USSR Navy (USSR Navy)- the navy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that existed from 1918 to 1992, created on the basis after the October Revolution. In 1918-1924 and 1937-1946 it was called Workers' and Peasants' Red Fleet (RKKF); in 1924-1937 and 1950-1953 - Naval Forces of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA Navy).
Creation of a fleet
The USSR Navy was created from the remnants of the Russian Imperial Navy, which was almost completely destroyed as a result of the October Revolution and the Civil War.
During the revolution, sailors left their ships en masse, and officers were partially repressed or killed, partially joined the White movement or resigned. Ship construction work was stopped.
The basis of the naval power of the Soviet fleet was supposed to be battleships of the "Soviet Union" class, and the construction of a modern fleet was one of the priorities of the USSR, but the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War prevented the implementation of these plans.
The Workers' and Peasants' Red Fleet took part in the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940, which was reduced mainly to artillery duels between Soviet ships and Finnish coastal fortifications.
World War II
In 1941, as a result of the attack of the Nazi German army on the Soviet Union, the army of the Soviet Union suffered huge losses, many sailors were transferred to the ground forces, and naval guns were removed from ships and turned into coastal ones. Sailors played a particularly important role on land in the battles for Odessa, Sevastopol, Stalingrad, Novorossiysk, Tuapse and Leningrad.
Submarine type M.
Composition of the Red Fleet in 1941
USSR Navy on the eve of the Great Patriotic War
By 1941, the Navy of the Soviet Union included the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific fleets.
In addition, it included the Danube, Pinsk, Caspian and Amur flotillas. The combat power of the fleet was determined by 3 battleships, 7 cruisers, 44 leaders and destroyers, 24 patrol ships, 130 submarines and more than 200 ships of various classes - gunboats, monitors, torpedo boats, auxiliary vessels... 1433 aircraft numbered naval aviation...
The forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet consisted of 2 battleships, 2 cruisers, 2 leaders, 17 destroyers, 4 minelayers, 71 submarines and more than 100 smaller ships - patrol boats, minesweepers, torpedo boats and others. The aviation assigned to the fleet consisted of 656 aircraft.
The Northern Fleet, formed in 1933, by 1941 had 8 destroyers, 7 patrol ships, 2 minesweepers, 14 submarine hunters, and a total of 15 submarines. The Fleet Air Force had 116 aircraft at its disposal, but half of them were obsolete seaplanes. There were 28 thousand 381 personnel on ships and in units of the fleet.
By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, a well-equipped fleet for that time had been created in the Black Sea, consisting of 1 battleship, 5 cruisers, 3 leaders and 14 destroyers, 47 submarines, 2 brigades of torpedo boats, several divisions of minesweepers, patrol and anti-submarine boats, and the naval air force. (over 600 aircraft) and strong coastal defense. The Black Sea Fleet included the Danube (until November 1941) and the Azov military flotilla, created in July 1941.
The Pacific Fleet included: 2 leaders of destroyers - "Baku" and "Tbilisi", 5 destroyers, 145 torpedo boats, 6 patrol ships, 5 minelayers, 18 minesweepers, 19 submarine hunters, 86 submarines, about 500 aircraft.
With such forces the fleet met the news of the beginning of the Second World War.
In August 1941, after the attack by the Nazis, 791 civilian ships and 251 border guard ships were “deported” to the Navy, having undergone appropriate re-equipment and armament. For the needs of the Red Banner Fleet, 228 coastal defense batteries, 218 anti-aircraft batteries and three armored trains were formed.
The Red Fleet in 1941 included:
- 7 cruisers (including 4 Kirov-class light cruisers)
- 59 destroyers (including 46 Gnevny and Storozhevoy-class ships)
- 22 patrol ships
- a number of smaller ships and vessels
Another 219 ships were under construction in varying degrees of completion, including 3 battleships, 2 heavy and 7 light cruisers, 45 destroyers and 91 submarines.
During the Second World War, the USA and Great Britain transferred ships, boats and vessels with a total displacement of 810,000 tons to the USSR under the Lend-Lease program.
Fleet operations
After the capture of Tallinn by the German army, the Baltic Fleet found itself blocked by minefields in Leningrad and Kronstadt. However, surface ships continued to play an important role in the defense of Leningrad - they actively participated in the air defense of the city and fired at German positions from main caliber guns. One example of the heroism of sailors is the actions of the battleship Marat, which continued to fight and fire from its main caliber guns until the end of the war, despite the fact that on September 23, 1941, as a result of an attack by German Ju-87 dive bombers, the ship was actually broken into pieces. two parts and was in a half-flooded state.
The submarines of the Baltic Fleet managed to break through the naval blockade and, despite the losses, they made a great contribution to the destruction of enemy sea communications in the Eastern European Theater of Operations.
Cold War
The military potential of the United States was already enormous by the mid-1940s. Their armed forces included 150 thousand different aircraft and the world's largest fleet, which had over 100 aircraft carriers alone. In April 1949, on the initiative of the United States, the military-political bloc North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created, after which two more blocs were organized - CENTO and SEATO. The goals of all these organizations were directed against socialist countries.
The international situation dictated the need to oppose the united forces of capitalist countries with the united power of socialist states. To this end, on May 14, 1955 in Warsaw, the heads of government of the socialist. countries signed a collective allied Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which went down in history as the Warsaw Pact.
Development of the USSR Navy after World War II
In the first post-war years, the Soviet government set the task of accelerating the development and renewal of the Navy. In the late 40s - early 50s, the fleet received a significant number of new and modern cruisers, destroyers, submarines, patrol ships, minesweepers, submarine hunters, torpedo boats, and pre-war ships were modernized.
At the same time, much attention was paid to improving the organization and increasing the level of combat training, taking into account the experience of the Great Patriotic War. Existing charters and training manuals were revised and new ones were developed, and to meet the increased personnel needs of the fleet, the network of naval educational institutions was expanded.
Equipment and weapons of the USSR Navy at the end of the 1980s
Aircraft carriers Riga and Tbilisi.
A. S. Pavlov provides the following data on the composition of the USSR Navy at the end of the 1980s: 64 nuclear and 15 diesel submarines with ballistic missiles, 79 submarines with cruise missiles (including 63 nuclear), 80 multi-purpose nuclear torpedo submarines (all data on submarines as of January 1, 1989), four aircraft-carrying ships, 96 cruisers, destroyers and missile frigates, 174 patrol and small anti-submarine ships, 623 boats and minesweepers, 107 landing ships and boats. A total of 1,380 warships (not counting auxiliary ships), 1,142 combat aircraft (all data on surface ships as of July 1, 1988).
As of 1991, the following were built at USSR shipbuilding enterprises: two aircraft carriers (including one nuclear-powered), 11 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, 18 multi-purpose nuclear submarines, seven diesel submarines, two missile cruisers (including one nuclear-powered), 10 destroyers and large anti-submarine ships, etc.
Organization
As of the end of the 1980s, the USSR Navy organizationally consisted of the following types of forces:
- underwater
- surface
- naval aviation
- coastal missile and artillery troops
- Marine Corps
The fleet also included special forces units and units, ships and vessels of the auxiliary fleet, as well as various services. The main headquarters of the USSR Navy was located in Moscow.
The USSR Navy included the following naval formations:
- Red Banner Northern Fleet
After the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, the USSR Navy was divided between the former Soviet republics. The main part of the fleet passed to Russia and on its basis the Navy of the Russian Federation was created.
Due to the ensuing economic crisis, a significant part of the fleet was scrapped.
Base points
In different years, the USSR Navy used foreign logistics support points (PMTO of the USSR Navy):
- Porkkala Udd, Finland (1944–1956);
- Vlora, Albania (1955-1962);
- Surabaya, Indonesia (1962);
- Berbera, Somalia (1964–1977);
- Nokra, Ethiopia (1977–1991);
- Victoria, Seychelles. (1984-1990);
- Cam Ranh, Vietnam (1979-2002)
And this is only a small part of the basing system of the Soviet fleet - the USSR Navy managed to “show up” in many other places:
- Naval Base (NAB) Cienfuegos and Naval Communications Center “Priboi” in El Gabriel, Cuba);
- Rostock, GDR;
- Split and Tivat, Yugoslavia;
- Swinoujscie, Poland;
- Hodeidah, Yemen;
- Alexandria and Marsa Matruh, Egypt;
- Tripoli and Tobruk, Libya;
- Luanda, Angola;
- Conakry, Guinea;
- Bizerte and Sfax, Tunisia;
- Tartus and Latakia, Syria;
- Marine Corps training ground on the island. Socotra in the Arabian Sea, Yemen.
In addition, the USSR Navy used listening stations in Poland (Swinoujscie), Germany (Rostock), Finland (Porkkala-Udd), Somalia (Berbera), Vietnam (Cam Ranh), Syria (Tartus), Yemen (Hodeidah), Ethiopia (Nokra), Egypt and Libya.
Prefix of ships and vessels
Ships and vessels that belonged to the USSR Navy did not have prefixes in their names.
Flags of ships and vessels
The naval flag of the USSR was a rectangular white panel with an aspect ratio of 2:3, with a narrow blue stripe along the lower edge. Above the blue stripe on the left side of the flag there was a red star, and on the right there was a red hammer and sickle. The flag was adopted on May 27, 1935 by resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1982/341 “On the naval flags of the USSR.”
Insignia
See also
Notes
Literature
- Ladinsky Yu. V. On the fairways of the Baltic. - Military Memoirs. - Moscow: Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense, 1973. - 160 p.
- Achkasov V. I., Basov A. V., Sumin A. I. et al. The combat path of the Soviet Navy. - Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988. - 607 p. - ISBN 5–203–00527–3
- Monakov M. S. Commander-in-Chief (Life and work of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S.G. Gorshkov). - M.: Kuchkovo Pole, 2008. - 704 p. - (Library of the Admirals Club). - 3500 copies. -
And the scientific secretary is Professor I.V. Kurchatov. The range of issues resolved by the commission covered the modernization of old and the creation of new warships, the search for ways to protect them from sea mines, and increasing the efficiency of naval artillery fire. The tactical and technical level of Soviet ships during the war years was generally at the level of world shipbuilding, however, the absence of a single research institute (RI) for military shipbuilding within the Navy had a negative impact on the quality and validity of technical specifications for the design of new ships. The most important area of activity of the Navy design bureaus in the Great Patriotic War was the adjustment of ship designs. A characteristic feature of this process was the desire of military leaders and ship designers to take into account in design work the experience of war at sea not only of the domestic fleet, but also of other fleets: England and the USA - against Nazi Germany in the Atlantic Ocean and the USA - against Japan in the Pacific Ocean.
During the design work, the role of various classes of ships was clarified, and the growing role of aviation, primarily ship-based, and submarines in naval warfare was taken into account. In the first period of the war, work was aimed at eliminating the shortcomings of ships that appeared during the fighting, the main of which were the low capabilities of repelling air raids, searching for and destroying detected submarines and combating mine danger. The lack of radar and sonar stations on ships reduced the ability to detect ships, submarines and aircraft, especially in bad weather and at night. The insufficient number of anti-aircraft guns and the lack of universal artillery mounts on ships did not ensure that attacks by enemy aircraft were repelled with the required effectiveness.
In accordance with the order of the People's Commissar of the Navy of February 28, 1942, work was carried out to additionally equip all classes of ships with anti-aircraft artillery installations and heavy machine guns. A serious contribution to increasing the air defense capabilities of ships was made by radar stations for detecting air and sea targets and gun guidance stations created during the war. Many ships, submarines and submarine hunters were equipped with Asdik sonar stations, received under Lend-Lease from England, and then with domestic ones of the Tamir type of various modifications. The ships were equipped with domestic radars such as RUS-1, RUS-2, "Redut" and "Pegmatit" for detecting air and sea targets, and SON-1, SON-2 and SON-3 stations for artillery fire control 241. The response to the widespread use by the Germans of non-contact - magnetic and acoustic mines was the use of a winding-free method for demagnetizing ship hulls, developed by Soviet scientists at the beginning of the war. Despite the halt in the construction of battleships and cruisers at the beginning of the war, design work to improve their combat and technical qualities continued. For the first two years of the war, TsKB-4 continued work on the battleship, on which the Navy command demanded that the 152 mm and 100 mm guns be replaced with twin 130 mm guns placed in the turrets, and other changes be made. However, later work on it was stopped due to the repurposing of TsKB-4 242. Based on the first experience of the war, proposals were formulated for adjusting the Project 30 destroyer, which were approved by the People's Commissar of the Navy on April 22, 1942. List of changes
of 170 points was aimed at strengthening the destroyer's hull, strengthening anti-aircraft weapons by replacing the 76-mm 39K turret with an 85-mm 92K turret with a fire control system, and installing six 37-mm machine guns. In addition, provision was made for the installation of radar and hydroacoustic stations. Due to the unavailability of five-tube torpedo tubes, three-tube ones were installed. In order to ensure the required stability, 120 tons of solid ballast were placed in the double-bottom space and side keels were installed. The first destroyer of Project 30 "Ognevoy" received the head system of torpedo firing control devices (PUTS) "Mina-30", its tests were carried out in 1943. It ensured the firing of torpedoes from two five-tube torpedo tubes 243. Additionally, the destroyer was equipped with an imported Asdik hydroacoustic station, and two bomb releasers were installed at the stern. The destroyer "Ognevoy" (project 30) was inferior in its characteristics to foreign ships, in particular the destroyer "Gearing" of the American Navy. On August 26, 1942, the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov approved the terms of reference for the design of a new Project 40 destroyer, a kind of continuation of the pre-war Project 35, which was not implemented at the beginning of the war.
In the assignment, although the standard displacement of the ship was increased compared to Project 30, research studies carried out by TsKB-17 showed that it was impossible to carry out all the work provided for in the technical assignment with this displacement. The Navy command in March 1944 agreed to increase the displacement of the Project 40 destroyer from 2700 to 3000 tons and reduce the speed from 40 to 36 knots, while three stabilized twin 130-mm installations were to be installed on the ship. The preliminary design, in the development of which the leading designers of TsKB-17, headed by chief engineer V.A. Nikitin, participated, confirmed the reality of fulfilling the technical specifications, but with an increase in the standard displacement to 3200 tons. The project was approved by Navy specialists, and in November 1944 approved by the People's Commissar of the Navy. This destroyer was considered by the Navy command as a promising ship for the Northern and Pacific fleets. The main modernizations of cruisers during the Great Patriotic War concerned the strengthening of anti-aircraft weapons. So, on the light cruiser “Red Crimea” in 1941–1942. 10x1 37-mm/67 70-K machine guns and 2x4 12.7-mm Vickers machine guns were installed. From the winter of 1941–1942 The light cruiser "Red Caucasus" began to be additionally armed with 37 mm/67 70-K machine guns. In April - May 1942, the ship was equipped with 2x2 100-mm/47 Minisini guns, removed from the lost cruiser Chervona Ukraine, 2x1 76-mm/55 34-K anti-aircraft guns (at the aft turret GK) and 6x1 20-mm/70 Oerlikon assault rifles received under Lend-Lease. Also in 1942, the ineffective M-4 mounts were replaced with 2x4 12.7 mm Vickers machine guns. Later, 37-mm 70-K 244 machine guns were placed in place of the Oerlikons. In 1944, radar stations for detecting air and surface targets (English types 281 and 291, American types X-SG), main fire control (English types 284 and 285) and anti-aircraft fire control (English types 282) were installed on the cruisers. During the war years, domestic ship artillery fire control (gun guidance) stations “Mars” and “Jupiter” were developed for light cruisers. In 1944, the Mars-1 artillery fire control radar was tested on the Molotov cruiser, which was put into service under the name Redan-1 245 . In addition, on the destroyers (projects 7 and 7-u) and leaders, stability was increased by laying solid ballast; reducing the rolling of ships by installing side keels; increasing supplies of provisions and fresh water; improvement of ship control and artillery and torpedo fire with modernization of bridges and wheelhouses; strengthening the insulation of residential and office premises 246. The command of the Navy and Fleet insisted on continuing work on battleships, and Project 24 was transferred to TsKB-17. Special Navy Commission headed by Vice Admiral
At the beginning of 1945, S.P. Stavitsky developed a new technical specification for the Project 24 battleship, which provided for an increase in air defense systems by installing 48x45 mm and 60x25 mm machine guns. The desire to maintain a maximum speed of 30 knots and a cruising range of up to 8 thousand miles at an economical speed required a standard displacement of 75 thousand tons.
Comparison of characteristics with US battleships under construction required an increase in speed to 33 knots and an increase in the caliber of anti-aircraft guns, which led to an increase in the standard displacement to 80 thousand tons. During the war years, TsNII-45 and the VMA continued research work on aircraft carriers, including studying data on foreign fleets. Aircraft carriers received the greatest development in the United States, whose Navy formulated the concept of aircraft carriers of three subclasses: heavy with up to 100 aircraft, light with up to 40, escort with up to 20–30. The terms of reference provided for the development of aircraft carrier designs for 30, 45 and 60 aircraft and with artillery with a caliber of 25 to 130 mm. According to the preliminary design project 72, developed by TsKB-17 in November 1944, an aircraft carrier for 30 aircraft with catapults and aerofinishers had a length of 272 m and a total displacement of 28,800 tons, which did not meet the requirements of the fleet. In 1945, the Navy concept of the need to create two types of aircraft carriers was worked out: a large one - for 60 aircraft and a small one - for 30, which was not implemented in the post-war period. The design of submarines was carried out by TsKB-18, which was led by the chief designer of most pre-war projects, chief engineer of the TsKB B. M. Malinin. The main attention, especially in the first half of the war, by the specialists of the Scientific and Technical Committee of the Navy and the designers of TsKB-18 was paid to the issues of modernization and elimination of deficiencies in submarines that appeared during wartime. A bubble-free torpedo firing system, tested before the war, was introduced on all submarines. Widespread work was carried out on depreciation of lighting fixtures and mechanisms. Before the war, submarines were armed with 53-38 and 53-38U torpedoes, developed in 1939. With the beginning of the war, 53-39 torpedoes with greater speed began to arrive from industry. Steam-gas torpedoes 53-38 and 53-39 were not inferior to the best examples of foreign torpedoes in their main indicators, and in terms of reliability, speed and range they had no equal. In addition, experimental work was carried out to enhance the combat power of conventional torpedo submarines with mines. Unmasking signs were the noise of submarines, the appearance of oily traces on the surface, and the sparking of exhaust from operating diesel engines when the boats moved on the surface.
Before the war, noise sources were not sufficiently studied; there were no methods for assessing them and no high-quality measurement tools. During the war years, a system of depreciation of machines and devices was introduced, including through foreign supplies of shock absorbers, low-noise propellers were created and periodic monitoring of the noise level of submarines was introduced. In 1942, an attempt was made to test the operation of engines under water using a pipe to exhaust gases and smoke, but this technology was not used. A winding-free system for submarine demagnetization was widely introduced on special stands. Noise reduction methods were developed and introduced by applying coatings (coating) to boat hulls. Since 1942, depth stabilizers "Sprut-1" and ultrasonic surveillance devices of the "Dragon-129" type began to be installed on submarines, making it possible to detect mines at a distance of 900–1300 m. The design of submarines during the war years was aimed primarily at solving current issues. During the defense of Sevastopol, the problem arose of supplying the city’s defenders with ammunition, fuel, and food by sea; surface transport required serious security during the transition and ships and transports suffered heavy losses. The idea of transporting goods under water arose, for which Project 605 of an underwater barge towed by a submarine was developed. Calculations and model tests revealed many problems that there was no time to solve, and this idea was abandoned.
The need to secretly lay minefields led to the modernization of Shch and M type submarines by installing special devices in the flimsy hulls for storing and laying mines at sea. Tests carried out in the summer of 1944 confirmed the required effectiveness. The boats had the ability to use torpedoes or mines, and be equipped with new hydroacoustic and radar stations and communications equipment. In 1944, the first domestic calculating and solving device (SRP) was put into service under the code TAS-L (torpedo firing machine - boat). At the end of 1944, they tried to use the latest steam-gas torpedoes of the 53-39 type from the K-51 submarine of the Baltic Fleet. Experience in designing submarines has shown that the technical specifications of Project 611 can be implemented only with a slight increase in displacement. After the end of the war and studying the German experience, the technical specifications for Project 611 were adjusted. Project 608 of the medium submarine, at the direction of the People's Commissar of the Navy, was redesigned.
The assignment was based on the technical characteristics of the German submarine U-250, although it, compared to Project 608, had lower underwater performance: a speed of 7.6 knots and a cruising range of 130 miles. During the war, minesweepers of projects 53 and 53-u had anti-aircraft weapons strengthened, hull strength increased, an electromagnetic trawl was installed, and other work was carried out 247. Project 73 of a minesweeper with two diesel engines and a full speed of 18.5 knots, developed by TsKB-32, received approval in January 1942. In August of the same year, the terms of reference for a new minesweeper were determined, which was to be equipped with new trawls of domestic and foreign production. Project 263 with a displacement of 675 tons was developed by TsKB-17 and approved on October 31, 1942, but it was impossible to master its construction in war conditions. Project 253 of the sea boat minesweeper, on the instructions of the fleet, was developed by TsKB-51 in Gorky in two versions - wooden and steel. The Navy Shipbuilding Department recommended the steel version of the boat as the most suitable for construction in the Baltic Sea in Leningrad.
After forced technological adjustments, the boat acquired a peculiar angular shape, which somewhat worsened its maneuverability. The minesweeper armament of the hundred-ton minesweeper, as the T-351 minesweeper was called, included a lightweight Schultz trawl, a boat paravan trawl, towed acoustic and boat electromagnetic KEMT-2 trawls. To use the KEMT-2 trawl, two minesweepers were required, since one did not have enough electricity. To eliminate this shortcoming, the design bureau of plant No. 189 carried out an adjustment to the project, during which an additional generator was installed, one of the three diesel engines was moved to the hold, which increased the survivability and stability of the minesweeper. They installed a gyrocompass, providing a chart room, and strengthened the anti-aircraft weapons by installing two 76 mm guns and two 12.7 mm machine guns. Displacement increased to 137 tons, but the loss of speed was insignificant. In 1942, a Project 123bis torpedo boat was created, on which a diesel engine and bulletproof armor were installed on the commander and gunner post. Boats of projects G-5 and 123 operated in the near sea zone. For remote areas of the Pacific and Northern fleets, boats with a cruising range of up to 1 thousand miles were required. Projects D-4, 163 and 158 of long-range torpedo boats were developed, but for various reasons they did not go into production. The NKVD OKB at plant No. 640 in Sosnovka developed the P-26 long-range torpedo boat project, which, by a joint decision of the People's Commissariats of the Navy and shipbuilding in July 1942, was approved as a single project for the creation of a long-range torpedo boat and small submarine hunters. In 1943, Project G-5 torpedo boats began to be equipped with 8-M-8 rocket launchers with 24 guides. According to the project specifications, 213 installations were placed on the boat's wheelhouse instead of a machine-gun turret. During the same period, the fleet began to receive the traceless electric torpedo ET-80 with a non-contact torpedo fuse NBC.
The lead boat OD-200 was tested in the Caspian Sea in October 1943 with positive results. On the OD-200 boat, instead of the 45-mm semi-automatic guns available on the MO-4 boat, a 37-mm automatic gun was installed, which increased its ability to repel attacks by enemy aircraft. The number of depth charges was increased from 8 to 12, combat posts for machine gunners were reserved, seaworthiness was increased, and automated course control equipment "Yantar-2" was installed. In addition, the commission recommended installing a 20-25 mm gun and an auxiliary motor on the bow, which was implemented on production boats. Work was underway to create a torpedo boat with a steam turbine unit with a direct-flow boiler of the Professor Ramzin system. Tests of the boilers revealed serious shortcomings in their circuit design solutions, which did not allow the work to be completed. The second direction is the creation of hovercraft. Under the leadership of chief designer V.I. Levkov, a preliminary design of 171 hovercraft torpedo boats was developed, approved on January 28, 1944.
The armored boats were intended to provide fire support to the Ground Forces in operations on the sea coast and rivers, and in the fight against ships and vessels near the coast and in skerries. The design of the Project 138 armored boat was led by TsKB-50. At the preliminary design stage, the use of both domestic and imported main engines 248 was considered. As a result, the option with one 1200 hp engine was chosen. With. and two diesel engines of 250 liters each. With. every. At the beginning of 1942, the design bureau of plant No. 194, on instructions from the Military Council of the Baltic Fleet, completed a preliminary design of a small marine monitor with reinforced armor and a gasoline engine. The characteristics of both projects were similar in basic characteristics, but for further work the monitor option was chosen. Further design was carried out by TsKB-4 (project 161). The preliminary design was approved in June 1942, and the technical design in September 1943. The head monitor was laid down in October 1942 at the Admiralty Plant. Particular attention in the project was paid to armoring the monitor; armor accounted for 37.3% of the weight load. The main characteristics of the Project 161 monitor were: total displacement of 157.8 tons, maximum speed of 13.1 knots, cruising range of 330 miles, two tank turrets with 76.2 mm guns, a 37 mm 70-K machine gun, DShK machine guns and two 82 -mm mortar. Two Packards were used as main engines.
This armored boat was called the “skerry monitor” 249. In October 1943, the Main Naval Staff issued technical specifications for the design of a new armored boat with weapons: two 76–85 mm cannons in single-gun turrets, two 20–25 mm machine guns in one mount, four heavy machine guns in two twin turrets. The armor was supposed to protect one part from a direct hit from 37 mm, the other from 20 mm shells, and part of the boat had no armor at all. Estimated speed is 12–13 knots, cruising range is at least 500 miles. Standard displacement is 130–150 tons. The development of the armored boat of Project 186 was entrusted to TsKB-32, and at the same time the design bureau of plant No. 194 was working on such a project. For further work, project 161u was chosen as more ready and in characteristics close to project 186, which the design bureau of plant No. 194 was entrusted with carrying out. operations in the Black Sea revealed the fact that the bot (a boat without standard weapons) was significantly flooded at seas of 3–4 points, aggravated by overloads of the bots. In 1944, TsKB-51 revised the design, which slightly increased the boat's seaworthiness. A new bot project was worked out, but its construction was not carried out during the war years. River armored boats of projects 1124 and 1125 received high praise from the crew during the war. Based on combat experience, M-8 rocket systems and mine devices were installed on some of these boats, an underwater exhaust was mounted, the main caliber artillery was replaced, the fire control system was modernized, smoke screens were installed, visibility from the wheelhouse was improved, and other work was performed 250 .
On the eve of 1944, the design of two types of armored boats with 76.2 mm guns in the turrets and four heavy machine guns on each, with increased armor protection of the hull and wheelhouse, began. Projects 190 and 191 were developed by TsKB-52. In parallel, the NKVD OKB at plant No. 340 in Zelenodolsk developed projects BKU-1 and BKU-2. The Navy supported the TsKB-52 projects, noting the positive qualities of the BKU-2, with the exception of its large displacement - 54 tons. In April 1944, the technical specifications were approved, and on April 30, the State Defense Committee ordered the armored boats to be equipped with 85-mm gun mounts. In general, the fleets received increasingly sophisticated weapons: mines, torpedoes, radar and hydroacoustic devices. The composition of the Northern Fleet was expanded most intensively.
For this purpose, some surface ships and submarines were relocated from the Baltic and Pacific fleets, the Caspian military flotilla by sea, along river canals and railways. Thus, the Northern Fleet, having received three submarines, two minesweepers, 32 torpedo and 62 anti-submarine boats during 1944, formed a new brigade of torpedo boats and a minesweeping brigade. The improvement of surface ships was achieved by increasing their speed, saturating them with weapons and limiting their displacement.
Domestic ships had a smaller side height and forecastle length, a smaller hull width and a larger length-to-width ratio, which determined seaworthiness. The main disadvantages for all types of ships were: insufficient anti-aircraft weapons, lack of protection against electromagnetic mines, the latest instruments (hydroacoustics, radar, fire control, etc.), insufficient cruising range compared to ships of other fleets of the corresponding classes, lack of depreciation of mechanisms, electrical equipment and devices, protection of electrical equipment from interference with radio reception, etc. The main directions for improving warships were: modernization work on existing ships, adjusting the designs of newly built ships, and testing new types of warships.
At the same time, the basis was the experience of the combat use of ships during the Great Patriotic War, as well as foreign military shipbuilding. As a result, anti-aircraft weapons were strengthened and modernized, the strength of ship hulls was increased as a whole or individual components, the protection of ships was strengthened (demagnetization, armor protection), armament with technical means of detection and communication (hydroacoustic equipment, radar, new radio equipment), depreciation of equipment, installation of anti-submarine weapons (“Asdik”, “Tamir”, depth charges), protection of electrical equipment from interference with radio reception. Thus, during the Great Patriotic War, after the heavy defeats of 1941 and 1942, the saturation of the Soviet troops with effective types of weapons and military equipment continuously increased. Small arms adapted to the conditions of close combat as much as possible, the created samples ensured high reliability and reliability, weight was reduced, and mobility increased.
The advanced technical solutions incorporated into domestic tanks optimally combined the requirements for combat power, security and mobility. The main directions of development of artillery weapons during the war were: increasing the power of artillery systems and ammunition, mobility and maneuverability, increasing the rate of fire and firing range, and the armor penetration of anti-tank artillery. New types of Soviet aircraft had improved flight performance, increased firepower, improved security and other qualities. The level of development of domestic science, technology, technology, the organization of development, production and supplies ensured the creation and equipping of the Red Army with weapons and military equipment that were not inferior in quality and efficiency, and in a number of characteristics were superior to the weapons and military equipment of the Wehrmacht. At the same time, Germany fully used the scientific, technical and production potential of almost all of continental Europe.
Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. In 12 volumes. T. 7. Economy and weapons
war. - M.: Kuchkovo pole, 2013. - 864 pp., 20 l. ill., ill.
The USSR Navy suffered fewer losses than the fleet of Nazi Germany, and this is a clear answer to the question: who fought better. ">
June 22 - Day of Remembrance and Sorrow - the day of the treacherous attack of Nazi Germany. The USSR Navy in the Great Patriotic War. The Great Patriotic War became the most difficult test for our people, country and, of course, for the Navy. They have been carefully preparing for this war for many years. Modern ships were put into operation, naval aviation was strengthened, coastal batteries were built, and logistics support was improved. A system for transferring fleets to increased levels of combat readiness was developed.
Nowadays one can often hear statements that the actions of the Soviet Navy in this war were of a secondary, auxiliary nature and were not marked by major victories. However, the facts completely refute these claims. The active actions of our fleets thwarted the fascists' attempts to block our communications. Northern convoys, transportation along the Northern Sea Route, the evacuation of the garrisons of Libau, Tallinn, Hanko, as well as the supply of Odessa, Sevastopol and Malaya Zemlya convincingly confirm this. The Nazis knew the combat capability of our fleet, and therefore refused attacks from the sea.
State of the Navy before the war
By the beginning of the war, the USSR Navy included about a thousand warships of various classes (including 3 battleships, 8 cruisers, 54 leaders and destroyers, 287 torpedo boats, 212 submarines), over 2.5 thousand naval aircraft and 260 batteries coastal defense. (Read about what torpedo boats of that time were like). During the hostilities, the Azov, White Sea, Volga, Dnieper, Ilmen, Ladoga, Onega and Peipus flotillas were formed. In general, the fleet was a powerful striking force, capable of significantly influencing the situation both at sea and in the coastal zone of ground forces operations.
Battle of Red Banner Baltic Fleet ships in the Irben Strait
From a painting by A.A. Efimova.
Thanks to this, our fleet was able not only to repel a surprise attack by the enemy, but also to begin decisive action from the very first days of the war. The four war years were filled with events of unprecedented drama and tension. Our fleets had to go through a very difficult first period of the war, when they had to defend their bases from land. More than 400 thousand sailors went to the land front to stop the enemy. Navy did everything possible to assist troops in coastal areas.
The most problematic issues in the activities of the Navy in the pre-war years were the low level of operational-tactical training of command personnel at all levels, as well as fire training of ships and aviation (this was clearly evident during). The main reason for this was mass repression, as a result of which the fleet lost about 3 thousand of its most competent and mature commanders. They were replaced by people who, as a rule, were not sufficiently prepared to perform new duties. Later this became one of the reasons for our losses and a number of unsuccessful operations.
A serious difficulty was also posed by the geographical isolation of the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets, which were not able to provide assistance to each other with ships. The situation was aggravated by the fact that a significant part of the Navy's forces (50% of torpedo boats, 45% of aviation, 40% of submarines, 30% of minesweepers) were located in the Far East. The enemy had the opportunity to create and strengthen groups of naval forces that were superior in quantity and quality to the Soviet fleets.
Navy in the initial period of the war
The war began with sudden attacks by fascist aviation on ships and bases in the Black and Baltic Seas, in the North, in the zones of the Danube and Pinsk flotillas. Thanks to the timely transfer of the fleet to full combat readiness, these attacks did not lead to losses in the naval personnel. The Navy entered the war in an organized manner and immediately began decisive combat operations in incredibly difficult conditions that arose due to the loss of a significant part of our basing system. Such activity and offensive impulse were characteristic of our fleet throughout the war.
The sailors fought with extreme strain in numerous combat clashes, attacks and landings, sometimes merging into multi-day and large operations. The sensitivity of our attacks is evidenced by the following data: Soviet sailors destroyed about 700 enemy vehicles with a total capacity of over one and a half million gross register tons and sank about 600 ships and auxiliary vessels. These were heavy, irreparable losses that undermined Germany's economic potential and also made it difficult to replenish and supply its troops by sea.
Battle of the steamship "Alexander Sibiryakov"
From a painting by P.P. Pavlinov “Polar “Varyag”.
In the initial period of the war, the Navy actively participated in the defense of naval bases and a number of coastal cities. Defense of Odessa - 73 days, Hanko - 164 days, Sevastopol held out for 250 days and, finally, Leningrad stood in the siege for 900 days! For comparison: the British naval base of Hong Kong defended itself for only one week. The initiative, activity and dedication of the sailors did not come without significant sacrifices. During the war, irretrievable losses of the fleet amounted to 154,771 people, including 10,729 officers. 150 large and about 700 other ships, boats and vessels, and about 5 thousand aircraft were lost.
Analysis of fleet combat losses
In terms of combat losses, the most unfavorable period for the Navy was the period 1941-1942, when we lost three times more ships than the enemy. This was the breakthrough of the blockade of the Gulf of Finland by submarines (7 submarines were killed) and the defense of Sevastopol (a cruiser was lost - read the article for details, four destroyers, two submarines and four large transports). The Azov flotilla lost many small ships during the evacuation of parts of the Crimean Front. The large losses of this period were explained by the failures of our ground forces and the dominance of German aviation in the air.
During offensive operations, the combat forces of the fleets attacked enemy communications, landed and supported landing forces, and transported troops and military equipment. As a result of this, our losses in warships in 1943 alone amounted to one third of all losses during the war. But losses in transports and auxiliary vessels have sharply decreased. In 1944 and 1945, enemy combat losses in ships significantly exceeded our losses. In general, we can say that the Navy's losses when solving defensive problems were incomparably higher than when solving offensive problems.
A comparative analysis of the losses of ships, transports and aircraft of the warring sides showed: the Soviet Navy suffered fewer losses than the fleet of Nazi Germany. This is a clear answer to the question: who fought better.
The main directions of the fleet's combat activities
Amphibious landings were one of the main and most active types of military operations of the Navy. In total, over 250 thousand people were landed in 120 amphibious assault forces. Up to 2 thousand warships and several thousand watercraft participated in supporting the landings. Despite the difficult conditions, 80% of the landings were successful. But there were also serious failures. The fate of many landings of the period 1941-1942 is tragic. This was explained by weak interaction with the ground forces, the inadequacy of the allocated forces for the landing missions, and the haste and low quality of their training.
From a painting by V.G. Puzyrkov "Chernomorets".
Activities of various naval forces
The experience of the Great Patriotic War showed that the fleet fought mainly with the “shore”. Traditionally, naval operations were only actions to protect or defeat convoys. More than 70% of the Navy's efforts were devoted to troop transport, coastal strikes, landings and mine warfare in the interests of coastal defense. Navy aviation took first place among the strike forces of the fleet. She accounts for 50% of all enemy transport losses. However, more than 70% of naval aviation sorties were carried out against ground targets, although air supremacy began to determine sea supremacy.
Submarines were used mainly to fight communications. Moreover, the effectiveness of their actions against merchant ships turned out to be much higher than against warships. In addition, submarines had a chilling effect on the enemy, who constantly felt the threat of attacks from under water. The Navy's cruisers and destroyers played an important role in the defense of coastal cities and bases in the early years of the war. Without them, it would be impossible to provide strategic transportation in the North.
The Marine Corps received significant development during the war. Its number in 1945 reached 40 thousand people, compared to several thousand in 1941. In all landings, the marines landed in the first throws and, after a difficult passage by sea, entered into battle with superior enemy forces. The decisive actions of the Marines in the first rush largely determined the success of the landing and the entire landing.
Conclusion
The Soviet Navy crushed the enemy's naval power in the Barents, Baltic and Black Seas, and also provided support for our troops in coastal areas. The Navy made a worthy contribution to achieving victory over Nazi Germany. But this was achieved at a huge cost. Eternal memory to the sailors who died on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War.
The following materials were used when writing this article:
- Gorshkov S.G. The naval power of the state. 1979
- Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet. 1978
- Red Banner Black Sea Fleet. 1979
- "In the fire of the Great Patriotic War." “Sea collection” No. 5, 1990
- Stalbo K. “The price of our victory.” “Sea collection” No. 5, 1991
And how do you, dear reader, evaluate the activities of the Soviet Navy during the Great Patriotic War in relation to the tasks it faced and in comparison with the activities of the fleets of Germany, the USA and Great Britain.
Share your opinion in the comments to this article. This will be interesting for everyone!
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