.9 mm and armor penetration of 20 mm were replaced by heavy ones - with a caliber of 28 mm, weighing 229 kg and armor penetration of up to 40 mm. Mass production of 50-mm anti-tank and 128-mm anti-aircraft guns was established (Table 19).
The small arms of the fascist German army generally met the requirements of the battle. However, rifles and carbines (Mausers) were somewhat heavy and had a relatively low rate of fire - 10 - 12 rounds per minute. Submachine guns (MR-28, MP-40) had a limited firing range (200 m). Before the start of the Second World War, the so-called single machine gun (light, heavy, anti-aircraft) was adopted, which had a high rate of fire (700 - 800 rounds per minute) and an effective range of up to 2000 m. But the complexity of production limited the production of these weapons.
Before the attack on the Soviet Union, the Air Force did not undergo significant organizational changes, but its combat effectiveness increased. This was achieved by modifying and, most importantly, increasing the production of aircraft that had proven themselves in the campaign in Western Europe, as well as by broadly generalizing combat experience and introducing it into pilot training practice. By the time of Germany's attack on the USSR, mass production of aircraft of new modifications had been established. German aircraft had a completely modern design, but were poorly adapted to combat operations from unpaved airfields. This was a significant drawback of the German Air Force (tactical and technical data of German aircraft are given in Table 20).
By the spring of 1941, the reorganization of the management of the armed forces of Nazi Germany was completed, taking into account almost two years of war experience. All levers of political and military leadership were concentrated in the hands of the dictator - Hitler, who had the official title of “Führer and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht.” The command of the German armed forces was divided into the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW), the main commands of the ground forces (OKH), the air force (OKL) and the naval forces (OKM), headed by loyal servants of German imperialism. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command was headed by Field Marshal General W. Keitel, who received this title after the defeat of France. As part of this management body there was an operational leadership headquarters, the head of which, from August 1940, was Colonel General A. Jodl. He received the right to personally report to Hitler on current issues of operational management of military operations and was practically on an equal footing with Keitel.
Table 19. Tactical and technical data of the main types of artillery weapons of the German army (by mid-1941) (N. Hohn. Feuerkraft der Aggressoren. Zur Entwicklung der Artillerie in der Landstreitkraften des deutschen Militarismus von 1935 bis 1960 (hereinafter - Feuerkraft der Aggressoren) . Berlin, 1961, S. 107 - 110; F. Senger und Etterlin. Die deutschen Geschutze 1939 - 1945. Munchen, 1960, S. 23 - 213.)
* Numerator - armor-piercing projectile, denominator - fragmentation projectile.
** The denominator shows the vertical firing range.
The commander-in-chief of the ground forces was Field Marshal V. Brauchitsch, and the chief of the general staff was Colonel General F. Halder. The leadership of combat operations on the Soviet-German front (under the control of Hitler) was entrusted to the OKH, and the OKB was responsible for organizing operations in other theaters and for coordinating the actions of the armed forces. The special position of the OKH was due to the fact that in the aggression against the USSR the ground forces were assigned a decisive role and, in addition, the OKH was responsible for coordinating the actions of the army, air force and navy on the eastern front.
The point of the organizational changes carried out in the Wehrmacht before the attack on the Soviet Union was to dramatically increase its striking power and maneuverability. This goal was served by changes in the nature of combat training of troops and naval forces. It was based on the experience of the Wehrmacht in Western Europe. Ground forces, rehearsing a surprise strike, were trained in specially equipped camps, at training grounds with training conditions as close as possible to a combat situation. The infantry was trained to break through defenses on the move, in cooperation with tank troops and the air force. Panzer divisions trained in rapid advances under Luftwaffe cover.
Hitler's command paid special attention to troop management during the implementation of the Barbarossa plan. Operational headquarters at games and field training learned to provide continuous leadership of rapidly advancing formations and organize the interaction of military branches.
The German ground forces were divided into an active army and a reserve army. The main strategic association of the army in the theater or strategic direction was the army group. Depending on the upcoming tasks, it included two or three field armies and one or two tank groups. The army united three to five army corps, a tank group - two or three tanks, and sometimes one or two army corps. The corps consisted of two to five divisions.
The Reserve Army was created at the beginning of the war and by the summer of 1941 received final organizational design. She trained personnel for the ground forces (in reserve units, formations and educational institutions). In addition, the reserve army, through military districts, mobilized and replenished all types of armed forces with personnel.
The reserve army was entrusted with meeting the needs of the Wehrmacht in small arms, vehicles, horses, fuels and lubricants, rubber products, chemical, medical and veterinary equipment. She was also responsible for the financial support of the active army.
In addition to spare parts, formations and educational institutions, the reserve army included security units and formations, territorial formations of military districts, and military hospitals stationed in Germany. All personnel who were undergoing treatment were also included in the staff of this army.
The air force (Commander-in-Chief Reichsmarschall G. Goering, Chief of the General Staff Air Force General G. Jeschonnek) consisted of five air fleets, the country's air defense forces and airborne troops. The air fleet had one or two aviation corps, an anti-aircraft corps and a separate aviation squadron. The aviation corps usually included two or three squadrons of bombers, one or two squadrons of fighters, one or three reconnaissance groups and one or two transport groups. The squadron consisted of two or three groups. The aviation group consisted of 39 - 47 aircraft (together with aircraft of reserve and regular units).
The Navy (Commander-in-Chief Grand Admiral E. Raeder, Chief of Staff of the Naval War Command Rear Admiral K. Fricke) consisted of three main associations of surface ships - groups “West”, “North” and “East” (the groups consisted of formations of ships) - and the submarine fleet. In total, the fleet consisted of 5 battleships (including two old ones), 8 cruisers, 43 destroyers and destroyers, and 161 submarines. The fleet did not have its own aviation. It was assigned special aircraft to conduct reconnaissance and interact with submarines performing combat missions.
In addition to the ground forces, air force and navy, Germany had special SS troops subordinate to the main command of the SS troops. They were formed from persons especially devoted to the fascist regime, were better provided for and were, in essence, fascist guards. Organizationally, the SS troops consisted of separate divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions and companies.
In preparation for aggression against the USSR, the Nazi command paid great attention to preparing the theater of military operations. The equipment of the initial areas for the offensive was carried out on the basis of the “Construction in the East” directive of August 9, 1940. The fascist leadership widely used labor from occupied Poland and France in construction.
In the spring of 1941, work was completed to repair tracks and increase the capacity of stations and sidings on the highways: Stettin - Königsberg, Berlin - Tilsit, Berlin - Poznan - Warsaw, Berlin - Lodz - Warsaw - Siedlce, Berlin - Breslau - Katowice - Brest, Berlin - Krakow - Rzeszow. The total capacity of these main lines was increased to 600 pairs of trains per day.
Simultaneously with the expansion and repair of highways running from west to east, the railways were put in order, and the highway network was improved and expanded. By the beginning of 1941, the construction of four highways in Germany was completed, and by the summer of that year, new highways were built connecting Central Germany with East Prussia, Poland and Austria. Since September 1940, work on the construction of roads on the territory of Romania was carried out on a wide front.
The modernized and newly created network of railways and highways in Germany, Poland and Romania fully ensured the rapid and secretive concentration and deployment of German armed forces at the western borders of the Soviet Union and the delivery of goods necessary for the troops.
Hitler's leadership made great efforts to build new and re-equip old airfields in the theater of military operations. From the summer of 1940 to May 1941, 250 airfields and 160 landing sites were equipped in Germany. During the same period, 100 airfields and 50 landing sites were built and restored in Poland. Airfields in Romania and Hungary were newly created and improved. A widely developed airfield network provided the German air force with dispersed basing and freedom of maneuver along the front and in depth.
Great importance was attached to the basing of naval units allocated for combat operations against the Soviet Union. The naval bases of Danzig, Gdynia and Memel, captured in 1939, as well as Pillau, were adapted by the Germans for parking submarines and light naval forces. An extensive basing system was created on the northern coast of Norway. It included Norwegian ports in the ice-free Varanger Fjord (Kirkenes, Vardø and Vadso), the ports of Hammerfest, Tromsø and other bases. On the Black Sea, the Romanian port of Constanta and the Bulgarian ports of Varna and Burgas were refurbished.
The German fascists, preparing for the invasion of the USSR, carried out extensive work to restore and strengthen the old (in East Prussia) and build new (in Poland) starting areas for the offensive.
* In addition, in the ground forces there were 900 thousand civilian personnel (B. Muller-Hillebrand. Das Heer 1936 - 1945. Bd. III. Der Zweifrontenkrieg. Frankfurt a/M., 1969, S. 251) and about 350 thousand. in other types of Wehrmacht.
** Accepted by the Armament Directorate and transferred to the troops. Captured tanks are not taken into account (B. Müller-Hillebrand. German Land Army 1933 - 1945, vol. II, pp. 144, 216). On December 23, 1940, there were 4,930 captured tanks, including ammunition transporters. (F. Halder. War Diary, vol. 2, p. 316).
*** Artillery and mortars with a caliber of 75 mm and higher, anti-tank guns 37 mm and 50 mm (B. Müller-Hillebrand. German Land Army 1933 - 1945, vol. II, pp. 125, 147, 216 - 217; G. Forster und andere. Der zweite Weltkrieg. anti-aircraft artillery with a caliber of 37 mm and higher (W. In aumbach. Zu spat? Mrincben, 1949, S. 225). 50-mm and six-barreled chemical mortars, coastal artillery and captured guns are not taken into account.
**** By the beginning of the World War, the German Air Force had 3,541 combat aircraft. Until June 22, 1941, the Wehrmacht received more than 13 thousand new and repaired combat aircraft. Irreversible losses during the same time amounted to about 6 thousand aircraft (Auf antisowjetiscbem Kriegskurs, S. 406, 416 - 417).
The eastern theater of military operations was prepared by the fascist German command in such a way as to redeploy and deploy troops covertly, strictly on time, and ensure combat operations of large military masses equipped with a huge amount of military equipment.
A comparison of the total number of armed forces of Nazi Germany and the forces allocated for the attack on the Soviet Union shows (Tables 22 and 23) that 83 percent of the personnel of the ground forces and SS units were thrown to the east, including 86 percent of tank divisions, all motorized divisions and three-quarters of all artillery, as well as more than 70 percent of active air force personnel and about 70 percent of combat-ready aircraft. These were the most combat-ready troops.
The strategic deployment of the Wehrmacht was carried out secretly.
Hitler's leadership had ample opportunities to mask the impending aggression, citing the need to conduct military operations against England, in the Balkans and in other areas. The state of war “justified” mobilization, reorganization, movement of troops and headquarters, and other preparatory measures for unleashing aggression.
* Two brigades are taken as one division. The total number includes 24 OKH reserve divisions.
** Field artillery of OKH divisions and reserves, anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery without 20-mm anti-aircraft guns, captured Czech and French guns, 50-mm and chemical 105-mm mortars are taken into account (B. Müller-Hillebrand. German Land Army 1933 - 1945 ., vol. II, pp. 125, 127, 216 - 217, 265 - 267).
*** Tanks from 19 tank divisions (47 battalions), 6 OKH reserve battalions and assault guns were taken into account (B. Müller-Hillebrand, German Land Army 1933 - 1945, vol. II, pp. 146 - 216).
**** As of May 29, 1941, the operational formations of the Air Force and military aviation intended for operations against the USSR included 306 combat squadrons, including 127 bomber and 89 fighter squadrons. The Luftwaffe's central reserve consisted of 397 aircraft. The staffing of squadrons, groups and squadrons was close to standard (Auf antisowjetischem Kriegskurs, S. 419, 424).
***** Including destroyers - 8, submarines - 11, various boats - 48, minelayers - 12 (of which 2 are underwater), mine clearers - 3, minesweepers - PO.
The strategic concentration and operational deployment of the armed forces of Nazi Germany in the east began in July 1940, when the headquarters of the 18th Army and 16 divisions were transferred to the borders of the USSR.
Strengthening the army in the east, the main command of the ground forces, based on the instructions of the OKB, carried out operational camouflage. Under the guise of replacing units, by September 20, it transferred from France to Poland the headquarters of Army Group B and the headquarters of the 4th and 12th armies, four corps headquarters, one tank and nine infantry divisions. The corps headquarters, two tank, one motorized and one infantry divisions were sent there from Germany. As a result, in the east, Army Group B (later renamed Army Group Center) included (from north to south) the 18th, 4th, and 12th armies ( The headquarters of the 12th Army was transferred to Romania in February 1941 to prepare for the invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece.), numbering up to 30 divisions (about 500 thousand people) ( B. Müller-Hillebrand. German Land Army 1933 - 1945, vol. II, pp. 104, 206.). The troops that arrived here were supposedly supposed to “repel any enemy offensive in the border area and thereby create the preconditions for our offensive actions” ( Fall Barbarossa, S. 231.). This task was of a disinformation nature and at the same time had the goal of instilling in the German soldier the idea of the “aggressiveness” of the Soviet state. The fascist secret service at this time was spreading a false version about the possible transition of the Soviet Armenians to the offensive against Germany. This version was then turned by fascist propaganda into a myth about the preventive nature of Germany’s attack on the USSR and was used by the Nazis to justify aggression.
To accommodate the new troops, reserve units of the 1st Corps District (East Prussia) were redeployed to the so-called “Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia”, and parts of the 8th Corps District were redeployed from Silesia to Alsace. Following this, nine infantry divisions were transferred from the west to Germany for reorganization. From October 25, a new order of subordination was introduced for troops stationed in France and Germany. The newly formed headquarters of Army Group D began to function. The commander of Army Group A simultaneously became the commander of German forces in the west. The headquarters of Army Group C was transferred to Germany ( N. Greiner. Die Oberste Wehrmachtsfuhrung 1939 - 1943. Wiesbaden, 1951, S. 312.).
On October 30, the main command of the ground forces relocated from Fontainebleau to Zossen (south of Berlin), where it remained until April 1945.
In addition to the command of the reserve army, the headquarters of the 2nd Army, which arrived from the west, and the newly formed 11th Army were concentrated on the territory of Germany itself. These headquarters and new formations that were part of the reserve army became subordinate to the headquarters of Army Group C, which was later renamed the headquarters of Army Group South.
The measures for the redeployment of troops and headquarters carried out in the summer and autumn of 1940 constituted only the initial stage of the strategic deployment of the Wehrmacht. Hitler's command did not intend to reveal its cards prematurely and concentrate large masses of troops in the eastern regions too early.
The transfer of the main forces from Germany and the occupied countries to the Soviet border in accordance with Appendix No. 2 to the directive on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops (Plan Barbarossa) was carried out from February to June 1941 in successive five echelons.
The first four echelons transported troops intended to participate in the offensive from the first day of the war. The fifth echelon was the reserve of the main command of the ground forces.
The first operational echelon (7 infantry and 1 motorized divisions) from February 4 to March 12 was concentrated on the Danzig-Katowice line. The second echelon (18 infantry divisions) moved from March 16 to April 8 to the Konigsberg, Warsaw, Tarnow line. The third (16 divisions) - was transferred from April 10 to May 10 to the Alenstein, Radom line. The concentration of the fourth echelon (47 formations, including 28 tank and motorized divisions) began on May 25 and was completed by mid-June.
From June 10, the troops intended for the breakthrough were withdrawn to their original areas located 7 to 30 km from the border. Their transfer took place at night, observing the strictest camouflage measures. By the end of June 21, the deployment of the ground forces, aviation and navy assigned to launch the first strikes was completed. The fascist German armed forces took up their starting position, as provided for by the Barbarossa plan.
In the far north, the Army of Norway, which included four German and two Finnish infantry divisions, deployed for an offensive in the Murmansk and Kandalaksha directions. One German division and Finnish troops were concentrated in the Ukhta direction and in South-Eastern Finland. The actions of German and Finnish troops from the air were supported by units of the 5th Air Fleet and Finnish aviation.
On the front sector from Klaipeda to Gołdap (230 km) for the offensive in the Leningrad direction, Army Group North (commander Field Marshal Leeb) took its starting position, consisting of the 16th and 18th field armies and the 4th tank group (20 infantry, 3 tank, 3 motorized and 3 security divisions). At airfields prepared in advance in the rear area of Army Group North, aviation from the 1st Air Fleet was deployed to support the offensive of the troops of this group. The strongest group of Nazi troops - Army Group Center (commanded by Field Marshal Bock) was concentrated on the front from Gołdap to Wlodawa (500 km). It consisted of two field armies (4th and 9th) and two tank groups (2nd and 3rd). In total, the army group had: 31 infantry, 9 tank, 6 motorized, 1 cavalry, 3 security divisions and 2 motorized brigades. Formations and units of the 2nd Air Fleet, which supported the offensive of Army Group Center from the air, were stationed at pre-prepared airfields in the rear area of this army group.
On the front from Wlodawa to the mouth of the Danube River (1250 km), Army Group South (commanded by Field Marshal Rundstedt) was deployed, consisting of the 6th, 17th and 11th field armies and the 1st Panzer Group, Hungarian and Romanian troops. In total, the army group (excluding Hungarian and Romanian troops) had 32 infantry, 5 tank, 4 motorized and 3 security divisions. In the rear area of Army Group South, aviation from the 4th Air Fleet was concentrated at pre-equipped airfields, providing air support for this group's offensive.
To build up attacks by army groups during the offensive, a reserve of the main command of the ground forces was created, consisting of 21 infantry, 2 tank and 1 motorized divisions. Of these, 12 infantry formations were supposed to arrive as part of the army groups before July 4, 1941 (two in the “North”, six in the “Center” and four in the “South”). The remaining reserve divisions arrived later ( W. Keiig. Das deutsche Heer 1939 - 1945. Bd. I, Dok. 191, S. 1.).
The fascist German command attracted the navy to hostilities against the USSR.
In the Barents Sea, the fleet forces consisted of part of the ships of the North group: the 6th flotilla of destroyers (5 units), 6 submarines, 10 patrol boats, a flotilla of special purpose minesweepers (10 ships). In addition, the Nazis prepared captured Norwegian ships for use: 3 destroyers, 2 underwater minelayers and 10 patrol ships.
For operations in the Baltic Sea, 5 submarines, 10 surface minelayers, 28 torpedo boats, 3 magnetic minefield breakers and 10 flotillas of minesweepers of various types, including those converted from fishing trawlers, were allocated F. Ruge. War at sea 1939 - 1945, p. 209.) (about 100 units in total). On the night of June 22, the Germans placed minefields at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland in the Moonsund archipelago, in the Irben Strait and in front of the ports of Libau and Vindava. Mines were also laid on the Black Sea - near Sevastopol.
In accordance with the idea of delivering the main attack in the Minsk-Moscow direction, the fascist German command included more tank divisions in Army Group Center than in the other groups combined, almost as many motorized divisions, and the largest number of infantry formations. Half of all reserves scheduled for commissioning in the first place were also sent here.
By the beginning of the aggression against the USSR, the ground forces of Army Group Center had more than 1 million soldiers and officers, about 2 thousand tanks and assault guns. The aviation units of the 2nd Air Fleet had over 1.6 thousand combat aircraft.
Army Group South had somewhat smaller but quite powerful forces. A characteristic feature of the deployment of this group was that the densest grouping of troops was created on the front from Wlodawa to the foothills of the Carpathians.
The troops of the allies of fascist Germany were concentrated on the flanks of the huge eastern front, but here the main operational directions were occupied by fascist German formations.
The distribution of Wehrmacht forces and assets near the borders of the USSR reflected the main focus of the fascist German command on waging a “lightning war” with the widespread use of mobile forces in the first strategic strike.
Before the attack on the USSR, the fascist German leadership intensified intelligence activities. Since October 1939, German intelligence agencies deployed a network of special units to send their agents into the USSR. Military intelligence was given the following tasks: to collect maximum data about the Soviet Army, its personnel, weapons, equipment; determine the military-economic potential of the USSR; study the moral and political state of Soviet society in order to identify elements in opposition and hostile to socialism, to achieve the creation of a “fifth column” in the USSR; obtain detailed information about the theater of military operations; provide conditions for covert preparation of the invasion and the success of the first operations.
The central body organizing military intelligence was the intelligence and counterintelligence department (Abwehr) of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (chief Rear Admiral V. Kanaris). Information was received here from the Main Directorate of Reich Security of the SS, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the apparatus of the Nazi Party, from military intelligence, Air Force intelligence, Navy intelligence, etc. The processing of intelligence data was carried out by the 1st (information) department of the Abwehr, which presented all information of a military operational nature to headquarters of the armed forces, including the department for the study of the armies of the East of the General Staff of the Ground Forces. The 2nd department organized sabotage, the 3rd was in charge of counterintelligence in the Wehrmacht and the German military industry.
The special purpose headquarters “Russia” was used to coordinate the activities of various economic intelligence departments. The economic information obtained was ultimately concentrated in the so-called “institute of geopolitics”, where there were more than a thousand employees.
Along with the intelligence agencies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was involved in espionage on the territory of the USSR. German diplomats in Moscow sought to collect intelligence information and establish informal contacts with Soviet people. The apparatus of military attaches was the most active. At one of the operational meetings held in May 1941, the German military attaché in the USSR, General Kestring, outlined a plan for using diplomatic couriers to obtain information about the movement of trains with units of the Soviet Army in the southern, western and northern directions. The German air attache, Colonel Aschenbrenner, together with his assistant, prepared data for raids on Moscow and other cities. They marked on the map of the capital objects scheduled for destruction from the air: power plants, the Sharikopodshipnik, ZR1S, Frezer, Dynamo factories, the buildings of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Supreme Council, the NKGB and NKVD, NGOs, railway stations, bridges, etc. Sketches of each object were drawn up with a description of landmarks visible from the air. The map and materials for it were sent to Germany before the war.
For espionage against the USSR, renegades were recruited - white emigrants, nationalists and other enemies of the Soviet Union who lived in Germany, in the allied and conquered countries. But the data received from them, according to the conclusion of the former fascist intelligence officer P. Leverkühn, was usually superficial, and sometimes represented “misinformation material, false information, which only contributed to causing confusion” ( P. Leverkuehn. Der geheime Nachrichtendienst der deutschen Wehr-macht im Krieg. Frankfurt a/M., 1957, S. 128.).
The fascist command, not really relying on agents of this kind, sent professional intelligence officers to the territory of the Soviet Union. Before the war, for example, groups from the special sabotage reconnaissance regiment “Brandenburg 800” (its first battalion served mainly Germans who spoke Russian) were actively used. On June 15, 1941, the German command began to transfer sabotage and reconnaissance groups and individual saboteurs to the territory of the USSR, who were tasked with the outbreak of hostilities to destroy communication lines, blow up bridges, railways on the main communications of the Soviet troops, seize bridges and hold them until the approach advanced units, destroy important military and industrial facilities.
Aerial reconnaissance was conducted to collect information about the USSR. From October 1939 to June 22, 1941, German aircraft invaded Soviet airspace more than 500 times. German civil aviation aircraft flying along the Berlin-Moscow-Berlin route often went off course and ended up over areas of the Soviet Union remote from this route.
On April 15, 1941, a German plane was landed in Rivne, violating the air border of the USSR. On the plane they found a topographic map of the border regions of the Soviet Union, photographic equipment, and exposed film. These items irrefutably indicated that the plane entered Soviet airspace for reconnaissance purposes. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in its note to the German government pointed out the inadmissibility of such facts in relations between neighboring states.
German intelligence showed increased interest in Soviet fortifications in the border zone. The fascist German authorities persistently sought to inspect the Brest fortress, allegedly in order to find the remains of German soldiers who died near it in September 1939. Reconnaissance groups of the German army penetrated into the Soviet border zone.
Hitler's command made extensive use of radio intelligence. Direction-finding bases were deployed in the initial areas for the offensive. Intelligence collection was carried out by special eavesdropping companies of army groups and reconnaissance communications platoons of divisions. Radio reconnaissance helped the German command obtain data on the position of some headquarters of the Soviet troops concentrated near the western borders.
However, the overall results of the intelligence activities of the spy organizations of Nazi Germany directed against the USSR were not as satisfactory as in preparing for attacks on other countries.
The monolithic moral and political unity of the Soviet people, their high vigilance, patriotism, and devotion to the cause of the Communist Party reduced the results of Nazi intelligence in the USSR to a minimum. Soviet counterintelligence agencies dealt severe blows to it.
The Nazis were unable to create an extensive intelligence network in the USSR, in particular in its deep rear. According to the conclusion of West German intelligence researcher O. Reile, fascist intelligence before the Second World War “was unable to cover the Soviet Union with a well-functioning intelligence network of well-located secret strongholds in other countries - in Turkey, Afghanistan, Japan or Finland” ( O. Rei1e. Geheime Ostfront. Munchen, 1963, S. 295.). Hitler's intelligence did not find a social basis for its activities in the USSR. Her methods of action, which usually brought success when she worked in capitalist countries, turned out to be ineffective on the territory of the USSR.
General information from Hitler's intelligence about Soviet military potential remained very meager, and data on the power of the Armed Forces was contradictory. Fascist intelligence was unable to correctly assess the ability of a socialist state to quickly rebuild the economy on a war footing and organize a decisive rebuff to the aggressor. West German historian P. Carell complains about this: “What happened to German espionage against Russia? What did the German leadership know from the secret service? The answer is in a nutshell: very little!.. It knew nothing about the military secrets of the Russians... We counted 200 divisions in the Red Army before the start of the war. 6 weeks after the start of the war, we were forced to establish that there were 360 of them" ( P. Gare11. Unternehmen "Barbarossa". Frankfurt a/M., 1963, S. 52.).
Although fascist German intelligence by the summer of 1941 had approximately established the combat strength and strength of Soviet troops in the western border districts, it had a vague idea of the USSR Armed Forces as a whole, clearly underestimated the mobilization capabilities of the Soviet Union, miscalculated the pace of mobilization of the Soviet Armed Forces, did not was able to determine the size of strategic reserves and the timing of their deployment.
Characteristic features inherent in the military construction of Germany, Italy and Japan were the creation and deployment of massive armies before the start of the war, as well as the use of material resources of the occupied countries of Western Europe and Asia to equip and replenish the armed forces during the war.
The German armed forces (Wehrmacht) formed the basis of the military power of the entire fascist bloc. The entire economy and other spheres of state life were subordinated to their construction. As a result of using the resources of a number of European countries, Germany's military potential increased to unprecedented proportions. By June 1941, the Wehrmacht had become the most powerful military machine in the imperialist world. It was a massive, well-armed, trained army, in which most of the military personnel had already participated in military campaigns, the command staff had high professional training and significant combat experience.
The German armed forces consisted of ground forces, air force and naval forces. The SS troops were a separate component. The special reserve army, which was part of the ground forces, was intended to train reinforcements for the active army and provide logistical support to the armed forces.
The continental nature of military operations predetermined the significant predominance of German ground forces over other types of armed forces. They accounted for 70 - 80 percent of the total strength of the Wehrmacht.
The Wehrmacht was recruited on the basis of universal conscription, introduced in 1935. Available human resources allowed the fascist leadership to increase the number of armed forces, which in 1943 reached its greatest value - about 10 million people (excluding military auxiliary units). Total in 1939 - 1945 Almost 17.9 million people were drafted into the armed forces (334). Heavy defeats on the Soviet-German front forced the Nazi leadership to carry out total mobilizations. Despite these emergency measures, the strength of the Wehrmacht, especially the active army, was continuously reduced in the last two years of the war. To compensate for the progressive decline in the strength of the Wehrmacht, military units were created from foreigners who had taken the path of cooperation with fascism; from September 1944, the formation of the Volkssturm began from teenagers and older men (335).
The officer corps was staffed mainly by the junkers, large and middle bourgeoisie. Much attention was paid to the professional training of officers. The rank and file also underwent thorough training. In 1941 - 1944 The reserve army trained on average about 130 thousand military personnel monthly to replenish the active troops. Much attention was paid to the ideological indoctrination of personnel in the spirit of anti-communism, racism, and chauvinism.
The combat effectiveness and special training of German soldiers and officers in the first campaigns of the World War were at a high level in all branches of the military, especially in tank forces and aviation. However, under the blows of the Soviet Army, the combat effectiveness and morale of the fascist army steadily fell.
In theaters of military operations, the operational-strategic association was the army group. It usually included 2 - 4 field armies, a tank group (tank army) and reserve formations of the main command. Field and tank armies, as well as mountain and parachute armies, consisted of 3 - 5 corps of different types (army, tank, mountain rifle and others); the corps consisted of 2 - 5 divisions.
The ground forces were the main branch of the German armed forces. They consisted of infantry, mountain rifle, tank troops, artillery, cavalry, anti-tank fighter, engineering and signal troops. The main tactical formation of the ground forces was the division, and the highest was the corps. Until 1945, the total number of formations increased, although their combat power was greatly undermined.
The staffing of the divisions was not the same. By the end of the war, the ground forces had 16 different types of divisions (tank, infantry, airfield and others).
Two-fifths of the ground forces were infantry. At the beginning of the war, the Wehrmacht infantry division was significantly superior in firepower to the corresponding divisions of other armies. It was armed with a large number of automatic small arms, mortars, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, light and heavy artillery and had sufficient tactical independence. Subsequently, losses in personnel forced the Nazi command to continuously reduce the division's staff strength (336). At the same time, measures were taken to increase the firepower of the units by increasing the number of machine guns, machine guns, replacing 37-mm and 50-mm anti-tank guns with more powerful 88-mm guns, and 50-mm mortars with 81-mm and 120-mm mortars. Since 1943, faustpatrons (melee rocket weapons with cumulative grenades) began to be widely used; at the end of the war, the infantry received a new automatic assault rifle.
The main striking force of the ground forces were tank formations and associations. Their numbers increased during the war, and armored vehicles were improved. In military campaigns in the West, the basis of the tank fleet was the T-I and T-P light tanks. In preparation for the attack on the USSR, the number of T-III and T-IV medium tanks increased significantly. However, the struggle on the Soviet-German front revealed their serious shortcomings. Despite modernization, in terms of basic indicators they were inferior to Soviet tanks. Since the end of 1942, production of more powerful combat vehicles began in Germany: heavy tanks T-VI (tiger) and medium tanks T-V (panther). In 1944, the heavy tank T-VIB (“Royal Tiger”) entered service with the troops, which was superior to all previous German tanks both in terms of fire power and armor protection. The Wehrmacht was armed with a significant number of assault anti-tank guns; they were widely used to fight tanks and support infantry.
Organizationally, the bulk of the tanks were concentrated in tank divisions (337), which were united together with motorized divisions into motorized (from July 1942 - tank) corps. Tank formations were also formed - tank groups, and from the end of 1941 - tank armies (each with 400 - 600, and sometimes up to 800 vehicles). Along with tanks, they included army corps, especially after the Wehrmacht switched to defensive operations.
Artillery as a branch of the armed forces in terms of the number of personnel occupied second place in the ground forces after infantry. Its share increased significantly during the war. Divisional artillery was strengthened. However, the artillery of the main command, as at the beginning of the war, remained relatively weak. The attempt to form artillery corps in 1944 was not completed.
The air force was considered one of the main means of waging “lightning wars.” They also included airborne troops, air defense troops and air force signal troops. Until 1943, the main focus was on the development of bomber aviation. In June 1941, bombers accounted for 58 percent of all combat aircraft in the German Air Force. From the second half of 1943, fighter aircraft (338) received great development.
During the war, existing combat aircraft were modernized and new types of fighters were developed. From mid-1944, Me-262 jet fighters (with a speed of up to 870 km/h) began to enter service, but their combat use was limited. If in the first period of the Second World War German aircraft were superior to many aircraft of Germany's main opponents in terms of basic tactical and technical indicators, then in subsequent years they were significantly inferior to most Soviet, as well as British and American combat vehicles.
The main organizational unit of the Air Force was squadrons, which were united into aviation corps. The corps included several squadrons of dive bombers, fighters, as well as reconnaissance and transport groups. The highest operational unit of the Air Force was the air fleet (600 - 1000 combat aircraft), which had from one to three air corps, an anti-aircraft corps, reconnaissance groups and a communications regiment. The Air Force was also entrusted with solving combat missions in naval theaters.
In 1944 - 1945 The Wehrmacht received V-1 projectile aircraft and V-2 ballistic missiles, which were used to attack administrative, political and military-economic targets in England.
The German naval forces included the fleet and coastal defense. The fleet practically did not have its own aviation. The development of the Navy in Germany received less attention than the ground forces and air force. Therefore, they were inferior to the navies of other major capitalist states. In terms of ship composition, the German fleet in the first period of the war was predominantly surface-based. Since mid-1941, the construction of submarines has sharply increased with the aim of disrupting the sea communications of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. In 1942 - 1945 they made up more than three-quarters of Germany's total warships. Despite the numerical growth of the submarine fleet, it was unable to withstand the strengthened anti-submarine defense of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.
In general, the armed forces of Nazi Germany on the eve and during the war were a modern military organization of the capitalist world at that time, equipped with all types of military equipment. However, the Wehrmacht, prepared to conduct “lightning wars,” could not withstand the intense confrontation with the Soviet Army.
Features of the Italian Armed Forces
The Italian armed forces consisted of ground forces, air force, navy and “national security” troops - the so-called militia, which was entrusted with a fairly wide range of tasks, including the country's air defense. Ground forces accounted for 82 - 87 percent of the total armed forces.
The Italian armed forces were recruited on the basis of conscription. On the eve of the war they numbered over 2.3 million people. During the war years, their numbers (together with the “national security” troops) almost doubled.
An operational-strategic association was an army group consisting of 2 - 3 armies, each army included 2 - 4 corps. The main unit of the ground forces was the division. From 75 to 85 percent of all divisions were infantry (339). During the war, the number of personnel in infantry divisions was reduced by almost half, but the number of artillery increased and their mobility increased due to the transfer of artillery from horse-drawn to mechanical and some replenishment of motor vehicles.
At the beginning of the war, the armored forces were armed with only wedges and light tanks with a 20-mm cannon; later medium tanks with a 47-mm cannon appeared. Since the end of 1942, due to heavy losses, the number of tanks in the army began to decline.
In the development of artillery, there was a tendency towards an increase in the share of anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns due to the reduction of field artillery.
In the construction of the Italian Air Force, the emphasis was initially placed on the creation of large formations of bomber aircraft. By mid-1940, bombers accounted for 44 percent of all combat aircraft, fighters 33, and reconnaissance aircraft 23 percent. In subsequent years, the main attention was paid to the development of fighter and reconnaissance aircraft. The number of aviation units and formations intended to directly support ground forces has increased.
Italy had a strong navy, which ranked third in Europe in terms of the number of surface ships (after England and France). However, in terms of combat and technical characteristics, they were inferior to the corresponding ships of other fleets. Italy did not have aircraft carriers, and coastal aviation was very weak. This made the Italian fleet more vulnerable to air strikes. The construction of new ships did not make up for the large losses in them.
The ground forces had low maneuverability and firepower, and the air force had low combat readiness and technical equipment. As a result, the Italian army played a supporting role in the fascist bloc during military operations.
Features of the armed forces of Japan
Japan's armed forces were deployed well in advance, had significant numbers, and were intensively preparing for offensive operations. They consisted of an army (ground forces) and a navy. Aviation was organizationally part of the army and navy.
The recruitment of the armed forces was carried out on the basis of the law on universal conscription. Total for 1941 - 1945 4.7 million people were mobilized. In addition, recruitment into the army was practiced. In 1942, universal conscription was extended to the population of Korea, and in 1943 to Taiwan. The troops of Manchukuo and other puppet governments created by Japan in a number of occupied Asian countries were completely subordinate to the Japanese government. The size of Japan's armed forces tripled from December 1941 to August 1945 and reached 7.2 million people.
The Japanese military command paid great attention to combat training and ideological indoctrination of personnel. Career military personnel who had experience in combat operations were used as the core for the formation of new units. At the beginning of the war, the level of combat training of the troops was high, but with each subsequent year (especially in 1944 - 1945) it decreased, as hundreds of thousands of those drafted into the army were sent to active troops without proper training.
The army consisted of regular troops, reserves and militia. Its number in 1945 increased to 5.5 million people. The army included infantry, cavalry, artillery, armored, engineering, transport and railway troops, signal troops, and air force. The basis of the ground forces was the infantry.
The highest operational-strategic formations of the Japanese army were the formations in the theaters of military operations (Kwantung Army, Expeditionary Army in China, Southern Army Group, National Defense Army), led by the main commands. They usually included 2 - 3 fronts, one or more separate field armies, 1 - 2 air armies; the front had 2 - 3 field armies and reinforcement units. In 1941 - 1945 the number of front-line departments increased from 1 to 18, and army departments - from 15 to 46.
The main tactical formation of the ground forces was the infantry division. By December 1941, there were 51 of them, in 1945 - 171. Improving the organizational structure of the division was aimed at increasing its mobility, while the number of its personnel decreased (340).
The Japanese army also had infantry, cavalry and tank brigades. Most tanks were originally part of infantry formations. During the war, 4 tank divisions and 9 separate tank brigades were formed. The division consisted of more than 300 tanks, half of them were light. According to tactical and technical data, Japanese tanks were outdated (they corresponded to the level of European models of the early 30s). Since 1943, production of more advanced medium tanks with an 88-mm cannon began, but their mass production could not be organized. In general, the level of motorization of the Japanese army was low.
The ground forces air force consisted of air armies, which included 2 - 3 air divisions, special units and ground support units. The total number of Army Air Force aircraft, despite heavy losses, gradually increased; the aircraft fleet was replenished with new aircraft that were distinguished by higher performance characteristics. Since 1943, Mitsubishi TV-03 heavy bombers (with a flight range of up to 4.8 thousand km), Aichi T-03 dive bombers, Nakajima I-03 fighters and others began to enter service. However, with the expansion of the scale of combat in the air, as well as due to the acute shortage of aviation fuel in the last years of the war, the effectiveness of air force combat operations decreased.
Japan's naval forces included naval personnel, naval aviation, coastal defense, and marines. By the beginning of the war, the Japanese fleet ranked third in the world (after the USA and England) and consisted of about 230 warships of the main classes. Much attention was paid to replenishing the fleet with aircraft carriers and submarines, as well as the development of naval aviation. During the war years, about 20 attack and escort aircraft carriers, more than 130 submarines, as well as 2 battleships and 6 light cruisers entered service. Coast-based naval aviation in 1941 had over 2,400 aircraft, and carrier-based aviation - about 770. As a result of heavy losses during the war, the combat strength of the fleet was sharply reduced.
The main formations of the Navy were the United Fleet, which included several squadrons, numbered fleets, and regional fleets. The operational-tactical formation of the fleet was the squadron, the main tactical formation was the brigade. Naval aviation was divided into base (coastal), aircraft carrier and ejection (on ships that do not have take-off decks). The highest organizational unit of base and carrier aviation was the numbered air fleets, which consisted of several flotillas and air groups of 2 to 5 aviation detachments. The total number of naval aviation combat aircraft increased to 3.6 thousand by 1945. In general, the Navy showed high combat effectiveness in the first one and a half to two years of the war in the Pacific, but then its effectiveness began to decline rapidly.
The armed forces of Hungary, Romania, and Finland, before these countries left the fascist bloc, together with the Wehrmacht, participated in military operations on the Soviet-German front.
The armed forces of Horthy Hungary consisted of ground forces, air forces, river flotillas and border troops. Ground forces (which actually included border troops) accounted for 90-96 percent of the total number of armed forces. They reached their maximum number (1.1 million people) by September 1944, and then began to rapidly decline under the blows of the Soviet Army. By February 1945, a little more than 200 thousand people remained in their composition.
The highest operational unit of the ground forces was the army, which usually operated as part of the German army group. In total, during the war years, three Hungarian armies were formed, each with 2-3 corps, one corps was mechanized. The Air Force was small. Hungary received a significant part of the weapons, often outdated models, from Germany.
The armed forces of Royal Romania included ground forces, air force and naval forces. In connection with preparations for the attack on the USSR, the number of Romanian armed forces increased from 500 thousand to 700 thousand people, and in subsequent years reached 1.1 million people. The ground forces, which were based on infantry, accounted for about 90 percent of all personnel. During the war, four field armies were formed. The number of combat divisions reached 36. The small arms and artillery weapons of the Romanian army were outdated. Our own production covered the needs only for rifles, machine guns, and mortars. Tanks and some artillery pieces came from Germany. The air force consisted of between 500 and 700 combat aircraft, the vast majority of foreign production. They united into two aviation corps. The naval forces were small.
The Finnish armed forces consisted of ground forces (88 - 90 percent regular army), as well as a small air force and navy. The Finnish troops reached their largest number - up to 605 thousand people - in 1941, then their number decreased slightly and by the time Finland left the war (September 1944) it amounted to about 560 thousand people. Along with the regular army, there were territorial troops represented by the shutskor - “security corps” - a reactionary military organization of the pro-fascist type.
The main tactical formation of the ground forces was the infantry division. The divisions were united into army corps, which were part of two armies. In 1943, instead of armies, three task forces were formed.
In general, the armed forces of fascist-militarist states posed a great threat to the security of freedom-loving peoples. The presence of pre-mobilized and well-armed armies devalued the fascist regimes' achievement of military superiority at the beginning of the war and created favorable conditions for active offensive operations. In building the armed forces of aggressive states, special emphasis was placed on mobile means of armed struggle. Fascist Germany developed primarily tank forces and aviation, and during the war, submarine forces, and militaristic Japan developed carrier-based aircraft. These forces, intended to deliver the first surprise strikes, according to the plans of politicians and strategists, were to decide the fate of military campaigns.
The experience of the Second World War showed that aggressive states, even with relatively limited human resources, are able to create significant armed forces. However, they are unable to achieve lasting strategic successes when they are opposed by a powerful military organization of a socialist state like the USSR, based on the broad masses of the people. In the fight against the Soviet Armed Forces, the armies of the fascist-militarist bloc suffered the greatest losses and suffered crushing defeats.
The war was a severe test of the combat power of the armies and navies of the warring states. The Armed Forces of the USSR withstood the greatest tests, bearing the brunt of the military confrontation with the main forces of the fascist bloc. They “emerged from these trials even more hardened, powerful, capable of reliably defending their homeland from any aggressors” (341).
The historical experience of the fight against fascism confirmed the foresight of the CPSU policy to strengthen the country's defense capability and maintain the army and navy in constant combat readiness. Relying on the moral and political unity and support of the entire people, on the advantages of an advanced social system and a socialist economy, the Soviet Army and Navy acted as a decisive force in the armed struggle against aggressors. Their improvement during the war was carried out on the basis of a comprehensive consideration of political, economic, military-technical factors and the requirements of military art.
In the struggle against fascism and militarism, during the people's democratic and socialist revolutions, people's armies arose in a number of countries. Relying on the help of the Soviet Union, they made a significant contribution to the joint victory over the common enemy. On the battlefields of the last war, their military partnership with the Soviet Armed Forces was born, which was further developed in the Warsaw Pact Organization.
The construction of the armed forces of the capitalist states, which were allies of the USSR in the anti-Hitler coalition, was characterized by a significant increase in their numbers and growth in technical equipment. But their real contribution to the victory did not correspond to the military potential of these states.
The armies and navies of the countries of the fascist bloc, which possessed significant power, did not withstand the test of war. Their defeat indicates that adventurism in politics and strategy fails when confronted by the united forces of freedom-loving peoples.
Combat practice has introduced a lot of new things into the main areas of military development and necessitated an in-depth analysis of the factors that determine the military power of states. The experience of the war clearly confirmed the increased role of scientific foresight in military affairs. This lesson of war is of particular importance for the Soyot Army and Navy in the conditions of the scientific and technological revolution, when fundamental changes in the material and technical base of the armed forces determine new requirements for all areas of military organization. The war showed that the leading trends in strengthening the power of the armed forces are increasing the efficiency of military equipment, increasing combat skill and improving the ideological and psychological qualities of personnel. With the introduction of new military-technical means, the combat capabilities of the branches of the armed forces and branches of the armed forces are changing, and the requirements for the ideological education of soldiers, their political consciousness, organization and discipline are increasing.
The greatest influence on military development in the post-war period was exerted by the use during the war of atomic weapons, long-range missiles, as well as jet aircraft, aircraft carriers, radar equipment and other types of military equipment.
The development of the ground forces of the main warring states was expressed in the increasing proportion of automatic small arms, tanks and artillery, which gave them high mobility, greater firepower, striking force, and also ensured the necessary survivability in battles. The development of these trends led to the complete motorization of the infantry and the organic inclusion of tanks and self-propelled guns into its composition.
The rearmament of the air force with more advanced equipment has increased the effectiveness of aviation combat operations on the battlefield and expanded the range of its missions. During the war, it was the main means of gaining air supremacy and influencing deep rear targets, troop groups, administrative, political and industrial centers.
The advent of jet aircraft during the war ushered in a new period in the history of aviation. The range of altitudes and speeds has expanded, the carrying capacity and flight range of aircraft have increased, and sighting and navigation aids and aircraft weapons have been improved. All this further increased the role of the air force in the armed struggle.
The massive use of aviation led to a qualitatively new development of air defense forces. The need to protect against air strikes not only groupings of troops in the front zone, but also objects in the deep rear, required the creation of formations and associations consisting of various branches of air defense troops. Fighter aviation, anti-aircraft artillery and radio engineering troops received the greatest development.
In combat operations in the sea and ocean theaters, the role of various branches of naval forces has changed significantly. Aircraft carriers and submarines took the leading place in solving combat missions, while the role of large surface artillery ships decreased. A wide range of tasks were performed by light naval forces (destroyers, minesweepers, combat boats, etc.). Anti-submarine defense forces and means and organizing the supply of warships using a “floating rear” became important.
The prospects for using radio equipment in the troops and navy were confirmed.
As war experience has shown, the degree of effectiveness of the combat use of troops (naval forces) largely depends on the compliance of organizational forms with the conditions of armed struggle. Combat practice required having such a structure of units, formations and formations that would facilitate the fullest use in battle and operation of the combat properties inherent in weapons and military equipment. The organizational forms of troops constantly developed and changed depending on the methods and forms of military operations, the quantity and quality of military equipment.
The improvement of organizational forms was carried out, firstly, through the creation of structural formations that met the constantly changing conditions of the armed struggle and met its requirements; secondly, by changing the quantitative and qualitative relationships between various elements of the existing organizational structure of units and formations. These trends were further developed during the post-war construction of armies.
The armed forces of each of the warring states had a class character and reflected their social structure and political goals. The war showed how important the moral and political fortitude of the troops, their readiness for selfless feats in the name of just goals of struggle are. The immeasurable moral and political superiority of the Soviet Armed Forces over the armies of the capitalist world was the most important factor in their combat power.
Both during the war years and in the post-war period, the nature and direction of military development were and are entirely determined by the policy goals of various states. The imperialist states rely on nuclear and missile weapons as the main means of unleashing an aggressive war against the forces of peace and socialism. The USSR, strengthening its defense capability, created nuclear missile weapons in response to the threat from imperialist forces.
The military power of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community is based on the advantages of an advanced social system, on the solid foundation of their economic power, the outstanding successes of science and technology, the ideological, moral, political, social and international cohesion of society, on the inextricable unity of the army and the people. With the growing aggressiveness of imperialism, in the context of aggravated international tension, the constant high combat capability and combat readiness of the Soviet Army and Navy are ensured by perfect military equipment, the maturity of military science and military art, high professional skill and moral and combat qualities of the personnel and their boundless devotion to the cause of the Communist Party.
The unity of the material and spiritual factors of the combat power of the Soviet Armed Forces is the key to their constant readiness to defend socialist gains. “A strong fusion of high technical equipment, military skill and indestructible moral spirit,” noted in the Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the XXVI Party Congress, “this is the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces. Now the sons and grandsons of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War stand in the ranks of the defenders of the Motherland. They did not pass the harsh tests that befell their fathers and grandfathers. But they are faithful to the heroic traditions of our army, our people" (342).
The creative use of war experience, taking into account the fundamental changes caused by military-technical progress, is one of the important factors in improving military organization, equipment and weapons, forms and methods of training the armed forces of the countries of the socialist commonwealth. The rich experience of the Soviet Armed Forces, in organic combination with modern changes in military affairs, serves to strengthen the defense capability of the Soviet state and the fraternal socialist countries.
When preparing the “eastern campaign,” Hitler’s elite counted on the widespread use of the armies of their allies and satellites. Fascist Germany managed to obtain the consent of a number of capitalist countries - Italy, Hungary, Romania, Finland, as well as the puppet states of Slovakia and Croatia to participate in the aggression against the Soviet Union.
The question of the entry of Italy, Germany's main partner, into the war against the Soviet Union was a foregone conclusion in the spring of 1941, when the Italian government, despite defeats in Greece, North and East Africa, pledged to allocate part of its armed forces for the war against the USSR.
From the moment it entered the war until the summer of 1941, the armed forces of Italy, due to heavy losses suffered in East and North Africa, increased slightly - by 157 thousand people. They numbered over 2.5 million military personnel. Power over the armed forces was concentrated in the hands of Mussolini, who, following the example of Hitler, called himself “Duce and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.” His deputies were officially listed as the chief of the general staff (from December 6, 1940, General U. Cavaliero) and the chiefs of the general staffs of the armed forces.
The ground forces, numbering 1,340 thousand people, consisted of 5 armies, which included 21 army corps. In total, the ground forces had 64 divisions (including 3 tank, 2 motorized, 2 cavalry, 5 mountain rifle and 52 infantry). The ground forces were armed with about 16.4 thousand guns and mortars, up to 1,500 tanks and wedges. The staffing and organizational structure of the Italian divisions has not changed compared to the beginning of the war.
The Italian army's weapons remained largely obsolete. Thus, the majority of the tank fleet consisted of tanks that were vulnerable even to small arms fire. The production of new weapons was hampered by a constant shortage of raw materials for the military industry. Stocks of basic types of raw materials amounted to no more than a month's requirements. A lack of raw materials hampered the accumulation of ammunition. According to the calculations of Italian military experts, the required minimum of shells for artillery could be created only by 1944, a stock of mines by 1948, and ammunition for small arms by 1949...
The Italian Air Force consisted of 250 thousand personnel, 2,416 combat aircraft (including 789 fighters, 1,097 bombers, 350 reconnaissance and spotter aircraft).
In terms of their flight performance, Italian aircraft were, as a rule, inferior to foreign models. The Italian Air Force suffered heavy losses in battles, which the aviation industry had difficulty replacing. During 1941, it produced an average of 62 bombers and 111 fighters per month.
The Italian navy was an impressive force: it consisted of 7 battleships, 17 cruisers, about 108 destroyers and destroyers, and 93 submarines. 167 thousand people served in the navy.
The command cadres of the Italian fleet, especially the highest echelons, had relatively low general and military training. Naval aviation remained small. The fleet was chronically short of fuel.
The national security troops, consisting of the fascist police, carabinieri (military police), border and customs troops, special police (railway, port, forest protection, road) and coastal defense troops, numbered over 800 thousand people.
Thus, Italy had large armed forces. However, many units were equipped with outdated weapons. The morale of the Italian army personnel, as shown by the fighting in North and East Africa and the Balkans, was very low.
The Italian high command allocated a separate corps for the war against the USSR, called the “Italian Expeditionary Force in Russia” (IRGC) - the three best Italian divisions, equipped with new military equipment. General D. Messe, a participant in many of Mussolini’s aggressive campaigns, was appointed commander of the corps. To provide aviation support for the corps' operations, two separate aviation groups were formed, which received the latest types of aircraft. In total, 60.9 thousand personnel, approximately 1,000 guns and mortars, 60 light tanks and 70 aircraft were allocated to participate in the war against the USSR. At the end of June 1941, the first formations that were part of the Italian Expeditionary Force were sent to the Soviet-German front.
Another ally of Germany in the war against the USSR, Finland, carried out partial mobilization on June 9, 1941, and general mobilization on June 18 and brought its armed forces to almost 650 thousand people. They were headed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Marshal K. Mannerheim, who carried out his functions through the Ministry of Defense and the main headquarters, created on June 17, 1941. It included the general headquarters and the headquarters of the rear (military economy).
The Finnish armed forces consisted of the active army, territorial troops and border guards. Detachments of territorial troops - shutskor served as a source of replenishment of personnel formations. With the announcement of mobilization, each district of the shutskor (there were 34 of them) formed an infantry regiment.
The active army included the ground, air force and navy. It numbered approximately 470 thousand people.
The Finnish ground forces consisted of 16 infantry divisions, 2 jäger and 1 cavalry brigades, 3 so-called partisan battalions and 16 separate artillery divisions. 12 divisions were consolidated into 5 army corps, 3 remained at the disposal of the main command, and one division was transferred to the navy.
Finland had a significant amount of weapons: 556 thousand conventional and 14.5 thousand rapid-fire rifles, 5.4 thousand machine guns, 13.7 thousand submachine guns, about 3.5 thousand guns and mortars, 86 tanks, 22 armored vehicles . In addition, there were 355 field artillery pieces in warehouses. The artillery of the Finnish army was largely updated. In 1940, Finland purchased 200 light field guns and 32 heavy howitzers from the United States. From Germany, under the agreement of October 1, 1940, over 800 guns and ammunition for them were received.
The main unit of the Finnish ground forces was the infantry division. According to the states of 1940, it included three infantry regiments, a light artillery regiment, and support and service units. In total, the infantry division had 16,348 men and 117 guns and mortars.
The air force was divided into aviation and air defense forces. Aviation had three aviation regiments of three to six squadrons, 307 combat aircraft, of which 230 were fighters.
Air defense assets (together with the defense of naval bases) included 761 anti-aircraft guns and 180 anti-aircraft machine guns.
The navy consisted of 80 ships and boats of various types, as well as forces and means of coastal defense, which on July 1, 1941 had 336 coastal artillery guns. In addition, 169 field guns were installed in coastal positions.
The Finnish army was equipped with modern weapons, it had experience in conducting military operations and a fairly high combat capability. The majority of Finnish soldiers were intoxicated by anti-Soviet propaganda.
For the war against the Soviet Union, Finland deployed all ground forces, over 2 thousand guns and mortars, all aviation and 52 warships. The main forces of the Finnish army were deployed in South-Eastern Finland. Here, in the Leningrad and Petrozavodsk directions, four army corps and the main reserves of the main command (12 divisions) occupied their starting positions. One division was targeted against a Soviet base on the Hanko Peninsula. Formations of one corps, together with fascist German troops, were preparing to strike at Ukhta and Kandalaksha and interrupt traffic along the Murmansk railway. The Wehrmacht mountain rifle corps concentrated north of Petsamo. Finnish warships were deployed in the Gulf of Finland.
The number of Romanian armed forces at the beginning of the war was increased to 703 thousand people. The general management of military development was carried out by the Supreme Defense Council, chaired by the Prime Minister.
The military forces were directly led by the Ministry of War (through the General Staff).
The Romanian armed forces consisted of the ground forces, air force and navy, as well as border guard corps, gendarmerie and construction corps.
The ground forces included three combined arms armies (21 infantry divisions and 14 brigades). They were armed with 3,850 guns, up to 4 thousand mortars, and 236 tanks.
The Romanian infantry division in 1941 included three infantry regiments, one artillery brigade (two regiments), a battery of anti-aircraft guns, an anti-aircraft gun company, a reconnaissance detachment, as well as service units and units. In total, the division had 17,715 people, it had 13,833 rifles, 572 machine guns, 186 guns and mortars.
The air force included 11 aeroflotillas: fighter - 3, bomber - 3, reconnaissance - 3, seaplanes - 1, balloons - 1. In total, the Air Force had 1050 aircraft, of which about 700 were combat: fighters - 301, bombers - 122, others - 276.
The Romanian naval forces consisted of the Black Sea Fleet and the Danube Flotilla. By the beginning of the war, the Romanian Black Sea Fleet had 2 auxiliary cruisers, 4 destroyers, 3 destroyers, a submarine, 3 gunboats, 3 torpedo boats, 13 minesweepers and minelayers. The Danube river flotilla included 7 monitors, 3 floating batteries, 15 armored boats, 20 river boats and auxiliary vessels.
Nazi Germany took an active part in the rearmament and training of Romanian troops.
To attack the Soviet Union, Romania allocated two field armies (3rd and 4th), which consisted of 13 infantry divisions, 5 infantry, 1 motorized and 3 cavalry brigades, about 3 thousand guns and mortars, 60 tanks. The offensive of the ground forces was to be supported by 623 combat aircraft. In total, troops numbering 360 thousand people were involved in the aggression against the Soviet Union.
The German command assigned the Romanian troops the task of ensuring the deployment of the 11th German Army in Romania and its offensive in Right Bank Ukraine. Four infantry divisions, three mountain rifle and three cavalry brigades were reassigned to the headquarters of the 11th Army from the 3rd Romanian Army. The remaining Romanian troops, consolidated into the 4th Army, were deployed on the extreme right wing of the Soviet-German front. Formally, all German and Romanian troops stationed in Romania were subordinate to the dictator Antonescu, but in fact they were commanded by the German general G. Hansen.
For combat operations in the Black Sea, the Nazis, not having their own warships there, used the Romanian Navy.
By mid-1941, the armed forces of Nazi Germany’s ally, Horthy Hungary, numbered just over 200 thousand people. They were led by the head of state with the help of the Supreme Military Council, the General Staff and the Ministry of War.
The ground forces had three field armies (three army corps each) and a separate mobile corps. The army corps consisted of three infantry brigades, a cavalry squadron, a mechanized howitzer battery, an anti-aircraft artillery battalion, a reconnaissance aircraft unit, an engineer battalion, a communications battalion and logistics units.
The peacetime infantry brigade included an infantry regiment and a field artillery division, 139 light and heavy machine guns, 20 guns and mortars. In case of war, its composition was doubled and, in addition, support and service units were formed in it.
The mobile corps that participated in the invasion of Yugoslavia was fully staffed: it consisted of two motorized and two cavalry brigades. The brigades each had one armored tank battalion (three companies of light tanks and a company of medium tanks, two companies of 40-mm self-propelled anti-aircraft guns). However, by the summer of 1941, the battalions were approximately 50 percent equipped with tanks. In total, the Hungarian ground forces consisted of 27 infantry (mostly framed), 2 motorized, 2 border ranger brigades, 2 cavalry, 1 mountain rifle brigade.
The Hungarian Air Force consisted of five aviation regiments, one long-range reconnaissance division and one parachute battalion. In total, the Hungarian Air Force (including military aviation) had 269 combat aircraft.
The Horthy government and the General Staff of Hungary intended to move their troops on a campaign against the USSR simultaneously with Germany. However, Hitler's leadership, believing that Germany had sufficient forces, envisaged Hungary's entry into the war at a later date. Therefore, in the Barbarossa plan, the Hungarian armed forces were not given active tasks.
To participate in the “eastern campaign”, the Hungarian command allocated a mobile corps, border ranger and mountain brigades, as well as an aviation group. These troops had 90 Toldi light tanks and 26 light self-propelled guns.
By the summer of 1941, the armed forces of Nazi Germany's European allies numbered about 4 million people. The main forces of the troops of the most powerful of them, Italy, at that time were bogged down in battles for the African colonies. However, Mussolini’s government decided “not to stand aside, since we are talking about the fight against communism,” initially allocating one corps for the “eastern campaign.” Spain decided to send so-called “volunteers” to the war against the USSR. The Bulgarian monarcho-fascists did not dare to join the “march to the east”, fearing the anger of the people. The total forces of Germany's allies allocated for the war against the USSR.
In total, by June 22, 1941, at the borders of the USSR, the allies of Nazi Germany deployed 29 infantry divisions, 16 brigades, about a thousand aircraft, more than 5,200 guns and mortars, over 260 tanks and 109 ships to act against the Soviet Army and Navy. This increased the combat capabilities of the Wehrmacht, allowing it to concentrate striking forces on the main directions.
