Rear troops. Questions and tasks

From the history of creation

The first elements of the rear of the troops were permanent military convoys, which appeared in the 70s. XVI century With the creation of regular armies, the growth in the scale of military operations and changes in the methods of conducting them in the 18th-19th centuries. As part of units, formations, associations, they began to create regular units (units) and institutions intended for logistics support. Further development of military affairs, especially application in wars of the 20th century. tanks and aviation, demanded the creation of forces and means of technical, road, airfield support, supply of fuel and other property. Equipping armies with nuclear weapons, missile technology, a large number of radio-electronic equipment and other modern weapons led to the introduction of new changes to the logistics support system.

The rear of the Armed Forces is the forces and means that provide logistics and technical support to the army and navy in peacetime and war. The rear includes various units, institutions and subdivisions necessary to perform the following main tasks: constantly maintain reserves of materiel and provide them to the troops; carry out preparation, operation, technical cover and restoration of communication routes and vehicles; provide military transportation of all types; restore military equipment and property; create conditions for the basing of aviation and naval forces; provide medical care to the wounded and sick; implement anti-epidemic, treatment-and-prophylactic, sanitary-hygienic and veterinary measures; provide trade and household services, apartment maintenance and financial support; provide assistance to troops in restoring their combat effectiveness and eliminating the consequences of enemy strikes. To carry out these tasks, it has bases and warehouses with stocks of material resources for various purposes, special troops (automobile, road, pipeline, etc.), auxiliary fleet, engineering and airfield, aviation and technical, repair, medical, veterinary and other units and divisions and institutions.

Special troops

They consist of military units and units designed to perform special tasks to support the combat and daily activities of the Armed Forces. There are special troops directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, as well as those that are part of individual branches and the Logistics of the Armed Forces. In most branches of the Armed Forces, these include: engineering troops, communications troops, radiation, chemical and biological protection troops, radio engineering units and topographic and geodetic units. The Logistics of the Armed Forces includes such special troops as automobile, road, pipeline, etc. Some branches of the Armed Forces have special troops unique to them, for example, the Air Force - units of the aviation engineering service.

Corps of Engineers - special troops intended for engineering support of combat operations. They consist of formations, units and subunits for various purposes: engineering and sapper, barriers and obstacles, road engineering, bridge construction, pontoon bridges, airborne crossings, positional, camouflage, field water supply, engineering and construction, etc. In battle they perform complex tasks engineering support, requiring special training of personnel, the use of engineering equipment and engineering ammunition.

Signal Corps

consist of units and units performing tasks of radiation, chemical and biological reconnaissance, decontamination, decontamination and disinfection of weapons, uniforms, and other materiel, as well as decontamination and decontamination of the area. They also include units designed to use flamethrower-incendiary agents and masking smoke.

Questions and tasks

1. What combat capabilities do the Strategic Missile Forces have?

2. For what purposes does the rear of the Armed Forces exist? What links are included in its system?

3. Name the composition of the special forces and characterize their main components.

Additional material

Rear of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

From the history of creation

Logistics support for troops arose with the emergence of the armies of slave states. It received its first organizational forms in the army of Ancient Rome, which had special bodies that issued salaries to soldiers, supplied them with weapons, clothing, etc. There were special camp workshops for the manufacture and repair of weapons and military equipment. Food was purchased from the population or collected as tribute from conquered peoples. Small supplies of weapons, food, clothing and shoes were transported behind the troops in convoys. For this purpose, pack animals, carts, and water vehicles allocated by the population at the request of military leaders were used. Great importance was attached to the construction of roads, bridges, and the search for water sources along the routes of troop movement. In the armies of slaveholding states, for the first time, treasurers, quartermasters, and persons in charge of road and fortification work, setting up camps and quartering troops appeared.

In the 11th-15th centuries. there was no centralized supply of troops. In mercenary armies of the 15th-17th centuries. mercenaries were required to purchase weapons, equipment, clothing and food with their salaries. The army was accompanied on its campaigns by merchants (Markitants), who supplied the soldiers with food and military supplies. With the increase in the number of regular armies, increasing difficulties arose in providing them with food and fodder during wars. In this regard, in the 2nd half of the 17th century. In the French and then in other European armies, the magazine supply system was adopted; later mobile magazines were introduced, which, although they were state-owned, were not subordinate to the armed forces. With the increase in the number of armies and the development of their organization (18-19 centuries), regular units gradually began to be created within units and formations, intended for centralized logistics support for troops and fleets. Since then, the T.V. began to take shape organizationally. With. in its modern understanding. With the appearance in the 2nd half of the 19th - early 20th centuries. massive armed forces, built on the principles of a cadre army and navy, equipping troops and naval forces with new military equipment. With. becomes more and more complex and diverse.

In Russia at the beginning of the 18th century. with the creation of the regular army, Peter I formed two services: the provision service - to provide the troops with food and fodder, and the commissariat service - to finance, provide clothing, convoys, and hand weapons. The regiments had economic units - permanent convoys with supplies of material resources: baking, drying crackers, preparing meat, sewing and repairing uniforms and shoes were carried out. In the 18th century infirmaries and hospitals were created (See Hospital).

From the beginning of the 19th century. The Ministry of War had commissariat and provisions departments, which became part of the Main Quartermaster Directorate formed in 1864. He was entrusted with functions previously performed by the troops themselves (supplying all types of material resources, organizing the tailoring of uniforms, etc.): the positions of quartermasters were established from chief to divisional. In 1900, quartermaster courses were created in St. Petersburg (in 1911 they were transformed into the Quartermaster Academy). By the beginning of the First World War of 1914-18, there were quartermaster departments - Main, district, serf, corps, division - as administrative bodies and various rear institutions (warehouses, workshops, bakeries, etc.). The troops included units and units of material, medical, veterinary, and in the navy, in addition, emergency rescue support.

In the German army at the beginning of the 20th century. The quartermasters of the armies, food stores in the theater of war (See Theater of War), food mobile stores on trains, on railways and on ships were subordinate to the chief quartermaster. Army, corps and division quartermasters were in charge of military quartermaster activities. Other armies had a similar rear organization.

The use of tanks, aircraft and road transport during the First World War required the creation of forces and means of technical, road, engineering, airfield and airfield technical support, supply of fuel, tools and other new equipment. The emergence of chemical weapons made it necessary to supply troops with means of protection against toxic substances. The difficulty of meeting the needs of a multimillion-strong armed force during the war for a variety of military equipment led to a significant expansion of military communications. With. with the state economy.

The rear of the Soviet Armed Forces was created simultaneously with the formation of units of the Red Army and Navy. In 1918 the Central Supply Administration was organized. The first detachments of the Red Army did not have regular rear units; they received material resources from local Soviets and military commissariats, which were in charge of the warehouses of the former tsarist army. Since 1918, the supply of troops with material resources was in charge of the supply chief of the corresponding front, army, division, brigade, to whom various services were subordinate. Important measures for organizing TV. With. were adopted as a result of the Military Reform of 1924-25 (See Military Reform of 1924-25); material support is concentrated in a single body - the Office of the Chief of Supply of the Red Army; the order of relationships between T.'s organs has been established. With. with national economic bodies; a supply scheme has been adopted - center - district - part; military logistics agencies were reorganized. As the national economy developed and the technical re-equipment of the armed forces, units and subdivisions appeared that performed the functions of supplying aviation, armored vehicles, automotive equipment and property, fuel, etc. In March 1941, by decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government, the leadership of the Main Quartermaster Directorate, Sanitary, Veterinary Directorates of the Red Army, the department of material funds was entrusted to the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny.

By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45 T.V. The village, in addition to the rear units, units and institutions that were part of the units, formations and associations of military branches and branches of the armed forces, also had bases and warehouses with supplies of material resources, automobile, railway, road, evacuation, repair, engineering and airfield, aviation technical, medical, veterinary and other rear units and institutions of central subordination. By decree of the State Defense Committee on August 1, 1941, a centralized system of TV management was introduced. pp.: the Main Logistics Directorate of the Red Army and the Logistics Directorate in fronts and armies were created, and the positions of Chief of Logistics of the Red Army and Chiefs of Logistics of Fronts and Armies were established. The Headquarters of Logistics Chiefs was formed within the Main Directorate of Logistics, and organizational planning departments were formed in the departments of Logistics Chiefs of fronts and armies. In addition, the center and associations had departments (departments) of military communications, a road service, and an inspection of the chief of logistics. The Main Quartermaster Directorate, the Fuel Supply Directorate, the Main Military Sanitary and Veterinary Directorates were also subordinate to the Chief of Logistics of the Red Army; the corresponding directorates and departments were subordinate to the logistics chiefs of the fronts and armies. On August 19, 1941, the position of Chief of Logistics of the Air Force was introduced, in May 1942 - Chief of Logistics of the Navy; at the same time, the positions of logistics chiefs were established in corps and divisions. Logistics chiefs were endowed with rights: in the center - respectively, deputy people's commissar of defense and navy, and in associations and formations - deputy commanders (commanders). They were responsible for organizing the rear, transporting material resources of all types, evacuating and providing troops for subordinate services; The chief of rear of the Red Army was also responsible for transporting all types of reinforcements to the fronts. During the war, stationary warehouses on the fronts were replaced by field warehouses, and field army bases were created in the armies. In January 1943, the Main Automobile Directorate was formed, and in June the Main Road Administration was formed. In June 1943, the Main Logistics Directorate of the Red Army was abolished; The headquarters, directorates and departments that were part of it were subordinated directly to the chief of logistics. At the same time, a new supply system was adopted - “from oneself”, according to which responsibility for the delivery of material resources from supply stations (army warehouses) to the troops (to divisional exchange points) was assigned to army logistics chiefs, and for delivery from divisional to regimental warehouses - to divisional logistics chiefs.

During the war years T.V. With. accepted from the national economy of the country, ensured the storage and delivery of more than 10 million tons of ammunition, over 16 million tons of fuel, a large amount of weapons, equipment, food and other material resources to the troops and naval forces. 145 million tons of supply cargo were transported by road alone. Military rail transportation exceeded 19 million wagons. The road service has built and restored about 100 thousand km of roads. The forces of railway troops and special forces restored and rebuilt about 120 thousand km of railway tracks. Over 6 thousand airfields are equipped for aviation. The medical service returned to duty after healing over 72% of the wounded and about 91% of the sick. Army and navy personnel received adequate nutrition. All the most important issues of logistics support for the armed forces were resolved by the State Defense Committee through the General Staff, the chief of logistics of the Red Army and the heads of other central government bodies. Centralization of rear management made it possible to effectively and economically use available forces and means. Feats of warriors T.V. With. during the Great Patriotic War, they were highly appreciated by the party and the government: 52 of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and more than 30 - Hero of Socialist Labor, many tens of thousands were awarded orders and medals; a large number of rear units and institutions were awarded orders, awarded the title of guards and received honorary titles.

After the war, the organizational structure was restructured and technical re-equipment was carried out. With. With the formation of new types of armed forces, their rear was simultaneously created. Complete motorization of all parts of the TV system was carried out. pp., new units and institutions for various purposes were created. In June 1958, the position of Deputy Minister of Defense - Chief of Logistics of the Ministry of Defense was established, which since 1962 has been called Deputy Minister of Defense - Chief of Logistics of the Armed Forces; in formations, formations and units, the position of chief of logistics was transformed into the position of deputy commander (commander) for logistics. T.v. With. headed by: Lieutenant General (later Army General) A.V. Khrulev (August 1941 - January 1951), Colonel General V.I. Vinogradov (January 1951 - June 1958), Marshal of the Soviet Union I.Kh. Bagramyan (June 1958 - April 1968), Army General S.S. Maryakhin (April 1968 - June 1972). Since July 1972 T.V. With. headed by Army General S.K. Kurkotkin.

The modern rear of the Soviet Armed Forces includes: arsenals, bases and warehouses with supplies of materiel; special forces - automobile, railway, road and pipeline; auxiliary fleet; units, institutions and subdivisions - airfield engineering, aviation technical, emergency rescue, evacuation, repair, construction, medical, veterinary, etc. To support the activities of the technical department. With. it may also include units and units of engineering troops, communications troops, air defense and security forces. According to the scale and nature of the tasks performed, TV. With. divided into strategic, operational and military rear; by affiliation - to the rear of the center, district, naval, front-line, army, flotilla, fleet aviation, corps, naval bases, divisional, brigade, regimental, ship, battalion. The strategic rear includes the rear of the center (arsenals, bases and warehouses with supplies of material resources, units of special rear forces and other rear units and institutions that are at the constant direct disposal of the Ministry of Defense and the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces). The operational rear consists of bases and warehouses with supplies of material resources, units of special rear forces and other rear units and institutions that are part of all types of armed forces. Military rear services are formed by warehouses with supplies of material resources, motor transport, repair, medical and other units and subunits intended for direct logistical support of formations, units, ships and subunits. Each military formation, unit (ship) and subdivision has its own rear, the composition of which is determined by the states. For example, the rear of a motorized rifle battalion consists of a supply platoon, a repair shop and a battalion medical center. Having the necessary motor transport, he is able to follow the battalion during combat operations or on the march and carry out his tasks in any situation.

Rear of the Armed Forces- these are the forces and means that provide logistics and technical support to the army and navy in peacetime and war.

The rear is an integral part of the armed forces; a set of military units, institutions and divisions that carry out the supply of materiel, material, transport, technical, engineering and airfield, airfield technical, medical, veterinary, trade and household, housing and maintenance, financial, and in the Navy, in addition, emergency rescue support.

    The rear includes various units, institutions and units necessary to perform the following main tasks:
  • constantly maintain reserves of material resources and provide them to the troops;
  • carry out preparation, operation, technical cover and restoration of communication routes and vehicles;
  • provide military transportation of all types;
  • restore military equipment and property;
  • create conditions for the basing of aviation and naval forces;
  • provide medical care to the wounded and sick;
  • implement anti-epidemic, treatment-and-prophylactic, sanitary-hygienic and veterinary measures;
  • provide trade and household services, apartment maintenance and financial support;
  • provide assistance to troops in restoring their combat effectiveness and eliminating the consequences of enemy strikes.

To carry out these tasks, it has bases and warehouses with stocks of material resources for various purposes, special troops (automobile, road, pipeline, etc.), auxiliary fleet, engineering and airfield, aviation and technical, repair, medical, veterinary and other units and divisions and institutions.

The rear of the Armed Forces is intended to provide the Armed Forces with all types of materiel and maintain their reserves, prepare and operate communication routes, ensure military transportation, repair weapons and military equipment, provide medical care to the wounded and sick, carry out sanitary, hygienic and veterinary measures and carry out a number of other logistics tasks. The rear of the Armed Forces includes arsenals, bases, and warehouses with supplies of materiel. It has special troops (automobile, railway, road, pipeline, engineering and airfield and others), as well as repair, medical, rear security and other units and units.

    The rear of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (Russian Armed Forces) includes:
  • Central Directorate of Military Communications of the Russian Ministry of Defense
  • Automobile and Road Administration of the Russian Ministry of Defense
  • Central Directorate of Rocket Fuel and Fuel of the Russian Ministry of Defense
  • Central Food Administration of the Russian Ministry of Defense
  • Central Clothing Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense
  • Fire, Rescue and Local Defense Service of the Russian Armed Forces
  • Veterinary and Sanitary Service of the Russian Armed Forces
  • Environmental Safety Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces
  • Main Directorate of Trade of the Russian Ministry of Defense
  • Directorate for Active Recreation of the Russian Ministry of Defense
  • Department of Agriculture of the Russian Ministry of Defense
  • Military Scientific Committee of the Logistics of the Russian Armed Forces
  • Secretariat of the Chief of Logistics of the Russian Armed Forces
  • Human Resources Department of the Logistics of the Russian Armed Forces
  • Department of Military Education of the Logistics of the Russian Armed Forces
  • Rear Front of the Russian Armed Forces
  • Air Force rear
  • Naval rear
  • Rear KV (December 1, 2011, the Aerospace Defense Forces were formed on their base)
  • Rear Strategic Missile Forces
  • Rear Airborne Forces
  • Rear of military districts (fleets) (groups of forces (flotillas)) of the Russian Armed Forces
  • Automotive troops
  • Railway troops of the Russian Armed Forces
  • Road troops of the Russian Armed Forces
  • Pipeline troops of the Russian Armed Forces
  • Rear Guard Troops of the Russian Armed Forces

Special troops of the Armed Forces

They consist of military units and units designed to perform special tasks to support the combat and daily activities of the Armed Forces. There are special troops directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, as well as those that are part of individual branches and the Logistics of the Armed Forces.

In most branches of the Armed Forces, these include: engineering troops, communications troops, radiation, chemical and biological protection troops, radio engineering units and topographic and geodetic units. The Logistics of the Armed Forces includes such special troops as automobile, road, pipeline, etc. Some branches of the Armed Forces have special troops unique to them, for example, the Air Force - units of the aviation engineering service.

In all branches of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation there are special troops - reconnaissance, communications, electronic warfare, engineering, radiation, chemical and biological protection, as well as technical support, represented both by individual formations and units included in the military units of the relevant branches and branches of the Armed Forces Russian Forces. They are designed to support the daily and combat activities of formations, formations and military units of the corresponding type of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, as well as to solve special problems.

Reconnaissance troops designed to obtain information about the enemy, as well as other information necessary for the actions of troops. To properly understand their purpose, it should be taken into account that in combat conditions, reconnaissance as a type of support for military operations, the totality of activities of command and headquarters of all levels, is carried out not only by reconnaissance formations, but also by formations and units of many branches of the military and special forces. In this general activity, reconnaissance units and units are assigned the most complex reconnaissance tasks, requiring special training, as well as specific types of weapons and military equipment.

Signal Corps- special troops designed to establish and maintain stable communications that ensure continuous command and control of troops. They are part of all types and branches of the Armed Forces. They can transmit information both in clear text and pre-coded, encrypted and classified. They are equipped with mobile means of various types of communication (radio, radio relay, tropospheric, wired, etc.) with high technical characteristics (reliability, noise immunity, etc.).

Electronic warfare troops solve the problems of radio-electronic reconnaissance and radio-electronic suppression of the enemy, providing radio-electronic protection of their radio-electronic assets, countering the enemy’s technical reconnaissance means, solving problems of reducing the visibility of weapons and military equipment for them.

Corps of Engineers designed to perform a wide range of engineering tasks in the interests of associations, formations and units of types, branches of troops, special troops, logistics, technical support of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, as well as the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the FSB Border Service and the Civil Defense formations of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia. Their tasks are varied. The goals of engineering support for combat operations are to create the necessary conditions for the timely and covert advance, deployment, maneuver of troops, their successful execution of combat missions, increasing the protection of troops and objects from all types of damage, through engineering equipment of the terrain (territory of combat operations) and other engineering measures losses to the enemy and difficulties in his actions. In combat, they perform complex engineering support tasks that require special training of personnel, the use of engineering equipment and engineering ammunition.

Technical support troops solve the tasks defined by their name, including maintaining weapons and military equipment (WME) of troops (forces), ammunition, measuring instruments and military-technical property in combat-ready condition, their maintenance (storage), evacuation and repair of WME.

Purpose troops of radiation, chemical and biological protection (RCBZ, RCB protection) outlined by their name. This is the protection of troops, the population and facilities from radiation, chemical and biological hazards during combat operations and in peacetime, including participation in the elimination of the consequences of man-made emergencies at radiation, chemical and biologically hazardous facilities. Along with these, the tasks of the RCBZ troops also include reducing the visibility of troops, objects and the use of flamethrowers and incendiary weapons.

Radiation, chemical and biological defense troops consist of subunits and units performing tasks of radiation, chemical and biological reconnaissance, decontamination, decontamination and disinfection of weapons, uniforms, and other materiel, as well as decontamination and decontamination of the area. They also include units designed to use flamethrower-incendiary agents and masking smoke.

Along with those listed in the Air Force and Navy, there are other special troops, units and subunits that correspond to the specifics of these types of Armed Forces.

Troops not included in the types and types of troops
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

Unlike the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (troops of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation), Russian legislation includes the border troops of the Russian Federation, internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, and civil defense troops (hereinafter referred to as other troops) as troops not included in the types and branches of troops.

Border troops of the Russian Federation provide protection of the state border, territorial sea, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation.

The internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation are designed to ensure the security of the individual, society and the state, to protect the rights and freedoms of man and citizen from criminal and other unlawful attacks.

Civil Defense Troops of the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Relief are created to protect the population and organizations from dangers arising during military operations or as a result of these actions, as well as to participate in the elimination of destruction caused by various natural or man-made disasters disasters.

Military units and cantonment and accommodation organizations play an important role in ensuring the activities of the Armed Forces. Quartering and arrangement of troops is the activity of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation for the creation and engineering support of military infrastructure facilities, the quartering of troops, the creation of conditions for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces and the conduct of combat operations.

Military builders erected hundreds of unique, engineering-complex special structures and complexes for defense purposes. These include the Baikonur and Plesetsk cosmodromes, the Kapustin Yar, Semipalatinsk, Sary-Shagan, and Balkhash training grounds. They provided the most complex structures for the Strategic Missile Forces' combat missile systems, command and control and communications posts, air and missile defense systems, built airfields and naval bases, and special fortifications; equipped thousands of military camps, built many administrative, educational, sports, medical and recreational facilities, residential buildings for military personnel and members of their families.

Other troops are not part of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, but together with them ensure the implementation of tasks related to the defense of the state.

BORDER TROOPS OF THE FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Border troops are designed to protect and protect the State Border of the Russian Federation, the protection of internal sea waters, the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone, the continental shelf of our country and natural resources.

    The main tasks of the border troops:
  • protection and security of the State Border of the Russian Federation in order to prevent its illegal passage, ensure compliance by individuals and legal entities with the border regime;
  • protection of internal sea waters, territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, continental shelf of the Russian Federation and their natural resources in order to preserve, protect and rationally use them, as well as to protect the marine environment, economic and other legitimate interests of Russia.

Structurally, the border troops are consolidated into 10 regional departments: Arctic, North-Western, Kaliningrad, Western, North Caucasus, South-Eastern, Transbaikal, Far Eastern, Pacific and North-Eastern.

INTERNAL TROOPS OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Internal troops are designed to protect the rights and freedoms of citizens from criminal and other unlawful attacks.

    The main tasks of the internal troops:
  • prevention and suppression of armed conflicts and actions directed against the integrity of the state;
  • disarmament of illegal groups;
  • compliance with the state of emergency;
  • strengthening public order policing where necessary;
  • ensuring the normal functioning of all government structures and legally elected authorities;
  • protection of important government facilities, special cargo, etc.

The most important task of the internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation is joint participation with the Russian Armed Forces in the territorial defense of the country.

The organizational reforms being carried out in the internal troops are aimed at increasing their mobility, the ability to quickly concentrate forces and resources where necessary, and actually ensure the protection of the life, health and property of citizens.

CIVIL DEFENSE FORCES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Civil defense troops are an important part of the security forces. They are designed to protect the territory of the country and its population from emergency situations in peacetime and war. These troops, in accordance with the Law of the Russian Federation “On Defense,” can be involved in defense using means of armed struggle. Organizationally, they are part of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations.

    The main tasks of the civil defense troops in peacetime:
  • accumulation, placement, storage and timely renewal of weapons, equipment, and other material and technical means intended for the deployment of troops and carrying out emergency rescue and other urgent work in peacetime and wartime;
  • participation in emergency prevention activities;
  • preparation of forces and means to prevent and eliminate emergency situations;
  • training the population in ways to protect themselves in emergency situations;
  • conducting radiation, chemical and bacteriological (biological) reconnaissance in emergency zones, as well as on advance routes to them;
  • carrying out emergency rescue and other urgent work for the prompt localization and elimination of natural and man-made emergencies on the territory of the Russian Federation, as well as on the territories of foreign states with which Russia has relevant agreements;
  • participation in the localization and elimination of large forest and peat fires;
  • ensuring the safety of goods transported to emergency zones as humanitarian aid;
  • participation in providing the affected population with food, water, basic necessities, temporary housing and other means and services, providing them with pre-medical care;
  • participation in activities to evacuate the population, material and cultural assets from emergency zones;
  • participation in the restoration of life support facilities for the population.
    The main tasks of civil defense troops in wartime:
  • conducting radiation, chemical and bacteriological (biological) reconnaissance in lesions, zones of contamination (contamination) and catastrophic flooding, as well as on routes to advance to them;
  • Carrying out emergency rescue and other urgent work in hot spots, areas of pollution (contamination) and catastrophic flooding;
  • carrying out work on sanitary treatment of the population, special treatment of equipment and property, disinfection of buildings, structures and territories;
  • ensuring the entry of civil defense forces into hot spots, areas of contamination (contamination) and catastrophic flooding;
  • participation in measures to evacuate the population, material and cultural assets from lesions, zones of pollution (contamination) and catastrophic flooding;
  • carrying out pyrotechnic work related to the disposal of aircraft bombs and landmines;
  • participation in work to restore life support facilities for the population and perform territorial defense tasks related to the restoration of airfields, roads, crossings and other important elements of the rear infrastructure.

Civil defense troops organizationally consist of formations, military units and organizations, which include emergency rescue, engineering, mechanized, fire, medical, pyrotechnic and other units. In accordance with the Geneva Conventions, they do not participate in hostilities, therefore they are armed with rescue equipment and light small arms.

Civil defense formations and units are located in those regions where there is a high probability of emergencies of a natural and man-made nature. The characteristics of the regions are taken into account in their structure and composition. If a region is earthquake-prone, there are more mechanized units in it; if it is prone to floods, pontoon-ferrying forces and means predominate in it; if there are many radiation or chemically hazardous production facilities, units with more radiation and chemical protection units are placed next to them.

    In the coming years, it is planned to carry out the following activities to further develop the civil defense forces:
  • reducing the number of civil defense troops to optimal limits;
  • reorganization of individual rescue brigades, individual mechanized regiments and individual mechanized battalions into rescue centers with a high degree of mobility;
  • creation of the State Rescue Service on the basis of the State Fire Service, civil defense troops and rescue organizations included in the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations system.

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RAIL OF THE ARMED FORCES

(T. VS), an integral part of the RF Armed Forces, including forces and means intended for. for logistics and logistics services technical. providing troops (forces) to the world. and military time. The T. VS includes: military bodies. control with warrior. units and organizations of support and security, special. troops (combined and military units of material support, automobile, road, pipeline, auxiliary fleet, military units for the supply of rocket fuel), warrior. units, organizations and bodies (military communications, transshipment areas, trade and household services, military press, tourism, cultural and leisure), rear services (fuel, food, clothing, medical, veterinary - San.), as well as military training. institutions, educational and stock. conn. and warrior. parts, scientific research, testing. and project. org-tions and warrior. parts. Organizationally, the forces and means of the rear are part of the fronts (fleets), military. districts, united, conn. and warrior. units of branches of the Armed Forces, branches of the Armed Forces, and are also located directly. subordination center. military authorities management. T.VS is divided: according to the scale and nature of the tasks performed - into strategic, operational. (operational-strategic, operational and operational-tactical formations) and military (unit, military units and subdivisions); by affiliation - to the rear of the Center, branches of the Armed Forces and branches of the Armed Forces, front, naval, district, army, corps, naval air force, rear of the fl, naval base, squadrons, divisional (brigade), regimental, battalion (divisions).
The first elements of T. VS in the form of permanent military. convoys appeared in the 70s. 17th century Before this, his tasks in most armies were carried out by various people. non-military departments and private entrepreneurs, and merchants (marketers) accompanied the troops on campaigns. In the 17th - 18th centuries. a store supply system was used. With the creation of regulation. armies, the growth of military headquarters. actions and changes in methods of conducting them in the 18th - 19th centuries. as part of parts, conn., unit. and the center is available. military authorities departments began to be staffed. subsection (parts) and institutions intended for for centralization provision of troops (forces) separately for each logistics service. Further development of the military. affairs, especially application in wars of the 20th century. tanks and aircraft, motorization and mechanization of troops, required the creation of forces and means of technical, road, airfield. provision, fuel supply, etc. Equipment of the armed forces with nuclear weapons, missiles. equipment, a large number of radioelectronics. funds and other modern technology led to the introduction of new changes to the T.V. system.
Home front Russian army its org. started on the 1st quarter. 18th century with the creation of regulation by Peter I. troops and navy, who demanded the organization of their permanent state. provision from government warehouses. Center. The supply bodies became orders (Provisions, Military, Art.), as part of the field management. The active army established a commissariat that was in charge of all types of supplies. Subsequently, the logistics support system was Russian. The army was improved taking into account the experience of wars. Supply transport has been developed, a system for echeloning supplies has been developed, and a unified quartermaster service has been created. To the 1st world. front formed during the war. and Armenian supply bases, the front began to function. distribution stations that provided railway reception. transport from the rear of the country, as well as buildings. unloading stations.
In Kr. The Army Center was formed in 1918. ex. supplies; in total and conn. positions of supply chiefs were established, the Crimea was subordinate to units, institutions and rear services. During Vel. Fatherland The war was well organized and technical. equipped with T.VS, which successfully coped with a large volume of tasks related to logistics support for troops (forces). From the beginning wars were created by Ch. ex. rear, ex. rear in fronts and armies. That. centralization was formed. rear. By May 1942, the positions of logistics chiefs in corps and divisions were introduced. During the war, T. VS accepted from the industry and provided storage and transportation to the troops (forces) of St. 10 million tons of ammunition, 16 million tons of fuel, approx. 40 million tons of food and fodder. Lich. the composition was issued to St. 70 million sets of uniforms. Military railways transportation exceeded 19 million wagons, vehicles. 625 million tons were transported by air. - OK. 140 million tons of material assets. The road troops built and restored approx. 100 thousand km of vehicles. roads, railways troops and special forces of the People's Commissariat of Railways - approx. 120 thousand km of railway ways. More than 6 thousand airfields are equipped for aviation needs. Military medical service and treatment. The institutions of the People's Commissariat of Health were returned to operation after the cure of St. 72% wounded and 91% sick.
In the post-war years as the country's economy develops, changes in the organization. structure, technical equipment of the armed forces, development of the military. science was improved. T. VS. The general management of the T. Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is carried out by the Minister of Defense through the head of the T. Armed Forces - deputy. Minister of Defense, Commanders-in-Chief. types of aircraft, teams. branches of the Armed Forces, heads of chiefs. and center. Departments of the Moscow Region. In the USSR during the existence of the People's Commissariat of the Navy and Navy. Min-va (1937 - 46; 1950 - 53) the rear of the Navy functioned independently. Heads of the Home Front of Kr. Army, Sov. Army, USSR Armed Forces and Russian Armed Forces: A.V. Khrulev (1941 - 51), V.I. Vinogradov (1951 - 58), I.Kh. Bagramyan (1958 - 68), S.S. Maryakhin (1968 - 72), S.K. Kurkotkin (1972 - 88), V.M. Ar-khipov (1988 - 91), I.V. Fuzhenko (1991 - 92), V.T. Churanov (1992 - 97), V.I. Isakov (since June 1997).

The rear of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is an integral part of the defense potential of the state and the link between the country's economy and the troops directly consuming the products produced; it is a well-coordinated, efficiently operating mechanism. It includes the Logistics Headquarters, 9 main and central directorates, 3 services, as well as command and control bodies, troops and organizations of central subordination, logistics structures of the branches and branches of the Armed Forces, military districts and fleets, associations, formations and military units.

Anniversary sign "300 years of the Russian Armed Forces' Logistics"

Rear of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

(Historical reference)

The year 1700 is taken as the starting point for the history of the Logistics of the Armed Forces. Then, on February 18, Peter I signed the Decree “On the management of all grain reserves of military men to Okolnichy Yazykov, with the name for this part General Provisions.” The first independent supply body was established - the Provision Order, which was in charge of the supply of bread, cereals and grain fodder to the army. He carried out centralized food supply, which, as is known, is today one of the types of material support for troops.

On the same day, “in the second half of the bright day” - by his Decree, the autocrat established another Order - Special, which later received the name Military (sometimes it is also called Commissariat). This order was in charge of the appropriations allocated for the armament of the troops, the monetary allowance of the army, and the supply of its uniforms and horses.

The regular army and navy created by the Tsar-Transformer required further steps to centralize their support, and in 1711, by decree of Peter I, the supply bodies became part of the active army. A commissariat was created in its field administration, which was in charge of all types of supplies, including food supplies. In divisions, the organization of supply was entrusted to chief commissars and chief provisions masters, and in regiments, respectively, to commissars and provision masters. Moreover, the regiments acquired their own military facilities.

The structure of governing bodies that took shape at the beginning of the 18th century and the experience accumulated during the Northern War in supplying the active army were enshrined in the Military Regulations of 1716. Responsibility for providing troops was assigned to the commander of the army (Field Marshal), and the direct management of its supply was assigned to the General Kriegs Commissar, whose duties, in particular, included supplying the troops with money, clothing, provisions, weapons and horses. Medical support was provided: in the army - a doctor under senior generals, in divisions - a doctor and a staff doctor, in regiments - a doctor, in a company - a barber (paramedic).

It is interesting to evaluate the status of the General Kriegs Commissioner by current standards. On the one hand, managing finances made him the most important figure. But, on the other hand, he is seen as weaker than the modern chief of logistics in terms of the available capabilities for organizing support. The main thing: there were no vehicles in his hands. The convoy in the army was subordinate to the General-Wagenmeister. The Quartermaster General stood above him. Along with transportation, the Quartermaster General also supervised the deployment of troops and hospitals, that is, in fact, it was he who created the rear infrastructure of the field army, although at the same time he was not the organizer of material support.

The division of supply and transport powers between officials had its own reasons at that time. In particular, in case of urgent need, the convoy could turn into a kind of fortification and was used as a defensive line. But the situation when one boss determines the rear “disposition”, and another - its supply content, is internally contradictory. At first it is barely noticeable. The rear of Peter's armies was decorated with Spartan modesty. However, as military affairs developed and the rear organization became more complex, the “worm” of contradictions became more dangerous. “Rear fragmentation” became like death at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

In the overall supply system, food had the largest share. The army was provided with provisions entirely from state reserves. By 1705, food warehouses had been opened in many cities. Products were delivered on carts or along rivers on plows (large boats). In addition to permanent (stationary) ones, temporary and mobile warehouses were also organized. Temporary troops were deployed during short stops. In mobile warehouses, called stores, it was prescribed to have constant food supplies in the amount of monthly needs.

You can get an idea of ​​these prototypes of modern logistics brigades, for example, from the report of Admiral Apraksin dated March 11, 1711. He reported to Peter I about the organization of a camp store on 2609 carts, carrying 4160 quarters of crackers, 384 quarters of cereals, 1200 quarters of oats and 22713 pounds of hay. If you calculate, this is about 1300 tons. It is quite comparable to the carrying capacity of the airborne transport of a separate logistics battalion of a modern division. Since the matter of supplying the army became entirely the concern of the state, rationing was inevitably required. On February 18, 1705, a decree determined the exact amount of grain “salary” for all lower ranks without exception. The “great-great-grandfather” of our food ration consisted of half an octah of flour (about 24 kg) and a small quart of cereals (about 3.5 kg) per month. Money was given for the purchase of other “welding” products.

Troops outside Russia were provided with additional “portions”: two pounds of bread (820 g), one pound of meat (410 g), two glasses of wine (250 g) and one garnz of beer (3.28 l) per person per day. In addition, two pounds of salt and one and a half garnets of cereals were provided for the month. As a rule, portions were given not in kind, but in money. Warriors could buy food at their own discretion. Contemporaries argued that “the allowance was excellent, and the tsar himself tested the soldiers’ rations for a month before approving them.”

Many aspects of modern logistics issues are rooted in history. For example, in the era of Peter the Great, provision masters and commissars were subordinate only to superior commanders in their specialty and were not subordinate to regiment and division commanders. They served with the troops as representatives from the army, sometimes from the province. In order to better protect the treasury from theft, commanders were removed from direct management of material resources. The image of the “voivode on feeding” was painfully enduring.

And take the military economy. After the death of Peter I in 1730, the Provisional Military Commission noted the insufficient supply of troops. Decisions followed that gave the regiments the right to accumulate funds allocated by the treasury. With “economic amounts” (money saved) it was possible to buy everything necessary - even horses. The certain autonomy of the military economy was beneficial to the state: its own property was preserved better than state-owned property. Why not the “economic sum”, say, the current type 101, which receives funds from subsidiary plots, saving bread, etc. Obviously, the practice of extrabudgetary funds has a long history.

In the middle of the 18th century, up to 49 percent of a soldier’s salary was deducted for a uniform issued for wear. Thus, the state improved the conservation of property. By the way, the fact that for a long time salaries and clothing was supervised by one official - the commissar - was determined precisely by this close relationship between them. The modern concept of clothing provision for military personnel serving under contract is a metamorphosis of the same idea. For supplies required by regulations but not received, compensation is due.

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of April 8, 1997 No. 305 “On priority measures to prevent corruption and reduce budget expenses when organizing the purchase of products for state needs” introduced a competitive supply system for the Armed Forces. A logical step for the state to transfer the economy to a market economy.

How much effort and energy it took for the logistics services specialists to adapt to the new requirements. But they are not that new. From time immemorial, private contractors have been involved in supplying the regular army in Russia.

For example, since the middle of the 19th century, five methods of procuring material resources were legalized: contract by auction, commercial, commission, cash purchase, as well as the release of money to the shelves for procurement “at their own expense.”

Contracting by auction was considered the most profitable. Moreover, the dual purpose of any government contract was officially recognized. It consisted: “1) in the acquisition of items necessary for procurement at prices that are not burdensome for the treasury and harmless for private individuals and 2) in the development of all branches of private industry, opening the way for it to sell its products for the sustenance and supply of troops.”

Along with the conditions (conditions) of the auction, the quartermaster's department set the "extreme price." It was impossible to pay more. A minimum price was also determined, and buying below which was also prohibited. The instructions to the procurers indicated that the treasury should not pursue the lowest possible contract price, but should always compare it with the minimum, beyond which the contractor's losses or dishonest fulfillment of obligations (bribery of acceptors, etc.) are inevitable. In both cases, harm to government interests was seen, and therefore competition in contracts had to have certain limits.

The rear of the Russian army received significant development at the beginning of the 19th century. In 1802, the Ministry of War was formed in Russia, initially called the Ministry of Military Ground Forces. The first Minister of War was Infantry General S.K. Vyazmitinov, who previously headed the Commissariat Department for some time. It was under him that in 1805 the Commissariat and Provision departments were combined into one Quartermaster Department. (“Intendant” is a word of French origin, meaning “manager, manager.” Today, we hear its English equivalent - “manager”).

The quartermaster's department did not last long then. Contemporaries were unable to appreciate the importance of having a body for centralized management of material support for troops. The commissariat was given the main blame for the failures in the wars of 1807 with France and 1808-1809 with Sweden, although at that time the entire military mechanism of the state was slipping. It is not the best tradition to see those in the rear as a “scapegoat”. True, quartermasters were still retained in armies, corps and divisions.

Since 1812, the War Ministry included 7 independent departments, including provisions, commissariat and medical. There has been significant progress in the field command and control of troops. According to the new Regulations, called “Institution for the management of a large army in the field,” control of the rear was entrusted to the army headquarters. He was obliged, with the participation of the relevant commanders, to develop plans for providing the army with weapons, ammunition, food, engineering and clothing equipment, salaries, plan the delivery of supply cargo, equip military roads and control traffic along them, organize medical support, place and move shops, art parks, hospitals. The headquarters as a control body, planning simultaneously both the combat operations of the troops and their supply, subordinated the entire organization of the rear to the interests of supply. The efficiency of the rear was raised to a higher level.

And yet, the issues of organizing the rear and organizing supplies were still divided - now between the quartermaster general and the chief of the main staff, who were equally subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief. But an important point: the position of a general on duty was introduced, reporting to the chief of the army's main staff. This official united, on the one hand, the management of transport support: the director of military communications reported to him (also a new position - author) and, through the General-Wagenmeister, the army convoy. And, on the other hand, he was also responsible for organizing the evacuation of the wounded and sick and providing them with medical care.

Half a century later, the idea of ​​the closest consolidation of supply agencies was taken up by the outstanding Russian military reformer D.A. Milyutin. In 1864, the Commissariat and Provision departments were again united in one department - the Main Quartermaster Directorate of the War Ministry. In 1868, the Committee on the Movement of Troops by Railroads, which by that time had become quite widespread, was established. The concept of "quartermaster transport" is replacing the convoy.

A truly revolution in the theory and practice of military art can be considered the discovery of D.A. Milyutin and his comrades, became the organization of the rear of the active army during the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. Changes in methods of warfare and an increase in the size of the army made it impossible to effectively organize supplies without “rear” unity of command.

Then an extraordinary step was taken - the position of “chief of military communications of the army in the field and commander of the troops located in its rear” was introduced. The commander of the Kyiv Military District was appointed to this position. The headquarters of the head of the department, the quartermaster, artillery, military medical, engineering in the rear of the army, and the military medical department in the rear of the army were subordinate to him. The rights and responsibilities of the new official were set out in the “Temporary Regulations on the Management of Military Communications of the Active Army and the Troops in its Rear.” This was the first experience of real centralization of rear management. The territory where the troops “in the rear” were stationed received the status of a military district. The district commander was essentially the chief of the logistics of the active army. According to the 1890 Regulations “On Field Command of Troops,” each active army was to be provided with “its own military district,” that is, its own rear.

But nevertheless, “rear” as a special term was added to the military lexicon only in the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905. They began to distinguish between the “general” and the “nearest” rear. In fact, the first is nothing more than the rear of the front, and the second is the rear of the army. The common rear received a kind of autonomy - independence from other officials. The chief logistics officer of the Manchu armies was subordinate only to the commander-in-chief. He was in charge of the rear department, which, located in Harbin, had at its disposal various units and institutions that performed the functions of supply and evacuation.

The rear, in an understanding close to the current one, developed at the operational-strategic level. The increased number of services, units and institutions of the rear, the volume of support tasks, transported personnel and cargo, wounded and sick people led to a qualitative change in the management system. The headquarters of the operational-strategic association could not digest the rear information. A new independent management body was created in the person of the chief of logistics and his staff. Logistics support was thus self-determined.

But the new body was not yet fully the organizer of providing support for the unification troops. At the front, other bodies and officials were also involved in this. The territorial component still largely prevailed over the functional one.

However, the fact remains that an independent rear organ has emerged! From this moment on, the future can be viewed through the prism of the introduction of the rear - into all links of the military organism - the rear, permanently evolutionary.

The construction of the military and operational rear, in the image and likeness of the model acquired for the front, could not proceed smoothly, if only due to the multiplicity of possible solutions. For example, a set of armies (in some cases this is an “active army”) solving a common operational-strategic task began to be officially called a front in the First World War. The management of its supply was carried out by the chief supply officer of the front armies. Reporting directly to the commander, he was essentially the head of the independent rear of the front. But calling it that was prevented by a glance at the past, or rather, the lag in the theory of military art. When a concept is vague, it is usually not possible to find the best form of expressing its content, including organizational form. Not to mention the interpolation of this shape to other levels. The First World War is a clear confirmation of this. Other rear units have not yet gained independence. Management of the rear and supply of the army was concentrated in the economic department of its headquarters. Which in itself is unprecedented! Although the headquarters were periodically in charge of transport, sanitary service issues, and gave separate instructions on the rear, the supply services had never previously reported directly to the headquarters. Also subordinate to the chief of staff was the chief field quartermaster at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in the theater of military operations, created during the war.

Unfortunately, this link was not destined to establish a reliable supply connection between the fronts and the center, where complete disunity of supply departments reigned.

At the military level, a third scheme was in effect: neither at headquarters nor in the rear - the corresponding rear services were not united at all. Their superiors autonomously turned directly to the commander.

And even at the front line itself, there was a retreat from the organization of the rear, which had been suffered through several wars and enshrined in the Regulations on Field Command of Troops in Wartime, on which on July 16, 1914, Emperor Nicholas II inscribed: “Be it so.” The head of the VOSO department and the head of the front sanitary unit were removed from the Office of the Chief Supply Officer of the Front and reassigned directly to the Commander-in-Chief.

Thus, the advantages and effectiveness of combining supply services, military communications and sanitary services in a single independent rear area in 1914-1918 were not realized. It should be noted that after the Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917, the rear services were repeatedly reorganized. However, the first and second parts of the Red Army Logistics Regulations (military and army rear services) and the outlines regarding front-line rear services also significantly diverged from the experience of the First World War. The organization of the rear and supply was entrusted to the front headquarters, which was supposed to have a military communications department (3rd) and a logistics department (5th). Supply services reported directly to the front commander. At the center there was even less coordination of their actions. The epiphany came in the very first weeks of the Great Patriotic War.

June 30, 1941 Lieutenant General A.V. Khrulev reported in writing to the Chief of the General Staff, Army General G.K. Zhukov: “The matter of organizing the rear services of the army in the field is in an extremely difficult situation. Neither I, as the Chief Quartermaster, nor the Logistics and Supply Directorate of the General Staff, currently have any data on the provision of food and commissary equipment to the fronts... There is also no supply, since the Main Quartermaster Directorate does not have data on where and how much is needed and can be delivered.”

At the same time, A.V. Khrulev did not dramatize the situation at all. Management of the supply of troops was indeed lost, as was the leadership of the troops themselves. G.K. Zhukov, during a personal meeting, answered the Chief Quartermaster something like this: “I can’t tell you anything, since we don’t have any connections with the troops and we don’t know what the troops need.”

A transport conflict arose: operational and supply shipments went to the west, and evacuation shipments from the west. Often what was sent to the troops was what they had evacuated. Counter cargo flows kept railways and roads under enormous tension. By mid-July 1941, the unplanned and unsystematic dispatch of supply transports and the untimeliness of their unloading paralyzed many communications. On July 14, at intermediate railway stations there were 465 trains that were actually abandoned without locomotives.

Something urgently needed to be done. The country was becoming a single military camp. The best minds of the commissariat, headed by Andrei Vasilyevich Khrulev, having studied and analyzed the experience of organizing supplies for the Russian army in the First World War, the Red Army during the Civil War and in subsequent hostilities, prepared proposals for the reorganization of the rear of the Red Army, which were initially reported to the Deputy Chairman of the People's Council Commissars of the USSR, member of the State Defense Committee A.I. Mikoyan, who was in charge of army supply issues.

“The next day,” wrote A.V. Khrulev, “Comrade A.I. Mikoyan called me on the phone.

Comrade Khrulev,” he said, “the Supreme Commander-in-Chief has instructed you to prepare a draft decision of the State Defense Committee on the organization of the rear of the Red Army.

Representatives of the General Staff and the best rear service workers were immediately recruited to work. And already at the end of July, the draft resolution of the State Defense Committee (O) was ready. The leading employees of the State Defense Committee gathered with I.V. Stalin. Having read the document, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief... immediately signed it.”

On August 1, 1941, he also signed the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 0257 “On the organization of the Main Directorate of Logistics of the Red Army...”, which united the headquarters of the Chief of Logistics, the Directorate of VOSO, the highway department and the inspection of the Chief of Logistics of the Red Army.

The position of Chief of Logistics of the Red Army was introduced, to whom, in addition to the Main Directorate of Logistics of the Red Army, “in all respects,” the Main Quartermaster Directorate, the Fuel Supply Directorate, the Sanitary and Veterinary Directorates were also subordinated. The position of chief of logistics was also introduced in fronts and armies. Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Lieutenant General of the Quartermaster Service A.V., was appointed Chief of Logistics of the Red Army. Khrulev, his chief of staff was Major General of the Quartermaster Service P.V. Utkin. Bringing together the entire set of supply, medical and transport structures under one umbrella made it possible to establish the complex process of logistics support for the active army.

It was this historical fact that formed the basis for the preparation of Order No. 225 of the Minister of Defense, which "... taking into account the merits of the personnel of the Logistics of the Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War, effective activities in logistics support for combat training of troops and naval forces in peacetime" on May 7 In 1998, Armed Forces Logistics Day was established. Now it is celebrated annually on August 1st. The choice of date, without a doubt, does not require explanation: on August 1, 1941, the actual self-determination of the rear of the Armed Forces took place. It appeared as an independent branch or branch of the Armed Forces. The fifth anniversary of this event, in particular, was dedicated to the order of the Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR dated August 25, 1946 No. 38, signed by I.V. Stalin.

May 1942 was marked by a new step in the development of the rear of the Armed Forces. The organizational and planning departments of the fronts and armies were reorganized into rear control headquarters. The positions of deputy commanders for logistics were introduced in corps and divisions. On issues of general logistics organization, supply planning, transportation and evacuation, supply services began to report to the chief of logistics: artillery, armored vehicles, engineering, communications, chemical and others.

Changes did not stop in the future. The Chief of Logistics was in charge of various bodies, for example, the Financial Directorate of the Red Army. Subordinate supply structures were reorganized. The number varied.

We had to fight for the integrity of the Home Front. Thus, in November 1944, the Fuel Supply Directorate was transferred to the subordination of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense. It returned in 1946 and forever. But the bodies of VOSO “went into isolation” for only 36 days. They were reassigned to the General Staff in January 1943. Supplies began to slip. And the rash decision was immediately reversed.

The end of the Great Patriotic War did not stop the search for optimal forms of organizing the rear. In 1946, the People's Commissariat for Defense of the Navy merged. In 1953, after the “divorce” of 1950, their new unification followed. The rear fully experienced the vicissitudes of the restructuring of the top military leadership. In the late 40s - early 50s, the Chief of Logistics of the Armed Forces lost his status as Deputy Minister of Defense. The military communications and housing services came out of his subordination. The rear headquarters was disbanded. On its basis, the Directorate of Logistics Services was formed, which returned to its headquarters quality only in 1953.

There were also acquisitions. In 1947, the rear of the airborne troops was formed. It took its rightful place in the same ranks with the rear of the Air Force and Navy, which were formed in the first period of the war. Subsequently, they were joined by the rear of the air defense forces and the Strategic Missile Forces.

In 1956, by decision of the Government, Glavvoentorg was transferred to the Ministry of Defense from the Ministry of Trade, which merged into the Home Front as the Main Directorate of Trade of the Moscow Region.

The period of completion of adaptation to the conditions of peaceful life and overcoming the inevitable spontaneity that accompanied it coincided with the coming to leadership of the Home Front by Marshal of the Soviet Union I.Kh. Bagramyan. Since the late 50s, research in the field of logistics theory has expanded widely. In 1964, the Operational Manual was published, and in 1965, the Military Logistics Manual. The chief of logistics again becomes the deputy commander (commander). The long-awaited event, conditioned by the logic of all previous transformations, is taking place - the concept of rear extends to the regimental (brigade) and battalion levels. In regiments (brigades) and battalions, the position of deputy commander of a regiment (brigade) or battalion for the rear is being introduced.

Peacetime, unlike wartime, bestows a certain impunity for reformist fantasies. And often certain innovations occur not out of necessity, not on the basis of scientific findings, but on a whim, under the pressure of subjective factors, sometimes as a result of interpersonal relationships. This is exactly how one can evaluate the withdrawal of the military communications and medical services from the Rear Services of the Armed Forces in 1992.

By and large, the military command and control bodies subordinate to the Chief of Logistics of the Armed Forces, as well as to any other Deputy Minister of Defense, can function independently in peacetime with varying degrees of success. Everything would be fine, but the return of any previously rejected organism takes time. Who can guarantee that it will be released? The Armed Forces must guarantee an immediate rebuff to any aggressor. That is why the governing bodies, to which the name of the rear authorities is assigned, require, among other things, unified leadership already in peacetime. Only their combination gives rise to quality that guarantees the reliability of logistics support. And disunity is like a blow, not from a fist, but from an outstretched hand.

The desire to recreate the previous structure, capable of solving the entire range of tasks related to logistics support for troops (forces) with acceptable quality, prompted the leadership of the Ministry of Defense in 1997 to decide to return the military medical service and the VOSO service to the Logistics System of the Armed Forces.

Unfortunately, the experience of the past is rarely taken into account. In 1991, the situation of forty years ago was repeated: the Chief of Logistics once again lost the status of Deputy Minister. The managerial distance between the Armed Forces Logistics and the Minister of Defense increased, although most significant logistical issues still required his decision. The efficiency of rear management, as well as its quality, have decreased, but the flow of documents, on the contrary, has increased sharply. It took three years to return the Chief of Logistics to direct subordination to the Minister of Defense and to the rank of his deputy - back to normal.

Today, the rear of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, being an integral part of the defense potential of the state and the link between the country’s economy and the troops directly consuming the products, is a well-coordinated, efficiently operating mechanism. It includes the Logistics Headquarters, 9 main and central directorates, 3 services, as well as command and control bodies, troops and organizations of central subordination, logistics structures of the branches and branches of the Armed Forces, military districts and fleets, associations, formations and military units.

Equipping with modern models of material and technical means allows rear structures to promptly and fully provide troops with everything they need when solving complex and important tasks related to maintaining the state’s defense capability at the proper level.

In recent years, the home front has worked steadily. All activities provided for by the Plan for the construction and development of the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for 2001 - 2005 and other documents have been completed.

Today, the Logistics of the Armed Forces, in the interests of the troops, solves a whole range of tasks, the main of which are: receiving supplies of logistics resources and equipment from the country’s economic complex, storing and providing them to troops (forces); planning and organization, together with transport ministries and departments, of preparation, operation, technical cover, restoration of communication routes and vehicles; transportation of all types of material resources; carrying out operational, supply and other types of military transportation, ensuring the basing of aviation and naval forces; technical support for troops (forces) in logistics services; organization and implementation of medical and evacuation, sanitary and anti-epidemic (preventive) measures, medical protection of personnel from weapons of mass destruction and adverse environmental factors, carrying out veterinary and sanitary measures and activities of the rear services for the NBC protection of troops (forces); monitoring the organization and state of fire protection and local defense of troops (forces), assessing the environmental situation in places of deployment of troops (forces), forecasting its development and monitoring the implementation of measures to protect personnel from environmentally harmful impacts of a natural and man-made nature; trade and household, housing and maintenance and financial support; protection and defense of communications and logistics facilities in the rear zones, organization of camps (reception centers) for prisoners of war (hostages), their accounting and provision; ensuring the exhumation, identification, burial and reburial of military personnel.

The main efforts of the Armed Forces Logistics are aimed at:

    ensuring combat and mobilization readiness, daily activities of troops (forces), as well as military reform measures of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

    implementation of the activities of the Transition Plan to an interdepartmental unified (linked) system of logistics support for the Armed Forces, other troops, military formations and bodies;

    implementation of measures to implement the concept of military development of the rear of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

    optimization of the food supply echelon system, accumulation and organization of complete storage of clothing, as well as continuation of work on loading fuel into the Transnefteproduct system;

    logistics support for the Joint Forces Forces (c) in the North Caucasus region, as well as formations and units of permanent readiness and peacekeeping forces;

    accumulation and delivery of material resources to the garrisons of the Far North, including military units and organizations of federal executive authorities;

    carrying out measures to ensure the safety of material assets.

In addition, there are such important tasks as basing aviation and naval forces; trade and consumer services for military personnel, members of their families and civilian personnel of the Armed Forces. Considerable attention is also paid to quality service for family holidays for military personnel using the existing material base of military tourism.

To solve these problems, the rear of the Armed Forces includes special troops (automobile, road, pipeline), formations and units of material support, medical formations, units and institutions, stationary bases and warehouses with appropriate supplies of material resources, transport commandant's offices, veterinary sanitary, repair, agricultural, trade and household and other institutions.

Whatever tasks the Armed Forces have faced throughout the history of the country, be it repelling enemy aggression during the harsh war years, in the post-war period - the creation of a nuclear missile shield, the entry of the fleet into the World Ocean, the strengthening of state borders, the actions of units in the so-called " hot spots" and peacekeeping operations - the logistics authorities, in close unity with the command, have always done and are doing everything in their power to ensure that the troops and naval forces have everything they need to complete their assigned tasks. After all, the overall result of combat operations and, ultimately, the lives of the fighters depend on how ready the rear services are to clearly perform their functions.

Ensuring the daily activities of the troops, the logistics structures of the RF Armed Forces must daily provide everything necessary not only to military personnel, but also to military equipment; provide life support to military garrisons and carry out a number of other activities in accordance with the assigned tasks.

Home Front Day of the Russian Armed Forces / Photo: Press service of the Russian Defense Ministry

Every year August 1st is celebrated Home Front Day of the Russian Armed Forces. This holiday was approved by Order of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation No. 225 of May 7, 1998.

The year 1700 is taken as the starting point for the history of the rear of the armed forces. Then, on February 18, Peter I signed the Decree “On the management of all grain reserves of military men to Okolnichy Yazykov, with the name for this part of General Provisions.”

The first independent supply body was established - the Provision Order, which was in charge of the supply of bread, cereals and grain fodder for the army. He carried out centralized food supply, which, as is known, is today one of the types of material support for troops.


On August 1, 1941, the actual self-determination of the rear of the armed forces took place - the rear was defined as an independent branch or branch of the armed forces.

On this day, Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin signed the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 0257 “On the organization of the Main Logistics Directorate of the Red Army...”, which united the headquarters of the Chief of Logistics, the VOSO Directorate, the Road Administration and the Inspectorate of the Chief of Logistics of the Red Army. The position of Chief of Logistics of the Red Army was introduced, to whom, in addition to the Main Logistics Directorate of the Red Army, “in all respects” the Main Quartermaster Directorate, Fuel Supply Directorate, Sanitary and Veterinary Directorates were also subordinated.

Bringing together the entire set of supply, medical and transport structures under one umbrella made it possible to establish the complex process of logistics support for the active army.

The position of chief of logistics was also introduced in fronts and armies. Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Lieutenant General of the Quartermaster Service A.V., was appointed head of the rear of the Red Army. Khrulev, his chief of staff was Major General of the Quartermaster Service P.V. Utkin. Bringing together the entire set of supply, medical and transport structures under one umbrella made it possible to establish the complex process of logistics support for the active army.

Today the rear of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, being an integral part of the state’s defense potential and a link between the country’s economy and directly the troops consuming manufactured products, is a well-coordinated and efficient mechanism.

It includes the logistics headquarters, 9 main and central directorates, 3 services, as well as command and control bodies, troops and organizations of central subordination, logistics structures of the branches and branches of the Armed Forces, military districts and fleets, associations, formations and military units.

On July 29, 2000, Russian President V. Putin signed a decree “On the 300th anniversary of the Logistics of the Armed Forces,” the text of which states: “Given the importance of logistical support for the army and navy, noting the military services to the Fatherland of veterans and personnel of the Logistics of the Armed Forces and in In connection with its 300th anniversary, I decree: Establish a memorable day - the 300th anniversary of the Logistics of the Armed Forces and celebrate it on August 1, 2000."

"VM", No. 1, 2000.

The rear of the Armed Forces: history and modernity

Colonel General V.I.ISAKOV, Chief of Logistics of the RF Armed Forces -

Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation

In 2000, the Logistics Service of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation celebrates its 300th anniversary. Strictly speaking, the home front existed long before 1700, officially considered the year of its founding. And that's why. Since ancient times, the word “rear” has meant the opposite side of something, the reverse side - i.e. what's behind. There is a face, and then there is behind-the-rear-ok, in Old Church Slavonic - in the rear, The side opposite to the front (front, face) - this is how the rear was understood in the old days. This, by the way, is how the current drill regulations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation define the rear side of the formation. But this is only one of the meanings. As military affairs developed, the rear began to be called not only a side, but also the entire territory lying outside the zone of actual military operations. Later, this concept also included administrative bodies, units and institutions located in the rear and, as a rule, performing supply and other auxiliary functions.

We are talking about the 300th anniversary of the Logistics of the Armed Forces based on our understanding of it as a system of forces and means intended for logistical support of troops. In other words, we mean not spatial-territorial, but structural and functional content. That is why the year 1700 was taken as the starting point for the history of the rear of the Armed Forces: then, on February 18, Peter I signed a decree “On the management of all grain reserves of the military people to the okolnichy Yazykov, with the name of him for this part of the general provisions.” The first independent supply body was established - the Provision Order, which was in charge of the supply of bread, cereals and grain fodder to the army. He carried out centralized food supply, which, as is known, is today one of the types of material support for troops. On the same day, by another decree, the autocrat established another order - Special, which later received the name Military (otherwise it was called Commissariat). He was in charge of the appropriations allocated for the armament of the troops, the monetary allowance of the army, and the supply of its uniforms and horses.

The regular army and navy created by the reformer tsar required further steps to centralize their supply, and in 1711, by decree of Peter I, supply bodies became part of the active army. In its field administration, a commissariat was formed that dealt with all types of supplies.

The structure of governing bodies that took shape at the beginning of the 18th century and the experience accumulated during the Northern War in supplying the active army were enshrined in the Military Regulations of 1716. Responsibility for providing the troops was assigned to the army commander (Field Marshal), and the direct management of its supply was assigned to the Kriegskomissar General, whose duties, in particular, were to supply the troops with money, clothing, provisions, weapons and horses. It is curious that vehicles were not the responsibility of the latter. The convoy in the army was subordinate to the General-Wagenmeister. The quartermaster general was in charge, who, along with transportation, also supervised the deployment of troops and hospitals. In fact, it was he who created the rear infrastructure of the field army, although he was not the organizer of material support.

The division of supply and transport powers at that time had its reason. If necessary, a convoy, for example, could turn into a kind of fortification and be used as a defensive line. However, if one commander determines the rear “disposition”, and the other - its supply content, this gives rise to a contradiction, which intensifies as military affairs develops and the rear organization becomes more complex.

In the overall supply system, food had the largest share. The army was fully provided with food from state reserves. By 1705, food warehouses had been opened in many cities. Products were delivered on carts or along rivers on plows (large boats). In addition to permanent (stationary) warehouses, temporary and mobile warehouses were also organized. The first were deployed by troops during stops for a short time. And the second, called stores, were ordered to have constant food supplies in the amount of monthly needs.

For example, the report of Admiral Apraksin dated March 11, 1711 will help you get an idea of ​​these prototypes of modern logistics brigades. He reported to Peter I about the organization of a camp store on 2609 carts, carrying 4160 quarters of crackers, 384 quarters of cereals, 1200 quarters of oats and 22,713 pounds of hay. If you count, it’s about 1300 tons! It is quite comparable to the carrying capacity of the airborne transport of a separate logistics battalion of a modern division.

It should be noted: many of the problems of today's home front have their roots in history. For example, in the Peter the Great era, provisions masters and commissars were not subordinate to the commanders of regiments and divisions, but only to higher commanders in their specialty; they served with the troops as representatives from the army, sometimes from the province.

After the death of Peter I in 1730, the Provisional Military Commission noted the insufficient supply of troops. Decisions followed that gave the regiments the right to accumulate funds allocated by the treasury. With “economic amounts” (money saved) it was possible to buy everything necessary - even horses. The certain autonomy of the military economy was beneficial to the state: its own property was preserved better than state-owned property. And what is not the “economic sum”, say, the current form 101, which receives funds from subsidiary plots, saving bread and ta. Obviously, the practice of extrabudgetary funds has a long history.

In the middle of the 18th century, up to half of the salary was deducted from a soldier for a uniform issued for wear. This is how the state stimulated the saving of clothing property. By the way, the fact that for a long time these issues were supervised by one official - the commissioner - is due precisely to their close relationship. The modern concept of clothing provision for military personnel serving under a contract is based on the same idea - compensation is due for supplies provided for by supply standards, but not received.

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of April 8, 1997 JNe 30S “On priority measures to prevent corruption and reduce budget expenses when organizing the procurement of products for government needs” introduced a competitive supply system for the Armed Forces. A logical step on the part of the state, which is transferring its economy to a market economy. However, how much effort and energy was required for the specialists of the rear services to adapt to the new requirements. However, they are not that new.

From time immemorial, private contractors have been involved in supplying the regular army of Russia. For example, since the mid-19th century, five methods of procuring material resources have been legalized: contract by auction, commercial, commission, cash purchase, as well as the release of money to the shelves for procurement “at their own expense.”

Contracting by auction was considered the most profitable. Moreover, every government contract, and this was officially recognized, had two goals: firstly, “the acquisition of items necessary for procurement at prices that are not burdensome for the treasury and harmless for private individuals” and, secondly, “the development of all industries private industry, opening the way for it to sell its products for the sustenance and supply of troops.”

Along with the conditions (conditions) of the auction, the Quartermaster Department set the “extreme price”. It was impossible to pay more. A minimum price was also determined, and it was also prohibited to buy cheaper than that. The instructions to the procurers indicated that the treasury should not pursue the lowest possible contract price, but always compare it with the minimum, beyond which the contractor's losses or dishonest fulfillment of obligations (bribery of contractors, etc.) are inevitable. In both cases, harm to government interests was seen, and therefore competition in contracts had to have certain limits.

Unfortunately, today not all decisions are made as carefully as before. Federal Law No. 97-FZ of May 6, 1999 “On tenders for placing orders for the supply of goods, performance of work, and provision of services for public needs,” adopted as a follow-up to Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 305, is aimed purely at maximizing the reduction of budget expenditures. And the interests of suppliers were sidelined. The terms of the competitions, determined by the Ministry of Economy, actually force them to lend to government needs. Someone else's "headache" is perhaps the least of which should worry the Ministry of Defense. But, unfortunately, it becomes ours, and above all in the situation with the purchase and supply of fuel and lubricants,

Competitions held in the first half of 1999 identified suppliers of only 30% of the volume of petroleum products needed by the Armed Forces - there were no more willing ones. The tough conditions have scared off oil companies. The situation was complicated by the fact that fuel, due to the difference in prices on the world and domestic markets, was in short supply. Then the government set mandatory targets for companies to supply petroleum products to the Ministry of Defense in the third and fourth quarters of 1999. But this measure, which suits us in principle, is not consistent with the current policy of a market economy.

The rear area received significant development in the first half of the 19th century. In 1802, the Ministry of War was formed in Russia, initially called the Ministry of Military Ground Forces. The first Minister of War was Infantry General S.K. Vyazmitinov, who previously headed the Commissariat Department. It was under him that in 1805 the Commissariat and Provision Departments were combined into one Quartermaster Department, which did not last long: contemporaries were unable to appreciate the importance of this body for centralized management of the material support of troops (however, in armies, corps and divisions, quartermasters were still retained) . The commissariat was given the main blame for the failures in the wars of 1807 with France and 1808-1809 with Sweden, although the entire military mechanism of the state was then stalled.

Since 1812, the War Ministry included seven independent departments, including Provisions, Commissariat and Medical. There has been significant progress in the field command and control of troops. According to the new regulation, called “Establishment for the management of a large army in the field,” control of the rear was entrusted to the army headquarters. He was obliged, with the participation of the relevant commanders, to develop plans to provide the army with weapons, ammunition, food, engineering and clothing equipment, salaries, plan the delivery of supply cargo, equip military roads and coordinate movement along them, organize medical support, place and move shops, art parks, hospitals. The headquarters as a control body, planning both the combat operations of the troops and their support, subordinated the entire rear to the interests of supply. The efficiency of the latter’s work was thus raised to a higher level.

And yet, issues of organizing the rear and organizing supplies were still divided - now between the quartermaster general and the chief of the General Staff, who were equally subordinate to the commander in chief. A notable innovation was the introduction of the post of general on duty, reporting to the Chief of the Army General Staff. This official, on the one hand, was in charge of both transport support and the army convoy; on the other hand, he was responsible for organizing the evacuation of the wounded and sick and providing them with medical care.

Half a century later, the idea of ​​the closest consolidation of supply agencies was continued by the outstanding Russian military reformer D.A. Milyutin. In 1864, the Commissariat and Provision departments were again united into one department - the Main Quartermaster Directorate of the War Ministry. Two years later, the Committee on the Movement of Troops by Railroads, which by that time had become quite widespread, was established. The convoy is being replaced by “quartermaster transport”.

The discovery of D. Milyutin and his associates was the organization of the rear of the active army during the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, which can be considered a true revolution in the theory and practice of military art. There were changes in the methods of warfare and the size of the army increased. Under these conditions, without “rear” unity of command, supply could not be effective. Then an extraordinary step was taken - the position of “chief of military communications of the army in the field and commander of the troops located in its rear” was introduced. The headquarters of the head of the department, the quartermaster, artillery, military medical, engineering and military medical departments in the rear of the army were subordinate to him. The rights and responsibilities of the new official were set out in the Temporary Regulations on the management of military communications of the active army and the troops located in its rear. It was First experience valid centralization rear management. The territory on which the troops “located in the rear” were stationed received the status of a military district. Its commander was essentially the chief of the rear of the active army. According to the 1890 regulation “On Field Command of Troops,” each active army was to be provided with “its own military district,” i.e. with your rear.

And yet, “rear” as a special term entered the military lexicon only during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. They began to distinguish between the “general” and the “nearest” rear. The first, in essence, is nothing more than the rear of the front, and the second is the rear of the army. The general rear received a kind of autonomy - independence from other officials. The chief commander of the rear of the Manchu armies was subordinate only to the commander-in-chief. He was in charge of the rear department, which, located in Harbin, had at its disposal various units and institutions that performed the functions of supply and evacuation.

It should be noted that initially the rear (in an understanding close to the current one) developed at the operational-strategic level. The increased number of services, units and institutions of the rear, the increased volume of tasks for moving cargo, personnel, wounded and sick people led to a qualitative change in the management system. The headquarters of the operational-strategic association could not process all the information. A new independent administrative body with its own apparatus, headed by

head of the rear. This new formation did not immediately become the sole organizer of providing support for the unification troops. At the front, these issues were also dealt with by other bodies and officials. The territorial component in many ways still prevailed over the functional one. The construction of military and operational rear services, even due to the multivariate solutions, could not proceed smoothly. Several armies that performed a common operational-strategic mission began to be called a front in the First World War. The management of its supply was carried out by the chief supply officer of the front armies. Reporting directly to the commander, he was essentially the head of the independent rear of the front.

Contrary to the Regulations on Field Command of Troops in Wartime dated July 16, 1914, the head of the VOSO department and the head of the front sanitary unit were removed from the Office of the Chief Supply Officer of the Front and reassigned directly to the Commander-in-Chief. Thus, the advantages and effectiveness of combining supply services, military communications and sanitary services in a single independent rear area in 1914-1918 were not realized.

It should be noted that after the October Revolution of 1917, the rear authorities were repeatedly reorganized. However, in the Red Army Logistics Regulations, the sections relating to military, army and front-line logistics also significantly diverged from the experience of the First World War. The organization of logistics and transportation was entrusted to the front headquarters, which was supposed to have a military communications department and a logistics department. Supply services reported directly to the front commander. At the Center there was even less coordination of their actions. The epiphany came in the very first weeks of the Great Patriotic War.

On June 30, 1941, Lieutenant General A.V. Khrulev reported in writing to the Chief of the General Staff, Army General G.K. Zhukov: “The matter of organizing rear services for the active army is in an extremely difficult situation. Neither I, as the Chief Quartermaster, nor the Logistics and Supply Directorate of the General Staff currently have any data on the provision of food and quartermaster equipment to the fronts... There is also no supply, since the Main Quartermaster Directorate does not have data on where and how much is needed and possible import." At the same time, he did not exaggerate the drama of the situation at all. Management of the supply of troops at the beginning of the war was indeed lost, as was the management of the troops themselves.

A transport conflict arose: operational and supply transportation - to the west, evacuation - from the west. Often what was sent to the troops was what they had evacuated. Counter cargo flows kept railways and roads under enormous tension. By mid-July, the unplanned and unsystematic dispatch of supply transports and the untimeliness of their unloading paralyzed many communications. At intermediate railway stations there were more than 450 trains that were actually abandoned without locomotives. Urgent radical measures were required.

The best minds of the commissariat, headed by A.V. Khrulev, having studied and analyzed the experience of organizing supplies for the Russian army in the First World War, the Red Army during the Civil War and in subsequent hostilities, prepared proposals for the reorganization of the rear of the Red Army. They became the basis for a draft resolution of the State Defense Committee on its organization. The project was immediately approved by I.V. Stalin. On August 1, 1941, he also signed order No. 0257 “On the organization of the Main Directorate of Logistics of the Red Army...”, which united the headquarters of the Chief of Logistics of the Spacecraft, the VOSO Directorate, the Highway Department and the Inspectorate of the Chief of Logistics of the Spacecraft.

The position of Chief of Logistics of the Red Army was established, to whom, in addition to the Main Directorate of Logistics of the spacecraft, “in all respects” the Main Quartermaster Directorate, the Fuel Supply Directorate, the Sanitary and Veterinary Directorates were subordinated. The position of chief of logistics was also introduced in fronts and armies. Bringing together the entire set of supply, medical and transport structures under one umbrella made it possible to establish the complex process of logistics support for the active army.

It is this historical fact, specifically “the merits of the personnel of the Logistics of the Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War” and further “effective activities in logistics support for combat training of troops and naval forces in peacetime” that formed the basis of the Order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation No. 225, by which Armed Forces Logistics Day was established, celebrated annually on August 1. On that day in 1941, the actual self-determination of the rear of the Armed Forces took place.

May 1942 marked a new step in the development of the rear of the Armed Forces. The organizational and planning departments of the fronts and armies were reorganized into rear control headquarters. The position of deputy commander for logistics was introduced in corps and divisions. On issues of general logistics organization, supply planning, transportation and evacuation, supply services began to report to the chief of logistics: artillery, armored vehicles, engineering, communications, chemical and others.

Changes continued in the future. Various bodies were in and out of the jurisdiction of the chief of logistics, for example, the Financial Directorate of the Spacecraft. Subordinate support structures were reorganized. The number varied. We had to fight for the integrity of the rear. Thus, in November 1944, the Fuel Supply Directorate was transferred to the subordination of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, which was returned to the rear structure only in 1946. Back in January 1943, the VOSO bodies were also reassigned to the General Staff. The supply began to “slip”, and the rash decision was urgently canceled.

The end of the Great Patriotic War did not stop the search for optimal forms of organizing the rear. In the late 40s - early 50s, the Chief of Logistics of the Armed Forces lost his status as Deputy Minister of Defense. The military communications and housing services came out of his subordination. The rear headquarters was disbanded. On its basis, the Directorate of Logistics Services arose, which returned to its headquarters quality only in 1953.

On the other hand, in 1947 the rear of the Airborne Forces was created. He took his rightful place in the same ranks with the rear of the Air Force and Navy, which were formed in the first period of the war. Subsequently, they were joined by the rear of the Air Defense Forces and the Strategic Missile Forces.

In 1956, by decision of the government, Glavvoentorg was transferred to the Ministry of Defense from the Ministry of Trade, which merged with the Rear Armed Forces as the Main Directorate of Trade of the Moscow Region.

Since the late 50s, research in the field of logistics theory has expanded widely. In 1964, the Operational Manual was published, and a year later - on military logistics. The chief of logistics again becomes the deputy commander (commander). The long-awaited event, conditioned by the logic of all previous transformations, is taking place - the concept of rear extends to the regimental (brigade) and battalion levels. In regiments (brigades) and battalions, the position of deputy commander of a regiment (brigade) or battalion for the rear is being introduced.

In peacetime, certain innovations, unfortunately, often occur not out of necessity, not on the basis of scientific conclusions, but on a whim or under the pressure of subjective factors, sometimes as a result of interpersonal relationships. This, perhaps, can explain the withdrawal of military communications and medical services from the Logistics of the Armed Forces in 1992.

Military command and control bodies subordinate to the Chief of Logistics of the Armed Forces, as well as to any other Deputy Minister of Defense, can function independently in peacetime. During the war period, their reunification is necessary, which, of course, will take time. Who can guarantee that it will be released? The Armed Forces must guarantee an immediate rebuff to any aggressor. That is why the control bodies, to which the name of the rear authorities is assigned, require, among other things, unified leadership already in peacetime,

The desire to recreate the previous structure, capable of performing a set of tasks for the logistics support of troops (forces) with acceptable quality, prompted the leadership of the Ministry of Defense in 1997 to decide to return the military medical service and the VOSO service to the Logistics System of the Armed Forces.

Today the Rear Services of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is a harmonious organism. It includes the headquarters of the Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, ten main and central directorates, three services, and the direction of personnel. Every year, about 8 million tons of fuel, food, clothing and other material resources are supplied to the troops, of which about 500 thousand are supplied to the garrisons of the Arctic and the Far North. Various types of transport transport almost 2 million people. More than 6 million military personnel, family members and military retirees receive medical care through the Ministry of Defense. At the same time, measures are being taken to reform the rear of the Armed Forces. Its structure is being improved and optimized, the adaptation of the logistics support system for troops to the conditions of a market economy is being completed, and a competitive mechanism for the procurement of material resources and the provision of services is being mastered.

In conclusion, I would like to dwell on the prospects for the construction of the Armed Forces Logistics and its structure. In accordance with the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation on military development for the period until 2005, approved by the President of the Russian Federation, on the agenda gradual transition e unified or linked system of logistics support for the Armed Forces Strength and other troops of the Russian Federation. The current autonomy of the supply process of law enforcement agencies results in an irrational division of expenses for defense needs and law enforcement activities even when performing the same type of functions, strategic costs in the combat and mobilization readiness of subordinate troops, etc. Isn’t it absurd, for example, dividing sick and wounded military personnel of different departments and demanding payment for treating “strangers”? Another example is the training of military logistics specialists, doctors, etc. The training programs of universities are of the same type, and they are trained in their own academies and schools, although the educational and material base of the Ministry of Defense makes it possible to train specialists from various departments.

In August 1999, work on creating a unified logistics support system moved to the level of making specific decisions on the basis of detailed joint scientific study, determining the final goal and assessing the results of integration, phased integration of functions and individual areas of activity of logistics services of various law enforcement ministries and departments. The Rear Front of the Armed Forces meets its 300th anniversary functionally prepared, capable of comprehensively ensuring the constant and mobilization readiness of troops (forces) and the fulfillment of their assigned tasks.

Archive PI, f. 10, op. 295, d. 001, l. 241.

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