Alexander I wished Russia liberal reforms. For this purpose, a “secret committee” was created, and Mikhail Mikhailovich Speransky became the emperor’s main assistant.
M. M. Speransky- the son of a village priest, who became the emperor's secretary without patronage, had many talents. He read a lot and knew foreign languages.
On behalf of the emperor, Speransky developed a project of reforms designed to change the management system in Russia.
Speransky's reform project.
M. Speransky suggested the following changes:
- introduce the principle of separation of powers into legislative, executive and judicial;
- introduce local self-government at three levels: volost, district (district) and provincial
- allow all land owners to participate in the elections, including state peasants (45% of the total)
The election of the State Duma was for the first time assumed to be based on suffrage - multi-stage, unequal for nobles and peasants, but broad. M. Speransky's reform did not give the State Duma broad powers: all projects were discussed, approved by the Duma, they would come into force only after the tsar's permission.
The tsar and the government, as executive power, were deprived of the right to make laws at their own discretion.
Assessment of M. Speransky's reforms.
If the project of state reform of Russia by M. Speransky had been translated into action, it would have made our country a constitutional monarchy, and not an absolute one.
Draft of a new Russian Civil Code.
M. Speransky dealt with this project in the same way as the first: without taking into account the real situation in the state.
The activist drew up new laws based on the philosophical works of the West, but in practice many of these principles simply did not work.
Many articles of this project are copies of the Napoleonic Code, which caused outrage in Russian society.
M. Speransky issued a decree changing the rules for assigning ranks, tried to fight the budget deficit that was devastated by wars, and participated in the development of the customs tariff in 1810.
The end of reforms.
Opposition to the reformer both at the top and at the bottom dictated to Alexander I the decision to remove M. Speransky from all positions and exile him to Perm. So in March 1812 his political activity was interrupted.
In 1819, M. Speransky was appointed Governor-General of Siberia, and in 1821 he returned to St. Petersburg and became a member of the established State Council. After forced exile, M. Speransky revised his views and began to express thoughts opposite to his previous ones.
The war is over. Having accomplished a patriotic feat in the struggle for the fatherland, the people expected liberation, but tsarism deceived their expectations. Discontent was growing in the country. Returning from a trip abroad to his homeland, Tobolsk, the future Decembrist G.S. Batenkov, who became a communications engineer in Siberia, wrote to his friends in the capital: “Attachment to the country where, it seems, nature itself throws only crumbs of its immense wealth, where they live in the treasury for a crime and whose name, like the whistle of a whip, terrifies; attachment to this country is not clear to you. . . but... our native side forms our habits, inclinations and way of thinking... Seek happiness, they tell me, but happiness on a foreign land is not your own happiness.” 38
Love of freedom and even revolutionary thoughts were awakened in the progressive circles of society. The first secret societies of noble revolutionaries began to take shape. The Union of Welfare, which arose in 1818, expanded its activities widely. He created, or was under his direct influence, a number of side organizations: the Free Society of Lovers of Russian Literature, the Free Society of Institutions of Mutual Training Schools, the Masonic Lodge of the “Chosen Michael”, through them the connections of the future Decembrists with the progressive circles of Siberia arose. In Tobolsk, a circle of “restless debaters” formed around “The Unknown”, who, despite the sidelong glances of “four important persons,” started disputes “about literary matter,” heatedly criticizing stagnation and inertia. They directly said that “mental slavery is worse than anything in the world.” 39
In 1818, a Masonic lodge of the “Eastern Luminary in the East” was created in Tomsk, organizationally connected with the St. Petersburg lodge of “Chosen Michael”, which included F. N. Glinka, brothers M. and V. Kuchelbecker, N. A. Bestuzhev. Its member already at that time was G.S. Batenkov, who was one of the founders of the Tomsk lodge. 40
Finally, in Irkutsk in 1819, the work of the “Free Society of Institutions of Mutual Training Schools” began, in whose activities the same tireless Batenkov took the most ardent part.
Fear of the revolutionary movement pushed Alexander I towards Arakcheevism, but the same fear caused reform efforts in the tsar. The emperor found himself simultaneously needing Arakcheev as a bulwark of reaction and Speransky as a mask of liberalism. Arakcheev rose to absolute power in the capital, and Speransky, returned from exile and again favored by Alexander I, was sent as governor general to Siberia to reform the administration of the distant outskirts. He was instructed to “figure out on the spot the most useful structure and administration of this remote region and make an outline of it.” 41
In May 1819, a major audit began. One after another, terrible pictures of abuses and arbitrariness of officials were revealed. They were most clearly manifested in the activities of the Nizhneudinsk police officer Loskutov, one of the champions of the feudal protective system of bureaucratic “guardianship” of the population established by Treskin. Loskutov traveled, accompanied by Cossacks, through the villages and lavished punishments on peasant farms for the slightest omissions: if the land was poorly plowed - flogging; unclean in the yard or hut - flogging; holes in a shirt or sundress - flogging. 42 He carefully “protected” the Karagas people from communicating with Russian traders and himself went to the Karagas camps to “inspect” the yasak. He walked around all the yurts, in each one he sat down on the spread out skins and served the owners a glass of vodka, and gave everyone, not excluding the children, cheap paper handkerchiefs. For this, everyone who received a “gift” laid a valuable sable skin at his feet. The police officer took them along with the bear and deer skins on which he sat, and then moved on. Meanwhile, his assistants collected debts. Officials established their monopoly in trade with yasak people: they supplied them with tobacco at a price of a ruble per pound, and received sable for it - 10-15 rubles. Debts were collected from the poor through beatings; the insolvent were encouraged to borrow heavily from their rich relatives for the missing furs. 43
Loskutov became an odious figure, but small and large scrap people were legion in Siberia. It was necessary to change not individual officials, but to break the entire bureaucratic management system. Near Krasnoyarsk, one of the peasants admitted to Speransky that requests for the removal of the local police chief had been prepared for his arrival in the village, but the people later decided that the new one might turn out to be even worse, since there was nowhere to get a good one, and besides, the new one would the request will be firmly received; finally, the old one is already full, and the new one arrives - still hungry. 44
An audit could only reveal defects, but not eliminate them. As a result of the audit, two governors and 48 officials went to trial, 681 people were involved in discovered abuses, and the amount of penalties imposed on the administration reached almost three million rubles. But even those removed from office were not very sad: they transferred most of their funds in advance to the names of their wives, 45 and they themselves moved to Moscow or St. Petersburg. “Although cruel, but original punishment - exile from Siberia to the capitals,” a contemporary sneered. 46 The audit only temporarily intimidated the officials. One pompadour was replaced by another.
Under these conditions, Speransky began preparing reforms in the management of Siberia. It was called upon to serve as one of the many supports for the autocracy. Speransky involved local forces in developing the reform. G.S. Batenkov became his closest assistant. In his youth, on the eve of the Patriotic War, while studying in the corps with V.F. Raevsky (later the “first Decembrist”), he had anti-government conversations with him, and then gave his friend his word, having matured, “to try to put our ideas into action.” 47
The Siberian reform, like all reforms at that time, was prepared in the strictest secrecy. Progressive circles pinned great hopes on her. “Siberia must be reborn... we have a new ruler, a good nobleman, strong and strong only for good,” Batenkov initially wrote about Speransky. 48 But these delights were premature. Speransky, first of all, was a well-trained courtier. With bold actions, he was afraid of scaring off Alexander I and at the same time incurring his disfavor. Serious differences arose between Batenkov and Speransky. Batenkov’s primary project, which the author himself characterizes as “an unattainable ideal, perfect goodness,” was sharply condemned by Speransky, calling it “impractical” and “melodramatic.” 49 Finally, in 1822, the reform, as a result of long work and struggle, resulted in a number of legislative acts: institutions for the management of the Siberian provinces; statutes on the governance of the Siberian peoples and Kyrgyz; statutes on exiles and on stages; charter on Siberian city Cossacks; regulations and rules on zemstvo duties, on grain reserves, on salt management, on the free resettlement of state-owned peasants to Siberia (previously prohibited) and others.
The authors’ desire, if not to bring it into conformity, then at least, if possible, to bring the management organization closer to the requirements of life, was undeniably positive.
Even in his first transformative projects, Speransky considered the outskirts of Russia as “heterogeneous” parts of the empire, requiring a unique organization of management. 50 Batenkov, like many Decembrists, a champion of the federal organization of the state, in this direction went further than his mentor, arguing that all legislation should be based on folk morals, take into account the history, ethnography, climate of the country, since “local differences are most important in such a vast state like Russia." 51 The authors of the Siberian reform tried to implement these principles. Thus, the analysis of the economic development of Siberia made by Batenkov helped to outline and implement the most rational zoning of the huge region, so that each main administrative region - the province - would have its own agricultural base, harmoniously combined with non-agricultural areas, and favorable conditions would be created for the development of local intra-Siberian trade. The division of Siberia into Western and Eastern, with the allocation of the Yenisei province, which almost completely coincided in territory with the modern Krasnoyarsk Territory, speaks of the viability of the zoning carried out, based on correctly understood geographical and economic data.
The development of the social division of labor required freedom of trade. To facilitate private entrepreneurial activity, Speransky, as governor general, issued in 1819 “Preliminary rules on freedom of internal trade” for all segments of the Siberian population. State trade was allowed only in exceptional cases and was regulated by a special “Regulation on Bread Stores.” There was a struggle against salt and wine farming. In 1820, “Rules on freedom of internal trade in salt” were published. 52
The “Charter on the Management of Foreigners of Siberia” suppressed attempts by local authorities to isolate the indigenous population of Siberia from the Russians. He asserted the right of yasak people to the free and duty-free sale of their products, opened entry into their nomads for all trading people, and demanded that government sales in no way hinder the “industry” of private individuals. 53
The development of the commodity economy was also facilitated by the desire to replace natural taxes and duties with monetary ones.
The administrative side of the reform itself looks much more conservative. The authors’ desire to protect the population from the arbitrariness of the authorities could not receive permission under the conditions of autocracy.
By the reform of 1822, the governor-general's power was preserved, and Siberia was divided into two governor-generates: West Siberian and East Siberian, with administrative centers in Tobolsk (from 1839 - Omsk) and Irkutsk. Governors-General still had extensive rights and powers in all areas of life of the governed region - economic, administrative, judicial. In order to at least somewhat limit the possible abuse of personal power, councils of officials appointed by the tsar were created under the governors-general.
In St. Petersburg, the affairs of Siberia were concentrated under the authority of a specially created Siberian Committee under the chairmanship of Speransky, soon replaced by Arakcheev, under which the post of director of committee affairs was occupied by Batenkov until the end of 1825. Subsequently, from 1838, the Siberian Committee was closed, and matters related to the Siberian administration began to be submitted for consideration directly to the State Council and the Committee of Ministers. However, this system did not justify itself, and in 1852 the Siberian Committee was restored.
The West Siberian General Government included Tobolsk, Tomsk provinces and Omsk region; in Eastern Siberia there were the Irkutsk and newly formed Yenisei provinces, as well as the Yakut region and three special administrations: Okhotsk, Kamchatka-Primorsk and Trinity-Savskoe (border).
Under the civil governors who headed the local administration, there were advisory councils consisting of officials subordinate to the head of the province. On this occasion, Speransky noted: “It would be more correct to form such a council from persons outside the local administration. But, firstly, it is impossible to compose it from the nobility or merchants because there, in Siberia, there is no nobility and very few merchants, and secondly, to compose a council from outside officials would be contrary to economy in people.” At the same time, he expressed the hope that this defect in the reform would be corrected in the future, “when Siberia has more population, when its wealth comes into greater movement and income increases.” 54
The heads of the regions, in contrast to the civilian governors, concentrated civil and military administration in their hands, which was of significant importance for the most remote and border areas.
The provinces were divided into districts, headed by district commanders with councils acting under them as an advisory body. They were composed of district officials. The district police and the zemstvo court were under the jurisdiction of the zemstvo police officers. In cities, administrative power was concentrated in the hands of mayors. The economic activity of the population in larger cities was directed by the estate duma consisting of elected heads and assessors, and in sparsely populated cities - by an elected headman. In Siberia, like the European part of Russia, the administrative, police and tax authorities for peasants were volost boards, which included an elected elder, village elders, tax collectors and a clerk. They were practically entirely dependent on the district authorities and the police.
A significant part of the Siberian reform of 1822 was the statutes on exile and stages. Forced to work on their compilation, Batenkov, in his unofficial papers, sharply opposed the system of fighting crime that reigned in Russia, the foundations of which “lie in the unlimited power of the government and in six centuries of submission to all its actions.” 55 The only possible attempt to improve the situation of those exiled was the establishment of stages. The route of the convict parties in Siberia was divided into 61 stages. At each stage, prisons were set up. They served as overnight and day stays for exiles and convicts who were exhausted through forced labor. Also, the charter made attempts to, to some extent, facilitate the establishment of labor and economic activities of exiled settlers - to streamline their situation and life. 56
Of all the acts of the Siberian reform, the “Charter on the management of foreigners of Siberia”, developed mainly by the same Batenkov, undoubtedly stands out. In contrast to the tendencies of the feudal-protective direction, the Charter provided ample opportunities for communication between the indigenous peoples of Siberia and the Russian population. In the Charter, according to the level of socio-economic development, Siberian peoples were divided into three groups - wandering, nomadic and sedentary. The charter provided for the gradual transition of backward peoples to sedentarism, as a result of which the former nomads would “be equal in rights and responsibilities,” and at the same time in the organization of governance with the Russians. 57
It is interesting that similar provisions regarding the structure and development of the peoples of Siberia were formulated in P. I. Pestel’s “Russian Truth” - this most important legislative project of Decembrism. According to P.I. Pestel, when nomadic peoples “transform into agricultural ones, then they should form volosts on general rules and join the general structure of the state structure on general rules.” 58 The “Russian Pravda” provided for “to assign a special space to each nomad, looking at it as a volost,” and Batenkov’s Charter practically assigned lands to the steppe ancestors created among nomadic peoples, replacing volosts. 59
In the field of development of public education, the Charter provided the rights of yasak people to send their children to study in government educational institutions and to open their own schools. For its time, this measure was progressive.
With regard to religion, the Charter stood for complete religious tolerance. 60
Reformers paid great attention to organizing the governance of the peoples of Siberia, trying to weaken the guardianship over them by tsarist officials and the police. The nomads created Tribal Councils and Steppe Dumas, which united groups of clans. The right of public meetings was asserted for the “relatives”. They elected officials of the clan and steppe administration. There were no restrictions on participation in general meetings and elections. Society and its elected representatives had to decide all issues of their internal life themselves, distribute taxes and duties, and perform judicial functions on the basis of their customary law. 61 Among the nomads of Siberia, the feudal nobility has long stood out, enjoying the rights, privileges and power that were rooted in them. These “honorary foreigners” did not have special rights in the face of the law and were legally equal to their relatives as tribute people. The charter allowed, in the presence of appropriate traditions, a hereditary principle in tribal management, but only where it had been established earlier. When drawing up a new foreign council from camps that had not previously been under common dependence, hereditary principles were not allowed. 62
The authors looked at the Charter as the first step towards transforming the entire life of the peoples of Siberia. Based on the aspirations for a federal form of government, Batenkov considered it necessary to develop for each nomadic people their own special “Steppe Laws” that correspond to the conditions of people’s life. This was stipulated in the Charter. 63
The “Siberian Institution” was approved in 1822. Direct management of its implementation fell on Batenkov as the head of the affairs of the Siberian Committee. He became its de facto head, since the chairman of the committee, Arakcheev, delved little into the affairs of Siberia.
For a long time Batenkov did not see real ways for the revolutionary reorganization of Russia. In anticipation of the possibility of this, he believed, one must act gradually: “taking a heavy cobblestone in one’s hands, drive away the flies from the government building,” “with hope in the heart, with Rognedon in the soul.” 64 He is developing a plan for organizing a secret “attacking” society, the members of which, “occupying clearly civilian positions, according to these orders, secretly perform those duties that will fall on them in the new order.” 65 The Director of Affairs of the Siberian Committee attached exceptional importance to such local activities. 66 The Siberian Decembrist wanted to “write a whole essay as an instruction to those who will occupy the lowest places”; at the same time, he set out to “notice and get closer to people who can be used, revealing (to them) at first only one goal - the establishment of civil freedom, which could be spoken publicly.” 67
Immediately after 1822, Batenkov, as the head of affairs of the Siberian Committee, energetically took up the development of Steppe laws locally. In his plans, the Decembrist found active support among progressive-minded officials, whom he began recruiting in 1819, compiling for Speransky lists of people suitable for filling administrative positions. 68 In connection with the separation of the Yenisei province, its officials were recruited almost anew. Batenkov managed to appoint A.P. Stepanov, a man of progressive views, a member of the Free Society of Lovers of Russian Literature, to the post of civil governor. As governor, the latter launched a vigorous activity. He opposed burdening peasants with taxes, seeing tax oppression as an “important social harm.” He considered the widespread enslavement of the Russian and non-Russian poor by debt obligations in Siberia - usury - “almost one of the most important reasons in the world for the emergence of slavery.” 70 He fought against the economic omnipotence of the merchants, who were crowding out free peasant trade, trying to organize the purchase of grain without contractors, so that “the money would scatter throughout the entire class of peasants.” 71 The governor took measures to establish freedom of trade in the uluses, in order to relieve yasaks from oppression by local monopolistic merchants, 72 and generally paid exceptional attention to the organization of self-government and life of the indigenous population of the region - he fought for its maximum liberation from the power of tsarist officials and police . Addressing directly the nomads of the Khakass steppes, he inspired them: “... the more freely people act, the more conveniently they can acquire benefits and peace of mind for themselves.” 73
A.P. Stepanov surrounded himself with liberals. The governor's son, N.A. Stepanov, subsequently became an active participant in the revolutionary democratic movement - he collaborated in Iskra, edited Alarm Clock; his friend Krasnoyarsk official V.I. Sokolovsky, the author of the famous poem on the death of Alexander I (“The Russian emperor passed away into eternity; the cameraman ripped open his belly ...”) - in 1834 he was arrested in Moscow along with A.I. Herzen . It is clear that in this environment, Batenkov’s desire to develop local Steppe laws found a lively response.
A.P. Stepanov, without delay, created a special committee for this under his leadership. Apparently, the leading member of the committee was engineer A. I. Martos, the son of a famous sculptor, the author of notes on the Patriotic War and military settlements. The second member of the committee was the provincial official Galkin, nominated by Stepanov, who, according to the gendarmerie report, “came out of the ordinary Cossacks.” 74 Representatives of tribes were involved in the development of the Steppe Laws. The translator on the committee was A.K. Kuzmin, according to the gendarmerie, “the official is not entirely well-intentioned” 75 - an expert on the life of the inhabitants of the Khakass steppes, a poet who later linked his fate with the Decembrists who were in exile. 76
The project developed in Krasnoyarsk was also adopted, with some discrepancies and additions, in the Irkutsk province, where Martos was traveling at that time. 77 At the end of 1824, “Projects of Steppe Laws for nomadic foreigners of the Irkutsk and Yenisei provinces” were sent to Batenkov. 78 Both projects were a significant step forward compared to the government-approved Charter. The elective principle here is decisively brought to the fore: “Foreigners are governed by their leaders, elected from among them,” is proclaimed in the project prepared in the Yenisei province; in the presence of hereditary power, “no one can exercise the right of succession until the relatives express their consent” (§7).
The draft limited the possibility of elders seizing communal lands and established strict liability of elders for their activities. The tribal court became public. Much attention was paid to raising the people's well-being by creating permanent funds in the hands of society; spending public sums was allowed only with the knowledge and consent of the available “relatives”, and the report on income and expenses had to be discussed annually at a meeting of the whole society. The project tried to resolve the agrarian question, established the division of land, arable land and hayfields between “relatives” “according to the number of male souls in each family.” Clearing new lands for arable land gave the right to receive the land in full ownership. This manifested the desire to implement the bourgeois idea of legitimizing private peasant land ownership, which was progressive for its time. In contrast to Eastern Siberia, where Batenkov’s attempt to implement new ideas by developing steppe laws met with support, the Governor-General of Western Siberia P. M. Kaptsevich, “a stern man, of Arakcheev’s temper,” 79 clearly became in opposition, arguing that “all the foreigners of the Tomsk province ... did not retain any tribal laws and customs.” 80
There was a struggle between Batenkov and Kaptsevich. Batenkov exposed the actions of West Siberian officials that burdened the population. Kaptsevich complained about Batenkov to the very pillar of the reaction, Arakcheev, accusing him of being partial to Siberia. 81
An interdepartmental commission was appointed to consider East Siberian projects in the summer of 1825. Batenkov was not included in it. From the very first meetings, the commission members reacted negatively to the presented projects. They were outraged why the Yenisei version did not talk about “various honorary titles or classes of foreigners and their special rights.” 82 At this time, a denunciation was received against Batenkov: he was accused of statements directed against Arakcheev, and of the fact that in the Siberian provinces he “arranged connections with some of his friends there very skillfully, who assure whoever is needed there that he is acting decisively in the Siberian Committee he, Batenkov, being strong among the gr. Alexey Andreevich (Arakcheev), to whom Siberia is not known in detail, but is in close ties with Speransky.” At the same time, direct hints were made that Speransky’s “connivance” with Batenkov was “not without sin.” 83 Batenkov was immediately removed from work both in the Siberian Committee and in military settlements. The Decembrist feared possible exposure of his activities and began to prepare for emigration. 84 This was a month before the Decembrist uprising. After the events of December 14, all the plans of the reformers of Siberia collapsed completely; Batenkov found himself in the position of a “state criminal”; the fate of Speransky himself hung in the balance; Stepanov, who maintained contacts with the Decembrists, asked them “not to mention his name in any correspondence with Russia.” 85
A. I. Martos hastened to publish “Letters about Eastern Siberia,” which, with its deliberate good intentions, differs sharply from everything he wrote earlier. On the proposals for state reforms outlined by Batenkov in the fortress at the request of the investigators, Nicholas I personally wrote: “All these types and N. Muravyov’s system of federal government; I congratulate the Tunguz people on this.” Citing this fact, V.I. Semevsky was perplexed: “The last acuteness was not at all caused by the constitution of N. Muravyov, since nomadic peoples were not given the right of citizenship in it.” 86 The flat wit of the tsar was indeed not caused either by the constitution of N. Muravyov, or even by the text written by Batenkov in prison, but it testifies that Nicholas I knew about the previous Siberian activities of Batenkov - the author of the “Charter on the Administration of Foreigners” and the head of affairs of the Siberian Committee... It is clear that the commission created to review the submitted draft Steppe Laws rejected them. A. Velichko, who took Batenkov’s place in the Siberian Committee, declared the need to cancel all deviations from the highest approved Charter allowed in the projects of Eastern Siberia, and demanded that its managers “base their code on the authentic testimony of the most honorable relatives” (our discharge, - Auth.). 87 This demand was fully consistent with the reactionary course of tsarism, which relied on the local feudal and semi-feudal nobility.
During the period of the reform and in the years that followed, a noticeable revival was observed in all areas of life in Siberia.
Progressive circles highly appreciated the reforms carried out, but did not immediately notice their weaknesses. The “Sibirsky Vestnik”, published at that time (1818-1824) by the first author of “Proposals for the Yasak Hordes” G.I. Spassky, especially noted the fact that the new laws “did not deprive the Siberian foreigners of the most precious freedom, did not burden them with chains just as the Spaniards once did to the unfortunate Americans,” but provided the opportunity for the peoples inhabiting the vast Siberia to be governed by their own laws. 88
Meanwhile, it became increasingly clear that the best intentions of the authors of the “Siberian Institution” could not be realized in practice. The powerlessness of reformers under the conditions of a bureaucratic tsarist monarchy was already noted by A. I. Herzen: “Speransky tried to alleviate the lot of the Siberian people,” but “three years later, officials were making money using the new forms no worse than the old ones.” 89 The desire to “give autocratic rule a logical structure and, as much as possible, protect it (i.e., autocracy) from action that requires beyond human strength” turned out to be a utopia.
34 K. K - sh about v. Tomsk conspiracy. Historical Bulletin, 1912, No. 8, pp. 622-644.
35 S. G. Svatikov. Russia and Siberia. Prague, 1929, p. 9.
36 GAOO, f. Siberian Governor-General, op. 1, cor. 44, no. 195.
37 RO GBL, f. G. S. Batenkova, cor. 1, no. 21.
38 Letters from G. S. Batenkov, I. I. Pushchin and E. G. Toll. M., 1936, p. 83.
39 Unknown. Letter from Siberia. Tr. General lovers of Russian literature, part XI, M., 1818, pp. 52-70. At the time described, G. S. Batenkov apparently belonged to the Tobolsk circle, although he soon moved to Tomsk, then to Irkutsk, and I. P. Mendeleev, who from 1821 became an official corresponding member of the Society of Lovers of Russian Literature.
40 A. N. Pypin. Russian Freemasonry. Pgr., 1916, pp. 468-472.
41 N. M. Yadrintsev. Speransky and his reform in Siberia. Bulletin of Europe, 1876, No. 5, p. 94.
42 I. T. Kalashnikov. Notes of an Irkutsk resident. Russian antiquity, No. 7, pp. 237-244. 1P
43 Central State Historical Archive of the USSR, f. First Siberian Committee, op. 1, no. 265, pp. 208-210.
44 M. Korf. Life of Count Speransky, vol. 2. St. Petersburg, 1861, p. 199.
45 V. G. Kartsev. Decembrist G. S. Batenkov. Novosibirsk, 1966, p. 50.
46 E. Stogov. (Sub. E......B). Speransky and Treskin in Irkutsk, pp. 524-525.
47 M. V. Nechkina. Decembrist Movement, vol. I. M., 1955, p. 107.
48 Letters from G.S. Batenkov..., p. 104.
49 Memoirs and stories of secret society figures of the 1820s, vol. 2. M., 1933, pp. 94, 95.
50 M. M. Speransky. Projects and notes. M.-L., 1961, p. 112.
51 T. G. Snytko. G. S. Batenkov - writer. Literary heritage, vol. 60, book. .1, M., 1956, p. 299.
52 L. I. Svetlichnaya. Transformative plans and administrative activities of M. M. Speransky in Siberia. Author's abstract. diss. M., 1952, p. 7.
53 PSZ, vol. XXXVIII, No. 29126, §§ 270, 271, 277, 278, etc.
54 N. M. Yadrintsev. Speransky and his reform in Siberia. Bulletin of Europe, 1876, No. 6, p. 489.
55 G. S. Batenkov. Notes on the regulations for exiles. RO GBL, f. 20, cor. 5, no. 10; Note without title, ibid., no. 4; Notes on the streamlining of internal government in Siberia, on police power, on crime and punishment, ibid., no. 2.
56 PSZ, vol. XXXVIII, Nos. 29128, 29129.
57 Ibid., No. 29126, § 71.
58 Decembrist uprising. Documents, vol. VII, M., 1958, pp. 142, 143.
59 PSZ, vol. XXXVIII, No. 29126, §§ 28-32.
60 Ibid., § 286.
61 Ibid., No. 29125 (Establishment for the management of Siberian provinces), §§ 155, 156 and No. 29126 (“Charter on the management of foreigners”), §§ 36, 37, 97, 98, 107.
62 Ibid., No. 29126, §§ 63, 66, 67; No. 29125, § 157.
63 Ibid., No. 29126, §§ 70, 71.
64 Letters of G.S. Batenkov..., pp. 143, 144. (Rogneda is a symbol of struggle, retribution to tyrants).
65 TsGAOR, f. Investigative Commission and the Supreme Criminal Court in the case of the Decembrists, d. 359, l. 112.
66 Letters from G.S. Batenkov..., p. 126.
67 Letters from the most important figures during the reign of the Emperor. Alexander I. Comp. N. Dubrovin. St. Petersburg, 1883, p. 468.
68 V. G. Kartsov. Decembrist G. S. Batenkov, p. 40.
69 Ibid., pp. 110-112.
70 A. P. Stepanov. Yenisei province, part 1, St. Petersburg, 1835, pp. 265, 266.
71 Ibid., part 2, p. 22.
72 GAKHAO, f. Koibal Steppe Duma, op. 1, d. 38, l. 34.
73 I. P. Kuznetsov-Krasnoyarsky. Archive of the Aski Steppe Duma. Tomsk, 1892, pp. 16-19.
74 GAIO, f. Office of the Irkutsk Governor-General, op. 3, cor. 8, d. 203, l. 13. 5 Ibid., l. 15.
76 See: A P. Belyaev. Memories of a Decembrist about what he experienced and felt. St. Petersburg, 1882.
77 Alexey Martos. Letters about Eastern Siberia. M., 1827.
78 Central State Historical Archive of the USSR, f. First Siberian Committee, op. 1, no. 273.
79 I. T. Kalashnikov. Notes of an Irkutsk resident. Russian antiquity, 1905, IX, p. 630.
80 Central State Historical Archive of the USSR, f. First Siberian Committee, op. 1, no. 269, pp. 8, 9.
81 Letters from the most important figures..., p. 433.
82 Central State Historical Archive of the USSR, f. First Siberian Committee, op. 1, d. 280, l. 80.
83 V.G.Kartsev. Decembrist G.S. Batenkov, p. 135.
84 TsGAOR f. Investigative Commission and the Supreme Criminal Court in the case of the Decembrists, no. 359, pp. 114, 115.
85 IRLI, f. Bestuzhevykh, 6, l. 205.
86 V.I. Semenevsky. Political and social ideas of the Decembrists. St. Petersburg, 1909, p. 483
87 Central State Historical Archive of the USSR, f. First Siberian Committee, op. 1, no. 280, no. 114 115 129.
88 About the laws of some Eastern Siberian foreigners. Siberian Bulletin, 1823, part 1, p. 2.
COURSE WORK
Subject: History of the National State and Law
Topic: Speransky M.M. - Governor General of Siberia
Introduction
Mikhail Mikhailovich Speransky, a far-sighted politician and manager, was able to study and develop a reform system for this region in two years of studying the vast territories of Siberia with its harsh climatic conditions and the arbitrariness in which the population found itself. Appointed to the post of Governor General, Speransky took a number of measures aimed at bringing Siberia closer to the level of European Russia in economic, social and cultural development. He established the Main Directorate of Trade of Siberia, created the Treasury Chamber to resolve land and financial issues. Direct communication with peasants, traders and industrialists provided material for the development and adoption of measures to encourage agriculture, trade and industry of the region. In total, Speransky spent about two years in Siberia. Historians compare his activities in scale to those of Peter the Great in European Russia a century earlier. In 1820, Speransky wrote to his daughter: “If I did little here, at least I dried a lot of tears, calmed indignation, stopped flagrant violence and, perhaps even more important, opened Siberia in its true political relations.”
The result of Speransky’s activities in Siberia and a new chapter in Siberian history was a series of legislative acts prepared by him, defining the new administrative structure and management of the region, legal proceedings and the nature of serving duties by the population, the social status of its various categories, the development of the economy of the region, united in the “Code for the management of Siberia.” After the accession of Nicholas I, Speransky headed the II Department of the Own E.I.V. in 1826. office, which codified laws. Under his leadership, the 45-volume “Complete Collection of Laws” (1830) and the 15-volume “Code of Laws” (1832) were compiled. In commemoration of his works, the emperor granted him the title of count and the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called.
“Speransky was a man of intelligence and science. From him we have a whole system of thoughts and the style of the government building left for us to study,” wrote the Decembrist G.S. Batenkov.
Two years of service in this position revealed him as a most skillful practitioner in organizing management to solve the most complex problems of such a colossal and sparsely populated region as Siberia in the 19th century. Having mobilized the knowledge and experience of those ministries and the State Council that were founded under him and with his participation, he formed and left the country an approach to solving the problems of a huge territory stretching from the Baltic to the Pacific Ocean, the entire North of Russia and even Alaska and part of California (Fort Ross), which were part of the country at that time.
During the period of his activities in Siberia, Speransky was not an ordinary official or a traditional “inspector”. As a political researcher, he used two years of his life to understand how Lomonosov's prophecy that Russia would grow with Siberia could be realized. He proved that governance is not about writing papers, but about finding a way for the common good.
Even at the dawn of developing his projects for management reforms, M. M. Speransky determined how Russia could develop. He saw three such sources: productive forces, popular forces - all the people who make up the state - and spiritual forces. “It is impossible to imagine other forces,” he said. Everything that happened closer to the 20th century in terms of the development of the natural resources of the country and Siberia, in essence, was part of the “productive” forces. But it was Speransky who laid the foundations for interaction with people, the art of understanding the interests of different segments of the population - for the sake of the development of society and the prosperity of the state. He was able to reveal the potential of the first producers, merchants, prospectors, guides, to discover a method of understanding nearby territories and their peoples, approaches to their introduction to the Russian people and the establishment of good neighborly relations.
Here, beyond the Ural “stone belt”, in the Asian part of the Russian Empire, Mikhail Mikhailovich was able to realize his goals for the development and use of the forces of the Siberians, especially the people’s spiritual forces. Without this, the rapid industrial development of the region, which had a huge impact on the increase in the historical wealth of Russia, would have been unthinkable. its economy, culture, national identity and, ultimately, to expand the role and weight of our country in the world.
I. Russia at the beginning of the 19th century
1.1 The need for changes in the country’s foreign and domestic policies
By the beginning of the 19th century. In Russia, new needs are beginning to appear, which are preparing the transition of the state order to new foundations. In foreign policy, the territorial and national unification of the Russian land continues.
In domestic politics, this is the need to equalize classes with common rights and encourage them to work together. In almost every reign, attempts were made to begin to resolve these problems. Each time timid or loud voices were heard against the existing order demanding changes; the next reign began to timidly or decisively carry them out in internal transformative activities. But every time it happened that some obstacle, external or internal, war or personal characteristics of the ruler, stopped the government halfway. Then the movement that began sank deeper into society and took on various forms.
Alexander I, successor of Emperor Paul, ascended the throne with a broader program and implemented it more consistently and thoughtfully.
The main goals of domestic policy: the equalization of all classes before the law and their introduction into joint government activities. It was necessary to establish new legislative relations between classes, increase the educational level of the people, and ensure a new structure of the state economy (finance).
The partial introduction of this restructuring caused double discontent in society: some were dissatisfied with the fact that the old was being destroyed; others were unhappy that new things were being introduced too slowly. A series of wars and internal reforms undermined the state economy, disrupted finances, and reduced the people's well-being. From 1801 to 1808 some transformations were made.
On March 30, 1801, the State Council was replaced by a permanent institution, called the “Permanent Council,” for discussing government affairs and decisions.
Then Peter's colleges were reorganized. By the manifesto of September 8, 1802, they were transformed into 8 ministries: foreign affairs, military forces, naval forces, internal affairs, finance, justice, commerce and public education.
The main difference between the new central government bodies was their sole authority: each department was controlled by a minister who reported to the Senate.
Since 1801, the distribution of inhabited estates into private ownership was prohibited.
The decree of December 12, 1801 granted the right to all persons of free status to acquire ownership of real estate outside the city without peasants. This law destroyed the centuries-old landowning monopoly of the nobility.
On February 20, 1803, a decree was issued on free cultivators: landowners could enter into an agreement with their peasants, freeing them with the land as whole villages or individual families.
II.Speransky - the Emperor's confidant
2.1Speransky's plans
Then events followed that distracted the emperor from internal affairs for some time; this was participation in two coalitions against France - in 1805 in alliance with Austria, in 1806-1807. - in alliance with Prussia. Campaigns and failures cooled the initial liberal-idyllic mood of Alexander I. Members of the unofficial committee, one after another, moved away from him. Their empty places were taken by one person, who became the only trusted employee of the emperor. It was Mikhail Mikhailovich Speransky.
Speransky came from a social environment that previous statesmen did not know. He was born in 1772 and was the son of a rural priest in the village of Cherkutin, Vladimir province. He received his initial education at the Suzdal Theological Seminary and completed his education at the St. Petersburg Main Seminary, which under Paul I was transformed into a theological academy. Having completed the course with excellence, he remained as a teacher at the academy; First he taught his favorite subject, mathematics, then eloquence, philosophy, French, etc. He taught all these various subjects with great success. Recommended as a house secretary to Prince Kurakin, Speransky, under his patronage, entered the office of the prosecutor general, which he then became a nobleman. So in 1797 The 25-year-old Master of Theology became a titular adviser. Speransky brought to the unkempt Russian office of the 18th century an unusually straightened mind, the ability to work endlessly (48 hours a day), and excellent ability to speak and write. This prepared him for an unusually fast career. Already under Paul I he was very famous. During the accession of Alexander I, he was transferred to the newly formed Permanent Council, where, with the rank of Secretary of State, he was entrusted with managing the expedition of civil and spiritual affairs. All the most important draft laws published since 1802 were edited by Speransky, as the manager of the department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Since 1806, Speransky and Alexander I became close.
2.2 Changes in administration
Speransky was appointed associate minister of justice and, together with the emperor, began working on a general plan for government reforms.
Speransky was the best, gifted representative of the old, spiritual and academic education. By the nature of this education, he was an ideologist or theorist, as they would call him in our time. He was capable of surprisingly correct political constructions, but at that time the concept of reality was difficult for him. He drew such a plan, characterized by amazing harmony and consistency in the implementation of the accepted principles. But when it became necessary to implement this plan, neither the sovereign nor the minister could in any way adjust it to the level of the actual needs and available resources of Russia.
According to Speransky, “the whole reason of his plan was to establish the power of the government on a permanent basis through laws and thereby give the action of this power more dignity and true strength.”
His plan outlined the basis for the management of the Russian estates before the law and a new structure of management: peasants received freedom without land, management was made up of a triple type of institutions - legislative, executive and judicial. All these institutions from top to bottom, from rural volosts to the top of government, had a zemstvo elective character. At the head of this building are three institutions: legislative - the State Duma, consisting of deputies of all classes; executive - ministries responsible to the Duma, and judicial - Senate. The activities of these institutions are united by the State Council, consisting of representatives of the aristocracy, structured in a manner similar to the English one.
The plan was drawn up very quickly: it was started at the end of 1808 and at the beginning of October 1809. lay completely ready on the emperor's table. This plan could not be implemented in full, because was not at all calculated on the political means of the country. It was a political dream that simultaneously illuminated two of the best bright minds in Russia.
But some of this plan was carried out. The implemented parts of Speransky's transformed plan all relate to central management.
On April 3, 1809, a Decree on court ranks was issued. The decree of August 6, 1809 established the procedure for promoting to the civil ranks of collegiate assessor (8th grade) and state councilor (5th grade). The new decree prohibited the promotion of employees who did not have a certificate of completion of a course at one of the Russian universities or did not pass the university exam according to the established program, which was attached to the decree. This program required knowledge of the Russian language and one of the foreign languages, knowledge of natural and civil rights, state economics and criminal laws, knowledge of national history and basic information in general history, statistics of the Russian state, geography and even mathematics and physics.
Both orders were prepared and issued in secret from the highest levels of government. On January 1, 1810, the reformed State Council was opened.
Thus, a firm legislative order was established:
1) The Council considers new laws in all areas of management;
2) he alone examines them;
3) not a single law considered by him is put into execution without the approval of the supreme power.
These features indicate the dual meaning of the council - legislative and unifying: it, firstly, discusses legislative issues raised in all branches of government; secondly, it unites the activities of all these industries, giving them the same direction. The council is chaired by the king himself, who also appoints the members of the council (35 people). The council consisted of a general assembly and four departments - legislative, military, civil and spiritual affairs and state economics.
A state chancellery was established with a special branch for each department. The office was headed by the Secretary of State, who was appointed Speransky.
Following the State Council, the Ministry of Speransky, established on September 8, 1802, was transformed according to the plan. Speransky found a double drawback in these ministries: the lack of a precise definition of the responsibilities of ministers and the incorrect distribution of affairs between the ministries. They were transformed by two acts: a manifesto on July 12, 1810 and June 25, 1811.
12 ministries were formed instead of 8. Both acts were recognized as exemplary works of our legislation, and the administrative order established in them, even in detail, was in effect for a very long time.
It was also proposed to transform the Senate. The transformation project was prepared by the beginning of 1811. and in June was introduced to the State Council. The project was based on a strict separation of administrative and judicial cases. It was proposed to transform the Senate into two special institutions: the Government Senate, which would consist of ministries with their comrades and heads of special departments; and another called the Judicial Senate. A special feature of this judicial Senate was the duality of its composition: some of its members were appointed from the crown, others were elected by the nobility.
There were many objections to this project in the State Council. The reform was not carried out, although most of the council spoke in favor and the sovereign approved the project.
This means that of the three branches of higher management - legislative, executive and judicial - only the first two were transformed; the third was not affected by the reform. The provincial administration was also not transformed.
For various reasons, Speransky was fired as soon as the institutions he transformed began to be introduced. His disgrace was sincerely welcomed in high society, which is quite understandable, and on the part of the people, who treated him with bitter bitterness, because. To streamline finances, by the laws of February 2, 1810 and February 11, 1812, all taxes were increased - some were doubled, others were more than doubled. As a result of the intrigues of his opponents, Speransky was exiled to Nizhny Novgorod and Perm.
2.3 Appointment of Speransky M.M. for the post of Governor-General of Siberia
In 1816, Speransky's disgrace was lifted, and he was appointed Penza civil governor, and in 1819 - governor-general of Siberia.
The moment for the appointment was chosen well. The vast Siberian territories, rich in valuable resources and which until recently provided quite large revenues to the treasury in yasak (valuable furs) and money, began to be distinguished by other “exploits” - unbridled tyranny and bribery of local officials. Governor General of Siberia P.I. Pestel ruled the region, paradoxically, from St. Petersburg.
The uncontrolled local bureaucracy only aggravated the already difficult conditions for the management and development of the eastern territories of the empire, associated with the underdeveloped infrastructure of the region, its multinational composition and the rather difficult foreign policy conditions for securing lands to Russia. All levels of provincial government in Siberia were permeated by extreme despotism, corruption, sophisticated torture during the investigation of cases, and shameless robbery of the indigenous population. This distinguished both governors (especially Irkutsk Treskin and Tomsk Illichevsky), and local police officers and mayors. It even got to the point that the local police chief of the city of Yeniseisk, Kukolevsky, harnessed his carriage to officials subordinate to him who dared to file a complaint against him, and drove it through the streets of the city. Complaints about the Siberian administration continued to reach the capital in all sorts of roundabout ways, audits were appointed, materials were reviewed... And everything remained the same.
Speransky received broad powers that went far beyond the usual governor-general status. He had the right to investigate, remove from service and bring to trial any official guilty of abuses, determine and take measures necessary to restore order.
The triune task set by the emperor for the new governor-general - audit, current management and preparation of reform of the Siberian region - each part of it would have been more than enough for even one experienced administrator, and the Speransky sovereign only allocated one and a half to two years to fulfill his plan. The solution to all these problems could drag on, like all Russian attempts at transformation, for many years, although the old saying “both the sheep are safe and the wolves are fed” was exactly similar to this decision of the monarch: Speransky seemed to be “forgiven and returned” to a high government position, and his finding in Siberia, and removal from national affairs did not cause new irritation to the capital's bureaucracy.
Speranskygovernor of Siberia reform
2.4 Study of the problems of Siberia. Carrying out regional management reforms
On May 22, 1819, Speransky was already approaching Tyumen, and on May 24 he was in Tobolsk. As he moved towards Irkutsk, the number of complaints from residents about the cruelty and arbitrariness of local authorities, oppression, arbitrariness, bribery and embezzlement grew. Speransky surveyed factories, the mint in Yekaterinburg, public places, hospitals, and prisons. August 29, 1819 He arrived in Irkutsk. “The further I descend to the bottom of Siberia, the more evil I find, and almost intolerable evil,” he wrote to a friend on June 24, 1819 from Tomsk. - Exhausted by complaints, denunciations, and misfortune, I can hardly find enough patience to finish the work entrusted to me. The rumors did not exaggerate anything, and things are even worse than the rumors.” The richest region with colossal natural and economic potential, due to its remoteness, the absence of any supervision and control from distant St. Petersburg, turned into an object of the most unscrupulous robbery and arbitrariness of local satraps. The new governor-general in a short time had to simultaneously revise the region, manage it, and collect materials for developing some basic principles of local government and writing charters for new institutions. He brought convicted embezzlers and oppressive bribe-takers to trial and even returned bribes to the “offended bribe-payers.” The picture of abuse was horrifying.
As a result of the inspection of “parts of the administration of the entrusted region”, Speransky created three investigative commissions - in Irkutsk, Nizhneudinsk and Yakutsk, which conducted proceedings on 74 investigative cases and the suitability of almost a thousand local officials. The results were extremely significant: 432 people were subject to imprisonment, 262 were subject to disciplinary action - dismissal from office, demotion, reprimands, etc., and 375 people involved in the investigation were acquitted. The number of punished officials could have been higher, since almost every employee turned out to be involved in abuses to one degree or another, but then the regional administration at all levels could simply be left without any civil servants at all.
The experience of previous activities and the Penza governorship gave Speransky the opportunity not only to quickly and decisively stop the rampant bureaucratic arbitrariness, but also to develop the activities of the administration to solve pressing problems of the development of the Siberian region. The new governor-general perfectly understood the economic significance that Siberia had for Russia. He established the Main Directorate of Trade of Siberia, modernized the land and financial management bodies, and the Russian-American Trading Company received serious support from the governor. A number of measures were taken to encourage the development of industry, agriculture, trade, and education.
But the main drawback, the “evil” in the non-compliance with state interests in the region, Speransky saw in the imperfect management of Siberia and the absence of a legally well-structured and agreed upon set of legislative acts that determined the administrative structure and competence of the local government apparatus, the position of various categories of the population - indigenous, newcomer and servicemen, as well as thousands exiled here from the purpose of providing labor for mining factories and colonizing the territories of convicts and exiled settlers.
2.5 Cooperation with Batenkov
Speransky understood perfectly well that in these conditions, a serious comprehensive reform at the level of the entire region was urgently needed for the region. Let us note that only he himself could handle the Siberian reform, and Speransky, together with Batenkov, began preparing bills. Based on the audit of the region, they came to the conclusion that the region required a well-structured system of central, governor general, provincial and local government (including management of the indigenous population), as well as codified legislation that replaced hundreds of laws published at different times and mostly contradictory to each other.
Batenkov, in the shortest possible time, did a huge amount of preparatory work on collecting and summarizing source materials for the preparation of a set of legislative acts on Siberia: he analyzed an array of legislative, statistical and factual data, and made specific proposals. As a result of this activity, a set of documents appeared under the general title “Note on the Settlement of Siberia,” as well as a number of documents on individual parts of the administration. It was a comprehensive study of the problems of the region that made it possible to come to complex solutions of a constructive nature, reforming the entire management system of the region and creating a complex of Siberian codified legislative acts.
Perhaps for the first time in the history of Siberia, the approach to reform was put on a practical and research basis. The materials prepared by Batenkov were presented to Speransky. At the same time, the Governor General requested a number of documents from local authorities - the state of communications, mining and their management, etc.
During his two years in Siberia, Speransky drew up a plan for the administrative reform of the region and prepared draft imperial decrees on the most pressing issues at that time. And he managed to convince the tsarist government of the need to fulfill them.
However, Russian domestic politics turned out in such a way that the ideas of M. M. Speransky, promising and far-sighted, were forgotten for almost a whole century - he was remembered as a statesman only at the beginning of the 20th century, and then not for long: a revolution broke out. As for his Siberian projects, they remained unattended.
While in his new position, he decided to conduct an audit of Siberia. It revealed blatant abuses, the arbitrariness of the local authorities and the complete lack of rights of the population. In order to somehow improve the situation, Speransky begins to carry out reforms in the administration of the region.
The “first collaborator” during the Siberian reforms was the future Decembrist S.G. Batenkov. He, together with Speransky, energetically worked on the development of the “Siberian Code” - an extensive set of reforms of the administrative apparatus of Siberia. Together they prepared many projects: land communications, the establishment of stages, the administrative formation of provinces for natural areas, etc. Of particular importance among them were two projects approved by the emperor: “Institutions for the administration of Siberian provinces” and “Charter on the administration of foreigners.” It is noteworthy that a feature of the latter was the new division of the indigenous population of Siberia, proposed by Speransky, according to their way of life into sedentary, nomadic and wandering. According to this division, each category received its own rights and responsibilities, and the authorities were prescribed the procedure for managing them.
During the period of work on the Siberian Code,” Batenkov sincerely believed that Speransky, “a good and strong nobleman,” would really transform Siberia. Subsequently, it became clear to him that Speransky was not given “any means to fulfill the assigned assignment” and the results of his activities in Siberia did not meet his hopes. However, Batenkov believed that “Speransky cannot be blamed personally for the lack of success.” He wrote about the latter: “The memory of him was preserved throughout Siberia, despite the change of persons, statutes and deeds, for many monuments and the outline of the institution survived among all this. His personality was not easily erased from memory, and many families remembered him kindly.”
At the end of January 1820, Speransky sent Emperor Alexander a brief report on his activities, where he stated that he would be able to finish all his work by May, after which his stay in Siberia “would have no purpose.” By this, Mikhail Mikhailovich clearly pushed the sovereign to allow him to return to St. Petersburg in the near future. Alexander's permission did not take long to arrive. But the emperor ordered his former secretary of state to arrange the route from Siberia in such a way as to arrive in the capital by the end of March next year. This delay greatly affected Speransky. A feeling of the meaninglessness of his own activities began to prevail in his soul, the consciousness that in St. Petersburg there were still influential enemies of him, the fear of remaining in Siberia forever, and even the fear of being subjected to unfounded accusations from local officials who were caught committing abuses.
III. Reasons for the failure of Speransky’s undertakings
The reason for the failure of the reform initiatives of Speransky and Alexander I was inconsistency. This is an inconsistency in the historical assessment of Alexander's activities. New government institutions, whether implemented or only conceived, were based on the beginning of legality, i.e. on the idea of a firm and uniform law for everyone, which was supposed to constrain arbitrariness in all spheres of state and public life, in management, as well as in society. But, according to the tacit or public recognition of the current law, a whole half of the population of the empire, which was then considered over 40 million of the total sex, depended not on the law, but on the absolute arbitrariness of the owner; Consequently, private civil relations were not consistent with the foundations of the new state institutions that were introduced and contrived.
According to the requirement of historical logic, new state institutions had to stand on the ready soil of new agreed upon civil relations, as a consequence grows out of their causes. The emperor and his employees decided to introduce new state institutions before the civil relations agreed upon with them were created, they wanted to build a liberal constitution in a society, half of which was in slavery, i.e. they hoped to achieve consequences before the causes that produced them. The source of this misconception is also known; it lies in the exaggerated importance that was then attached to forms of government. People of those generations were confident that all parts of social relations would change, all private issues would be resolved, new morals would be established as soon as the plan of government, drawn with a bold hand, was implemented, i.e. the system of government institutions. They were all the more inclined to think that it was much easier to introduce a constitution than to carry out the petty work of studying reality, transformative work. The first work can be written in a short time and reap the glory; the results of the second work will never be appreciated, even noticed by contemporaries, and provide very little food for historical ambition.
Conclusion
Speransky's solution to the problems of managing Siberia and the Penza province had progressive significance for these territories. Speransky's administration of the Siberian region entailed a decisive turn in the autocracy's policy towards Siberia and, in particular, its indigenous population. Thanks to Speransky, in the government’s view, Siberia was no longer a fishing colony, but an organic part of Russia, governed taking into account natural geographic and ethnic features.
The vector of development of interaction between the state and the indigenous peoples of Siberia outlined by Speransky remains true to this day. At the present time, the core of government policy towards the indigenous people of Siberia is the protection of their interests and ensuring sustainable development in the field of traditional environmental management. developed by Speransky in 1819
The main goal of the Siberian transformations - the transformation of Siberia into a producing region - is being realized in modern conditions. It is the main priority of the activities of the current senior administrators of Siberia.
During the Siberian reform of 1822 M.M. Speransky achieved the creation of councils under governors general, governors and district commanders. These collegial and advisory bodies consisted of officials, not deputies - residents of the region. The composition and functions of the councils determined by Speransky indicate the divergence between the reformer’s initial idea of involving representatives of Siberian society in the development of administrative decisions and his practical steps to organize the management of the region.
However, the very establishment of councils corresponded to Speransky’s proposals of 1803-1809 - to create bodies that in the future could become politically independent.
Despite the unrealization of many of the plans of the Siberian reformer, the regional organization created according to his projects represented a more effective model of territorial management than the previously existing one. This model contributed to accelerating the pace of socio-economic development of the Siberian region.
Governor's activity M.M. Speransky in Penza is of particular interest, first of all, from the point of view of determining the influence of administrative experience on the reformer’s ideas about the structure of local government. While in Penza, Speransky focused his attention on identifying the shortcomings of the current Institution of Governorates (1775) and on revising the regulations of the governor-general and gubernatorial power. In Penza, Speransky developed a number of measures to free provincial institutions from the excessive tutelage of the main local bosses, as well as to weaken the personal power of senior local administrators. The experience of the governor's service convinced Speransky of the need to separate the functions of supervision and management of local authorities.
During the period of practical activities to resolve issues of provincial and regional administration, a change occurred in Speransky’s approach to the reorganization of local government. Now he put the reform of provincial government in first place among civil reforms, gradually leading to political changes. Guided by this approach, M. Speransky drew up several projects for provincial and district government at the beginning of the reign of Nicholas I in 1829-1831. These projects contained proposals that made significant changes to the current order of organization and functioning of local government. These were proposals concerning the removal of the governor from active administration, the creation of common presences under the governor and in the counties, the separation of judicial and economic functions from the police, as well as the reorganization of the county police and the strengthening of the volost administration.
In Speransky’s theoretical developments to improve local management in 1827-1831. reflected the reformer's desire to include more active representatives of the qualifying strata of society in the work of municipal and regional government bodies. The main task of the reformer both in 1809 and in the 20s. XIX century was to promote the creation of an independent structure of self-government bodies capable of effectively solving pressing economic and social problems. The reorganization of local government, designed by Speransky, was supposed to help the population (real estate owners, economically independent people) participate in government.
The analysis of the activities of M.M. carried out in the study. Speransky on the design of regional, provincial and district administration, allows us to say that the outstanding reformer of the central bodies of state power and administration of the early 19th century paid serious attention to the development of local institutions. Nemon saw the only opportunity to resist the excessive and unjustified strengthening of central power and associated it with overcoming the lack of freedom in Russian society.
M.M. Speransky realized that the path to expanding the independence of local authorities and forming local self-government would require enormous efforts from the state and society. It was this direction of government reforms that the reformer defined as one of the main components of Russia’s strategic response to a key question for it: how to respond to the challenge of Europe, which is the center of an unprecedented acceleration of economic growth. M.M. Speransky included the construction of a system of interaction between the state and local self-government structures in the set of prerequisites necessary for the realization of the enormous creative national potential of Russia, without which the reformer could not imagine ensuring the prosperity of the country, its worthy place in the world.
Literature
1. Levandovsky A. Self-government in the context of autocracy // Knowledge is power. 1992 No. 2
2. Speransky M.M. Projects and notes. - M. - L.: Publishing House of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 1961.
3. Speransky M.M. Guide to the knowledge of laws. - St. Petersburg, 1845.
4. Speransky M.M. Review of historical information about the code of laws (from 1700 to 1826). - St. Petersburg, 1833.
5. Schilder N. Emperor Alexander I: T.III. - St. Petersburg, 1897.
6. Tomsinov V.A. The luminary of the Russian bureaucracy: Historical portrait of M.M. Speransky. - M.: Young Guard, 1991.
7. Chibiryaev S.A. Great Russian reformists: life, activities, political views M.M. Speransky. - M.: Resurrection, 1993.
COURSE WORK
Subject: History of the National State and Law
Topic: Speransky M.M. - Governor General of Siberia
Introduction
Mikhail Mikhailovich Speransky, a far-sighted politician and manager, was able to study and develop a reform system for this region in two years of studying the vast territories of Siberia with its difficult climatic conditions and the arbitrariness in which the population found itself. Appointed to the post of Governor General, Speransky took a number of measures aimed at bringing Siberia closer to the level of European Russia in economic, social and cultural development. He established the Main Directorate of Trade of Siberia, and created the Treasury Chamber to resolve land and financial issues. Direct communication with peasants, traders and industrialists provided material for developing and taking measures to encourage agriculture, trade and industry in the region. In total, Speransky spent about two years in Siberia. Historians compare his activities in scale to those of Peter the Great in European Russia a century earlier. In 1820, Speransky wrote to his daughter: “If I did little here, at least I dried a lot of tears, calmed indignation, stopped flagrant violence and, perhaps even more important, opened Siberia in its true political relations.”
The result of Speransky’s activities in Siberia and a new chapter in Siberian history was a series of legislative acts prepared by him, defining the new administrative structure and management of the region, legal proceedings and the nature of serving duties by the population, the social status of its various categories, the development of the economy of the region, united in the “Code for the management of Siberia " After the accession of Nicholas I, Speransky headed in 1826 the II Department of the Own E.I.V. office that codified laws. Under his leadership, the 45-volume “Complete Collection of Laws” (1830) and the 15-volume “Code of Laws” (1832) were compiled. In commemoration of his works, the emperor granted him the title of count and the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called.
“Speransky was a man of intelligence and science. From him we have a whole system of thoughts and the style of the government building left for us to study,” wrote the Decembrist G.S. Batenkov.
Two years of service in this position revealed him as a most skillful practitioner in organizing management to solve the most complex problems of such a colossal and sparsely populated region as Siberia in the 19th century. Having mobilized the knowledge and experience of those ministries and the State Council that were founded under him and with his participation, he formed and left the country an approach to solving the problems of a huge territory stretching from the Baltic to the Pacific Ocean, the entire North of Russia and even Alaska and part of California (Fort Ross), which were part of the country at that time.
During the period of his activities in Siberia, Speransky was not an ordinary official or a traditional “inspector”. As a researcher and politician, he used two years of his life to understand how Lomonosov’s prophecy that Russia would grow with Siberia could be realized. He proved that management is not about writing papers, but about finding a path to the common good.
Even at the dawn of developing his projects for management reforms, M. M. Speransky determined how Russia could develop. He saw three such sources: productive forces, popular forces - all the people who make up the power - and spiritual forces. “It is impossible to imagine other forces,” he said. Everything that happened closer to the 20th century in terms of the development of the natural resources of the country and Siberia, in essence, was part of the “productive” forces. But it was Speransky who laid the foundations for interaction with people, the art of understanding the interests of different segments of the population - for the sake of the development of society and the prosperity of the state. He was able to reveal the potential of the first producers, merchants, prospectors, guides, to discover a method of understanding nearby territories and their peoples, approaches to introducing them to the Russian people and establishing good neighborly relations.
Here, beyond the Ural "stone belt", in the Asian part of the Russian Empire, Mikhail Mikhailovich was able to realize his goals for the development and use of the forces of the Siberians, primarily the people's spiritual forces. Without this, the rapid industrial development of the region was unthinkable, which had a huge impact on the increase in the historical wealth of Russia, its economy, culture, national identity and, ultimately, on the expansion of the role and weight of our country in the world.
I. Russia at the beginning of the 19th century
1.1 The need for changes in the country’s foreign and domestic policies
By the beginning of the 19th century. In Russia, new needs are beginning to emerge that are preparing the transition of the state order to new foundations. In foreign policy, the territorial and national unification of the Russian land continues.
In domestic politics, this is the need to equalize classes with common rights and encourage them to work together. In almost every reign, attempts were made to begin to resolve these problems. Each time, timid or loud voices were heard against the existing order, demanding changes; the next reign began to timidly or decisively carry them out in internal transformative activities. But every time it happened that some obstacle, external or internal, war or personal characteristics of the ruler, stopped the government halfway. Then the movement that began sank deeper into society and took on various forms.
Alexander I, successor of Emperor Paul, came to the throne with a broader program and implemented it more consistently and deliberately.
The main goals of domestic policy: the equalization of all classes before the law and their introduction into joint state activities. It was necessary to establish new legislative relations between classes, increase the educational level of the people, and ensure a new structure of the state economy (finance).
The partial introduction of this restructuring caused double discontent in society: some were dissatisfied with the fact that the old was being destroyed; others were unhappy that new things were being introduced too slowly. A series of wars and internal reforms undermined the state economy, disrupted finances, and reduced the people's well-being. From 1801 to 1808 some changes were made.
On March 30, 1801, the Council of State was replaced by a permanent institution, called the "Permanent Council", to discuss government affairs and regulations.
Then Peter's Collegiums were reorganized. By the manifesto of September 8, 1802, they were transformed into 8 ministries: foreign affairs, military forces, naval forces, internal affairs, finance, justice, commerce and public education.
The main difference between the new central government bodies was their sole authority: each department was controlled by a minister who reported to the Senate.
Since 1801, the distribution of inhabited estates into private ownership was prohibited.
The decree of December 12, 1801 granted the right to all persons of free fortune to acquire ownership of real estate outside the city without peasants. This law destroyed the centuries-old landowning monopoly of the nobility.
On February 20, 1803, a decree on free cultivators was issued: landowners could enter into an agreement with their peasants, freeing them with the land as whole villages or individual families.
II. Speransky - the Emperor's confidant
It was impossible to achieve the rule of law in a feudal autocratic state, but the very fact of codifying legislation was of enormous historical significance, although it was devoid of practical meaning. In general, the state activities of M.M. Speransky is extremely complex, rich in events and contradictions. Fate destined him to be at the very center of the first national political history...
On the 40th anniversary, Speransky was awarded another award - the Order of Alexander Nevsky. However, the ritual of presenting the award took place in an unusually strictly formal manner, and it became clear to the court that the “star” of the reformer was beginning to fade. But few could have foreseen that the fall would happen so soon. Feeling the coldness of Alexander I towards his Secretary of State, Speransky’s ill-wishers...
In 1816, Speransky's disgrace was lifted, and he was appointed Penza civil governor, and in 1819 - governor-general of Siberia.
The moment for the appointment was chosen well. The vast Siberian territories, rich in valuable resources and which until recently provided quite large revenues to the treasury in yasak (valuable furs) and money, began to be distinguished by other “exploits” - unbridled tyranny and bribery of local officials. The Governor-General of Siberia P.I. Pestel ruled the region, paradoxically, from St. Petersburg.
The uncontrolled local bureaucracy only aggravated the already difficult conditions for the management and development of the eastern territories of the empire, associated with the underdeveloped infrastructure of the region, its multinational composition and the rather difficult foreign policy conditions for securing lands to Russia. All levels of provincial government in Siberia were permeated by extreme despotism, corruption, sophisticated torture during the investigation of cases, and shameless robbery of the indigenous population. This distinguished both governors (especially Irkutsk Treskin and Tomsk Illichevsky), and local police officers and mayors. It even got to the point that the local police chief of Yeniseisk, Kukolevsky, harnessed his carriage to officials subordinate to him, who dared to file a complaint against him, and drove it through the streets of the city. Complaints about the Siberian administration still reached the capital in all sorts of roundabout ways, audits were appointed, materials were reviewed... And everything remained the same.
Speransky received broad powers that went far beyond the usual governor-general status. He had the right to investigate, remove from service and bring to trial any official guilty of abuses, determine and carry out measures necessary to restore order.
The triune task set by the emperor for the new governor-general - audit, current management and preparation of the reform of the Siberian region - each part of it would have been more than enough for even one experienced administrator, and the sovereign allotted Speransky only one and a half to two years to carry out his plan. The solution to all these problems could drag on, like all Russian attempts at reform, for many years, although the old saying “both the sheep are safe and the wolves are full” was exactly like this decision of the monarch: Speransky seemed to be “forgiven and returned” to a high government position , and his presence in Siberia and removal from national affairs did not cause new irritation to the capital’s bureaucracy.
Studying the problems of Siberia. Carrying out regional management reforms
On May 22, 1819, Speransky was already approaching Tyumen, and on May 24 he was in Tobolsk. As he moved towards Irkutsk, the number of complaints from residents about the cruelty and arbitrariness of local authorities, oppression, arbitrariness, bribery and embezzlement grew. Speransky surveyed factories, the mint in Yekaterinburg, public places, hospitals, and prisons. August 29, 1819 He arrived in Irkutsk. “The further I descend to the bottom of Siberia, the more evil I find, and almost intolerable evil,” he wrote to a friend on June 24, 1819 from Tomsk. - Exhausted by complaints, denunciations, sneaking, I can hardly find enough patience to finish the work entrusted to me. The rumors did not exaggerate anything, and things are even worse than the rumors.” The richest region with colossal natural and economic potential, due to its remoteness, the absence of any supervision and control from distant St. Petersburg, turned into an object of unscrupulous robbery and arbitrariness of local satraps. In a short time, the new governor-general had to simultaneously conduct an audit of the region, manage it, and collect materials for the development of some foundations of local government and write charters of new institutions. He brought convicted embezzlers and oppressive bribe-takers to trial and even returned bribes to the “offended bribe-payers.” The picture of abuse was horrifying.
Based on the results of the inspection of “parts of the administration of the entrusted region,” Speransky created three investigative commissions - in Irkutsk, Nizhneudinsk and Yakutsk, which conducted proceedings on 74 investigative cases and the suitability of almost a thousand local officials. The results were extremely significant: 432 people were imprisoned, 262 were subject to disciplinary action - dismissal from office, demotion, reprimands, etc., and 375 people involved in the investigation were acquitted. The number of punished officials could have been higher, since almost every employee was involved in abuses to one degree or another, but then the regional administration at all levels could simply be left without civil servants at all.
The experience of previous activities and the Penza governorship gave Speransky the opportunity not only to quickly and decisively stop the rampant bureaucratic arbitrariness, but also to develop the activities of the administration to solve pressing problems of the development of the Siberian region. The new governor-general perfectly understood the economic importance that Siberia had for Russia. He established the Main Directorate of Trade of Siberia, modernized the land and financial management bodies, and the Russian-American Trading Company received serious support from the governor. A number of measures were taken to encourage the development of industry, agriculture, trade, and education.
But Speransky saw the main drawback, the “evil” in non-compliance with state interests in the region in the imperfect management of Siberia and the absence of a legally competent and coordinated set of legislative acts that determined the administrative structure and competence of the local government apparatus, the position of various categories of the population - indigenous, newcomers and servicemen, as well as thousands of those exiled here in order to provide labor for mining factories and colonize the territories of convicts and exiled settlers.
Cooperation with Batenkov
Speransky understood perfectly well that in these conditions, a serious comprehensive reform at the level of the entire region was urgently needed for the region. Let us note that only he himself could handle the Siberian reform, and Speransky, together with Batenkov, began preparing bills. Based on the audit of the region, they came to the conclusion that the region required a well-structured system of central, governor-general, provincial and local government (including management of the indigenous population), as well as codified legislation that replaced hundreds of those published at different times and mostly contradictory. friend of legalizations.
Batenkov, in the shortest possible time, did a tremendous amount of preparatory work on collecting and summarizing source materials for the preparation of a set of legislative acts on Siberia: he analyzed an array of legislative, statistical and factual data, and made specific proposals. As a result of this activity, a set of documents appeared under the general title “Note on the Settlement of Siberia,” as well as a number of documents on individual parts of the administration. It was a comprehensive study of the problems of the region that made it possible to come to complex solutions of a constructive nature, reforming the entire management system of the region and creating a complex of Siberian codified legislative acts.
Perhaps for the first time in the history of Siberia, the approach to reform was put on a practical and research basis. The materials prepared by Batenkov were presented to Speransky. At the same time, the Governor General requested a number of documents from local authorities - on the state of communications, mining and their management, etc.
During his two years in Siberia, Speransky drew up a plan for the administrative reform of the region and prepared draft imperial decrees on the most pressing issues at that time. And he managed to convince the tsarist government of the need to fulfill them.
However, Russian domestic politics turned out in such a way that the ideas of M. M. Speransky, promising and far-sighted, were forgotten for almost a whole century - he was remembered as a statesman only at the beginning of the 20th century, and then not for long: a revolution broke out. As for his Siberian projects, they remained unnoticed.
While in his new position, he decided to conduct an audit of Siberia. It revealed flagrant abuses, the arbitrariness of local authorities and the complete lack of rights of the population. In order to somehow improve the situation, Speransky begins to carry out reforms in the administration of the region.
The “first collaborator” in carrying out the Siberian reforms was the future Decembrist S.G. Batenkov. He, together with Speransky, energetically worked on the development of the “Siberian Code” - an extensive set of reforms of the administrative apparatus of Siberia. Together they prepared many projects: on land communications, on the establishment of stages, on the administrative formation of provinces in natural areas, etc. Of particular importance among them were two projects approved by the emperor: “Institutions for the administration of the Siberian provinces” and “Charter on the administration of foreigners.” It is noteworthy that a feature of the latter was the new division proposed by Speransky of the indigenous population of Siberia according to their way of life into sedentary, nomadic and wandering. According to this division, each category received its own rights and responsibilities, and the authorities were prescribed the procedure for managing them.
During the period of work on the Siberian Code,” Batenkov sincerely believed that Speransky, “a good and strong nobleman,” would truly transform Siberia. Subsequently, it became clear to him that Speransky was not given “any means to fulfill the assigned assignment” and the results of his activities in Siberia did not meet his hopes. However, Batenkov believed that “Speransky cannot be personally blamed for failure.” He wrote about the latter: “The memory of him was preserved throughout Siberia, despite the change of persons, statutes and deeds, for many monuments and the outline of the institution survived among all this. His personality was not easily erased from memory, and many families remembered him kindly.”
At the end of January 1820, Speransky sent a brief report on his activities to Emperor Alexander, where he stated that he could finish all his work by May, after which his stay in Siberia “would have no purpose.” By this, Mikhail Mikhailovich clearly pushed the sovereign to allow him to return to St. Petersburg in the near future. Alexander's permission did not take long to arrive. But the emperor ordered his former secretary of state to arrange the route from Siberia in such a way as to arrive in the capital by the end of March next year. This delay greatly affected Speransky. A feeling of the meaninglessness of his own activities began to prevail in his soul, the consciousness that there were still influential enemies of him in St. Petersburg, the fear of remaining in Siberia forever, and even the fear of being subjected to unfounded accusations from local officials who had been convicted of abuses.
The reasons for the failure of Speransky’s undertakings
The reason for the failure of the reform initiatives of Speransky and Alexander I was inconsistency. This inconsistency lies in the historical assessment of Alexander's activities. New government institutions, whether implemented or only conceived, were based on the beginning of legality, i.e. on the idea of a firm and uniform law for everyone, which was supposed to constrain arbitrariness in all spheres of state and public life, in management, as well as in society. But, according to the tacit or public recognition of the current law, a whole half of the empire’s population, which was then considered over 40 million of the total sex, depended not on the law, but on the personal arbitrariness of the owner; Consequently, private civil relations were not consistent with the foundations of the new state institutions that were introduced and contrived.
According to the requirement of historical logic, new state institutions had to stand on the ready soil of new coordinated civil relations, as a result growing out of their causes. The emperor and his employees decided to introduce new state institutions before the civil relations agreed upon with them were created; they wanted to build a liberal constitution in a society, half of which was in slavery, i.e. they hoped to produce effects before the causes that produced them. The source of this misconception is also known; it lies in the exaggerated importance that was then attached to forms of government. People of those generations were confident that all parts of social relations would change, all private issues would be resolved, new morals would be established as soon as the plan of government drawn with a bold hand was implemented, i.e. system of government agencies. They were all the more inclined to believe that it is much easier to introduce a constitution than to carry out the petty work of studying reality, transformative work. The first work can be drawn up in a short time and reap the glory; the results of the second work will never be appreciated, even noticed by contemporaries, and provide very little food for historical ambition.
