Three-engine passenger Ju 52/3m were operated in many countries around the world. The largest number of cars served in the German airline Deutsche Lufthansa. It accepted the first Ju 52/3mce aircraft on May 1, and the second on September 10, 1932. Since November, the Junkers entered the Munich-Milan-Rome line, and a few years later they became the most common aircraft in German civil aviation. They served both domestic and international lines. Ju 52/3m flew to all European capitals. In 1934, pilot Untucht flew from Berlin to Shanghai in a Junkers. From 1936 the Germans began flights to Kabul in Afghanistan. One of Lufthansa's longest routes was the Berlin - Rio de Janeiro line through Seville and Bathurst.

All German civil aircraft had their own names, which were printed on the side near the cockpit. They were given in honor of various prominent figures. About a dozen cars before the war were assigned as personal to the top leaders of the Reich. Hitler flew on the Immelmann plane, Goering flew on the Manfred von Richthofen, and Field Marshal von Blomberg flew on the Hermann Goering. The Ju 52/3m formed the backbone of Lufthansa's fleet until the end of World War II.

Since 1934, the Junkers were operated by the Soviet-German company Deruluft on the Moscow-Berlin line. It owned three cars, named “Condor”, “Cormoran” and “Milan”. The aircraft were registered in Germany. Landing in Moscow was carried out at the Central Airfield, but at one time they also landed in Bykovo. In winter, “Deruluft” cars were put on skis.

In general, Ju 52/3m were in the fleet of 30 airlines in 25 countries, in particular: Aero (Finland), AGO (Estonia), Olag (Austria), Sabena (Belgium), DDL (Denmark) and others. Even states with their own developed aircraft manufacturing bought Junkers. For example, one car flew in the colors of British Airways. In Latin America, the Ju 52/3m was part of the fleet of three companies in Brazil (Varig, VASP and Sindicate Condor). They were also available in Aeroposta Argentina, LAB (Bolivia), CAUSA (Uruguay), SETA (Ecuador). In Peru, the Junkers were used by the local branch of Lufthansa.

Many Latin American companies were fully or partially owned by German capital. In September 1941, Ecuador, under US pressure, requisitioned two Ju 52/3m from the Syndicate Condor company. One of them was given to the Americans as a trophy at the beginning of 1942. The American crew took delivery of the aircraft in Talara, Peru, and ferried it to Albrook Field in the Panama Canal Zone. The Junker entered service with the US Army Air Forces as the C-79. The entire engine installation on it was replaced. The place of the “native” BMW 132 engines was taken by the American R-1690-23 (also “Hornets”) with a power of 525 hp. The hoods were taken from the DC-2. The S-79 was operated by the 20th Transport Squadron until the end of 1943. It was then sold to Costa Rica, and from there it was resold to Nicaragua in 1948. A year later, the plane crashed during landing and was not recovered.

In Africa, Ju 52/3m served in Mozambique (DETA company) and the Union of South Africa (South African Airways). In China, they were flown by German crews of the Eurasia joint society.

The first war in which the Ju 52/3m was used was fought in South America. Colombia and Peru fought. In August 1932, Peruvian troops captured the border port of Leticia in the upper Amazon. Three Junkers of the Colombian Air Force deployed reinforcements to the border, which managed to stop the enemy’s advance. The conflict ended in July 1933.

Then the Bolivian-Paraguayan war began. In 1928, the American company Standard Oil discovered oil in the sparsely populated Chaco border region. Perhaps this is what spurred the neighbors to conflict. That same year, the first armed clashes occurred along the ill-defined border. Low-intensity skirmishes escalated into something more serious when the Bolivian president declared war on Paraguay in June 1932.

In October 1932, the Bolivian company LAB received the first Junker from Germany. From the end of the year he began regular flights to the front. Weapons, ammunition, food, and medicine were transported to the frontline Villa Montes airfield. Even guns were transferred; their carriages had to be dismantled. The wounded were evacuated on return flights. In 1933, two more planes arrived to the Bolivians; they were not even registered as civilian ones.

But all three aircraft were flown by LAB crews, consisting of Germans, both local and hired in Germany. I had to work in difficult conditions. Hot during the day and rather cool at night, dust, primitive airfields without any equipment. Nevertheless, before the end of the war in July 1935, three Junkers transported up to 40,000 soldiers and 4,850 tons of various cargo. This, however, did not help the Bolivians - they still lost the war.

The last Bolivian Ju 52/3m crashed in November 1940.

The Treaty of Versailles prohibited Germany from having military aircraft. The Germans constantly tried to circumvent this limitation. After the Nazis came to power, these attempts became even more active.

Under the guise of the Lufthansa flight school, the training of bomber aviation crews began. Formally, the school was subordinate to... the railway department. It taught mainly navigation and blind flying techniques. The pilots practiced cross-country instrument flight at night and in the clouds. The school received both new Junkers from the factory and old cars from Lufthansa. All aircraft carried civilian designations.

On April 10, 1934, Reich Air Commissioner Goering gave a secret order to form the first bomber squadron in Nuremberg by October 1. It was to consist of three squadrons.

It began with the creation of the Auxiliary Bomber Squadron. It was the first bomber unit in Germany after the end of the World War. She disguised herself as the Lufthansa Line Inspectorate. The squadron was tasked with training flight and technical personnel. By April 1, 1934, it received 24 regular passenger Ju 52/3mge and three new Dornier Do 11 C bombers. But the latter turned out to be not very reliable in operation, so they were quickly removed from service. There were only Junkers left in the squadron.

Meanwhile, the Nazis' appetites were growing rapidly. At the end of 1934, the formation of four bomber squadrons began at once. Now the squadron included three groups (regiments). The group included two squadrons of 12 aircraft each. Since the new bombers Ju 86, He 111 and Do 17 (created for political purposes as dual-purpose vehicles - passenger and military at the same time) existed only in the form of prototypes, these squadrons began to equip Ju 52/3m and Do 11. At the same time, they were more reliable and The better-developed Junkers made up more than two-thirds of the fleet.

The KG 152 “Hindenburg” squadron was the first to be equipped, followed by KG 153, KG 154 and KG 155. Their squadrons were located at the airfields of Giebelyitadt, Tutov, Greifswald, Merseburg, Finsterwalde and Fasberg. Ju 52/3mg3e with full armament were already arriving there.

In March 1935, the German government officially announced the revival of its air force - the Luftwaffe. The Reich Air Commissariat was renamed the Reich Ministry. The rapid quantitative growth of military aviation began. It was on the Junkers that the most experienced Luftwaffe personnel were trained. Then came the stage of rapid introduction of new generation bombers. Nevertheless, Ju 52/3mg3e and Ju 52/3mg4e carried bomb weapons until 1937–1938. By the spring of 1938, the rearmament of bomber aviation was completed. The old Junkers remained in service in only one group - IV/KG 152 in Finsterwald. It became the core of German military transport aviation.

Ju 52/3m were used as bombers in the Spanish Civil War.

In July 1936, Spanish generals rebelled against the government of the republic. After the death of General Sanjurjo in a plane crash, General Franco, who arrived from the Canary Islands, became the leader of the rebels. The troops supporting him were mainly in that part of Morocco that was then a Spanish colony. They needed to be transferred across the strait. The fleet, for the most part, remained loyal to the republic. They decided to transport the soldiers by air. But Franco also had few planes. However, the fascist regimes of Italy and Germany took his side.

On July 19, the rebels sent representatives to Rome and Berlin. Three days later, Franco sent a telegram to Hitler asking for ten transport planes with crews. On July 24, after a meeting with representatives of the rebels, the Fuhrer ordered the supply of 20 Junkers.

Luftwaffe headquarters received the order on the 25th, and a day later the first plane took off from the Berlin Tempelhof airfield. In total, ten vehicles were sent by air to Morocco by August 9 - Ju 52/3mg3e with weapons removed. German civilian markings were applied to their sides and wings. Formally, these Junkers were sold to the Hispano-Morocco de Transnoptes (HISMA) company. The crews were recruited from Luftwaffe squadrons and replenished with experienced pilots from Lufthansa. All the personnel, of course, were dressed in civilian clothes.

Lieutenant R. von Moreau was appointed commander of the transport unit. The shipment of equipment to Spain was supervised by the already mentioned E. Milch, who by this time had become a general.

We flew through Italy with a landing in Sicily. One Junker entered Republican-controlled territory and landed at Barajas airfield. Convinced of the mistake, the Germans immediately took off, but the second time they landed again near the Republicans. The plane was requisitioned and began to be converted into a bomber. Work was stopped due to a protest from the German embassy, ​​and in October the car itself was bombed by the Francoists.

Ten more Junkers arrived in Morocco by sea. They were sent by steamer from Hamburg on July 29. The vehicles were unloaded at their destination on August 11.

Immediately after their arrival, German pilots began regular flights from Tetouan (Morocco) to Tablada airfield near Seville. In the first days they deployed 500 soldiers. This allowed the rebels to go on the offensive and advance north of the city.

The planes made up to four flights a day. At the same time, instead of 17 people according to the norm, up to 40 were taken on board. The record was set by the pilot Henke (from Lufthansa), who transported 243 soldiers and officers in a day. Together with the troops, aviation transported ammunition and weapons, including machine guns and small cannons.

Since the beginning of August, Italian planes have also begun operating on the “air bridge” from Morocco. By the end of the month, 7,350 people had already been airlifted to Spain. These included units of the Foreign Legion and Moroccans. On August 5, under the cover of Italian aviation, transportation by sea began. Therefore, the importance of the air route gradually weakened. Flights stopped in mid-October. In total, during the operation, 868 flights were made, 14,000 soldiers, 44 guns and 500 tons of various cargo were transferred. Hitler said: “Franco should erect a monument to the Ju 52. The revolution in Spain owes its victory to this aircraft.”

On August 20-21, the Junkers were used to drop food, ammunition and medicine to the rebels defending the Alcazar fortress in Toledo.

But the Ju 52/3mg3e was used in Spain not only as military transport aircraft. From the beginning of August they began to work as bombers. On August 3, 1936, the German crew bombed a concentration of Republican troops for the first time. Ten days later, two Junkers attacked the battleship Jaime I near Malaga. The leader of the pair, Lieutenant von Moro, was unable to hit the target, but the crew of his wingman, the already mentioned pilot Henke, achieved two hits with 250 kg high-explosive bombs. 47 sailors were killed and wounded on the battleship.

Success led to the decision to create an improvised bomber squadron, simply called "Moro Squadron". By the end of August, the Germans had installed machine guns and cluster bombs on six aircraft.

By this time, the Spanish rebels themselves were also already armed with Ju 52/3m3e. Apparently they received all the cars they sent by sea. In August 1936, Group B was formed in Salamanca under the command of X. Diaz de Letzea. It consisted of three flights of three aircraft each. Specialists from the “Moro squadron” assisted in training the crews.

On August 14, bombers from Group B already attacked the Getafe Republican airfield near Madrid, and two days later another attacked Cuatro Vientos. On August 27 and 28 they bombed the capital of Spain. The raid on Getafe on October 4 was very effective. A pair of Junkers destroyed nine aircraft on the ground.

Meanwhile, in Stettin and Swinemünde, units of the Condor Legion, a German aviation unit created specifically for combat operations in Spain, were loading onto ships. Its main striking force was the K88 group. Initially, it was divided into three squadrons of 12 bombers. The group mainly received improved Ju 52/3mg4e, but there were also earlier “g3e” ones. The equipment was transported to Salamanca via Italy. After arriving in Spain, K88 absorbed the Moro Squadron. It was reorganized into four squadrons of nine vehicles each.

The Junkers took an active part in the battles near Madrid in the fall of 1936. While the Republicans flew all sorts of junk, slow-moving three-engine bombers worked quietly during the day. But in October, Soviet fighters I-15 and I-16 were unloaded from the ships. The pilots for them also arrived. On November 4, I-15s shot down the first Junker over the suburbs of Madrid. The pilot, Lieutenant Kolbitz, was killed, the rest of the crew escaped with parachutes.

On the same day, Soviet pilots intercepted a Ju 52/3m flight flying to Madrid in the clouds and attacked the last bomber. The damaged car turned back, but did not reach its airfield. I had to sit wherever I could. The navigator died from his wounds.

The next day, according to Soviet data, two Junkers were shot down, on November 6 - another (interestingly, the enemy admitted the loss of not one, but two bombers on that day; the first, with a Spanish crew, was killed, the second, on which von was flying Moro was forced to land not far from the front, the German pilots were not injured).

Soviet pilots assessed the Ju 52/3m as a fairly serious opponent. This is what Ya.I. told the head of the Red Army Air Force. Alksnis, a Chernykh fighter pilot who returned from Spain: “The car is very durable. We came close, shot at it, you feel that the bullets are flying into the car, but it doesn’t fall and doesn’t burn.” High combat survivability was ensured by a multi-spar wing, thick pipes of rudder control rods, and fuel distribution over a large number of protected tanks. If the motor mount was damaged, the engine was held in place by safety cables.

Nevertheless, the losses of the Junkers grew. They were destroyed not only in the air, but also on the ground. According to Soviet data, the first five bombers were disabled at the airfield in Seville, which on October 28 came under attack from the Republican SB and Pote 54. On November 11, bombs fell on aircraft parking in Avila. There, among other aircraft, two Junkers were destroyed.

But the Ju 52/3m continued to fly during the day, dropping bombs on Madrid from medium altitudes. So, on November 19, almost 40 tons of deadly cargo were dropped on the city, and republican fighters responded by shooting down one Junker and damaging two.

At the end of December, Junkers from K88 began operating on the Northern Front, in the area of ​​Santander and Bilbao. There were few Republican aircraft there.

Basically, these were “motley” outdated machines. This allowed the Ju 52/3m to continue to operate fairly confidently during the day. But on January 4, 1937, two bombers fell victim to the Republican I-15s. One, shot down by S. Bulkin, fell near Bilbao, the second, attributed to S. Petrukhin, crashed on the approach to the Vitoria airfield.

Near Madrid, Francoist aviation tried to reduce its losses by strengthening fighter escort, but this did not produce significant results. Already in October 1936, the first cases of Junkers being used at night were noted. During several raids on the San Javier airfield, they damaged a total of eight SBs, two of which had to be written off. On the night of January 11, 1937, enemy planes bombed Madrid and the Campo Real airfield in the dark. However, groups of Junkers with a powerful escort (three to five or more fighters per bomber) met during the day until April 1937. As daylight bombers, Ju 52/3m took part in battles on the river. Jarama and Guadalajara.

Later, in central Spain, the Junkers switched exclusively to night operations. By the beginning of the battles for Brunete, the Francoists had 12 Ju 52/3m (groups 1-G-22 and 2-G-22), the Condor Legion had 25 (group K88).

On the night of July 26, 1937, Republican fighters made their first night interception. Soviet pilot M. Yakushin on an I-15 at an altitude of 2000 m attacked a single “junker” from squadron 3/K88 near the front line. The bomber caught fire and crashed. The entire crew died.

The next night, A. Serov discovered a Ju 52/3m illuminated by a searchlight at an altitude of 3000 m. He fired at it, but the bomber got away. Almost immediately, Serov noticed the second plane and joined its tail. Despite the fire from the top gunner of the Junkers, after the third burst the Soviet fighter set the German on fire. Four members of the bomber's crew bailed out and were captured. After that, Serov chased after the third car, but burned all the fuel and was forced to sit down near the front line.

Another victory was won on the night of September 14-15 by I. Eremenko. He shot down the rebels' Junkers. It is interesting that the captured plane commander turned out to be a Russian White emigrant.

On October 15, more than 60 Republican fighters stormed the Garapinillos airfield. Smoke from the fires was visible almost 100 km away. It was possible to destroy a significant number of aircraft of various types. Three Ju 52/3m burned out completely, and several more were damaged.

In the north, the Junkers maintained the practice of conducting daytime operations longer, and, despite the weakness of Republican aviation on this front, they periodically paid for it. On April 13, 1937, anti-aircraft gunners shot down one of the three planes that bombed Bilbao. The car crashed in the Mondragon area. On July 19, two Junkers fell on republican territory, shot by fighters.

It was on the Northern Front that the famous massive raid on the small town of Guernica took place, which became a symbol of fascist barbarism. On April 26, 1937, German and Italian planes practically wiped it off the face of the earth. At the same time, both the nearby bridge and the military plant on the outskirts remained intact, and more than 1,500 civilians died. 18 Junkers from K88 took part in the raid. The lead car was driven by Major Fuchs. When there was a fuss in the foreign press, at first the Francoists blamed everything on the Republican sappers who allegedly blew up the town during the retreat, then they began to talk about a navigation error. It is now known that this was a deliberate act of intimidation plus the development of tactics for destroying cities by aircraft.

Since February 1937, K88 units began to rearm with new equipment. In mid-May, two squadrons were already flying the new He 111B bombers. The last time Junkers were actively used in the north of the country was in October (and during the daytime); by the end of the month, the re-equipment of the group was completed.

The Germans handed over most of the Ju 52/3m that became redundant to the Francoists, the rest were used as transport aircraft. In mid-August 1938, according to Republican intelligence, the enemy had about 25 Junkers left. It is precisely known that on December 23, there were 13 vehicles in two groups of night bombers (1-G-22 and 2-G-22); The Condor Legion had three more.

The last combat flight of the Franco Junkers was carried out on March 26, 1939 - the day the republican government capitulated. In April, all surviving vehicles were assembled at the airfield in Leon. There were 23 of them. In total, according to various sources, the Germans sent from 55 to 61 Ju 52/3m to Spain, including two vehicles on floats.

One aircraft, captured by the Republicans at the end of 1936, was delivered to the USSR early next year, tested and studied.

In February 1930, Lufthansa and the Chinese government agreed to organize a joint airline, Eurasia. From September 1934 to September 1938, she received nine Ju 52/3mge. These aircraft flew on domestic and international (to Southeast Asia) routes. The crews were composed mainly of Lufthansa personnel. After Japan's attack on China in July 1937, Eurasia continued to function.

On August 1, Japanese aircraft destroyed one of the company’s airliners at the airfield in Kunming. By December 1939, Eurasia had lost four more aircraft from enemy actions and accidents. After the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, which created the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo “axis,” the Chinese government stopped the company’s activities, but until August 1941 its aircraft and crews continued to operate as government service personnel.

In September, the Germans left China, and the vehicles were received by Chinese Air Force crews.

The planes were used as transport aircraft, mainly for transporting high-ranking officials. President Chiang Kai-shek himself repeatedly made trips around the country on them. In particular, he flew one Ju 52/3mge to meet with communist leader Mao Tse Tung.

Three Chinese Junkers were destroyed by Japanese bombers in Hong Kong on December 8, 1941. It is unknown when the last Chinese Junker was written off.

By the beginning of 1938, only one group remained in the Luftwaffe, armed with three-engine Junkers - IV/KG 152 in Fünsterwald. It was assigned to the 7th Airborne Division. On March 13, 1938, the group conducted its first combat operation - during the Anschluss of Austria, its planes landed a battalion of paratroopers at the Thalerhof airfield in Graz. 54 cars took part.

On April 1 of the same year, this unit became known as KGrzbV 1 - 1st Special Purpose Group. At this time it had 39 aircraft. Some of the equipment and crews were allocated as the core of the new group KGrzbV 2 in Brandenburg. Each of the groups was supposed to have four squadrons of 12 aircraft and a headquarters unit of five aircraft. In the summer of 1939, two more such groups were created.

All of them were united into the squadron KGzbV 1. At the end of August, the formation of the second squadron, KGzbV 2, began, and then the third - KGzbV 172. The latter, consisting of two groups, received 59 Junkers, requisitioned from Lufthansa along with the crews. During the invasion of Poland, it was planned to land a large assault force near Poznan, but it was not needed. Transport aircraft were mainly engaged in supplying forward units and removing the wounded. Thus, 19,760 people and 1,600 tons of various cargo were transferred. To do this, it was necessary to hastily assemble three more transport groups using equipment and personnel from flight schools. On September 25, the Junkers, as bombers, took part in a major raid on Warsaw. At the same time, small incendiary bombs of 2 kg each were loaded into the fuselage and thrown out of the doors manually. Polish fighters were no longer seen in the sky. Bombing was carried out as at a training ground. The Junkers dropped 72 tons of incendiary bombs and 486 tons of fragmentation and high-explosive bombs. After the capture of the city, the Fuhrer personally inspected its destruction from aboard his personal aircraft.

During the battles, the Poles managed to shoot down a dozen Ju 52/3m, another 44 (according to other sources - 47) vehicles were written off due to various damages (including accidents). Several planes ended up in territory occupied by the Red Army. On October 8, there were at least three Junkers on our side: two in Lvov and one stuck in a meadow near the village of Shklo. All this equipment was returned to the Germans, although not fully equipped. The disappearance of the equipment was attributed to the Poles, although it was carefully packed and taken to the Air Force Research Institute.

Following Poland, it was the turn of Denmark and Norway. The German General Staff called the operation to capture them “Weserübung” - “Exercise on the Weser”. By its beginning, the forces of transport aviation had increased significantly. Ten groups and four separate squadrons were used to transport the first wave of airborne assault alone. At the same time, almost all German military transport aviation was equipped with Ju 52/3m. Only one squadron had a mixed composition, and three groups were equipped with seaplanes. A total of 573 three-engine Junkers were involved in the operation.

On April 9, 1940, these vehicles landed troops at airfields in southern Norway. The sites were captured by paratroopers, after which German airfield teams arrived there by air. They provided unloading of infantry, various weapons and equipment. According to this scheme, the Germans captured the Forneby airfields in Oslo and Sola in Stavanger. The landing in Sol, however, was not particularly successful - all the Norwegian planes flew north literally a few minutes before the arrival of the German transport workers. But the paratroopers managed to prevent the explosion of an important bridge in Vordingborg.

Later, units quickly moving north were also supplied by air. About 160 tons of fuel alone were transported. Reinforcements were also transported by plane. In this case, we had to sit down on any more or less suitable platforms. On April 14, the Norwegian Fokker C.V biplane discovered 11 Junkers on the ice of Lake Hartvigvann, which landed a unit of mountain rangers. These planes from group KGrzbV 102 were stuck on the lake due to lack of fuel for the return trip. Six Fokkers dropped bombs on them, but missed - only a few transporters were damaged by shrapnel. After refueling, the Norwegians carried out a second raid on stationary vehicles. This time two of them were burned and four more were damaged. By April 16, the Germans were able to deliver a certain amount of fuel to the lake, but the Norwegian pilots with a new blow destroyed three aircraft and completely disabled five. One "junker" managed to fly away, but the pilot got lost and landed in Sweden, where the car was interned. Soon the ice melted, and all the other planes sank to the bottom.

In total, during the Norwegian campaign, the Ju 52/3m transported more than 29,000 people, 2,414 tons of various cargo, plus 118 tons of aviation gasoline for aircraft at forward airfields.

The next step of Hitler's strategists was an offensive in the west. According to the Gelb plan, the main attack on France was delivered through Belgium and the Netherlands. Airborne troops played an important role in the capture of strategic objects. The landing of parachute, glider and landing troops was provided by about 430 Ju 52/3m, combined into seven air groups.

The operation began on May 10, 1940. In Belgium, the Germans set the task of capturing an important transport hub in the Maastricht area. There were three bridges over the Albert Canal - at Veldweselt, Vroenhofen and Cann. All of them were controlled from Fort Eben-Emael - a powerful modern defensive structure.

Early in the morning, 11 Junkers delivered nine DFS 230 landing gliders to the target; two became detached along the way due to problems. The gliders landed right in the fort's courtyard. The paratroopers pierced the armored caps of the gun turrets with shaped charges and threw grenades at the artillerymen. The Germans managed to paralyze the fort until the approach of motorized units. Paratroopers landing from other aircraft captured two of the three bridges.

Landing assaults were widely used in the Netherlands. The Junkers landed directly at Dutch Air Force airfields, airports, and even on wide highways. The first to appear were Luftwaffe fighters and bombers, destroying enemy aircraft and suppressing anti-aircraft weapons. Immediately after this, transport workers came to land. The infantry was unloaded under fire, often while continuing to steer along the runway. Along with the soldiers, machine guns, small cannons, and small-caliber anti-aircraft guns were delivered by air. Dutch aircraft diligently stormed airfields captured by the Germans. For example, on May 10, 11 Dutch planes stormed Ypenburg and Valkenburg, where, according to intelligence data, up to 50 Junkers had accumulated. They dropped bombs on the parking lots and machine-gunned the transport vehicles and landing forces. The Dutch lost five vehicles, but many Junkers were left to burn out on the ground.

The enemy fighters also took a beating. On the morning of May 10, several Fokker D.XXI monoplanes intercepted 55 Ju 52/3m from group KGrbzV 9. Dutch pilots shot down 18 vehicles one after another; The anti-aircraft gunners also made their contribution.

All landing operations in the Netherlands, including the capture of bridges over the Meuse at Dordrecht, were generally successful. But the losses were enormous. Some groups lost up to 40% of their members. In total, the Luftwaffe lost 162 Junkers. Since the damaged vehicles remained in the hands of the Germans, some of them were restored. Out of two or three, one plane was assembled. A total of 53 transporters were repaired.

The aircraft fleet was restored due to new production and requisition of aircraft from Lufthansa. However, most

The battered squadron KGzbV 1 had to be temporarily disbanded, as well as groups KGrzbV 11, 12 and 101. In total, the Germans lost 242 Ju 52/3m before the French surrender in June 1940.

Three-engine Junkers were used in World War II not only by the Germans and their allies, but also by their opponents. After the declaration of war, the South African Air Force requisitioned 11 Ju 52/3mge from South African Airways. They became part of a bomber-transport group assembled from former passenger aircraft.

In the fall of 1940, South African soldiers were transferred to them to the border with Somalia. Then, already as part of the 50th squadron, the Junkers provided supplies to the troops advancing to the north and transported the wounded. They also periodically made flights to South Africa and Egypt. In 1942, the squadron was re-equipped with American C-47s.

In October 1940, Mussolini asked Hitler for help. He needed planes to transport troops to Albania. Italy, which at that time belonged to Albania, used it as a springboard for an attack on Greece. But the Greeks not only repelled the attack, but also launched an offensive themselves. The Fuhrer came to the aid of his hapless ally.

One group of Junkers (53 vehicles) was sent to Foggia in eastern Italy. On December 9, German planes began flying from there to Tirana. In 50 days they transported 30,000 soldiers and 4,700 tons of cargo. Return flights brought 8,346 wounded.

Since the flights were carried out far from the front, the Germans had no losses.

German transport aircraft returned to the Mediterranean at the beginning of 1941. From February they began transporting to Libya for Rommel's Afrika Korps. The Ju 52/3m group was stationed at Comiso airfield in Sicily. The planes made up to three flights a day, with crews staying in the air for up to 12 hours. Up to 1,000 people and 25 tons of cargo were transported across the Mediterranean every day. British fighters diligently hunted for leisurely transporters, and the Germans constantly suffered significant losses.

On April 6, 1941, Germany attacked Yugoslavia and Greece. In preparation for this campaign, three new transport groups were formed. They, along with other units, were concentrated in Plovdiv (Bulgaria), uniting into the XI Air Corps. From there, some of the planes flew to Larissa in northern Greece, which had already been captured by the Germans. There we refueled and took the landing party on board.

The task was to capture the bridge over the Corinth Canal. The operation involved six tugboats with gliders and 40 Junkers with paratroopers. The parachute landing captured the surrounding heights and took up defensive positions. The glider pilots had to take the bridge itself. One of the gliders crashed into an abutment and crashed; the rest landed safely. The paratroopers managed to disarm the guards, but an English battery opened fire on the bridge. The shell hit the explosives embedded in the support, and the bridge flew into the air.

The largest airborne operation carried out by the Germans in World War II was, of course, the occupation of Fr. Crete. For this purpose, ten transport groups were assembled plus a separate squadron of glider towing aircraft (also on Ju 52/3m) - a total of 493 serviceable vehicles.

Early in the morning of May 20, 1941, after being hit by bombers, the DFS 230 gliders detached from the towing vehicles and began to land in the intended locations. The main task of the first wave was to destroy anti-aircraft batteries. This was followed by the landing of paratroopers. They were thrown out in four places. In total, 10,000 people parachuted. This was not seen even during the pre-war maneuvers of the Red Army. Paratroopers were shot in the air, and on the ground they immediately had to engage in battle with English and Greek soldiers. The losses were very great.

By the end of the second day of fighting, paratroopers captured Maleme airfield. Although he was bombarded by artillery, the Junkers landed one after another, unloading the 5th Mountain Ranger Division. The damaged planes were on fire, they were extinguished, the wreckage was pulled aside and new aircraft were accepted. Aviation delivered everything necessary to the island - ammunition, food, medicine, as well as heavy weapons and vehicles. In total, more than 13,000 soldiers, 353 guns and 771 motorcycles were transferred to Crete during the landing. The latter were partially transported on an external sling between the landing gear.

The island was captured, but at the cost of heavy losses. By 31 May, only 185 serviceable aircraft remained in the XI Air Corps, that is, less than half of the original strength. Some groups had to be disbanded again. By the time of the attack on the USSR, German transport aviation had not yet managed to fully restore its combat effectiveness.

On June 22, 1941, German troops crossed the border of the Soviet Union. Large airborne assaults were not planned here, but the rapid advance to the east often forced them to resort to supplying advanced units with aviation. The four transport groups sent to the territory of the USSR were clearly not enough. Already in December, Hitler ordered the formation of five new groups specifically for the Eastern Front. The personnel for them were assembled from instructors and cadets of flight schools.

In early 1942, the Red Army broke through the front south of Lake Ilmen and encircled General von Busch's 16th Army. There were about 100,000 German soldiers and officers in the “cauldron” near Demyansk. The group of Lieutenant General von Seydlitz rushed to the rescue. She managed to break through the narrow, 4 km wide, “Ramushevsky Corridor” (passing through the village of Ramushevo). It was completely covered by Soviet artillery. It was possible to supply those surrounded only by air. The Germans collected suitable aircraft along the entire front, pulled them from the rear, and even transferred a group of KGrzbV 500 from the Mediterranean theater. But this was not enough. In Germany, five groups were hastily completed, two of which received Ju 52/3m, and in another two they were combined with obsolete bombers.

On February 20, 1942, the first four Junkers landed in Demyansk. Only before landing, intense anti-aircraft fire cut off the pursuing Soviet fighters. The entire armada began to travel between Demyansk and the airfields outside the encirclement. In the Kholm area, cargo was dropped by parachute.

At first, German planes flew in small groups and individually, constantly changing routes. They were awaited by ambushes by anti-aircraft gunners and fighters deployed to the forward sites. The 161st Fighter Aviation Regiment alone shot down 12 Junkers in a short time, including Lieutenant Usenko who destroyed three vehicles in one sortie. The transport workers were hunted not only by our fighters, but also by bombers and attack aircraft. IL-2s quite successfully dealt with clumsy three-engine aircraft with cannon fire. The stormtroopers went hunting for the Junkers one at a time or in small groups. Protected by powerful armor in front, the pilots, not paying attention to the fire of the enemy shooter, shot at the transport vehicles from cannons at point-blank range. Sergeant Ryaboshapka shot down four enemy aircraft in a short period. The record was set by senior lieutenant V. Oleinik, who accounted for six Junkers destroyed in the air and eight on the ground. German vehicles loaded with ammunition or fuel often exploded in the air. Sometimes attack aircraft worked as “beaters,” directing groups of transport workers under attacks from our fighters.

Fleeing from the air threat, German pilots began to fly close to the ground, descending to 15–20 m. But there the planes came under intense small arms fire. The passengers fired back from machine guns and threw hand grenades. But soon heavy losses forced the Germans to take a detour route. They spent more fuel on it, but the route ran over snow-covered forests, bypassing populated areas and roads. The encirclement flew out into the ring in the evening and returned at dawn. The Soviet 6th Air Army concentrated its efforts on attacks on airfields in the Demyansk area. After a large group of transport workers was discovered at some site during the day, at night it became a target for U-2 biplanes, which pelted it with incendiary ampoules. Twin-engine bombers were guided by the fires, using high-explosive bombs to disable the airfield. When in the morning the German airfield teams hastily filled up the craters and removed the burned-out aircraft, our Il-2 attack aircraft appeared and dispersed the workers with machine-gun fire and at the same time shot at the equipment on the field. After such a combined attack, the airfield was usually inactive for several days. This tactic also ensured significant enemy losses in equipment. At the Glebovshchina airfield, aerial photography showed up to 70 crashed aircraft.

On the one hand, by the end of April, the Germans managed to deliver more than 65,000 tons of various cargo to the encircled, transport 30,500 reinforcements and evacuate 35,400 wounded. On the other hand, they lost 265 aircraft, mostly Ju 52/3m. According to Soviet data, attack aircraft alone shot down more than 60 Junkers from March to November 1942. Nevertheless, the “air bridge” saved the 16th Army. In March 1943, she managed to break through to her own people. At airfields in the Demyansk area, the enemy abandoned 78 damaged aircraft, mostly transport ones.

Another big problem for the German command was the supply of the Afrika Korps. The Allied navy and air force interfered with shipping between Italy and the North African coast. At the same time, everything needed had to be delivered from Europe. The more important transportation by air became.

The transport aviation forces stationed in Italy and Greece were constantly growing. Junkers usually flew across the Mediterranean in large groups (up to 25–30 aircraft) in tight formation at low altitude. As a rule, there was no fighter cover along the route. To increase the defense capability of the groups, they began to include “Waffentregers” - converted Ju 52/3mg4e with enhanced weapons. All vehicles of this type belonged to group 11/KGzbV 1.

When in November 1942, under pressure from the British, the Italian army and the Afrika Korps rolled back, and the Allies landed in Algeria, the time had come to organize an “air bridge” to Tunisia. But no matter how hard the Germans tried, they failed to ensure a full supply of neither their units, nor even the Italians. They only lost a large number of aircraft. But these losses could not be compared with what they lost during the Battle of Stalingrad...

On November 19, Soviet troops closed the ring around Paulus's 6th Army that had entered Stalingrad. Those surrounded needed to deliver approximately 750 tons of various cargo per day. Goering promised the Fuhrer to do this. A large number of aircraft were concentrated at the Morozovskaya and Tatsinskaya airfields to the west of the city. These included 375 Ju 52/3m.

They began to fly to sites inside the encirclement ring. Mass transportation began on November 23. We flew during the day. Transport workers acted in small groups and individually. Sometimes they were accompanied by fighters, but more often not: there were no longer enough fighters for all of them. The destruction of transport aircraft became the main task of Soviet pilots and anti-aircraft artillery. They shot down up to 30–50 vehicles a day, about a third of all those flying across the front line. Thus, four Soviet fighters caught a group of 17 Ju 52/3m and four Bf 109 fighters at Bolshaya Rossoshka. The unexpected attack deprived the Germans of five Junkers and one Messerschmitt.

Heavy losses forced the enemy to change tactics. Small groups with strong cover were sent forward, distracting the Soviet fighters, followed by the rest of the vehicles. Having lost air superiority, the Germans began to fly late in the evening and early in the morning, as well as in poor visibility conditions, camouflaged by cloud cover. Enemy fighters only covered takeoff and landing inside the ring. Since mid-December, transport workers have stopped flying during the day altogether.

Soviet aviation destroyed transport aircraft at airfields as well. Tatsinskaya and Morozovskaya were regularly bombed. Every day they bombed and stormed all the sites in Stalingrad several times. Long-Range Aviation regiments worked at night, as well as light night bombers and pairs of U-2 illuminator aircraft and Il-2 attack aircraft. On November 30, 15 Junkers were burned on the ground, on December 1 - 13, on December 10 - 31 (including 22 at the Basargino airfield), on December 11 - 58! On December 30, six dive bombers from the 35th Guards Bomber Regiment destroyed about 20 aircraft in Tormosin.

The Germans managed to deliver no more than 90 tons of cargo to the city daily. This was clearly not enough. The encirclement ring was shrinking. The airfields were captured by Soviet troops one after another. The Junkers took off and landed on them until the last moment, until the tanks burst onto the airfield. In the end, the 6th Army had only one airfield left at its disposal - Pitomnik, cluttered with broken planes. Our pilots managed to thwart the enemy's attempts to evacuate the command staff. Thus, in one of the downed Ju 52/3m officers of the headquarters of the 376th Infantry Division, led by its commander, were killed.

By January 11, 1943, the enemy, at the cost of huge losses, managed to deliver only 5,227 tons of cargo to Stalingrad. When transport planes lost the ability to land, they began to drop cargo with or without parachutes. The “parcels” often fell in the wrong place and were happily picked up by the Red Army soldiers. More than half of the discharged “arrived” for other purposes. There was a case when a bag with orders fell right in a camp for German prisoners of war.

By the time Paulus gave the order to surrender on February 2, 1943, the Luftwaffe had lost 266 Junkers and more than 1,000 aircrew. It is interesting that ours assessed their successes a little more modestly - 250 Ju 52/3m destroyed and captured. All airfields near Stalingrad were littered with abandoned aircraft of varying degrees of serviceability. More than 40 of them were counted in Bolshaya Rossoshka alone, and 17 in Basargino. While retreating, the Germans tried to disable vehicles that could not take off. Sometimes planes that looked serviceable were mined. Some of the captured Junkers were later restored and used in the rear.

All further major operations of German military transport aviation were associated with the Eastern Front, or rather with attempts to provide supplies to one or the other surrounded group. After Stalingrad, it was never able to restore its former power. In May 1943, the Luftwaffe had five transport squadrons, four of which were armed with Ju 52/3m.

In the spring of 1943, the Junkers were used to transport soldiers of the 17th Army from the Kuban. Then they had to deliver goods to the blocked Crimea. To do this, the TG 2 squadron was transferred from the Mediterranean Sea, which became unnecessary there after the defeat of the Axis forces in North Africa.

In April 1943, the Ju 52/3m was used for the last time as bombers. During the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, they dropped bombs and leaflets on the city.

In March - April of the following year, four groups of Junkers tried to deliver the necessary supplies to units of the 1st Tank Army, driven into a "sack" near Kamenets-Podolsky. In May, the Germans organized an airborne assault for the last time. Paratroopers landed near the Yugoslav city of Drvar tried to capture the headquarters of Tito's partisans, but were unsuccessful; Soviet pilots took him to Italy.

Since the summer of 1944, the activity of German transport aviation began to decline - there was not enough fuel. But sporadic attempts to help those surrounded continued. In January 1945, the Junkers broke through into besieged Budapest. The last significant operation was the "air bridge" in Breslau in February - April of the same year. We have only flown here at night. Nevertheless, the Germans lost 165 vehicles (not only the Ju 52/3m type).

The Junkers also tried to fly to besieged Berlin. On April 29, an aircraft from the TG 3 squadron dropped cargo in the area of ​​the Reich Chancellery.

On April 25, the Luftwaffe still had 190 Ju 52/3m. Our pilots continued to come across them even after the official surrender of Germany. On May 8, Captain Dobrov and Senior Lieutenant Struchalin discovered two Junkers near Fr. Bornholm. They were heading towards Sweden. One transport ship was shot down, however, Dobrov’s “yak” also received damage from return fire. The next day D.A. Matveev from the 486th Fighter Regiment shot a Junker in the Brno region in Czechoslovakia. This may have been the last Ju 52/3m destroyed in World War II.

After the surrender, the allied armies received about 140 vehicles in various conditions.

“Mausi” - “mice”, this is the nickname the Ju 52/3m (MS) minesweepers received from German pilots. They were first used in combat conditions in September 1940 off the Dutch coast. The planes were supposed to destroy magnetic bottom mines dropped by British bombers.

Soon six squadrons of minesweepers were put into operation, operating in the North, Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas, as well as off the Atlantic coast of France. After the enemy acquired mines with acoustic fuses, the squadrons began to consist half of vehicles with magnetic windings and half of carriers of “K” containers.

The usual Mausi tactics looked like this. A flight of aircraft with magnetic windings walked in a wedge at a height of 10 to 40 m above the water. They were followed at intervals of 200 m by a squad with demolition charges.

In November 1943, the Luftwaffe had 74 minesweepers, united in the Mine Sweeping Group. Soviet pilots met them over the Black Sea more than once in 1943–1944. near the mouth of the Danube. At the end of November 1943, Il-2 shot down one Ju 52/3m (MS) in the Ochakov area.

In April 1944, six aircraft of this type were sent to Hungary, where they trawled the Danube. Since the beginning of 1945, most of the Mausi were laid up due to a lack of fuel.

The first six Ju 52/3m arrived in Hungary in 1937. They were operated by the Malert airline. During the war they were transferred to the Air Force, to the 2nd Transport Squadron. In the summer of 1942 they worked on the Don, providing transportation for the 2nd Hungarian Army. In September, one Ju 52/3mg7e transferred by the Germans was added to them. For the most part, these planes were engaged in evacuating the wounded. In October 1944, five Hungarian Junkers burned American Mustangs at Bergend airfield. The last aircraft remaining with the Hungarians in December of the same year took part in transportation to Budapest, surrounded by Soviet troops.

The Germans sold a total of 33 Ju 52/3m to Romania. The first of them arrived in November 1941. In the winter of 1941/42, our pilots came across them near Stalingrad. Some of them were shot down. At the beginning of 1944, Junkers transported Romanian soldiers and officers from the blockaded Crimea. After Romania defected to the Allies in August of that year, the Romanians captured German planes located at their airfields. Among them were 11 Ju 52/3m; six of them were later taken to the USSR. In Romania, the last Junkers were in service until the early 1960s.

In 1940, the Italian Air Force requisitioned the Ju 52/3mlu of the Ala Littoria airline. It was used as a military transport. In September 1943, after a coup in Italy, the car was captured by the Germans. For some time she served at Lufthansa.

Bulgaria acquired two Ju 52/3mg4e in 1939. Although they were registered as civilian, they were actually used by the Air Force. In 1943, two Ju 52/3mg10e were added to them. In September 1944, Bulgaria declared war on Germany. A month later, a group of Bulgarian troops was surrounded by the Germans in the Ratunda-Drenyak area.

The planes delivered various cargoes to the surrounded people. Bulgarian Junkers made 13 sorties and dropped 14 tons of food and ammunition. In Bulgaria, Ju 52/3m were operated until the mid-1950s.

As already mentioned, at the end of 1936 the Spanish Republicans managed to capture a practically intact Ju 52/3mg3e. In January of the following year he was already near Moscow, at the airfield of the Air Force Research Institute. Our vehicle received the camouflage designation DB-29 (or DB-29-3M-BMW). There was snow, and they began to adapt skis from TB-1 to the plane. After the test flight, the shock absorbers had to be strengthened. By March 10, the Junkers had already completed five flights.

Captain Stefanovsky was appointed as the lead pilot, and 3rd rank military engineer Antokhin and Captain Datsko also flew with him. In addition to them, the Junkers were tested by more than a dozen pilots, including the head of the research institute, division commander Bazhanov. In total, the vehicle made 70 flights with a total duration of 32 hours and 45 minutes.

The tests ended in May. In general, the aircraft was considered obsolete. Although at low altitudes the DB-29 was slightly superior in speed and climb rate to the TB-3 with M-34RN engines, its flight data was considered insufficient for a modern bomber. At the same time, they noted the ease of piloting and the availability of the machine for pilots below average qualifications. The report states: “The aircraft is very reliable and very easy to operate both on the ground and in the air.”

The Junker could be quickly disassembled into units; numerous hatches provided access to parts that needed to be checked, adjusted or lubricated. Gas tanks were easily removed from the wing through large hatches. It took only 15 minutes to fill the car with fuel, and even less with oil. If necessary, gasoline was quickly drained in flight through special valves. To prevent splashes from getting on the wing, canvas sleeves fell out under the necks. In general, 55 new products were found on the Junkers, which were considered useful for the domestic aircraft industry. We noted the successful design of welded gas tanks, wheels and their brakes, chassis shock absorbers, and many elements of electrical equipment.

The bomber's defense capability was tested in air battles with both fighters and SB and DB-3 bombers. All of them could easily catch up with the slow-moving and not very maneuverable car. The “German” had many angles that could not be shot through from which he could be attacked. The Ju 52/3m's armament was generally considered completely obsolete.

The testers' conclusion was: "Despite the outdated design of the aircraft as a whole, it deserves special attention."

After the tests, the head of the Air Force Alksnis gave the order: “The aircraft should be preserved as an exhibit for further study by employees of serial aircraft manufacturing plants and the designers of these factories...” The machine arrived at plant No. 156 in Moscow, where it was disassembled, measured and carefully studied.

Passenger Ju 52/3m were not new to Moscow - they regularly landed at the Central Airfield. Military vehicles met our Red Army soldiers again in Poland. Our mechanics even dismantled one of them themselves before returning it to the Germans.

After the Baltic republics joined the Soviet Union, two Ju 52/3m of the Estonian airline AGO entered the fleet of the Baltic Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet. We began to call them Yu-52. They were operated for some time on the Riga - Velikiye Luki - Moscow line.

Luftwaffe planes, just like Soviet ones, violated the border from time to time. So, on July 28, 1940, a single Junker passed over Kaunas. Two I-15bis flights from the 31st Fighter Aviation Regiment took off to intercept. In the area of ​​​​Mariampol, the German vehicle was overtaken and fired several warning bursts, after which the Ju 52/3m went towards the border.

At the end of 1940, the Soviet Union ordered 10 Junkers in a cargo version from Germany. In February - April of the following year, three of them flew around and were accepted. But these machines did not arrive in the USSR. This was due to the fact that the delegation led by I.F. Petrov, having become acquainted with the Ju 52/3m in Germany, converted into a flying laboratory for testing engines, asked for five of the ten ordered machines to be delivered in this version. The company agreed to finalize only one aircraft with a deadline of October 1941.

After the start of the war, two Baltic Junkers were evacuated to Siberia, where they were used on the Moscow-Irkutsk air route. On July 14, 1942, the head of the Main Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet B.C. Molokov sent a letter to Stalin asking for permission to use captured German aircraft in the rear. In October of the same year, the first Junker was added to Aeroflot’s fleet, and a month later another one. But due to a shortage of spare parts, only two of the four Yu-52s could fly. All four vehicles at that time were registered with the West Siberian Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet (the highway directorate was disbanded).

But early next year the situation changed dramatically. Many German transport aircraft were captured at Stalingrad. Brigades were sent there from air bases to select and carry out initial repairs of vehicles. Upon closer examination, the Junkers turned out to be not as serviceable as it seemed to the infantrymen and tankmen who captured them. The fuselages, wings and engines were in their places, but the tires were punctured, the engines were faulty, and there were not enough instruments and radio stations. And standing for a long time under the snow did not benefit the technology.

The most suitable Yu-52s were brought “to condition” right on the spot, fortunately there were enough spare parts around. What was not on one plane was on the other. On April 1, 1943, the Civil Air Fleet already had 14 Junkers, and the NKAP had another German transporter. 11 of them were concentrated in the Moscow department. Of the subsequent receipts, three more Yu-52s were given to the NKAP and two to an exhibition of trophies deployed in the Central Park of Culture and Leisure named after. Gorky in Moscow.

Soviet radio stations MRK-005 appeared on some Junkers (only where German ones were absent). The tires were used from TB-3, the skis from Li-2. One aircraft was equipped with a tail wheel from an Il-4.

Meanwhile, the collection of trophies continued. In May 1943, air repair base No. 405 sent a brigade led by engineer Pevzner to Stalingrad. A total of 29 cars were selected. 15 were considered suitable for restoration, and the rest were taken for spare parts. Aircraft repair bases No. 401, 403, 405 and plant No. 243 were involved in the repair of the Junkers.

Major alterations occurred at base No. 405, which was considered the lead base. Among them, mention should be made of the project of replacing three BMW 132 engines with two domestic ASh-62IR. The drawings were developed by engineers at base No. 405, and an experimental motor mount was also manufactured there. By September 28, 1943, its static tests were completed. In October - November, one Junkers aircraft was converted to a pair of ASh-62IR, but it is not known whether it was completed.

Since the end of spring 1943, Yu-52 began to be widely used for transportation in the European part of the USSR. At first, they acted on air defense services like a red rag on a bull. When a characteristic silhouette appeared, gunfire immediately opened. On April 29, anti-aircraft artillery fired at a plane flying from Syzran to Kuibyshev. It all worked out - no casualties, no holes. But on May 12, a Yu-52 coming from Chelyabinsk came under fire near a bridge in Ulyanovsk. The plane made an emergency landing at Strigino airfield. Mechanics found two significant holes in the right wing. Such cases were not isolated.

Many planes were idle due to lack of rubber. As of October 25, the Civil Air Fleet had 31 Yu-52s, including 23 serviceable ones, but six of them turned out to be “unshoeed.” It was even proposed to replace the German wheels with wheels from the Li-2. A set of drawings was completed at base No. 405. True, things didn’t go any further.

On September 21, Aeroflot resumed regular service on a number of airlines. Yu-52 operated on the Sverdlovsk-Krasnoyarsk and Kuibyshev-Tashkent-Alma-Ata routes.

By winter, the Junkers were put on skis. The skis were different: from Li-2 (they were installed on base No. 405), and from TB-1, and special ones. The latter were developed at the Civil Air Fleet Research Institute. They were first installed on the L-23 aircraft in October 1943.

For 1943, the goal was to obtain 25 Yu-52. The plan was exceeded: according to documents from the Civil Aviation Air Force, 27 Junkers were delivered. As of January 1, 29 Ju-52s were in service (including 21 serviceable). We only lost one. On October 24, 1943, a plane with the number L-37 crashed and burned at Asha station. The crew died.

As the situation at the front changed, more and more trophies became available. Junkers continued to be supplied to the Civil Air Fleet, making up for relatively small losses (in 1944 they lost three aircraft, in 1945 - two). The number of vehicles gradually grew, but there was never such a quantitative leap as after the Battle of Stalingrad. On June 1, 1944 there were 30 of them, on January 1, 1945 - 31.

According to the GKO decree of December 12, 1944, all captured Yu-52s were subject to surrender to the Civil Air Fleet. But there were also exceptions. One “junker” served for quite a long time in the medical detachment of the Baltic Fleet Air Force. Three flying minesweepers were used after the Black Sea war. They destroyed magnetic mines off the coast of Crimea, in the Odessa region and at the mouth of the Danube.

But most of the trophies still went to civil aviation. After the surrender of Germany, planes, engines, various equipment and spare parts were sent in trains to the Soviet Union. By October 1, 1945, the Civil Air Fleet fleet already included 37 Junkers. Of these, five perfectly serviceable aircraft arrived from Romania - they were seized by order of the Allied Control Commission.

Now the Junkers worked not only in the Moscow department. Already in 1944, the Civil Air Fleet, which had significantly replenished its personnel with Li-2s and American S-47s, could afford to equip rear units with new vehicles. They began to push the Yu-52 to the outskirts of the country. Seven aircraft were sent to Turkmenistan to transport sulfur. They had to replace the outdated and extremely worn-out G-2. Four Yu-52s had been working there since the end of 1944. Or rather, three were working - the fourth was waiting a long time for new engines. One of these planes (pilot Borovoy) crashed on March 15, 1945 during an emergency landing on two engines.

Two cars arrived in Yakutia. Two planes in Tajikistan served the line to Kulyab. Among the pilots there were two women. One of them, Komissarova, died in a disaster in 1945.

In Central Asia, the Yu-52 motor unit was modified. German engines suffered greatly from sand dust. Even in winter, the piston rings wore out within 15–20 flight hours. In early June 1945, air filters designed by the Civil Air Fleet Research Institute were installed on the right and middle engines of the L-68 aircraft. On the left, at the suggestion of local craftsmen, the suction pipe was installed not under the engine nacelle, but above it. After successful tests on the Ashgabat - Tashauz and Ashgabat - Darvaza lines, the middle engines on all aircraft in Turkmenistan were equipped with new suction pipes. Later, another version of the pipe appeared, tested on the L-35.

The last Yu-52 entered the Civil Air Fleet in 1946. After the Li-2 and S-47, freed from front service, entered service, there was no longer a great need to use German aircraft. On June 28, 1947, an order was issued by the head of the Civil Air Fleet Main Directorate on the decommissioning and further use of captured equipment. After defect detection, nine of the most worn-out Yu-52s were written off by the end of the year, and another one crashed in an accident. On December 1, there were a total of 23 Junkers. From now on, they were prescribed to be used only as cargo in remote areas. For example, in the East Siberian Directorate, Yu-52 entered the 10th transport detachment and began transporting food to the mines.

In 1948, ten more Junkers disappeared from the lists. According to the results of the census of the aircraft fleet carried out in May, two aircraft remained in stock - one was waiting to be written off, the second was flying its resource in Eastern Siberia. As of June 1, there was only one Yu-52 on the lists. By the end of the year he was gone too.

Captured Junkers were also operated by departmental aviation. In June - August 1945, the crews of the Moscow group of the Polar Aviation Administration (UPA) transported one aircraft on wheels and one on floats from Germany. At plant No. 477 in Krasnoyarsk, a cabin heating system and new engine hoods were designed for them. We designed, manufactured and tested skis with “positive results”. "Junker" with the number N-380 served for quite a long time in the Igara air group. During 1946, polar Yu-52s flew 351 hours. The last of them was written off at the beginning of 1949.

The NKAP (later MAP) also had German aircraft. The People's Commissariat received the first Yu-52 at the beginning of 1943. These vehicles ensured the urgent transportation of components from one plant to another. In April 1947, the ministry had six Junkers; later the fleet was increased due to the transfer of equipment from the Civil Air Fleet and the Air Force. On October 1 of the same year, it already included ten Yu-52s. Their write-off began next year. On January 1, 1950, five vehicles remained in service. All of them were written off in the 1st quarter of next year.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs had a certain number of aircraft. They served camps in remote areas. For example, in April 1947, two Ju-52s worked in the air squad of the Norilsk plant (subordinate to the Main Directorate of Metallurgical Industry Camps). But even here they tried to get rid of them. By April 1949, there was only one Junker left in the Ministry of Internal Affairs system; at the beginning of 1950, that too was written off.

The Ministry of Fishery Industry of the Western Regions in April 1947 had one aircraft based at the Izmailovsky airfield in Moscow. By the beginning of 1949, three such machines were operated by the Sevryba trust in Arkhangelsk. By April 1, only one of them was flying.

By 1951, not a single Yu-52 remained in Soviet aviation.

In November 1936, the Portuguese government approached Berlin with a request to sell ten Junkers. The Germans supplied them with a batch of Ju 52/3mg3e under the designation Ju 52K. The vehicles were delivered by sea from Hamburg in 1937. They were armed with a bomber squadron at the Sintra airfield. This unit was later transferred to the Azores, where it was disbanded in January 1944. The planes flew to the mainland and were mothballed at the Ota base.

In September 1950, the Portuguese acquired two captured Ju 52/3mg7e from Norway. The planes were transported by air through Copenhagen and Brussels. At the end of 1960, the park was replenished with 15 French AAS.1. The cars were received in Oran (Algeria), and then they flew to Lisbon with an intermediate landing in Seville. These Junkers served as transport ships. They were also used to train parachutists. The last of them “survived” until 1968.

In October 1939, three Ju 52/3mg4e were sold to Switzerland. The planes were intended for training in air navigation, but were also used as transport ones. After the war, they were fitted with main wheels from the AAS.1, and the tail wheels were replaced with nose wheels from the British Vampire fighters. The Swiss Junkers were the last to be used in military aviation. In September 1982, they were sold to a company in Germany, which uses these rare machines for demonstration flights.

The Second World War ended, but the Ju 52/3m still had the chance to take part in several local conflicts. French Toucans fought in Indochina. In February 1946, the GT I/34 Bearn squadron arrived at Bien Hoa airfield (northwest of Saigon). It included 16 AAS.1. The vehicles were equipped with bomb racks under the center section and consoles. Toucans were used to support troops on the ground. In addition to bombs, they carried canisters with a flammable mixture, which they simply threw out of the doors. The aircraft have proven themselves in terms of reliability and ease of maintenance.

In the summer of 1946, the squadron took part in several parachute landings - in Luang Prabang (Laos) and north of Haiphong. In December of the same year, its planes supported the advance of French troops towards Hanoi, and on January 6, 1947, they carried out a landing at Nam Dinh. The paratroopers were supposed to capture two bridgeheads for an amphibious landing, but anti-aircraft artillery fire scattered the transport planes, and with them the paratrooper units.

The landing of paratroopers at Hoa Binh in April of the same year was more successful, facilitating the capture of the city. The number of “toucans” in Indochina gradually increased. In May, two squadrons of these vehicles operated there. In October, another dozen AAS.1 were delivered on the deck of the aircraft carrier Diksmünde.

The planes were alternately used as transport aircraft and as bombers. On May 27, 1949, 30 Toucans dropped a parachute battalion at the Dong Khe post besieged by the Vietnamese. The post was successfully defended. But in October of the following year, two battalions had to be landed in the same area. The Vietnamese smashed them to smithereens. Despite air support (including AAS.1 with bombs), only 23 people emerged from the jungle. In January - May 1951, “ersatz bombers” actively worked near Hanoi.

The last combat operation of the Toucans was the landing at Hoa Binh on November 14, 1951. There they dropped three battalions. As auxiliary aircraft, the AAS.1 served in Indochina almost until the armistice was concluded in 1954.

In France, toucans were in service until the spring of 1960.

Spanish CASA 352 fought in Western Sahara. In February 1958, they dropped supplies to the Ifni garrison surrounded by partisans. There they landed a unit of paratroopers. Several vehicles were equipped with bomb racks and used to attack partisan positions. Spanish Junkers operated in Western Sahara until 1969. The process of removing them from service began in 1965, but the last aircraft of this type were decommissioned only in 1978.

After the war, the Ju 52/3m was used by civilian pilots in many countries. The British sold the captured vehicles to BEA. The Short factory in Belfast converted them into 12-passenger passenger cars by sewing up the cargo hatch on the starboard side and replacing the radio equipment. 11 aircraft operated on local routes in the UK, in particular on the London - Belfast route, until August 1948.

Float cars were flown in Sweden and Norway. The Swedish company SAS scrapped them only in 1956. Three former military Junkers served in Bulgaria on the Vrazhdebna - Burgas line. In Romania, the same aircraft were operated until 1947.

The Ju 52/3m lasted the longest in New Guinea. In 1955, Gibbs Sepik Airways bought three Junkers from Sweden. The company's owner, former military pilot Gibbs, personally flew the first plane to the town of Goroka in October. In January 1957, two more cars followed.

The planes were equipped with additional gas tanks, and the engines were replaced on site with Australian-made R-1340-SH-G (600 hp) and Hamilton Standard 3D40 three-blade propellers were installed. German vehicles were able to take off and land where the American C-47s could not. They carried passengers and cargo throughout New Guinea and occasionally flew to Australia. One plane crashed during a forced landing in October 1959, and two more were scrapped in April 1960.

Plan
Introduction
1 Plan Alternatives
2 Designation of strategic goals
3 OKH Plan of October 19, 1939
4 OKW remarks
5 OKH plan of October 29, 1939
6 Criticism of the OKH plan
7 Notes from Army Group A
8 Additions to the OKH plan
9 "Mechelen Incident"
10 "Long start"
11 OKH Plan of January 30, 1940
12 Military staff games
13 Manstein Plan
14 Criticism of Manstein's plan
15 Implementation of the Gelb plan
16 Notes
17 Sources

Introduction

Plan "Gelb" or Gelb-plan (German. Fall Gelb- Yellow Plan) is the code name of the German blitzkrieg plan against the countries of modern Benelux: Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, and France in 1940. It was later partially realized during Hitler's offensive known as the French Campaign. The plan became one of the stages of the “Phantom War”, which was skillfully used by the German command as a kind of strategic pause-respite. This allowed Germany to successfully complete the Polish campaign, implement the plan for the occupation of Denmark and Norway (Danish-Norwegian Operation), as well as prepare the invasion of France (the Gelb Plan itself), and finally consolidate the results of the Anschluss (annexation of Austria) and the capture of the Sudetenland.

1. Plan Alternatives

The first version of the Gelb military campaign, known as "OKH Plan", was rather theoretical, positional in nature. He was not destined to come true. Another option, known as the "Manstein Plan", was more successful and was successfully implemented on May 10, 1940 in the first phase of the French Campaign. The result of the plan was the occupation by German troops of the territories of Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg and northern France.

2. Designation of strategic goals

Development of an offensive against France began on September 27, 1939. At a meeting of commanders-in-chief and military headquarters, Hitler emphasized: “The goal of the war is to bring England to its knees, to defeat France.”

The plan was opposed by the commander-in-chief of the ground forces, Brauchitsch, and the chief of the general staff, Halder. They even prepared a plan to remove Hitler from power, but, not finding the support of the commander of the reserve army, General Fromm, abandoned the attempt.

On October 6, 1939, German troops completed the occupation of Poland, and on October 9, the “Message on the conduct of the war on the Western Front” was sent to the commanders of the armed forces, Brauchitsch, Goering and Raeder. This document, based on the concept of “blitzkrieg,” determined the strategic goals of the future campaign:

"3. ... for further conduct of military operations I order:

a) on the northern flank of the Western Front, prepare an offensive through the territories of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. It is necessary to attack with as many forces as possible and as quickly as possible; b) the goal of this operation is to destroy, if possible, large associations of the French army and the allies on its side, and at the same time seize as much territory as possible in Holland, Belgium and Western France in order to create a springboard for the successful conduct of an air and naval war against England and to expand the buffer zone of the vital Ruhr region."

"3. …Für die weitere Durchführung der Feindseligkeiten bestellt:

a) auf der nördlichen Flanke des westlichen Front bereiten Offensive teritorrii durch Luxemburg, Belgien und Holland. Die Offensive sollte so viel Kräfte wie möglich und so schnell wie möglich;b) Der Zweck dieser Maßnahme - zerstören die Möglichkeit der großen französischen Armee und Verbündete auf seiner Seite, und gleichzeitig zu nutzen, so viel Gebiet der Niederlande, Belgium and Westen Frankreichs zu schaffen, ein Sprungbrett für eine erfolgreiche Luft-und Seeweg Krieg gegen England und erweitern Sie den Puffer Die Umgebung von entscheidender Bedeutung Ruhrgebiet.”

The highest German generals reacted to Hitler's decree with doubt. One of the generals even shouted: “France is not Poland!” But, despite fears about the disastrous outcome of the operation, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Walter von Brauchitsch, ordered the General Staff (OKH) to develop "Gelb Directive on the Strategic Deployment of Troops" .

The basis for the operation plan by the command of the ground forces (OKH) was the Schlieffen plan of 1914, but unlike the Schlieffen plan, the OKH plan did not aim for complete victory in Flanders, but was exclusively positional in nature - its full implementation only led to the establishment of a positional front along the Somme River.

· Army Group "B" (Fedor von Bock) - 2nd, 4th and 6th armies (37 divisions)

· Army Group “A” (Gerd von Rundstedt) - 12th and 16th armies (27 divisions)

Army Group C (Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb) - 1st and 7th armies (25 divisions)

· Army Group “N” - 18th Army (3 divisions)

· Reserve - 9 divisions

The main blow was to be delivered by Army Group B on both sides of Liege with the goal of defeating the Anglo-French forces in Belgium along with the Belgian and Dutch armies. Army Group A will be located to the south. The 12th Army will cover the southern flank of Army Group B, the 16th Army will attack in the direction of southern Belgium and Luxembourg. After the march through Luxembourg, the 16th army should take up defensive positions north of the western flank of the Maginot Line between the Saar and Meuse. Army Group C will operate against the Maginot Line. Depending on the political climate, Army Group "N" was intended to defeat Holland. The directive ended with an order to Army Groups “A” and “B” to concentrate their troops in such a way that they could occupy exit positions for the offensive in six night marches.

4. OKW comments

On October 21, 1939, the commander of the Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW), Wilhelm Keitel, criticized Hitler about the “Gelb Plan.” They boiled down to the following:

· Army Group “N” has unreasonably large forces. She has equally little chance of breaking through the fortified Grebbe line.

· The left-flank 4th Army of Army Group B, advancing south of Liege, should strike to the west, and only as a last resort to the northwest.

· It is worth reconsidering the composition of the 6th Army, which strikes north of Liege. The three tank and one motorized divisions allocated to it are not enough to develop success.

· After the start of the offensive and the withdrawal of French troops from the Maginot Line, it will be possible to transfer ten divisions from Army Group C to strengthen the advancing group.

Thus, the headquarters of the operational leadership of the OKW proposed to further strengthen the northern flank, mainly with mobile troops.

In the strategic plan of October 29, 1939, a broader goal was set - to destroy the allied group in the area north of the Somme and reach the English Channel. The 18th Army was additionally included in Army Group B, and the number of its divisions increased to 43 (of which 9 were tank and 4 were motorized). The composition of Army Group A was reduced to 22, and Army Group C to 18 divisions. The liberated divisions strengthened the northern wing of the front. Army Group "B" received the task of breaking through with one strike group north of Liege, in the Brussels area, and with the other, south of Liege, in the area to the west of Namur, and then continue the offensive in a northwestern or southwestern direction. Army Group A had the supporting mission of covering Army Group B on the southern and southwestern flanks; Army Group C, as in the plan of October 19, occupied a position opposite the Maginot Line. The border with Holland was covered by the 6th Corps District, which was subordinate to Army Group B.

It was planned to complete the deployment by November 5th. On November 12, 1939, the offensive was to begin.

6. Criticism of the OKH plan

Adolf Hitler called the plan prepared by the OKH the height of mediocrity. At one of the meetings to discuss the operational plan, Hitler, addressing Keitel and Jodl, noted:

“So this is the old Schlieffen plan with a reinforced right flank and the main direction of attack along the Atlantic coast. Numbers like this don’t work twice!”

The repetition of Schlieffen's plan at the beginning of the century, an attack on France in a crescent-shaped movement through Belgium, did not suit him. In 1939 it was more obvious than in 1914 that if there was going to be any fighting between Germany and the Allies, it would be in Belgium, since the Maginot Line along the Franco-German border reliably protected France. Compared to the Maginot Line, the Belgian fortifications were very weak. Obviously, the French also understood this and expected such a development of events. However, although Hitler had a different point of view, he wanted the offensive operation to begin as quickly as possible:

“Time is on the enemy’s side... Our Achilles heel is the Ruhr... If England and France break through Belgium and Holland to the Ruhr, we will be in great danger.”

On November 5, Brauchitsch again tried to dissuade Hitler from invading France. Hitler, in turn, once again confirmed that the offensive must begin no later than November 12. However, on November 7, the order was canceled due to unfavorable meteorological conditions. The late start of the operation will be postponed another 29 times.

7. Notes from Army Group A

Even during the preparation of the OKH plan, the chief of staff of Army Group A under the command of Rundstedt, Erich von Manstein, noted that his plan was too obvious. Another drawback of the OKH plan, according to Manstein, was that German troops would have to face British units, which would definitely be a tougher enemy than the French. Moreover, this plan did not promise a decisive victory.

Pondering this problem, Manstein concluded that it would be better to deliver the main blow through the Ardennes in the direction of Sedan, which the Allies could not have expected. The main idea of ​​this plan was "lure". Manstein had no doubt that the Allies would definitely react to the invasion of Belgium. But by deploying their troops there, they will lose their free reserve (at least for several days), they will load the roads to capacity, and most importantly, they will weaken the Dinan-Sedan operational sector by “sliding north.”

Soldiers! The battle that begins today will determine the fate of the Reich and the nation for the next thousand years.

From the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces dated May 9, 1940

On the night of May 9-10, 1940, Hitler’s order to attack was read out in all companies and batteries of the German front stretching 650 kilometers from North Holland to the borders with Switzerland. At first light, the German Luftwaffe dropped thousands of tons of deadly cargo on enemy positions. And before the German infantry went forward, the earth shook from the volleys of thousands of batteries. After a three-hour artillery barrage, only charred earth, pitted with tens of thousands of deep craters, smoked in front of the German divisions...

75 divisions of Army Groups A and B, reinforced by the 22nd Airborne Division, concentrated in the direction of the main attack. 19 divisions of Army Group C opposed the French on the Maginot Line and did not take part in active hostilities in the first stage of the operation. Another 45 divisions (together with the Waffen SS divisions) were waiting in the wings in the first echelon of the reserve. Army Group "B" with its three armies launched an auxiliary attack in the north of Belgium and Holland, and Army Group "A" launched the main attack through Luxembourg - Southern Belgium - Ardennes department and, after crossing the Meuse, reach the lower reaches of the Somme, cutting off the existing enemy divisions in Belgium. A structured attack by German divisions was supposed to force the Anglo-French allies to retreat northward. After the defeat of the Belgian and Dutch armies, the dismemberment of the encirclement and the liquidation of part of the French army and the British Expeditionary Force, the second stage of the campaign was to begin - Operation Roth - a massive offensive of the German armed forces in a southern direction.

On the night of May 10, the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, reinforced by the 3rd Fuhrer Regiment of the SS Special Purpose Division, secretly advanced to the Dutch border. The main forces of the SS Special Purpose Division were stationed in the Munster area and were supposed to cross the Dutch border immediately after breaking through the border fortifications. The Death's Head division was in the OKH reserve and was camped near Kassel. The Waffen SS police division was also in reserve and was pulled behind the Rhine front of Army Group C.

WAFFEN SS IN HOLLAND

The small Dutch army was unable to adequately protect the 300-kilometer section of the German-Dutch border. An important component of the country's strategic defense were numerous canals and natural barriers - rivers. The relatively weakly fortified bridges and crossings in the border zone became increasingly powerful fortifications as they moved westward, turning into the insurmountable “Fortress Holland” on the last line of defense, which included Rotterdam, Amsterdam, The Hague, Utrecht and Leiden. There was a real danger that, as a last resort, the Dutch might open the floodgates on the coast, as the Belgians had already done in 1915. The German offensive plan was based on capturing the strategic crossings of the Meuse and the bridges at Maastricht between the Meuse and the Albert Canal. The implementation of this most important task was entrusted to the parachute units of the Luftwaffe and the landing units of the Wehrmacht.

The success of the German offensive in this direction was to be ensured by a battle group of about 4 divisions: 4,000 Luftwaffe paratroopers and 4 Wehrmacht glider regiments, an army tank division and 4 motorized Waffen SS regiments. The third-rate reserve - a cavalry division and 6 Landsturm infantry divisions - could not be taken into account. With air support, German troops had to break the resistance of the Dutch and occupy the key cities of “Fortress Holland”.

On May 9, 1940, at 21.00, army radio operators received a short radiogram - “Danzig”. The operation has begun.

The Leibstandarte occupied positions near the Dutch border town of De Poppe. Exactly at 5.30, in the pre-dawn twilight, the assault detachment of the Leibstandarte took the half-asleep Dutch border guards by surprise, cleared the bridge and took up a perimeter defense. A few minutes later, columns of SS transport trucks crossed the bridge. Simultaneously with the ground transport, military transport Yu-52/ZM took off with troops on board.

The Leibstandarte advanced with stunning speed and, by noon of the first day of the offensive, immediately took the administrative center of the province of Oberisel, the city of Zwolle, and two bridges over Issel. The sensational and practically bloodless success of German weapons was somewhat overshadowed by the fact that, fearing an airborne assault, the Dutch seriously damaged the crossings. However, this did not prevent the 3rd battalion of the Leibstandarte from crossing to the other side of the river in the Zuitfen area, capturing Hoven and 200 soldiers of its garrison. With a rapid forced march, the battalion advanced another 70 kilometers into Dutch territory and captured 127 prisoners of war. For this daring operation, the battalion commander, Obersturmführer Krasse, was awarded the Iron Cross, First Class, becoming the first Army Group B officer to earn the honor. The successes ended there, the Leibstandarte ran out of steam and stopped.

On May 11, 1940, the commander-in-chief of Army Group B, Fedor von Bock, transferred the SS division to the southern sector of the front.

Meanwhile, advancing in the vanguard of the 207th Infantry Division, the 3rd Fuhrer Regiment of the Waffen SS Special Purpose Division crossed Issel near Arnheim on May 10, crossed the Grebbe Line and turned to Utrecht.

On May 11, Gausser's 9th Panzer and SS Divisions entered the battle in the direction of the main attack. The only intact bridge over the Meuse was captured by commandos of the special sabotage unit of the military counterintelligence “Brandenburg-800”. On the eve of the invasion, on May 9 (at about 23.00) the saboteurs crossed the Dutch border in the Gennep area. At dawn, a column of “captured German prisoners of war” under heavy guard from the “Dutch” moved across the bridge. Having silently eliminated the sentries on the eastern side, the column moved on. One of the commandos, who was fluent in Dutch, warned the commander of the Dutch checkpoint on the western side by telephone that a column of prisoners of war was about to pass through and they should be allowed through unhindered... "Brandenburg" captured the bridge and held it until the approach of Gausser's tanks and motorized infantry, which proceeded deeper province of North Brabant.

As the German offensive developed, the Allies transferred almost all of their light divisions to Belgium in order to stop the Wehrmacht on the Antwerp-Breda line at all costs. When the commander of the 7th Army, French General Henri Giraud, learned that German paratroopers had captured the bridges near Moerdik, which were extremely important for maintaining communications between Belgium and “Fortress Holland,” he immediately decided to drive the Germans out of the bridgehead they had captured at any cost. On May 11, the French entered Breda, and Giraud sent two motorized regiments northeast and northwest of Moerdik with orders to liquidate the German group. This maneuver did not go unnoticed, and the commander of the 9th Panzer Division sent half of his tanks and a division of the Waffen SS to the southeast to prevent the development of the French counteroffensive, and he himself, with the remaining formations at his disposal, continued to move towards Moerdik, in the vicinity of which he was supposed to connect with a life trouser transferred from the north.

Giraud's two regiments were immediately discovered by aerial reconnaissance and scattered by a powerful air strike from Ju-87 Stukas dive bombers. On May 11, Giraud's main forces collided head-on with the 9th Panzer and Gausser's divisions. After fierce fighting on May 13, the French retreated to Roosendaal, and a day later their marching columns reached Antwerp. The Dutch were driven to the coast. This is how Brabant was cleared.

On May 12, the northern flank of the 9th tank division linked up with the German paratroopers holding the crossings near Moerdik and crossed the water barrier. Gradually, the German offensive became bogged down in the deeply echeloned Dutch defense. On May 14, Rotterdam, and with it “Fortress Holland,” was still holding out. OKH decided to withdraw the 9th Panzer Division and motorized units of the Waffen SS from Holland and transfer them to the French direction.

Before the start of the operation in Holland and Belgium, Hitler expressed the wish of the Luftwaffe to “show restraint and not bomb civilian objects unnecessarily” - a wish that is as good as it is impossible to implement in wartime conditions: if an OP is equipped on the roof of an apartment building or a machine gun is installed, then this no longer a civilian object, but a military target. On May 13, the transfer of the Leibstandarte was completed, and on May 14, Goering gave the order to bomb Rotterdam. “Sepp” Dietrich received an order “after a massive bombardment to proceed through Rotterdam (in the second echelon of the offensive) to link up with German paratroopers fighting surrounded in the Delft-Hague-Schiedam region.”

At about 15.00, Xe-111 air wings circled over the doomed Rotterdam. A few hours later the city ceased to exist, turning into continuous smoking ruins. During the raid, 800 civilians were killed or missing, thousands were injured, and tens of thousands were left homeless. The last bombs hit the city at 15.45. At the same time, the Life Standard moved to its original positions.

Less than 2 hours after the bombing, the Dutch, shocked by the scale of the destruction, sent envoys to discuss the terms of surrender. General Kurt Student, who landed with his men in the vicinity of Rotterdam on May 10, together with the commander of the airborne units, Oberstleutnant Dietrich von Holitz, went to the Dutch headquarters. Meanwhile, hundreds of Dutch soldiers gathered in front of the headquarters building for the surrender ceremony.

As luck would have it, it was at that very moment that the Leibstandarte happened. Having never gotten rid of the acquired habit of shooting first and then sorting things out, the SS men opened hurricane fire from machine guns. The student rushed to the window in bewilderment... what happened... who dared... - and received a severe gunshot wound. Dripping with blood, the general fell unconscious into the arms of von Holitz, who barely had time to catch him. The founder of the German parachute troops, General Student, survived only by a miracle, and already in 1941 he commanded the landing operation on Crete. The only memory left of the meeting with the Leibstandarte was an ugly scar. Without slowing down, the motorized column proceeded to the exit from the city to join the paratroopers, whose commander, out of ignorance, they almost took the life of.

Paratroopers of the 22nd Airborne Division, who landed near Delft and The Hague on May 10, were supposed to capture Dutch military airfields and ensure the landing of Ju-52 transport aircraft. However, the Germans had never encountered such a density of anti-aircraft fire. Even on the approach to the capital, most of the transport workers were shot down, and the surviving paratroopers were scattered, surrounded and liquidated. All that the Leibstandarte discovered was the wreckage of planes and the corpses of German paratroopers. Only a few soldiers of the 22nd division managed to break through to their own. At 21.00 the motorized columns of the Leibstandarte entered Delft, and the next morning - into The Hague. During short but fierce battles, 3,536 Dutch soldiers and officers were captured. On such a high note, the SS Leibstandarte “Adolf Hitler” completed his tour of the country of tulips - Holland capitulated.

While the German formations were regrouping to strike France, Gruppenführer Gau Esser, “together with part of the SS Special Forces Division, reinforced by several army infantry formations, pushed the Allies towards the sea. With strong support from attack aircraft, the Deutschland regiment broke through to the coast near the port city of Vlissingen, but on May 17, the Franco-Dutch units that survived the battles managed to evacuate on British destroyers that approached the shore.

During the Dutch campaign, the symptoms of the disease fully manifested themselves, from which the SS troops were never able to get rid of it until the end of the war. The Waffen SS suffered heavy losses.

“No matter how bravely the Waffen SS divisions fought, no matter how wonderful successes they achieved, there is still no doubt that the creation of these special military formations was an unforgivable mistake... The blood they shed was in no way compensated by the successes achieved,” he wrote subsequently, in his memoirs, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein.

The surrender of Holland coincided with the completion of the second stage of the German offensive in Belgium. The Belgian defensive formations were swept away, the French positions between the Meuse and Oise were broken, and the remnants of the French and British armies were driven into Flanders. German troops rushed to the coast of the English Channel.

On May 16, the hour struck for the Death's Head division. It was withdrawn from the OKH reserve and, having made a rapid march from Kassel - Namur - Charleroi, through Belgium it was transferred to France to the northern flank of General Hoth's 15th Corps, which was attacking on a wide front. On May 17, the vanguard of General Rommel's 7th Panzer Division broke through to Chateau, and the very next day one of his tank battalions occupied Cambrai, where the 5th and 7th Panzer Divisions of the 15th Corps stopped, awaiting the arrival of lagging infantry and reinforcements. On May 19, the Death's Head division appeared at the forefront. Icke received orders to clear the region of Yvui - Abancourt - Manieres - Cambrai. So the division received a baptism of fire and suffered its first losses: from May 19 to 20, 16 SS men were killed and 53 wounded.

While the 7th Panzer and Totenkopf were consolidated on the lines southwest of Arras, 4 other Wehrmacht tank divisions reached the coast west of Abbeville, completing the encirclement of over 40 Belgian, British and French divisions - about a million soldiers in total - in the Somme and Scarpe basin and cutting them off from the main French army forces in the south.

All attempts by the Allies to break through to join the encircled divisions were thwarted largely due to the miscalculations of the Anglo-French command, the sluggishness of their reconnaissance and the determination of the Germans. However, the partial success of the counteroffensive south of Arras was a real shock for the now self-confident Wehrmacht, accustomed to winning victories with little bloodshed.

At noon on May 21, 74 heavy British tanks and 2 infantry battalions, supported by 60 tanks of the French light motorized division, struck the flanks of the 7th Panzer Division and the outposts of the Totenkopf division. Before the attackers were stopped, they managed to turn both army and SS units into a stampede. In the very first minutes of the battle, the Germans lost 9 medium and dozens of light tanks and armored vehicles. Losses in manpower amounted to: 89 killed, 116 wounded, 173 missing, including Totenkopf SS lost 19 killed, 27 wounded and 2 missing soldiers.

The next day there was an attempt to counterattack the allied divisions surrounded in the east. The Leibstandarte, which was redeploying to the south, was urgently deployed and transferred to the breakthrough zone south of Valenciennes. Along a 32-kilometer front, the SS repulsed about a dozen timid French counterattacks.

DUNKIRK

To increase pressure on the southern flank of the allied forces pressed to the coast, the OKH transferred every single motorized division to the front line. The Allies concentrated on a narrow section of the coastal strip between Gravelines, Lons-Plage and Saint-Paul, stretching 80-100 km in the direction of Valenciennes. From the south, their positions were reliably protected by numerous canals, transformed by the British Expeditionary Force into powerful and impregnable fortifications. All Waffen SS formations involved in the campaign took part in the operation in northern France.

On the night of May 23-24, the Leibstandarte was transferred to the west and took up positions near Wattan, a one-day march from the canal. Totenkopf and Gruppenführer Gausser's division pushed the British from the southeast, pulling up to the main forces.

On May 24, the SS special forces division entered the Isberg area. 32 soldiers of the reconnaissance group in armored vehicles crossed the Aire-La-Basse canal and moved towards Merville, where they were attacked by British tanks. The reconnaissance group, which did not have heavy weapons, faced an unequal battle. The next morning, the divisional radio operators received a radiogram stating that only 8 uninjured soldiers remained in the group. The situation was hopeless, and the survivors were ordered to destroy the radios and retreat under cover of darkness. None of the 32 scouts returned to the division's location. The group did not die in vain: reports transmitted to headquarters made it possible to identify failures in the Allied defense. cov. Units of the SS special forces division rushed into the gaping gap, seizing a bridgehead in the Saint-Venant area. The British deployed assault units to the breakthrough site, but it was too late. The southern line of defense was broken through.

Another part of the SS unit cleared the area northeast of Arras. In the battle for canals, success alternated with one side and then the other. On the night of May 23-24, a reinforced SS patrol crossed the crossing and gained a foothold in enemy-controlled territory. In the morning, a British tank battalion, covering the retreat of the rearguard, collided head-on with them. Before reinforcements arrived, the SS lost three field guns along with their combat crews, but left most of the British tanks burning out on the battlefield.

To this day, the debate continues on the topic: why the notorious “Fuhrer stop order” of May 24 was given, prohibiting troops from crossing the canal line. By the time the order was received by the troops, part of Gausser’s division had already entrenched itself on the enemy shore, and Sepp Dietrich decided to ignore the order of the Fuhrer Headquarters. In fairness, it should be noted that at this moment the Leibstandarte came into direct fire contact with the enemy, and Dietrich could no longer retreat without killing most of the regiment. The Leibstandarte broke the fierce resistance of the British, crossed the canal near Wattan and occupied the dominant heights. Another breach was made in the British defense. Only the southeastern third of the defensive formations remained monolithic like reinforced concrete:

A pre-storm calm reigned on the Southern Front. London decided to take advantage of the gift of fate and evacuate the expeditionary force by water from Dunkirk. After a hasty regrouping of forces, three defensive infantry divisions were formed to cover the troops retreating to the coast of the Strait of Dover. Meanwhile, the German motorized and infantry divisions received orders to “consolidate their positions, use the respite for personnel rest, routine maintenance and repair of military equipment.”

While the Wehrmacht was resting, the Waffen SS fought fierce battles with the enemy for captured bridgeheads and bridgeheads. The bridgehead near Saint-Venin became the scene of fierce fighting. The British were eager to push back Gausser's forces at any cost, which had cut off their vital communications and jeopardized the entire Dunkirk evacuation plan. On May 25, a fresh brigade from the British replenishment that landed on the coast drove the SS men out of the city. For the first time during this campaign, the SS troops were forced to abandon a major stronghold. Having restored the bridge across the Lys near Merville, the British dug in and took up a perimeter defense. Exactly two days later, the Germans regained their lost positions.

On the night of May 26–27, Hitler withdrew his order and German troops went on the offensive. The “Death’s Head” crossed the water barrier near Bethune and fought deeper into enemy-controlled territory in the direction of Merville. The Allied defensive divisions fought for every inch of land with unprecedented ferocity. But this time they had to deal with five panzer divisions, a Wehrmacht motorized division, two SS motorized divisions, the elite army regiment Grossdeutschland and the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler. The fighting on May 27 was the bloodiest of the campaign, and the SS troops suffered heavy casualties.

The SS Special Forces Division was ordered to fight its way to Dieppe with two regiments through an eight-kilometer strip of dense forest. The 3rd Regiment of the Deutschland Division continued the attack on Merville as part of the battle group of the 3rd Panzer Division (neighbor on the right) and Totenkopf SS (neighbor on the left). The lightly armed regiments "Germany" and "Führer" came under targeted fire from British batteries. Junior commanders raised fighters in hand-to-hand combat, lost people and died themselves. So for the first time during this war, the SS troops were faced with the so-called “domino principle” or “factor of negative manifestation of positive impact” - a kind of paradoxical ethical trap for the Waffen SS command staff, from which they were never able to get out until the end of the war. The principle “follow me and do as I do” professed by SS commanders was an indispensable condition for the extraordinary combat effectiveness of the SS formations, and at the same time the reason for the extremely high losses among non-commissioned officers.

The British dug into the ground, building a powerful uk-reprio upstream of the Lys between Saint-Venant - Merville - Nieppe - Armentières. The line, bristling with gun and machine-gun barrels, became the last hope for the allied units retreating to Dunkirk. The vanguard of the 3rd Panzer Division fought fierce battles on the outskirts of Merville. On the afternoon of May 27, after numerous attacks, the Deutschland regiment broke through to Lys between Merville and Thienne and built a bridgehead, becoming the vanguard of the German offensive on this sector of the front. The regrouped remnants of the 2nd British Division fiercely resisted the breakthrough group, preventing the development of success - at any cost the British had to try to hold positions along the Lys and the Canal for at least another 24 hours.

The regiment commander, Oberführer Steiner (the same Felix Steiner, whose model of combat training was universally accepted in the Waffen SS), gave the order to cross the water barrier. Subsequently, Steiner’s report on the operation carried out under his command successively passed through all authorities and ended up on the desk of the Reichsführer SS. Hovering in the strategic empyrean, Corporal Hitler never delved into tactical details at a low regimental level for him, but the report made such a strong impression on Himmler that he decided to take an unprecedented step and, printing the text in a larger font (one of the most protected “secrets of the Reich” : the Fuhrer was blind), introduced him to Hitler as “a model of courage and heroism of the Waffen SS.” Hitler got acquainted with the document and returned it to Himmler’s adjutant, SS Oberstgruppenführer Karl Wolf, with the note “Brilliant!”

With the support of two SS artillery batteries, the 3rd Sturmbann of the Deutschland Regiment went forward. Due to the limited ammunition, each of the batteries fired only a few dozen shells, nevertheless, the gunners managed to destroy enemy pillboxes with precise volleys and suppress enemy machine-gun nests. By noon on May 27, Steiner's two Sturmbann were already holding the captured bridgehead. The positions on the left and the commanding heights of Lestrom remained in British hands. The Death's Head division, which was supposed to cover Steiner's left flank, was hopelessly bogged down in fighting about a kilometer away. On the right flank, the situation was no less threatening: the British held Merville, and the assault units of the 3rd Wehrmacht Panzer Division fought the enemy on the southern approaches to the city. The main forces fought with the surviving soldiers of the 2nd British Division on the banks of the canal. Thus, to provide cover from the flanks, Steiner was forced to stretch his already more than modest forces. Meanwhile, the SS light sapper companies began constructing minefields, anti-tank obstacles, and establishing crossings across the Lys using available building materials.

At about 19.00 on the same day, Steiner, together with his adjutant, crossed to the opposite bank of the canal to inspect the gradually expanding German bridgehead. Suddenly, a group of British combat vehicles appeared from the northern direction, attacking the positions of the 1st Sturmbann with the support of machine gunners. The Germans' temporary crossings were still flimsy and intended exclusively for infantry, so until the evening of May 27, not only not a single light tank, but also a single anti-tank gun was transported to the enemy shore. About 20 tanks ironed the battalion positions, and the 3rd company was literally smeared on the ground. This is what Oberführer Felix Steiner wrote in a report dated May 31, 1940:

“Soldiers and officers tied themselves with bundles of anti-tank grenades and threw themselves under the tanks. One of the SS men managed to jump onto the armor of an English tank in order to blow up the crew with a hand grenade through the viewing slot. A British tank running on a parallel course cut down a fighter with a burst from a heavy machine gun...

I saw with my own eyes how soldiers brought tanks within 5-10 meters and only then opened fire with small arms or hit the target with anti-tank rifles and rifle grenade launchers. I would like to separately petition for the award of the Iron Cross, first class (posthumously), to three company commanders who became the heart and soul of the German resistance (personal files are attached)...

Only the timely approach of the anti-tank destroyer company of the Totenkopf SS division saved the bridgehead from complete destruction and forced the British to retreat. The British continued to fire at our positions along a flat trajectory with 190 mm cannons and 200 mm howitzers, destroying 5 anti-tank guns of the SS artillery regiment. The Allies achieved their goal: they managed to briefly hold back the advance of the advancing German troops. But on the night of May 28, British units and the 1st French Army were forced to retreat north.”

Contempt for death was the main component of the value system instilled in the elite formations of the Waffen SS. Their fearlessness in battle bordered on fanaticism - ruthless towards themselves, they were extremely cruel towards the enemy.

MASSACRE AT LE PARADISE AND ATROCITIES AT ESQUEBEC

The crossing of the Aire-les-Basse canal near Bethune resulted in the Totenkopf division having to overcome two water obstacles: the main canal and its branch. Already on the first day of the Totenkopf operation, the SS lost 44 people killed, 144 wounded and 11 missing. When crossing the second barrier, the division suffered even greater losses. But the worst thing awaited the SS men ahead: the soldiers of the 2nd British Division were fighting to the death, and they were suicide bombers who vowed not to let the enemy get to Lys.

The “Dead Head” was advancing in the area of ​​​​responsibility of the 4th Brigade of the 2nd British Division. Under the blows of the SS men who furiously stormed the positions, the British retreated to the Le Paradis - Lokon line and took up defensive positions. A combined detachment of the 1st Royal Scottish, 2nd Royal Norfolk and 1./8th Lancashire infantry regiments covered the retreat of the main British forces in this direction. The battle for Le Paradis was divided into dozens of small battles. The 4th company of the 1st battalion of the 2nd Infantry Regiment Totenkopf SS Oberst\rmführer Fritz Knochlein stormed the British stronghold at one of the farmsteads near Le Paradis. About a hundred infantrymen of the Norfolk Regiment did not allow the SS men to raise their heads for several hours. Enraged by the resistance, having suffered severe losses that day (on May 27, in the battles near Le Paradis, the 2nd SS Totenkopf Regiment lost 1 officer and 16 soldiers killed, 50 wounded and missing on the battlefield), the SS men carried out a savage massacre of the British who had surrendered. . After a search and a short interrogation, 28-year-old Knochlein ordered the prisoners of war to be lined up in a column and shot. Two heavy machine guns riddled unarmed people. The SS men finished off the survivors with shots to the back of the head or pinned them with bayonets. Until the end of the war, Knochlein rose to the rank of Obersturmbannführer and in 1944 received the Knight's Cross while commanding a regiment of Norwegian SS volunteers in Courland.

Details of the Le Paradis massacre became public during the trial against former SS commander Knochlein. Two miraculously surviving seriously wounded British soldiers, under the cover of darkness, got out from under a mountain of corpses and were picked up by German soldiers of one of the army units. Two British soldiers passed through German concentration camps, survived and became the main witnesses for the prosecution. On October 25, 1948, the court sentenced Knochlein to death by hanging.

This episode, of course, was not included in the combat log of the Totenkopf SS division. Shortly after the brutal massacre of prisoners of war, Le Paradis was visited by the Chief of the Personal Staff of the Reichsführer SS, Oberstgruppenführer Wolf, and expressed concern that “the bodies of the SS heroes who fell in battles have not yet been buried with due honors.” Nevertheless, echoes of rumors excited the army public: they talked about some strange challenges to Knochlein to a duel by his fellow soldiers and about strange statements by SS reservists who were transferred to the reserve after the end of the French campaign... The fact is. that all Totenkopf reservists who were transferred to the reserve signed a non-disclosure agreement, but many of them expressed a desire to serve in any other division, but not in the “Dead Head”, or even stated that they would leave the SS after the end of the war. Attempts by the Main Directorate of SS Courts to understand the current situation were stopped personally by Himmler, and division commander Eike was encouraged. The massacre at Le Paradis became a harbinger of the future massacre of Americans at Malmedy in 1944.

Meanwhile, other Totenkopf SS units fought fierce battles with the British guard formations in the northern direction. Each new day of the war cost the Death's Head 150 killed, the British were losing up to 300 people a day. On May 28, the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, advancing to Dunkirk, almost lost its commander. Dissatisfied with the reports arriving at the command post, Sepp Dietrich went to the front line. On the way between the 1st and 2nd battalions near Esquebec, his headquarters car almost drove into the location of British units. 50 meters from enemy positions, the car was fired upon, and the Obergruppenführer and his adjutant barely had time to jump out of the car and lie down in a gutter before the car, turned into a sieve, flew into the air. Streams of burning gasoline flowed into the makeshift shelter. They could only escape by burying their heads in the mud, which they did, lying motionless for a total of about five hours. Having received news of the disappearance of the commander without a trace, the chief of staff of the Leibstandarte threw two companies at the British positions near Esquebec. The SS suffered heavy losses and were forced to retreat. Then an army tank company went into battle, losing its commander and 4 tanks, and it returned with nothing. And only after 5 heavy tanks, a platoon of armored cars and the 3rd Sturmbann of the Leibstandarte were thrown at the British positions, Dietrich and his adjutant were saved.

At this time, the 2nd battalion of Hauptsturmführer Wilhelm Mohnke stormed Esquebec from the southeast. Shocked by the death of their commander (hopes for saving Dietrich were fading with each passing hour), the SS men thirsted for blood. Having captured about 80 British, the Germans drove the prisoners into a barn, set it on fire and threw grenades at it (after the war, 15 soldiers who survived that massacre testified at the trial against Mohnke).

After Dietrich's lucky escape, supported by tanks, infantry, artillery and aircraft, the inspired Leibstandarte took a major British stronghold at Wormhood on the move, capturing 17 officers and 750 privates of the 2nd Royal Warwickshire Infantry. The Leibstandarte continued to strike the rearguard of the enemy retreating to Dunkirk, but was soon redeployed to Cambrai for replenishment and rest. Part of Gausser's SS division would probably have wandered around in the dense Dieppe forest if it had not been recalled to rest and transferred to the Cambrai area. On May 30, the SS Totenkopf division was redeployed to the Le Portel - Boulogne area to patrol the coastal zone. By June 3, 200,000 soldiers of the British Expeditionary Force had safely evacuated from Dunkirk - among them about 140,000 French and Belgians. The army was shocked by the ease with which Hitler stopped the offensive and allowed the enemy to escape freely. At one time, many of the most fantastic and completely plausible versions of the “miracle of Dunkirk” were discussed: from related “Aryan roots” and Hitler’s desire to make peace on terms favorable to Germany or Goering’s assurances that the Luftwaffe would not allow the British to escape by sea, to the operational -tactical miscalculations of the OKW...

Thus the battle was won, but the victory was lost.

In a conversation with the architect Troost, Hitler said: “The blood of every Englishman is too precious for me to shed unnecessarily. Whatever my generals may say, I am firmly convinced that our peoples are united racially.” - Approx. auto

Hitler's thoughts and reasoning expressed here on September 27 were reflected in Directive No. 6 on the conduct of military operations, dated October 9. It says the following:

1. It must be admitted that England, and, following its example, France, do not want the war to end, so I decided, without wasting any more time, to proceed to active offensive actions.

2. Further delay will not only entail the end of Belgian and, probably, Dutch neutrality, which the allies will not fail to take advantage of, but also a further build-up of the enemy’s military power, which will undermine the faith of neutral states in the final victory of Germany and will significantly complicate Italy’s entry into the war, as a full ally.

3. For further conduct of military operations, I order:

a) on the northern flank of the Western Front, prepare an offensive through the territories of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. It is necessary to attack with as large a force as possible and as quickly as possible;

b) the goal of this operation is to destroy as large as possible the formations of the French army and the allies on its side, and at the same time seize as much territory as possible in Holland, Belgium and Northern France in order to create a springboard for the successful conduct of an air and sea war against England and expand the buffer the vital Ruhr area;

c) the time of the start of the offensive depends on the readiness for action of tank and motorized formations, the achievement of which should be accelerated by the maximum effort of all forces, and on existing and expected weather conditions.

4. The Luftwaffe prevents the actions of the Anglo-French forces against our army and directly supports, as far as necessary, its advance. At the same time, it is very important to restrain the actions of the Anglo-French air forces and the landing of the British in Belgium and Holland.

5. The naval forces do everything possible to support, directly or indirectly, the operations of the ground forces and the Luftwaffe throughout the offensive.

6. Along with these preparations for the systematic launch of an offensive in the west, the ground forces and the Luftwaffe must be ready at any time to advance towards the Anglo-French invasion of Belgium and meet it on Belgian territory, occupying the western sea coast of Holland.

7. Disguise of preparations should be carried out in such a way that it can only be a matter of precautionary measures against the threatening accumulation of French and British forces on the Franco-Luxembourg and Franco-Belgian border.

8. I ask the Commanders-in-Chief to submit to me as soon as possible their plans based on this directive and to constantly report to me through the OKW on the progress of preparations.

The first meeting in the OKW on the army's plans and the state of affairs in preparation for the start of the offensive followed on October 15 in a detailed discussion with the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, General Jodl. At the same time, General Halder spoke out against the offensive, and above all against its conduct this year. After the conversation, the head of the operational management department wrote in his diary: “We will win this war (this probably meant the planned campaign against the Western powers), even if he (Halder) objects a hundred times to the doctrine of the General Staff, because we have the best troops, better weapons, better nerves and purposeful command.”

The next day, Hitler, in a short conversation, told the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces that he hoped for a conciliatory position from Great Britain. Chamberlain's response to his peace proposal convinced the Fuhrer that it would be possible to talk to the British only after their heavy military defeat. It is necessary to launch an offensive, and the sooner the better. Hitler set the earliest date to be between October 15 and 20, after General Brauchitsch informed him that the tank and motorized divisions would not be ready before then. The next day it became clear that the replenishment of the five active tank divisions and the 10th Panzer Division created before the start of the war, as well as the rearmament of four light tank divisions into medium tanks undertaken after the end of the Polish campaign, could be completed by November 10. On this day, motorized units will also be ready, with the exception of individual units. Therefore, on October 22, Hitler scheduled the start of the offensive for November 12. He stubbornly held on to this date, although Colonel General von Brauchitsch and General Halder pointed out that the army’s preparations were not yet completed. They also objected at a meeting with Hitler on October 27. Hitler wanted to make the final decision on whether this period would remain seven days before its onset, that is, November 5 - such a long “running start” was needed by the main command of the ground forces to bring attacking formations to the borders of the Reich, since this, for reasons secrecy, was done at the last moment.

In a conversation on September 27, Colonel General von Brauchitsch, supported by the Chief of the General Staff, suggested that the Fuhrer postpone the offensive to a time of year with more favorable weather conditions. A similar proposal had been made by Colonel-General von Reichenau two days earlier during a discussion in the Reich Chancellery, in which Colonel-General von Bock and von Kluge also participated, together with the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and the Chief of the General Staff. Apparently, he was pushed to this by von Brauchitsch, who believed that if anyone could dissuade the Fuhrer from implementing this offensive plan, it would only be Colonel General von Reichenau, of whom the Fuhrer had a very high opinion. Reichenau, to emphasize his words, pointed out that by postponing the start of the offensive to the spring of next year, the winter months could be used to eliminate the lack of training in the reserve divisions and “weld together” the unprepared divisions of the fourth wave. Hitler did not ignore these arguments, but objected that in this way the Western powers would have time to strengthen their forces and could well enter Holland and Belgium and reach the Meuse. In short, this attempt to persuade Hitler to at least push back the start date of the offensive failed.

However, Colonel General von Brauchitsch until that moment refrained from reporting his opinion on the possibility and chances of success of an offensive against the Western powers, as reflected in the mentioned memorandum of General Stülpnagel, although he was shared by his colleagues in the command and the army generals. Given the decisiveness that Hitler always flaunted, and the existing tension in the relationship, which did not ease, he probably considered it pointless and psychologically incorrect to raise all his objections to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's plan. Obviously, he, on the contrary, considered it expedient to give the Fuhrer the impression that the main command of the ground forces was eager to do everything possible to overcome the difficulties associated with a quick offensive. Obviously, he wanted to first create a favorable atmosphere so that later he would have a better chance of success by opposing Hitler's decisions. In addition, he hoped that the weather would not allow an offensive in late autumn and winter. However, after all hints of unfavorable weather conditions remained fruitless and Hitler, remaining firmly resolved, set a date for the start of the offensive, Colonel General von Brauchitsch realized that it was impossible to delay any longer and it was necessary to express all the reasons impeding the military campaign.

On November 5, that is, the day when Hitler had to make the final decision whether the big offensive would begin on November 12, von Brauchitsch went to the Reich Chancellery in the middle of the day and asked the Fuehrer to give him time for a private conversation. In the aforementioned conversation, the commander-in-chief of the ground forces read out a memorandum written in his own hand, in which he summarized all the reasons that, in his opinion, speak against the upcoming offensive. He discussed his position during a recent stop on the Western Front with his subordinate commanders. It turned out that they shared it completely. (All this was related by Colonel General Keitel, who, half an hour after this conversation, was summoned by Hitler, the head of the country’s defense department three days later.) Among other reasons, it was especially emphasized that the German infantry during the campaign against Poland was not characterized by a high offensive spirit, as was the case during the First World War, there were even instances of breaches of military discipline, and it was feared that the army lacked the internal readiness to bear the enormous strain that would certainly accompany offensive operations against the Western powers. At this point, Hitler interrupted his reading of the memorandum, filled with righteous indignation at statements that, in his opinion, were directed against National Socialist education. He demanded that he immediately be told the compounds in question. According to him, he wanted to go there that evening and influence people with a personal appeal. Since Colonel General von Brauchitsch could not do this, Hitler did not want to listen to him any further and sent him away in a very harsh manner.

After the Colonel General's departure, the head of the OKW suggested that insufficient morale and cases of violation of military discipline may have occurred among older conscripts who participated in the First World War. To this, Hitler responded, becoming even more agitated, that he had long insisted that middle-aged conscripts - the so-called white bloc - receive at least minimal training. But this idea, like all his unusually prudent plans, was invariably opposed by the man whom the entire army revered, and was praised beyond measure by Colonel General von Brauchitsch - Colonel General von Fritsch. From this, the OKW chief concluded that the already existing hostility between Hitler and Brauchitsch had become even more acute due to the reading of the memorandum and would ultimately lead to a rupture. Indeed, Hitler did not receive the commander-in-chief of the ground forces for a long time, although he sent him extensive materials confirming everything that was said within a few hours after the meeting.

Busy with the clash and subsequent showdowns, Hitler and Keitel completely forgot that on this day, no later than 13.00, a decision had to be made whether the offensive in the west would begin on November 12 or not. Colonel Warlimont, who, replacing the ill General Jodl, arrived at the Reich Chancellery to await this decision, after the deadline had expired, turned to the Chief of the Wehrmacht General Staff with a question about a postponement. He immediately went to Hitler and within a few minutes came out with a ready-made decision - the prearranged signal must be given. The speed with which such an extremely complex decision, fraught with dire consequences, was made, as if casually, after the commander-in-chief of the ground forces expressed well-founded concerns, cannot but surprise. It suggests that the decision was not made by thoughtfully, with an understanding of one’s own responsibility, weighing all the pros and cons. His acceptance was spurred by an acute hostility to the command of the ground forces and an irresistible desire to subjugate the demonic will. Soon after this, Colonel Warlimont transmitted a prearranged signal by telephone to the operational department of the Army General Staff. The department's senior officer, Lieutenant Colonel Heusinger, who was filling in for the absent department chief, Colonel von Greifenberg, objected that there must be a misunderstanding. The Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces had just personally reported to the Fuehrer at the Reich Chancellery all the reasons against such a decision. The head of the country's defense department could only answer him that the report of Colonel General von Brauchitsch was prematurely interrupted and, obviously, did not influence the decision in any way. Lieutenant Colonel Heusinger asked for written confirmation, which arrived to him in the afternoon.

However, the order to begin the operation two days later was canceled due to extremely unfavorable weather forecasts. And yet Hitler did not abandon his intention to launch an offensive as soon as possible, but only later postponed it for several days, although the weather did not improve at all, and even in Western Germany, with a very mild climate, winter set in unusually early that year. A special communication service was organized for meteorologists with the participation of the army and the Luftwaffe, and Hitler personally received daily reports from the leadership of the meteorological aviation meteorological service. At the same time, his unrelenting distrust of army generals manifested itself even more strongly: he ignored weather reports from areas where ground forces were concentrated, since he was inclined to think that they were deliberately made unfavorable in order to avoid the outbreak of hostilities.

Hitler, having received a detailed message from the OKH, did not speak again about his intention, expressed in a conversation with Colonel General von Brauchitsch on November 5, to personally influence the troops in which, in the campaign against Poland, violations of military discipline were committed and high morale was not demonstrated, Hitler did not speak again. Instead, on November 23 at noon, he gathered in his Reich Chancellery the commanders and chiefs of staff of the ground forces, army groups and armies, as well as some elderly officers of the General Staff. Before them, the Fuhrer gave a multi-hour speech in which he showed how he made decisions, contrary to all the prophets who predicted misfortune, and constantly led the Reich from success to success. He further pointed out that Germany had never been in such a favorable position from a military point of view as after the defeat of Poland - it was facing a war on only one front. Hitler expressed his firm belief that the German army, despite the numerous doubts about its intrinsic value recently expressed to him, was and remains the best in the world and, with good command, can cope with any tasks. He loudly announced that he had unconditionally decided to launch an offensive in the west as soon as possible, because he wanted, under any circumstances, to prevent the French and British from getting ahead of him in capturing Belgium and Holland. And if this happens, the Ruhr region will be under threat, and without it the war will not be able to be brought to a victorious end. At the end of his speech, Hitler assured that the chance of decisive success was extremely high, but to achieve it it was necessary that all armed forces be filled with an unshakable will to victory.

In December, the offensive had to be postponed again because severe frost and heavy snowfalls made travel on roads in the area of ​​​​operation extremely difficult and made active participation of the Luftwaffe impossible. At Christmas, Hitler agreed to a slight weakening of combat readiness, so that the troops, who had suffered from unfavorable weather and exhausted by constant tension, received a short respite, and some were even able to go on vacation. On January 10, the moment finally came to make a positive decision. The Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe informed the Fuhrer that starting from the 15th, good weather and 10-12 degrees below zero were expected for 10-12 days. Based on this, Hitler scheduled the start of the offensive at 8.16 on January 17. But just three days after that, he was forced to stop the movement of troops that had begun and again postpone the date of the decision - this time to January 15. On this day, meteorologists without much confidence predicted the onset of an imminent, more or less prolonged period of good weather. But now Hitler refrained from setting an exact date for the start of the offensive, providing for its postponement to early spring. However, he ordered that the troops be kept on constant combat readiness in order to be able to take advantage of favorable weather conditions and repel the enemy if he unexpectedly entered Belgium or Holland.

After some time, Hitler significantly changed his position regarding the constant combat readiness of offensive troops. Now he placed the main emphasis on maintaining secrecy. It turned out that the enemy had fairly accurate information about the last date for the start of the offensive. This may have been due to troop movements that were carried out more or less openly, but it may have been due to the event that took place on January 10th. On that day, in the Mechelen area in Belgium, 13 kilometers north of Maastricht, a German plane carrying two Luftwaffe majors made an emergency landing. Both officers flew from Munster to Cologne in the morning, but lost their course in bad weather conditions. They had with them many important documents, including secret ones concerning the use of paratroops and airborne troops in the planned offensive, and it was doubtful that the officers managed to destroy them before they were taken by the Belgian military. Although the German air attache in Brussels, General Wenninger, who had gained access to the interned pilots and arrived to report in Berlin, informed the Fuehrer on January 13 that most of the secret documents had been destroyed by fire, from information that appeared in the following days it followed that the Belgians and Dutch since On the night of January 14, they began to recall vacationers and take other measures to increase their defense capabilities. Judging by the scale of the activities carried out, more materials fell into the hands of the Belgians than originally thought, and they contained important information regarding the German plans. But of course, the enemy could have received information about the upcoming German operation from other sources. In any case, the enemy was warned, and the required surprise was now impossible to ensure, since only seven days remained before the order to begin the offensive. Therefore, Hitler decided to act differently. He wanted to give the enemy the impression that the offensive could begin at any day, so that he would be in uncertainty, and therefore in constant tension. For this purpose, tanks and motorized formations, which until now, for reasons of secrecy, had remained east of the Rhine, so that only after receiving the order to begin the offensive they would move to their starting positions west of the Rhine, were now placed directly behind the first line of infantry divisions. Thus, during the shortened period of 24 hours before the start of the attack, no major troop movements or railway transport were to take place. And the infantry divisions of the second and third waves were supposed to retreat beyond the Rhine and begin moving only with the beginning of the general offensive. From mass deployment it turned out to be “fluid,” gradual. There was another advantage here: a number of reserve divisions, not yet fully “put together,” were meanwhile able to eliminate shortcomings in their combat training on training grounds. To ensure secrecy, Hitler henceforth informed only an extremely limited circle of people into his plans, and in the OKW and the highest command levels of the Wehrmacht units, individual officers knew only what they needed to perform their service.

The occupation of new positions made it necessary to regroup forces, which for a long time limited the army’s readiness for the offensive on January 20. Hitler, at a meeting with the commanders-in-chief of the ground forces and the Luftwaffe and their chiefs of the General Staff, explained that the offensive would probably not begin before March, but Wehrmacht units should be in constant readiness to repel an Anglo-French invasion of Belgium as soon as possible, if it followed. However, at this time Hitler was more occupied with other plans that were directly related to recent political events in Scandinavia.

Following the Soviet Union's intervention in the campaign against Poland and the incorporation of the territory of Eastern Poland into the USSR, Stalin entered into negotiations with the Baltic states, with the goal of securing greater access to the Baltic Sea. They took place from September 28 to October 5, 1939 and ended with the signing of pacts with Latvia and Estonia. These documents gave the Soviet Union the right to build naval bases and airfields on the Estonian islands of Ezel and Dago, as well as in the Baltic port of Paldiski and the Latvian harbors of Libau and Windau, and to maintain a limited contingent of ground and air forces there. In addition, coastal batteries could be installed on the coast between Libau and the Gulf of Riga. The pact with Lithuania, which came into force on October 10, gave the Soviet Union a number of military bases in exchange for the return of the territory of the Vilna region to Lithuania.

Negotiations began with Finland in early October on moving the Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus to ensure the security of Leningrad, the cession of a number of Finnish islands in the Gulf of Finland and the lease of the Finnish part of the Rybachy Peninsula with the Petsamo harbor. There was also talk about the construction of a Soviet naval and air base on Hanko. Together with the Baltic port of Paldiski and the island of Dago located opposite, it blocked the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, and access to the Baltic Sea remained open. Since no agreement was reached at these negotiations, which were very difficult from the very beginning, the Soviet Union, after the termination of the non-aggression treaty that existed between the two states since 1932 and the severance of diplomatic relations, began military operations on the Karelian Isthmus. Finland appealed to the League of Nations, which called on all its members to provide all possible assistance to the country subjected to aggression. The Soviet Union was expelled from the League of Nations.

From the very beginning of the Soviet-Finnish war, Hitler followed its progress with great concern because of the possibility of intervention by Western powers on the side of Finland. It could be said with complete confidence that the demands for sending an allied expeditionary force there were increasingly heard in the press and in the French parliament, but it would be preceded by the occupation of the Northern Norwegian ports by the British, primarily Narvik, through which the export of Swedish iron ore, which was vital for Germany, took place. In this, Hitler, like Grand Admiral Raeder, also saw a great danger for Germany’s military operations, because the British would not only block the flow of ore, but would also be able to control the sea routes to the Baltic Sea and from Scandinavian airfields would be able to use their air force over The Baltic Sea and surrounding areas. On the other hand, Grand Admiral Raeder repeatedly pointed out to the Fuhrer the great advantages of waging a naval and air war against Great Britain, which would bring Germany's occupation of the coast of Norway. In December, the leader of the radical National Socialist Party of Norway, Vidkun Quisling, who had previously been Minister of War, arrived in Berlin. After earlier negotiations with Reichsleiter Rosenberg and the Commander-in-Chief of the Kriegsmarine, he firmly promised Hitler, in a long conversation on December 13, full political support for the landing in Norway. On the same day, the Fuhrer instructed the operational leadership department to study the issue of landing in Norway.

The result of the research carried out by the country's defense department was outlined in an explanatory note transmitted to Hitler in mid-January. The Fuhrer decided to carry out a surprise seizure of the main Norwegian ports as soon as possible, and to simultaneously occupy Denmark to ensure rear connections. He entrusted the leadership of further preparatory work to Colonel General Keitel. A small headquarters was created, consisting of staff officers from all three types of Wehrmacht troops, which met at the OKW on February 5 and developed the essence of the future operation. The new operation was codenamed "Weserubung".

Given the insignificant naval forces that Germany had, Hitler made an extremely bold, even, perhaps, desperate decision. He, like Grand Admiral Raeder, clearly understood that such an operation was associated with a huge risk of the complete loss of the German navy, while the metropolitan fleet, given its size, was not threatened with anything like that. At the same time, they were aware that if Great Britain gained a foothold in Scandinavia, the danger to the Reich would be so great that they would have to take a risk. On the other hand, for Hitler it seemed extremely tempting to use the Norwegian coast as an air and submarine base to wage war against England. Of course, the operation could only be carried out when the ice in the western part of the Baltic Sea broke up and the ports were open to shipping. Given the harsh winter conditions, this could be weeks away, so the danger of the Western powers overtaking Germany and capturing Norway first was very real. We know today from Churchill’s memoirs and other sources that this fear was not at all unfounded.

Thus, it seemed that the Western powers had very definite plans to support the Finns. Moreover, in addition to sending large forces to Finland through Scandinavia, it was necessary to take into account the possible intervention of the Allies in the Arctic Ocean and even a strike through Iran to Baku. However, these large-scale plans were soon consigned to oblivion, since, in view of the successful resistance that, contrary to everyone’s expectations, the small Finnish army offered to a formidable enemy, there was no need to come to the aid of Finland. Only in response to the Finns' repeated insistent request for urgent military support did the Supreme Military Council of the Allies decide on February 5 in Paris to send an expeditionary force of three or four divisions, including two British, through Narvik to Finland. But the collection of these divisions at the British ports of departure lasted for a long time, and the Finns, seeing the weakening of their forces and the lack of effective assistance, were faced with the need to negotiate with the Soviet Union, which took place in Moscow on March 12 and ended with the signing of a peace treaty. The expeditionary force, which by this time numbered 58 thousand British and French, however, not one of them had yet left British soil, and the transport fleet ready to go to sea was out of work.

Hitler did not know about the decision of the Allied War Council, but he had every reason to believe that the enemy was planning something similar. Hence the concern that the Western powers might beat him to Norway, especially since in this operation they are not as dependent on weather conditions as the Germans. And this anxiety was further intensified by the incident in mid-February, which proved that England would not hesitate to violate Norway's sovereign rights if necessary. On February 16, a British destroyer flotilla attempted to push the German steamer Altmark off the coast. This ship, with 300 British prisoners on board, entered Norwegian territorial waters two days earlier from the Atlantic and, with the permission of the Norwegian government, headed for their homeland. When the ship then entered Jossingfjord for shelter, the British destroyer Kosak followed the ship the next night and freed the British prisoners.

This incident forced Hitler to hurry. He demanded that preparations be accelerated and on February 21 he assigned the commander of the 21st Army Group, Infantry General von Falkenhorst, command of Operation Weserübung. The general seemed to him the most suitable person for this purpose, since during the First World War he took part in hostilities in Finland and had practical experience in combined sea and land operations. His chief of staff was Colonel Buschenhagen. All issues related to maritime transport were to be dealt with by Captain 1st Rank Kranke. Aviation General Kaupisch was to command the troops intended for the invasion of Denmark. Based on the preparatory work carried out earlier and at the suggestion of General von Falkenhorst, an operational directive for Operation Weserübung was prepared, which was signed by the Fuhrer on March 1 and handed over to Wehrmacht units. It said:

"1. The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the implementation of all appropriate measures to occupy Denmark and Norway (Operation Weserubung). Thus, British attempts to invade Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea region should be forestalled, the security of our sources of ore in Sweden should be ensured, and the starting positions for actions against England should be expanded for the naval and air forces. The task of the naval and air forces is reduced to providing the operation, within the limits of available capabilities, with reliable cover from the actions of the British naval and air forces. Considering our military-political superiority over the Scandinavian countries, it is necessary to allocate as small forces as possible to carry out Operation Weserübung. Their small numbers must be compensated by courageous actions and stunning surprise in the operation. In principle, one should strive to give the operation the character of a peaceful seizure, with the goal of armed defense of the neutrality of the Scandinavian countries. Simultaneously with the start of the operation, the governments of these countries will be presented with corresponding demands. If necessary, demonstrative actions of the naval and air forces will be carried out to exert the necessary pressure. If, despite this, resistance is offered, it must be broken using all available military means.

2. I entrust the preparation and conduct of the operation against Denmark and Norway to the commander of the 21st Army Group, General von Falkenhorst. The latter is subordinate to me directly in matters of command. The headquarters should be expanded to include three branches of the armed forces.

The forces assigned to carry out Operation Weserübung must be at the disposal of a separate command. I do not authorize their use in other theaters of military operations. The air force units assigned to carry out the Weserübung are tactically subordinate to the 21st Army Group. Upon completion of their tasks, they again come under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. The use of units directly subordinate to the command of the air and naval forces in the operation is carried out in close cooperation with the commander of the 21st Army Group. The supplies assigned to the 21st Army Group are provided by the branches of the armed forces in accordance with the requests of its commander.

3. The crossing of the Danish border and the landing in Norway must be carried out simultaneously. The preparation for the operation should be carried out with maximum activity and as quickly as possible. In the event that the enemy takes the initiative against Norway, countermeasures must be taken immediately. It is extremely important that our measures take both the northern countries and Western opponents by surprise. This must be taken into account during all preparatory work. This especially applies to bringing transports and troops into readiness, assigning tasks to them and loading them. If it is no longer possible to maintain the secrecy of loading onto ships, commanders and troops, for the purpose of misinformation, name other destinations. Troops should be familiarized with real tasks only after going to sea.

4. Occupation of Denmark (“Weserubung-Zuid”).

The task of the 21st Army Group: the sudden capture of Jutland and Funen, then the capture of the island of Zealand. To do this, it is necessary to break through to Skagen and the eastern coast of Funen as quickly as possible, providing cover for the most important points. On the island of Zealand, strongholds must be captured in a timely manner as starting positions for subsequent occupation. The navy allocates forces to ensure communications between Nyborg and Korser and to quickly capture the bridge across the Little Belt Strait, and, if necessary, to land troops. In addition, they are preparing coastal defenses. Air force units are primarily intended for demonstration and leaflet dropping. It is necessary to ensure the use of the Danish airfield network, as well as air defense.

5. Occupation of Norway (“Weserubung Nord”).

The task of the 21st Army Group: sudden capture of the most important coastal points from the sea and by airborne forces. The naval forces take upon themselves the preparation and transportation of landing troops by sea, and in the future - units intended for movement to Oslo. They provide supplies by sea. They are also responsible for the accelerated construction of facilities for the defense of the Norwegian coast. The air force, after the occupation, must provide air defense, as well as the use of Norwegian bases to wage an air war against England.

6. The 21st Army Group constantly reports to the headquarters of the Supreme High Command on the state of preparations and submits calendar reports on the progress of preparatory work. The shortest period of time that will be required between the issuance of the order for Operation Weserübung and the beginning of its execution should be indicated.

Report regarding the intended command post.

Code designations:

“Weser” day – the day of the operation;

“Weser” hour is the hour of the operation.”

As follows from the directive, we were talking about a combined operation with the participation of ground naval and air forces, from the planning and execution of which the command of the ground forces was completely removed, and the commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe - to a certain extent. The air force participating in the operation, commanded by Lieutenant General Geisler, was tactically subordinate to the 21st Group. General von Falkenhorst received instructions personally from Hitler, who was advised by the chief of the operational leadership department, and the functions of the General Staff in developing the operation were performed by the country's defense department. This is how the first so-called theater of operations of the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW) appeared, in which the main command of the ground forces (OKH) had no influence on the operational command of these military formations.

Contrary to the initial intention of using only the weakest forces in the operation, in the following days Hitler ordered the use of such large forces that there was no fear of failure. Six divisions were envisaged for the capture of Norway, of which four (69, 163 and 196th Infantry Divisions and the 3rd Mountain Division) would land first, and two (181st and 214th Infantry Divisions) would follow. In addition, the 2nd Mountain Division was later added to them. The 170th and 198th infantry divisions, as well as the 11th motorized rifle brigade, were intended for the invasion of Denmark. Based on a meeting held on March 5 with the commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht armed forces and General von Falkenhorst, Hitler issued an additional order, according to which the directive of March 1 underwent some changes. Larger forces were now heading towards Narvik and the capture of Copenhagen was envisaged.

The question of which of the two planned operations should be carried out first - Gelb or Weserubung - was considered in detail. Both depended on the onset of favorable weather conditions, but at the same time were impracticable because there were not enough air forces, and especially paratroopers, who in both cases had extremely important tasks. Hitler was initially inclined to carry out Operation Weserübung only when the offensive in the West was completed. But, fearing that Great Britain would beat him to the north, he finally decided to start with Operation Weserübung. In addition, he believed that this operation would take him three to four days. He planned to begin the operation on March 15–17, but unfavorable weather conditions, as well as the fact that preparations had not yet been completed, forced him to postpone the date. When all preconditions were met on April 2, Hitler scheduled the landing in Norway and the invasion of Denmark for April 9.

Meanwhile, the Supreme Military Council of the Allies on March 28 in London decided to stop the transport of Swedish ore to Germany through Narvik after notifying Sweden and Norway in early April to install mines in Norwegian territorial waters. In addition, in anticipation of a likely German counterattack, send British and French troops to Narvik, as well as to Trondheim, Bergen and Stavanger. Mining followed in the early morning of April 8 in front of the entrance to the Vestfjord, the fairway leading to Narvik. It was produced by British destroyers. One of them, "Firefly", after completing the task, remained in place to look for the person who had fallen overboard. At exactly 8:30 a.m., 150 miles southwest of Westfjord, she encountered German naval forces moving toward Trondheim and was sunk after a short battle. Hitler used the chance meeting of the ships for propaganda purposes and presented the long-planned operation as a counterattack against the British violation of Norwegian neutrality. But in reality, Hitler knew nothing about the Allied plans, giving the order on April 6 for naval forces and transports to go to sea. Today it can definitely be said that Operation Weserubung would have been postponed had the Fuhrer known that he might be faced with the presence of British naval forces in Norwegian waters. For if German units collided with British warships, the entire operation could fail. In any case, there could be no talk of surprise, which Hitler so strived for in the hope that the Norwegian government, taken by surprise, would abandon all resistance.

Now there was no question of surprise. On the afternoon of April 8, the German transport Rio de Janeiro, carrying troops, was torpedoed off the coast of southern Norway by a British submarine. German soldiers from the ship in distress were brought ashore, so the Norwegians were warned of the danger and hastily took defensive measures. As a result, the forces sent to Oslo encountered unexpectedly strong resistance, which was broken only after lengthy bloody battles, especially since the planned airborne landing was delayed due to bad weather. The occupation of other ports passed without any particular difficulties, because the Norwegians, after a short resistance, retreated into the interior of the country. German troops continued to advance in order to quickly establish land communications between the conquered bridgeheads, especially between Oslo and Trondheim and other ports on the west coast, and to capture airfields to ensure supplies, which Hitler especially insisted on.

A detailed description of the entire course of the operation is beyond the scope of this book. The lack of materials does not allow me to do this. I will focus only on the events in the Narvik area, since they led Hitler to a kind of nervous crisis. The capture of this small, but extremely important for the cargo flow of Swedish ore to Germany, was the main link of the entire expedition. Its great distance from the German North Sea and Baltic ports - 2 thousand kilometers from the first, 2300 kilometers from the second - made it impossible for transports with troops and supply ships to arrive there on time. British naval forces would certainly have preceded the Germans in capturing Narvik or intercepted them along the way. The following way out of the situation was found: to load one regiment of the 3rd Mountain Division under the personal command of an experienced, battle-tested division commander, General Dietl, and the soldiers had to carry only small arms, onto 10 high-speed destroyers that would make a quick and possibly hope a smooth passage to Narvik. They will be followed by two or three high-speed steamers with guns, anti-aircraft guns, ammunition and supply cargo.

Ten destroyers under the command of Captain 1st Rank Bonte made the passage through a very rough sea, were not subjected to strong enemy attacks and, as planned, arrived in Narvik on the morning of April 9. The landing mountain regiment occupied the city and its environs and took under guard the ore railway, which ran east of the city to the Swedish border. However, the ships with equipment and supplies did not arrive, because the British naval forces, starting from April 10, blocked the entrance to the West Fjord. Captain 1st Rank Bonte and General Dietl found themselves cut off from all communications with the rear, and it was only a matter of time before the enemy gathered forces at sea and on land for a decisive blow to the weakening German forces. At sea, the British did not have to wait long. Already on April 10, 5 British destroyers attempted to break through to Narvik, but were forced to retreat, losing 2 ships. At the same time, 2 German destroyers were sunk, among them the lead ship. The commander of the German destroyer formation, Bonte, was killed in the battle. On April 13, the British battleship Warspite and 9 destroyers, accompanied by dive bombers from the aircraft carrier Furious, broke into the fjord. After a short battle, they easily defeated the 8 surviving German destroyers. 4 ships were sunk in the open channel and at the berths of Narvik, the rest were severely damaged and were blown up after the teams landed on shore. The sailors completely used up the ammunition on board. On land they strengthened the weak forces of the regiment, General Dietl.

For the German navy, the loss of 10 destroyers meant a severe blow. Since two destroyers, Leberecht Maas and Max Schultz, were sunk by enemy aircraft during the attack in the North Sea, only 10 of the 22 modern destroyers available at the beginning of the war remained. This was an insignificant number for the multifaceted tasks of the navy. But even this did not make the strongest impression on Hitler. He feared that General Dietl’s small unit in Narvik, cut off from all connections with the rear and completely left to its own devices, would not be able to resist the expected offensive of the large Allied forces landing in Harstad on April 14. The consequence was a nervous crisis, which had the most detrimental effect on the Wehrmacht command. Hitler was always worried about his prestige, and the very thought of receiving such a sensitive blow from the British in the far north was unbearable for him. Therefore, he, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the German Wehrmacht, now sat for hours, bending over a map of Northern Norway, and pondered how Dietl’s group could be led through difficult areas to German troops in the Trondheim area without heavy losses. He even considered the option of moving the group to Swedish territory, and hoped that it, together with Swedish forces, would be able to protect the rich ore deposits located there from the British. In any case, on the morning of April 15, the decision to leave Narvik seemed to have already been made, and the radiogram sent at 10.30 to the 21st group that no more troops would be sent to Narvik before it was possible to arrange supplies for the units already there could well be considered as a preliminary order before the final order to retreat.

In the country's defense department, which, as already mentioned, was charged with headquarters development of operations in Norway and Denmark, Hitler's uncertain command, expressed in individual nervous orders, made a stunning impression. How, one wonders, such a weak commander will cope with the serious crises that will definitely be in the upcoming Western campaign if he wastes so much nerve when faced with a difficult, but not at all hopeless, situation, and on a local scale. Therefore, Lieutenant Colonel von Losberg, who was replacing his ill superior, first officer of the Army General Staff in the country's defense department, went to the Reich Chancellery on April 15 to see Colonel General Keitel and General Jodl, where he raised sharp objections to the methods of leadership of the High Command in recent days. He even ventured to explain that the decision to leave Narvik spoke of a nervous crisis, like the one that happened in the army command in 1914 during the hardest days of the Battle of the Marne. Operation Weserübung was carried out mainly to ensure the uninterrupted export of Swedish ore to Germany, so it is completely incomprehensible why an area that was clearly the main area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe operation would be abandoned unnecessarily. The 21st group has a specific task and enough strength to complete it. Instead of issuing separate combat orders, which only confuse the command of the troops, it is necessary to limit oneself to directives with approximately the following content: the protection of the Swedish ore deposits is the main task in Norway and everything must be done to supply and strengthen Dietl’s group. The Swedish government should also be encouraged to concentrate troops to protect its ore deposits and order them, in the event of an invasion of Swedish territory by the British, to act together with the Dietl group. As for the final plans of the High Command, the eight divisions already participating in Operation Weserubung should be followed by a ninth in order to gather large forces in the Oslo area and put pressure on Sweden. It will be possible to say that we have a desire to win in the West, and therefore it is necessary to be as strong as possible there, and the 21st Dietl group can solve the task entrusted to it with the forces at its disposal. If the command so easily scatters its forces for secondary theaters of military operations, the initiative will quickly pass into the hands of the main enemy.

After the very first words of Lieutenant Colonel von Losberg, Colonel General Keitel left, probably considering it beneath his dignity to listen to the temperamental but apt statements of the young General Staff officer. General Jodl replied that, undoubtedly, the extremely unfavorable unpleasant manner in which orders had been given during the last days was due to the constant interference of the Fuehrer, who always demanded the speediest execution of his wishes. Leaving Narvik is his personal will, and in this matter he is very intractable. Losberg countered that if the Führer's closest military advisers had no influence over him, they should give way to stronger individuals.

However, Losberg's words did not go unheeded. He prompted the chief of the operational leadership department to openly and energetically object to Hitler, meaning a calmer and more systematic command of operations in Norway. Therefore, Hitler has so far refrained from ordering the withdrawal of troops from Narvik, but expressed fear that he would not be able to be restrained and would still have to leave, only gradually and under the influence of the actions of British and French forces that had meanwhile been transferred from Harstad to the area north of Narvik. Because of his courageous performance, Lieutenant Colonel von Losberg fell out of favor with Hitler and his military advisers, but retained his place as the first officer of the General Staff in the national defense department until the beginning of 1942.

Hitler was firmly of the opinion that the offensive in the west should follow immediately after the start of Operation Weserübung, and accordingly, on April 10, he gave the order to begin preparations for transportation means, but the offensive itself was delayed because part of the parachute troops and the main forces of transport aviation, without which The Western campaign could not be avoided; they remained in Norway longer than expected. On April 14, he told the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces that the offensive would not begin until the 21st or 22nd, since the Luftwaffe needed a few more days to restore its combat effectiveness. On April 18, General Jodl informed the OKH that the implementation of the Gelb plan would not begin until the 24th. In the end, Hitler decided to move to the west only when the operations in Norway were completed. This condition seemed to be fulfilled when, at the beginning of May, land communications were established between Oslo and the west coast harbors of Stavanger, Bergen and, above all, Trondheim. At the same time, the British troops that landed in mid-April in Namsus and Åndalsnes and advanced to Verdal (80 kilometers north of Trondheim) and Lillehammer were thrown back to their bridgehead. Now it was possible to take advantage of the first period of good weather in the west. The attack, originally planned for May 6–7, was eventually scheduled by Hitler for 5.35 a.m. on May 10, since the forecasts of authoritative Luftwaffe meteorologists foreshadowed favorable weather from that day on for a long time. The Fuhrer, as he intended, wrote a letter to the Queen of the Netherlands, which was to be delivered by a special courier - a high-ranking official of the Reich Chancellery, Major of the Reserves Kivitz. He was going to leave for The Hague by car on May 9, but at the last minute Hitler stopped him, fearing that the special courier might be captured along the way and the enemy would learn about Germany’s offensive plans ahead of time. The neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg was no longer taken into account by Hitler at all.

Based on the oral directives that Hitler gave to the commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht on September 27, and Directive No. 6 on the conduct of military operations of October 9, the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces developed instructions for the deployment of troops according to the Gelb plan. They provided for the deployment of Army Groups "B" and "A" on the Geldern - Mettlach line (on the Saar north of Merzig) and an offensive in a westerly direction, through the southern tip of Holland and Belgium, to destroy enemy forces north of the Somme and reach the shore of the English Channel. Army Group C, under the command of Colonel General Knight von Leeb (headquarters - Frankfurt am Main), was faced by the forces of the 1st Army (Colonel General von Witzleben, headquarters - Bad Kreuznach) and the 7th Army (Infantry General Dolman, headquarters - Karlsruhe) defend the borders of the Reich from Mettlach to Basel.

Army Group B under the command of Colonel General von Bock (headquarters - Bad Godesberg) was supposed to prepare the 6th Army (Colonel General von Reichenau, headquarters - Grevenbroich) north of Liege, the 4th Army for the offensive (Colonel General von Kluge, headquarters - Euskirchen) south of Liege and for use during the offensive in the area of ​​​​operation of the 6th Army, form the command of the 18th Army Group (AOK 18) (Artillery General von Küchler), and in the area of ​​​​operation 4- 1st Army - command of the 2nd Army Group (AOK 2), (Infantry General Baron von Weichs). After breaking through the Belgian fortifications, they must first move in a westerly direction, then, according to circumstances, continue to move in a western, north-western or south-western direction, and send their mobile forces in two strike groups north and south past Liege to Ghent and Ten. And the 6th Army should advance from the Venlo-Aachen line in the direction of Brussels and encircle Liege from the north, as well as Antwerp from the north and east. At the same time, the 4th Army breaks through between Liege and Houffalize and advances on both sides of Namur towards Nivelles-Chime.

The task of Army Group A of Colonel General von Rundstedt (headquarters Koblenz) was to cover Army Group B from enemy attacks from the south and southwest. To do this, she advances her left flank through the Meuse above Fume in the general direction of Laon. Its 12th Army under the command of Colonel General von List (headquarters - Mayen), having crossed Ur, must break through the Belgian border fortifications on both sides of Bastogne, cross the Meuse above Fume with a strong right flank and move to Laon. With its left flank it should join the defensive front of the 16th Army in the Carignan area. The 16th Army, under the command of General of Infantry Bush (headquarters - Bad Bertrich on the Mosel), advances from the Wallendorf - Mettlach line and, sharply pushing forward the right flank, must occupy the Carignan - Longwy - Sierk line.

These deployment instructions were discussed in detail with Hitler and his military advisers and initially received the full approval of the Fuhrer, but after his intervention they were finalized and underwent significant changes. The use of almost all the mobile forces - nine tank and four motorized divisions - of the 6th and 4th armies on both sides of Liege, by all accounts, was due to the fact that the Ardennes, especially in winter, presented an almost insurmountable obstacle for such formations. On the other hand, everyone, of course, understood what difficulties awaited them north of Liege when crossing the Meuse and the Albert Canal. In essence, this is why the ground forces command from the very beginning considered the chances of success small. Hitler was also worried about the situation, because if the strike wedge stopped at these water barriers for at least a few days, there would be no need to think about a quick decisive success, which in these circumstances was especially valuable. Hitler puzzled for a long time over the question of what to do. And on October 30, he came to the conclusion that for the passage of one of the strike groups it was possible to use a forest-free and passable section of terrain that stretches from Arlon in Belgium-Luxembourg in a westerly direction through Tintigny and Florentville to Sedan. It will consist of one tank and one motorized division. In other words, if a breakthrough is attempted here too, the chances of success can be increased. On November 5, the main command of the ground forces gave in to this initiative with great reluctance. The fact is that, on the one hand, it did not want to deviate unnecessarily from the once chosen, well-thought-out grouping of forces, on the other hand, one could not expect much from such a maneuver, because the mobile forces that arrived here would soon also stumble upon a serious obstacle, which could not be underestimated - on the Sedan. In the end, the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces proposed placing in this direction the 10th Panzer Division, one motorized division (2nd or 29th) and also the motorized division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler under the command of Panzer General Guderian with the headquarters of XIX housings.

But this no longer satisfied Hitler. He became seriously interested in his idea, expected great success from the breakthrough to Sedan, and on November 10 he demanded another tank division for General Guderian’s corps, namely the 2nd, and, in addition to the motorized division and the SS division, also the motorized Grossdeutschland regiment. He instructed Colonel General Keitel to “induct” the general himself. The Army General Staff complied with the Führer's request and changed the deployment instructions accordingly. Now it said that Army Group A should advance with its right flank through the Meuse between Fume and Mouzon in the direction of Laon, and with its left flank cover the advance of troops from enemy attacks from the south and southwest. In front of its front, a group of mobile forces, using areas free of forest on both sides of Arlon, Tintigny and Florentville, moves towards Sedan, with the goal of striking at the enemy mobile forces thrown at Southern Belgium in the Sedan area and to the southeast of it suddenly reaching bank of the Meuse, thereby creating favorable preconditions for the further conduct of the operation. The 12th Army, having crossed Ur, must break through the Belgian border fortifications on both sides of Bastogne, cross the Meuse between Fume and Mouzon with a strong right flank, and move to Laon. The 16th Army advances from the Wallendorf-Metlach line and, sharply pushing forward the right flank, must occupy the Mouzon-Longwy-Sierk line. It covers the southern flank of the general advance and maintains a connection with the fortified line on the Saar south of Mettlach.

Even now, when the idea of ​​breaking through a tank wedge to Sedan was included in the operational plan of the ground forces, Hitler was not satisfied. He doubted whether, thanks to surprise, it would be possible to capture intact the bridges across the Albert Canal north and northeast of Liege, which was a necessary prerequisite for a strike by the motorized formations of the 6th Army, ready for battle. The mobile forces on the attacking flank of Group A had much more favorable chances, especially since the enemy most likely expected a German attack in the north. Judging by the available information, the main direction of enemy deployment was on the western border of Belgium, and there was every reason to believe that the large forces of the British and French gathered there would invade Belgium with the start of the German offensive. If the southern tank wedge manages to break through Sedan to the west, not only will the enemy’s front be torn apart in the center, but the flanks in Belgium will also be won. This began a large-scale envelopment of the enemy, which could lead to the complete destruction of the northern group of Allied forces. Based on these considerations, Hitler on November 14 ordered General Jodl to find out from the main command of the ground forces what possibilities existed, in the event of the impressive success of Guderian’s corps, to quickly strengthen it with additional motorized forces. In the additional order issued to the Wehrmacht units on November 20 to the Gelb plan, containing Directive No. 8 for the conduct of military operations, he ordered that all measures be taken to transfer the main attack area of ​​the operation from the area of ​​​​operations of Army Group B to the area of ​​Army Group A. , if the enemy forces are fragmented there, which will allow us to hope for a faster and greater success than in Army Group B.

Based on Directive No. 8, the command of Army Group A around this time, and then again at the beginning of December, proposed to the OKH to move the main attack site in advance to the southern flank of the offensive front. After weighing the pros and cons, Colonel General von Brauchitsch and General Halder decided to concentrate mobile forces (5 tank and 3 motorized divisions), dividing them into three echelons, under a single command in the area of ​​​​operations of the 12th Army on the Meuse near and below Sedan . The first echelon was to be commanded by General Guderian and the headquarters of the XIX Corps, the second by Lieutenant General Reinhardt and the headquarters of the XXXXI Corps, the tank group was entrusted to General von Kleist, and Colonel Zeitzler became his chief of staff. Thus, the area of ​​the main attack was transferred from the right to the left flank of the offensive. In the area of ​​operation of the 6th and 4th armies, the XVI Panzer Corps remained under the command of General Gepner and the XV Panzer Corps under the command of General Hoth.

The idea of ​​a tank attack on Sedan later, when it proved its highest effectiveness in the process of execution, was attributed by wide army circles to Lieutenant General von Manstein, who until February 1940 was the chief of staff of Army Group A and was considered the best operational mind of the army. In fact, General von Manstein apparently from the very beginning favored a breakthrough of mobile forces through the Ardennes and across the Meuse in the Sedan area; Hitler learned about this in the last days of October from his chief adjutant, Colonel Schmundt, and thus developed the idea of ​​​​sending motorized formations through Arlon to Sedan. Thus, even if Hitler cannot be considered the creator of this idea, he nevertheless immediately recognized it as productive, and his intervention in the actions of the OKH led to victory. And the credit for putting this idea into practice belongs to General Halder.

The instructions for the deployment of ground forces have undergone significant changes in terms of actions in relation to Holland. This issue was raised at the discussion of the plan of operation in October, and Hitler decided that Holland, with the exception of its southern tip, through which the right flank of the 6th Army should pass, would not be occupied at first. Therefore, on the German-Dutch border north of Geldern, only weak forces were envisaged, united in army division N. The commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe spoke out against this position. Through his Chief of the General Staff, General Jeschonnek, on October 30, and then again on November 11, he referred to the fact that England, without a doubt, would not respect the neutrality of Dutch airspace. Under such circumstances, the Ruhr region can be effectively protected only by extending the air defense and warning organization as far as possible into Dutch territory. Consequently, from the very beginning, most of Holland must be occupied. Hitler agreed and on November 15 gave orders that the army should be in readiness, by special order, to occupy Holland first to the Grebbe–Meuse line. It depends on the political and military position of Holland, as stated in the directive sent by Colonel General Keitel to the OKH, and on the extent of the floods whether it will be necessary and possible to set further goals. But in Directive No. 8, which appeared five days later, Hitler ordered not only by special order to occupy the territory of Holland, including the adjacent West Frisian Islands, without Texel for now, primarily to the Grebbe-Meuse line. A new task was entrusted to the 18th Army, led by Artillery General von Küchler. Its six infantry divisions, the 9th Panzer Division, the motorized V SS Division, both SS regiments - Adolf Hitler and Führer - and the 1st Cavalry Division deployed on the Dutch border north of Geldern - the former site of Army Unit N With the entry into the forefront of the 18th Army, a new organization of ground forces came into force: Army Group B was now subordinate to the 6th and 18th Armies, Army Group A was subordinate to the 4th, 12th and 16th Armies, and also Panzer Group Kleist.

The goal of operations in Holland was set later, taking into account the use of parachute and airborne troops. Hitler had thought about this question in advance. He discussed many possibilities with the OKH and the Luftwaffe, and from the very beginning it was clear that only their use in the main attack sector, therefore in front of Army Group B, was taken into account. Here were the heavily fortified main Belgian defensive positions, which stretched from Namur on the north bank of the Meuse to Liege and beyond the deep Albert Canal to the heavily fortified Antwerp, then west to round the positions on the Dyle, which had been under construction since 1937. defended the capital of the country and from the north of Namur went beyond Dyle through Wavre and Louvain to Lir, where they adjoined the outer belt of Antwerp forts. There was every reason to use paratroopers to open these fortified lines from the rear, especially as long as there was an intention to use the main forces of the tank and motorized formations of Army Group B to strike on both sides of Liege on Ghent and Taine. But only Hitler decided otherwise. He assumed that the Belgian troops brought in to defend these positions, as soon as the German forces made a breakthrough, together with parts of the British and French troops who arrived to help, would flee to the so-called national redoubt. This meant the territory that was protected in the north by the mouth of the Scheldt, in the east by the fortress of Antwerp, in the south by the lowlands of the Scheldt on both sides of Thermon, the strong but not yet ready bridgeheads of Ghent, and the Lys River. Hitler planned to break into it in advance, so that the enemy would have nowhere to retreat when he was knocked out of his forward defensive positions. Therefore, at the end of October, he ordered the use of the 22nd Infantry (Airborne) Division to recapture the bridgehead from Ghent as the offensive began.

The OKH did not expect success from this operation and in return wanted to drop paratroopers on the bridges across the canal between Liege and Antwerp in order to capture them in advance and open the way for the 6th Army to Belgium. Field General Marshal Goering also rejected Hitler's planned use of elite airborne units, considering it pointless. He expressed his opinion in a conversation with the OKW chief on November 6. It seemed impossible to Goering that his paratroopers, having landed on the bridgeheads of Ghent, located about 180 kilometers from the borders of the Reich, would be able to hold out until ground forces arrived there. These objections could not dissuade Hitler, but nevertheless prompted him, in case the explosion of the bridges over the Meuse and the canal north of Liege did not allow the 6th Army to make a quick breakthrough, to provide another option, namely, the dropping of paratroopers on the bridges over the Meuse between Namur and Dinan to keep them open to the tank units of the 4th Army. Hitler wanted to make the decision whether paratroopers would be used in Ghent or Dinant only on the day of the offensive, when it would be clear how things were going with the bridges in the 6th Army sector. The Chief of the General Staff and the commander of the parachute division, General Student, objected to this at a meeting on December 29 that it was very difficult at the last moment to navigate and focus on both possibilities. At the next meeting, held on January 10, General Jeschonnek drew the attention of those gathered to the fact that, given the severely frozen soil, dropping paratroopers onto bridges over the Meuse in the Dinan area would be impossible. Instead, he proposed an airborne landing in the Amsterdam area to open for the 18th Army the so-called Fortress Holland - the central part of the Netherlands, protected in the south by the rivers Meuse, Waal and Lek, in the east - fortifications on the Gorinchem - Utrecht - Amsterdam canal, and also Zuider Zee. This new idea was in direct connection with the question persistently raised by the Luftwaffe of late that, in order to ensure the defense of the Ruhr region against enemy air attacks, it was necessary, if possible, to occupy all of Holland from the very beginning. And thanks to the already mentioned forced landing of two German pilots in Belgium, which occurred on the same day that General Jeschonnek put forward his proposal, it acquired extremely great significance.

One of the two officers served at the 7th Air Division headquarters in Munster. He was supposed to take part in a meeting on January 10 at the headquarters of the 2nd Air Fleet in Cologne about the use of paratroopers in the upcoming campaign. One of his friends persuaded him to fly there the next morning, although the officer was carrying secret documents that were forbidden to be taken on a plane in the immediate vicinity of the front. As already mentioned, the plane, in bad weather conditions, lost its course and made an emergency landing. When the officers were convinced that they were on Belgian territory, they tried to burn the documents. It is difficult to say how much they succeeded in this before the arrest, so there is every reason to believe that some of the secret documents fell into the hands of the enemy and now the Allies are more or less aware of the matter regarding the offensive plans of the Germans, as well as the planned use of airborne assault forces.

Hitler suspected, as always in such cases, of betrayal, ordered the arrest of the wives of both officers, and a search was carried out in their houses, as a result of which nothing incriminating was found. He removed Air Force General Felmy from his post as commander of the 2nd Air Fleet and appointed the former commander of the 1st Air Fleet, Colonel General Kesselring, in his place. However, first of all, he decided, under the pressure of circumstances, to use paratroopers differently. He was also imbued with the conviction that to ensure the security of the Ruhr region, the occupation of Holland was inevitable, he picked up the idea of ​​General Jeschonneck and on January 14 ordered an airborne assault on the Holland fortress, but not in the Amsterdam area, but further to the south - in the Rotterdam-Dordrecht area. In this way it was possible to capture the bridges over the Lek and the Waal lying there and, above all, the most important bridgeheads on the Meuse in the Moerdijk area, thereby opening the Holland fortress to the 18th Army. She was now tasked with sending her mobile forces through South Holland in order to establish contact with the landing force as quickly as possible.

It was particularly important to the 6th Army that the railway and road bridges across the Meuse at Maastricht, as well as the Albert Canal bridges immediately to the west and southwest of that city, remained intact. In addition, it was necessary to capture the strong fort of Eben-Emael, located 5 kilometers to the south. It was built as a left-flank stronghold of the Belgian fortifications on the Meuse in 1932 - 1935 and blocked the area from Wiese to Maastricht. Hitler turned his close attention to him in advance. Ideas came to his mind, on the one hand, unusually attractive, and on the other hand, contrary to a true soldier’s perception. The question remains open whether he was the only one who came up with them, but, in any case, the OKW and the Army General Staff did not participate in this. Fort Eben-Emael was to be captured in the pre-dawn twilight of the day of the attack by selected assault troops, who were transported in specially built cargo gliders. And to capture the bridges in Maastricht, on the night before the start of the offensive, a small detachment of SS men dressed in Dutch uniforms entered the city. It was not difficult for them to cope with the Dutch bridge guards. And the bridges over the Albert Canal to the west and southwest of the city were eventually to be captured by paratroopers.

In winter, the offensive forces of the army could be significantly increased. In mid-October, the leadership of the Army General Staff estimated the total number of divisions as 75 - 104. By the end of April, the number of divisions had increased to 148. Of these, 117 divisions were used on the Western Front, namely 73 in Army Groups A and B, 19 in Army Group C, and 25 behind the front line as army reserves.

Thus, every precaution was taken to ensure the success of the upcoming operation. At a meeting in the Reich Chancellery with his military advisers, Hitler expressed his conviction that the offensive in the West would lead to the greatest victory in world history. The attack was now set for 5.35 am on May 10th, and the Fuhrer looked to the future with optimism.

Hitler was not deceived in his expectations. True, the factor of surprise was only partially used - German troops most often encountered an enemy ready for defense, and a large number of bridges across the Meuse and canals were blown up, as were railway and road bridges in Maastricht, despite the fact that the SS men were in Dutch uniform on site on time. But the bridges over the canal to the west and southwest of the city fell into the hands of German paratroopers intact. Fort Eben-Emael was no longer able to participate in the fighting early in the morning of May 10, although its encircled garrison surrendered only at noon the next day. First of all, the decisive breakthrough of General von Kleist's tank group through the Southern Ardennes and through Sedan was completely successful. Success turned out to be beyond all usual ideas.

The French High Command expected that the main German attack would be directed on both sides of Liege towards Brussels, and according to this, when deployed, it placed the main defense area on the left flank of its armies, as the Germans had assumed. Here, between the coast of the Channel and the upper reaches of the Sambre, there was the 7th French army of General Giraud, which had seven divisions, the English army of General Lord Gort, which had nine divisions, and the 1st French army of General Blanchard, which consisted of seven divisions. Among the French units there were three light tank divisions. To the southeast - to the Meuse - were located the 9th Army of General Corap and the 2nd French Army under the command of General Huntzinger, which with its eastern flank adjoined the Maginot Line in the Longillon area. The first had seven, the last six infantry divisions, two partially motorized cavalry divisions and one cavalry brigade. These five armies formed the army group of General Billot, who also had a reserve of eleven divisions, including three French heavy armored divisions, five French motorized divisions and one British motorized division.

At the beginning of the offensive, the three armies of the left wing were immediately transferred to Belgium to the Namur-Louvain-Antwerp line in order to delay the expected German attack and push them back with a bilateral enveloping counteroffensive. The 9th Army, adjacent to the south, was supposed to advance to the Meuse in the Sedan-Namur sector. Here, given the serious natural obstacle - a river flowing in a deep valley - it was possible to use a relatively weak army - among its seven infantry divisions, only two were personnel, and there were not enough anti-tank weapons in it, since the French, like the Germans initially, considered the Ardennes practically impassable for large tank formations. Moreover, the deployment on the Meuse was very slow. It was this army that met the attack of the XV Panzer Corps on the northern flank in the Dinan area, and in the south - at the junction with the 2nd Army, the left flank of which consisted only of divisions of the third wave - a powerful blow from Kleist's tank group. The French army was unable to withstand such a strong double onslaught. Therefore, the advanced German tank formations were already able to cross the Meuse in the area of ​​Yvoire and Givet, as well as near Monterme, on May 13, expand the captured bridgeheads the next day and break through to Montcornet on May 15 - 70 kilometers west of Sedan. Thus, the desired operational breakthrough was achieved directly across the French front, and the victorious march of Kleist’s group to the coast of the Channel (Strait) began.

During this operation, extremely tense relations between Hitler and the OKH arose repeatedly. Hitler feared that Colonel General von Rundstedt's armored wedge, which had advanced far forward west of the Meuse, might encounter a strong enemy counterattack from the south before the lagging infantry could organize reliable flank protection on the Ardennes Canal and the Aisne. Therefore, on May 17, he wished that the tanks, which by that time had reached the line Avesnes - Guise - Marl - Rethel, would be stopped until a sufficient number of infantry divisions of the 12th Army arrived to cover the southern flank and replace those temporarily used for this the goals of General von Kleist's unit. The Commander-in-Chief and Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces did not neglect the danger of this kind of counterattack, based on the situation in which the enemy found himself as a result of the German breakthrough. However, at that moment they did not consider the threat to be immediate and believed that they could resist it at any time, providing flank protection with existing forces, which would be replenished from the rear every day and every hour. They saw a much more serious danger for the success of the breakthrough and encirclement operations in the fact that the enemy, if the tank wedge was delayed for a while, would have time to create a new defensive front on the Oise and the Sambre-Oise canal, where the German offensive could be stopped. They demanded the lifting of the ban on the continuation of the movement, to which Hitler agreed only after a very tense discussion on May 18. The operation was not damaged because the army command had not yet ordered the mobile formations to be stopped.

A new, this time fraught with extremely serious consequences, difference of opinion emerged a few days later. It was of great importance for the further course of operations, and, perhaps, for the war in general. After Kleist's tank group reached the mouth of the Somme in the area of ​​Abbeville on May 20, thereby making a breakthrough to the Channel coast, it was turned north to close the ring around the large northern enemy group, consisting of Belgian and British troops, as well as the 1st , units of the 7th and remnants of the 9th French Army. Advancing along the coast and east of it, German tank and motorized divisions reached Bethune and Saint-Omer on May 24 and were advancing on Calais when they were unexpectedly stopped by Hitler. He was of the opinion that the terrain of Flanders, cut by numerous water streams, would not allow strong tank formations to move through it and that the army group of Colonel General von Bock, advancing from the east, had by that time reached the line Ghent - Kortrijk - Valenciennes, perhaps itself, in cooperation with the Luftwaffe , complete the task of destroying the northern enemy group. Colonel-General von Brauchitsch, General Halder and the leading commanders operating in this theater of operations insisted in vain on the continuation of the tank attack of the Kleist group through Dunkirk in order to close the sea front and cut off the enemy from the still open embarkation ports. Hitler insisted on his point of view, in which he relied on the knowledge of the terrain of Flanders, which he personally acquired during the First World War, when he served as a simple soldier. The Fuhrer was supported by Colonel General Keitel and General Jodl. In addition, Hitler believed that tank and motorized formations, which were not as easy to recruit and replenish as infantry, should be protected and given a break before they moved on to the next stage of the campaign - breaking through the meanwhile created new French defensive front on the Aisne and Somme. And Kleist’s group received an unambiguous order to go on the defensive on the Bethune-Saint-Omer-Calais line, and von Bock’s army group, using all the forces at its disposal, to push the encircled enemy to the west. But what the commander-in-chief of the ground forces foresaw happened: the divisions of the 6th and 18th armies leading the frontal attack encountered ever-increasing resistance from the enemy leading a systematic retreat and moved forward very slowly. There was a fear that the formation of a giant cauldron would require quite a long time and the enemy would be able to evacuate a significant part of its forces by sea, especially since the unfavorable weather did not allow the full use of aviation. Therefore, on May 26, Hitler was forced to allow the movement of mobile forces in the direction of Ypres and, above all, a rapid rush to Dunkirk in order to prevent a widespread evacuation of enemy forces by sea. Nevertheless, it was not possible to complete the encirclement by cutting off the enemy from the sea, and the British managed to transport most of their troops to England, albeit without equipment, and part of the French troops. Cloudy weather also came to their aid. Subsequently, the British, not without reason, could claim a “brilliantly executed retreat maneuver,” but its success was primarily ensured by Hitler’s operational mistakes.

The second stage of the Western Campaign, the so-called Operation Rot, began on the morning of June 5 with the advance of Army Group B (4th, 6th and 9th Armies) through the Somme and the Oise-Aisne Canal to the lower Seine, the area north of Paris and the lower Marne . It was to be followed by the main attack of Army Group A (with the 2nd and 12th Armies) across the Aisne on either side of Reims and later by the 1st Army from the Saarbrücken area to Saarburg and the 7th Army across the Upper Rhine . The mobile forces moved in three groups: General Hoth's XV Panzer Corps (5th and 7th Panzer, 2nd Motorized Division) under the 4th Army from the Lower Seine to Rouen, General von Kleist's Panzer Group under the 6th Army XIV Panzer Corps (General von Wietersheim, 9th and 10th Panzer, 13th Motorized Division) from Amiens and XVI Panzer Corps (General Hoepner, 3rd and 4th Panzer, 20th Motorized Division) from Peron towards on Krei and General Guderian's Panzer Group (XXXIX Panzer Corps, General Schmidt, 1st and 2nd Panzer, 29th Motorized Division and XXXXI Panzer Corps, General Reinhardt, 6th and 8th Panzer Divisions) with 12- th army from the Rethel area to the south-southeast. It was envisaged that Kleist's Panzer Group, as soon as it reached the Oise in the Creil area, would move up to Army Group A. Then General Halder wanted, according to his original plan, to transfer both tank groups to the left wing of the troops operating in the direction of the main attack in the area of ​​​​Saint-Dizier and Bar-le-Duc, so that they would go from there, on the one hand, through Saint-Mihiel to Pont-a -Monsoon, separating part of the forces to Verdun, on the other hand, south of Toul to the upper Moselle. However, he abandoned this idea because at the beginning of June information was received about the concentration of French troops in the Paris area and, consequently, the relative weakening of the French Eastern Front, which had to be taken into account. It was necessary to consider the possibility of turning Army Group A to the southwest and concentrating combined tank groups in front of the left flank at Auxerre with the aim of conducting an operation to encircle the enemy in the Paris area. And in this case, the French forces located east of the Meuse had to be dealt with by the 16th Army and both armies of Group C.

The new plan did not arouse Hitler's enthusiasm. After the report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces on June 6, the plan seemed too risky to the Fuhrer. First, it is necessary, in accordance with the previous point of view, to deal a crushing blow to enemy forces in Alsace-Lorraine and to the west and crush the Maginot Line. To do this, Army Group A and with it the 9th Army launched a strike in the south-southeast direction on June 9. After Army Group B on the same day reached the 4th Army to the Seine in the Rouen region, the 6th Army to the area of ​​Creil and Villers-Cotterets, and the right flank of the 9th Army to the Marne at Chateau-Thierry , Hitler the next day ordered (at the suggestion of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces) to involve Kleist's tank group in the main operation and send it through Chateau-Thierry to Troyes, and turn Guderian's tank group advancing east of Reims to Vitry-le-Francois - Bar-les- Duke. From it, one tank and one motorized division were to approach the western and southern fronts of the Verdun fortress, the rapid capture of which Hitler attached great importance to. This capture was also supposed to have a strong moral impact on the French. However, it turned out that this was not necessary, because the offensive of the 16th Army from the north developed very quickly, and already on June 15, Verdun was taken by it. Other operations also developed systematically and with amazing speed, since the exhausted French army could now offer only weak resistance. Army Group B advanced on both sides of Paris, which was taken on the 14th, across the Seine to the lower Loire, where it reached a few days later. In front of Army Group A, which was advancing to the southeast, Kleist's tank group was moving, partly to the upper reaches of the Loire, and the main forces to Dijon. Guderian's Panzer Group advanced through Besançon towards the Swiss border, which it approached on 17 June. Kleist advanced along the Saône valley to Lyon, which was taken on the 20th, and sent, on Hitler's orders, a mobile unit to the lower Loire to strike along the Atlantic coast to Bordeaux. Guderian turned northeast to Mühlhausen and Epinal in order to, together with the 16th Army, which left Saarbrücken on June 14 for Lunéville with the 1st Army and the next day crossed the Upper Rhine with the 7th Army, to finish off the French forces in Alsace-Lorraine . Finally, another battle group created from the mountain troops and the XVI Panzer Corps under the command of Colonel-General List was allocated to move from Lyon to Grenoble and Chambery in order to open passage through the Alps for the Italians, who entered the war on July 11. But before it came to that, the conclusion of a truce on June 25 at 1.35 put an end to hostilities.

The incredibly rapid, highly successful campaign against the Western powers filled the German people with pride and excitement and filled the rest of the world with anxiety and doubt. What was truly disastrous for the German High Command and the entire further course of the war was that Hitler’s faith in himself and his own talents as the greatest strategist was strengthened many times over. At the same time, he began to pay much less attention to the advice given to him by the country's leading military figures. No less serious consequences were had by the fact that the German generals were now inclined to recognize certain intuitive abilities of their Supreme Commander in assessing the strategic situation. As a result of this, German generals were now more willing than before to fulfill Hitler's demands and did not contradict his plans, which were becoming more and more pretentious.

In fairness, it should be added that the idea of ​​​​breaking through Sedan, picked up by Hitler and implemented, made a decisive contribution to the success of the entire military campaign. But one or two successful ideas or timely insight are not a sign of a commander’s genius. The extent to which Hitler lacked spiritual and mental strength was demonstrated by his amateurish interventions at the beginning of the offensive in the West. This manifested itself in a slightly different way in the further course of the war.

However, the decisive factor for victory in the west was the quantitative and qualitative superiority of the German tank and air force. During the First World War, almost until the end, defense was the most powerful form of warfare; the lethal power of firearms was not fully used due to the lack of means of attack. Since that time, thanks to the development of engine technology, there has been a decisive change in the conditions of warfare. Modern tanks and aircraft were attack weapons of the highest penetrating power, operating at high speed. They could only be resisted if they had the same weapons. The defensive weapons that were simultaneously developed were no longer sufficient. Hitler, being a technically competent person, realized this in a timely manner and therefore tried in every possible way to speed up the construction of tanks and aircraft. The Germans united tank and motorized divisions, corps and large operational groups, which they used to achieve a decisive breakthrough in the main attack area. They were mobile and acted skillfully. Of great importance was the good organization of joint actions with the air force, which had very effective means of supporting ground forces, primarily dive bombers. Unlike the Germans, the French, in their views on the basic principles of using tank forces, did not move too far from the summer of 1918. They almost always used tanks in direct infantry support. At the same time, the French air force did not have dive bombers at all, and in general they had so few modern combat aircraft that they could not have any significant impact on the course of ground operations.

Tank blitzkrieg Baryatinsky Mikhail

OPERATION GELB

OPERATION GELB

The guns in Poland had not yet fallen silent, and the German General Staff had already begun planning military operations in the West. The first version of the OKH operational directive was ready on October 14, 1939. It was planned to use 75 divisions for the offensive in the West. 16 divisions were left to defend the Siegfried Line and 13 divisions in the east. On October 19, Brauchitsch signed a directive from the high command of the ground forces, which received the code name “Gelb” (“Yellow”).

According to this directive, the offensive on the northern flank was to be led by army unit N (3 infantry divisions), in the center - Army Group B (2nd, 6th and 4th field armies - 37 divisions, of which 8 tank and 2 motorized) and on the left flank - Army Group A (12th and 16th field armies - 27 divisions, of which 1 tank and 2 motorized).

A train with Pz.I and Pz.II tanks before being sent to the west. Poland, November 1939.

This first version of the strategic plan continued the traditional ideas of the German General Staff, which had developed long before the First World War: to attack France through Belgium and Holland, attacking with the right flank. But in 1914 such a blow had far-reaching goals. In October 1939, the Belgian direction was chosen because, firstly, German industrialists were afraid for the Ruhr and wanted to protect it from invasion and air raids; secondly, the German command sought to counter the expected Allied offensive in Belgium with its own counteroffensive; thirdly, to capture the Belgian coast and create the preconditions for further warfare, the prospects and methods of which were not yet entirely clear.

The order to go on the offensive was given and the readiness date was set - November 12, 1939. However, the date for the invasion of France was soon pushed back to the spring of 1940, mainly due to the unpreparedness of the German armed forces for the “big war” with France and England. The latter themselves gave Germany time to prepare, and the Germans did not waste it. The main attention was paid to aviation and tank forces.

This train with the motorized part of the Wehrmacht is also heading west. Opel Blitz trucks are on the platforms. 1940

After the Polish campaign, the Germans increased the number of tank divisions to ten, converting all four light divisions into tanks. The latter had a regular structure with not two, but one tank regiment, albeit of three battalions. However, it was not possible to fully equip them with the regular number of all types of tanks. However, the “old” five tank divisions were not much different from the “new” ones in this regard. A tank regiment, for example, was supposed to have 54 Pz.III and Pz.Bf.Wg.III tanks. It is not difficult to calculate that there should have been 540 Pz.III in ten tank regiments of five divisions. However, this number of tanks was not simply physical. Guderian complained about this: “The re-equipment of tank regiments with tanks of the Pz.III and Pz.IV types, which was especially important and necessary, progressed extremely slowly due to the weak production capacity of the industry, as well as as a result of the mothballing of new types of tanks by the main command of the ground forces.”

The first reason expressed by the general is indisputable, the second is highly doubtful. The presence of tanks in the troops was quite consistent with the number of vehicles produced by May 1940.

Be that as it may, the Germans had to concentrate scarce medium and heavy tanks in formations operating in the directions of the main attacks. Thus, in the 1st Panzer Division of Guderian’s corps there were 68 Pz.III tanks and 40 Pz.IV tanks. The 2nd Panzer Division had 58 Pz.III and 32 Pz.IV. Other divisions had fewer combat vehicles of these types.

To undermine the fortifications of the Maginot Line, a number of Pz.I tanks were converted into Ladungsleger I destroyer tanks.

By the beginning of active hostilities in the West, the Panzerwaffe had 3,620 tanks, of which 2,597 were in combat-ready condition. At the same time, the majority of non-combat-ready tanks were light Pz.I - about 700 units. The share of medium and heavy tanks has increased significantly. The troops already had 381 medium Pz.III tanks and 290 heavy Pz.IV tanks (until 1943, the Germans classified tanks by weapon caliber, so the Pz.IV, armed with a 75-mm cannon, was considered heavy). True, only 349 and 278 vehicles of these two types, respectively, were in immediate readiness for combat. As for the Pz.II light tanks, they still formed the basis of the Panzerwaffe fleet: by the time of the attack on France there were 1,110 of them, of which 955 were combat-ready. The number of Czech-made combat vehicles in the troops also increased significantly. At the same time, the number of Pz.35(t) tanks already out of production remained almost unchanged and amounted to 138 line and command vehicles (versus 120 on the eve of the Polish campaign). But the number of significantly more effective Pz.38(t) has increased. If in September 1939 the Wehrmacht had 78 combat vehicles of this type, then by May 1940 the 7th and 8th Panzer Divisions already had 230 Pz.38(t) line and command tanks.

For the invasion of France, the Wehrmacht was replenished with completely new types of combat vehicles. Thus, in 1940, the formation of the first batteries of assault guns began, of which four were ready by May. Each battery included 6 StuG III Ausf.A assault guns.

Shortly before the French campaign, German tank units were replenished with another self-propelled gun. We are talking about a 47-mm Czech anti-tank gun on the chassis of the Pz.I light tank. 132 units of these vehicles, called Panzerjöger I, were ordered. In anti-tank companies of tank divisions, they equipped one company each - 12 vehicles.

Overhaul of Pz.35(t) tanks and assembly of Panzerjöger I self-propelled guns (apparently in the workshop of the Skoda plant). 1940

As part of the 701st - 706th companies of heavy infantry guns, 38 150-mm self-propelled infantry guns, also on the chassis of the Pz.I tank, were preparing to take part in the battles.

By the beginning of May, the Wehrmacht had 338 half-track armored personnel carriers, 800 light and 333 heavy armored vehicles.

In addition to the qualitative and quantitative growth of the Panzerwaffe, in the winter of 1940, the provisions of the Gelb plan continued to be improved. As the plans of the Allied command became more and more refined, the Wehrmacht leadership more and more confidently abandoned the main attack in the West with the northern flank, which did not promise major results, and came to the idea of ​​​​moving the main efforts to the southern section of the front favorable for the offensive, to the region of the Ardennes Mountains, with the aim of exiting to the rear of the northern group of Allied armies and its defeat.

The initiator of the new version of the Gelb plan was the chief of staff of Army Group A, Lieutenant General E. von Manstein. This is how it looks like as presented by G. Guderian: “One day in November 1939, Manstein asked me to come see him. He expressed to me his views regarding an attack by large armored forces through Luxembourg and the southern part of Belgium on the Maginot Line at Sedan with the aim of breaking through this fortified sector, and then the entire French front. Manstein asked me to consider his proposal from the point of view of an armored forces specialist. After a detailed study of the maps and on the basis of personal acquaintance with the conditions of the terrain during the First World War, I was able to assure Manstein that the operation he was planning was feasible. The only condition that I could set was the use of a sufficient number of tank and motorized divisions in this offensive, and best of all!”

An assault gun unit crosses the Dutch border. May 1940. In the foreground is a StuG III Ausf.A assault gun.

However, Manstein was not the only one who thought about the shortcomings of the original plan. Already in mid-October 1939, the commander of the 6th Army Reichenau told General Bock that a possible frontal clash on the Franco-Belgian border could lead to “losing the operation.” The commander of the 4th Army, Kluge, expressed the same opinion. Bock fully shared this point of view. He wrote to the OKH on October 12: “An offensive with the intended purpose will have no prospects for decisive military success.”

On February 24, 1940, the Wehrmacht High Command issued a directive that contained the final version of the Gelb plan. The idea of ​​the operation was to cut the Allied front with a blow from a powerful group of troops, press the enemy’s northern group to the English Channel and destroy it. The direction of the main attack passed through the Ardennes to the mouth of the Somme, south of the deployment area of ​​the Franco-British troops intended to advance to Belgium, and north of the Maginot Line. The core of the strike force was to consist of tank and motorized formations, the actions of which were supported by large aviation forces.

To support the operation from the south and repel possible counterattacks of French troops from the depths of the country in the northern direction, it was planned to create an external defense front along the line of the Aisne, Oise and Somme rivers. Subsequently, from this line, it was planned to conduct a second strategic operation with the goal of the final defeat of France.

The German troops located north of the strike group had to quickly capture Holland, invade the north-eastern part of Belgium, break through the defenses of the Belgian army and divert as many Anglo-French troops as possible. The planned advance of a strong group of allies to Belgium, which became known to the Wehrmacht command, significantly facilitated the implementation of the main plan of Operation Gelb. The most combat-ready British and French divisions, advancing in accordance with the “Diehl Plan” to Belgium, were to be pinned down in order to ensure an offensive on the main direction.

The troops concentrated against the Maginot Line should not have allowed the transfer of opposing French forces to the direction of the Wehrmacht's main attack through the Ardennes.

German tanks (the lead one is Pz.III Ausf.E) on one of the streets of Rotterdam. May 1940.

In accordance with the Gelb plan, three army groups were deployed, consisting of 8 armies (a total of 136 divisions, of which 10 tank and 7 motorized), whose actions were supported by two air fleets.

To deliver the main attack in a strip 170 km wide - from Rötgen (south of Aachen) to the junction of the borders of Germany, Luxembourg and France - Army Group A under the command of Colonel General von Rundstedt occupied the starting area. It included the 4th, 12th and 16th armies (45 divisions in total, including 7 tank and 3 motorized).

This group of armies had the task of passing through the Ardennes through the territory of Luxembourg and Southern Belgium, reaching the Meuse, forcing it between Dinan and Sedan, breaking through the enemy defenses at the junction of the 9th and 2nd French armies and delivering a cutting blow in the north-west direction to English Channel. Rundstedt's troops were also entrusted with securing the left flank of the advancing strike force from a possible enemy counterattack from the fortified area of ​​Metz-Verdun. It was planned to use the bulk of the mobile troops in the first echelon of Army Group A. In the center, in the zone of the 12th Army, the tank group of General P. Kleist was concentrated, which included two tank and one motorized corps (1250 tanks). Here we should immediately make a reservation - in 1940 the Wehrmacht did not yet have tank and motorized corps. All corps were army corps, sometimes the prefix (mot. - motorisiert) was added to them. However, it is more convenient to name them by their actual composition.

Heavy armored radio vehicles Sd.Kfz.263 (8-Rad) from the 38th communications battalion of the 2nd tank division of the Wehrmacht overcome a water barrier. Belgium, May 1940.

On the right, in the offensive zone of the 4th Army, the tank corps of General G. Hoth (542 tanks) had to operate. The actions of Rundstedt's Army Group were supported by aviation from the 3rd Air Fleet.

Army Group B, under the command of Colonel General von Bock, consisting of the 18th and 6th armies (29 divisions, of which 3 tank and 2 motorized) deployed from the North Sea coast to Aachen and was supposed to capture Holland and prevent the connection of the Dutch armies with Allied forces, break through the defenses created by the Belgians along the Albert Canal, push back the Anglo-Franco-Belgian troops beyond the Antwerp-Namur line and pin them down with active actions. In the offensive zone of Army Group B in Holland and Belgium, it was planned to drop parachute groups, which were supposed to capture bridges along the routes of the advancing troops, airfields, disorganize defense control and carry out sabotage. Particular attention was paid to the capture by airborne forces of the Liege fortified area, which blocked the path to Central Belgium. Air support for Bock's Army Group was provided by the 2nd Air Fleet.

Army Group C, under the command of Colonel General von Leeb, consisting of the 1st and 7th armies (19 divisions), occupied positions along the Franco-German border. She received the task of providing defense in a 350 km section - from the Franco-Luxembourg border to Basel. By active reconnaissance operations and demonstrating readiness for an offensive in the Palatinate region, von Leeb's troops were to mislead the French command and pin down as many French divisions as possible on the Maginot Line and on the Rhine. In addition, Army Group C was supposed to assist in securing the southern flank of the strike force.

There were 42 divisions left in the reserve of the German ground forces command. They were intended to be used to build up the attack on the main direction.

The Utility B tractor of one of the Belgian Army's anti-tank units is towing a 47 mm FRC mod anti-tank gun. 1932. May 1940.

The Gelb plan was designed to wage a fast-moving war. The Wehrmacht command did its best to avoid a repetition of the events of September 1914, when the armies of William II were stopped by the French on the Marne, and the war took on a protracted positional character. The calculation was made to maximize the use of the surprise factor, create a decisive superiority in forces in the main direction and massive use of tanks and aircraft.

In this regard, one cannot ignore the von Kleist tank group, which was created on the basis of the German General Staff's study of the experience of the Polish campaign, especially the 10th Army with its three mobile corps and the Guderian group created on the left flank of Army Group North after September 8 1939. Kleist's group, which made up the strike force, had to overcome the Ardennes, cross the Meuse River at Sedan and go to the rear of the main Allied forces conducting operations in Belgium and Northern France. The crossing of the Ardennes Mountains was thought out in every detail. Detailed information about roads, water barriers, bridges, and crossings was collected at German headquarters. Methods for moving vehicles off-road and ways to overcome all kinds of obstacles were developed. The assault troops were trained in crossing water obstacles such as the Meuse River in rubber inflatable boats. The Army Corps of Engineers created designs for easy-to-use and fast pontoon ferries and bridges. Motorized infantry spent at least six months learning to move through mountains and forests.

A Belgian anti-tank battery moves towards German tanks. May 1940.

The tank group was an unusually powerful formation. Its 5 tank and 3 motorized divisions, a large number of corps and army units, rear services totaled 134,370 people, 41,140 various vehicles, including 1,250 tanks and 362 armored vehicles. The group interacted closely with aviation - with the headquarters of the 3rd Air Fleet, the 2nd Air Corps, especially with the Stutterheim short-range bomber group that supported it, and with the 1st Air Defense Corps.

An unavoidable lack of planning for the Kleist group’s actions included the fact that it received only four through routes through the Ardennes on a front 35 km wide, although it needed at least five. She did not have an independent zone of action, but was a “guest” in the zones of the armies, which were reluctant to give way to her. The narrow offensive front and extreme congestion of routes made the group extremely vulnerable from the air. The length of its marching columns on each of the routes, including reinforcements and rears, exceeded 300 km!

The Allies here had another chance to disrupt the German offensive with their aircraft. However, they did not use this chance either.

It must be said that almost all of the operational-strategic planning of the French command in 1939–1940 essentially came down only to the development of a troop maneuver to Belgium. The Allies' plans testified to the passive nature of their strategic concept and major miscalculations in assessing the likely course of hostilities, as well as an underestimation of new means and methods of armed struggle. And this at a time when, even without taking into account the French forces in the Alps and Africa, there was obvious superiority of the Allies over the Wehrmacht in forces and means. The Germans only had a slight advantage in aviation. As for tanks, the Allied command on the North-Eastern Front had 3,099 tanks at its disposal, many of which were superior to German vehicles in armor protection and armament, although they were inferior to them in mobility. But the quantitative advantage of the Allies lost its significance due to the fact that most French tanks were consolidated into separate tank battalions distributed between the armies. This limited the possibilities of their use. On the North-Eastern Front, half of all tank battalions were part of the 2nd Army Group, in whose defense zone the enemy did not plan active combat operations. The 2nd and 9th armies, which were to be attacked by Kleist's tank group, had only 6 tank battalions! Organizationally, German tanks were part of tank formations and were intended for massive use. The French command had only three tank divisions at its disposal, and even those were not intended to be used in the main attack zone of the German troops.

Light tank ASG1 from a separate armored squadron of the cavalry corps of the Belgian army. May 1940. On the side of the tower is the squadron emblem.

At 5:35 a.m. on May 10, 1940, Wehrmacht ground forces began their invasion of Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg.

Having received information about the start of the German offensive and a request from the governments of Belgium and Holland for help, the French commander-in-chief General Gamelin at 6:35 gave the order to the 1st Army Group to enter Belgium according to the “Diehl Plan”. At the same time, the left-flank 7th Army had to maneuver according to the “Bred option”, that is, advance to Holland, establish contact with the Dutch army and protect the poorly fortified gap between the Belgian and Dutch defensive lines. The 2nd Army Group received orders to move part of its forces to Luxembourg.

Cavalry and mechanized divisions moved forward in all directions. According to the calculations of the French General Staff, they had to win the 5-6 days necessary for the main forces of the Allied armies to be stationed on the line of defense provided for by the Diehl Plan. The same calculations said that the Germans would not be able to conduct an attack with significant forces across the Meuse River southwest of Liege and through the Albert Canal before the 5th day of the offensive; therefore, the “Diehl maneuver” was supposed to be carried out without much hindrance.

A 1.5-ton Krupp L2H143 truck with a 37-mm cannon on a trailer from one of the Wehrmacht motorized units on the street of Liege. Belgium, May 1940.

The Allied command decisively rushed the armies forward. The mines on the Belgian border have been removed and the barriers have been opened. The French army and British expeditionary forces left their positions that had been so long and carefully prepared along the Franco-Belgian border and moved along all roads to the Antwerp-Louvain-Namur line, welcomed by the population of Belgian cities and villages. The generals' imagination pictured a well-equipped front on this line with a system of anti-tank barriers and trenches. True, due to Belgian neutrality, not a single French officer had ever seen this position; so far it existed only on headquarters maps. It is easy to imagine the disappointment of the first French reconnaissance groups, who arrived on May 10 at the “Diele position” and, instead of powerful defensive structures, saw an open plain, suitable only for the maneuver of German tanks.

On the same day, alarming information about events in Holland and Belgium began to arrive at Allied headquarters. German airborne assault forces were dropped in Holland and managed to capture several bridges on the Meuse and Waal rivers. The German 18th Army broke the resistance of the Dutch border troops, captured the northeastern provinces and broke through the defensive positions on the Pel Line on the very first day. The Dutch troops hastily retreated behind the water barriers to Fortress Holland. On May 14, part of the forces of the 9th Panzer Division occupied the seaside town of Bergen op Zoom, thereby cutting off the Dutch army from the rest of the allied forces. On the same day, the main forces of the 9th Panzer Division and the SS Adolf Hitler regiment captured Rotterdam, and on May 15 entered The Hague.

Self-propelled anti-aircraft installation of a 37-mm FlaK 36 automatic cannon based on the Sd.Kfz.6/2 half-track tractor on the bank of the river. Maas. Belgium, May 1940.

The German 6th Army struck further south - through Maastricht. Having crossed the Meuse with units of the 4th Army Corps and the 4th Panzer Division, it fought and advanced several kilometers west of the river. In view of the obvious threat to the defense on the Albert Canal, the Belgian General Staff decided already on the evening of May 10 to withdraw the main forces of the army to the main line of defense, that is, to the Antwerp-Louvain line, and here to stop the enemy with the forces of formations withdrawn and brought up from the depths. This was part of the very line towards which the 1st Allied Army Group was now moving. By the evening of May 11, the French 1st Army had reached its intended position; the left-flank formations of the 9th Army, marching to the right, were approaching the Meuse south of Namur; the vanguard of the British Expeditionary Force appeared at the River Dyle. On the morning of May 11, the 4th German Panzer Division quickly completed crossing the Meuse and moved along the roads to the southwest, bypassing the Liege fortress from the north. Following it, 6 infantry divisions advanced, expanding the breakthrough towards the northern flank. By mid-day, the Meuse had already been crossed in the Maastricht area at a front of up to 30 km. The Belgian formations quickly retreated.

A Belgian T.13 Type III self-propelled gun captured by the Wehrmacht.

Meanwhile, on the evening of May 11 in Holland, the city of Breda was captured by German tanks. The next day, the advance detachment of the 9th Panzer Division, supported by aircraft, linked up with the paratroopers holding the bridge over the Meuse at Moerdijk. The intention of the commander of German Army Group B was to turn the 9th Panzer Division to invade "Fortress Holland" from the south. The Dutch defense system was falling apart. Having lost faith in Anglo-French support, feeling abandoned and exhausted, representatives of the Dutch command notified the Nazi leadership on May 13 of their desire to begin negotiations. The quick surrender of Holland and the unsuccessful actions of the 7th Army, rushing to its aid, were the first blow to the Allies. The 18th German Army was being released, the appearance of which was soon to be expected in Belgium.

The 4th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht, advancing in Belgium, crossed the Albert Canal on the morning of May 11. The next day, in the area of ​​Annu, Tisne, Vansen, she came across the French 1st Mechanized Cavalry Corps under the command of General Priou. Due to the resistance offered by the French light mechanized divisions, General Hoepner threw his entire tank corps into battle on May 13th. Fierce tank battles ensued, in which both sides suffered heavy losses. For example, the 3rd DLM alone lost 105 tanks, while German losses amounted to 164 tanks. On May 14, the 16th German Tank Corps, continuing its offensive, approached the first Belgian line of anti-tank barriers at Cointet, which, unfortunately for the defenders, was not continuous, and in the afternoon attacked French positions near Gembloux. The offensive resumed on May 15 and 16 did not lead, despite the massive support of attack aircraft, to a breakthrough of the front of the 1st French Army, whose artillery inflicted heavy losses on the German tank divisions. The German offensive in Belgium was stopped, and the Allied command took heart, not yet knowing that this fact no longer decided anything. The main events developed to the south, in the offensive zone of the German Army Group A.

German tanks Pz.II Ausf.C in France. May 1940.

At the very time when the Belgian army was fighting heavy battles, and the 1st Group of Allied Armies was rushing to its aid, a German strike force was already moving to the south, in the Ardennes, to which no one had yet paid attention. Throughout the night of May 10, hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles, thousands of trucks and motorcycles of the Kleist group roared on the roads, approaching the Luxembourg border. At 5:35 the advanced tank detachments crossed the border line. Luxembourg was asleep, and not a single rifle shot was heard on the border. German troops poured into the Ardennes. The well-prepared march proceeded without delay. The mechanized columns encountered unguarded concrete fences on the mountain roads, not much taller than a man, with iron rails built into them, deep holes, and minefields, which the German engineering troops were prepared to overcome. Ramps with decking were installed to the fences, and cars drove freely over the obstacles. Detours were made around the pits. A small group of motorcyclists forded the border river Ourcq and passed electrically controlled and even unlocked iron gates. A battalion of German paratroopers landed behind the Belgian border fortifications near Martelange and occupied them, opening the way for the armored vanguards further west.

A column of vehicles of the 37th engineer battalion of the 1st tank division of the Wehrmacht in the Sedan area. France, May 1940.

At the beginning of the offensive, Kleist's tank group was positioned as follows: in front was the 19th Panzer Corps, which was entrusted with carrying out the breakthrough; on the right flank the 41st Panzer Corps, which covered the actions of the tank group from the north and interacted with Guderian’s corps; behind them is the 14th Army Corps. In addition to its three tank divisions, the 19th Tank Corps also had separate units: the Grossdeutschland regiment, an artillery regiment (two 105 mm and one 150 mm howitzer divisions), an anti-aircraft artillery regiment, a communications battalion, an engineer battalion, a squadron reconnaissance aircraft. The corps reached the Belgian border on a stretch of about 40 km between Bastogne and Arlon, built at an angle forward: in front and in the center was the 1st Panzer Division, followed by separate units. Behind, on the flanks, were: on the right the 2nd Panzer Division and on the left the 10th Panzer Division. Resuming its advance on the morning of May 11, the 1st Panzer Division encountered a second line of destruction and defensive structures in Neuchateau. She captured Neuchateau, but at Bertry she was attacked by units of the French 5th Light Cavalry Division, which she managed to repulse. Then turning south, the tanks of this division broke into Bouillon, but failed to completely capture this settlement. After this, the motorcyclists of the 1st Panzer Division managed to cross the river. Semois in the zone of the 2nd Panzer Division and create a bridgehead on the southern bank of the river. In the first half of May 12, having completed a 110-km march along mountain roads, German tank divisions crossed the French border and began to reach the Meuse.

The R35 light tank rushes towards German troops. May 1940.

Crossing the river The Meuse south of Namur was planned to be carried out simultaneously on May 13 and 14 by the 15th Panzer Corps north of Dinant and Kleist's Panzer Group near Monterme (41st Panzer Corps) and Sedan (19th Panzer Corps). Each of these corps was supposed to attack only on a very narrow front - 2.5 km, but their joint offensive on a sector of 80 km (from Dinan to the area east of Sedan) was supposed to collapse the entire French defense system.

On the night of May 13, the motorized infantry of the 7th Panzer Division of the 15th Panzer Corps crossed the Meuse in inflatable boats and captured a bridgehead 3–4 km wide and of the same depth, which the French failed to liquidate the next day. On May 14, the 15th Tank Corps, supported by powerful air strikes, transported its tanks to the left bank and expanded the bridgehead to 25 km along the front and to 12 km in depth. On May 15, the 15th Panzer Corps encountered the French 1st Armored Division north of Flavion.

German tank Pz.IV Ausf.B of the 10th Panzer Division in the vicinity of Sedan. France, May 1940.

The 1st Armored Division was a strong, well-equipped force with 150 tanks. She arrived on the morning of May 12 from Champagne to the Charleroi area. The French command, confident that the Germans were delivering the main blow in Belgium, in accordance with pre-war calculations, intended to introduce the division into battle in the 1st Army zone on the Belgian front. But on May 14, the dimensions of the 9th Army’s disaster began to emerge more and more clearly. On the afternoon of May 14, the commander of the 1st Armored Division, General Bruno, received a new task by telephone - to urgently transfer the division to the southeast, counterattack the enemy in the Dinan area and push him back across the Meuse. The tanks moved towards the Meuse, but soon found themselves in a continuous stream of refugees, convoys and soldiers retreating in disarray. The slow, endless march among the crowds of people moving towards them led the division into complete disorder. The tank crews were mortally tired. Driving in low gears and constantly switching them led to increased fuel consumption, and the tankers were located at the tail of the convoy, stretching for tens of kilometers. Only by the morning of May 15 did trucks with fuel reach the combat units. Two battalions of B1bis tanks were refueling when they were attacked at 8:30 am, first by German Ju.87 bombers and then by General Rommel's 7th Panzer Division. Having discovered that the shells of their tank guns did not penetrate the armor of heavy French tanks, the Germans began to hit the tracks and radiator shutters. The absence of radio stations on most French tanks made it very difficult to control the battle, and the tanks acted either individually or in small groups.

The 7th Panzer Division began to outflank the French, leaving them to the 5th Panzer Division moving on the right. By this time, almost nothing remained of the two French battalions: one had four B1bis tanks in service, the other two. According to the French, they knocked out up to 100 German tanks in this battle, which in itself is quite possible. But the nature of German losses differs from French ones. The 1st DCR retreated to Beaumont and then to Aven, abandoning the battlefield. Therefore, all French tanks can be considered lost forever, but German ones cannot. However, General Bruno still had a battalion of R35 tanks at his disposal, which did not participate in the battle on May 15. However, due to a lack of fuel, serviceable tanks had to be abandoned during the retreat, and the 1st DCR reached Aven with only 17 combat vehicles. Not far from Aven on May 16, these tanks were discovered by the advancing 7th German Panzer Division, which completed the destruction of the French formation.

Light tank Pz.II Ausf.S on the road to Sedan. 2nd Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht, France, May 1940.

The 2nd Armored Division on May 13 at noon was alerted in the Chalon camp and moved to Soir-le-Chateau to the reserve of the main command. At the very time when the bombardment preceding the attack on Sedan was especially intensifying, General Georges ordered the 2nd Armored Division to be sent after Bruno's 1st Division to Belgium to assist the 1st Army. But as soon as the first echelons moved to Belgium, a new order came from the commander of the North-Eastern Front. Concerned about the position of the 9th Army, he changed his original decision and transferred the 2nd Armored Division to the 9th Army. Due to the unimaginable confusion with orders, which were repeatedly canceled, and the terrible confusion that reigned in these days on the railways, the division was literally transported piecemeal to different areas and ceased to exist without ever reaching the battlefield.

French 25-mm anti-tank gun "Hotchkiss" mod. 1934.

Meanwhile, Kleist's group crossed the Meuse between Monterme and Sedan.

The 41st Panzer Corps crossed the Meuse at Nuzonville on May 15. Having filtered between the retreating French columns, German tanks approached Liar; some of them even advanced as far as Montcornet, located 80 km from the Meuse. After this, the 41st Tank Corps, in close cooperation with the 19th Corps, could begin to build on the success.

The 19th Panzer Corps used the night of May 12–13 and the morning of May 13 to prepare for the crossing of the Meuse simultaneously by the 1st and 10th Panzer Divisions.

A damaged German light tank Pz.I Ausf.A from the 5th Panzer Division. France, May 1940.

The 2nd Panzer Division only supported them with the forces of its advanced units (reconnaissance battalion, motorcycle battalion, artillery) and therefore did not cross the Meuse on the same day. The offensive was preceded by a massive bombardment carried out by 12 squadrons of dive bombers. As a result of air raids, which lasted from 8 a.m. to 3 p.m. and then with maximum intensity from 3 p.m. 50 minutes. until 16:00, French artillery (especially anti-aircraft) was suppressed, field fortifications were destroyed, and telephone communications were interrupted. The bombing had a significant morale impact, and the thick dust and smoke blinded the defenders. German artillery (4 divisions of 105 mm howitzers, including 2 belonging to the 1st Panzer Division, and 2 to the artillery regiment of the 19th Tank Corps; 4 divisions of 150 mm howitzers, including one each from the 1st, 2 1st and 10th tank divisions and one from the artillery regiment of the 19th tank corps) operated on a front of 2.5 km from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. and especially intensively in the last 10 minutes. Anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns and tanks fired directly at the embrasures of the French fortifications. This bombardment allowed the infantry to cross the Meuse in inflatable boats. The attackers managed to break through the front in the sector of the 55th French Infantry Division and by the end of the day captured defensive structures on the banks of the Meuse. At midnight, the advanced units reached Sheery and Chaumont, creating a bridgehead 5–6 km deep on the left bank of the Meuse. At night, tanks, light artillery and trucks crossed the Meuse via a bridge built at Gaulier. The 10th Panzer Division, finding itself under French artillery fire, managed to transport only minor forces to the left bank. On the morning of May 14, this division managed to cross the Meuse between Vadlencourt and Basel, and the 2nd Panzer Division, taking advantage of the French retreat, did so at Donchery.

Light tank Pz.38(t) from the 10th Tank Regiment of the 8th Tank Division. France, 1940.

On the same day, the French 3rd Armored Division (two battalions of B1bis tanks and two battalions of H39 tanks) received orders to move east to the Sedan area. The march proceeded slowly. B1bis tanks experienced difficulties at every river crossing - not all bridges could withstand 32-ton combat vehicles. However, the column faced even greater difficulties when it had to move through crowds of refugees and retreating French soldiers. The hysteria was such that it happened that French troops opened fire on their own tanks, mistaking them for German ones.

The 3rd DCR reached the Stene area around 06:00 on 15 May. She was ordered to attack the city at 11:00 in conjunction with the 2nd Light Cavalry Division (DLC). However, the commander of the 3rd Armored Division, not wanting to throw his battalions into the attack almost on the move, gave the order to go on the defensive, especially since the vague orders of the higher command could be interpreted in different ways. The tanks of the three battalions were dispersed along the 20 km front in the form of barriers, one B1bis and two H39s in each.

French campaign of 1940.

When the time came to attack, it was not possible to fully assemble the tanks scattered across the area. In addition, the approaching motorized regiment "Greater Germany" managed to organize a strong defense around the Wall, saturated with a large number of anti-tank guns. The indiscriminate attacks launched by the French at the end of the day were repulsed. On the night of May 15-16, a company of B1bis tanks and a battalion of H39 again moved towards the Wall, but, having lost 33 tanks, were forced to retreat. The tanks of the 10th tank and motorized infantry of the 2nd motorized division of the Wehrmacht had already arrived at the battle area, and the belated attacks of scattered units of the 3rd DCR became useless.

Tank Pz.III Ausf.E on the street of a French town. May 1940.

It should be noted that against the background of unsuccessful actions of French tank units and formations, small groups and even individual tanks fought quite successfully. For example, on May 16, 1940, B1bis tanks of the 41st battalion received orders to attack German positions near Stene. Later, the battalion commander, Captain Malaguti, who led the attack, recalled: “This attack was carried out in the best conditions, as in maneuvers. It was carried out quickly, and in about twenty minutes, having destroyed many German infantrymen - very good fighters, we captured Stene.” On the northwestern outskirts of the city, the captain's tank unexpectedly came across a German tank column standing on the highway. Without hesitation, he opened fire from a distance of 30 m. At the same time, Captain Billot’s B1bis approached from the other side of the highway. French tank crews managed to disable 13 German tanks (two Pz.IV and 11 Pz.III) within 15 minutes. But this particular success had no effect on the situation as a whole.

A German officer inspects a damaged French B1bis tank. In front of the vehicle lies the commander's cupola, torn off by an internal explosion.

On May 15, German tank divisions broke through the French front in two places: in the center of the French 9th Army and on the left flank of the French 2nd Army. On the night of May 16, the development of success was almost stopped by the order of von Kleist, according to which the tank corps were to remain in place to strengthen the defense of the bridgeheads on the Meuse. This was the first stop order during the French campaign. The appearance of this order at first glance looks quite strange, but if you look at it, it is quite understandable.

Damaged medium tank Pz.III Ausf.E. France, May 1940. Judging by the image of a bison on the side of the turret, this tank belongs to the 7th Panzer Regiment of the 10th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht.

Indeed, in the direction of the main attack of Group A, five German tank divisions could move freely into an open 50-kilometer space. Of these, three (1st, 2nd, 6th) reached Montcornet on a narrow front, and the advanced detachments of Guderian’s corps were already approaching the Marl road junction, located 20 km west of this point. “The offensive of the strike force, conducted in the form of a wedge,” wrote the chief of the German general staff, Halder, on that day, “is developing very successfully. West of the Meuse everything was in motion.” However, the German command could not even imagine that the French military leadership would be so helpless that it would allow the Wehrmacht to achieve such brilliant results at such an inexpensive price. Still not believing what was happening and expecting growing French resistance in the near future, without overcoming the confusion in organizing the actions of the tank group, the main command of the ground forces categorically ordered to stop the offensive. It considered it necessary, as planned before the outbreak of hostilities, to secure a bridgehead across the Meuse, for which purpose the 14th Army Corps was to be transferred to it. The high command responded to Guderian's requests to allow movement forward with a decisive refusal. The conflict that began became increasingly acute. “It could never have occurred to me,” writes Guderian, “that my superiors were still thinking of gaining a foothold on the bridgehead at the Meuse... However, I was monstrously mistaken.” There was open space ahead, but the German tanks stopped. However, Guderian's violent reaction prompted him to first postpone the execution of the order for a day, and then completely cancel it. Guderian demanded that the tankers move forward without delay or stops. The situation on the 190-kilometer front between the Sambre and Aisne rivers became catastrophic for the French.

A D2 medium tank from the 345th Independent Tank Company (345e CACC), part of the French 4th Armored Division, hurries to the front line. Laon area, May 16, 1940. Noteworthy is the landing of the vehicle commander in a stowed position on the hinged cover of the rear turret hatch.

However, the retreating 9th French Army was planning a counterattack from the south against the flank of the German divisions turning west. The main hopes were placed on the newly formed 4th Armored Division of Colonel de Gaulle. On May 11, 1940, it had 215 tanks of various types. Formed after the outbreak of hostilities, it was a complex conglomerate of units of various levels of training. On this occasion, de Gaulle wrote in his memoirs: “Meanwhile, I received for replenishment the 3rd Cuirassier Regiment, which consisted of two squadrons of SOMUA tanks (medium tank S35 - Author's note). However, the tank crews were headed by commanders who had never fired a gun before, and the drivers had a total of no more than four hours of driving a tank under their belts.”

In addition to the S35 battalion, the 4th DCR included a battalion of heavy tanks B1bis, two battalions of light R35s, a company of medium tanks D2 and one infantry battalion.

Colonel de Gaulle - commander of the 4th Armored Division. May 1940.

With these forces, de Gaulle launched an offensive on May 17 northeast of Laon in the direction of Montcornet in order to cut the road junction and prevent the enemy from approaching the positions that the 6th Army, which was advancing from the reserve, was supposed to occupy. Overturning the Germans, the 4th DCR advanced 20 kilometers and approached Montcornet. But de Gaulle failed to take the city by crossing the Serre River. His division was subjected to severe artillery fire. German aircraft continuously bombed its battle formations. However, the covering combat mission was completed, and on the night of May 18-19, de Gaulle withdrew his troops back to Laon. His hastily organized division experienced an acute shortage of everything. There was no artillery cover, air support, and finally, radio communications - we had to use messengers the old fashioned way. And yet, at dawn on May 19, Colonel de Gaulle again launched his division on the offensive, now north of Laon. By this time, a light artillery regiment and another infantry battalion were at his disposal. The 4th DCR approached the river, on the other side of which the main German forces with heavy artillery were located. They easily destroyed French tanks trying to approach the crossings. Without the support of heavy artillery, aviation and infantry, it was impossible to force the water line. De Gaulle's division found itself on the flank of General Guderian's 19th Panzer Corps, which turned to the sea after breaking through the French front. “At these moments,” wrote de Gaulle, “I could not help but think what the mechanized army, which I had dreamed of for so long, was capable of. If I had such an army now, the advance of the German tank divisions would be immediately stopped, their rear would be in disarray... However, our forces in the area north of Laon are extremely insignificant.”

One of the D2 tanks of the 345th separate tank company, knocked out in the battle for the town of Crecy-sur-Serre on May 19, 1940.

Fate brought de Gaulle almost face to face with General Guderian, the main German tank theorist. He wrote the book “Attention, Tanks!”, which was like a German version, however independent, of de Gaulle’s book “For a Professional Army.” But a personal duel of sorts could take place between two tank fans! Alas, no matter how de Gaulle dreamed, such a duel did not work out - the forces were not equal. However, Guderian noted the efforts of the 4th DCR: “As early as 16 May we knew of the presence of a French armored division, General de Gaulle’s new formation, which first entered the battle at Montcornet. De Gaulle confirmed our data a few days later. On May 18, several tanks from his division approached within 2 km of my forward command post in the Olnonsky forest, guarded only by a few 20-mm anti-aircraft guns. I survived a couple of hours in languid uncertainty until these formidable guests turned back.”

OPERATION "URANUS" November 13, 1942 The Supreme High Command Headquarters finally approved the plan for the counteroffensive near Stalingrad. In accordance with the plan, the main blow was delivered by troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts. It was planned to surround the main forces with converging powerful blows