Illustration copyright AFP Image caption One of the problems is the presence of outdated equipment in the troops

During round tables and panel discussions at the Army-2015 forum, less is said about problems than about its achievements - including with the aim of popularizing the armed forces among Russians, rather than discussing the shortcomings of the army and navy.

However, during one of the discussions - about the future appearance of the army - State Duma deputy Vyacheslav Tetekhin cited the example of the Pentagon, where, according to him, they are trying to talk more about the problems of the US Army in order to more clearly identify and identify them, and then solve them.

Tetekhin said that Russia is sorely lacking the same kind of discussion in parliamentary and military circles for the development of the army.

The BBC Russian service asked military experts to name those weaknesses of the Russian army that, in their opinion, should be corrected first. Experts identified five problems:

• The production and development of modern weapons suffers from a lack of personnel and imperfect material resources
• The armed forces are insufficient in strength and recruitment is fraught with difficulties due to lack of personnel
• Inconsistency of reforms, voluntarism in decision making
• Lack of modern weapons, including unmanned systems, low rate of army rearmament
• The need for large expenditures to continue the reform - it cannot be stopped, and large funds are needed to complete it

Vyacheslav Tetekhin, member of the State Duma Committee on Defense, communist (from a speech at the round table):

“I outlined the problem of vocational education. But you [the military] must pose the problem of applied science to politicians, and to us.

All these wonderful systems, who will make them? I'm talking about hands. Where are these minds? [...] Who will generate all these things?

For example, my brother worked at the Institute of Radio Engineering and Electronics of the Academy of Sciences, which does not exist now. He is 70 years old. He says that now the level of those who come to research institutes is an order of magnitude lower than ours."

Konstantin Sivkov, Chairman of the Union of Geopoliticians:

“The main problem of the Russian armed forces is that they are small in number.

In order to ensure a normal, full-fledged solution to the country's defense problems, their number must be increased by about one and a half times.

Secondly, Russian troops now need to purchase as much modern equipment as possible.

Modern Russian military equipment meets all the most modern requirements in terms of the level of capabilities and the technologies contained therein.

But purchases, in my opinion, are carried out in insufficient quantities."

Igor Korotchenko, editor-in-chief of the magazine "National Defense":

“In the previous period, insufficient attention was paid to drones. Here we need to decisively catch up with the gap.

Russia needs drones of all main classes - from the tactical level to strategic aerial reconnaissance aircraft.

Attack drones are needed because they are the future.

The second problem is that it is necessary to eliminate voluntarism in decision-making related to arms purchases.

It’s a sad tradition in Russia - a new commander-in-chief comes and priorities change. We need an institution of permanent deputy ministers of defense and commanders-in-chief of all types of armed forces."

Konstantin Bogdanov, military observer of Lenta.Ru:

“The first and main problem is the incompleteness of the military reform, launched in the late 2000s, and repeatedly changed in particulars, both under Serdyukov and Shoigu.

The second problem is related to the fact that what is called the “purchasing holiday of the 90s” has not yet been overcome. That is, a significant part of the equipment, which should have been withdrawn from service by the beginning of the 2000s and replaced with new models, is being replaced only now. Lost for at least 15 years.

This led, in particular, to the fact that a number of industrial enterprises, in sports parlance, “became untrained.” For a long time they could not provide the necessary equipment and weapons with the required characteristics and cost indicators.

This situation is being partially corrected, but back in the late 2000s it was absolutely outrageous.

The problem of recruitment associated with the demographic gap. People have to be dragged into the army, I don’t want to say on a lasso, but on a very, very sweet carrot - monetary allowance.

Another problem is the need for huge infrastructure expenditures.

Abandoned military camps in the Arctic, construction of new bases there. But this is not only a problem of the Arctic, it’s just that attention is focused on it. [...] Airfields are being restored, military bases that were abandoned in the late 90s are being restored.

This is a huge amount of money, and it is difficult to say how it will all look in the face of financial difficulties. The army is absorbing a lot of resources, but it has already gone halfway and it would be wrong to freeze at this point."

Given the close attention that the whole world has paid to Russia’s military potential this year, it is advisable to reflect on the impact that the rapidly changing conditions of modern warfare may have on Russian military power in comparison with leading Western countries, UKROP writes with reference to nationalinterest.org.

The trend towards further automation, including the use of remote-controlled weapons and the creation of autonomous weapons with elements of artificial intelligence (AI-driven autonomous warfare) will lead to a decrease in the comparative indicators of Russia's military potential. It does not have technologies comparable to Western ones in the field of modern automated systems, nor the ability to create its own analogues of such systems in the foreseeable future. The Russian military industry lags far behind the Western one in the field of automatic control systems, combat unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as the entire range of modern electronics.

The Russian government is aware of this gap and, until recently, has attempted to bridge the gap through active cooperation with the Western defense industry. However, the freezing of military cooperation between NATO countries and Russia, which became one of the consequences of the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent introduction of economic sanctions against Russia by most Western countries, will in the coming years hinder the rapid development of modern military and dual-use technologies by Russian defense companies. Financial restrictions caused by the budget crisis, caused by Western sanctions and falling oil prices, will also become an obstacle to the development and entry into service of the army of new types of weapons based on modern technologies.

As a result, Russia will be forced to look for alternative ways to counter Western automated technologies. There are two ways to increase Russia's relative military power: suppression of enemy communications, as well as the use of electronic weapons to destroy unmanned aerial vehicles and other types of automated military equipment. It is in these two areas that the Russian (and formerly Soviet) military has significant experience. The newly created air-to-ground and air-to-air electronic warfare system "Lever-AV" is designed to suppress radar systems within a radius of several hundred kilometers, that is, it is capable of rendering all enemy radio-controlled weapons ineffective. The new system can be installed on a range of land, sea and air-based platforms, and its capabilities, according to Russian official sources, significantly exceed all existing Western analogues.

The Russian military may also counter Western technological advantages with its activity in the use of cyber weapons against Western countries, both in the event of direct conflict and in irregular and hybrid wars during periods of aggravation of relations. In both of these areas, Russia has advantages compared to Western countries. The lack of democratic accountability in the Russian political system makes the use of disinformation and irregular warfare tactics easier for Russia than for Western governments forced to adhere to democratic norms. By participating in hybrid conflicts against Western countries, Russia can attract mercenaries and other irregular forces operating with the support of units of the GRU and other intelligence services. It can also use friendly populations in neighboring countries as cover for covert operations on enemy territory.

In addition, Russia has extensive experience in cyber warfare and does not face legal restrictions on the use of cyber weapons like most Western countries. The main tactic of cyber warfare under the auspices of the Russian government could, in all likelihood, be special operations. The Chinese attack on the US Government Personnel Office, which resulted in the theft of personal data on all employees granted security clearance by the US government since 2000, suggests that hacking attacks and tactics may be used by Russia and other US adversaries in the near future. penetration of databases in combination with damage to enemy security systems.

In addition, Russian intelligence services will maintain close ties to independent hackers who can be mobilized to launch powerful online attacks. This tactic is not new. It has already been demonstrated by Russian hackers in Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008, but similar techniques could be very effective in the future in disrupting civilian infrastructure and perhaps even government communications.

In terms of more traditional military capabilities, the use of precision guided munitions will be of particular importance to Russia. The defensive strategy of creating no-fly zones and blocking areas will focus on protecting one's own territory through defensive networks. These multi-layered defense systems are currently installed in Crimea. In the future, they will most likely be deployed in the Kuril Islands, Kaliningrad, and possibly in other coastal areas. To counter traditional American advantages in stealth technology, Russian anti-aircraft missile control centers have installed low-frequency radar systems. These measures could make U.S. military aircraft more vulnerable to Russian air defense systems for a long time. A major limitation to this strategy's capabilities will also be technology: the persistent challenges facing the Russian space program in launching satellites will likely limit the Russian military's ability to track potential enemy attacks, forcing Russia to rely on ground-based radars to cover key strategic regions.

Precision-guided munitions can also be used for military operations. Surface-to-surface missiles such as the Iskander, which have a maximum destruction radius of 500 kilometers, can be used to pose a threat to neighboring countries. The Russian military is currently equipping numerous ships and submarines with powerful land-attack cruise missiles that are not covered by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Agreement and have a range of 2,500 to 3,000 kilometers. These missiles will allow the Russian military to threaten not only its immediate neighbors, but also more distant countries from well-defended positions in its own territorial waters, for example, in the Black, Baltic and Okhotsk seas. Because these missiles can be fired from relatively small warships such as frigates and corvettes, the Russian Navy could pose a serious threat to regional security, even though it has had little success building large warships.

Since Russia's ability to compete with US conventional forces or counter Western technological superiority in conventional weapons is highly unlikely, the Russians will continue to rely on their nuclear deterrent as their primary insurance policy. Russian military strategists tend to believe that nuclear weapons are a compensation for Russia's relative weakness in the field of conventional weapons. Russia's nuclear doctrine to some extent parallels that of NATO during the Cold War, although Russian leaders have been much more likely to make public statements suggesting that they might use tactical nuclear weapons to stop a conventional attack that threatens Russian territory or state sovereignty.

Russian leaders are clearly aware that today's domestic military capabilities are no match for those of the United States, and that China is likely to emerge militarily ahead within the next two decades. However, they are actively planning tactics to use certain areas in which Russia has comparative advantages to compensate for the overall inadequacy of its military capabilities. Western strategists, in turn, should focus on countering these Russian advantages in areas such as cyber warfare and the potential threat of Russia using its cruise missiles as well as tactical nuclear weapons to achieve political goals in neighboring countries.

Author, Dmitry Gorenburg (Dmitry Gorenburg), research fellow at the Center for Naval Research (Center for Naval Analyzes), expert at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University.

An expert from the United States analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of the Russian army. The conclusions he came to turned out to be very interesting and unexpected for many.

Russia is strong enough to defeat the army of any neighboring state except China. In addition, the Russian army has capabilities in some types of weapons that others do not, says analyst Dmitry Gorenburg of the Center for Naval Analysis and Harvard University. At the same time, there are areas where the Russian Federation is noticeably lagging behind, the expert believes.

Gorenburg analyzed the Russian state weapons program, designed until 2027. In his opinion, Russia will be ahead of its competitors in some types of weapons - in particular, we are talking about anti-ship missiles, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and air defense.

In other areas, the Russian army will be able to reduce the gap during this period - for example, with regard to unmanned vehicles and precision-guided munitions. And in some, the lag will be significant and will remain - we are talking primarily about surface ships and automated control systems. When we talk about “lag,” we mean the West (primarily the United States) and China.

Actually, the most important problem is the issue of financing. Of course, this is by no means a peculiarity of our country; almost all states face similar problems. With the possible exception of the USA and China. And then, in the United States, current generals constantly talk about how difficult it is for them to curb the “Russian threat” without taking the necessary measures, which first of all imply stable and abundant funding.

In particular, Dmitry Gorenburg believes, the nuclear triad will actively develop. We are talking about both new intercontinental ballistic missiles and other projects - for example, the Barguzin and Sarmatakh combat railway missile systems. In addition, the modernization of the Tu-160 and Tu-95 strategic bombers will continue - according to the expert, this is a more rational option for the foreseeable future than relying on the development of the PAK DA.

As for the Navy, the report calls it the “big loser.” Firstly, due to the high cost of development, for which reason, the American expert believes, the emphasis will be on the development of the submarine fleet and corvettes. The construction of larger surface ships, Gorenburg believes, is influenced by Western and Ukrainian sanctions. Apparently, this implies the story with the Mistrals and the cessation of supplies of Ukrainian engines for the needs of the Russian Navy (although active work is currently underway to replace them, serial production is expected to begin in 2018).

Secondly, another problem identified in the report is the inability of the shipbuilding industry to utilize the funds already allocated.

At the same time, the report praises the Caliber missiles, which, as Gorenburg notes, pose a great threat to a potential enemy, including NATO.

Regarding the air force, the report notes that the emphasis will be on the Su-30SM, Su-24 and Su-35S. Perhaps the VKS will acquire some MiG-35s. As for the fifth-generation Su-57 fighters, Gorenburg believes that they will appear in noticeable quantities by 2027, that is, after the completion of the development of the new generation engine. Until then, these aircraft will be purchased in small quantities for testing.

Due to the high cost, the American analyst believes, the number of T-14 Armata tanks and combat vehicles created on this platform in the Russian troops will be small. However, here the author of the report does not demonstrate complete confidence that this will be the case.

Generally speaking, the report deals mainly with already known developments. And even then, not about everyone - as has already been said, there is an advantage in electronic warfare and air defense systems, but there is nothing about the prospects of these types of weapons. However, the report itself is not too voluminous and the analysis is quite general.

As a result, the author comes to the conclusion that Russian developments are updated versions of late Soviet designs. And the Russian industry is faced with the task of mastering the serial production of new types of weapons in order to ensure their uninterrupted supply.

At the moment, Gorenburg believes, the Russian army is able to cope with the army of any neighboring state in a conventional war - with the exception of China.

Photo: reuters.com

At the Army 2015 forum, during a discussion about the future appearance of the army, a State Duma deputy Vyacheslav Tetyokin stated that Russia “acutely lacks” discussions “in parliamentary and military circles for the development of the army,” at which it would be necessary to identify the problems of the Russian army, and cited the Pentagon as an example, where this is customary. Yes, what the military lacks for complete happiness is a qualified (after all, experts in the military field!) opinion of State Duma deputies with a discussion of the latest (and, accordingly, not really for the public) data on military issues in an environment where many are not shy have dual citizenship.

But the Russian service of the BBC liked the idea, and it “turned to military experts with a request to name those weak points of the Russian army that, in their opinion, should be corrected first.” “Political Russia” recently talked about “five vulnerabilities of the US Army”: what is their significance and for what purpose was the corresponding material published (most likely, the Pentagon just wants budget money). Let's look at these five points from the BBC too.

1. The production and development of modern weapons suffers from a lack of personnel and imperfect material resources.

Quote from the speech at the round table by Vyacheslav Tetyokin:

“I outlined the problem of vocational education. But you [the military] must pose the problem of applied science to politicians, to us. All these wonderful systems, who will make them? I'm talking about hands. Where are these minds? [...] Who will generate all these things? For example, my brother worked at the Institute of Radio Engineering and Electronics of the Academy of Sciences, which does not exist now. He is 70 years old. He says that now the level of those who come to research institutes is an order of magnitude lower than ours.”

Nobody argues with the fact that education needs to be reformed, freeing from liberal reforms and sweeping out reformers with a ban on working in the field of education and in government positions; but this is a general problem, and not at all an army problem. By the way, the effectiveness of the proposal to introduce discussions in the State Duma on military issues is immediately visible: let them first at least learn to walk in formation, and then, perhaps, it will be clear that they need to answer the question posed, and not argue in an intellectual way “based on motives.”

And, by the way, the state weapons program implies achieving the share of modern weapons and military equipment from 70 to 100% by 2021.

2. The strength of the armed forces is insufficient, and recruitment is fraught with difficulties due to the lack of people.

Konstantin Sivkov, Chairman of the “Union of Geopoliticians” (this is my first time encountering this):

“The main problem of the Russian armed forces is that they are small in number. In order to ensure a normal, full-fledged solution to the country's defense problems, their number must be increased by about one and a half times. Secondly, Russian troops now need to purchase as much modern equipment as possible. Modern Russian military equipment meets all the most modern requirements in terms of the level of capabilities and the technologies contained therein. But purchases, in my opinion, are carried out in insufficient quantities.”

No argument was found other than the words “in my opinion.” I, too, am more of a “geopolitician” than a military expert - but at least I don’t give advice to the military on what to do. Yes, now 40% of Russian residents are in favor of increasing the size of the army, but quantity and quality are paradigmatically different categories, and the first does not transform into the second by simple extensive growth. In December, the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Army General Valery Gerasimov(I think that he should know the needs of the troops better than various “geopoliticians”), stated:

“With a constant number of combat personnel, increasing the equipment of new equipment plus solving issues of supporting the armed forces leads to an increase in the combat effectiveness of individual units, groupings of armed forces in all strategic directions, as well as the Armed Forces as a whole. Thus, we can say that the combat capabilities of our armed forces have increased by 1.3 times.”

Wherein Sergei Shoigu back in September last year, he said that the army had fulfilled the annual plan for recruiting contract soldiers and was even “forced to take measures to restrain those who wanted it” - so maybe the military still knows better how many military personnel the country needs?

3. Inconsistency of reforms, voluntarism in decision making.

Igor Korotchenko, editor-in-chief of the National Defense magazine, noted:

“It’s a sad tradition in Russia - a new commander-in-chief comes and priorities change. We need an institution of permanent deputy ministers of defense and commanders-in-chief of all types of armed forces.”

“The first and main problem is the incompleteness of the military reform, launched in the late 2000s, and repeatedly changed in particulars. Moreover, both under Serdyukov and under Shoigu.”

One cannot but agree with the first: constant rotation of superiors does not lead to anything good, be it a platoon commander or the president of the country. Removal from a position should depend on the results of work, and not simply “it’s time for someone else to give orders here.” So I would reformulate the thesis less delicately: let’s play politics separately, and let the army work at the level of deputies. However, the current commander in chief, unlike the previous one, in my opinion, sets priorities quite normally.

But the second is standard journalistic incompetent whining. Was it really necessary to accept the reform plan and stick to it to the end - regardless of everything that was happening? Oh well.

4. Lack of modern weapons, including unmanned systems, low rate of army rearmament

Again Igor Korotchenko:

“In the previous period, insufficient attention was paid to drones. Here we need to resolutely catch up. Russia needs drones of all main classes - from the tactical level to strategic aerial reconnaissance aircraft. Attack drones are needed because they are the future. The second problem is that it is necessary to eliminate voluntarism in decision-making related to arms purchases.”

Regarding voluntarism in procurement, I can’t say anything without specifics, although the topic is important, and at the same time not exclusive to Russia: for example, in Germany the Bundeswehr has a problem of the form “defective fighters and overheating rifles,” and the US Accounts Chamber found that all 33 deployed The missiles of the American missile defense system have defects. And I wasn’t even looking for anything, just links from the browser open. So they also have voluntarism in terms of “what to buy.”

About drones - I agree that this issue is significant, but “a weak point that needs to be corrected first”? Somehow I have a suspicion that the Russian BBC service “on its knees” compiled the list, simply compiling opinions on various occasions. Tetyokin’s quote is designated as taken from a round table - it is unlikely that he was asked the specific question stated. “The state stops investing in social capital and invests in defense and security forces. In the first quarter of 2015, defense spending amounted to a record 9% of quarterly GDP. This means that there will be fewer schools, fewer hospitals..."

So a puzzle has arisen: I, of course, do not pretend to be telepathic, but here there are not “five main problems”, but a pulled-from-the-finger news feed “the deputy proposed to discuss”, then from the pine forest the opinions of people, of whom only Igor Korotchenko understands the topic , and, apparently, he was not asked the question in the stated wording. And at the end the main idea is conveyed: “This is very expensive!” It is for the sake of promoting this idea, I think, that the BBC tried. And it doesn’t matter that the topic is presented with the remark “ it would be wrong to freeze in this place"- the article (and there are many reposts and retellings of it!) is not intended to convince that already there is no need to feed your army, namely to introduce the idea of ​​“feeding your army expensive" - will be very useful in case of any difficulties when the idea is pushed: “Russia does not need a powerful modern army, it is very expensive, sausage is better than missiles!”

However, there is a feeling that the State Department has run out of professionals, and those who exist do not understand that Russia always unites from external influences, and Russians have not been intimidated by difficulties for many centuries.

In recent weeks, detailed reports have emerged about Russia's 2018-2027 weapons program. During this period, about 19 trillion rubles should be received from the state treasury for the development and production of military equipment, which is significantly less than what is required by the armed forces, although, given the economic difficulties of Russia, this is still a lot. However, what is more interesting than the actual amount is what exactly the Kremlin is going to purchase during this period.

Let us recall that Russian state weapons programs are always designed for ten years, but they are adopted every five years to maintain their relevance. The program for 2011-2020 was assessed by many as the first successful program in the history of Russia, although its implementation was very negatively affected by the decline in oil prices. The program for 2016-2025 was previously worked out, but Western sanctions and other circumstances made it necessary to postpone this program, so the actualization has shifted in such a way that the implementation of the program will begin only next year.

According to official statements, the new program identifies two main tasks. The first requires the development of certain types of new generation weapons, that is, weapons that use completely new concepts and principles based on the latest technological advances. The second task is the need to support mass production of existing and gradually modernized types of equipment. The very fact that the second, seemingly completely obvious, task is once again clearly stated means that the Russian leadership is aware of the problems in this area.

In general, we can say that the Russian military-industrial complex has enormous technological potential and in some respects is completely advanced, but has long been experiencing difficulties with production, or rather, with the introduction of new types of equipment into mass production. There remain problems that date back to the times of the Soviet Union and the turbulent 90s. Now they have been supplemented by those problems that are a consequence of the current international situation.

We are talking not only about sanctions from the West, but also about the cessation of supplies of components from Ukraine, which negatively affects, first of all, shipbuilding and the production of helicopters. Without Ukrainian engines, some new classes of ships will likely never be completed, and helicopter deliveries have begun to suffer major delays. Russia wants to compensate for the shortage on its own or with the help of China, but Russian engine production is taking its first steps very slowly, and Chinese models are often unreliable.

In addition, it is somewhat paradoxical that some Russian weapons are attracting great interest on the world market, including among states that previously relied primarily on Western technology. We are talking, among other things, about Egypt and Saudi Arabia. But the production capacity of Russian defense plants has its limits and simply cannot satisfy the demand in both the domestic and foreign markets. Perhaps the Russian armed forces should have an advantage, but the sale of weapons is an extremely important source of funds, which, by the way, subsequently goes to finance the Russian army itself. Thus, a vicious circle is obtained.

The fact that Russia really needs money is also evidenced by the fact that the government has given the go-ahead for the export of S-400 Triumph anti-aircraft missile systems to Turkey and Saudi Arabia, as well as to China. The latter also received Su-35 fighters. But it was customary to talk about both types of technology as something that should never fall into the hands of the Chinese and Western allies, since there is a threat that they will learn and copy unique technologies.

It is also quite paradoxical that the smallest part of these 19 trillion rubles is intended for the branch of the military, which is traditionally given the greatest importance in Russia. We are talking about strategic missile forces. The reason is that their re-equipment with the new Topol-M and Yars complexes has already been generally completed, but three more large projects are being implemented in parallel. More precisely, they were implemented until recently, since, according to the latest news, the project of the extremely problematic Barguzin mobile railway ballistic missile system was stopped (again).

In addition to technical problems and high cost, one of the reasons for the closure of the project is that Barguzin could too provoke the Americans, who were very afraid of the old RT-23 Molodets railway missile system. Development continues of the light RS-26 Rubezh ballistic missile, which is sometimes said to be an attempt to circumvent the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and of the very heavy RS-28 Sarmat missile, which should replace the R-36M, called the Satan "

Context

Russia's military priorities

Russia is investing effectively in defense

Priority is given to nuclear warheads and precision weapons

The indicated problem with mass production is clearly expressed in the case of ground forces. Some fans of this type of equipment were most likely expecting large-scale arrivals of new generation armored vehicles - such as the T-14 Armata tank, the Kurganets-25 infantry fighting vehicle and the Boomerang wheeled platform. It was said that about 2.3 thousand Armata tanks would be produced, but the new project brought disappointment, since the Uralvagonzavod defense plant does not have the capacity for such production. In addition, the new tank is not completely ready and will almost certainly become a very expensive “toy”.

Therefore, the current plan for the next decade involves the production of a maximum of one hundred or two hundred T-14 tanks, which will be received by elite units of the Russian army. The main type will continue to be the T-90, which will be supplemented by the modernized T-72 and T-80. A similar situation is developing in the case of infantry fighting vehicles: Russian motorized rifles will have to wait a few more years for large deliveries of Kurganets-25 armored vehicles and rely on the updated BMP-2 and BMP-3.

Aviation will be in exactly the same situation, where in the next decade the already operational Su-27, Su-30SM and Su-35S fighters, as well as Su-34 fighter-bombers and Su-25 attack aircraft will dominate. Russia also has a fifth-generation fighter, the Su-57 PAK FA, in reserve, but judging by the current plan, only a few will be produced for testing and training. Serial production will begin only when work on the new engine is completed, and this may take several years. There will likely be delays in the implementation of the PAK DA futuristic strategic bomber project.

It is planned that aviation will also receive modernized Tupolev Tu-160, Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3 bombers, the capabilities of which will significantly expand, primarily in the field of traditional air strikes. By the way, this can be called one of the “red threads” running through the entire weapons program. Strategic nuclear forces remain the backbone of Russia's armed forces, and, nevertheless, traditional types of defensive and offensive weapons are becoming increasingly important.

This can be linked directly to the use of long-range bombers and naval vessels in Syria, where Russia has successfully used air- and ship-launched cruise missiles. This is naturally reflected in the section of the new program on the navy, where maximum emphasis is placed on submarines and small surface ships capable of carrying Caliber cruise missiles. This weapon, capable of striking at a distance of 2.5 thousand kilometers, provides Russia with offensive power comparable in level to the famous American Tomahawk missiles.

But, in addition to the subsonic Caliber, Russia produces and develops much faster missiles. There was information about supposedly successful tests of the Zircon hypersonic missile, the speed of which is eight times the speed of sound, that is, reaching more than nine thousand kilometers per hour. It must be emphasized that today no country in the world has effective defense against such weapons, and that is why the Americans and Chinese are now actively working on the development of such offensive weapons.

One way or another, Russia wants to rely on small but very well-armed surface ships. And it is almost certain that no surface ship larger than a frigate will be built under the new program. The new program involves the allocation of funds for the development of new aircraft carriers and amphibious helicopter ships, the construction of which can realistically be expected after 2025. So Russia will have to rely on the aging Admiral Kuznetsov in the future, although it will undergo large-scale modernization and deliveries of new MiG-29K fighters.

As part of the new weapons program, it is also planned to develop a new generation of submarines, although they will not enter service until 2030. Russia is going to create a new ballistic missile for submarines, as well as an interesting “Skif” system, which involves bottom-based missiles. The existence of this project has been known for several years, and although there is little information about it, it is the subject of lively debate. Perhaps the project violates the Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1974.

The department of Viktor Bondarev, the former commander-in-chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces, who today is a member of the Federation Council Committee of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on Defense and Security, even made a statement from which it followed that the Sarmat, Zircon and Skif missiles are already in service. Shortly after publication, the material was withdrawn with the explanation that these types of weapons were still being developed, but Russian (and pro-Russian) media had already published several sensational news based on the initial statement.

There is no need to doubt the technological potential of Russian industry, but we should not forget about its constant problems. The example of the Armata tank, Su-57 aircraft, as well as large ships suggests that from an ambitious project or an impressive prototype, you need to go through a long, complex and expensive path to mass production and practical applicability. Of course, all this applies to the new generation of missiles.

The end also begs the question of whether the statement by Viktor Bondarev’s department was really just a mistake, or whether the material in its original (inaccurate) form was published intentionally. After all, we should not forget the fact that in strategic defense the psychological factor plays an extremely important role. The announcement of the deployment of new and generally mysterious missiles, which the media immediately latched on to, seems to be a simple tool capable of intimidating and causing confusion among the enemy. This, by the way, fits perfectly into the Russian (dis)information strategy.

InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.