Three-level concept of an individual. Individual and group

[from lat. individuum - indivisible], a concept denoting a representative of a class. groups, which have a separate independent existence and characteristic features, due to the presence of which it cannot be identified with other representatives of the same group. In the process of historical development of the concept of “individual”, anthropological and psychological meanings were added to its original logical and physical meanings, which made this concept very important and relevant for modern Europe. human philosophy, ethics, aesthetics, social and political philosophy. In modern philosophy and psychology, the concept of “individual” is used primarily in relation to a person. An individual is any specific person as a single representative of the entire totality of people (in the biological sense - the species homo sapiens), possessing properties and qualities inherent only to him alone, and also characterized by the integrity of mental life and self-awareness. Starting from late ancient philosophy, the concept of “individual” in relation to rational beings (man, angel, God) was developed in close connection with the concept of “personality” (Greek πρόσωπον, in Christian triadology and Christology also Person), but some -ry philosophers and theologians did not agree with him in meaning in everything.

The origin and development of the concept of “individual” (ἄτομον) in ancient philosophy

Lat. the word individua (individuals), in its terminological meaning found for the first time in Cicero (1st century BC) (see: Cicero. De fato. 18, 22, 23; Idem. De fin. bon. et mal. I 6 . 17-18; Idem. De natura deorum. I 66), originally used to convey the term ἄτομα, introduced in Greek. philosophical language by Democritus and other atomists. Within the framework of the latter’s teaching, this concept was used to designate the smallest indivisible “elements” (στοιχεῖα), infinite in number and not perceived by the senses, which, along with “emptiness” (κενόν), Democritus considered the first causes of all emerging things (see, for example: DK .67A32; 68A1). According to Diogenes Laertius, Democritus taught “that the beginning of everything is atoms and emptiness” (Diog. Laert. IX 44). According to the testimony of Aristotle in the treatise “On Creation and Destruction,” Democritus and Leucippus said that “all ... [things] consist of indivisible bodies (ἐκ σωμάτων ἀδιαιρέτων), infinite in number and shape, and differ from each other in composition, and also by the position and order of these [elements]” (Arist. De generat. et corrupt. I 1.314a); in his treatise “On Heaven,” Aristotle also mentioned that Democritus and Leucippus “affirm that the primary quantities are infinite in number, indivisible in size, many do not arise from one, and one from many, but everything is generated by their combination and interweaving.” (Idem. De cael. III 4. 303a).

As can be seen from the treatise “On Man,” Albertus Magnus, who had an outlook unprecedented for the Middle Ages, knew (apparently through Aristotle’s treatise “On the Soul”) the original Greek. the word ἄτομον (lat. atomus) in the meaning in which it was found in the writings of Democritus and Leucippus, i.e. as a designation of the indivisible particles of which everything that exists is composed. In particular, he noted that, according to Democritus, “the substance of the soul consists of fiery spherical atoms; from the indivisibility (ab indivisibilitate) of atoms it has incorporeality, from roundness - mobility, and from fiery - warmth and lightness” (Ibid. I 3. 1). Albert found this teaching unsatisfactory, and the term “atom” itself, identified with the term “point” (punctum), was used by him only in the specified narrow meaning and did not correlate with the Latin. analogous to individual.

The concept of “individual” was considered by Albert in both a logical and ontological sense. Logical consideration was based on tradition. Aristotle's idea of ​​predication: I. is something that is not predicated, that is, it is not said about anything except one special thing. Moreover, even about such a thing I. is spoken of in a special sense of indirect predication, or designation. In this regard, Albert introduced an important distinction between the concept of “individual”, used in a broad sense (individuum vagum), and the concept of “individual”, used in a narrow or specific sense (individuum certum). The idea of ​​a special kind of individual, which is at the same time common to other individual things, was probably borrowed by Albert from Ibn Sina (Avicenna), who wrote about “the singular (singulare) in a broad and incomplete (incertum) sense” (see .: Avicenna. Liber primus naturalium: Tractatus primus: De causis et principiis naturalium / Ed. S. van Riet. Leiden, 1992. P. 12-13). According to Albert, “the individual in the broad sense” can be said about many things, but at the same time it is said not as something individual, but as a species: “The individual in the strict sense (individuum certum) does not say about anything except one single separate and designated [thing]... while the individual in the broad sense (individuum vagum) speaks of many things, however, not by saying the individual, but by saying the species” (Albert. Magn. De praedicab. 4.7). According to Albert’s thought, the individual is, for example, the name “man”, used not in relation to people in general, but in relation to a specific person who can be directly pointed to. The name Socrates is also individual in a broad sense, which can be applied to many people. I., without being a species for them. The transition from I. in the broad sense to I. in the strict sense is carried out, according to Albert, through the most precise specification of the special accidental personal characteristics of I. (proprietates accidentales). Referring to Boethius (for a similar reasoning of the latter, see: Boetius. Comm. in Porphyr. // PL. 64. Col. 114), Albert identified 7 personal characteristics, the combination of which is unique for each individual and cannot be common to 2 different names: personal form (propria forma), personal appearance (figura), personal kinship (parentela), personal name (nominatio), personal fatherland (patria), personal time (tempus) and personal place (locus). Albert especially emphasized that these are not some general accidents that can be abstracted from a thing, but its characteristics at a given moment in time and in a given place, defining its unique existence: “All this cannot be abstracted from this thing, because [ exists] as exactly this, exactly here and exactly now (per hoc et hic et nunc)” (Albert. Magn. De praedicab. 4. 7).

Albert paid special attention to the question of the relationship between identification as a particular and species as a general. With reference to Boethius, Albert taught that the entire being of individuals is contained in the species to which they belong: “A species, as Boethius says, is complete being (totum esse) for individuals” (Ibidem). In this case, the species is not divided into I. as its component parts; according to Albert, we should rather talk about the participation of I. in the species: I. relate to the species “as something individual, in accordance with full being and power (potestatem)”, they “have a species in themselves and are involved in it” (in se habentia speciem et participantia - Ibidem). In another place, Albert speaks of the species as an “essential similarity” that exists between I. (Ibid. 4.2). This essential similarity, according to Albert, is determined by “general nature” (natura communis), while objects of the same species differ from each other due to matter, and therefore they can be called “particular [things] determined in matter” (particularia in materia determinata - Ibidem). Thus, Albert clearly postulates the essential superiority of the general over the particular, since the essential existence of the latter is entirely determined by its genus-specific nature.

The entire system of interrelations of various terms relating to the relationship between the general and the particular in things is built by Albert in his commentary to the “Sentences” of Peter of Lombardy: “With regard to lower [things], there are four [names], namely: thing of nature (res naturae), subject, suppository, individual, but in relation to rational things a fifth [name] is added to them, namely personality. By a thing of nature we understand a composition (compositum) of matter and form... The suppository adds to a thing of nature a relation to the general nature, to which it is subject as incommunicable. The subject... is a being, complete in itself, giving the opportunity to another to exist in it... The individual is something that has individualizing accidents (accidentia individuantia). Personality, in relation to rational nature, denotes the incommunicable...” (Albert. Magn. In Sent. I 26.4). Albert specifically stipulates that the concepts of “individual” and “singularity” in relation to God were not used by ancient church writers and can only be used conditionally: “The individual and the singular are not used in the proper sense in relation to divine objects (in divinis)” (Ibidem; more about for the relationship between the concepts of “individual” and “personality” in Albert, see: Anzulewicz H. Grundlagen von Individuum und Individualität in der Anthropologie des Albertus Magnus // Individuum und Individualität im Mittelalter 1996. S. 124-160).

The doctrine of I. Roger Bacon (Ɨ after 1290) in plural. In parts it is similar to the teachings of Albert, however, on a number of positions, there was a serious controversy between these authors, reflected in their writings. In the treatise “Communia naturalium” (General Physics), Bacon noted the most fundamental point of divergence: according to Albert and his associates, individuality is formed through the species and the accidents attached to it. Bacon, on the contrary, believed that every individual from the moment of its emergence has individuality, that is, “the individual, since he is an individual, by nature has true being and his essence before his universal arises, and therefore neither [itself] the universal, nor anything added to it produces an individual” (Rogerus Baconus. Communia naturalium // Idem. Opera hactenus inedita. Oxf., 1910. Vol. 2. P. 99). For Bacon, I. seems to be a unique creation of God, which in itself contains the foundations and principles of its individuality: “The own principles (principia propria), included in the essence of the individual, create him” (Ibidem). Due to such uniqueness, I., according to Bacon, has a special value in the universe: “Nature acts secretly in things, so that when this [specific] person is born, a person [in general] is born; this is the reason why one individual transcends all the universals of the world. For the universal is nothing other than the relation (convenientia) of many individuals” (Ibid. P. 94). It is noteworthy that the value of I. is substantiated by Bacon theologically, through an appeal to the idea of ​​​​Divine Providence about the world, which is directed not at “man in general,” but always at a specific (“individual”) person: “God did not create this world for a universal person , but for individual individuals; He created and redeemed the human race not for the sake of universal man, but for the sake of individual individuals; glory is not reserved for the universal man, but for selected individuals, whose number is certain. And from this it is clear that the individual is incomparably better than the universal” (Ibid. P. 95). Bacon's firmly stated focus on the primacy and uniqueness of personality was later adopted by John Duns Scotus and Occam, who sought to more thoroughly reveal the internal structure of individuality.

The shift of emphasis from the essential analysis of the concept of “individual” to its consideration within the framework of the doctrine of individuation (i.e., the possibility, criteria and conditions of individual existence), noticeable already in Albertus Magnus and R. Bacon, became even stronger in the subsequent Middle Ages. philosophy. At the same time, when analyzing specific issues related to various aspects of the problem of individuation, ideas about identity and individuality were clarified and deepened. At the same time, the consideration of the relevant problems was correlated with theological tasks, in solving which the concept of “individual” was used. Throughout the XIII century. a stable range of issues was formed, when considering which turning to the analysis of the meanings of individuality turned out to be inevitable. These questions primarily included: the problem of the logical-ontological relationship between the general and the particular, the problem of the concept of “personality” in relation to God and man, the problem of cognition of individual things, as well as specifically theological questions about the method of existence of two natures in one Hypostasis (or one Person) Jesus Christ and the method of transubstantiation in the Eucharist (see: Portalupi E. Das Lexicon der Individualität bei Thomas von Aquin // Individuum und Individualität im Mittelalter. 1996. S. 61-62).

All of the identified aspects of the doctrine of personality were developed to one degree or another in the writings of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), who very often used the term “individual” and terms derived from it. Following the established tradition, Thomas distinguished between I. in the general sense, “the name of the second intention,” i.e., the general concept of I., applicable to each specific I., and I. in the narrow sense of the “first intention,” i.e. any single thing: “An individual can be designated in two ways: either by the name of the second intention (per nomen secundae intentionis), which are the names “individual” or “singular” (singulare), which designate not a single thing (rem singularem), but the intention of singularity ( intentionem singularitatis), or through the name of the first intention, which designates [the very thing] with which the intention of private being (particularitatis) is consistent” (Thom. Aquin. In Sent. I 23. 1. 3). Thomas knew Greek. origin of the term “individual”: thus, citing the words of St. John of Damascus that Christ assumed human nature ἐν ἀτόμῳ, Thomas explains this everywhere: “that is, in the individual” (id est in individuo; see: Thom. Aquin. In Sent. II 16. 1. 3; Ibid. III 5. 3. 3; Ibid. 6. 1. 1; In this regard, according to Thomas, the most general and superficial meaning of the concept “individual” is something simple and indivisible, the opposite of the composite and the complex: the complex is divided “down to individuals” (usque ad individua), but the individuals themselves are no longer divided ( Idem. Sententia Libri Politicorum. I 1. 8). In a narrower sense, also associated with the idea of ​​​​indivisibility, I. is that “which is separated (divisum) from everything else that exists or can exist in the same form, but in itself exists as indivisible (in se indivisum existens).” (Idem. In Sent. IV 12. 1. 1); “indivisible (indistinctum) in itself, but separated (distinctum) from others” (Idem. Sum. th. I 29.4). Some researchers saw in such a double characteristic an echo of the distinction between the individual and the individual (singular), which is absent in explicit form in Thomas. According to R. Panikkar, the principle of singularity is based on external factors and serves to distinguish one thing from another, while the principle of individuality is based in the internal structure of a thing capable of self-identity, and therefore “singularity is a numeric quality, and individuality has an ontological character "(Panikkar. 1975. P. 161-162). The fundamental property of any information is “incommunicability” (incommunicabilitas - Thom. Aquin. Quaestiones disputatae de potentia. 9. 6), following. which I. cannot be “in many ways” (in multis, in pluribus) and has unique and inimitable spatiotemporal characteristics (hic et nunc).

The ontologically special position of individuals is determined by the fact that, according to Thomas, only they possess “unconditional being”: “There is no unconditional being (simpliciter esse) except [the being of] individuals” (Thom. Aquin. In Sent. I 23. 1. 1 ). In this sense, individuality is identified by Thomas with unity: “Everything, insofar as it has being, [also] has unity and individuality” (Idem. Responsio de 108 articulis ad magistrum Ioannem de Vercellis. 108). Individuality is also inextricably linked with the actual (and not with the mental or potential) existence of a thing: according to Thomas, every I. must be “actually existing (ens actu) either in itself or in something else” (Idem. In Sent. IV 12. 1. 1). According to Thomas, everything that exists is individual, even universals have real existence insofar as they are individualized in specific things: “Universals have existence in things of nature not as universals, but only in accordance with how they are individualized” (Idem. Quaestiones disputatae de anima .1).

The question of individual accidents was posed by Thomas in connection with the doctrine of transubstantiation, which occurs in the sacrament of the Eucharist. According to the traditional view, with which Thomas agreed, accidents receive their individual existence thanks to the substance or subject with which they are connected (see, for example: Idem. Sum. th. I 29. 1). However, in the case of Eucharistic transubstantiation, the substance (essence) changes, but the accidents remain the same. Explaining the apparent contradiction, Thomas noted that the individuation of accidents can occur not only through the essence of the subject, but also through a special “measurable quantity” (quantitas dimensiva), which becomes the subject of accidents (Ibid. III 77. 2).

When considering the question of whether Christ can be considered to have two hypostases or two individuals, Thomas clarified the meaning of using the concept “individual” in relation to something that is part of another, more complex thing. According to Thomas, “just as this hand here is called an individual, or individual, or particular, so human nature in Christ is an individual, individual or particular” (Idem. In Sent. III 6. 1. 1). Thus, Thomas believed, any parts of complex things that can be thought of as having their own existence can be called individuals in the broad sense. Continuing his reasoning, Thomas noted that terms such as “personality” (“person”), “hypostasis”, “supposite”, “thing of nature” can refer exclusively to independently existing things (per se subsistentia), while the terms “ individual,” “single,” “particular” can refer both to things that exist independently and to things that exist as components of something else. Therefore, Thomas concluded, one can speak in different senses about one or two (or many) I. in Christ: “We say that the hypostasis is an individual; Consequently, since there is a unity [of natures] accomplished in the hypostasis, it was also accomplished in the individual, so that in this sense we can say that there is one individual in Christ, but in another sense there are two or many individuals in Him...” ( Ibidem). In the Summa against the Gentiles, Thomas correlated the concept of “complete individual” (individuum completum), applied to substances, with the concepts of “person” and “hypostasis”, used in the same sense, but in relation exclusively to “rational nature” (natura intellectualis) (Idem. Sum. contr. gent. IV 48. 2). As Thomas believed, the individual and particular “in a more precise and perfect manner” are found among “rational substances” (in substantiais rationalibus), which tend to have “power over their action” (dominium sui actus), therefore, to designate these special things it was a separate name was introduced - “persona” (persona) (see: Idem. Sum. th. I 29. 1). Reasonable I. differ from unreasonable ones, among other things, in that the Providence of God in relation to reasonable I. acts separately in relation to each, while in relation to unreasonable ones it acts “according to the species” (see: Idem. Sum. contr. gent. III. 111-113).

A special important layer in Thomas’s reflections on individuality is the epistemological analysis of the individual, i.e. questions about the knowability of individual things (both by man and by God) and about the mechanisms of such knowledge. Since, according to Thomas, material individual things cannot be directly accessible to the mind, every image is first perceived by the senses and transformed into a special image or idea - a “phantasm”. Then, based on the totality of phantasms, the active mind creates a general concept, with which the intellect itself can already work. Thus, I. as such are not conceived by the mind and cannot be the object of exact scientific knowledge: “Individuals... do not fall under consideration of the species; there is no understanding (intelluctus) of them, but only feeling (sensus)” (Thom. Aquin. Sentencia super Meteora). However, in a number of texts, Thomas spoke about the special, indirect conceivability of information, which exists thanks to the connection between reason and “mental power” (vis cogitativa), which processes and generalizes individual sensory data (for more information about the cognition of the individual according to Thomas, see: Klubertanz G. P. St. Thomas and the Knowledge of the Singulars // The New Scholasticism. 1952. Vol. 26. P. 135-166; B é rub é. 1964. P. 41-61).

From the 2nd half. XIII century the question of identity is almost completely shifted to the area of ​​disputes about individuation and the principle of individuation. Although most are medieval. The authors claimed that when considering this set of problems they relied on the teachings of Aristotle, modern. researchers highlight several. stable positions regarding the principle of individuation, which are difficult to agree with each other. Considerable attention to various aspects of the problem of individuation was paid in their writings by such thinkers of this time as Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus, Godefroy of Fontenay, Peter Aureoli, John Baconthorpe, James of Viterbo, Richard of Middleton, Henry of Harkley, Walter Barley, etc. (see Art. Individuation). One of the most important particular questions devoted to individuation, but internally related to the understanding of the nature of I., was the question of the individuality of “separated substances,” i.e., in relation to Christ. creed, angels. Significant spread in the 13th century. received the position of Thomas Aquinas, according to him, for angels deprived of individualizing matter, I. is identical to the species, therefore each angel is at the same time a separate I. and a special species. However, this teaching of Thomas was disputed by many. theologians, who saw in it echoes of the views of Avicenna, in accordance with which angels have a divine nature. In particular, Henry of Ghent devoted several times to the topic of angelic individuality. extensive “questions”, in which he tried to prove that the reduction of individuality to matter or form leads to theological problems, and therefore the final basis of any individuality should be recognized as God, who creates individual things and endows them with a unique individual existence (see: Brown S. F. Henry of Ghent // Individuation in Scholasticism. 1994. P. 195-219). Apparently, under the influence of Henry, the theses that God cannot multiply individuals within a species without the help of matter were included as heretical in the list of errors published in 1277 by the Bishop of Paris, Etienne Tampier (see: Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis. P. , 1889. Vol. 1. P. 548-549).

An important role in the development of the Middle Ages. The doctrine of I. was played by the departure from consideration of questions about individuation and I. represented in the writings of Duns Scotus and his followers from the consideration of questions about individuation and I. within the boundaries of the Aristotelian dichotomy of matter and form. According to Duns Scotus, of the many different characteristics of individuality identified by his time by researchers of this issue, the most important is the original characteristic of “indivisibility.” At the same time, he emphasized the difference between the “integral” parts (partes integrales) and the “subjective” parts (partes subjectivae) of a thing. It is obvious that every person can be divided into some parts: for example, you can separate the legs from the body or the soul from the body. All parts resulting from such division are integral parts of a person, that is, parts that are included in him as a whole and are not a person outside of this whole. Divisibility into such parts does not in any way prevent each person from being a single unique I. Indivisibility, which characterizes the individual, indicates the impossibility of dividing individual existence into subjective parts, that is, into such parts that would be the same the same as a divisible whole. Thus, one person can never be divided into 2 full-fledged people - that is why, according to Duns Scotus, he can rightfully be called I. In general, any single thing is individual, which cannot be divided into 2 or more things of the same essence. The reason for individuality, according to Duns Scotus, is one and unique for every being. He called this reason “positive reality” (realitas positiva), “positive essence” (entitas positiva), “individual difference” (diffirentia individualis), and also received later. widespread use of the term “thisness” (haecceitas). It is precisely because of thisness that I., which have a common nature, can be distinguished from each other. At the same time, thisness cannot be reduced to either matter or form, but rather is the totality of the existential reality of a specific thing. According to Duns Scotus, the concept of “individual” is the most general concept for describing individual givenness, which is applicable to all of nature and is then narrowed into the concepts of “supposite” and “personality”: “How [the concept of] “individual” is used in relation to all of nature in general , so “supposite” - in relation to the substantial nature, and “personality” - in relation to the rational nature” (Ioan. D. Scot. Ordinatio. I 23. 1). According to Duns Scotus, every I. combines the general and the personal, and it is the uniqueness of such a combination that determines the uniqueness of I. : “Every individual has the species nature intact (integraliter) ... but in addition to the species nature [individuals] also have individual forms, thanks to which they are formally different and which do not belong to the definition of the species” (Idem. In Met. VII 13). The uniqueness of identity and individual difference makes it impossible for a person to draw up their definition: “We cannot define an individual, but not because of his fault, but because of our weakness” (Ibidem), that is, following. limitations of human cognitive abilities (for a detailed presentation of these and other aspects of Duns Scotus’s teaching about I., see: Wolter A. B. John Duns Scotus // Individuation in Scholasticism. 1994. P. 271-298; Sondag G. Introduction // Duns Scot. Le principe d "individuation. P., 2005. P. 7-69; Noone T. B. Universals and Individuation // The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus / Ed. Th. Williams. Camb., 2003. P. 100-128; Gracia J. J. E. Individuality and the Individuating Entity in Scotus's Ordinatio: An Ontological Characterization // John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics / Ed. L. Honnefelder et al. Leiden, 1996. P. 229-249).

The position of Occam, who was guided by the ideas of Duns Scotus, but radicalized them to a large extent, is characterized by postulating the primacy of individual and singular things and denying the real existence of any general concepts. The question of how a thing becomes individual was declared by him to be a pseudo-problem - things are created as individual by God and are accessible to man exclusively as individual: “Every single thing in itself (se ipsa) is individual” (Guillelmus de Ockham. Ordinatio. I 2. 6 // Idem. St. Bonaventure, 1967. Vol. Therefore, it is not the fact of the existence of information, which is intuitively obvious to everyone, that requires explanation, but only the question of the relationship of information with general concepts, which was solved by Ockham nominalistically: every general concept is only a conventional name, or a “universal concept” formed by man, which ry denotes a collection of individual things. Unlike Duns Scotus, who believed that the thisness of things ultimately depends on the divine will that constitutes them, Ockham argued that every thing is naturally, by its very nature, individual, “from itself this” (de se haec - Ibid. P. 224). In addition, he emphasized individuality as the incommunicability of individual qualities, arguing that if we take 2 I., then “there will be nothing the same in both, but everything that is in one is unconditionally and absolutely not in itself.” what is in another” (Ibid. P. 212). The nominalistic idea of ​​\u200b\u200bI. was also manifested in Ockham’s theory of knowledge: according to his teaching, any knowledge begins with intuitive knowledge of an individual thing, while the knowledge of each thing is unique, therefore, the one who knows one thing cannot use this knowledge to acquire knowledge about other similar things. A person must always begin with an intuitive appeal to the individual and cannot rely on his conditional generalizations.

In connection with this approach to the question of intelligence, the task of giving a logically accurate description of intelligence and terms related to individuals was of serious importance to Ockham. According to Occam, within the framework of logic, the concept of “individual” can have 3 areas of application. In the first, most general sense, I. is called everything that is “one thing in number, and not many things” (Guillelmus de Ockham. Summa logicae. I 19 // Idem. Opera philosophica. St. Bonaventure, 1974. Vol. 1). In this sense, universals can be individual, since every universal is formally one name, and therefore, in an ontological sense, one thing: “Any universal is one individual thing” (una res singularis - Ibid. I 14). In the second sense, I. is called every thing existing in the external world, “a thing outside the soul” (res extra animam), which is characterized by its individuality. Such a thing, according to Ockham, cannot “be a sign for anything,” that is, it cannot be said about anything. It is in this sense that I. is called Aristotle’s “first substance” (Ibidem). Finally, in the 3rd (strictly logical) sense, I. is “the proper sign of one” (proprium signum uni). This sign, according to Occam, is an “abstract term” (terminus discertus; later authors also used the expression “single term” - terminus singularis), that is, a term applicable to a single thing and inapplicable to others. It was precisely this sign that Ockham considered to refer to the words of Porphyry that I. is said about one single thing (see: Ibidem). Within the last meaning of individuality (I. as a sign), Ockham made another threefold division: individual signs are divided into proper names (nomen proprium, for example, Socrates, Plato), demonstrative pronouns (pronomen demonstrativum, for example: “this”, with indicating a specific thing) and demonstrative pronouns connected to a common name (pronomen demonstrativum sumptum cum aliquo termino communi; e.g.: “this man, this horse) (Ibidem; cf. also: Maurer A. A. William of Ockham // Individuation in Scholasticism. 1994. P. 388-389).

Among the representatives of late scholasticism during the Counter-Reformation period, Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) paid great attention to the problems of identity and individuality. Having devoted the 5th of the “Metaphysical Discourses” (Disputationes metaphysicae, 1597) to the question of individuality and individuation, Suarez, within the framework of this study, proposed a certain generalization of scholastic views on I. The concept of “individuality” in Suarez is closely related to the fundamental metaphysical concept of “unity”; characterizing individuality, Suarez usually used the expression “individual unity” (unitas individualis). The defining feature of an individual being, according to Suarez, is incommunicability, therefore the individual and the particular are, first of all, something opposed to the universal and the general: “The general or universal is that which is communicated (communicatur) to many in the same sense or is found in many; one in number, singular (singulare) or individual is called a being that is one in such a way that, in accordance with the concept of a being, in accordance with which it is called one, it is incommunicable to many, be it in the sense of something lower and its subjects, be it in the sense of many things having the same concept” (Suarez. Disp. met. V 1. 2). Thus, in order to consider something I., it is sufficient to fulfill only one condition: this something must be incommunicable. Suarez did not share what was found among many. scholastics' idea of ​​individuality, according to which the condition for the existence of an individual being is difference from something else. Individual unity by nature is more primary for a thing than its difference from other things, but this difference is an internal and inevitable consequence of the individuality of a thing. According to the teachings of Suarez, all things in this world are individuals: “All things that are actually existing, or that exist immediately (immediately) or can exist [immediately], are [things] singular (singulares) and individual” (Ibid. V 1 .4). The reference to the “immediacy” and “actuality” of existence allows Suarez to exclude from this thesis of individuality any universals (e.g. “man,” “animal,” “white,” “long,” etc.) that do not themselves exist in themselves, but are found only in other things. Individuality, according to Suarez, even extends to God: “The divine nature is one in such a way that it cannot be multiplied or divided into many similar natures; therefore it represents one individual and singular nature" (Ibid. V 1. 6). The individuality and singularity of every thing are so fundamental that “even by the absolute power of God, an actually existing real entity cannot be deprived of individuality and singularity” (Ibid. V 1.5). Since unity as transcendental is reversible with being, individuality is identified by Suarez with “essence” (entitas). To really exist means to be individual (for a more detailed presentation of Suárez’s ideas about individuality, see: Gracia J. J. E. Francis Suárez // Individuation in Scholasticism. 1994. P. 475-510; Idem. Introduction // Su á rez. On Individuation: Metaphysical Disputation V: Individual Unity and Its Principle / Transl. J. J. E. Gracia, 1982. P. 1-27).

The concepts of “individual” and “individuality” in modern European philosophy (XVI-XX centuries)

The transition from a theocentric to an anthropocentric worldview, characteristic of the philosophical schools of the Renaissance, which were very different in their orientation, could not but be reflected in the ideas of thinkers of this period about personality. Already in late scholasticism, a movement from the perception of individuality as a logical category to “peering” into a specific I., in every unique and inimitable person. Among the thinkers of the Renaissance, the human personality and its individuality become absolute values, based on which only the general can be understood. The essence of this transition process is expressed in the polemically pointed, but essentially correct statement of J. Burckhardt (1818-1897): “In the Middle Ages, both sides of consciousness - turned by man to the world and to his inner life - were, as it were, under a certain common cover, in dreaming and half-asleep... Man knew himself only as part of a race, people, party, corporation, family or some other form of community. In Italy this veil is lifted for the first time; an objective vision of the state and an objective attitude towards it, as well as towards the whole world in general, awakens; at the same time, the subjective principle declares itself with full force, a person becomes a spiritual individual and recognizes himself as such” (Burckhardt J. Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien. Basel, 1860. S. 131). Individuality in the Renaissance becomes an immediate fact of life, therefore the scientific analysis of this category is largely replaced by various forms of its direct existence and manifestation. The place of individualism in the cosmos among the philosophers of the Renaissance is not so much comprehended as it is re-constituted, therefore such spheres of individual activity as politics, art, craft, etc. come to the fore. (see for more details: Kassirer. 2000; Gurevich. 2005).

The tendencies toward the absolutization of religion, characteristic of the Renaissance as a whole, were also reflected in religion. the thinking of the founders of Protestantism. In the writings of M. Luther (1483-1546), J. Calvin (1509-1564) and other Protestants. traditional theologians. Catholic idea of ​​religion, based on the authority of the Holy. Scripture and Tradition of the Church, is replaced by the doctrine of religion as a personal relationship between human history and God. Since every I. should not in his religion. life rely on k.-l. authority, apart from the authority of God and one’s own conscience, the authority of church and pastoral teaching is reduced to a minimum. This leads to the formation of “radical religious individualism,” the essence of which, according to E. Troeltsch (1865-1923), is that each individual is considered uniquely “filled with faith from God and confirmed by [His] indestructible power” (see .: Troeltsch E. Luther und die moderne Welt // Idem. Kritische Gesamtausgabe.; N. Y., 2001; Each individual stands before God in a unique way and has a unique relationship with Him, therefore, in a Protestant way, the rethought religion in many ways becomes not a uniting principle, but a dividing and isolating principle.

Connection of the Middle Ages. paradigms of understanding history with certain tendencies of the Renaissance are characteristic of Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464). Nikolai Kuzansky accepted traditions. correlation between species and species (genus): “Genus... exist only... in specific species, and species - only in specific individuals, which alone actually exist” ( Nikolai Kuzansky. About learned ignorance // Same. Op. M., 1979. T. 1. P. 144). At the same time, I. is recognized as only a small and imperfect part of the universe, unable to embrace it entirely: “Not a single individual can fully embrace his species and the universe as a whole: after all, even between individuals of the same species there will necessarily be a difference in the degree of perfection, so that no one will achieve all the perfection available for a given type of perfection, when greater perfection would already be unthinkable, and on the other hand, it is impossible for an individual to be so imperfect that it is impossible to imagine a more imperfect one” (Ibid.). Moreover, each individual, according to Nicholas of Cusa, is harmonious and perfect in itself: “In no individual can the principles of individuation be combined in the same harmonious proportion as in another: each is unique in itself and, to the extent possible, perfect” ( Ibid., p. 146). At the same time, in every species, and especially in the human species, there are always individuals who are in certain respects more perfect and stand out from the total number. However, the judgment available to a person about this is necessarily limited, since other images can never be known in their entirety and always, to one degree or another, remain something mysterious and enigmatic: “[We] cannot perfectly know even one of all "(Ibid. p. 147). Every individual, according to Nicholas of Cusa, is unique, just as everything that exists in general is unique and unique: “Just as the unique God is maximally unique, so, after Him, the uniqueness of the world is maximally unique, then the uniqueness of species, then the uniqueness of individuals, each of which is also unique; everyone rejoices in this uniqueness, of which there is so much in him that he is unique” (He. The Hunt for Wisdom // He. Soch. M., 1980. Vol. 2. P. 381). This uniqueness and uniqueness of everything stems from God as from “the single cause of everything unique, which gives uniqueness to everything,” and this cause itself is “neither a whole nor a part; neither species nor individual; neither this nor that; nor anything named” (Ibid.).

In the works of G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716), the term “individual”, on the one hand, is closely connected with the logical tradition dating back to Aristotle, and on the other hand, it is endowed with certain new meanings and characteristics determined by Leibniz’s metaphysical system - monadology . Defining the fundamental relationship between personality and species for the Aristotelian tradition, Leibniz wrote: “Individuals... of a lower species are that which cannot be distinguished by means of an essential definition (per essentialia)” (Leibniz G. W. Table de définition // Opuscules et fragments inédits de Leibniz / Ed. L. Couturat. P., 1903. Hildesheim, 1988r. The impetus for the formation of a new idea of ​​\u200b\u200bI. by Leibniz was the desire to overcome the gap between the last (i.e., least general) type and I. present in the above definition. According to Leibniz, clarification of the concept is an endless process, as a result of which I. and the concept will overlap on each other and essentially coincide. Drawing an analogy with the mathematical calculus of infinitesimals, Leibniz believed that the concept should be differentiated until the difference between a thing and a concept becomes “less than any given quantity” (Idem. Generales inquisititiones de analysi notionum et veritatum // Ibid. P. 376- 377). Based on this, Leibniz extended to all substances the teaching of Thomas Aquinas that every angel is both an individual and a species: “What Saint Thomas asserted in relation to angels or intelligentsia (namely, that in this case every individual is a lower species), is true in relation to all substances" (Idem. Discours de métaphysique // Idem. Philosophische Schriften: Bd. 4: 1677 - Juni 1690: Tl. B. B., 1999. S. 1541; cf.: Thom. Aquin. Sum. th. I 50. 4). Because of this, according to Leibniz, I. differ from each other not only materially, but also formally or conceptually (see: Individuum, Individualität. 1976. S. 310-311).

Consideration of the concept and I. as logically commensurable quantities allowed Leibniz to make a kind of logical revolution: instead of, in accordance with tradition, saying that individual substances that differ only in number fall under general concepts or ideas, Leibniz preferred to assert that the universal is contained or lies in special and individual, thereby largely accepting the ideas of ancient and medieval times. realism on the question of the nature of universals. According to Leibniz, "[the concept] 'animal' contains more individuals than [the concept] 'man', but [the concept] 'man' contains more ideas or formalities (formalités), the former has more exemplars, the latter more levels of reality (degrés de realité)..." (Leibniz G. W. Nouveaux Essais sur l "entendement humain // Idem. Philosophische Schriften. 1962. Bd. 6. S. 486). Identification of specific “individual concepts” as the tops of the logical hierarchy, replacing abstract teaching about logic, located outside this hierarchy and deprived of its own concept, marked Leibniz’s transition from extensional to intensional logic.

Although “individual concepts” are a kind of mediator between logic and metaphysics, in purely metaphysical contexts Leibniz usually used not the concept “individual”, but the expression “individual substance”. At the same time, the “individual concept,” according to Leibniz, is a complete reflection of the “individual substance.” The latter was nominally defined by him as follows: “... when several predicates are attributed to one and the same subject, and this subject is not attributed to any other, then it can be called an individual substance” (Idem. Discours de métaphysique. S. 1540). For a real and not formal definition of an individual substance, according to Leibniz, it is necessary to take into account that “the term of the subject must always contain the terms of the predicate,” due to which the individual substance contains “the basis and meaning of all predicates that can truly be said about it "(Ibidem). According to Leibniz, this means that an individual substance contains and in a certain way reflects “imprints of what has happened to it, signs of what will happen to it, and even traces of everything that happens in the universe” (Ibidem). However, according to Leibniz, “God alone is able to recognize them” (Ibidem), therefore “we cannot have knowledge of individuals and find a way to accurately determine the individuality of each thing” (Idem. Nouveaux Essais sur l "entendement humain. S. 289 Since “individuality contains infinity” (Ibidem), human finite discursive analysis is unable to comprehend the “contingent or factual truth” (verité contingente ou de fait) of individual things and facts (Idem. La monadologie. 33 // Idem. Opera philosophica omnia. B., 1840. Bd. 1/2. P. 707). and is contained only in the “vision” (visio) of God. In Leibniz’s later writings, individual substance is identified with the monad and endowed with all the fundamental properties of the latter: indivisibility, independence, freedom, autonomy, etc.

Leibniz's ideas became very widespread in him. school philosophy XVIII - early. XIX century, but at the same time among many. The authors outline pronounced tendencies to abandon a strictly metaphysical and logical idea of ​​logic. Thus, school logic did not go beyond the Leibnizian ideas about logic; for example, H. Wolf (1679-1754) proposed the following definition: “The singular being (ens singulare), or individual, is that which is comprehensively (omni mode) determined” (Wolff Chr. Philosophia prima, sive Ontologia. Francofurti; Lipsiae , 1736. P. 188), essentially following Leibniz’s doctrine of the “complete concept”. At the same time, he has. Romantics formed ideas about I. that are closely related to the growing intensification in the 2nd half. XVIII century anthropologization of this concept, with a tendency towards its primary application in relation to man. In I. G. Herder (1744-1803), individuality is declared to be the “deepest foundation” of human existence (see: Herder J. G. Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele. Riga, 1778. S. 55), but a mysterious and incomprehensible foundation, to which indicate the famous words of J. W. Goethe (1749-1832): “The individual is inexpressible” (Individuum est ineffabile; see Goethe’s letter to I. K. Lavater dated September 20, 1780: Goethes Briefe und Briefe an Goethe. Münch., 1988. Bd. 1. S. 325). These words are a secularized version of Christ. provisions on the inexpressibility of God, whose place among a number of thinkers of the New Age begins to be occupied by human I. In the works of many. German Romantics, in particular F. Schlegel (1772-1829), renaissance ideas about humanity as a microcosm that contains the entire universe reappear: “Man is a microcosm, the characteristic of the universe is associated with the characteristics of the individual” (Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel -Ausgabe / Ed . E. Behler., 1958. Bd. 229). The opposite is also true: the world is also I. (die Welt ein Individuum ist - Ibid. 1958. Bd. 12. S. 42). Both world history and human history are constantly developing and changing, “the individual is a kind of constant becoming” (Ibidem), therefore it cannot be strictly scientifically defined and is “grabbed” only in intuitive creative comprehension: “Every individuality is poetic” ( Ibid. 18. S. 253); “for each individual there is an infinite number of real definitions” (Ibid. 1958. Bd. 2. S. 177). The romantics were erasing traditions. opposition between the individual and the universal: the idea was interpreted as something individual, and the idea was considered as a “personified idea” (see : Ibid. S. 265). Schlegel has pronounced individualistic motives, reflecting the tendency towards the absolutization of human individuality: the formation and development of one’s own individuality was considered by him as a “higher calling”, “a kind of divine egoism” (göttlichen Egoismus - Ibid. Bd. 18. S. 134). A similar understanding of individuality was proposed by W. Humboldt (1767-1835), who wrote that “all individuality manifests itself in a certain aspiration (Treib)” (Humboldt W., von. Werke / Hrsg. A. Flitner, K. Giel. Darmstadt , 1981. Bd. 3. S. 199), which is human power (Kraft), connecting a person with the world around him that he comprehends and transforms. Individuality formed in interaction with the world is “an idea reflected in reality” (Ibid. S. 198). This idea is no longer understood as a possibility, but as a real reality (Tatsache), which has its own basis in itself and is therefore identified with freedom: “Freedom is nothing more than ... the unhindered action of the true forces of a thing” (Ibid. Bd. 2. S. 338). At the same time, Humboldt placed special emphasis on the fact that human intelligence cannot exist and develop “as a separate being,” but needs spiritual interaction with other individuals, which in reality is achieved primarily through speech, which is also a means of expressing individuality , and a means of communication between different individuals (for more information about I. among the German romantics, see: Behler E. Die Konzeption der Individualität in der Frühromantik // Denken der Individualität. 1995. S. 121-150).

Philosophical reflection and partly refutation of German ideas. Romantics about I. can be found in various forms in the works of J. G. Fichte (1762-1814) and G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831), the common motive for whom in the doctrine of I. is the postulation of the primacy of the universal over the individual. At the same time, the very relationship between the universal and the individual is interpreted differently by them. In the preface to Science, Fichte characterized his philosophy as “a system, the beginning, the end and the whole essence of which is that individuality should be theoretically forgotten and practically refuted” (Fichte J. G. Sämtliche Werke. B., 1845. Bd. 1. S . 516-517). However, to refute individuality it was necessary to point to a certain concept of individuality, which necessitated its existence. According to Fichte, individuality is necessary as a “condition for self-consciousness” (Ibid. 1845. Bd. 3. S. 8). In “The Fundamentals of Natural Law” and “The System of the Doctrine of Morality,” Fichte noted that a “finite rational being” cannot exist and realize itself in isolation from other rational beings. According to Fichte, “I oppose myself to another rational being, and it opposes itself to me; and this means - I, as an individual, relate myself to it, and it, as an individual, relates itself to me. Because of this, understanding oneself as an individual is a condition of selfhood (Ichheit)” (Ibid. 1845. Bd. 2. S. 221). According to Fichte's teachings, each individual is characterized by a unique and exclusively characteristic “manifestation of freedom” (Äußerung der Freiheit - Ibid. Bd. 3. S. 42). Freedom manifests itself primarily in “free action” (freie Handlung), thanks to which individuality is formed and determined. Fichte especially emphasized the dynamic nature of human individuality, which is not something established once and for all, but is a constantly changing reflection of human existence: “At every moment of my existence (Existenz) ... I am what I make myself with the help of freedom; I am like this precisely because I make myself like this” (Ibid. 1845. Bd. 4. S. 222). However, according to Fichte, the difference between all ideas formed in this way is not something positive; on the contrary, reason demands the equalization of individual differences. “The highest law of humanity (Menschheit),” according to Fichte, is that all the inclinations in each individual should be developed “uniformly” (gleichförmig), which means: “All different rational beings must be transformed and become uniform in relation to each other "(Ibid. 1845. Bd. 6. S. 314). Because of this, Fichte declared the ultimate goal of any society to be “complete likeness (Gleichheit) of all its members (Mitglieder)” (Ibid. S. 315). In Fichte's later works, the relationship between the individual and the universal is also interpreted through the relationship between humanity and gender (Gattung). At the same time, individuality is declared to be “foolishness” or “unreasonableness” (vernunftlose) in relation to the race, therefore “reasonable life” should consist in the individual “forgetting himself in the race”, sacrificing his life “as a sacrifice to the life of the whole” (Ibid . 1846. Bd. 7. S. 35). Later, similar ideas were developed in the early philosophical works of F. W. J. Schelling (1775-1854). According to Schelling, “every individual expresses completely and perfectly (vollkommen) the concept of the genus; each individual [individual] realizes the ideal of his kind" (Schelling F. W. J. Sämtliche Werke. Stuttg., 1856. Abt. 1. Bd. 1. S. 471). Schelling especially noted that the advantage of the gens over humanity is determined by the constant existence of the gens: “The individual should seem to be a means, the gens the goal of nature; the individual is transitory, but the race remains” (Ibid. Bd. 3. S. 51).

In Fichte's later works, in addition to the idea of ​​individuality, denoting “the exclusively personal sensory existence of the individual,” the concept of “ideal individuality” is found. This individuality is a form of manifestation of a certain “eternal idea”; it is in no way determined by sensory individuality, but destroys it (see: Fichte J. G. Sämtliche Werke. Bd. 7. S. 69). In essence, this individuality is not “I”, but “We”, i.e., collective intelligence. According to Fichte, “nothing in the world depends on ... what the individual thinks or does not think (der Einzelne),” but only the individual and the collective at the same time. individual personalities and merged into a unity of thinking” (Ibid. S. 239) - only such “We” is a genuine rational subject of thinking and action. In the early Schelling, this “We” is identified with the genus, which allows him to assert: “All my actions must be aimed as an ultimate goal at something that can be realized not through one individual, but only through the entire genus,” therefore “not the individual acts in history, but the race” (Schelling F. W. J. Sämtliche Werke. Stuttg., 1858. Abt. 1. Bd. 3. S. 596-597).

According to Hegel, various aspects and forms of manifestation of individuality make it necessary to consider its concept within the framework of different sciences. The philosophy of nature (Naturphilosophie) deals with the real manifestations of individuality; philosophy of religion and philosophy of history explore the history of individuality, in particular the historical formation of the “infinite and absolute value” of the individual-personal spirit (Hegel G. Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie // Idem. Werke / Hrsg. E. Moldenhauer, K. M. Michel. Fr. /M., 1969-1971. Bd. 18. S. 68); aesthetics is concerned with the “beautiful individuality” of the ideal; etc. However, the very concepts of “individual” and “individuality”, according to Hegel, should be considered in the “science of logic” (for more information about the logical aspect of Hegel’s teaching about logic, see: Individuum, Individualität. 1976. S. 317-319 ). Hegel did not use the concept of “individual” in the limited anthropological sense that had spread by his time, that is, he did not reduce it to human identity, but retained the old Leibnizian meaning of individuality as unity in plurality and identity as an “atom of nature.” According to Hegel, I. is characterized by the fact that all its parts are “connected into a kind of true unity (Eins).” At the same time, individuality differs from “simple order, arrangement (Arrangement) and external interconnection of parts” (Hegel G. Die Wissenschaft der Logik // Idem. Werke. Bd. 6. S. 424). Determination (Bestimmtheit) of I. is, first of all, “in itself and for itself, existing certainty,” “immanent form,” “self-determining principle” (Ibidem). Within logic, individuality manifests itself as a concept, or more precisely, as “a substance released as a concept”, which is “the cause of itself” (Ibid. S. 251). Moreover, in its singularity, which excludes other I. and opposes itself to the universal, I. is only a “negative unity.” On the contrary, as a moment of the concept, the individual merges with the universal (genus) and the particular (species characteristic), as a result of which the individual becomes “the depth in which the concept comprehends itself” (Ibid. S. 297). Thus, the individual is justified in its existence only where its self-will is destroyed in the mind.

Hegel's theoretical ideas about individuality were reflected in his social and political teachings. According to him, individual people themselves form only a multitude of people, a formless mass whose activity is determined by elementary needs and is essentially unreasonable. Only a few I. are able to stand out from the general mass, but even they do not act of their own will and desire, but are able to stand out due to the subordination of their own individuality to the universal dictates of the world spirit. It is from this idea of ​​the role of individuality that Hegel’s famous statement about the “cunning of reason” manifested in history comes from: “The particular is in most cases too small in comparison with the universal: individuals are sacrificed and doomed to death. The idea pays the tribute of existence and frailty not from itself, but from the passions of individuals” (Hegel G. Vorlesungen über die philosophie der Geschichte // Ibid. Bd. 12. S. 49). Hegel also associates the common with the moral (Sittliche), which opposes the arbitrariness of individuals. The highest form of morality in the field of objective spirit, according to Hegel, is the state, which sublates the individual in the universal.

Hegel's criticism of the absolutization of the universal was consistently carried out in the works of S. Kierkegaard (1813-1855). His doctrine of individuality, continuing the traditions of him. romanticism and developing the individualistic tendencies of Protestantism, occupies a special place in the history of this issue in the 1st half. XIX century In thinking about the individual and the individual, Kierkegaard proceeded from the fact that the really existing individual is more important than abstract and speculatively created general entities. Life, according to Kierkegaard, does not develop according to dialectical laws, but is a chain of paradoxes that are not subject to the order of reason. The most important of these paradoxes is one that can only be comprehended by religion. faith is the fact that an individual person (Enkelte, synonymous with the term “individual”) “is precisely as an individual in an absolute relation to the Absolute (et absolut Forhold til det Absolute)” (Kierkegaard S. Frygt og Bæven // Idem. Samlede Værker / Ed . P. P. Rohde et al. København, 1962-1964. 5. S. 102). Hegel's dialectics, according to Kierkegaard, is powerless to explain I., who exists before God and enters into direct personal relationships with Him. The infinite significance of each specific I., the “little I” (lille Jeg), according to Kierkegaard, can only be realized thanks to Christianity: “[Christianity] strives to make each individual eternally blissful and... within this individual it presupposes an infinite interest in his own bliss" (Idem. Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift til de philosophiske Smuler // Ibid. Udg. 9. S. 18-19). It is the active desire for such bliss that “absolutely transforms the existence of the individual” (Ibid. Udg. 10. S. 82). This desire simultaneously unfolds the true dialectic of the infinite and the finite: “The existing [individual] is infinite and finite... if... bliss becomes the highest good for him, this means that within him all finite elements are once and for all reduced to that from which you will still have to give up, building an attitude towards eternal bliss” (Ibid. S. 85). Thus, Christianity taken seriously transforms the entire existence of I., however, no one can judge the depth of this transformation, “except for the individual himself in the depths of his soul (med sig selv)” (Ibid. S. 87). Ultimately, according to Kierkegaard, I. must “destroy himself,” but not in the sense of the Hegelian identification of himself with the universal, but in the sense of the mystical subordination of his individuality to the personal Absolute: I. must go through “self-destruction,” since “through suffering the individual falls down into your relationship with God" (Ibid. S. 229). As Kierkegaard wrote, “God becomes the basis only when everything else on this path is taken away, when everything finite is taken away, and above all the individual himself in his finitude, in his rebellion against God” (see: Ibidem).

Kierkegaard also proposed his own interpretation of the relationship between humanity and gender (Slægt), which for him is not an abstract universal, but a living connection between individuals. This interpretation in Kierkegaard is closely related to Christ. the doctrine of original sin, which is both the ancestral and the individual’s own sin. According to Kierkegaard, “at every moment the individual is both himself and the genus” (Idem. Begrebet Angest // Samlede Værker. 1962-1964. Udg. 6 . S. 124). The relationship between history and the genus is an existential and historical relationship: “No individual can be indifferent to the history of the genus, just as the genus is not indifferent to the history of any individual” (Ibidem). The contradiction between history and the race, according to Kierkegaard, should not be removed, as in Hegel, but constantly intensify in the “historical movement”, since every “individual constantly starts over... and thereby he begins the history of the race again” (Ibidem).

Characteristic for him. Romanticism, the absolutism of I. as a free and independent rational figure, possessing uniqueness and originality (Eigentümlichkeit), was brought to the maximum by certain thinkers attributed to individualism as a philosophical trend that spread significantly in Europe. philosophy of the XIX-XX centuries.

The term “individualism” (French individualisme; German Individualismus) originated in French. thoughts when analyzing the ideological content of the Enlightenment and the socio-political events of the French Revolution of 1789-1799. Conservative thinkers saw the source of political upheaval in the absolutization of individual will and the derogation of the idea of ​​the public good. Catholic the publicist J. de Maistre (1753-1821) noted that the social order is wavering in its foundations, since in Europe there has become “too much freedom and too little religion” (Maistre J., de. Oeuvres complètes. Lyon, 1884-1887. T 2. P. 342). According to de Maistre, it is “the deep and frightening division of minds, the endless fragmentation of all doctrines, political Protestantism” that leads to “absolute individualism” (Ibid. 1886. Vol. 14. P. 286). Dr. French Catholic, F. R. de Lamennais (1782-1854), argued that individualism is a social manifestation of the philosophical absolutization of I. Enlightenment philosophers proclaimed that the reason of I. “is his law, his truth, his justice.” In their opinion, “to impose on an individual obligations which he himself does not impose upon himself in his thinking and will is to violate the most sacred of his rights.” It was precisely due to the spread of such ideas in society that it turned out that “no legislation, no power is possible.” Individualism, according to Lamennais, “destroys the very idea of ​​obedience and duty,” so that as a result nothing remains but “a terrifying confusion of interests, passions and different opinions” (Lamennais F. R., de. Oeuvres complètes. P., 1836-1837. T 9. P. 17-18).

If in a conservative Catholic. French Literally, the term “individualism” became a designation for the root of all social disorders, then liberal and revolutionary-minded writers in France and Germany, on the contrary, proudly called themselves individualists and defended individualism as a way of relationship between society and man. Thus, in M. Stirner (1806-1856), individualism was directly identified with extreme egoism and was reduced to an anarchic rebellion against society. In the book. “The One and His Property” (Der Einzige und sein Eigentum, 1844) Stirner wrote: “I, an egoist, have nothing to do with the good of “human society”; I don’t sacrifice anything for him, I just use him; and in order to be able to fully use it, I turn it into my property and into my creation, that is, I destroy it and build in its place a union of egoists” (Stirner M. Der Einzige und sein Eigentum. Stuttg., 1991. S. 196). Among more moderate authors, individualism was often identified with individuality and denoted the need for each human individual to independently develop his own abilities. At the same time, individualism and society were not opposed, but were recognized as complementary and interacting realities (for more information about the history and various meanings of the term “individualism” see: Lukes S. The Meanings of “Individualism” // Journal of the History of Ideas. 1971. Vol. 32. N 1. P. 45-66; Individualism.

Negative reaction to those that spread in the 1st half. XIX century individualistic sentiments are reflected in the works of A. Schopenhauer (1788-1860). Based on the doctrine of the world will, Schopenhauer identified different levels of the existence of individuality in the natural world: “Every person can be considered... as some special, definite and characteristic manifestation of the will; in animals this individual character is generally absent... and its trace disappears even further.” to a greater extent in plants located even further from humans.” In the field of inorganic nature, “all individuality completely disappears” (Schopenhauer A. Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung // Idem. Sämtliche Werke / Hrsg. A. Hübscher. Wiesbaden, 1966. Bd. 2. S. 156-157). However, according to Schopenhauer, although individuality is an integral feature of a person, given by his will, individuality is not identical to the will, and therefore belongs to the realm of phenomena, it is a “transient manifestation of the will” (Ibid. S. 242). Following I. Kant, Schopenhauer argued that individuality as a phenomenon is constituted by space and time as a priori forms of sensory intuition, which determine the possibility of plurality and difference. According to Schopenhauer, “the will manifests itself in a multitude of individuals,” while as a “thing in itself,” this will is one, not multiple, and therefore not individual. The will is present in every I. “entirely and inseparably,” therefore, everyone who cognizes I. necessarily “realizes himself as an integral will to life,” as “the being-in-itself (Ansich) of the world itself,” as a microcosm equal in value to the macrocosm (Ibid. S. 391-392). Like individual will, individual representation is only a phenomenon, that is, the world not in its essence, but in its existence for the individual knowing subject. At the same time, a person has “the direct consciousness that all... worlds exist only in our imagination, only as modifications of the eternal subject of pure knowledge” (Ibid. S. 242). If a person distances himself from his individuality and forgets about it, he realizes himself as such a subject of knowledge, which Schopenhauer also called “the eternal eye of the world, which ... looks from every living being” (Ibid. Bd. 3. S. 424) . This knowledge is always self-identical, it is “one and the same, the bearer (Träger) of the world and unchanging ideas,” while I., precisely because of his individuality, endowed with incomplete and vague knowledge, “has as its object only individual things and is the same transient, like them” (Ibidem). Since the individuality of cognition, which makes it imperfect, is determined by the individuality of consciousness, the pure subject of cognition, which is no longer a phenomenon, but is a “thing in itself,” is formed due to the “lack of individuality” and the “abolition of consciousness” (Ibid. S. 370) . Therefore, pure knowledge is something unconscious, residing “beyond knowledge,” “empty nothingness,” which “floats like the final goal above all virtues and beatitudes” (Ibid. Bd. 2. S. 487). Based on this ultimate goal, Schopenhauer gave a negative assessment of human individuality: “At its core... all individuality is only a special form of error (Irrthum), an offense (Fehltritt), something that would be better not to exist.” Therefore, the “real goal of life” is for a person to extract himself from the individuality of consciousness and knowledge and dissolve in a single unconscious subject (Ibid. Bd. 3. S. 563).

Diametrically opposite t. view. on I. and its position in the world was developed by F. Nietzsche (1844-1900). For Nietzsche, the independence of I. is unconditional, and his subordination to the universal is only “fetters” that must be destroyed. I. is interpreted by Nietzsche primarily as a manifestation of the creative will: “The individual is always new and creates new things” (Nietzsche F. Werke: Kritische Gasamtausgabe / Hrsg. G. Colli, M. Montinari. B.; N. Y., 1977. Abt. 7. Bd . 1. S. 705). It is this creative nature of I. that determines his opposition to universal law, be it in a moral or legal sense. According to Nietzsche, I. must creatively overcome his timidity before the universal, which, if it remains, is only as a common ultimate goal. Nietzsche saw such a goal in overcoming man himself as a natural species, achieved through the creative efforts of individuals: “Shouldn’t... every individual be an attempt to achieve a higher kind than man, and precisely thanks to his most individual?” (Ibid. 1971. Abt. 5. Bd. 1. S. 567). Based on this, Nietzsche proclaimed his own “morality”, the task of which is to “more and more take away from man his universal character and isolate him,” making him “incomprehensible to others” (Ibidem). In place of humanity as the ultimate goal of a particular person’s activity, Nietzsche puts individuality, interpreted in its development as something that overcomes the person himself and makes him a superman. Since individuality is most clearly expressed in the will to power, and the latter is primarily a struggle with others, Nietzsche’s interpretation of individuality also contains utopian-anarchist motives: “The highest degree of individuality will be achieved when everyone, like a hermit, is in the highest anarchy will establish its own state” (Ibid. S. 539). “The age of anarchy,” according to Nietzsche, is “the age of the most spiritual and freest individuals” (Ibid. 1973. Abt. 5. Bd. 2. S. 350), fully realizing their own independence (more about the development and changes in Nietzsche’s ideas about And . and individuality in different periods of creativity, see: Nabais N. The Individual and Individuality in Nietzsche // A Companion to Nietzsche / Ed. K. Ansell-Pearson, 2006. P. 76-94).

From the 2nd half. XIX century theoretical interest in the question of identity and the concept of individuality gives way in philosophy to the problematization of the very fact of individual existence of a person in all the diversity of his physical and spiritual life. Although the idea of ​​identity, dating back to Leibniz and finally formalized by Hegel, as a being constituted by an original and unconditional self-determination and free self-consciousness, remained widespread and practically generally accepted, identity was less and less perceived as an independent monad, as something self-sufficient. The central theme of philosophical reflection on individuality is the relationship of the individual to other individuals, that is, the actual, rather than theoretical, relationship between the individual, identified with each specific person, and the universal, embodied in society and the state.

The idea of ​​the interdependence of concrete human history and society as a totality of history was quite radically pursued in the philosophical and socio-political writings of K. Marx (1818-1883). According to Marx, “the first condition of all human history is naturally the existence of living human individuals” (Marx K. Die deutsche Ideologie // Marx-Engels-Werke. B., 1969. Bd. 3. S. 20-21). However, the natural structure, the “bodily organization” of these I. presupposes the need for their relationship with the outside world. Individuality is formed primarily by the natural circumstances of human existence, but to an even greater extent it is formed by more complex social and social relations. The human being in its real existence, according to Marx, is not “an abstraction relating to an individual,” but “an ensemble of social relations” (Idem. Thesen über Feuerbach // Ibid. S. 534), “the world of man, the state, society” (Idem. Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtphilosophie // Marx-Engels-Werke. B., 1976. Bd. 1. S. 378). Society is not formed from independent and autonomous identities, but “expresses the totality of interconnections and relationships in which individuals are with each other” (Idem. Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie. B., 1953. S. 176). Social relations are formed by individuals and in turn form individuals, therefore it is in the field of social relations that “reversal” that Marxist ideology called for, seeing in it a way of practical abolition of “unfreedom” and “oppression” reigning in bourgeois society, should take place. .

Attempts to offer a harmonious system of correlation between the individual and the universal were made in the philosophy of the neo-Kantians. P. Natorp (1854-1924) identified several areas in which the relations between the individual and the universal are built according to different schemes. In philosophy, as well as in theoretical knowledge in general, “the individual remains subordinate to the law-giving universal”; in ethics there is a “strict balance of the general and the individual”; finally, in aesthetics there is a “complete revolution in the relationship between the general and the individual,” i.e., the individual here has an unconditional advantage over the universal (Natorp P. Philosophie, ihr Problem und ihre Probleme: Einführung in den kritischen Idealismus. Gött., 1911. S . 104-105). G. Rickert (1863-1936) saw in the natural sciences the area of ​​dominance of universal concepts, while the humanities, in particular history, deal with the individual. At the same time, the individual is endowed with value and meaning from the perspective. universal (see: Rickert H. Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung. Tüb.; Lpz., 1902).

Throughout the 20th century. in zap. Philosophy continued to study the problems of identity and individuality from a variety of perspectives. The relationship between I. and society, the historical fate of I. and the structure of the individual existence of each individual person were considered in the works of G. Simmel, M. Heidegger, K. Jaspers, J. P. Sartre, G. Marcel, G. G. Gadamer, E. Levinas and others. The antinomies of the individual and the general (collective) were developed in detail both in the works of Marxist philosophers and in the writings of their opponents. A serious contribution to the analysis of the social and political nature of history was made by the philosophical and sociological studies of K. Popper, T. Adorno, and K. Schmitt. Various structures of relationships between specific ideas were illuminated in the works of representatives of the philosophy of dialogue, existential philosophy, and psychology: K. Löwith, M. Buber, C. G. Jung, E. Fromm, and M. Teunissen. Within the framework of M. Scheler's philosophical anthropology, the question of the relationship between space and space as a whole was raised, which is actively discussed in modern times. philosophers. In the 2nd half. XX century in Anglo-Amer. In analytical philosophy, there has been a tendency towards the de-anthropologization of the concept of “individual”, which again acquired a logical and linguistic meaning among representatives of this philosophical direction.

The concept of “individual” in Orthodox theology

In modern Orthodox in theology, the concept of “individual” is used relatively rarely, most often in polemical opposition to the concepts of “personality” and “person”. The most thorough attempt at such a contrast is presented in the article by V. N. Lossky (1903-1958) “The Theological Concept of Human Personality.” According to Lossky, any anthropology of personality must be built on the basis of Christology, that is, correlated with church teaching about the Person of Jesus Christ and verified by this teaching. Lossky argued that the concept of “individual” has no place either in triadology or in Christology: “In Trinitarian theology... the concept of “hypostasis” is not equal to the concept of “individual” and “Divinity” is not some kind of “individual substance” of the Divine nature” ( Lossky 2000. P. 293). I. was understood by Lossky as something limited, fragmenting nature and was opposed to the concept of “hypostasis,” which simultaneously expresses both the general and the particular. The human hypostasis, according to Lossky, “is not reducible to the level of individual natures, or substances” (Ibid. p. 294). Recognizing “that in the language of theologians (i.e., church writers of the patristic and medieval eras - D.S.) - both Eastern and Western” - the term “human personality” coincides with the term “human individual,” Lossky believed, that one cannot dwell on this statement and one should “discover another... understanding of personality,” which can no longer be identical to the concept of “individual” (Ibid. p. 295). Personality should not be understood as part of the “complex individual nature of man”, as “the highest quality of the individual, the quality of his perfection as a being created in the image of God” (Ibid. pp. 299, 298). According to Lossky, personality can only be defined apophatically, as “the irreducibility of man to [his] nature” (Ibid. p. 299). I., according to Lossky, is something fragmented, devoid of existential integrity. The identification of personality and personality can only “split nature” and “reduce personality to the level of the closed existence of private substances” (Ibid. p. 302).

Criticism of the identification of personality and identity was also carried out by the Greek. Orthodox theologian and publicist John (Zizioulas), Metropolitan. Pergamsky (born in 1931). According to Met. John, the concept of “personality” cannot be reduced “to the totality of natural, psychological or moral qualities that are in a certain sense “contained” in the human individual” (Zizioulas J. Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church. Crestwood (N.Y.) , 1985. P. 47). In his works, Met. John harshly criticized the philosophy of individualism, which considers the highest value the freedom of the individual, understood as a self-sufficient, self-governing and unrestricted ego. The task of the Christian Metropolitan. John sees in overcoming “one’s own “selfhood” and in “becoming a related being,” as a result of which a person becomes “not an individual, but a personality, that is, an ecstatic being (ek-static being),” which “already cannot be considered from the point of view of its limits” (Ibid. P. 226). According to Met. John, “being a person... differs from being an individual or “personality”, since a person cannot be imagined in itself, but only within its relationships” (Ibid. P. 105). Any individuality in the sense of separation, according to Met. John, is abolished by the fact of the life and resurrection of Christ, Who “cannot be imagined as an individual” (Ibid. P. 136), that is, outside of his connection with the Church - the Body of Christ. Therefore, human individuality must also be sublated in the Church, in personal communication with other individuals: “There is no true being without communication” (Ibid. P. 18)

Although the argument given by Lossky and Metropolitan. John (Zizioulas), is largely correct and deserves attention; when assessing the relationship between the concepts of “personality” and “individual,” one cannot help but take into account the fact that, as the analysis of patristic statements shows, personality and individuality were not perceived in the patristic era as incompatible and opposite categories. Contradiction and incompatibility between them arise only if one of them is taken in the classical philosophical and theological sense, and the other is interpreted on the basis of its understanding in modern Europe. philosophy. In this regard, the tasks of systematizing ideas about personality and the individuality of ancient church writers and correlating these ideas with their ideas about personality and with various teachings about personality and personality that developed in modern Europe are especially important. philosophy. An example of such an analysis is the work of L. Turcescu (Turcescu. 2002).

“Individual” in the writings of the Eastern Fathers of the Church and church writers

The concepts of “individual” and “individual” (indivisible, ἄτομος, ἀμέριστος) are found in Greek. patristic literature is rare; They are also used in tradition. philosophical sense, and in relation to the concepts of “hypostasis” and “person”, typical for theological constructions.

The Holy Fathers were aware of the comparison between I. as particular and genus and species as general, dating back to Aristotle. Theodoret, bishop Kirsky wrote: “According to... the teaching of the fathers, what difference does the general (τὸ κοινόν) have in relation to the particular (τὸ ἴδιον) or the genus in relation to the species or individual (τὸ ἄτομον), the same difference has the essence in relation to hypostasis "(Theodoret. Eranist. P. 64). The concept of “individual” is correlated here with that characteristic of the East. Christ theology with the doctrine of hypostasis as an independent individual being. A similar idea can be seen in the opus attributed to Leontius of Byzantium. “On sects”: “[The Fathers] call hypostasis or person (πρόσωπον) that which philosophers call indivisible essence (ἄτομον οὐσίαν)” (Leont. Byz. De sect. 1 // PG. 86. Col. 1193), however here There is some terminological confusion: the “indivisible essence” turns out to be identical to the hypostasis and is perceived as something individual, whereas tradition. for patristic literature there was an idea of ​​essence as a general thing. However, given that this work speaks of an “individualized” essence, these words can be understood as a continuation of the division of the first essence (particular, individual) and the second essence (general), going back to Aristotle. It is in this sense that the comparison of the terms “essence”, “hypostasis”, “person” and “individual” is carried out in the treatise “To the Hellenes, on the basis of general concepts” by St. Gregory, bishop Nyssa. According to St. Gregory, “if someone says that we call Peter, Paul and Barnabas three partial entities (οὐσίας μερικάς), which obviously means partial (ἰδικάς) [entities] ... he must understand that ... we do not mean anything , except [that any of them] is an individual (ἄτομον), that is, a person (πρόσωπον)” (Greg. Nyss. Ad Graec. // GNO. Vol. 3(1). P. 23). According to St. Gregory in this treatise, I. correlates with appearance in the same way as essence correlates with hypostasis; Moreover, the knowledge of the individual and the knowledge of the species in a thing are carried out in cognitive acts that are different in their orientation: “It is obvious that the species (εἶδος) and the individual, that is, the essence and the hypostasis; for when something individual is spoken of, that is, of a hypostasis, it directly refers the listener's thought to the search for [someone] with curly hair, blue eyes, a son, a father, and the like; when it is said about the form, that is, about the essence, it serves the knowledge of a rational animal, mortal, capable of understanding and knowledge, or an unreasonable animal, mortal, capable of neighing, and the like” (Ibid. P. 31; Wed also: Turcescu. 2002).

Church writers knew the Aristotelian doctrine of individual properties, or characteristics that are not identical to the individual essence: “We correctly say that this is an indivisible essence, for church writers did not call the indivisibility of the adjunct (τὰ ἄτομα τῶν συμβεβηκότων) either a person or a hypostasis” (Leon) t . Byz. 1 // PG. 1193). In the one attributed to St. Kirill, archbishop. Alexandrinsky, treatise “On the Trinity”, I., along with hypostasis and person (personality), belongs to the category of “private” (περιεχόμενα): “Private... individuals, and hypostases, and persons are called. And individuals are called this because cutting or division never happens to them” (Cyr. Alex. (Ps.). De Trinit. 13 // PG. 77. Col. 1149). In those attributed to St. Athanasius, archbishop. Alexandrinsky, the dialogues “On the Holy Trinity” also emphasize the difference between “essence” as a general and “individual” as a particular: “Anomeus: Does this mean that humanity (ἀνθρωπότης) does not exist independently (ὑφέστηκεν)? Orthodox: Of course it is, if it is seen in individuals (ἐν ἀτόμοις). Anomey: But isn’t she then a hypostasis? Orthodox: I have already said, if it is seen in individuals. Anomey: What is an individual and what is humanity? Orthodox: The individual is our own hypostasis (ἡ καθ᾿ ἕκαστον ὑπόστασις), and humanity is the community of essence (ἡ τῆς οὐσίας κοινότης)” (Athanas Alex. . (Ps.). Col. 1141).

The general result of the patristic reception of the philosophical concept of “individual” was summed up by St. John of Damascus in the Philosophical Chapters of The Source of Knowledge. In ch. 11 of this work, entitled “On the Individual,” St. John identified 4 meanings of the word “individual” (τὸ ἄτομον): “An individual is something that is not cut or divided, such as: a point (ἡ στιϒμὴ), an instant (τὸ νῦν), a unit (ἡ μονάς), similar things are called also without quantity (ἄποσα). An individual is also called something that is difficult to separate, that is, difficult to dissect, for example: a diamond and the like. An individual is a species that is not divided into other species, that is, the lowest species (τὸ εἰδικώτατον εἶδος), for example: a person, a horse, etc. An individual in the proper sense (κυρίως) is something that, although it can be divided, is after division it does not retain its original appearance (οὐ σῴζει δὲ μετὰ τὴν τομὴν τὸ πρῶτον εἶδος); for example, Peter can be divided into soul and body, but neither the soul itself is already a complete (τέλειος) man or a complete Peter, nor the body. In this [last] sense, philosophers speak of the individual, namely, that it designates a hypostasis [based] on essence (τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἐπ τῆς οὐσίας)” (Ioan. Damasc. Dialect. 11). St. John also testifies to the established patristic tradition of perceiving the terms “hypostasis,” “person,” and “individual” as synonyms: “The individual (τὸ μερικὸν) they [i.e. e. the holy fathers] called an individual, a person, a hypostasis, for example, Peter, Paul” (Ibid. 31); “You should... know that the holy fathers with the names “hypostasis,” “person,” and “individual” meant the same thing, namely, that, consisting of essence and accessory [properties] (ἐξ οὐσίας κα συμβεβηκότων), there exists in itself and independently (ὑφιστάμενον), differs in number and expresses such and such, for example, Paul, Peter, such and such a horse” (Ibid. 44).

A similar understanding of the relationship between personality and hypostasis can be traced among the Monophysite authors of the 6th century. In the treatise “On a Hundred Heresies” St. John of Damascus provides a fragment of the work “The Arbitrator” by John Philoponus, in the 7th chapter. of which the latter, with reference to the previous church and philosophical traditions, offers a detailed explanation of the relationship between the general and the particular, as well as the philosophical concept of “individual” and the theological term “hypostasis”: “When a living being is divided into rational and unreasonable, and the rational, in turn, into man, angel and demon, then an individual is called that into which each of these last species is divided: a man, for example, into Peter and Paul, an angel - say, into Gabriel and Michael and each of the other angels - because each of these It is no longer possible for beings to be divided into others, preserving their nature during division. After all, the division of a person into soul and body leads to the destruction of the entire living being. Therefore, the Peripatetics usually call such beings individuals. Church teaching called them hypostases, since in them the genus and species receive existence, for, although a living being, for example, even a person, of which the first is a generic concept, and the second is a specific one, have their own definition of being, however, they receive existence only in individuals, that is, in Peter and Paul: outside of them they do not exist" (Ioan. Damasc. De haer. 83; see also: Lang U. M. John Philoponus and the Controversies over Chalcedon in the Sixth Century: A Stud. and Transl . of the Arbiter. 2001. P. 190-191).

The identification of the concept of “individual” with the concepts of “hypostasis” and “person” is reflected in Eastern Trinitarian theology. church writers. Thus, in the one attributed to St. Kirill, Archbishop Alexandrian, treatise “On the Trinity” says: “...we confess in the Divinity one essence, one nature, one form, but three individuals, three hypostases, three persons, recognizable by corresponding characteristic features, that is, their own properties” (Cyr. Alex. (Ps.). 13 // PG. 1149). According to Rev. To John of Damascus, in relation to the Holy Trinity, as in other cases, “hypostasis means the individual (ἡ ὑπόστασις ἄτομον δηλοῖ), i.e. Father, Son, Holy Spirit...” (Ioan. Damasc. De fide orth. III 4).

Finally, the concept of “individual” was used by some in the East. church writers in relation to Jesus Christ. Yes, St. Gregory, bishop Nyssa, discussing the mystery of the Incarnation, asked the question: “Human nature is small and limited, but the Divinity is limitless - how can the limitless be embraced by an individual?” - and responded to this that “The Divinity, although it was in man, was not subject to any limitation” (Greg. Nyss. Or. catech. 10). Later the term “individual” was used by St. John of Damascus, when considering the question in what sense is said about God’s perception of human nature by the Word: “God the Word, having become incarnate, did not perceive human nature, seen only by speculation... or seen in the form (ἐν τῷ εἴδει)... but [perceived] that [nature], which is in the individual (ἐν ἀτόμῳ) and which is identical to the species (τὴν αὐτὴν οὖσαν τῷ εἴδει) ... However, not the one that would exist at first, at first it became an individual and it would be perceived by him. , but [He assumed the nature] realized in His hypostasis” (Ioan. Damasc. De fide orth. III 11).

In the Latin theological tradition

the concept of “individuality” was used already at the turn of the 2nd and 3rd centuries. Tertullian, however, for the most part in the technical sense of the inseparability and inseparability of something (see: Tertull. De poenit. 5, 15; Idem. De monog. 5). For example, interpreting the Lord's Prayer, Tertullian wrote: “... asking for our daily bread, we ask for eternal abiding in Christ and inseparability (individuitatem) from His Body” (Idem. De orat. 6). Tertullian used the concept of “indivisibility” in a similar meaning when considering the trinitarian problematic, saying that the Son is “inseparable and inseparable (individuum et inseparatum) from the Father” (Idem. Adv. Prax. 18, 19, 23). At schmch. Cyprian, bishop Carthage, the concept of “indivisibility”, which has the same meaning, was often used in relation to the Church, which is “the unity of an indivisible and indivisible (inseparabilis atque individuae) house” (Cypr. Carth. Ep. 69.4).

The philosophical meaning of the concept “individual” became known to Latin church writers only in the 4th century. and is first found in the work of Victorinus Maria “Adversus Arium” (Against Arius), in which the author says about God: “From this universal and super-universal being (esse universale et supra universale) universal being receives its own being, [but already divided] into genera and species and individuals” (Mar. Vict. Adv. Ar. I 34). An interesting understanding of I., apparently borrowed from the Greek. commentators on Aristotle, found in Victorinus' op. “Explanationes in Ciceronis Rhetoricam” (Explanations to Cicero’s “Rhetoric”): “The individual is that which is visible to the eye and what can be pointed to with the finger” (Idem. Explanationes in Ciceronis Rhetoricam // Rhetores latini minores / Ed. C. Halm. 1863 .P. 212).

However, both in Victorinus and in subsequent lats. Among church writers up to Boethius, the concept of “individual” in its philosophical sense did not become widespread. The only notable precedent for the philosophical use of this term in Lat. patristics is a passage from the treatise “On the Trinity” by Bl. Augustine, bishop Hippo (354-430). Considering triadological terminology here, blzh. Augustine identified various senses in which the terms “nature”, “essence” (essentia), “substance”, “person”, etc. can be used. In particular, he noted that “the name of a substance or person” can mean “not a type, but something singular and individual (singulare atque individuum),” and in this case, a substance or a person will be spoken of “not in the same way as a person is spoken of [in general], that is, as something common (commune) for everyone people, but as it is said about this (hic) person, that is, for example, about Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, or about anyone else, to whom, as present, one can point the finger” (Aug. De Trinit. VII 6). Thus, I. is a single being, the independent existence of which can be recorded in perception. It is the existence and perception of a single and individual blzh. Augustine considered the basis for the formation of general species concepts, which in the case of man he associated not only with the genus-species logical structure, but also with the natural-material unity of the human race. He noted: “...there is no species that goes beyond its individuals to embrace something else. For if I begin to define what a person is (and this is a specific name), any individual people who are individuals will be contained in this very definition, and nothing else that is not a person will belong to it” (Ibidem). At the same time, the concept of “individual”, associated with quantitative unity, was apparently recognized by the blj. Augustine is not suitable for triadological constructions and is not found anywhere else in the treatise.

Thus, with rare exceptions, the category “individuality” is used in Lat. fathers only in the usual sense of the indivisibility of something into its component parts. It is in this meaning that the adjective “individual” (indivisible) was often applied to the Holy Trinity, as an analogue of the Greek. the term ἀδιαίρετος in the stable expression “individua Trinitas” (indivisible Trinity - see, for example: Aug. Ep. 188. 3; Idem. Contr. Maxim. arian. // PL. 42. Col. 770; Beda. In Marc. III 10; In Luc. III 10, IV 18).

Lit.: Cassirer E. Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie des Renaissance. Lpz.; B., 1927 (Russian translation: E. Kassirer. The individual and the cosmos in the philosophy of the Renaissance // Izbr.: The individual and the cosmos. M.; St. Petersburg, 2000. P. 7-206); Preiswerk A. Das Einzelne bei Platon und Aristoteles. Lpz., 1939; Alfieri V. E. Atomos idea: L "origin del concetto dell" atom nel pensiero greco. Florenz, 1953; Kaulbach F. Atom und Individuum: Studien zu Heimsoeths Abhandlung “Atom, Seele, Monade” // Zschr. f. philos. Forschung. 1963. Bd. 17. N 1. P. 3-41; Rist J. M. Forms of Individuals in Plotinus // CQ. N.S. 1963. Vol. 13. N 2. P. 223-231; Wade F. Abelard and Individuality // Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter, ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung: Vortr. des 2. Intern. Kongr. für Mittelalterliche Philosophie, Köln, 31. Aug. - 6. Sept. 1961/Hrsg. P. Wilpert. B., N.Y., 1963. S. 165-171; B é rub é C. La connaissance de l "individuel au moyen âge. Montréal, 1964; Blumenthal H. J. Did Plotinus Believe in Ideas of Individuals? // Phronesis. 1966. Vol. 11. P. 61-88; Mamo P. S. Forms of Individuals in the Enneads // Ibid. 1969/1970. N 2. P. 77-96; Individuals in Aristotle's Categories // Ibid. 1971/1972. Vol. 16/17. N 2. P. 107-123; Pieper A. Individuum // Handbuch philosophischer Grundbegriffe. Münch., 1973. Bd. 2. S. 728-737; Annas J. Individuals in Aristotle's “Categories”: Two queries // Phronesis. 1974. Vol. 19. N 1-2. P. 146-152; Panikkar R. Singularity and Individuality: The Double Principle of Individuation // Revue intern. de philosophie. 1975. T. 29. P. 141-166; HWPh. 1976. Bd. 300-323; 1978; Bynum C. W. Did the Twelfth Century Discover the Individual? // JEcclH. 1980. Vol. 1. P. 1-17; Individual Personality in Origen and the Cappadocian Fathers // Arché e Telos: L "anthropologia di Origene e di Gregorio di Nissa: Analisi storico-religiosa: Atti del Colloquio, Milano, 17-19 maggio 1979 / Ed. U. Bianchi, H. Crouzel. Mil., 1981. P. 170-196; Gracia J. J. E. Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages. Münch; W., 1984; idem. Individuality: An Essay on the Foundations of Metaphysics. Albany, 1988; Martine B. J. Individuals and Individuality. Albany, 1984; Frede M. Individuals in Aristotle // Idem. Essays in Ancient Philosophy. Minneapolis, 1987. P. 49-71; Janke W. Individualismus // TRE. 1987. Bd. 16. S. 117-124; Morris C. The Discovery of the Individual, 1050-1200. Toronto, 19872; Soto Bruna M. J. Individuo y unidad: La substancia individual según Leibniz. Pamplona, ​​1988; Vaysse J. M. L "oubli du singulier: individuation, individualité, individu // Kairos. Toulouse, 1991. T. 2. P. 187-221; Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation (1150-1650) / Ed. J. J. E. Gracia. Albany, 1994; Denken der Individualität: F. S. Simon zum 65. Geburtstag. T. S. Hoffmann, S. Majetschak., 1995; Princeton, 1994; Rijk L. M., de. Ockham's Horror of the Universal: An Assessment of His View of Individuality // Mediaevalia: Textos e Estudos. 1995. Vol. 7/8. P. 473-497; Siep L. Individuality in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit // The Modern Subject/Ed. K. Ameriks et al. Albany, 1995. P. 131-148; Graeser A. Individualität und individuelle Form als Problem in der Philosophie der Spätantike und des frühen Mittelalters // Museum Helveticum. 1996. Vol. 53. N 2. P. 187-196; Individual und Individualität im Mittelalter / Hrsg. J. A. Aertsen, A. Speer. B.; N. Y., 1996. (Miscellanea Mediaevalia; 24); De Sousa R. Individual Natures // Philosophia. 1998. Vol. 26. N 1/2. P. 3-21; Tabarroni A. Individual or Individualism: Scotus and Francis of Assisi // Franciscan Studies. 1998. Vol. 55. P. 239-251; Morel P.-M. Individualité et identité de l"âme humaine chez Plotin // Cahiers philosophiques de Strasbourg. 1999. T. 8: Plotin. P. 53-66; Batkin L. M. European man alone with himself: Essays on cultural-historical foundations and limits personal self-consciousness. M., 2000; Lossky V. N. Theological concept of human personality / Translated from French: V. A. Reshchikov // Theology and vision of God. M. L. Individuals and Individuation in Aristotle // Unity, Identity, and Explanation in Aristotle's Metaphysics / Ed. Th. Scaltsas et al. Oxf., 2001. P. 55-71; Wood R. E. Individuals, Universals, and Capacity // Review of Metaphysics. 2001. Vol. 54. N 3. P. 507-528; Cross R. Individual Natures in the Christology of Leontius of Byzantium // JECS. 2002. Vol. 10. P. 245-266; Frandsen H. V. Sur l "ontologie de la théologie négative: Individu et univers chez Denys l" Aréopagite // Théologie négative / Ed. M. M. Olivetti. Padova, 2002. P. 515-523; Turсescu L. “Person” versus “Individual” and Other Modern Misreadings of Gregory of Nyssa // Modern Theology. 2002. Vol. 18. N 4. P. 527-539; Gurevich A. Ya. Human personality in medieval Europe: real or false problem? // Personal development. M., 2003. No. 1. P. 24-30; No. 2. P. 29-40; aka. Individual and society in the medieval West. M., 2005; Bedos-Rezak B. M., Iogna-Prat D. L "individu au Moyen Âge: Individuation et individualisation avant la modernité. P., 2005; Di Bella S. The Science of the Individual: Leibniz"s Ontology of Individual Substance. Dordrecht, 2005; Neretina S. V., Ogurtsov A. P. Paths to universals. St. Petersburg, 2006; Schiller H.-E. Das Individuum im Widerspruch: Zur Theoriegeschichte des modernen Individualismus. B., 2006.

D. V. Smirnov

Each person is essentially a biological individual and, like all other living beings, is a part of nature. But unlike the latter, she can become a person, an individual. This is possible thanks to the presence of intelligence and interaction with the environment. So who is an individual - in this article.

Signs of an individual

Having been born, a person, by definition, is already an individual, which reflects his tribal affiliation. This is a specific bearer of individually unique traits, but primarily biologically determined. He is united with all other people by his musculoskeletal structure, the structure of his brain, the presence of speech, etc. But at the same time, an individual is a single being that differs from others in individual characteristics - hair color, skin color, functioning of the nervous system, etc.

However, they are considered not only as an individual representative of a human race, but also as a member of a certain social group. It is distinguished by the following characteristics:

1. The integrity of the psychophysical organization of the body.
2. Stability relative to the surrounding reality.
3. Activity.

For those who are interested in what an individual means, we can answer that, thanks to a high social organization, he can consciously overcome the inherent biological “program”, make changes in his behavior and control it, and manage all higher psychological processes.

Social qualities of an individual

Being born as an individual, a person becomes a personality in the process of life. And due to the fact that his adaptation mechanisms are poorly developed, an individual can become a person only through constant communication and interaction with others. This is influenced by relationships within the family, within the group. A person does not receive personal characteristics from birth. He adopts all mental traits, views and customs from the society in which he lives.

The social qualities of an individual include:

• temperament;
• character;
• capabilities;
• motivation;
• responsibility;
• self-realization;
• cooperation;
• reflection;
• emotional stability, etc.

A person reaches personal maturity gradually and each age stage is characterized by a special qualitative identity. Personality formation is a long and complex, multifactorial and multidimensional process. Based on experience, norms and values, civic position, attitude towards oneself, people and the world are formed.

Differences between the individual and personality

The personality of each person is a collection of traits and characteristics that form its individuality. Thus, individuality is understood as a combination of psychological characteristics of a person, which makes him unique, original, and different from others. Individuality is manifested in everything - body type, clothing style, temperament, life experience, aspirations, ways of self-expression, etc. Individuality is not a manifestation of the integrity of the individual, but a certain “zest” that distinguishes a person from others.

Individuality is formed under the influence of the environment in which the individual grows, his upbringing, accumulated experience, characteristics of relationships within the family and treatment of the child. The most important factors are a person’s innate characteristics and his own life position. Russian psychologist, politician and scientist A.G. Asmolov said that “one is born as an individual, one becomes an individual, and one defends individuality.” That is, it happens in society, and individuality occurs outside it. This process occurs separately, uniquely and inimitably.

The population of our country is increasing every day. As a result, the world receives millions of new ideas, visions and opinions every year. It is impossible to find absolutely identical people. Even twins can be so different that they can compete with two strangers of opposite personalities. Nevertheless, it is simply necessary to respect each person, both for society as a whole and for individual representatives of the population. Thus, psychologists and scientists have developed various definitions and characteristics that help explain how important each of us is. It is from here that such concepts as individual and personality emerged. Let's understand these definitions.

Who is the individual?

Very often we hear from friends and colleagues that we are individual, and it is simply impossible to find similar people. However, plunging deeper into the bustle of life, unfortunately, a person forgets about this and underestimates his capabilities. On the other hand, he can overestimate them, not respecting and not considering those around him. These two situations are dire and the consequences are significant. People must understand that an individual is a natural being who is the bearer of unique and distinctive traits. This is a representative of Homo Sapiens, a person who was created in order to inhabit and adapt to the world around him, to be resistant to various stressful situations and to be active.

Characteristics of the concept of “personality”

The concept of “personality” appeared a little later than the “individual”. This was the name given to people who had an inner core and lived boldly, consciously and fairly. In addition, a person as an individual chooses his own freedom, life path and way of reacting to society. Thus, this is still the same representative of Homo Sapiens, but he is considered as a social being, acquiring unique character traits, forming his own behavior and establishing contact with others. At the same time, an individual is a representative of society, an individual who, over time, turns into a personality - a unique, original person with a unique psyche and the ability to find a common language with other people.

How does a personality differ from an individual?

In fact, each individual becomes a personality in the future. It’s up to him to decide what kind of person he will become. In addition, his development and worldview are influenced by a number of factors that can disrupt the individual’s psyche and completely change his outlook on life. Due to the influence of a number of events, a person grows up to be strong, purposeful, conscientious and fair, or weak, envious, cunning and inhuman. Thus, everyone can “go over to the side of evil” and live not according to the laws of society, which will only bring trouble in the future. One way or another, an individual is a person who chooses what kind of person to become and what path in life to choose.

Personality structure

Characterizing a personality is very difficult. It consists of complex elements that are inherent to certain people. However, scientists identify three blocks in the structure of each person. These are his orientation, abilities and psychological characteristics. The first block includes the needs, motives, interests, and feelings of a person; to the second - its capabilities; and to the third - character and temperament. Depending on this, the three sections are called as follows: intra-individual, inter-individual and meta-individual. Each component of the personality structure is inherent to all people on our planet, because everyone has feelings, motives, needs, character and abilities for one thing or another. Thus, three blocks briefly and superficially show the essence of each person’s personality. The remaining details (the most important ones, which distinguish all people from each other) can only be recognized by a professional psychologist and only on an individual basis.

Individual and person

In addition to the individual and personality, there are such concepts as “individual” and “person”. The first definition appeared quite a long time ago, even before the appearance of Homo Sapiens, because it means a living creature that has its own abilities and characteristics. As for the concept of “man,” this is a creature capable of adapting to social society. It is important to note that not all individuals are people, since animals, birds, fish, and so on fit the description of a living creature. For example, a crow and a hamster are also individuals, but this does not mean that they are people. Man, in turn, is a being endowed with certain qualities, possessing a soul and mind. Moving further, we note that the individual is a representative of the society in which people live; an organism with its own needs, personal properties and character. When talking about a person, everyone immediately remembers what exactly separates him from other living beings. Of course, these are independence, emotions, biological, social and personal qualities.

Individual development

The concept of “individual” appeared on the basis of certain properties that distinguish people from all others. Scientists included age-sex and individual-typical characteristics among them. Depending on this, each person has character traits, physique, and so on that are unique to him. It is the interaction of these two properties that creates needs and psychophysiological functions. Age-sex properties are the basis for the development of an individual, as well as his ontogenetic evolution. It is during this period that a person experiences puberty. Individual-typical ones form the symmetry of the figure, the neurodynamic properties of the brain, the peculiarities of the functional geometry of the hemispheres and much more. All of the above properties ensure full development at the cellular and molecular levels. When the formation and development of an individual is almost complete, he is subject to influence from the society in which he is located.

Are all people individual?

It would seem that a person can be called completely differently: personality, individual, individual, but what unites all these concepts, and do they make each of us individual? Many psychologists believe that it is necessary to consider another definition - “person”. This is a person who plays a certain role in society. In any case, to the question whether all people are individual, we can safely answer yes! Of course, there are basic traits and characteristics inherent in every person, but the mystery lies in the details. For example, an individual is resistant to the environment, active and has an integral psychophysical organization of the body. Thus, a person is able to experience emotions, build relationships with other people, feel needs and achieve goals. These are the common traits of every person, but if you dig deeper, you can learn about the secrets and unique traits of a certain soul. Individuality is a set of physiological, mental and social characteristics that can be seen in a person’s activities, behavior, and communication.

Individual: human-organism

One individual is necessarily different from another. It has certain features or disadvantages; ability or knowledge. However, each of them is an individuality that makes a person a unique personality. The kind that others are drawn to, who are never like anyone else. In a word, unique, one of a kind.

For socio-psychological analysis of personality, the concepts of “person”, “individual”, “personality”, “individuality” should be distinguished.

The most general concept is “man” - this is a biosocial being with articulate speech, consciousness, higher mental functions (abstract logical thinking, logical memory, etc.), capable of creating tools and using them in the process of social labor. These specifically human abilities and properties are not hereditary, but are formed in a person during his lifetime, in the process of assimilating the culture created by previous generations. There are reliable facts that indicate that if children from a very early age develop outside of society, then they remain at the level of an animal, they do not develop speech, consciousness, thinking, and do not have an upright gait. A person living in isolation from other people and society will not independently develop logical thinking and will not develop a system of concepts. People of each subsequent generation begin their lives in the world of objects and phenomena created by previous generations. By participating in work and various forms of social activity, they develop in themselves those specific human abilities that have already been formed in humanity.

The concept “individual” can refer to both a person and an animal. “Individual” (from the Latin “individuum” - indivisible) is a person as a representative of the species Homo sapiens, a unity of innate and acquired, a bearer of individually unique traits. The main characteristics of an individual are activity, integrity, stability and specificity of interaction with the outside world. When characterizing a person as an individual, we consider first of all his biological nature. Therefore, when organizing educational and work activities, the manager (teacher) must take into account compliance with safety measures, sanitary and hygienic working conditions.

In psychology, the concept of “personality” is one of the fundamental ones. “Personality,” wrote S. L. Rubinstein, “forms the basis that internally determines the interpretation of the human psyche as a whole. All mental processes constitute the mental content of a person’s life. Each type of mental process makes its own specific contribution to the richness of her inner life.” In order to become a person, a person must acquire spiritual values, moral standards, and methods of activity.

Personality is a person defined in a system of socially conditioned characteristics that are manifested in social connections and relationships by nature, are stable, and determine a person’s moral actions.

The formation of a person as a personality is characterized by the development of the higher spheres of his psyche: mental, emotional, volitional. L. Feuerbach wrote: “A perfect person has the power of thinking, the power of will and the power of feelings. The power of thinking is the light of knowledge, the power of will is the energy of character, the power of feeling is love. Reason, love and willpower are perfection.” It is important for a leader (teacher) to create a set of conditions in a team in which not only biological, but also social and spiritual needs are identified.

The concept of “individuality” emphasizes the unique identity of a person, that in which he is different from others. His individuality is expressed in the presence of special experiences, knowledge, opinions, beliefs, and character that are unique to him. Motivation, temperament, abilities, character are the main parameters of individuality. The prerequisite for its formation is anatomical and physiological inclinations, transformed in the process of life. Individuality is manifested in the properties of temperament, character traits, and the specific interests and abilities of the individual. It is the originality of feelings, the peculiarity of character, and the uniqueness of thinking. “The higher a social being is organized, the more individuality is expressed in it,” wrote I. I. Mechnikov. Knowing the strengths and weaknesses of schoolchildren, it is possible to determine the conditions for their learning and development, rationally build a work schedule, and help find ways of self-improvement.

Thus, comparing these concepts, we can note: “individual” means something whole, indivisible, indicates what unites a given person with the human species; “individuality” answers the question of how a given person differs from all other people; the concept of “personality” characterizes integrity, but one that is born in society.

Individual is a separate individual that combines a unique set of innate qualities and acquired properties. From the perspective of sociology, an individual is a characteristic of a person as a separate representative of the biological species of people. An individual is a single individual of representatives of Homo sapiens. That is, it is an individual human being that combines the social and the biological and is determined by a unique set of genetically programmed qualities and an individual socially acquired set of traits, characteristics, and properties.

The concept of individual

An individual is a carrier of the biological component in a person. People as individuals represent a complex of natural genetically dependent qualities, the formation of which is realized during the period of ontogenesis, the result of which is the biological maturity of people. It follows that the concept individual expresses the species identity of a person. Thus, every person is born an individual. However, after birth, the child acquires a new social parameter - he becomes a person.

In psychology, the first concept with which the study of personality begins is the individual. Literally, this concept can be understood as an indivisible particle of a single whole. Man as an individual is studied not only from the point of view of a single representative of a human race, but also as a member of a certain social group. This characteristic of a person is the simplest and most abstract, saying only that he is separated from others. This remoteness is not its essential characteristic, since all living beings in the Universe are fenced off from each other and in this understanding “individuals”.

So, the individual is a single representative of the human race, a specific bearer of all the social characteristics and psychophysical traits of humanity. The general characteristics of the individual are as follows:

— in the integrity of the psychophysical organization of the body;

- stability relative to the surrounding reality;

- in activity.

Another way to define this concept is the phrase “specific person”. Man as an individual exists from his birth until his death. An individual is the initial (initial) state of a person in his ontogenetic development and phylogenetic formation.

The individual, as a product of phylogenetic formation and ontogenetic development in specific external circumstances, however, is by no means a simple copy of such circumstances. It is precisely a product of the formation of life, interaction with environmental conditions, and not conditions taken by themselves.

In psychology, the concept of “individual” is used in a fairly broad sense, which leads to a distinction between the characteristics of a person as an individual and his traits as a person. It is their clear distinction, therefore, that underlies his delimitation of such concepts as individual and personality, and is a necessary prerequisite for the psychological analysis of personality.

Social individual

Unlike young animals, the individual is practically devoid of innate adaptive instincts. Therefore, for survival and further development, he needs communication with his own kind. After all, only in society will a child be able to realize his innate potential and become an individual. Regardless of what society an individual is born into, he will not be able to do without the care and teaching of adults. For full development, a child needs a long time so that he can absorb all the elements and details that he will need in independent life as an adult member of society. Therefore, from the very first days of life, a child needs to be able to communicate with adults.

The individual and society are inseparable. Without society, an individual will never become an individual; without individuals, society simply will not exist. In the initial period of life, interaction with society consists of primary facial reactions, body language, with the help of which the baby informs adults about his needs and shows his satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The responses of adult members of a social group also become clear to him from facial expressions, various gestures and intonations.

As the child grows up and learns to speak, the language of gestures and facial expressions gradually fades into the background, but never throughout the adult life of the individual it completely loses its significance, transforming into the most important tool of nonverbal communications, which expresses feelings sometimes no less, and sometimes and more than ordinary words. This is due to the fact that gestures, facial expressions and postures are less controlled by consciousness than speech, and therefore, in some cases, are even more informative, telling society what the individual wanted to hide.

So, we can confidently say that social qualities (for example, communication) should be formed only in the process of interaction with society in general and communication with other people in particular. Any communication, verbal or non-verbal, is a necessary component for a person to become socialized. The social qualities of an individual are his abilities for social activity and the process of socialization. The earlier the socialization process begins, the easier it will be.

There are various forms of learning through which an individual is socialized, but they should always be used in combination. One of the methods that adults consciously use to teach a child to socially correct and approved behavior is reinforcement learning. Consolidation is realized through the targeted use of the method of rewards and punishments in order to demonstrate to the child which of his behaviors will be desired and approved, and which will be disapproving. In this way, the child is taught to comply with the elementary requirements of hygiene, etiquette, etc. that apply in society.

Some elements of an individual’s everyday behavior can become quite a habit, which leads to the formation of strong associative connections – the so-called conditioned reflexes. One of the channels of socialization is the formation of conditioned reflexes. Such a reflex, for example, could be washing your hands before eating. The next method of socialization is observational learning.

An individual learns how to behave in society by observing the behavior of adults and trying to imitate them. Many children's games are based on imitating the behavior of adults. Role-based social interaction of individuals is also learning. An adherent of this concept, J. Mead, believes that mastering social norms and rules of behavior occurs through interactions with other people and through various games, especially role-playing games (for example, playing mother and daughter). Those. learning occurs through interaction. By participating in role-playing games, the child brings to life the results of his own observations and his initial experience of social interaction (visiting a doctor, etc.).

Socialization of an individual occurs through the influence of various agents of socialization. The most important and first such agent in the process of social formation of an individual is the family. After all, it is the first and closest “social environment” of the individual. The functions of the family regarding the child include caring for his health and protection. The family also satisfies all the basic needs of the individual. It is the family that initially introduces the individual to the rules of behavior in society and teaches communication with other people. In the family, he first becomes acquainted with gender role stereotypes and undergoes gender identification. It is the family that develops the primary values ​​of the individual. However, at the same time, the family is the institution that can cause the greatest harm to the process of socialization of the individual. For example, the low social status of parents, their alcoholism, conflicts in the family, social alienation or single-parent families, various deviations in the behavior of adults - all this can lead to irreparable consequences and leave an indelible imprint on the child’s worldview, his character and social behavior.

School is the next agent of socialization after family. It is an emotionally neutral environment, which is fundamentally different from the family. At school, the child is treated as one of many and in accordance with his real characteristics. In schools, children learn practically what success and failure are. They learn to overcome difficulties or get used to giving in to them. It is the school that forms an individual’s self-esteem, which, most often, remains with him throughout his adult life.

Another important agent of socialization is the environment of peers. During adolescence, the influence of parents and teachers on children weakens, along with this, the influence of peers increases. All academic failures and lack of parental attention are compensated by the respect of peers. It is among his peers that the child learns to resolve conflict issues and communicate as equals. And in school and family, all communication is built on hierarchy. Relationships in a peer group allow an individual to better understand himself, his strengths and weaknesses.

The needs of the individual are also better understood through group interaction. The social environment of peers makes its own adjustments to the value ideas instilled in the family. Also, interaction with peers allows the child to identify with others and, at the same time, stand out among them.

Since groups of different affiliations interact in the social environment: family, school, peers, the individual faces some contradictions. For example, an individual’s family values ​​mutual assistance, but at school the spirit of competition dominates. Therefore, an individual has to feel the influence of different people. He tries to fit into different surroundings. As an individual matures and develops intellectually, he learns to see such contradictions and analyze them. As a result, the child creates his own set of values. The formed values ​​of an individual allow them to more accurately define their own personality, outline a life plan and become an proactive member of society. The process of forming such values ​​can be a source of significant social change.

Also among the agents of socialization it is necessary to highlight the media. In the process of their development, the individual and society continuously interact, which determines the successful socialization of the individual.

Individual behavior

Behavior is a special form of activity of the human body, which masters the environment. In this aspect, behavior was considered by I. Pavlov. It was he who introduced this term. With the help of this term, it has become possible to display the sphere of relationships between an individual interacting individual and the environment in which he exists and interacts.

Individual behavior is the individual’s reaction to any changes in external or internal conditions. It can be conscious or unconscious. Human behavior develops and is realized in society. It is also associated with speech regulation. The behavior of an individual always reflects the process of his integration into society (socialization).

Any behavior has its reasons. It is determined by the events that precede it and cause a certain form of manifestation. Behavior is always purposeful.

An individual's goals are based on his unmet needs. Those. any behavior is characterized by the goal that it seeks to achieve. Goals perform motivating, controlling and organizational functions and are the most important management mechanism. To achieve them, a number of specific actions are performed. Behavior is also always motivated. Whatever the behavior, challenging or detached, it necessarily contains a motive that determines the immediate form of its manifestation.

In the process of technological progress in modern science, another term has appeared - virtual behavior. This type of behavior combines theatricality and naturalness. Theatricality is due to the illusion of natural behavior.

The behavior of an individual has the following characteristics:

— level of activity (initiative and energy);

— emotional expressiveness (and intensity of manifested affects);

- pace or dynamism;

- stability, which consists in the constancy of manifestations in different situations and at different times;

— awareness based on understanding one’s behavior;

- arbitrariness (self-control);

— flexibility, i.e. changes in behavioral reactions in response to environmental transformations.

individual personality individuality

An individual is a living being that belongs to the human species. A person is a social being who is included in social interactions, participates in social development and performs a specific social role. The term individuality is intended to emphasize the unique image of a person. This is how a person’s image differs from others. However, with all the versatility of the concept of individuality, it still, to a greater extent, denotes the spiritual qualities of the individual.

Individual and personality are not identical concepts; in turn, personality and individuality form integrity, but not identity. The concepts of “individuality” and “personality” contain different dimensions of a person’s spiritual nature. A personality is more often described as strong, independent, thereby highlighting its active essence in the eyes of others. And the individuality is bright and creative.

The term “personality” is distinguished from the terms “individual” and “individuality”. This is due to the fact that personality develops under the influence of social relationships, culture, and environment. Its formation is also determined by biological factors. Personality as a socio-psychological phenomenon presupposes a specific hierarchical structure.

The personality is the object and product of social relationships, feels social influences, and refracts them, transforming them. It acts as a set of internal conditions through which the external influences of society are modified. Such internal conditions are a combination of hereditary-biological qualities and socially determined factors. Therefore, personality is a product and object of social interaction, and an active subject of activity, communications, self-knowledge and consciousness. The formation of personality depends on activity, on the degree of its activity. Therefore, it manifests itself in activity.

The role of biological factors in the development of personality is quite large, but the influence of social factors cannot be neglected. There are certain personality traits that are particularly influenced by social factors. After all, you cannot be born a person, you can only become a person.

Individual and group

A group is a relatively isolated collection of individuals who are in fairly stable interaction and also carry out joint actions over a long period of time. A group is also a collection of individuals who share socially defined characteristics. Collaborative interaction in a group is based on a specific common interest or is associated with the achievement of a specific common goal. It is characterized by group potential, which allows it to interact with the environment and adapt to the transformations that occur in the environment.

The characteristic features of the group are that each member identifies himself, as well as his actions with the group as a whole. Consequently, in external circumstances, everyone speaks on behalf of the group. Another feature is interaction within the group, which has the nature of direct contacts, observation of each other’s actions, etc. In any group, along with the formal division of roles, an informal division of roles will necessarily develop, which is usually recognized by the group.

There are two types of groups: informal and formal. Regardless of the type of group, it will have a significant impact on all members.

The interaction between the individual and the group will always be of a dual nature. On the one hand, the individual, through his actions, helps solve group problems. On the other hand, the group has a huge influence on the individual, helping him satisfy his specific needs, for example, the need for security, respect, etc.

Psychologists have noticed that in teams with a positive climate and active intra-group life, individuals have good health and moral values, they are better protected from external influences, they work more actively and efficiently than individuals who are in an isolated state or in groups with negative climate, which are plagued by intractable conflict situations and instability. The group serves for protection, support, training and problem solving skills, and the required norms of behavior in the group.

Development of the individual

Development can be personal, biological and mental. Biological development is the formation of anatomical and physiological structures. Mental – natural transformations of mental processes. Mental development is expressed in qualitative and quantitative rearrangements. Personal – the formation of personality in the processes of socialization and education.

The development of an individual leads to modifications in personality properties, to the emergence of new qualities, which psychologists call new formations. Personality transformations from one age to another occur in the following directions: mental, physiological and social development. Physiological development consists of the formation of skeletal muscle mass and other body systems. Mental development consists of the formation of cognitive processes such as thinking and perception. Social development consists of the formation of morality, moral values, the assimilation of social roles, etc.

Development occurs in the integrity of the social and biological in man. Also through the transition of quantitative transformations into qualitative rearrangements of the mental, physical and spiritual qualities of the individual. Development is characterized by unevenness - each organ and organ system develops at its own pace. It occurs more intensely in childhood and puberty, and slows down in adulthood.

Development is determined by internal and external factors. Environmental influence and family upbringing are external factors of development. Inclinations and drives, the totality of feelings, anxieties of an individual arising under the influence of external conditions are internal factors. The development and formation of an individual is considered the result of the interaction of external and internal factors.