Turkish army 1877. Russian-Turkish war (1877-1878)

Kuban Plastuns in the Caucasian Army in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877–1878

Cossacks - participants in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877–1878

BALKAN KNOT

More than 130 years ago, the battles of the Russian-Turkish War of 1877–1878, which arose as a result of the rise of the liberation movement in the Balkans and the aggravation of international contradictions in the Middle East, died down. Russia supported the liberation movement of the Balkan peoples, and also sought to restore its prestige and influence, undermined by the Crimean War of 1853–1856.

By the beginning of the war, Russia deployed two armies: the Danube (185 thousand people, 810 guns) under the command of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and the Caucasus (75 thousand people, 276 guns) under the command of Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich.

Both armies included mounted Cossack regiments of the Kuban Cossack Army (KKV) and battalions of Kuban Plastuns, who, as in previous years, made a worthy contribution to the Russian victories. The sabotage and reconnaissance parties of Plastuns acted courageously and skillfully in both theaters of military operations. However, if much is known about the military exploits of the Cossacks in the Balkans, then, in the author’s opinion, not enough has been said about the combat work of the Plastuns in the Caucasus.

The mobilization of the Caucasian Army was preceded by a preparatory period (September 1 - November 11, 1876) and the mobilization period itself (November 11, 1876 - April 12, 1877). Simultaneously with the mobilization of infantry, artillery and cavalry units of the Russian army, by order of the Minister of War, the following units of the Kuban Cossack army were subject to mobilization: 10 cavalry regiments, a squadron of His Imperial Majesty's Own convoy and 20 Plastun hundreds. In November, five battalions of four hundred strength were formed from the Plastun hundreds (3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 battalions), the regiments were given the name of the second.

The formation of Cossack units was complicated by the fact that at the beginning of the mobilization of firearms to arm the Cossacks it turned out to be insufficient. Alas, the army’s insufficient preparedness for war was characteristic of both the Russo-Japanese and the First World Wars. As of September 1876, the KKV had 6,454 rifles of the Berdan system, 2,086 were missing. At the end of October, a transport with 10,387 rifles arrived from St. Petersburg to Yekaterinodar, which made it possible to arm only the regiments of the first set, the second set of Cossacks arrived at the assembly point with their own rifles of the system Tanner. Some Plastun battalions were armed with guns of the Karley system. At subsequent stages of mobilization, Plastun foot battalions were armed with dragoon rifles of the Krnka system. In general, Cossack units were armed with firearms of different systems, which created difficulties in providing ammunition.

Soon, the aggravation of the political situation, military preparations of the Turks and the mood of the highlanders required additional mobilization in early April 1877, including the conscription of the third stage of the KKV. Additionally, five prefabricated mounted Cossack regiments and five KKV foot battalions (8, 9, 10, 11 and 12th) were formed. In total, the KKV fielded 21,600 Cossacks, who took part in the defense of the Bayazet fortress, the capture of Kars and Erzurum, and in the battles on Shipka and on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus.

WAR

In the Caucasus-Asia Minor Theater, after the declaration of war on April 12, 1877, the troops of the Active Corps and its detachments under the command of Adjutant General Mikhail Tarielovich Loris-Melikov (future Minister of Internal Affairs) crossed the border and entered enemy territory in several columns. Information has been preserved about the successful actions during this period of the Plastuns of the 2nd Plastun foot battalion and two hundred of the Poltava Cavalry Regiment of the KKV, who were tasked with removing the Turkish border posts and ensuring the unhindered passage of the main forces of Colonel Komarov’s detachment in the area of ​​​​the village of Vale. Plastuns and mounted Cossack hundreds were actively involved in flying and reconnaissance detachments to collect data on enemy fortifications, the strength of garrisons, the nature of the terrain, and damage to telegraph communication lines. Information was collected both through personal observation and by interviewing local residents and capturing prisoners.

So, for example, a hunting team consisting of 11 Plastuns and Cossacks of the Poltava Cavalry Regiment in May 1877 was tasked with reconnaissance of the heights of Gelyaverda (near Ardagan), determining the route for the approach of the main forces and obtaining the language. To disperse the attention of the Turks, distracting actions of other Plastun groups were simultaneously carried out. The hunting team, led by the centurion Kamensky, safely passed three enemy chains, carried out reconnaissance of the fortifications and “captured a sentry with a gun, whom they delivered to the camp as proof of their feat.” In July, during reconnaissance of Turkish forces near Dagor, a detachment consisting of 20 Cossacks-Plastuns and 20 Chechens from the Chechen Cavalry Irregular Regiment under the command of the General Staff of Colonel Malama crossed the Arpachay River at night, conducted a successful reconnaissance of the area and returned safely to their territory.

Plastuns were actively used in the coastal direction, where the actions of the Cossack cavalry regiments were hampered by mountainous and wooded terrain. For example, a summary of the military actions of the Sochi detachment from July 28 to August 28, 1877 speaks of a successful reconnaissance operation of hundreds of plastuns under the command of the cornet Nikitin: “... a party of plastuns in Sandripsha found enemy pickets, and near Gagra they noticed the movement of a significant mass of people, Moreover, the passage was guarded by two Turkish battleships. The detachment commander reported that the enemy had taken all measures to prevent our troops from advancing to the Gagrinsky fortification. The Plastuns were given instructions to conduct reconnaissance of bypass mountain paths.” Subsequently, the Plastuns were given the task of taking control of the largest possible area near Gagra, so that the enemy did not have time to occupy difficult-to-reach approaches, which would then have to be taken from him with great casualties. Subsequently, together with the riflemen, three hundred plastuns took part in the successful assault on the Gagrinsky fortification.

Plast scouts sometimes obtained information that made it possible to expose some careless officers. For example, on May 31, 1877, Lieutenant General Geiman reported to his command the following fact, refuting the officer’s report on the incident at the Cossack picket: “Information was received from scouts that our picket at Ardost was attacked not by 300 bashi-bazouks, but by only 30–40 people; There was a complete mistake at the post: half of the Cossacks were sleeping, and the others were eating sour milk, which is why they did not have time to collect the horses, of which the enemies took them all. This information was given by the spies, and it is completely different from the officer’s report. We would have thought to carry out an investigation and bring the officer to justice, otherwise, due to the carelessness of our Cossacks, such cases could repeat.”

The command of the Russian troops skillfully used the outstanding fighting qualities of the plastuns when pursuing the retreating enemy. For example, by skillful maneuvers of our forces, detachments of retreating Turkish troops were led out to ambushed Plastuns and came under their well-aimed weapons fire. The effective actions of the plastuns suggested to the command of the Russian troops the idea of ​​​​forming prefabricated battalions of hunters, which, along with the plastuns who formed their basis, included the most intelligent and physically trained volunteers from the infantry regiments of the Russian army.

The Kuban Plastuns, as part of the 7th Plastun battalion under the command of Yesaul Bashtannik, the hero of the defense of Sevastopol, were involved in the Danube Army. From the coastal Sistovsky heights, which the battalion captured from the enemy with extraordinary courage and courage, thereby ensuring the crossing of the Russian army across the Danube, under the leadership of General Gurko, the Kuban plastuns began their glorious military journey to the legendary Shipka. For the exploits shown on the battlefields in Bulgaria, many plastuns were awarded the Cross of St. George, many lower ranks were awarded non-commissioned officer and officer ranks.

Interesting memories of the actions of plastuns during the Russian-Turkish War of 1877–1878 were left by the famous journalist and writer Vladimir Gilyarovsky. During that war, he volunteered to serve in the active army and, thanks to his restless and adventurous nature, found himself among the Kuban claymore hunters who operated on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus.

LOST WORLD

One way or another, the war was won. However, the subsequent development of events makes us think about the questions of how justified the sacrifices made by Russia were and who is to blame for the lost results of the victories of Russian weapons.

Russia's successes in the war with Turkey alarmed the ruling circles of England and Austria-Hungary. The British government sent a squadron to the Sea of ​​Marmara, which forced Russia to abandon the capture of Istanbul. In February, thanks to the efforts of Russian diplomacy, the Treaty of San Stefano, beneficial for Russia, was signed, which, it would seem, changed the entire political picture of the Balkans (and not only) in favor of Russian interests.

Serbia, Romania and Montenegro, previously vassals of Turkey, gained independence, Bulgaria acquired the status of a virtually independent principality, Turkey undertook to pay Russia an indemnity of 1,410 million rubles, and from this amount ceded Kapc, Ardahan, Bayazet and Batum in the Caucasus and even Southern Bessarabia, seized from Russia after the Crimean War. Russian weapons triumphed. How did Russian diplomacy use the victorious results of the war?

The Plastuns were still continuing skirmishes with the Bashi-Bazouks when the Berlin Congress, dominated by the “Big Five”: Germany, Russia, England, France and Austria-Hungary, began revising the results of the war on June 3, 1878. Its final act was signed on July 1(13), 1878. The head of the Russian delegation was formally considered the 80-year-old Prince Gorchakov, but he was already old and sick. In fact, the delegation was led by the former chief of gendarmes, Count Shuvalov, who, judging by the results, turned out to be a diplomat, much worse than a gendarme.

During the congress, it became clear that Germany, concerned about the excessive strengthening of Russia, did not want to support it. France, not yet recovered from the defeat of 1871, gravitated towards Russia, but was afraid of Germany and did not dare to actively support Russian demands. The current situation was skillfully used by England and Austria-Hungary, who imposed well-known decisions on the Congress that changed the Treaty of San Stefano to the detriment of Russia and the peoples of the Balkans.

Thus, the territory of the Bulgarian Principality was limited to only the northern half, and southern Bulgaria became an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire called Eastern Rumelia. Serbia was given part of Bulgaria, which quarreled the two Slavic peoples for a long time. Russia returned Bayazet to Turkey, and as an indemnity exacted not 1,410 million, but only 300 million rubles. Finally, Austria-Hungary negotiated for itself the “right” to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As a result, the Russian-Turkish war turned out to be a win for Russia, but unsuccessful. Chancellor Gorchakov, in a note to the Tsar about the results of the congress, admitted: “The Berlin Congress is the darkest page in my career.” Emperor Alexander II added: “And in mine too.”

Shortly after the end of the Russo-Turkish War, the chief of the Russian General Staff, General Nikolai Obruchev, wrote in a memo to the emperor: “If Russia is poor and weak, if it is far behind Europe, then this is primarily because it very often incorrectly resolved the most fundamental political issues : where she should and where she should not sacrifice her property. If you follow the same path, you can completely perish and quickly complete your cycle of a great Power...”

Even taking into account the changes in the geopolitical situation that have occurred over the past more than 100 years, the words of General Obruchev have not lost their relevance today.

It would seem that in that grandiose battle that took place on the outskirts of the capital in the winter of 1941, every detail was studied, and everything has long been known, however...

Few people know that in one of the sectors of the front, Russian cannons manufactured at the Imperial Gun Factory in Perm back in 1877 played a decisive role. And this happened in the Solnechnogorsk-Krasnaya Polyana defense sector, where the 16th Army, drained of blood by long battles, fought under the command of Konstantin Rokossovsky.

K.K. Rokossovsky turned to G.K. Zhukov with a request for urgent assistance with anti-tank artillery. However, the front commander no longer had it in reserve. The request reached the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Stalin’s reaction was immediate: “I also do not have anti-tank artillery reserves. But in Moscow there is the Military Artillery Academy named after F. E. Dzerzhinsky. There are many experienced artillerymen there. Let them think and report on a possible solution to the problem within 24 hours.”

Indeed, back in 1938, the artillery academy, founded in 1820, was transferred from Leningrad to Moscow. But in October 1941 she was evacuated to Samarkand. Only about a hundred officers and employees remained in Moscow. Training artillery was also transported to Samarkand. But the order had to be carried out.

A happy accident helped. An elderly man worked at the academy who knew well the locations of artillery arsenals in Moscow and in the immediate Moscow region, where worn-out and very old artillery systems, shells and equipment for them were mothballed. One can only regret that time has not preserved the name of this man and the names of all the other employees of the academy, who within 24 hours carried out the order and formed several high-power anti-tank defense fire batteries.

To fight German medium tanks, they picked up old 6-inch caliber siege guns, which were used during the liberation of Bulgaria from the Turkish yoke, and later in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. After its completion, due to the severe wear of the barrels, these guns were delivered to the Mytishchi Arsenal, where they were stored in mothballed form. Shooting from them was unsafe, but they could still withstand 5-7 shots.

As for shells, the Sokolniki artillery warehouse had a large quantity of captured English high-explosive fragmentation shells from Vickers of 6 inches caliber and weighing 100 pounds, that is, just over 40 kilograms. There were also caps and powder charges captured from the Americans during the Civil War. All this property had been stored so carefully since 1919 that it could well have been used for its intended purpose.

Soon, several heavy anti-tank artillery fire batteries were formed. The commanders were academy students and officers sent from military registration and enlistment offices, and the servants were Red Army soldiers and students in grades 8-10 of Moscow special artillery schools. The guns did not have sights, so it was decided to fire only direct fire, aiming them at the target through the barrel. For ease of shooting, the guns were dug into the ground up to the hubs of the wooden wheels.

German tanks appeared suddenly. The gun crews fired the first shots from a distance of 500-600 m. German tank crews initially mistook shell explosions for the effects of anti-tank mines. Apparently, the "mines" were very powerful. If a 40-kilogram shell exploded near a tank, the tank would turn over on its side or stand on its butt. But it soon became clear that they were firing cannons at point-blank range. A shell hit the tower tore it down and threw it tens of meters to the side. And if a 6-inch siege cannon shell hit the forehead of the hull, it would go right through the tank, destroying everything in its path.

The German tank crews were horrified - they did not expect this. Having lost a company, the tank battalion retreated. The German command considered the incident an accident and sent another battalion in a different direction, where it also ran into an anti-tank ambush. The Germans decided that the Russians were using some new anti-tank weapon of unprecedented power. The enemy offensive was suspended, probably to clarify the situation.

Ultimately, Rokossovsky’s army won on this section of the front for several days, during which reinforcements arrived and the front stabilized. On December 5, 1941, our troops launched a counteroffensive and drove the Nazis to the West. It turns out that the Victory of 1945, at least to a small extent, was forged by Russian gunsmiths back in the 19th century.

On the eve of the war, Russian artillery had 48 artillery brigades intended to operate with infantry divisions. Each brigade consisted of six batteries - but there were 8 guns in each battery. The battery was a separate part and could operate independently. The first division of the brigade (3 batteries) was armed with 9-pound cannons, the second - with 3-4-pound copper cannons loaded from the treasury! In four Caucasian artillery brigades, one battery was armed with 3-pound mountain cannons.

The horse artillery consisted of 26 regular and 22 Cossack batteries. Ver batteries had six guns and were armed with A~fn rifled copper cannons, loaded from the treasury. Each Caucasian division had 2 batteries. The siege artillery included 630 guns of various calibers.

The fortress artillery had 44 fortress battalions. In case of mobilization, personnel were intended to man the siege artillery, which did not have its own personnel in peacetime. In wartime, 48 reserve artillery batteries were formed (according to the number of artillery brigades). Organizationally, Russian artillery was superior to Turkish artillery. The presence of 48 guns in the division made it possible for its commander to decisively influence the course of the battle. The independence of the batteries allowed them to operate in isolation from the rest of the brigade. In peacetime, there was a supply of material for 48 batteries, and with the beginning of mobilization, 68 batteries could be formed. This event made it possible to quickly replace artillery losses in the war. Noteworthy is the careful thought given to the organization of artillery and its mobilization deployment. The Turks and other armies of Western Europe did not have a similar system. By the beginning of the war, the Russian army had 365 batteries with 2,808 rifled guns. In a short period of time, the Russian artillery industry ensured the creation of ratios in our artillery - 4 guns per 1000 bayonets, in horse artillery - 6 guns per 1,000 sabers.

The Turks at that time had 2 guns per 1000 bayonets, and the cavalry had no artillery at all. Each gun had a supply of ammunition as part of one combat kit, located in the limbers and charging boxes. Delivery was carried out by artillery limbers, which during offensive operations approached the troops. . In the Turkish campaign of 1877 - 1878, the Russian soldier again showed his valor, and his officers and generals showed their extraordinary abilities. Russian artillery had a decisive influence on the entire course of the war. The first event that stunned Western Europe was the successful crossing of the Danube by the main forces of the Russian army at Ztsmnitsa, carried out in 3-4 days with minimal losses. Russian artillery skillfully ensured this crossing, pinning down strong enemy groups in the fortresses of Rushchuk and Nikopol and clearing the Danube of Turkish ships. In total, up to 100 siege and 100 field guns operating along a 160-kilometer front took part in ensuring the crossing of the Danube. The successful operation of the artillery was facilitated by a good supply of ammunition.

1^6 field guns, 33 siege guns and 4 rapid-fire guns took part in 6 battles for Nikopol. The battles required a large number of shells. Thus, from June 25 to July 1, 1877, Russian artillery fired 3,248 shells at the Rushchuk fortress, which ensured a blockade of the Turkish flotilla on the Danube.

A significant event was the military operations of General Gurko’s detachment at the Shipka Pass in Bulgaria. At first, Shipka had only 27 guns, while the Turks had 48. Turkish troops occupied commanding heights. However, they did not take possession of the pass. By the end of August, there were already 55 guns and more than 15 thousand soldiers at the pass. This was due to the difficulty of supplying ammunition. On average, the artillery had 130 shells per gun, the rest of the ammunition was in the rear. The struggle continued for four months, and the Turks, despite a number of obvious advantages, failed to capture the pass. Under very difficult conditions for the supply of ammunition, Russian artillery spent 18,930 shells during the fighting at the pass, on some days the consumption exceeded 50 shells per gun. There were very few losses of materiel; almost all damage was repaired at firing positions. In the history of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-78, the struggle for Plevna occupies a special place. It began in July 1877 and lasted until December 10. The first attack on Plevna involved 40 guns, which fired 1,980 shells. The attack failed. The second attack involved up to 170 guns, but due to poor organization of the assault, Russian troops failed again.

For the third time, a decision was made to first capture Lovchey, a large stronghold south of Plevna. On August 3, 1877, Lovcha was captured. The attack on Turkish positions was supported by 98 guns, which spent 5,375 shells in one day, which averaged 58.5 shells per gun. The infantry spent 245 thousand rounds of ammunition - 14 rounds per rifle. The comparison needs no comment. During the third attack on Plevna, 424 guns were concentrated.

However, as a result of the inept use of artillery, on September 7, only 152 guns fired, on September 8 - 214, on September 9 and 10 - 226 guns out of 424. The rest were in the second lines and inactive. During the period of preparation and during the assault, the field artillery spent 4^200 shells, which averaged 170 shells per gun. After this, the siege of Plevna began. By the end of the siege, the Russians had 349 guns in the battle line and 186 guns in reserve. The guns were serviceable and of good quality. On December 10, the Plevey garrison capitulated. Next, the Russian army crossed the Balkan Mountains and brought the Turkish army to the brink of disaster, which forced the Turkish government to request a truce. t. , January 6, 1878, in his order, addressing the soldiers, General Gurko wrote; “The transition through the Balkans has ended.

You don’t know what to be more surprised at: your bravery and courage in battles with the enemy, or your perseverance and patience in enduring hard work in the fight against mountains, frosts and deep snow. Years will pass, and our descendants, having visited these Dtsk mountains, will say with pride and triumph: “Russian troops passed here and resurrected the glory of Suvorov and Rumyandev’s miracle heroes.” An important condition for successful artillery operations in the mountains was the provision of its shells. With this task, the service The artillery supply was successfully carried out, despite the stretched communications and the lag in the rear. Shells were accumulated in sufficient quantities during the preparatory period. The mobile parks were brought closer to the troops. Each gun had reserves of shells in its limbers and charging boxes.

The Russian fleet won the fight for the sea - it was able to cover its shores and preserved the main communications. At the same time, the Turks, who had multiple numerical superiority, were unable to reliably protect even navigation off their own shores, and the success of their operations off the Caucasian coast turned out to be temporary. However, wars are won not by defense and protection of communications, but by offensive actions - this is what the Russian naval command intended to switch to. Unable to resist the Turks in a classic naval battle, the Russians decided to use the latest shipborne weapons - mines.

The birth of mine boats

By the 70s of the 19th century, sea mines were divided into stationary and mobile. The first were anchored underwater at a certain depth and exploded either from their own impact fuse or through an electrical cable from the shore. They were first used in the Crimean War, were actively used during the American Civil War and are still used today without fundamental changes.

Mobile mines required a carrier - a small boat that hit the side of the enemy ship with a long pole with a mine suspended from it, or brought the mine to the enemy in tow. In Russia, experiments with mine boats began in 1862, when Major General Baron E. B. Tizenhausen proposed the design of a pole mine, which he called "mine ram". A mine with a charge of one and a half pounds of explosives on a 15 m long pole was tested on the gunboat "Experience" - it blew up the schooner "Meteor" at anchor. In 1868, the report of the commission of Admiral E.V. Putyatin, which conducted tests of pole mines, already spoke of the need “immediately... develop the issue of using underwater mines on destroyer ships in our country”. By the mid-1870s, the Russian fleet was armed with about ten types of pole mines with a charge of 3.2 to 182 kg of artillery gunpowder. These mines were supposed to arm a wide variety of ships - from small boats to gunboats and even cruisers.

The first special mine boat, designed to operate with pole mines, was built in England in 1873 - it had a displacement of 7.5 tons and a huge speed of 15 knots for those times. In Russia, similar boats began to be ordered from the Berda plant in the fall of 1876, on the eve of the war with Turkey - they were armed with both pole mines and towed “lionfish” mines. The latter were less reliable and more difficult to use, but somewhat safer, since they did not require bringing the boat close to the target.

Whitehead self-propelled mine

The main disadvantage of movable mines was the extremely short attack distance, which made the carrier ships of these weapons extremely vulnerable not only to artillery, but even to rifle fire. This pushed for the creation of a mine capable of reaching an enemy ship on its own. Such weapons were developed in different countries, but the greatest success was achieved by the English engineer Robert Whitehead, who worked in the workshops of the Austrian port of Fiume - he was the first to create a reliable and technologically advanced hydrostatic device that allowed the mine to move steadily at a predetermined depth.

The Luppis-Whitehead "fish torpedo" was first tested in Austria in 1868. A year later, England bought a patent for the production of self-propelled mines, in 1872 a batch of these weapons was acquired by France, and in 1873 by Italy and Germany. In Russia, Admiral A. A. Popov insisted on completing the development of a domestic self-propelled mine of the I. F. Aleksandrovsky system, so the contract with Whitehead was concluded only in March 1876. By the end of the year, the first three batches of torpedoes (20 pieces) were delivered to Russia, in 1877 - another 55 copies, in 1878 - 25. The new weapon was very expensive, so for the war with Turkey... it was simply not issued.

Mine boats are heading to the Danube

At the end of 1876, the massive dispatch of mine boats to the Danube began - they were supposed to operate only with pole and towed mines. The boats had to be delivered from the railway on carts, so they arrived on the Lower Danube only at the beginning of hostilities (in mid-April), and on the Middle Danube their concentration ended in early June. From the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, special detachments of sailors were allocated (Baltic - 445 people, Black Sea - 200 people), intended to staff the Danube River Flotilla. Already in November 1876, both detachments were sent to Chisinau at the disposal of the commander of the Russian army in Bessarabia.

The Turks maintained a strong Danube squadron on the Danube under the command of Admiral Mehmet Arif Pasha, the basis of which was the turret armored corvettes Lutf-yu Jelil and Hivz-ur Rahman, stationed in Tulcea. These were large seaworthy ships with a displacement of 2540 tons, protected by an armor belt up to 140 mm thick. Each of them carried two 229 mm and two 178 mm muzzle-loading guns, as well as one 120 mm breech-loading gun.

In addition, there were small river monitors "Khizber" and "Seifi" (404 tons, two 120-mm muzzle-loading guns each), as well as five armored gunboats of the "Feth-ul-Islam" type (335 tons, two 150-mm muzzle-loading guns). Both monitors and the gunboat "Semendire" were stationed in the port of Sulin at the very mouth of the Danube, the remaining ships were located higher up the river: in Machina - the paddle steamers "Kiliji Ali" and "Arkadion", in Gabrovo - the armored gunboat "Feth-ul-Islam", the wooden gunboat Akkia and the paddle steamer Hayredan. In Silistria there was the wheeled steamer "Islahat", in Rushchuk - the armored gunboats "Boportlen" and "Iskodra", the wooden gunboats "Varna" and "Shefket-Numa". In Vidin there were the armored gunboat Podgorica, the iron gunboat Sunna and the paddle steamer Nusretie. In addition, the Danube squadron had 9 transport ships and two dozen small ships.

Turkish river monitor “Hizber” of the same type as “Seyfi”, 1875.
B. Langensiepen, A. Guleryuz, J. Cooper. The Ottoman Steam Navy 1828–1923

The main disadvantage of the Turkish ships was the lack of horizontal armor - only the Khizber-type monitors, in addition to the 76-mm side, carried a 32-mm armored deck.

The main bases of the Turkish squadron were located in the Sulina arm and the Machinsky branch of the Danube - out of sight of Russian observers from the left bank of the river. Together with the Danube Army of Abdulkerim Nadir Pasha and a chain of fortresses, the squadron was supposed to prevent Russian and Romanian troops from crossing the Danube and invading Dobruja and Bulgaria. Thus, the success of the land campaign depended entirely on victory in the river war.

The beginning of the mine war

The fighting began on April 12 (according to the new style - 24) April 1877, when Russian troops entered Romania, formally a vassal of the Ottoman Sultan. By mid-May, almost the entire territory of Romania along the left bank of the Danube was occupied.

The Turks did not intend to defend the northern bank of the Danube, but the river line itself along the border with Bulgaria was covered by a chain of powerful fortresses: Vidin, Nikopol, Rushchuk, Turtukai, Silistra. The main crossing point was Zimnitsa, which lies between Nikopol and Rushchuk - the main forces of the Russian army were concentrated here. Assistance in crossing the river was provided by the Danube River Flotilla, the basis of which was steam boats transported overland, armed with pole or towed mines.

The general course of hostilities in the European theater of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877–1878. Marine atlas. Volume III military history. Part one

At the same time, the Lower Danube detachment as part of the 14th Infantry Corps operated in the lower reaches of the Danube against Dobrudzha. Back in April, to support it, a Black Sea detachment of ships was formed and transferred by sea to the Kiliya arm, consisting of 4 steam mine boats, 2 towing ships adapted for laying mines (“Explosion” and “Barrage”), as well as Romanian ships: one gunboat boats, two armed steamers and one steam launch.

Already on the night of April 17 to 18 (from 29 to 30) the Black Sea detachment, consisting of the steamship "Zazhdanie" and several rowing boats under the command of Lieutenant Commander Bekleshev, placed the first minefield of 9 automatic and 12 galvanic shock mines at Reni (at the mouth of the Prut River) min. On April 18 (30), two steam boats from the detachment placed a barrage of 9 galvanic shock mines on the Seret River below Brailov. On the afternoon of April 18 (30), a detachment from boats and rowboats placed a minefield of 5 galvanic mines in one line on the Seret River in front of the Barboshsky railway bridge (later it was reinforced by a second line). To cover the barriers, large-caliber field batteries were installed on the left bank of the Danube.

First Russian victories

On April 29 (May 11) one of the most striking events of that war took place. Several Turkish ships, led by the battleship Lutf-yu Jelil, emerged from the lower reaches of the Machinsky branch. They soon entered into a firefight with Russian field batteries at Brailov. During the firefight, a 229-mm field mortar shell hit the unprotected deck of a Turkish battleship. The ship's cellars exploded and it sank almost instantly, while the Turkish squadron hastily took refuge in the Machinsky sleeve. This accidental hit made a huge impression on the Russian sailors - 229-mm mortars were considered such an effective weapon that they even tried to arm the battleship Peter the Great with them.

Turkish armored corvette "Lutf-yu Jelil".

However, ships in the Machinsky branch, controlled by the Turks, still posed a serious danger, so on May 4 (16), a detachment of the Danube flotilla consisting of mine boats “Ksenia” (commander - Lieutenant Shestakov), “Dzhigit” (commander - midshipman Persin) and “Tsarevna” ( commander - midshipman Bal), together with five rowboats, under fire from Turkish ships, placed a barrage of 32 galvanic mines in two lines in the lower part of the Machinsky sleeve (above Brailov). On May 12 (24), Russian ships made a demonstrative performance - in front of the Turks, they dumped sandbags into the water at the exit from the Machinsky sleeve.

Mine boat "Ksenia".

On the night of 13 to 14 (25 to 26) May, Russian sailors won their first victory. A detachment consisting of four mine boats (“Tsarevich”, “Ksenia”, “Dzhigit” and “Tsarevna”) left Brailov for the Machinsky sleeve to attack the anchorage of Turkish ships. Near Machin, the boats found the Seyfi monitor standing in the middle of the river, and to the left of it the armored gunboat Feth-ul-Islam and the armed steamer Kiliji Ali. The boats turned into two columns and attacked enemy ships under enemy fire. “Tsarevich” hit the monitor with a pole mine in the aft part of the starboard side, and “Ksenia” - in the left side under the turret. After the second explosion, the Seyfi quickly sank.

The sinking of the monitor "Safe" at Machin on the night of May 13-14, 1877.

On May 27 (June 8), a detachment of ships consisting of the Romanian gunboat “Grand Duke Nicholas”, as well as the mine boats “Tsarevich” and “Ksenia”, which left Gura-Yalomitsa to the Turkish-occupied Girsov (now the Romanian city of Hirsov), met here the Turkish monitor and attacked him. The monitor considered it best to retreat, and the boats pursued him all the way to Girsov in order to determine the fire zone of the Turkish coastal artillery, after which they returned. The next day, the same ships and the boat “Dzhigit” discovered two Turkish gunboats in the upper part of the Machinsky branch, which immediately retreated, opening the entrance to the branch. After this, Russian boats laid a minefield in the upper reaches of the Machinsky branch.

Due to the spring flood, the crossing of the Danube was scheduled for mid-July. Preparations for the operation began a month in advance: from June 7 to 11 (from 19 to 23) minefields were placed on both sides of the intended crossing site (between Sistovo and Nikopol). At the same time, on June 8 (20), a detachment under the command of Captain 1st Rank M.D. Novikov, consisting of 10 steam boats, met the Turkish military steamer Ereklik at Parapan, coming from the direction of Rushchuk. The steamer opened grapeshot fire on boats and boats with mines and in response was attacked by the boat “Shutka” (commander - midshipman Nilov). The attack was unsuccessful - the bullets broke the electrical conductors to the charge of the pole mine, and it did not explode, even when it hit the side of the ship. Deciding not to tempt fate, “Ereklik” turned around and went to Rushchuk. As a result of this operation, the Turkish ships were separated and locked in their bases (Ruschuk and Nikopol). It is interesting that the artist V.V. Vereshchagin, who received a bullet wound in the battle on June 8, was on the “Joke” as a volunteer.

Mine boat "Shutka".
Magazine "Naval Campaign". 2011, No. 1

On June 11 (23), while the boats of the Upper Danube detachment were laying mines near Flamunda, the Turkish monitor “Podgorica” left Nikopol. The boats “Mina” (commanded by midshipman Arens) and “Shutka” tried to attack him, but were repulsed by grapeshot and rifle fire; The monitor also turned back.

On June 12 (24), on the fairway near Corabia (above Nikopol), the rowing boats of Captain 1st Rank M.D. Novikov placed another barrage of 23 galvanic shock mines in two lines, and from June 13 to 15 (from 25 to 27) the barrier at Flamunda was reinforced with another line of 36 minutes.

Crossing the Danube

The Lower Danube detachment was the first to take action, with the goal of diverting the attention of the Turks from the direction of the main attack. Early in the morning of June 10 (22), Russian troops began crossing the Danube at Galati and Brailov, where the Danube turns sharply to the Black Sea. At the same time, a detachment consisting of the gunboat “Grand Duke Nikolai”, the boats “Tsarevna” and “Ptichka” made a diversionary exit to the Turkish batteries. As a result, the Galati detachment (two regiments) successfully crossed the Danube, occupied Budzhak and captured the Budzhak Heights.

On this day, the main forces of Zimmerman's 11th Corps were crossing at Brailov. On June 11 (23), the boats “Tsarevich” (commander – Lieutenant Shestakov), “Ptichka” (commander – Midshipman Arkas) and “Tsarevna” (commander – Midshipman Bal) carried out reconnaissance near Machin and discovered that the city had been abandoned by the Turks. On June 13 (25), Zimmermarn’s corps occupied Galati, 14 (26) – Tulcea and Isaccia, 15 (27) – Brailov. On June 26 (July 8), Girsov was occupied by an attack from the north, after which the entire Machinsky branch came under Russian control. By the beginning of July, Russian troops occupied the entire Northern Dobruja, reaching the Cernavode-Constanza line. The Turkish Danube squadron was blocked at the mouth of the Danube, a difficult-to-reach area between the Kiliya and Sulina arms.

Fighting on the Danube in 1877.
Marine atlas. Volume III military history. Part one

On the night of June 14 to 15 (from 26 to 27) the main Russian forces began crossing the Danube at Zimnitsa opposite the city of Sistova. The first to cross the river on iron rowing pontoons was the detachment of General M.I. Dragomirov. The Turks had about 4,000 people at the crossing site and were unable to provide serious resistance - all their forces were diverted to other areas and the defense of fortresses. A Turkish ship (according to some sources, the armored corvette Khivz-ur Rahman) came out from Nikopol to the crossing, but the demonstration of an attack by the boats Peter the Great, Experience and General Admiral forced it to turn back.

By the end of June 15 (27), 30,000 people had already been transported to the southern bank of the Danube. Construction of a pontoon bridge across Ada Island began and was completed in three days. Two weeks later, all four Russian corps were already on the Bulgarian coast.

Crossing of Russian troops across the Danube at Zimnitsa and its support.
Marine atlas. Volume III military history. Part one

On the night of 16 to 17 (28 to 29) June, the barrier at Parapan on the main fairway of the Danube was reinforced with another 25 mines, placed in a checkerboard pattern. Now the Turkish ships had no chance of breaking through from Rushchuk up the Danube. On June 18 (30), a team of guards sappers from rowboats set up a barrage of 42 galvanic mines in three lines near Vardin Island, and on June 19 (July 1) the barrage at Flamunda was reinforced by laying new mines from boats. During these days, the Russian flotilla suffered its first setback: on June 17 (29), near Turnu Severin, the steamer Ada was overtaken by a Turkish monitor and scuttled by its crew to avoid capture.

On June 23 (July 5) Byala was taken, and two days later - Tarnovo. On July 2 (14), Russian troops reached the Khankioi Pass, and on July 5 (17) they occupied the Shipka Pass. The corps of Lieutenant General N.P. Kridener began the siege of the Nikopol fortress - on the morning of July 3 (15), Russian troops began bombing, and in the afternoon they occupied several redoubts covering the fortress. The assault was scheduled for the next day, but never began - early in the morning of July 4 (16), the Turkish garrison threw out a white flag. On the same day, on the Osma River near Nikopol, the river gunboats Podgorica and Iskodra, partially damaged by field artillery, with their boilers disabled, were discovered. The gunboats were repaired, included in the Russian Danube Flotilla and renamed Nikopol and Sistovo.

Turkish river armored gunboat "Feth-ul-Islam". Iskodra and Podgorica belonged to the same type.
Magazine "Naval Campaign". 2011, No. 2

Fighting in the lower Danube and the end of the campaign

From that moment on, the Turkish flotilla on the Danube was cut into three parts: above Nikopol; on the section from Ruschuk to Silistra (above Chernavode); in the lower reaches of the river (Sulina branch). Even the Turkish ships that retained their combat capability no longer posed a significant threat. On July 9 (21), a Russian detachment (gunboat "Grand Duke Nikolai", boats "Tsarevich" and "Ptichka") left Cernavode up the Danube to reconnoiter the location of enemy troops retreating to Silistria and fought with enemy ships near the village of Budzhaki; According to reports from the crews, a fire broke out on the Turkish ship, identified as the monitor, from the fire of the 10-pound bow gun of the gunboat.

After this, the activity of the river flotillas finally moved to the lower reaches of the Danube, where the Turks had the most powerful ships, and most importantly, access to the sea through Sulin. Here the Russians needed, at a minimum, to lock the enemy in arms, not allowing him to rise higher, and, if possible, to attack the enemy and deprive him of striking power. For this purpose, on July 28 (August 9), a flotilla of Lieutenant-Commander Dikov, holding the flag on the armed steamer “Experience,” arrived from Odessa to the Kiliya Arm to help the Lower Danube detachment. On August 12 (24), “Experience”, with the support of four mine boats, placed a barrier of 20 galvanic mines in two lines at the entrance to the Georgievskoe arm.

At the beginning of September, Dikov’s detachment was reinforced by ships that came from Odessa - the schooner “Raven”, the steamer “Sister” and three mine boats. On September 27 (October) Dikov tried to attack Sulin, located at the very mouth of the branch, and from the land covered by floodplains and swamps. The steamship "Opyt", the armed steam schooners "Voron", "Duck" and "Swan", as well as a mortar barge, descended along the Sulinsky arm to the third mile, where at night the boats laid a minefield. The steamship Kartal and the gunboat Sunne came out to meet them. The fire of the schooner "Voron" (900 tons, three 153-mm cannons) forced the "Kartal" to retreat to Sulin, and the gunboat "Sunne" (200 tons, 4 guns) ran into mines and sank. Dikov's detachment went even further and entered into a firefight with the battleships Khivz-ur Rahman and Mukadem-i Khair. At 13:00, due to the creeping fog, the battle was stopped, and Dikov’s detachment retreated up the river.

The battle of Dikov’s detachment near Sulin on September 27–28, 1877.
Marine atlas. Volume III military history. Part one

The next day, Dikov’s detachment again went down to Sulin and, hiding behind a minefield, entered into a firefight with two Turkish monitors. “Hivz-ur Rahman” was hit by a 153-mm shell from the schooner “Raven” and retreated, after which “Mukadem-i Khair” also retreated to the mouth of the Danube.

At this point, attempts to storm Sulin from the upper reaches of the Danube stopped. In January 1878, Chikhachev’s detachment, which came from Odessa, made an unsuccessful attempt to attack Sulin from the sea, but this no longer had strategic significance - the Turkish fleet was inactive.

In the middle reaches of the Danube, military clashes were also sporadic. Thus, on October 2 (14), Lieutenant Dubasov’s detachment, consisting of the gunboat “Experience” and four mine boats, tried to burn Turkish ships near Silistria with six fire ships - the only case of the use of fire ships in this war. One fire-ship was sent adrift towards a Turkish patrol ship, but to no avail. On November 30 (December 12), the Nikopol monitor exchanged fire with three Turkish ships off Mechka Island near Rushchuk, and also fired at the location of enemy troops.

"Grand Duke Konstantin" - carrier of mine boats

The armed steamship "Grand Duke Konstantin" (formerly one of the best liners of the Russian Society of Shipping and Trade) became the most active Russian cruiser of the war of 1877–1878. Enormous credit for this belonged to its commander - lieutenant (later - captain of the 2nd rank) S. O. Makarov, later a famous admiral and shipbuilder.

However, Makarov, who was appointed to this position on December 13 (25), 1876 and was personally involved in the re-equipment of the Konstantin, dreamed of turning it into a real attack ship, capable of fighting not only transports, but also Turkish battleships. In his opinion, the main weapon of the cruiser should have been four mine boats - “Chesma”, “Sinop”, “Navarin” and “Miner”. The last three were ordinary ship boats, and the Chesma was distinguished by its speed, reaching a speed of 12 knots (twice as fast as the others). Armed with pole and towed mines, Makarov’s boats were supposed to attack Turkish ships in harbors and roadsteads, where the seaworthy Konstantin delivered them.

Steamship "Grand Duke Konstantin".
Magazine "Naval Campaign". 2011, No. 1

Alas, the first attack on the Batumi roadstead on the night of April 28-29 (May 10-11) was unsuccessful: Chesma was able to place a towed mine under the stern of the Turkish yacht Sultaniye, but the electric fuse did not work. Exactly a month later, boats from the Konstantin tried to attack Turkish ships in the Sulina roadstead, but were unable to force the booms; the Chesmy towed mine got entangled in this obstacle. As a result, only two larger and faster destroyers No. 1 and No. 2 (with a displacement of 6 and 24 tons, purchased just before the war in England and Denmark, respectively) went on the attack. Both of them were able to detonate their mines on the side of the armored corvette Ijaliye - alas, too early, so the Turkish ship was not damaged. Destroyer No. 1 was damaged by rifle and grapeshot fire and sank, its entire crew being captured.

The next attack attempt by mine boats took place on the evening of August 11 (23) in Sukhum-Kale Bay. By this time, the Turks had already defended all their ports and anchorages with booms, but the Russian sailors used new tactics: the boat "Sinop" brought its mine under the barrier and detonated it, after which the "Navarin" and "Miner" entered the harbor and attacked with towed mines a Turkish ship that turned out to be an armored corvette "Assar-i Tevfik". One of the mines exploded near the side, the battleship received an underwater hole, but remained afloat and was taken to Batum for repairs.

It became clear to Makarov that pole mines, and even more so towed mines, are extremely unreliable weapons. If on rivers with their narrow fairways mines still had a chance of success, then on the open sea they were completely powerless. The boat could not keep up with a seaworthy ship, that is, it was possible to attack the enemy only in harbors protected by booms, patrol ships and artillery. Under these conditions, the chances of a mine boat getting close to the victim became illusory. Thus, a weapon was required that could hit the enemy from a distance of at least several tens of meters - a self-propelled mine. There were already such mines in Russia, and Makarov, promoted to captain of the 2nd rank in September 1877, made every effort to obtain them. The boats “Sinop” and “Chesma” were equipped with new weapons. “Sinop” was dragging a raft with a mine in tow, during an attack it pulled it to the side and was aimed by the hull. On the Chesma, a wooden pipe was installed under the keel, into which the Whitehead mine was placed.

Torpedoes go into battle

The first attack with self-propelled mines took place on December 15 (27), 1877. Late in the evening, “Grand Duke Constantine” approached the Batumi roadstead and launched the boats into the water. “Chesma” and “Sinop” successfully overcame the boom without getting caught on anything. In the darkness of the southern night, three masts were discovered off the coast, and the sailors decided that it was a large three-masted ship, standing on its side towards the shore. In fact, these were three battleships, standing in a row with their stern to the shore. The fired torpedoes passed between them and jumped ashore - the Turks later stated that they found them unexploded and even announced their serial numbers. However, according to reports from the boat crews, one explosion did occur - perhaps one of the torpedoes hit the anchor chain and broke in two, the warhead fell to the bottom and exploded, and the tail with the propellers moved on.

The failure did not discourage Makarov. On his next trip to the Caucasian coast, he decided to attack the ships at Batum again. On the night of January 13 to 14 (25 to 26), 1878, “Chesma” and “Sinop” again penetrated the Batumi roadstead. There were many ships moored here, including three battleships, but the roadstead was illuminated by the moon, and the boat crews were strictly instructed to attack for sure. Therefore, they chose a separate patrol ship as victims and fired torpedoes at it from a distance of 30–40 fathoms (64–85 m). Both torpedoes hit their target, the ship exploded and quickly sank, killing 23 Turkish sailors.

It later turned out that the torpedoes had sunk the small gunboat Intibakh with a displacement of 163 tons, armed with three 18-pound muzzle-loading cannons. The sunken ship did not have great military significance, but the explosion on the Batumi roadstead became a symbolic final chord of the war: on January 19 (31) a truce was signed in Adrianople.

Turkish gunboat "Intibah".
Magazine "Naval Campaign". 2011, No. 2

The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 was not the first conflict in which mines were actively used, but it was the first to demonstrate that these weapons could become decisive in a naval war - this was facilitated by the passivity of the Turkish fleet. As a result, this led to some exaggeration of the capabilities of mine boats as a means capable of neutralizing the enemy's superiority in large ships. It was in 1878 that the massive construction of torpedo weapon carriers—destroyers and torpedo boats—began all over the world.

Sources and literature:

1. Marine atlas. Volume III military history. Part one. General Staff of the Navy, 1959
2. Marine atlas. Volume III military history. Part one. Descriptions for cards. General Staff of the Navy, 1959
3. Battle chronicle of the Russian fleet: Chronicle of the most important events in the military history of the Russian fleet from the 9th century. to 1917 M.: Voenizdat, 1948
4. N.V. Skritsky. Corsairs of Russia. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2007
5. V. Chubinsky. On the participation of sailors in the war with Turkey of 1877–1878. St. Petersburg, 1899
6. V. G. Andrienko. Round ships of Admiral Popov. St. Petersburg: Gangut, 1994
7. William Allen, Pavel Muratov. Battles for the Caucasus. History of wars on the Turkish-Caucasian front. 1828–1921. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2016
8. Magazine "Naval Campaign". 2007, No. 1
9. Magazine "Naval Campaign". 2007, No. 2
10. V.V. Yarovoy. Steamship "Grand Duke Konstantin" // Magazine "Gangut", 2001, No. 21
11. B. Langensiepen, A. Guleryuz, J. Cooper. The Ottoman Steam Navy 1828–1923. Conway Maritime Press, 1995

The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 was a war between the Russian Empire and Ottoman Turkey. It was caused by the rise of the national liberation movement in the Balkans and the aggravation of international contradictions in connection with this.

Uprisings against the Turkish yoke in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1875-1878) and Bulgaria (1876) sparked a social movement in Russia in support of the fraternal Slavic peoples. Responding to these sentiments, the Russian government came out in support of the rebels, hoping that if they were successful, they would strengthen their influence in the Balkans. Great Britain sought to pit Russia against Turkey and take advantage of the weakening of both countries.

In June 1876, the Serbo-Turkish War began, in which Serbia was defeated. To save it from death, Russia in October 1876 turned to the Turkish Sultan with a proposal to conclude a truce with Serbia.

In December 1876, the Constantinople Conference of the Great Powers was convened and tried to resolve the conflict diplomatically, but the Porte rejected their proposals. During secret negotiations, Russia managed to obtain guarantees of non-interference from Austria-Hungary in exchange for the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In April 1877, an agreement was concluded with Romania on the passage of Russian troops through its territory.

After the Sultan rejected a new reform project for the Balkan Slavs, developed at the initiative of Russia, on April 24 (April 12, old style), 1877, Russia officially declared war on Turkey.

In the European theater of operations, Russia had 185 thousand soldiers; together with its Balkan allies, the size of the group reached 300 thousand people. Russia had approximately 100 thousand soldiers in the Caucasus. In turn, the Turks in the European theater had a 186,000-strong force, and in the Caucasus they had approximately 90,000 soldiers. The Turkish fleet almost completely dominated the Black Sea; in addition, the Porte had the Danube flotilla.

In the context of the restructuring of the entire internal life of the country, the Russian government was unable to prepare for a long war, and the financial situation remained difficult. The forces allocated to the Balkan theater of operations were insufficient, but the morale of the Russian army was very high.

According to the plan, the Russian command intended to cross the Danube, cross the Balkans with a swift offensive and move on the Turkish capital - Constantinople. Relying on their fortresses, the Turks hoped to prevent Russian troops from crossing the Danube. However, these calculations of the Turkish command were disrupted.

In the summer of 1877, the Russian army successfully crossed the Danube. An advance detachment under the command of General Joseph Gurko quickly occupied the ancient capital of Bulgaria, the city of Tarnovo, and then captured an important passage through the Balkans - the Shipka Pass. Further advance was suspended due to lack of forces.

In the Caucasus, Russian troops captured the fortresses of Bayazet and Ardahan, defeated the Anatolian Turkish army during the Battle of Avliyar-Alajin in 1877, and then captured the fortress of Kars in November 1877.

The actions of Russian troops near Plevna (now Pleven) on the western flank of the army were unsuccessful. Due to gross mistakes by the tsarist command, the Turks managed to detain large forces of Russian (and somewhat later Romanian) troops here. Three times Russian troops stormed Plevna, suffering huge losses, and each time without success.

In December, the forty thousand-strong garrison of Plevna capitulated.

The fall of Plevna caused the rise of the Slavic liberation movement. Serbia entered the war again. Bulgarian militias fought heroically in the ranks of the Russian army.

By 1878, the balance of power in the Balkans had changed in favor of Russia. The Danube Army, with the assistance of the Bulgarian population and the Serbian army, defeated the Turks while crossing the Balkans in the winter of 1877-1878, in the battle of Sheinovo, Philippopolis (now Plovdiv) and Adrianople, and in February 1878 reached the Bosporus and Constantinople.

In the Caucasus, the Russian army captured Batum and blocked Erzurum.

The ruling circles of Russia faced the specter of a big war with the European powers, for which Russia was not ready. The army suffered heavy losses and experienced supply difficulties. The command stopped the troops in the town of San Stefano (near Constantinople), and on March 3 (February 19, old style), 1878, a peace treaty was signed here.

According to it, Kars, Ardahan, Batum and Bayazet, as well as Southern Bessarabia, were ceded to Russia. Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina received broad autonomy, and Serbia, Montenegro and Romania received independence. In addition, Türkiye was obliged to pay an indemnity of 310 million rubles.

The terms of the treaty caused a negative reaction from Western European states, which feared Russia's enormously increased influence in the Balkans. Fearing the threat of a new war, for which Russia was not prepared, the Russian government was forced to revise the treaty at the international congress in Berlin (June-July 1878), where the San Stefano Treaty was replaced by the Berlin Treaty, which was unfavorable for Russia and the Balkan countries.

The material was prepared based on information from open sources